XENOPHON'S
MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES
WITH
ENGLISH NOTES, CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY, THE PROLEGOMENA OF KUHNER, WIGGERS' LIFE OF SOCRATES, ETC.

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TO THE

REV. GEORGE W. BETHUNE, D.D.,

THE AGILE THEOLOGIAN, THE ELOQUENT DIVINE, AND THE
GRACEFUL AND ACCOMPLISHED SCHOLAR,

THIS WORK

IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED,

TO ONE WHO TAKES PRIDE IN CLAIMING HIM AS AN EARLY
PUPIL, AND A STEADFAST FRIEND.
PREFACE.

Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates affords so excellent a course of reading for the younger students in our colleges, that its absence hitherto from the list of text-books is much to be regretted. The editor hopes that the labor which he has here bestowed upon the work may succeed in bringing it more into favor with both instructors and pupils, and in opening up to them a more familiar acquaintance with one of the most beautiful treatises of antiquity.

The text is substantially Kühner's, with such alterations, however, as appeared to the editor to be required by the interests of those for whose benefit the present work is intended. Thus, for instance, the punctuation has been entirely remodelled, and a change has been made from the German and more involved mode of pointing to one more closely analogous to our own. The decided advantage resulting from such an arrangement an experienced instructor will at once appreciate. Another deviation from Kühner consists in restoring to the text the Attic termination of the second person in ε, which rests on too sure grounds to be lightly rejected, even in prose. New readings have also been introduced wherever they seemed to bring out the meaning of the author more clearly, or to do away with some awkward and evidently erroneous construction. The great merit of the present text, however, consists in its being an
expurgated one. Every passage has either been rejected or essentially modified that in any way conflicted with our better and purer ideas of propriety and decorum, for even in the ethical treatises of the Greeks expressions and allusions will sometimes occur which it is our happier privilege to have been taught unsparingly to condemn. It is believed that the present is the only edition in which this most salutary rule has been followed, a circumstance which will not fail to recommend it to the notice of those instructors of youth who adhere strictly in this respect to the wise precept of the Roman satirist.

The notes appended to the present work contain the whole body of Kühner’s valuable commentary, with such additions as the editor was enabled to make, both from numerous other commentators, and also from his own resources. In clothing Kühner’s commentary in an English garb, the editor has been very materially aided by the excellent edition of the Memorabilia recently published by Dr. Hickie, and he begs leave here to return his acknowledgments for the valuable materials with which that work has supplied him. In order, however, to render the present edition still more complete than any of its predecessors, some important subsidiary matter has been appended to the volume, which will put the student into possession of the whole ground relative to the Life and Character of Socrates, and will enable him to form an unbiased opinion for himself. These addenda are as follows: 1. The Prolegomena of Kühner, as far as translated by Wheeler, of Trinity College, Dublin, and which have never before appeared in this country in an English dress. 2. The Life of Socrates, by Dr. Wiggers, translated from the German, and which appeared from the
London press in 1840. 3. Schleiermacher on the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher, translated from the German by the present Bishop of St. David's, and originally published in the Philological Museum. As the opinions of Wiggers on the character and nature of the philosophy of Socrates differ materially from those of Schleiermacher, Brandis, and Ritter, it was thought advisable by the English translator of the Life of Socrates to append this essay of Schleiermacher's to his work, and we have allowed the arrangement to remain undisturbed. To the Prolegomena of Kühner the editor has appended a note on the subject of the so-called demon of Socrates, in which the opinion of Lelut on this much-disputed point is referred to an opinion which, in all likelihood, contains the most rational view of the case.

The editor will now mention the principal works to which he is indebted for valuable aid in preparing the notes appended to the present volume.

1. Xenophonis de Socrate Commentarii. Recognovit et explanavit Raphael Kühner, &c.; Gotha, 1841, 8vo.
2. Xenophonis Memorabilia Socratis, ed. Schneider; Oxon., 1813. 8vo.
3. Xenophonis Memorabilia, ed. Weiske; Lips., 1802, 8vo.
5. Xenophonis Memorabilia, ed. Lange; Hal. Sax., 1806, 12mo.
6. Xenophonis Memorabilia, ed. Seyffert; Brandenb., 1844, 12mo.
9. Xenophontis Opera, ed. Dübner; Paris, 1833, 8vo.
10. Xenophontis Memorabilia, &c., ed. Hickie; Lond., 1847, 12mo.
11. Ruhnkenii Dictata in Memorabilia Xenophontis, MS. copy; 1756.
12. Xenophon's Vier Bücher Sokratischer Denkwürdigkeiten, von Johann Michael Hinze; Weimar, 1818, 12mo.
13. *Xenophon's Denkwürdigkeiten des Sokrates, von Mryer; Prenzau, 1831, 12mo.*


15 *Du Démon de Socrate, par F. Lelut; Paris, 1836.*


It remains but to add that, in preparing this volume for the press, the editor has been enabled, as on previous occasions, to secure the assistance and co-operation of his learned and very accurate friend, Professor Drisler, whose services in the cause of classical learning are known to and appreciated by all.

*Columbia College, August 30th, 1842.*
PROLEGOMENA.
I: Concerning the Design and Plan of the Following Books.

The design of Xenophon in these books is to defend Socrates, his beloved instructor, from the accusations of his prosecutors, and to prove that he had been a citizen most useful to individuals and to the state. That this defence might have the greater weight, he is not contented merely to review and refute the charges laid against Socrates, but, devoting merely the first two chapters of the first book to this part of his subject, he then introduces Socrates, and represents him disputing with his pupils, friends, and even sophists, upon the most important topics of morality, and that part of philosophy which treats of the reformation of human conduct.

If we except the commencement of the first book (chap. i., § 1 and 2), Xenophon rarely addresses his readers in his own person, and then only premises a few words to the discourses of Socrates, to inform us whence the discussion arose, and to render it more intelligible; or, at the close of a disputation, he briefly draws an inference with reference to the teaching or mode of life of Socrates. Hence, while we read these books, a living representation of the philosopher arises before us; for these discourses embrace a great variety of subjects, and are addressed to men of every class and station, and so graphically exhibit Socrates in the act of addressing individuals, as to show how aptly he suited and modelled his language to the condition or disposition of each. And hence we may clearly perceive the manifold powers of Socrates in discussion, his skill in addressing men of every class, his noble natural endowments, his life and character.

Xenophon does not profess to have taken down at the moment, and bequeathed to us, the very words of Socrates. If, however, we consider the diversified style of argument in these discussions on various subjects, we can hardly entertain a doubt that Xenophon has modelled his style and diction to the closest resemblance with the style and diction of his master. We may the more readily believe the language to be closely assimilated, if we consider how easily, from long intimacy and familiarity, Xenophon could invest his lan-
guage with a true Socratic coloring. Hence the mild and gente
tenor which pervades all the writings of Xenophon,\textsuperscript{1} that native and
ingrained simplicity, redolent with all the graces and beauties of
Atticism, while it entices the reader by its simple elegance, appears
admirably adapted to depict the amiable character of Socrates, his
candor, his insinuating affability in his conversation with his fellow-
men. To omit other points, one example will prove how admirably
Xenophon has adumbrated the peculiar character of his master. It
is well known that by the Greeks of old Socrates was called \emph{δ τιτων},
from that irony or dissimulation by which he appeared to grant all
they claimed to frivolous pretenders to philosophy, while he him-
self assumed the disguise of ignorance on all subjects; and this
artifice he used most skilfully for the express purpose of confound-
ing them at the close, and convincing them of their ignorance and
folly.\textsuperscript{2} In many passages, so elegantly and naively has Xenophon
represented this irony, that we can not entertain a doubt that it is
drawn from living nature.\textsuperscript{3} The extraordinary affection and sin-
cere love toward his master, manifested in these books, give them
a most pleasing and grateful charm.

II. \textsc{On the Arrangement of the Subjects in the Following Books.}

Although Socrates spent the entire period of his life in the study
of wisdom, and was the first to construct philosophy on firm and
solid foundations, yet he never studied to reduce his discoveries to
any art or system; but just as an occasion presented itself, he dis-
coursed on whatever tended to a proper course of life, to reform
character, and conduct to happiness; as, \textit{e. g.}, on piety, beauty, jus-
tice, temperance, fortitude, the body politic, the duties of a state
minister, the government of men, and, in fine, on all topics the
knowledge of which would render men honorable and excellent,
while ignorance of them would degrade men to a servile condition.\textsuperscript{4}
Hence, in the full glare of active life, and in the throng of men, he
was ever found scattering his words to persons of every condition,
illumining their minds with the light of his instruction, and guiding
them on the path which led to happiness; and so, we must not
think it strange that Xenophon did not arrange these discourses of
Socrates according to any similarity of argument or subject, or did
not form a scientific system from them. Those who have expect-

\textsuperscript{1} Compare Cic., \emph{de Orat.}, ii., 14, 58; Brut., xxxv., 132
\textsuperscript{2} Compare Cic., Brut., lxxxv., 292.
\textsuperscript{3} Compare l., 2, 34, \textit{seqq.}; iii., 6, 2, \textit{seqq.}; iv., 2.
\textsuperscript{4} Compare l., 1, 18.
ed to find such an arrangement or system in these books, were utterly ignorant of the method of teaching pursued by Socrates, and of the object of these books; for if Xenophon had systematized, according to the rigid rules of art, the precepts of Socrates, he would not only have deviated from the method of his master, but have left us only a meagre and imperfect picture of his mind, and broken down the whole vigor and power of his defence. Hence with entire freedom he has narrated the discussions of Socrates, and appears rather to have followed the chronological order of their delivery than the arrangement or connection of their subject matter; yet in the larger portion of the work it is not difficult to trace some slight attempt at regular arrangement; for the first two chapters of the first book are employed in a general defence of Socrates against the charges of his accusers; and then, in the following portion, the general defence is proven by particular instances. This chiefly consists of viva voce discussions between Socrates and his friends. The third chapter of the first book is closely connected with the preceding portion: it recalls the points asserted before, but in such a way as that when previously it was generally stated that Socrates worshipped the gods and was eager in the pursuit of virtue, now he explains the method in which he worshipped the gods; and his temperate mode of life, and freedom from passion are more fully shown. The fourth chapter, also, is not unaptly added, for therein he demonstrates the falsehood of the assertion of many, that Socrates indeed exhorted men to the pursuit of virtue, but did not guide them up to its consummation.

The subjects contained from chap. v., Book I., down to chap. i., Book II., follow each other without any attempt at arrangement. But from chap. ii., Book II., to chap. vii., Book III., it is clear that the discourses are linked together by a similarity of subject and thought.

For in (ii., 2) he treats of filial piety, in (3) of fraternal affection, then (4–10) on friendship, next (iii., 1–4) of the duties of a commander, next (5) how the Athenians might recover their former glory and prosperity, and finally (6–7) he treats of the right method to administer the state. The remaining portion of the third book has no connecting order.

In the fourth book, all from the first chapter to its close is most closely united and connected together. The design of all the discourses therein contained is plainly to show the extraordinary talent possessed by Socrates in judging of and managing the dispositions of the young, and to describe his plan of training them in self-
edge, piety toward God, justice, temperance, and other virtues pertaining to happiness of life.

The closing chapter of the fourth book is added as an epilogue, and proves that the death of Socrates was most glorious, most happy, and most dear in the sight of heaven. The whole concludes with a brief summary of the subjects treated of in the work.

III. The Precepts of Socrates Reduced to a System.

That the whole doctrine of Socrates may be placed in a clearer light, we must collect into one body the limbs, as it were, scattered throughout the book, and reduce all to some sort of system.

It is well known that the Moral Philosophy of the ancients was usually divided into three great heads.

I. Of the good, and highest good = de bonis, et de summō bonō.

II. Of virtue = de virtutibus.

III. Of duties = de officiis.

The good (bonum) is defined to be "that which is produced by the efficacy of virtue," and the highest good (summum bonum) is "the union of all goods which spring from virtue."

Virtue (virtus) is a constant and perpetual power of the mind, by which power good (bonum) is produced.

Duty (officium), finally, is the rule and standard to which, in the conduct of life, virtue should conform itself.1

A. And now we must first consider what is the nature of that which Socrates, as set forth by Xenophon, defines to be good (bonum).

The Good, which should be the object of man's pursuit, is the useful (ὠφελίμων, χρήσιμων, λυσίτελες, utile). The useful is defined to be the "end of action," or the result which we expect by action. Every thought and act of man should be useful, i. e., should have reference to some special end. Independently, then, and in itself, nothing is good, but only becomes such by special reference to its object. The same statement is made regarding the beautiful (pulchrum), iii., 8, 3, 6, 7, 10; iv., 6, 9. The highest end, for which man should strain his utmost, is happiness. The good, therefore, is that which is useful to aid us in obtaining that highest end, happiness of life. The good and the beautiful, therefore, differ not from the useful. Independently and of itself, nothing is useful, nothing is good, nothing is beautiful, but only becomes so by special reference to its end severally (iii., 8, 3, 6, 7, 10; iv., 6, 9). Whence

follows that what is useful to some may be prejudicial to others (i., 6, 8). The highest good (sumnum bonum) is happiness of life (εὐδαιμονία), but this happiness is not perceived by reason of external goods, or those presented by chance, but only by those goods which man has acquired for himself by toil, industry, exertion, and exercise of his natural powers, that is, by good and virtuous qualities. Happiness of life, therefore, and the exercise of virtuous qualities, are the same. The less one is dependent upon external things, the closer is his resemblance to the Deity (i., 10, 6). But, seeing that things which have relation to our happiness are not of themselves good, but, if availed of in an improper manner or at an improper time, may prove evils to us, we must take especial care lest we rashly confide in them, and must use the utmost anxiety, circumspection, prudence, and perseverance that we may use those things only so far as they may tend to increase, not to impede our happiness (iv., 2, 34). To obtain virtue, there is need for the exertion of all our powers; without toil we can not reach to her (i., 2, 57; iii., 9, 14). For happiness is not good luck (εὐτυχία), but good action (εὐπρεπία, actio bona). If one, though making no search, casually lights upon what he requires (τὰ δέοντα), that is good fortune (εὐτυχία); but if any one by diligent study and zealous care conducts affairs with good success, that is good action (εὐπρεπία) Those men are the best and most acceptable to Heaven who rightly perform their duty with success, whether it be as agriculturists, as physicians, or in state employments. They who perform nothing rightly are good for nothing, and rejected by the gods (iii., 9, 14, 15).

The goods by whose union the highest good (sumnum bonum), i.e., happiness, is obtained, are these:

1. Good health and bodily strength; for these contribute much to render our life praiseworthy, honorable, and useful to our country and its citizens. For health of frame is useful not only for all things which are performed by the body, but also for the right execution of all that is performed by the mind and intellect. We should, therefore, cultivate gymnastic exercises, as by these not only the body, but the mind itself is strengthened (iii., 12).

2. Sanity of mind, the power of thought and mental faculties (iii., 12, 6); but sanity of mind very much depends on sanity of body, wherefore, as we have seen above, care must be taken to insure good bodily health.

3. Arts and Sciences, which are most useful for living well and happily. But we must confine the extent of our studies in them
to that which will be practically useful in life. Speculations which spring beyond the sphere of daily life, on things mysterious and concealed from the eyes of men, are useless, and withdraw us from pursuits of other things which may be practically useful (iv., 7). Under this head is mentioned the science of Dialectics, or the art of examining concerning the good, useful, and beautiful, and other points tending to happiness of life, in such a way as to find out the essential properties of things, and then define and lucidly explain them (iv., 6). Whosoever has acquired clear notions of things, no matter in what sphere of life he may be placed, will always select the best course, and, consequently, will be the more fitted to transact affairs (iv., 5, 12). Arithmetic (so far as accounts, &c.), Geometry, and Astronomy are enumerated and limited (iv., 7). All arts, in fine, which have reference to the uses of life, are clearly to be referred to the head of goods. Those arts, indeed, peculiar to handicrafts (βαρυσίακα), are, according to the idea of the ancients, to be excluded from among goods, since they are practiced by those who are ignorant of the good, the beautiful, or the just (iv., 2, 22), and enfeeble both body and mind (Econ., iv., 2, seq.). Socrates appears to have classed among the goods the more refined arts, as Painting and Statuary (iii., 10), but has not expressly informed us of their relation to his test, utility. Yet, since he has maintained that nothing is beautiful but what is useful, we may infer that these arts also he encouraged from an idea of their utility.

4. Friendship is a good of the highest value. No good is more precious, lasting, or useful than a sincere friend. He regards the interests of his friend as if they were his own; he participates with him in prosperity or adversity, and provides for his safety and property as much as for his own, nay, even to a greater degree (ii., 4). The value of a friend should be estimated from the love and tender affection with which he clings to his fellow-friend, from his zeal, benevolence, and duty in deserving well of him. That friendship may be more lasting, we should endeavor to be esteemed of the highest value by our fellow-friend. Friends should be temperate, for men given to gluttony, wantonness, sleep, inactivity, luxury, or avarice, can be of no utility to us, nay, often prove a detriment. They should be faithful and ready to perform services, and push the interests of their friend (ii., 6, 1-5). Friendship can not exist, unless between the good and honorable; for they who are useless can never gain the useful as their friends (ii., 6, 14-16). And though, since good men often desire the same goods, and hence contention may arise among them, yet their innate virtue will ap-
pease and calm, beneath the influence of reason, those desires which have caused dissension (ii., 6, 19-28). Friendship arises from an admiration of virtue. This admiration inspires good will, and urges us to bind our friend closely to us by every kind of attention. Truth is the foundation of friendship, and hence the shortest, surest, and most honorable way to gain friendship is to endeavor really to be the character you would wish your friend to think you (ii., 6, 33-39).

5. Concord between Parents, Children, and Brothers, for these have been created by God, in order that they may give mutual aid (ii., 2, 3).

6. Civil Society, or the Republic, which, if well constituted, affords the greatest benefits to its citizens (iii., 7, 9). Accordingly, if any one be naturally endowed with talents fitted to govern and administer a state, it is his duty to apply his whole powers to the administration and amplification of his country (iii., 7).

B. Now follows his doctrine concerning Virtue. In order to gain those goods in which happiness consists, we must furnish our minds with virtue, i.e., with a constant and unceasing power of intellect, by which we obtain for ourselves all those goods on which happiness of life depends. In order that a more accurate idea of virtue might be presented to us, the ancient philosophers laid down certain primary parts of virtue, and these primary parts they called the "Cardinal Virtues." In general, four cardinal virtues are enumerated: Prudence (φρόνησις, Prudentia); Fortitude (Άνδριτα, Fortitudo); Justice (δικαιοσύνη, Justitia); and Temperance (σωφροσύνη, Temperantia). In these books, however, and also in the writings of Plato, Socrates fixes only three cardinal virtues; e.g., Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice. Prudence (φρόνησις or σοφία) he denied to be a peculiar virtue. If four virtues be enumerated, then the term virtue has a twofold application, seeing that Prudence is perceived by mental science, the others by action. Now the faculty of judging concerning the good and honorable (i.e., useful, according to his meaning), and of the evil and depraved (i.e., prejudicial), and of adopting the former and avoiding the latter, Socrates would not allow to be separated from action, but laid down that Prudence (σοφίαν) was identical with virtue in its widest sense. Accordingly, Prudence is not a singular species of virtue, but embraces all virtue (iii., 9, 4, 5), so that Fortitude, Justice, and Temperance are parts of it. The wise man (σοφός, sapiens) is he who thoroughly knows what is good and excellent (i.e., useful), and moulds his life

in strict accordance with this principle of good and excellent which is comprehended and grounded in his mind; for he who is wise i. e., who knows what is good and excellent, will always do what harmonizes with that good; for all things which are done virtuously, i. e., temperately, justly, and bravely, are excellent and good. On the other hand, all that is done in opposition to virtue is evil and disastrous. Since the wise man knows this, not only by his mental assent will he prefer what is good and excellent to what is evil and prejudicial, but also effect the former in action. On the contrary, the unwise, seeing that they know not what may be good, not only mentally prefer the evil and prejudicial to the excellent and useful, but even effect them in action; and even when they endeavor to prefer good to evil, they will err (i. e., easily they will fall into a wrong judgment in the distinction of good and evil) through ignorance. Therefore, he who knows the virtues will also practice them, but whosoever knows them not will not be able to practice them, even should he wish to do so. Since, therefore, all that is excellent is effected by virtue, it is clear that virtue is wisdom (iii., 9, 5). Theory and practice, accordingly, can not be severed. The conviction of the excellent influences us to suit our actions to it, and he who is devoid of this conviction is the fool (i., 1, 16; ii, 19; iv., 6, 10, seq.)

And now for the several parts of the division of Virtue.

a. Temperance (ἐγκράτεια, Temperantia) is called by Socrates “the foundation of virtue (ἀρετῆς κρατίς).” This virtue is perceived in the calming and curbing the appetites and desires, so that they be obedient to right reason, and not violate the settled convictions of the intellect (i., 5; ii., 1-7, and esp. iv., 5). Without it we can do nothing vigorously or strenuously (i., 5, 5); we can neither benefit ourselves or others, or be welcome in the society of our friends (i., 5, 1-3). If we be ensnared by the allurements of pleasure, or overcome by weariness of toil or difficulty, we will surely fail in our duty (ii., 1, 1-7). Temperance causes us to undertake all labors with a cheerful spirit, because we follow good and useful counsel, and expect that the most ample fruits will redound to us from these toils (ii., 1, 17-19). Effeminacy and pleasure oppose the health of the body, and prevent us from providing our minds with laudable knowledge. Zeal and energy carry us through to excellent and good results. Without labor and toil, nothing noble is granted to us by the gods. In short, we can not reach true happiness unless we be temperate (ii., 1, 19, seq.). Temperance should be, as it were the foundation of every action we undertake. He who ren-
ders himself suoservient to pleasure, makes nimsself subject to the heaviest slavery (iv., 5, 3-5). Intemperance, by depriving us of wisdom, and confounding the notions of good and evil, forces us to elect the evil instead of the good, and plunges us in every species of depravity (iv., 5, 6-7). Temperance, on the other hand, by placing our desires beneath the regulation of reason, and preserving sanity of mind, urges us, in every circumstance and phase of life, ever to elect the good, and therefore renders us fit for the transaction of important affairs (iv., 5, 7-12).

β. Fortitude (avôpia, Fortitudo) is the science by which we conduct ourselves with prudence and energy in alarming or dangerous affairs. They are not to be reckoned as brave who do not fear dangers from ignorance of them; for so, many insane and cowardly persons would be brave. Nor can they be considered brave who are cautious regarding things not to be feared. Those only are brave who know the nature of the danger, and in it act with constancy and energy (iv., 6, 10, 11).

γ. Justice (diKaiosûny, Justitia) is the knowledge of the laws in force among men, and which must be obeyed. But there are two species of laws, either the written or unwritten. Written laws are those which the body politic unanimously adopt for their common safety, concerning what men should do or avoid doing. From strict observance of these laws, many other important advantages are obtained by men, but what is more than all, Concord, the strongest bulwark and foundation of happiness, and the highest good not only to individual members of a state, but to the whole community. That state whose citizens render the greatest obedience to the law, is not only best constituted in peace, but is unconquerable in war (iv., 4, 10-18). But, seeing that these laws should provide for the safety of the state and its citizens, observance of them is not independently and of itself just, but only so when that safety is the object of obedience. Hence it happens that the same action, under different circumstances, or regarding different men, either by whom or against whom it may be done, can be both just or unjust (iv., 2, 13-19).

Unwritten Laws (êôê) are those given to man by the deities themselves, and which, in the same manner, are observed throughout the universe; for instance, to cherish parents, not to form marriages between the parent and child, to feel gratitude toward our benefactor, &c. That these laws are of divine origin is proved from this fact, that immediate and unavoidable punishment visits those who violate them (iv., 4, 19-24).
C. The Third Part of Moral Philosophy is concerning *duty* ("officium"). *Duty* is a law which must be followed by us in life's conduct; and this law should harmonize with the doctrine of the highest good. Since, then, in the doctrine of Socrates, the good is the same as the useful, it follows, that the law of duty should urge us in every proceeding to follow that line of conduct which may appear to be most useful. But since it often happens that, owing to the various nature of occasions, situations, or circumstances, the same thing may be in one case beneficial, in another prejudicial, we must use anxious care and circumspection as to what we should follow and what avoid. Thus, for instance, to speak falsehood, to deceive, to pilfer, to plunder, are forbidden by justice, yet often in war these are just, i. e., useful (iv., 2, 11-17). The chief heads of duty are thus briefly enumerated in ii., 1, 23: If you desire that the gods should be propitious to you, you must worship these gods; if to be loved by friends, these friends must be benefited; to be honored by your state, you must materially serve that state. If you desire the earth to yield an abundant produce, you must cultivate the earth; to be enriched by the produce of your herds, you must take diligent care of them; if you are anxious to increase your means by war, and to become able to liberate your friends and master your enemies, not only should you learn the arts of war, but also, by constant practice, learn how to use them. Finally, if you desire to be robust in body, your body must be under the direction of your intellect, and trained to endurance of toil and labor. In proportion as the goods of human life are fleeting and transitory (iv., 2, 34), so much the more should we endeavor to require as few auxiliaries as possible to life (i., 6, 10). But, since nothing is good independently and of itself, but all things uncertain and doubtful, very frequently the intellect of man does not clearly see what line of conduct it should pursue. But for this our feebleness and imbecility, a most sure and unerring aid is found in Divination. The beautiful order of the universe, the whole construction of the human frame, the noble and erect stature of man, the powers of his intellect, &c., all prove that the gods exist, that they keep together by their power the extended universe, and provide for the wants and requirements of mortals. With piety and purity, therefore, should the gods be worshipped; and if we faithfully do this, we may surely be persuaded that in mysterious or doubtful matters the gods will readily enlighten man (i., 4; iv., 3).
IV. **Whether the genuine doctrines of Socrates have been handed down to us by Xenophon.**

Having given a sketch of the whole moral doctrines of Socrates as represented by Xenophon, we now arrive at a question difficult of satisfactory elucidation, namely, whether this be really the genuine doctrine of Socrates, or be that of Xenophon himself attributed to his master. This question has been agitated, and discussed by many critics of former times, and in our own age has been treated of with great talent and learning by Louis Dissen,1 Fr. Schleiermacher,2 Ch. A. Brandis,3 H. Th. Röetscher,4 and lately by Carl Rossel.5 These writers have pursued severally a different line of criticism, yet all excepting Röetscher are unanimous in deciding that the genuine doctrines of Socrates have not been handed down to us in the writings of Xenophon.

Dissen, having proved that the whole doctrine of Socrates, as given by Xenophon, rests upon the sole basis of utility, hesitates not to assert that, so far from being the whole system of Socrates, it does not even pertain to it in any way, and should be judged altogether unworthy of that Socrates to whom Plato would have ascribed all his doctrines. He grants, indeed, that Socrates would not have disputed with such subtlety on Moral Philosophy as has been done by Plato; yet it can hardly be questioned that Socrates would have thought that honor (honestum) should be eagerly sought for and embraced, as being the sole source whence salvation could be found for the human race. How, then, does it happen that Xenophon has described the doctrine of his master thus, in this commentary? This question he thus answers: "Socrates was in the constant habit of holding discussions with men of every grade, and exciting them to fortitude, justice, and temperance. For this latter purpose he could propose no better inducement than by setting before them the emoluments to be thence derived. When Xenophon, whose talent lay not in investigating the more subtle questions of philosophy, heard these discourses, he described Socrates as to one part only of his teaching, that, namely, which at first view was pre-

5. Dissertatio de Philosophia Socrati. Götting., 1837

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sent to those whom nature formed for active business in life, not for calm speculation. He therefore has drawn a picture of a philosophy which measures all things by the standard of utility, seeing that he desired to represent Socrates as wholly averse to subtle and refined speculations, while his aim was to exhort all to a proper regulation of active life: a philosophy, however, whose system he did not clearly understand himself."

Schleiermacher also thinks that the true and correct view of the Socratic Philosophy is to be derived from the writings of Plato, not from those of Xenophon.

But since it is clearer than light that all the dogmas laid down in the dialogues of Plato have not proceeded from Socrates, Brandis adopts the authority of Aristotle as a text and standard by which to distinguish the doctrines of Socrates from those of Plato. Xenophon he considers not to have had capacity fitted to comprehend thoroughly the system of his master, and he utterly rejects his statement and authority.

Rosself examined anew the various tracts upon this subject, and arrived at the conclusion that not only should all which is stated by Aristotle, as the doctrines of Socrates, be considered as his, but also thinks that a much wider extent of subjects could be found in those passages where Plato endeavors to connect his close-drawn conclusions with the notions of his master. He judges of Xenophon even more harshly than Dissen.

Rœtscher, finally, endeavors to vindicate the faithfulness and authority of Xenophon in his statements regarding the doctrine of Socrates, and thinks that his commentaries form the purest and clearest source whence the genuine doctrine of Socrates can be drawn.

It is time, however, clearly to state what may be my own opinion regarding this subject. I acknowledge that at an earlier period of my life I was strongly in favor of that opinion regarding Xenophon's authority held by my preceptor Dissen, worthy as he was of my unceasing affection; but, the more frequent and careful has been my perusal of the Socratic books of Xenophon, the more I began to doubt the truth of the conclusions of Dissen and the others above stated; and at last was I convinced that they should be wholly rejected, and that the true and genuine doctrines of Socrates have been handed down to us by Xenophon alone. The writers above enumerated appear to me to have chiefly erred, because they did not examine the doctrine of Socrates as described by Xenophon, by itself and independently, but have compared it with the doctrines
attributed to Socrates by Plato, and endeavored to reduce it to conformity with them. The necessary result was, that the unadorned and inartificial simplicity of Socrates as described by Xenophon was at once overwhelmed by the richness and splendor of the philosopher described by Plato. As the former called down Philosophy from heaven to earth, and adapted her to the necessities and plans of every-day life, so the latter raised her from earth to heaven, and formed her by the divine images of all that is honorable, beautiful, or just.

And assuredly, if we should follow no other authority regarding Socrates save that of Xenophon, yet, if we weigh the matter with diligence, and unbiased by a preconceived opinion, we must needs confess that the deserts of Socrates as a philosopher are illustrious and immortal; for he first scrutinized the secret corners of the human heart, and keenly examined the nature of the mind, laid open the source of thought, and so reared the fabric of Philosophy upon a firmer and surer foundation. All the philosophers who taught before him were engaged upon the discovery of mysterious things, or matters wrapped in secrecy by Nature herself. From these physical investigations, which conduce in no respect to a happy life, Socrates led Philosophy to the examination of the soul of man and his life, and thus became the first teacher of all moral doctrine. Although the brilliancy of such a philosophy is eclipsed by the burring light of Plato's splendor, yet if we consider that it was the elder it is most worthy of our admiration; add, too, that by discovering the fount of human thought, Socrates scattered the frivolity and vanity, and broke down the authority of the Sophists, who placed the science of all things, not in thought or intellect, but fondly persuaded themselves that it existed in the senses, and endeavored to unsettle the minds of their fellow-citizens by an unmeaning jargon of empty words, and a wild confusion of ideas; add, too, that by the integrity of his life and the purity of his character, Socrates led the way for his countrymen on the path of righteous life, and by his most glorious death established the sincerity of his doctrine: if we embrace all this in thought, we will cease to wonder how that Socrates, such as he is described by Xenophon, could have obtained from all men such celebrity and fame; and even in the divine genius of Plato could excite such admiration, that he attributed all his discoveries to his glorious master, from whose lips he had caught the first principles of all true investigation.

1. Compare Cic., Academ., i. 4, 15 Tuse., v. 4, 10.
XXIV

PRLEGOMENA.

But to proceed to our immediate subject. The moral doctrine of the Xenophontean Socrates seeks in every action what may be its especial good. The moral doctrine of the Platonic Socrates, on the other hand, sets forward the highest good in the abstract ῥά ὁμοθύνον. i.e., the Deity. All that the human mind can reach which is good or beautiful, that, he asserts, is the most perfect exemplar of all virtue, which we should look to and follow all our life through. Who will assert that this doctrine is not most exalted and divine? but that it is Socratic I vehemently deny. Can any art or science be found which, at its very origin, sprung forth finished and perfect in all its parts? Nay, it is natural to the matter itself, that lie by whom the first foundation of Moral Philosophy was laid, should refer all science and all virtue to the standard of utility, i.e., to the test regarding the end of action; and should in every action seek what might be its particular good, i.e., what each thing may contribute to the obtaining of happiness of life, which happiness is life's highest end. Dissen, and the followers of his opinion regarding the Xenophontean Socrates, interpret that utility which Socrates shows should be followed in every action, as if it were perceived alone by certain advantages external to the action itself; but in this opinion they are wholly deceived; nay, that utility must be nothing else than the express end of action, or that which each looks to in action. Hence Socrates laid down that nothing can be good unless it be useful (ὡς ἀμομον), i.e., unless it be that which has a close connection with happiness of life, while this happiness is not placed in pleasure, but in virtues. And, accordingly, Socrates is said to have usually execrated those who first in thought severed the virtuous from the useful, united and coherent as these are by nature.

Besides what we have above stated as to the nature of the Moral Philosophy of Socrates, many other considerations exist against our calling in question the genuineness of the doctrine laid down by Xenophon.

And, first, Xenophon was a most attentive auditor of Socrates, and although less adapted by natural endowments for the more recondite disquisitions of philosophy, yet he excelled in so many brilliant characteristics of mind and talent, that among all the friends and companions of Socrates, none was more fitted rightly to catch the true spirit of his master's teaching and faithfully hand it down to us. We do not insist upon his candor, purity of character, stering judgment, his acquirements in literature, the gracefulness and

1. Plato, Alcib, 1, p. 116, C.
Elegance of his genius, his love of truth, and his whole life passed amid the bustling throng of men. Yet all these points wonderfully coincide with the disposition, character, and life of Socrates. If any other, Xenophon peculiarly should be called Socratic; for he had imbibed in his heart the whole principles of his master, so that not only do all his writings breathe the same Socratic spirit which we see stamped upon these commentaries, but his whole life is modelled and directed upon the principles of his precepts. Finally, from the very fact that Xenophon’s natural talent was not such as to influence him to amplify his master’s doctrine and enrich it with new discoveries, the strongest argument for his authenticity is derived. The fact is far otherwise in the case of Plato. The latter yielded not to Xenophon in love or admiration for his master, but from a certain divine exuberance of genius, an incredible acuteness of mind, an admirable faculty for conceiving imagery, born and formed, as it were, for the pursuit of the most recondite philosophy, he could not rest within the limits of his master’s teaching, or remain satisfied with his discoveries; but the first principles of philosophy received from him he amplified by the celestial magnificence of his mind, and elevated from the humility of actual life to his divine ideality. Neither the acuteness nor subtlety of the Platonic philosophy, nor the sublimity and majesty of his style, harmonize with the genius of Socrates, who daily conversed in the workshops and public streets, on virtue and vice, on good and evil. Of the whole system of Socrates (excepting a few of his axioms, such as that all virtue consists in knowledge), Plato appears to have adopted nothing else but his new and admirable mode of argument, by which he first acutely examined the principles of the human mind, and laid a secure foundation for thought. Nor are there any traces found in Plato from which we can certainly conclude that the true and genuine doctrine of Socrates is contained in his Dialogues. Nay, if with diligent study we read his Dialogues, we clearly see many doctrines in the progress of time to be gradually improved and at length perfected by Plato; and hence it is evident that Plato did not hand down a philosophy already completed and imparted to him by another, but wrote a system of philosophy wholly and peculiarly his own, proceeding in improvement as his age increased. A difficult and dangerous line of argument they appear to me to have adopted, who conclude, from the doctrine of a pupil, what the doctrine of the instructor should be, or be not, especially if the disposition, life,

and design of both were most different. On the other hand, Xenophon, in his Commentaries, desired not to act the part of a philosopher, but to support the character of a simple narrator, and in describing the life and teaching of his master, to defend him against the accusations of his enemies. He must, accordingly, have made it his highest care religiously to preserve historical accuracy in ail his statements. If we will cast an imputation of doubt upon Xenophon, we must confess that all the sources of ancient writers are impure, and the whole truth of antiquity is slippery ground.

It can not, indeed, be asserted that Xenophon has given the dialogues of Socrates in his express words unaltered, since that does not appear to have been his own intention, and in many places he states his desire to mention "what he had treasured up in memory," while he often relates discussions related to him by ear and eye witnesses. But it can not be questioned that Xenophon, enjoying the closest intimacy with his master, most diligently observed his whole life, and made himself fully acquainted with his mode of disputation, constantly reviving by memory and meditation his sentiments and arguments; nor is it at all unlikely that he set down briefly the heads of the discussions he heard from Socrates.

The very form and style of the Socratic sentiments in Xenophon are everywhere so moulded, that every portion presents the appearance of truth, and seems to be drawn from actual life. Moreover the same argument is frequently handled in different and separate discourses; and if these were united together, the subject would be completed with much more clearness and accuracy. Hence we may fairly conclude that Xenophon did not unite or compound his master's discussions at his own fancy, but wrote them down as he had heard them delivered, if not in the precise words, at least preserving the sentiments and arguments.

Finally, it is no slight proof of Xenophon's authenticity that he composed this commentary to defend the life and doctrine of his preceptor against the accusations of his adversaries. To this design, what could be more abhorrent than to draw up a set of discourses from mere fiction, language which Socrates had never uttered, and to publish facts and sentiments at variance with his philosophy, known, as it was, to so many persons? Xenophon himself, too, in express terms, tells us that he relates either what he heard with his own ears, or from the lips of others.

Unless we are inclined to believe that Xenophon was so poorly endowed by nature as to be unable to comprehend a philosophy not speculative and remote from daily life, but a popular system formed
and improved amid the throng of men; or so lost in reason as, by the corruption and alteration of his master's doctrine, not to see that he would enfeeble the whole power and force of his defence; or so guilty as not to blush to recommend falsehood for truth, and thus overturn all faith and accuracy of statement; or, finally, of so weak a mind as to prefer the petty reputation arising from a display of his own talent to the glorious fame of a faithful and veracious writer—unless we are inclined to lay down this, we must acknowledge that Xenophon has handed down the true and genuine doctrine of Socrates.

And yet so far am I from supposing that the entire and complete Philosophy of Socrates is contained in the writings of Xenophon, that I certainly believe much to have been delivered by Socrates to his pupils and followers which was unknown to Xenophon, or unconnected with the especial object of this book. Many subjects, also, which are here cursorily and briefly touched upon by Socrates, I believe to have been treated of more fully and accurately in other discourses. Yet I also believe, that, whatever may have been the nature of those discussions which are not contained in this commentary, they all closely harmonized with the doctrine of Socrates as it has been here set forth by Xenophon.

V. On the Daemon of Socrates.

In all ancient writings concerning Socrates, mention is constantly made of a daemon (δαίμόνιον), which was, as it were, his constant companion through life. Since not only in ancient times, but even in our own day,1 numerous and varied opinions, often far-fetched and portentous, have been propounded, we are called upon to declare what conclusion we have come to regarding it, from a diligent comparison of all those passages in Plato and Xenophon in which mention is made of the daemon, and also of a book specially written upon the subject by Plutarch.

And, first, we must remark, that the word δαίμονιον, in general, signifies the same as θείον, i. e., "divine," whatsoever proceeds from the gods. Thus, in Mem., i., 1, 9: "τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν τῶν τοιοῦτων οἰκείων εἰναι δαίμονιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἀνθρώπινης γνώμης," the word δαίμονιον is opposed to all that springs from the operation

of the human intellect. Hence τὸ δαίμονιον (with the article) has the same meaning as τὸ θεῖον, "the deity," "the divinity," as in Mem., i., 4, 2: λέξι . . . , ἂ ποτε αὐτοῦ ἴδονα περὶ τοῦ δαίμονίου μελετήσας. -10: οὖν τ. . . . ψευδώ τὸ δαίμονιον: and iv., 3, 14: ἄλλα μὲν καὶ ἄνθρώποιν γε ψυχήν, ἂ εἰπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἄνθρωπῶν, τοῦ θείου μετέχει, οτι μὲν βασιλεύει εἰν ἡμῖν, φανερῶν, ὡς τε ὁ θεὸς αὐτή. "A χρή κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλ' ἐκ τῶν γεγονότων τῆν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμενάνων τιμᾶν τὸ δαίμονιον (where it has evidently the same meaning as τὸ θεῖον above)." Hence, also, the plural form τὰ δαίμονια has usually the same meaning as ὁ θεὸς, as among the Germans, die Gottheiten for Göttenth us, in Mem., i., 1, 1: οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεὸν ς ὄν νομίζων, ἐπερά δὲ καὶνα δαίμονια εἰςφέρων: and similarly in numerous passages.

And, first, let us consider the passages in Xenophon relating to this subject. See Mem., i., 1, 2-5.

From that passage it clearly appears that the daemon (τὸ δαίμονιον) was a certain divine voice or intimation which Socrates mentally felt, and which either discouraged him from the performance of any act, or encouraged him in the performance of it. That this voice was divine, Socrates concluded, because it never deceived him, but always proved to be true. This certain truth regarding future things could proceed from nothing except a deity. Nor was the perception of this voice limited only to his own immediate concerns, but aided him in assisting others by his counsel. In fine, what auguries, oracles, and other external signs of the divine will were to the rest of men, his demon was to Socrates. Nor is there a less important passage in Mem., iv., 3, 12, 13, where, by many arguments, having proved that the gods take diligent concern for the human race, he gives, as the last proof of divine providence, the fact that the gods have granted divination to man, by which future events are discovered. To this Euthydemus replies, "To you, Socrates, the gods seem to be more benign than to other mortals, since, even though not interrogated by you, they signify beforehand what it is right you should do, and what not" (in which words Euthydemus alludes to the δαίμονιον of Socrates). To this Socrates replies: ὅτι δὲ γε ἡ λήπθη λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνῶσαι ἂν μὴ ἄναμένῃς, ἂς ἄν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἄλλ' ἐξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἠγα αὐτῶν ὁράντες ὀρέσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς. Ἐντοῦτε δὲ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ οἱ θεοὶ οὕτως ὑποθέκνουσιν, &c. From this passage, it is clear that Socrates
did not consider that the δαιμόνιον was given specially to himself alone, as a peculiar gift, by the Deity, but was common to him with other men. Other men, indeed, did not acknowledge this δαιμόνιον, simply because they had not faith in it, so as to be satisfied with perceiving its effects by their understanding, but wished to behold it bodily with their eyes. But, in order that this divine voice may be heard by us, we worship the gods with piety and sanctity. Akin to these passages are Mem., iv., 8, 1: Εἰ δὲ τις, οὗ φάσκοντας αὐτοῦ (τοῦ Σωκράτους) τὸ δαιμόνιον έκαστῷ προσημαίνειν ἃ τε δέοι καὶ ἢ μὴ δέοι πράττειν, ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος, οἵτινες αὐτῶν ἐλέγχεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου ψευδόμενον, ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον μὲν δὴ, &c.; where Xenophon endeavors to prove that they were deceived who thought, because Socrates was condemned to death and could not escape capital sentence, that therefore he had spoken falsely as regarded his δαιμόνιον, seeing that he asserted it to signify beforehand to him what he should do and what he should not. And Xenophon proves so by this argument, that the δαιμόνιον was right in allowing Socrates to be put to death, since by death, no evil, but, on the contrary, the highest good, was provided for him. Comp. § 5 and 6: 'Αλλὰ νῦν τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτοῦ (sc. Σωκράτην), ὥστε ἑρμόγενες, ἡδὴ μονὴ ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἡ νατικότητα τοῦ δαιμόνιου. Καὶ αὐτὸς (Ἑρμογένης ἔφη) εἰπεῖν: ἡμαστὰ λέγεις: τὸν δὲ Σωκράτην, Θαυμάζεις, φῶναι, εἰ τὰ θεῖα δοκεὶ βελτιὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτάν τῶν βίων ἡδῆ, where Socrates expressly says that the advice of the daemon was that which was pleasing to the divinity. Sentences to the same purport are found Apol., 4, 5, 12, 13, where Socrates calls his daemon "the voice of God," θεοῦ φωνῆν. The passages from Plato are as follows, Apol., p. 31, C. D.: ἡμεῖς ἐμοὶ πολλάκις ἀκροάσατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θείον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίνεται . . . . ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτ' ἵσταμεν ἵκ παιδός ἄρξαμεν, φωνὴ τις γεγομένη, ἥ, διὰν γένεται, ἄει ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, δὲ ἄν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ σοφοτε. Here we see that Plato agrees with Xenophon in explaining the power and meaning of this daemon, but disagrees in this, that while Xenophon, in many passages, asserts that Socrates was not only prevented by the daemon from undertaking any act, but also was urged to undertake others, Plato expressly declares that the daemon had only a dissuasive power, never a persuasive. Nor less clearly is the latter's opinion stated in many places, e. g., Theag., p. 128, D.: ἐστί γὰρ τι θεία μορφα παρεπόμεναι.
PROLEGOMENA.

Alcibiades, we infer, distributed explanatory silent encouragement, referred, moved imparted, is comprehended by the nearest oropinquity of Deity, which was inferred from its silence. If this voice, whenever it was heard by Socrates, was a sign of discouragement, it follows, of necessity, that as often as the voice was silent, its silence was a sign of encouragement and exhortation. In the Apology, also, p. 40, A., B., C., it is clear that Socrates took the silence of the daemon as a sign of assent. And in Phaedr., 242, B., C.: ἡνίκ' εμελλον.... τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰσώδες σημεῖον οἰοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο; ἢ ἵνα ἔτσι ἐπίσης ὅ ὧν μέλλων πράττειν, where the words καὶ τὸ εἰσώδες σημεῖον are added as explanatory, "The Daemon," i. e., that well-known sign. Besides the above passages, we may also compare Euthyphr., p. 3, B.; Theages., p. 151, A.; Polit., vi, p. 496, C.; Alcib. i., p. 103, A., B., p. 124, C. Those passages in the Theages, a dialogue unjustly attributed to Plato, differ from those in Xenophon and Plato, because in them such power and efficacy is attributed to the Socratic daemon as that they who experienced the intimacy of Socrates, although they had embraced none of his doctrine, by his mere presence and oropinquity advanced in virtue; yet not all, but only those whom the Deity willed should (ἐὰν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ἤ). This idea of the Socratic daemon approaches nearest to that invented at a later period, and which attributed to Socrates a sort of tutelary spirit or genius.

In Plutarch (De Socratis Genio) many statements are made, partly strange, partly ridiculous, but yet some sentiments here and there interspersed are admirable. In chap. x., Theocritus says, "that the daemon was given by God to Socrates as his guide in life, to afford him light on obscure points, and knowledge in things not comprehended by human intellect, and to inspire his counsels by a certain divine spirit (ἐπιθεωμένον ταῖς αὐτοῦ προαρέσεαι)." But what is afterward related of the power of this daemon is ridiculous; e. g., "Socrates wished once, with some of his friends, to enter the house of Andocides, but suddenly stopped in his way, being warned by his daemon. Having meditated in silence for a time, he then proceeded to his destination, not by the straight course, but by another..."
route. Many of his friends follow him, but some, desirous of proving the demon of Socrates to be false, go by the straight course; as these latter proceeded, a herd of swine, covered with filth, meets them; and, since they had no way to avoid their path, the swine overthrow some, and cover others with filth." Although this is a ridiculous and jocular anecdote, and the matter, if true, is rather to be attributed to chance than to the effect of the demon, it is intended to prove that the demon warned Socrates not only in matters of great, but even in those of little importance; which Plato also asserts in the passage cited above, Apol., p. 40, chap. x. Plutarch agrees with Xenophon in attributing to the demon both a persuasive and dissuasive force (δαμόνιον εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἢ κελεύον). And then, having opposed the opinion of a certain Megarean, who thought the demon of Socrates to be "a sneeze," he thus proceeds: Αἱ δὲ Σωκράτους αὖ ὅρμαι τὸ βέβαιον ἔχονται καὶ σφοδρότατα φαίνονται πρὸς ἄπαν, ὡς ἂν ἔξ ὀρθῆς καὶ ἵσχυρᾶς ἀφεμέναι κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς, τὸ σῶμα Socrates and his death is not that ἄνδρος ἐκ κληρονομιῶν ἢ παραμῶν μεταβαλλομένην, ὅτε τώχω, γνώμην ἔχοντος, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ οἰείσθεν ἐπιστασίαν καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀγομένου πρὸς τὸ καλὸν. But, omitting other passages which do not tend to explain the matter, we proceed to one of considerable importance (chap. xx.):

(Συμμίας) Σωκράτην μὲν ἕφη περὶ τούτων ἐρώμενος ποτὲ μὴ τυχεῖν ἀποκρίσεως, διὸ μηδ' αὕτης ἐρέσθαι· πολλάκις δ' αὐτῷ παραγενέσθαι τοὺς μὲν δι' ὅψεως ἐντυχεῖν θείῳ τινὶ λέγοντας ἀλαζόνας ἡγομένης, τοῖς δ' ἀκούσαι τινος φωνῆς φάσκοντας προφέροντι τὸν νόον καὶ διαπιστῶν μὲν ὑπὸ σπουδῆς· ὅθεν ἤμιν παρίστατο, σκοπούμενος ίδία πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὑπονοεῖν, μὴ ποτὲ τὸ Σωκράτους δαμόνιον οὐκ ὑπήρξε, ἀλλὰ φωνῆς τινος αἰσθησίς, ἡ λόγων νόησις εἰς, συνυπόπτος ἀτόπῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερ καθ' ὑπόν οὐκ ἔστι φωνῆ, λόγων δὲ τινῶν δόξας καὶ νοῆσεις λαμβάνοντες, οίνοιτα φθεγγομένων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ὡς ἑληθῶς οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη σύνεσις γίνεται, δι' ἡσυχίαν καὶ γαλήνην τοῦ σώματος, ὅταν καθεύδωσι· μόλις ἐπίκους ἔχουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν κρειττῶν· καὶ πεπνυμένοι γε θορύβῳ τῶν παθῶν καὶ περιαγωγῇ τῶν χρείων εἰσακούσαι καὶ παρασχεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐ δύνανται τοὺς ὑλομένους. Σωκράτει δὲ ὁ νοῦς καθαρὸς ὃν καὶ ἀπάθης τῷ σώματι μικρὰ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων χάριν καταμιγνύσαντον, εὐαφὴς ἦν καὶ ληπτὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ προσπεσύνοντος ἄξιος μεταβάλει· τὸ δὲ προσπίπτον οὐ φθόγγον, ἀλλὰ λόγον ἄν τις εἰκάσει δαμόνος, ἀνεν φωνῆς ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτῷ τῷ ῥή- λομένῳ τῇ νοοῦντος.

Nor must we pass over in silence Cicero's opinion regarding the same daemon: "Ut igitur," he proceeds, "qui so tradet ita quieti, præparata aximo quum bonis cogitationibus, tum rebus ad tranquil
litatem accommodatis, certa et vera cernit in somnis: sic castus sensus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum et ad avium reliquorum-que signorum et ad extorum veritatem est parator. 

Hoc nimirum est illud, quod de Socrate sape dicitur, esse divinum quiddam, quod ἐνμονον appellant, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, saepe revocanti."

It remains now, from a comparison of these passages, briefly to state our own opinion regarding this point.

From all that has been cited above, it appears most clearly that the daemon was not considered to have any external form or appearance, nor to have been any thing externally perceptible by the senses, but to have been a more intense emotion of the mind, which Socrates called ἐνμονον, from a persuasion that that emotion arose within him from the Deity. It is called, indeed, a divine voice, but we must understand by this a voice not heard by the bodily ears, but mentally perceived. This divine voice, which from his boyhood, as Plato states, was the lot of Socrates, and never left him during his whole life, was always heard by him as often as he was about to do any thing neither rightly nor honorably: its silence he considered to be a sign of approbation; and so this daemon is thought by Xenophon to have had both a persuasive and dissuasive power. Not only in matters pertaining to Socrates alone, but also in those of others, in subjects of great or little importance, this voice was heard in warning; it never deceived, but always spoke the truth; and hence Socrates was convinced of its divinity. Nor did Socrates consider that divine voice to be any peculiar benefit given by God to himself alone, but to be shared also with other men: that its power could be mentally perceived by all men who worship the gods with piety and truth, and are pure and chaste. Hence it is clear that this daemon was naught else than an emotion of the mind, by which Socrates was dissuaded from his design of performing any thing; an emotion common, indeed, to all other men, but not having the same efficacy in all, but in proportion to the purity and integrity of each, in proportion to his acuteness and vigor of intellect, to his upright thoughts and chastity of character, so the more vivid and efficacious. It should not be wondered at that this emotion of an interior power in the majority of men should be so triiling and powerless as not to be perceived at all, while in Socrates it was most vigorous and impulsive; for Socrates was imbued with the most delicate sense of honor, rare purity of character, heartfelt piety toward God, and a firm persuasion of his providential care. Endowed, moreover, with a wonderful acuteness of intellect, vigor
of mind, and clearness of judgment, he investigated the whole natur of the human mind, and paid the closest attention to its emotions. But this \( \delta \alpha \mu \o \nu \o m \) did not shed its light alike on all subjects but only on those which could not be embraced within the scope of human thought; for, since reason was given by God to the human race, Socrates considered it impious to strive after divine forewarnings in all things which man could discover by the exertion of the intellect alone.

NOTE BY THE AMERICAN EDITOR.

A new theory was started in 1836 by a French physician, Lelut in relation to the daemon of Socrates, which is not noticed by Kühner, but would seem, nevertheless, to contain the only rational exposition of this much-contested question. Lelut ranks the belief which Socrates entertained respecting a divine and secret monitor under the head of mental hallucination, and maintains that the philosopher, under the influence of an active mental organization and ardent imaginative powers, gradually worked himself into this belief of an internal monitor, although perfectly sound in mind on every other point. In other words, it was simply and plainly monomania. Lelut's official experience in the treatment of cases involving a greater or less degree of mental aberration, renders his remarks on this head peculiarly valuable. To a German scholar, wrapped in the transcendental speculations of his country's philosophy, and seeking and finding the mysterious everywhere, the theory of Lelut has little, if any, thing, to recommend it; but to one accustomed to come into daily contact with his fellow-men, and observe the various eccentricities and weaknesses in which even the strongest minds are prone to indulge (and oftentimes, the stronger the intellect, the more startling the hallucination), the view of the French physician will appear an extremely plausible one. The title of his work is as follows: "Du Démon de Socrate, Specimen d'une application de la Science Psychologique a celle de l'histoire. Par F. Lelut, Médecin surveillant de la Division des Aliénés de l'Hospice de Bicêtre, et Médecin adjoint de la Prison." Paris, 1836.
XENOPHONTIS
MEMORABILIA
SOCRATIS.
XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA
OF
SOCRATES.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

SUMMARY.

The two charges brought against Socrates by his accusers, and for which he suffered death, are first stated. These were, 1. His not regarding, as such, the gods recognized by the state, but introducing ἑτέρα καὶ νὰ δαυῤῥων; and, 2. His corrupting of the young. (§ 1.)

Xenophon proceeds to defend his master's memory against these charges, as follows:

1. Socrates did not slight the gods of his country, but often sacrificed to them, both at home and on the public altars. (§ 2.)

2. Neither did he make any secret of his use of divination. (§ 2.)

3. As to his saying, indeed, that he was accustomed to receive certain intimations from an internal something, which he called τὸ δαυῤῥων, he did not, even as regarded this, differ essentially from the rest of his countrymen, for they themselves, when making use of auguries, and omens, and other things of this kind, did not suppose that these things knew what was good for them, but that the gods by their means gave intimations of the future. (§ 3.)

4. In one respect, however, he certainly did differ from the great body of his countrymen; for whereas the greater part of those who practice divination say that they are influenced in their actions by the flight of birds, or some other accidental occurrence, Socrates, on the contrary, said, openly and without reserve, that he received his intimations, not externally, from birds and other objects, but internally, from what he called τὸ δαυῤῥων; and he gave advice, also, to many of his friends and followers in accordance with the suggestions of this same δαυῥων. (§ 4.) Now he would never, surely, have done this in the case of his friends and followers, had he not been sincere in his convictions with regard to these internal suggestions; and if sincere respecting these, how could he disbelieve the existence of gods? (§ 5.)

5. Again, as regarded the necessary affairs of life, Socrates always advised his friends to perform these in the best manner they were able.
with respect, however, to those matters the event whereof was doubtful, he always sent them to consult the gods whether these ought to be undertaken or not; whereas he thought it a kind of impiety to endeavor to ascertain from the gods what can be satisfactorily mastered by the powers of the human intellect. (§ 6–9.)

6. Still farther, though Socrates was always in public, and more or less amid crowds of men, yet no one ever saw him doing, or heard him saying, any thing impious or profane. Neither did he occupy himself, like others, with curious but unprofitable researches into the operations of nature; on the contrary, he thought that the things relating to man formed man's proper study, and that those inquiries alone deserved to be pursued by us, the results of which would tend directly to make us virtuous, and, consequently, happy. (§ 10–17.)

7. He did not, however, merely teach the lessons of morality and virtue, but exemplified them, also, in his own life and conduct; and a remarkable instance of his unbending integrity, and his regard for the sacred character of an oath, was given in the case of Thrasyllus and Erasinides, together with their colleagues, when the people wished to condemn them contrary to the laws. And his reverence for an oath arose from a deep-seated conviction that every word, every action, nay, even our most secret thoughts, lie open to the view of Deity. How, then, could the Athenians ever suffer themselves to be persuaded that such a man entertained sentiments injurious to the gods? (§ 18–20.)

1. ΠΟΛΛΑ ΚΙΣ εθαυμασα, τισι ποτε λόγοις Ἀθηναίοις ἐπείσαν οἱ γραφάμενοι Σωκράτην, ὡς ἄξιος εἶη θανάτου τῇ πόλει. 'Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραφή κατ' αὐτὸν τοιάδε τις ἦν· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὗς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἑτέρα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰςφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

2. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς, ποίω ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; ᾠδὼν τε γὰρ φανερῶς ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἶκοι, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καὶ μαντικὴ χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανῆς ἦν· διεταρφηλητο γὰρ, ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐαυτῷ σημαίνει. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μᾶλλον μα δοκοῦσιν αὐτῶν αἰτιασοθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰςφέρειν. 3. ὃ δὲ οὐδὲν καὶνότε- ρον εἰςεφερε τῶν ἄλλων, δόσει μαντικήν νομίζοντες οἷον τοῖς τε χρώνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβολοίς καὶ ὦναις· οὔτος καὶ τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνονσιν οὐ τοὺς ὅρνισθα οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντώντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαν- ενομένοις, ἀλλὰ
τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κάκεκινος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν. 4. Ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλείστοι φασίν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀρ- νίθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντώντων ἀποτρέπεσθαι τε καὶ προτρέ- πεσθαι. Σωκράτης δὲ, ὡς περὶ ἐγίνοντως, οὕτως ἔλεγε· τὰ δαιμόνια γὰρ ἐφή σημαίνειν. Καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ξυνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμο- νίου προσημαίνοντος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συν- ἔφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε. 5. Καίτω τίς οὖν ἂν ὁμολογήσειν αὐτὸν βούλεσθαι μήτ' ἡλίθιον μήτ' ἀλα- ζόνα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς συνούσιοι; Ἐδόκει δ' ἂν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, εἰ προαγορεύον ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ φαινόμενα κάτα φευ- δόμενος ἐφάνετο. Δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν προέλεγεν, εἰ μὴ ἐπίστευεν ἀληθεύειν. Ταῦτα δὲ τίς ἂν ἄλλῳ πιστεύσειν ἢ θεί; Πιστεύων δὲ θεοῖς πῶς οὖν εἴναι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν; 3. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔποιει καὶ τάδε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιπηδείοις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα συνεδούλευε καὶ πράττειν, ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἀριστ' ἂν πραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων, ὅπως ἂν ἀπο- βησοῦσι, μαντευσομένους ἐπεμπεῖν, εἰ ποιητέα. 7. Καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἰκοὺς τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσεις μαντικῆς ἐφὶ προσδέεται· τεκτονικῶν μὲν γὰρ, ἢ χαλκευτικῶν, ἢ γεωργικῶν, ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικῶν, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικῶν, ἢ λογιστικῶν, ἢ οἰκονομικῶν, ἢ στρατηγικῶν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα μαθήματα, καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμη αἰρετέα ἐνόμιζεν εἰναι. 8. Τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτως ἐφί τούς θεοὺς ἐαυτούς καλούσεται, ὡς όδον ἔδηλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ τῶν καλῶς ἄγρον φυ- τευσαμένῳ ὄνολον, δοτίς καρπώσεται· οὔτε τῶν καλῶς οἰκίαι οἰκοδομησαμένῳ ὄνολον, δοτίς οἰκήσει· οὔτε τῶσο στρατηγικῶ ὄνολον, εἰ συμφέρει στρατηγεῖν· οὔτε τῶσο πολιτικῶ ὄνολον, εἰ συμφέρει τῆς πόλεως προστατεῖν· οὔτε τῶσο καλῆ γῇ- μαυτὶ, ὡς εὐφραίνηται, ὄνολον, εἰ διὰ ταύτην ἀναίσθηται οὔτε τῶ ὅνωσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει κηδεστὰς λαβόντε ὄνολον, εἰ διὰ τούτοις στερήσεται τῆς πόλεως. 9. Τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ολομένους εἶναι δαιμόνιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς ἐνθρωπίνης γνώμης, δαιμονᾶν ἐφί· δαιμονᾶν δὲ καὶ τού.
μαντευομένους, ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν· οἶνον εἰ τις ἐπερωτήῃ, πότερον ἐπιστάμενον ἢμιχειν ἐπὶ ζεῦγος λαβεῖν κρείττον, ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον· ἢ πότερον ἐπιστάμενον κυβερνᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν κρείττον λα-
βεῖν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον· ἢ ἢ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας, ἢ με-
τρήσαντας, ἢ στήσαντας εἰδέναι· τοὺς τὰ τοιαύτα παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυθανομένους ἀθέμιστα ποιεῖν ἤγειτο· ἐφε δὲ
dειν ἢ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἐδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μανθάνειν· ἢ
dε μὴ δῆλα τοὺς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς
παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυθανόντων· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ἔσθι
谰ν ίδεῖν σημαίνειν.

10. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκείνος γε ἂεὶ μὲν ἢν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ

πρῶτο γὰρ ἐλς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἤει, καὶ
πληθοῦσας ἀγορὰς ἐκεῖ φανερὸς ἢν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἂεὶ τῆς
ἡμέρας ἢν ὅπου πλείστους μέλλοι συνέεσθαι· καὶ ἐλεγε
μὲν ὡς τὸ πολὺ, τοῖς δὲ βουλόμενοις ἐξῆν ἀκοῦειν. 11.
Οὐδείς δὲ πάσητε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβές, οὐδὲ ἀνόητον,
οὐτε πράσσοντος εἰδέν, οὐτε λέγοντος ἢκουσειν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ
περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ἦπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι
ἀειλέγετο, σκοτών, ὑπὸ ὁ καλούμενος ὅπο τῶν σφιστῶν
κόσμος ἐφ’ καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἐκαστα γέγονεται τῶν ὑ-
ρανίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαύτα μωράινο-
ντας ἀπεδείκνυεν. 12. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει,
πότερά ποτὲ νομίσαντες ἰκανῶς ἠδὴ τὰνθρώπων εἰδέναι,
ἐρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν, ἢ τὰ μὲν
ἀνθρώπεια παρέξετε, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες, ἤγονται
τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν. 13. Ἑθαύμαζε δ’, εἰ μὴ φανερὸν
αὐτοῖς ἔστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἔστιν ἀνθρώποις εὐ-
ρεῖν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῶ περὶ τού-
των λέγειν, οὐ ταῦτα δοξάζειν ἀλλήλους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μανω-
μένοις ὁμοίως διακείσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. 14. Τῶν τε γὰρ

υαίνομενοι τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ τὰ δεινὰ δεδείναι, τοὺς δὲ καὶ
τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὐδ’ ἐν ὑπὸ δοκεῖν
ἀισχρὸν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν, τοῖς δὲ οὐδ’ ἔζεις-τέον
eἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δοκεῖν· καὶ τοὺς μὲν οὐδ’ ἴερον, οὐτε
θωμόν, οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν θεῖων οὐδὲν τιμάν, τούς δὲ καὶ λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα καὶ θηρία σέβεσθαι τῶν τε περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως μεριμνώντων τοῖς μὲν δοκείν ἐν μόνον τὸ ἐν εἰναι, τοῖς δ' ἀπειρὰ τὸ πλῆθος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι πάντα, τοῖς δ' οὐδὲν ἂν ποτε κινηθῆναι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πάντα γέγενοντα τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῖς δὲ οὔτ' ἄν γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἀπολείσθαι. 15. Ἐσκόπει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τάδε· ἄρ' ὡς περὶ τὰν ἀνθρώπεια μανθάνοντες ἤγονται τούθ', δ' τι ἂν μάθοσιν, ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τών ἄλλων διότι ἂν βουλώνται ποίησειν, οὔτω καὶ οἱ τὰ θεία ζητοῦντες νομίζουσιν, ἔπειδ' ἡνωθείν αἰς ἀνάγκαις ἐκαστα γίγνεται, ποιήσειν, ἄνθρωπος ταῖς, καὶ ἀνέμως, καὶ ὕδατα, καὶ ἄρας, καὶ δότο δ' ἂν ἄλλον δέωνται τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ τοιῶτο μὲν οὐδὲν οὔδ' ἐλπίζοισιν, ἄρκει δ' αὐτοῖς γνώμην μόνον, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἐκαστα γίγνεται. 16. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ταύτα πραγματευομένων τοιαῦτα ἐλεγεν· αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἂν ἂεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβές, τί άσεβές· τί καλὸν, τί αλαχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἀδίκουν· τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανια· τί ἄνδρεια, τί δειλία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχή ἀνθρώπων, τί ἄρχικος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἤγεντο καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἄγνοοντας ἀνθραποδόῳδες ἂν διεισδύςθαι. 17. Ὑσα μὲν οὖν μή φανερὸς ἢν ἢπως ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ὑπὲρ τούτων περὶ αὐτοῦ παραγωῦνα τοὺς δικαστάς· οὐσα δὲ πάντες ἢςεαν, οὐθαμαστόν, εἴ μὴ τούτων ἐνεθυμῆσαν; 18. Βουλεύσας γὰρ ποτε, καὶ τὸν βουλευτικὸν ἄρκον ὁμᾶςας, ἐν ὅ ἢν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους βουλεύσειν, ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγοὺς μὴ ψήφω, τοὺς ἀμφὶ Θράσυλλον καὶ Ἐρασινίδην, ἀποκτείσαν πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησαν ἐπιψηφίσαι, ἀρχιζομένου μὲν αὐτῷ τοῦ δήμου, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλοῦντων· ἄλλα περὶ πλείονος ἐποιήσατο εὐορκεῖν, ἢ χαρίσασθαι τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ φυλάξασθαι τοὺς ἀπειλοῦντας. 19. Καὶ γὰρ ἔπιμε-
CHAPTER II.

SUMMARY.

XENOPHON comes now to the second charge brought against Socrates by his accusers, namely, his corrupting of the young, and he disposes of it as follows:

1. Socrates, instead of being a corrupter of the young, recalled many of them from habits of impiety and wrong-doing, and from intemperate and dissolute courses of life, by inspiring them with the love of virtue, and by encouraging them to entertain the hope that by a steadfast perseverance they might make themselves virtuous and esteemed. And what he thus taught produced a much stronger impression on the minds of the young, because he himself was the purest specimen of the very virtues which he wished them to cultivate and exercise. (§ 1-8.)

2. Neither did he, as his accusers also alleged, make those who associated with him contemners of the laws, and violent and audacious in their deportment. On the contrary, the lessons of prudence and of wisdom which he continually imparted, impressed them with the conviction that, in operating on the minds of their fellow-men, advice, not violence, and persuasion, not force, were to be employed. (§ 9-11.)

3. Nor could the conduct of Alcibiades and Critias, and the harm which they both did unto the state, be regarded as the results of the teaching of Socrates; for these two did not seek his converse with the view of modeling their own lives after his, but merely in order that, by listening to his discourses, they might attain to greater ability in the art of public speaking, and greater skill in the management of public affairs. And what is more, during all the period of their intercourse with Socrates they kept down their evil and vicious propensities, and only gave these full vent after they had left the discipline of their master. (§ 12-13.) For
virtue, unless made the subject of constant exercise, is at first enfeebled and then eventually destroyed. (§ 19-23.) Now Alcibiades and Critias were corrupted by their intercourse with other men (§ 24-28) rather than by that with Socrates, who exerted every means in his power to recall them from the influence of evil propensities; whereas those young men who associated with Socrates, not with any ambitious views of future distinction in the state, but in order to lead purer and better lives, fully accomplished that object, and never incurred even the suspicion of wrongdoing or of crime. (§ 28-48.)

4. As to what his accusers still farther alleged, that Socrates taught his followers to contemn parents, and kindred, and friends, all this rests on arguments equally false and absurd. (§ 49-55.)

5. Of the same false and absurd character, moreover, is the other charge brought forward against him, that he used to quote passages from the ancient poets, and, by a perversion of their meaning, make them a ground for inculcating sentiments hostile to freedom (§ 56-60); whereas, in truth, Socrates not only loved his own countrymen, but even extended his kindly feelings unto all mankind, so that his chief aim seems to have been to promote, as far as lay in his power, the common welfare of his fellow-men. (§ 61.)

6. Such being the state of the case, Socrates undoubtedly ought rather to have received the highest honors at the hands of his countrymen, than to have been deemed worthy by them of the punishment of death (§ 62-64.)
οὐκ ἐπῆνει. 'Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπερεσθιόντα ὑπερπονεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζε, τὸ δὲ, διὰ γ' ἡδέως ἡ ψυχὴ δέχεται, ταῦτα ἴκανῶς ἐκπονεῖν ἐδοκίμαζε· ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἐξίν ὑγιεινὴν τε ἴκανως εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμελεῖαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἐφ᾽. 5. 'Ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μὴν θρυπτικὸς γε, οὐδὲ ἀλαζονικὸς ἢν, οὔτε ἀμπεχόνη, οὔθ᾽ ὑποδέσει, οὔτε τῇ ἀλλή διατή· οὐ μὴν οὖθ᾽ ἐρασιχρημάτους γε τοὺς συνόντας ἐποίει· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔπαυε, τοὺς δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντας οὐκ ἐπράττετο χρήματα. 6. Τούτοις δ᾽ ἀπεχόμενος ἐνόμιζεν ἑλενθερίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τοὺς δὲ λαμβάνοντας τῆς ὑμιλίας μισθὸν ἀνδραποδιστὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκάλει, διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαίον αὐτοὺς εἶναι διαλέγεσθαι, παρ᾽ ὧν ἂν λάθοιεν τὸν μισθόν. 7. 'Εθαύμαζε δ', εἰ τις ἀρετὴν ἐπάγγελλομενος ἠργύριον πράττοιτο, καὶ μὴ νομίζῃ τὸ μέγιστον κέρδος ἐξειν, φίλον ἄγαθον κτησάμενος, ἀλλὰ φοβοῖτο, μὴ ὁ γενόμενος καλὸς κἀγαθός, τῷ τὰ μέγιστα ἐνεργετήσαντι μὴ τὴν μεγίστην χάριν ἔξοι. 8. Σωκράτης δὲ ἐπηγγείλατο μὲν οὖνεν πῶστε τοιούτοις οὐδὲν· ἐπίστευε δὲ τῶν ἐννόμων ἑαυτῷ τοὺς ἀποδεξαμένους, ἀπερ αὐτὸς ἐδοκίμαζεν, εἰς τὸν πάντα βιόν ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἀλλήλους φίλους ἄγαθους ἔσεσθαι. Ἡώς ἂν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ διαφθείροι τοὺς νέους; εἰ μὴ ἀρα ἴ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεία διαφθορά ἐστιν. 9. 'Ἀλλά, νῦν Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἐφ᾽, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει τῶν καθεστῶτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας, λέγων, ὡς μωρῶν εἰς, τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κυάμου καθίστασθαι, κυβερνήτης δὲ μηδένα θέλειν κεχρήσατο κυαμεντὼ, μηδὲ τέκτονι, μηδ' αὐλητῇ, μηδ' ἐπ᾽ ἀλλὰ τοιαύτα, ἀ πολλῷ ἐλάττωνας βλάδας ἀμαρτανόμενα ποιεῖ τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀμαρτανομένων· τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἐφ᾽ τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστώσεως πολιτείας, καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους. 10. 'Εγὼ δ' οίμαι τοὺς φρόνησιν ἀσκοῦντας, καὶ νομίζοντας ἴκανον ἐσεθαι τα/συμφέροντα διδάσκειν τοὺς πολίτας, ἤκιστα γίγνεσθαι βιαίους, εἰδότας ὅτι τῇ μὲν βίᾳ πρόσειον ἔχοντα καὶ κίνδυνοι, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πείθειν ἀκινδύνους τε καὶ μετὰ φιλίας -αὐτῷ νίγνεται οἱ μὲν γὰρ
βιασθέντες, ώς ἀφαιρεθέντες, μισοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες, ώς κεχαρισμένοι, φιλοῦσιν. Όντον τῶν φρόνησιν ἀσκοῦντων τὸ βιάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἱσχύν ἀνευ γνώμης ἐχόντων τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν ἐστίν. 11. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ συμμάχων ὁ μὲν βιάζεσθαι τολμῶν δεοτ' ἂν οὐκ ὁλίγον (ὁ δὲ πειθεὶς δυνάμενος οὐδενός) καὶ γὰρ μόνος ἤγοιτ' ἂν ὑδνασθαι πείθειν. Καὶ φονεύειν δὲ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἥκιστα συμβαίνετις γὰρ ἀποκτείναι τινα βούλωτ' ἂν μᾶλλον, ἢ ζῶντε πειθομένως χρησίματα;

12. Ἐφ' ἂν γὰρ κατήγορος, Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὴ γενομένῳ Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὁλιγαρχίᾳ πάντων πλεονεκτίσατός τε καὶ βιαίωτας ἐγένετο, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πάντων ἀκρατέστατος, καὶ υδριστότατος, καὶ βιαίωτας. 13. Ἐγὼ δ', εἰ μὲν τι κακὸν ἐκεῖνω τῇ τῆς πόλιν ἐποιησάτην, οὐκ ἀπολογήσομαι τὴν δὲ πρὸς Σωκράτην συνουσίαν αὐτοῖς, ὡς ἐγένετο, δηγγήσωμαι. 14. Ἐγενέσθην μὲν γὰρ ὃ ἄνδρες τούτω φύσει φιλοτιμοτάτω πάντων Ἀθηναίων, Βούλομένω τε πάντα δι' ἐαυτῶν πράττεσθαι, καὶ πάντων ὅνομαστότατος γενέσθαι. Ἡδέσαν δὲ Σωκράτην ἀπ' ἐλαχίστων μὲν χρημάτων αὐταρκέστατα ζῶντα, τῶν ἡδονῶν δὲ πασῶν ἐγκρατέστατα δυνατα τοῖς δὲ διαλεγομένοις αὐτῶ πάσι χρώμευον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὡς Βούλωμαι. 15. Ταύτα δὲ ὅρωντε, καὶ ὅτε οἷς προειρησθοῦν, πότερον τις αὐτῶ φῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπιθυμήσαντε καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἢν ἐκείνος εἴχεν, ὁρέξασθαι τῷς ὁμιλίας αὐτοῦ, ἢ νομίσαντε, εἴ ὀμιλησάτην ἐκείνῳ, γενέσθαι ἂν ἰκανωτῶ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν; 16. Ἐγὼ δὲν γὰρ ἠγούμαι, θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτοῖς ἢ ζήν ὅλων τοῦ βίου, ὅσπερ ζῶντα Σωκράτην ἐδώρων, ἢ τεθνάναι, ἐλέοσαι ἂν αὐτῶ μᾶλλον τεθνάναι. Δὴ λέγει ὁ ἐγενέσθης ἐξ ἦν ἐπραξάτην· ὡς γὰρ τάχιστα κρείττονε τῶν συγγενεμένων ἠγησάθη τινα, εὔθεις ἀποπηρήσαντε Σωκράτους, ἐπραττέτην τὰ πολιτικά, ὁπερ ἐνεκα Σωκράτους ὀφεροθήτην.
17. ἰσως οὖν εἶποι τις ἂν πρὸς ταύτα, ὅτι χρὴ τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικὰ διδάσκειν τούς ευνόουτας, ἢ σωφρονεῖν. Ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀντιλέγω τάντας δὲ τοὺς διδάσκοντας ὅρῳ αὐτοὺς δεικνύοντας τι τοῖς μανθάνουσιν, ἂπερ αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν, ἢ διδάσκονσι, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ προσβεβάζοντας. 18. Οἶδα δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην δεικνύοντα τοῖς ἐννοοῦσιν εαυτὸν καλὸν κάγαθὸν ὄντα, καὶ διαλεγόμενον κάλλιστα περὶ ἀρετῆς, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. Οἶδα δὲ κάκεινω σωφρονοῦντε, ἐστε Σωκράτει συνήστην, οὐ φοβομένων μή ἣμιούθι τὴν παίζοντο ὑπὸ Σωκράτους, ἀλλ' ολομένω τότε κράτιστον εἶναι τοῦτο πράττειν.

19. ἰσως οὖν εἶποιν ἂν πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖς, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ὁ δίκαιος ἄδικος γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ὁ σώφρων ύμριστής, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδέν, ἣν μαθησὶς ἐστίν, ὁ μαθὼν ἀνεπιστήμων ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο. Ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ τούτων οὖχ οὗτω γιγνώσκω· ὅρῳ γάρ, ὃσπερ τά τοῦ σώματος έργα τούς μή τά σώματα ἁσκοῦντας οὐ δυναμένους ποιεῖν, οὔτω καὶ τά τῆς ψυχῆς έργα τούς μή τήν ψυχήν ἁσκοῦντας οὐ δυναμένους· οὔτε γάρ, ἢ δει, πράττειν, οὔτε, ὃν δει, ἀπέχεσθαι δύνανται. 20. Διὸ καὶ τοὺς νιείς οἱ πατέρες, καὶ σώφρονες άπο τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων εϊργοῦσιν, ὡς τήν μὲν τῶν χρηστῶν ὁμιλίαν ἀσκησιν οὖσαν τῆς ἀρετῆς, τήν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν κατάλυσιν. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὃ τε λέγων,

'Εσθλὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάσκει· ἢν δὲ κακοίσι Συμμάχης, ἀπολείπε καὶ τόν ἐοτά νόσου.

Καὶ ὁ λέγων,

Αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἁγαθὸς τοτε μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλὸς.

21. Καγὼ δὲ μαρτυρῶ τούτοις· ὅρῳ γὰρ, ὃσπερ τῶν ἐν μέτρῳ πεποιημένων ἐπών τοὺς μὴ μελετῶντας ἐπιλαμβανομένους, οὔτω καὶ τῶν διδασκαλικῶν λόγων τοῖς ἀμελοῦσι λήθην ἐγχειρομένην. Ὑστον δὲ τῶν νοθετικῶν λόγων ἑπιλάθηται τις, ἐπιλέξθηται καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πάσχουσα τῆς σωφροσύνης ἑπεθύμει τούτων δ' ἐπιλαμβανομένων οὐδὲν δαυμαστῶν καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης ἑπιλαμβάνει. 22. Ὦρω δὲ καὶ
Memorabilia.

1. "Memorabilia," in Latin, was a collection of sayings, sayings, and anecdotes, compiled by Diogenes Laëritius. It was one of the first major works of literature in the Greek language. It is thought to have been compiled in the 2nd century BCE.

2. The text is written in Latin, the language of ancient Rome and one of the major classical languages of Western Europe. It is a valuable source of information about life in the ancient world, including its customs, culture, and politics.

3. The text is divided into sections, each beginning with a number. The numbers are likely to be chapter or section numbers, indicating the organization of the text.

4. The text is written in a formal style, typical of much classical Latin literature. It is likely to be a translation or adaptation of earlier works, possibly from Greek sources.

5. The text is a valuable source of information about the life and times of the ancient world, and is likely to be of interest to scholars and students of classical literature.

6. The text is a reflection of the values and beliefs of the ancient world, and is likely to be of interest to those studying the history and culture of the Roman Empire.

7. The text is written in a form of Latin that is likely to be unfamiliar to modern readers, and may require knowledge of Latin grammar and vocabulary to fully understand.

8. The text is a valuable source of information about the ancient world, and is likely to be of interest to those studying the history and culture of the Roman Empire.
λος ἰκανοὺς ποιήσας τοὺς μαθητὰς, ἐὰν πρὸς ἄλλους ἐλθὼν
tες χείρους φανώσιν, αἰτίαν ἔχει τούτο; τις δὲ πατήρ,
ἐὰν ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ συνδιατρίβων τῷ, σώφρων ἦ, ὦστερον δὲ
ἄλλῳ τῷ συγγενόμενος, πονηρὸς γένηται, τὸν πρόσθεν
αἰτιάται; ἀλλ' οὕχ δὲω ἀν παρά τῷ υἱερῷ χείρων φαι-
νηται, τοσοῦτῳ μάλλω ἐπαίνει τὸν πρότερον; ἀλλ' οὐ
gε πατέρες αὐτοὶ συνόντες τοὺς υλόπ, τῶν παῖδων πλημμ-
έοντος, οὐκ αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοὶ σωφρονῶσιν. 28
Οὐτῶ δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην δίκαιον ἢν κρίνειν· εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς
ἐποίει τι φαύλον, εἰκότως ἂν ἔδοκει πονηρὸς εἶναι· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς
σωφρονῶν διετέλει, πῶς ἂν δικαιῶς τῆς οὐκ ἐνούσης
αὐτῶ κακίας αἰτίαν ἔχοι;
29. 'Ἅλλ' εἰ καὶ μηδὲν αὐτὸς πονηρὸν ποιῶν ἐκείνους
φαύλα πράττοντας ὑρὼν ἐπήνει, δικαίως ἂν ἐπετιμᾶτο.
Κριτίαν μὲν τοίνυν αἰθανόμενος ἔρωντα Εὐθυδήμου, ἀπέ-
tρεπε, φάσκων ἀνελεύθερον τε εἶναι καὶ οὐ πρέπον ἀνδρὶ
calφ κάγαθῳ. 30. Τοῦ δὲ Κριτίου τοῖς τοσοῦτοι οὐχ
ὑπακούοντος, οὐδὲ ἀποτρεπομένου, λέγεται τὸν Σωκράτην,
ἄλλον τοις πολλῶν παρόντων καὶ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου, εἰπείν,
ὅτι ὑίκοιν αὐτῷ δοκοίη πάσχειν ὁ Κριτίας. 31. Ἡς ὁν δὴ
cαὶ ἐμίσει τὸν Σωκράτην ὁ Κριτίας, ὅστε καὶ, ὅτε τῶν τρι-
ἀκοντα ὃν νομοθέτης μετὰ Χαρικλέους ἐγένετο, ἀπεμιμο-
νευσεν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραφε, λόγων τέχνην μὴ
dιδάσκειν, ἐπηρεάζων ἐκείνῳ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ὅπῃ ἐπιλάβοιν,
ἄλλα τὸ κοινή τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώ-
μενον ἐπιφέρων αὐτῷ, καὶ διαβάλλων πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς·
oi'dε γὰρ ἔγονε, οὔτε αὐτὸς τοῦτο πώποτε Σωκράτους
ἐκονσα, οὔτ' ἄλλον φάσκοντος ἀκηκοέναι ἡθόμοιν. 32.
Ἔδηλωσε δὲ· ἔπει γὰρ οἱ τριάκοντα πολλοί ἡν τῶν
πολιτῶν καὶ οὐ τοὺς χειρίστους ἀπέκτεινον, πολλοὶ δὲ
προετρέποντο ἀδικείν, εἰπεῖ ποῦ ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁτι θαυμαστὸν
οἱ δοκοίη εἶναι, εἰ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεῖς, καὶ
τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν, μη ὁμολογοηή κα-
kδὲ βοικόλος εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἰ τις προστά-
tῆς γενόμενος πόλεσ, καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους
καὶ χείρους, μὴ αἰσχύνεται, μηδὲ οἶδει κακὸς εἶναι προστάτης τῆς πόλεως. 33. Ἀπαγγελθέντος δὲ αὐτοῖς τούτων καλέσαντες οὐκ Κριτίας καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς τὸν Σωκράτην, τόν τε νόμον ἐδεικνύτην αὐτῷ, καὶ τοὺς νέους ἀπειπέτην μὴ διαλέγεσθαι. Ὅ δὲ Σωκράτης ἐπήρετο αὐτῷ, εἶ ἐξείη πυνθάνεσθαι, εἰ τι ἀγνοοῖτο τῶν προαγορευμένων. Τῷ δὲ ἐφάτην. 34. Ἑγὼ τοίνυν, ἤφη, παρεσκεύασμαι μὲν πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις· ὅπως δὲ μὴ δὲ ἀγνοοῖαν λάθω τι παρανομήσας, τοῦτο βουλόμαι σαφῶς µαθεῖν παρ᾽ ὑμῶν. Πῶς τούτοις τῶν τῶν λόγων τέχνην σύν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λεγομένοις εἶναι νομίζουσι, ἢ σύν τοῖς μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύετε αὐτῆς; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ σὺν τοῖς ὀρθῶς, δῆλον δὴ ἀφεκτέον εἰς τοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγειν· εἰ δὲ σὺν τοῖς μὴ ὀρθῶς, δῆλον δὴ πειρατέον ὀρθῶς λέγειν. 35. Καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς ὀργίσθεις αὐτῷ, Ἐπειδή, ἤφη, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀγνοεῖς, τάδε σοι εὐμαθεστέρα ἄντα προαγορεύομεν, τοῖς νέοις ὅλως μὴ διαλέγεσθαι. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἡνα τοίνυν, ἤφη, μὴ ἀμφίβολον ἢ, ὡς ἄλλο τε ποιώ ἢ τά προπηγορευμένα, ὀρίσατε μοι, μέχρι πόσων ἐτῶν δεὶ νομίζειν νέοις εἶναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς, Ὁσοὶ περὶ, εἰπε, χρόνον βουλεύειν οὐκ ἔξεστιν, ὡς οὕτω φρονεῖς οὐσί· μηδὲ σὺ διαλέγεις νεωτέρους τριάκοντα ἐτῶν. 36. Μηδὲ, ἀν τι ζώον μαῖ, ἤφη, ἢν πολὺ νεώτερος τριάκοντα ἐτῶν, ἔρωμαι ὅποιον πωλεῖ· Ναὶ τά γε τοιαύτα, ἤφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς· ἀλλὰ τοῦ σὺ γε, ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰσθανέτω, εἴδως πῶς ἔχει, τά πλείστα ἐρωτᾶν· ταύτα οὖν μὴ ἐρωτᾶ. Μὴν' ἀποκρίνωμαι οὖν, ἤφη, ἢν τίς με ἐρωτᾷ νέος, εάν εἰδὼ, οὖν, ποῦ οἰκεῖ Χαρικλῆς; ἢ ποῦ ἔστε Κριτίας; Ναὶ τά γε τοιαύτα, ἤφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς. 37. Ὅ δὲ Κριτίας· Ἀλλὰ τῶνδε τοῦ σε ἀπεχεθαί, ἤφη, δεήσῃ, ὁ Σωκράτης, τῶν σκυτέων, καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων, καὶ τῶν χαλκέων· καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοῖς ἥδη κατατετρίφθαι διαθρυλουμένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· Οὐκοῦν, ἤφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων τούτων, τοῦ τε δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ὅσιον, καὶ τῶν ἅλλων τῶν τούτων· Ναὶ μᾶ δὴ Δί, ἤφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε εἰ δὲ μὴ, φυλάττων, δπως μὴ καὶ σὺ ἐλάττωσι τάς βοῦς
ποιήσεις. 38. Ἐνθα καὶ δὴλον ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἀπαγγελθέντος αὐτοῖς τῷ περὶ τῶν βοῶν λόγων, ὁργίζοντο τῷ Ἀσκράτει. Οἷα μὲν οὖν ἡ συνονοσία ἐγερόμει Κριτία πρὸς Ἀσκράτην, καὶ ὡς εἰχον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἔφηται. 39. Φαίην δ' ἂν ἔγγυε μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν εἶναι παῖδευν απὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδε- σκοντος. Κριτίας δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐ- τοῖς Ἀσκράτους ὑμιλησάτην, ἵνα χρόνον ὑμιλείτην αὐτῷ ἀλλ' εὖθες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὀρμηκάτε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως· ἐτὶ γὰρ Ἀσκράτει συνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ μᾶλλον ἐπεξεργαζόμενοι διαλέγεσθαι, ἡ τοῖς μάλιστα πράττοντο τὰ πολετικά. 40. Λέγεται γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδης, πρὶν εἰκοσὶν ἐτῶν εἶναι, Περικλεί, ἑπιτρόπῳ μὲν ὄντι ἑαυτοῦ, προστάτη δὲ τῆς πόλεως, τοιάδε διαλεξθήναι περὶ νόμων. 41. Εἰπὲ μοι, φάναι, ὦ Περίκλεις, ἔχοις ἃν με διδάξαι, τί ἐστι νόμος; Πάντως δήπο, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα. Δίδαξον δὴ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην· ὡς ἐγώ' ἀκούσων τινῶν ἐπαινο- μένων, ὅτι νόμιμα ἄνδρες εἰσίν, ὦμαι μὴ ἂν δικαίως τού- τον τυχεῖν τοῦ ἐπαινοῦν τὸν μὴ εἰδότα, τί ἐστι νόμος. 42. Ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι χαλεποῦ πράγματος ἐπιθυμείς, ὦ Ἀλκιβιά- δη, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, βουλόμενος γνώναι, τί ἐστι νόμος· πάντες γὰρ οὕτω νόμοι εἰσίν, οὗς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὼν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἐγραψε, φράζον, ἀ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν, καὶ ἄ μῆ. Πό- τερον δὲ τάγαθά νομίσαν δειν ποιεῖν, ἦ τὰ κακά; Τάγαθά, νή Δία, φάναι, ὦ μειράκιον, τα δε κακά οὖ. 43. Ἐὰν δὲ μή τὸ πλῆθος, ἄλλ', ὡσπερ ὅπου ὁλιγαρχία ἐστίν, ὁλέγοι συνελθόντες γράψωσιν, ὃ τι χρή ποιεῖν, ταῦτα τί ἐστί; Πάντα, φάναι, ὅσα ἄν τὸ κρατοῦν τῆς πόλεως βουλευά- μενον, ἄ χρή ποιεῖν, γράψῃ, νόμος καλεῖται. Καὶ ἂν τῷ- ράννος οὖν κρατῶν τῆς πόλεως γράψῃ τοῖς πολίταις, ἄ χρή ποιεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα νόμος ἐστί; Καὶ ὅσα τῷ ράννος ἁρ- χῶν, φάναι, γράφει, καὶ ταῦτα νόμος καλεῖται. 44. Βία δὲ, φάναι, καὶ ἀνομία τί ἐστιν, ὦ Περίκλεις; Ἀρ' οὔχ ὅταν ὁ κρείττων τὸν ἱστω μὴ πείσας, ἁλλ' βιασάμενος, ἀναγκα- σῃ ποιεῖν, ὃ τι ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα. Καὶ ὅσα ἀρα τῷ ράννῳ μὴ πείσας τοὺς πολίτας
ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν γράφων, ἀνομία ἔστι; Δοκεῖ μοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα· ἀνατίθεμαι γὰρ τὸ, δοσά τιραννος μὴ πείσας γράφει, νόμον εἶναι. 45. "Οσα δὲ οἱ ὀλίγοι τούς πολλούς μὴ πείσας, ἀλλὰ κρατοῦντες γράφουσι, πότερον βίαι φῶμεν, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι; Πάντα μοι δοκεῖ, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, δοσά τις μὴ πείσας ἀναγκάζει τινὰ ποιεῖν, εἴτε γράφων, εἴτε μὴ, βία μᾶλλον ἡ νόμος εἶναι. Καὶ δοσά ἄρα τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος κρατοῦν τὼν τὰ χρήματα ἐχόντων γράφει μὴ πείσαν, βία μᾶλλον ἡ νόμος ἢν εἴη; 46. Μάλα τοι, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, ὃ 'Αλκιβιάδη· καὶ ἡμείς, τηλικοῦτοι ὄντες, δεινοὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἴμεν· τοιαύτα γὰρ καὶ ἐμελετώμεν καὶ ἐσοφιξώμεθα, οὔτε περ καί σὺ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς μελέταν. Τὸν δὲ 'Αλκιβιάδην φάναι· Εἴθε σοι, δ Περίκλεις, τότε συνεγέρχομην, ὅτε δεινότατος σαυτοῦ ταύτα ἤσθα. 47. 'Επει τοῖς τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων ὑπέλαθαν κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκέτι προσήθαν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἴππες, εἰ τε προσέλθοις, ὑπὲρ ὁν ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχόμενοι ἡχθονοτ· τὰ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐπράττουν ὑπὲρ ἐνεκεν καὶ Σωκράτει προσήλθον. 48. 'Αλλὰ Κρίτων το Σωκράτος ἢν ὑμιλήτης, καὶ Χαριφῶν, καὶ Χαιρεκράτης, καὶ Ἐριμοκράτης, καὶ Σιμίας, καὶ Κέβθα, καὶ Ψαιδώνδης, καὶ ἄλλοι, οὗ τεκέενς συνήσαν, οὐχ ἴνα δημηγορικοὶ ἢ δικανικοὶ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἴνα, καλοὶ τε κάγαθοι γενόμενοι, καὶ οἰκῳ καὶ οἰκέταις, καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις, καὶ τόλμω ἀν καὶ πολίταις δύναντο καλῶς χρησθαι· καὶ τούτων οὐδεὶς, οὔτε νεώτερος οὔτε πρεσβύτερος ὢν, οὔτ' ἐποίησε κακῶν οὐδέν, οὔτ' αἰτίαν ἐσχεν. 49. 'Αλλὰ Σωκράτης γ', ἐφι ὁ κατήγορος, τοὺς πατέρας προσηλκισεν ἔδιδασκε, πείθων μὲν τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι παραγωγὰς ἐλόντι καὶ τὸν πατέρα δῆσαι, τεκμηρίῳ τούτῳ χρώμενος, ώς τὸν ἄμαθέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτέρου νόμιμον εἰς δεδέσθαι. 50. Σωκράτης δὲ τὸν μὲν ἄμαθίας ἐνέκα δεισιδένοντα δικαίως ἢν καὶ αὐτὸν ἢ μετο δεδέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ἢ μὴ αὐτός ἐπίσταται· καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
ἐνεκα πολλάκις ἐσκοπεῖ, τί διαφέρει μανίας ἀμαθίας καὶ τούς μὲν μανικόμενους ὕετο συμφερόντως ἃν δεδέσθαι καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς φίλους, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένους τὰ δέοντα, δικαίως ἃν μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων. 51. Ἀλλὰ Ἔσκατας γε, ἐφή· ὁ κατήγορος, οὗ μόνον τοὺς πατέρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίησεν ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἴναι παρὰ τοῖς ἐαυτῷ συνούσι, λέγων, ὡς οὕτε τοὺς καμνύντας, οὕτε τοὺς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὑφελοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ λατροὶ, τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι. 52. Ἐφή δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν λέγειν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὑφελος εὐνοὺς εἶναι, εἰ καὶ ὑφελεῖν δυνήσονται· μόνοις δὲ φάσκειν αὐτὸν ἁξίους εἶναι τιμής τοὺς ἐλθότας τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἐρμηνεύει συναμένους· ἀναπείθοντα σὺν τοὺς νέους αὐτῶν, ὡς αὐτοὺς εἰς σοφῶτατος τε, καὶ ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιήσαι σοφοὺς, οὕτω διαπείθει να τοὺς ἐαυτῷ συνόντας, ὡς μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς ἐαυτόν. 53. Ἡγὼ δ' αὐτὸν οἶδα μὲν καὶ περὶ πατέρων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν καὶ περὶ φίλων ταῦτα λέγοντα· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε δή· ὅτι, τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελθούσης, ἐν ἡ μόνη γίγνεται φρόνησις, τὸ σώμα τοῦ ὀἰκειοστότον ἀνθρώπου τὴν ταχίστην ἐξενεγκαντες ἀφανίζωσιν. 54. Ἐλεγε δὲ, ὅτι καὶ ἥν ἐκαστὸς εαυτοῦ, ὁ πάντων μάλιστα φίλει, τοῦ σώματος δ' τι δὲν ἀχρείον ἐκαὶ ἀνωφελές, αὐτὸς τε ἀφαίρει, καὶ ἄλλω παρέχει· αὐτοῖς τε γὰρ αὐτῶν ὑπερχάς τε, καὶ τρίχας, καὶ τύλους ἀφαιρεῖς, καὶ τοῖς λατροῖς παρέχουσι μετὰ πόνων τε καὶ ἀληθῶν καὶ ἀποτείμνει καὶ ἀποκαίει, καὶ τούτου χάριν ρίονται δεὼν αὐτοῖς καὶ μισθὸν τίνειν· καὶ τὸ σίαλον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος ἀποπτύουσιν, ὡς δύναται πορήωτὰ τώ, διότι ὑφελεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἔων, βλάπτει δ' πολὺ μάλλον. 55. Ταῦτ' οὖν ἔλεγεν, οὐ τὸν μὲν πατέρα ζώντα κατορύπτειν διδάσκων, ἐαυτὸν δὲ κατατέμνειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύων, ὅτι τὸ ἄφρον ἀτιμὸν ἔστι, παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὑφελιμώτατον, ἕπος, κἂν τε ὑπὸ πατρὸς, κἂν τε ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ, κἂν τε ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς βουλήτηι τιμᾶσθαι, μή, τῷ ὀἰκείῳς εἶναι πι-
56. ᾿Εφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατηγόρος· καὶ τὰν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἔκλεγόμενον τὰ ποιημάτα, καὶ τούτοις μαρτυρίοις χρώμενον, διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κακοῦργους τε εἶναι, καὶ τυραννικοῦς. Ὅσιόδον μὲν τό ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὅνειδος, ἀργήγη δ' ἔτερον τοῦ ὅνειδος, τοῦτο δὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς κελεύει μὴ δενὸς ἔργον, μήτε ἀδίκου μήτε αἰσχροῦ, ἀπέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει. 57. Σωκράτης δ' ἐπειδῆ ὁμολογήσας, τό μὲν ἐργάτην εἶναι ωφέλιμον τε ἀνθρώπω καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀργὸν βλασφήμον τε καὶ κακόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀργεῖν κακόν, τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦντας ἐργάζεσθαι τε, ἐφη, καὶ ἐργάτας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοὺς δὲ κυβεῦντας, ἦ τι ἄλλο ποιημόν καὶ ἐπιζήμιον ποιοῦντας, ἀργοὺς ἀπεκάλει. Ἡκ δὲ τούτων ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τό ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὅνειδος, ἀργήγη δ' ἔτερον τοῦ ὅνειδος. 58. Τὸ δὲ Ὅμήρου ἐφή ὁ κατηγόρος πολλάκις αὐτὸν λέγειν ὅτι Ὅδυσσεύς, ὃντινα μὲν βασιλῆς καὶ ἔφοιν άνδρα κυβείς. Τὸν δ' ἀγανοῦ ἰππέσιον ἐρρήνθησας παραπτάς· Δαιμόνι, οὗ σὲ ἐοικε κακόν ὡς δειδίσσεσθαι, Ἀλλ' αὐτὸς τὸ κάθησο, καὶ ἄλλους ἱδρυν λαοῦς. Ὅν δ' αὐ ὅρων τ' ἀνδρα ἱδοί, βοῶγατα τ' ἐφεύροι, Τὸν σκήπτρα διάστασκεν, ὄμολοισακε τὸ μύθον· Δαιμόνι, ἀτρέμας ἄσω, καὶ ἄλλων μύθον ἀκούει, Οἱ σέα φέρεσοι εἰς· οὐ δ' ἀπόλεμοι καὶ ἀναλίκης, Οὔτε τοπ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμησιν, οὔτ' ἐνί βουλη. ταύτα δὴ αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαί, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς ἐπαινοῦ ἑπίεσθαι τοὺς ἁμότας καὶ πένητας. 59. Πωκράτης δ' οὐ ταύτ' ἐλεγε· καὶ γὰρ ἐαυτὸν οὕτω γ' ἂν ἠτερ δεῖν παίεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐφη, δεῖν τοὺς μήτε λογῷ μήτ' ἐργῷ ἀφελίμως ὄντας, μήτε στρατεύματι, μήτε πόλει, μήτε αὐτῷ τῷ δήμῳ, εἰ τι
Λόγος ἤκοιτος ἱκανούς ἄλλως· εάν πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ θρασείς ὤσι, πάντα τρόπων καλύπτοντα, κάν πάνω πλούσιοι τυχάνωσιν ὑμεῖς. 60. Ἄλλα δὲ Σωκράτης γε, τάναντια τούτῳ, φανερὸς ἦν καὶ δημοτικός καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ὄν· ἐκεῖνο γάρ, πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμητάς καὶ ἀστούς καὶ ζένους λαβὼν, οὐ δέναι πώποτε μισθόν τῆς συνυούσας ἐπράζατο, ἄλλα πάσιν ἀφθόνως ἐπήρκει τῶν ἐαυτοῦ· ὧν τινὲς μικρὰ μέρη, παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνον προῖκα λαβόντες, πολλοὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπώλοντο, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν, ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνος, δημοτικοὶ· τοῖς γάρ μὴ ἐχοῦσι θρήματα διδόναι οὐκ ἤθελον διαλέγεσθαι. 61. Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κόσμου τῇ πόλει παρείχε πολλὰ μάλλον, ἡ Δίκαια τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων, διὸ ὁμοιότος ἐπὶ τούτῳ γέγονε. Δίκαια μὲν γὰρ ταῖς γυμνοπαιδίαις τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ ἐξένου ἐδείπνιε· Σωκράτης δὲ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου τὰ ἐαυτοῦ δαπανῶν τὰ μέγιστα πάντας τοὺς βουλομένους ὕφελει· βελτίως γὰρ ποιῶν τοὺς συγγενισμένους ἀπέπεμπεν. 62. Ἔμοι μὲν δὴ Σωκράτης, τοιοῦτος ὡν, ἐδόκει τιμῆς ἁξίος εἶναι τῇ πόλει μάλλον ἢ θανάτου. Καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους δὲ σκοπῶν ἃν τις τοῦθ' ευροί. Κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους, ἢ ἄν τις φανερὸς γένηται κλέπτων, ἢ λασποδυτῶν, ἢ βαλαντιστομῶν, ἢ τουχωρυχῶν, ἢ ἀνθραποδιζόμενος, ἢ ἱεροσυλῶν, τούτοις θανατός ἐστιν ἢ ζημία· ἃν ἐκεῖνος πάντων ἀνθρώπων πλείστον ἀπείχεν. 63. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῇ πόλει γε οὕτε πολέμου κακῶς συμβαίνοντος, οὕτε στάσεως, οὕτε προδοσίας, οὕτε ἄλλου κακοῦ οὔδενος πώποτε αἰτίος ἐγένετο. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἵδια γε οὕδενα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὕτε ἀγαθῶν ἀπεστήρησεν, οὕτε κακῶς περιέβαλεν· ἀλλ' οὐδ' αἰτίαν τῶν εἰρημένων οὔδενος πώποτ' ἔσχε. 64. Πῶς οὖν ἐναχος ἢν εἰὴ τῇ γραφῇ; διὸ ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεοῦς, ὡς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ γέγραπτο, φανερὸς ἦν θεραπεὺς τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων· ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους, ὃ δὴ ὁ γραφάμενος αὐτὸν ἦτιότα, φανερὸς ἦν τῶν συνόντων τοὺς ποιημάς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχοντας τούτων μὲν παύων, τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀπο-
CHAPTER III.

SUMMARY.

In the two previous chapters a general answer has been given to the charges preferred against Socrates. The remainder of the work has now the following objects in view: 1. That the general defence, thus far made out, may be strengthened by particular details, and in this way the malignity of the accusers be placed in a stronger light; and, 2. That the whole life of Socrates may be set forth as a pattern of every virtue.

In this third chapter, therefore, it is shown, in a more special manner, how both he himself worshiped the gods, and how he recommended others to worship them (§ 1–4); and how he himself practised self-control, and advised others to act in similar cases. (§ 5–7.)

1. 'Ως δὲ δὴ καὶ ωφελείν ἐδόκει μοι τοὺς ξυνόντας τὰ μὲν ἔργα δεικνύων ἐαυτὸν ὅλος ἦν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διαλεγόμενος, τούτων δὴ γράψω, ὅποσα ἄν διαμνημονεύωσο. Τὰ μὲν τοῖνυν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φανερὸς ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων, ἦπερ ἡ Πυθία ὑποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας, ἢ περὶ προγόνων θεραπείας, ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων. ἢ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναιρεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἄν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρῆκε, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πως ποιοῦντας περιέργους καὶ ματαιοὺς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. 2. Καὶ εὐχέτο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τάγαθα διδόναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας, ὅποια ἀγαθά ἐστιν· τοὺς δὲ εὐχομένους χρυσίον, ἢ ἀργύριον, ἢ τυραννίδα, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, οὐδὲν διάφορον ἐνόμιζεν εὑχεσθαι, ἢ εἰ κυβεῖαν, ἢ μάχην, ἢ ἄλλο τι εὐχουντο τῶν φανερῶς ἀδήλων ὡς ἀποθέσωσθε. 3. Θυσίας δὲ θύων μικρὰς ἀπὸ μικρῶν, οὐδὲν ἢγεῖτο μειοῦσθαι τῶν ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα θυόντων. Οὕτε γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐφ᾽ ἐκατό λέος ἐχεῖν, εἰ ταῖς μεγάλαις θυσίαις μᾶλλον· ἢ ταῖς μικραῖς ἐχαίρουν
πολλάκις γάρ ἂν αὐτοῖς τὰ παρὰ τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν εἶναι κεχαρισμένα· οὔτ' ἂν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄξιοι εἶναι ζήν, εἰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ζῶν κεχαρισμένα τοῖς θεοῖς, ἢ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν· ἀλλ' ἐνόμιζε τούς θεοὺς ταῖς παρὰ τῶν εὔσεβεστάτων τιμαίς μᾶλιστα χαίρειν. 'Επαινέτης δ' ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἐπούς τούτου.

Καὶ δύναμιν δ' ἐρείν ἐρ' ἀθανάτοιοι θεοῖς·
καὶ πρὸς φίλους δεῖ, καὶ ξένους, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην ἀδιαταν καλῆν ἐφῆ παραίνεσιν εἰναι τὴν Καὶ δύναμιν ἐρείν. 4. Εἰ δὲ τι δόξειν αὐτῷ σημαινεσθαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἢττον ἀν ἐπείση παρὰ τὰ σημαινόμενα ποιήσαι, εἴ τις αὐτῶν ἐπειθεν, ὁδὸν λαβεῖν ἡγεμόνα τυφλόν, καὶ μή εἰδότα τὴν ὁδὸν, ἀντὶ βλέποντος καὶ εἰδότος· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ μωρίαν κατηγόρει, οἴτινες παρὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν σημαινόμενα ποιοῦσι τι, φυλαττόμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδιαταν. Αὐτὸς δὲ πάντα τανθρώπινα ὑπερώρα πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐμπουλλαν.

5. Διαίτη δὲ τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἐπαύεις καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἢ χρώμενος ἄν τις, εἰ μή τε δαμόνιον εἰη, θαράλεως καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διάγοι, καὶ οὐκ ἄν ἀπορήσεις τοσαύτης δαπάνης. Οὕτω γὰρ εὐτελῆς ἦν, ὡς' οὔκ οἶδ', εἰ τὶς οὕτως ἄν ὅληγα ἐργάζοιτο, ὡςθ' μὴ λαμβάνειν τὰ Σωκράτει αρκοῦντα· σίτῳ μὲν γὰρ τοσοῦτῳ ἐχρῆτο, διὸν ἥδεως ἢσθεῖ'· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένος ἦει, ὡςθ' τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ σίτου οὕπου αὐτῷ εἰναι· ποτὸν δὲ πάν ἢδον ἢ αὐτῷ, διὰ τὸ μὴ πίνειν, εἰ μὴ διψῆ. 6. Εἰ δὲ ποτε κλῆθεις ἐθελήσεις ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἐλθεῖν, δ' τοῖς πλεῖστοις ἐργῳδεστάτον ἐστίν, ὡςθ' φυλάξασθαι τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν καιρὸν ἐμπίπλασθαι, τοῦτο ῥαδίως πάνυ ἐφυλάττετο· τοῖς δὲ μὴ δυναμένοις τοῦτο ποιεῖν συνεδύεται φυλάττεσθαι τὰ πειθοῦτα μὴ πεινῶντας ἐσθίειν, μηδὲ διψῶντας πίνειν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λυμαίνόμενα γα στέρας, καὶ κεφαλᾶς, καὶ ψυχάς, ταῦτ' ἐφη εἰναι. 7. Οἰεσθαί δ' ἐφη ἐπισκόπτουν καὶ τὴν Κίρκην ὡς ποιεῖν, τοῦτος πολλοὶς δειπνίζωσαν· τὸν δὲ 'Οδυσσέα Ἔρμον τε
CHAPTER IV.

SUMMARY.

The belief entertained by some that Socrates could indeed inflame his hearers with the love of virtue, but could never influence them so far as to induce them to make any great proficiency therein, is disproved both by other things, and especially by the conversation which he once had with Aristodemus, a contemner of the gods, on the subject of Deity; from which conversation it appears most clearly what lofty conceptions Socrates entertained respecting the Divine nature. (§ 1, 2.)

The conversation alluded to may be arranged under the following heads:

1. Works intended for certain useful purposes must be acknowledged by us to have originated not from mere chance, but from reason and design. (§ 3, 4.) Now the whole frame and constitution of man indicate most clearly an arrangement intended for purposes of utility. It must be confessed, therefore, that man is the work of some great artificer, who was prompted to that work by a love for man. (§ 5–7.) Nor is the kindness of the gods shown only in the frame of man and the constitution of his nature; the order and arrangement of the universe also give the plainest indications of divine wisdom and providence, although the forms themselves of the gods are concealed from mortal view. (§ 8, 9.)

2. Even from those very attributes of body and of mind by which men surpass other animals, as, for example, erectness of stature, the possession and employment of hands, as well as other peculiarities, but most of all from the excellence of his intellectual nature, is it manifest that the gods extend a guardian care toward man. (§ 10–14.) To this is added, that the gods indicate unto men, both by oracles and other means, what things ought to be done by them, and what not. (§ 15.)

3. That the gods, moreover, do not neglect any single individual, but exercise a care over persons as well as communities, appears from the following considerations: first, because they presignify the future to all men alike; and next, because they have wrought into the mind of man a persuasion of their being able to make him happy or miserable; and finally, because the states and nations most renowned as well for their wisdom as their antiquity, are those whose piety has been the most observable; and even man himself is never so well disposed to serve the Deity, as in that part of life when reason bears the greatest sway. (§ 16.) Even as the mind, therefore, rules the body, so the providence of the gods rules
the universe and takes all things contained therein under its care. (§17.)

If men, therefore, will but worship the gods in a pure and holy spirit, they will attain to a full conviction of their wisdom, their power, and their love toward the beings whom they have made. (§18, 19.)

1. El dé tines Σωκράτην νομίζουσι, (ὡς ένιοι γράφονσι τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαίρομενοι,) προτρέπασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπʼ ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, προαγαγείν δʼ ἐπʼ αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανόν οἰκεφάμενοι, μὴ μόνον δὲ ἐκείνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ’ ολομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ᾿Ηλεγχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δ’ λέγων συνημέρευε τοῖς συν-διατρίβουσι, δοκιμαζόντων, εἰ ικανὸς ἦν βελτίως ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας. 2. Λέξων δὲ πρῶτον, αὐτὸν ἥκουσα περὶ τοῦ δαμαμοῦν διαλεγομένου πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον τὸν Μικρὸν ἐπικαλούμενον. Καταμαθὼν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐτε θύ-νοντα τοὺς θεοὺς, οὐτ’ ευχόμενον, οὔτε μαντικὴ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιοῦντων ταῦτα καταγελώντα, Εἶπε μοι, ἐφι, ὥ Ἀριστόδημε, ἐστιν οὕτωσις ἀνθρώπους τεθαύμακας ἐπὶ σοφία; ἩΕγωγε, ἐφι. 3. Καὶ δς, Λέξων ῥμίν, ἐφη, τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν. Ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖν τοῦς ποιῆσαι "Ομηρὸν ἔγωγε μάλιστα τεθαύμακα, ἐπὶ δὲ διθυράμβῳ Μελανιππί-δην, ἐπὶ δὲ τραγῳδίᾳ Σοφοκλέα, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνδριαντοσοφίᾳ Πολυκλείτου, ἐπὶ δὲ ζωγραφίᾳ Ζεῦζιν. 4. Πότερά σοι δοκούσιν οἱ ἀπεργαζόμενοι εἰδὼλα ἀφρονα τε καὶ ἀκίνητα, ἀξιοθαυμαστότεροι εἶναι, ἢ οἱ ζῶα ἐμφρονά τε καὶ ἐνεργά; Πολύ, νη Μία, οἱ ζῶα, εἴπερ γε μὴ τύχη τινὶ, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ γνώμης ταῦτα γίγνεται. Տῶν δὲ ἀτεκμάρτως ἔχοντων, ὅτου ἕνεκα ἔστι, καὶ τῶν φανερῶς ἐπὶ ὥφελεία ὅνων, πότερα τύχης καὶ πότερα γνώμης ἔργα κρίνεις; Πρέπει μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ ὥφελεία γιγνόμενα γνώμης ἔργα εἶναι. 5. Οὐκοῦν δοκεὶ σοι ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶν ἀνθρώπους, ἐπὶ ὥφελεία προσ-θείναι αὐτοῖς δι’ ὧν αἰσθάνονται ἑκαστα, ὀφθαλμοὺς μὲν, ὢθοὶ ὁράν τὰ ὀρατά, ὡτα δὲ, ὦτα ἀκούειν τὰ ἀκούστα ὀσμῶν γε μήν, εἰ μὴ ῥίνες προσετήθησαν, τί ἄν ἡμῖν ὥφελος ἦν; τίς δ’ ἄν αἰσθῆσις ἦν γλυκέων, καὶ ὀμμέων, καὶ πάν-των τῶν διὰ στόματος ἢδέως, εἰ υπ’ γλάττα τούτων γνώμων ἔνεργάσθη; 6. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ τόδε
οφύσι τε ἀπογεισώσαι τὰ υπὲρ τῶν ὀμμάτων, ὥς μηδ' ὃ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἱδρῶς κακομομῆ: τὸ δὲ, τὴν ἀκοὴν δέχεσθαι μὲν πάσας φωνᾶς, ἔμπιπλασθαι δὲ μῆποτε· καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρόςεθεν ὁδόντας πάσι ζώως οἷον τέμνειν εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους οἷον παρὰ τούτων δεξαμένους λεαίνειν· καὶ στόμα μὲν, δὲ οἷόν, ὅν ἐπιθυμεῖ τὰ ζώα, εἰςπέμπτεται, πλησίον ὑφαλμῶν καὶ ρινῶν καταθεῖναι· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἀποχωροῦντα δυσχερῆ, ἀποστρέφει τοὺς τούτων ὄχετοὺς καὶ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἦ δυνατὸν προσωτάτω, ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταῦτα οὕτω προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα, ἀπορεῖς, πότερα τύχης ἢ γνώμης ἔργα ἐστίν; 7. Οὐ μά τὸν Δ', ἕφη, ἀλλ' οὕτω γε σκοπούμενως πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημομοργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου τεχνήματι. Τὸ δὲ, ἐμφύσαι μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τεκνοποιίας, ἐμφύσαι δὲ ταῖς γειναμέναις ἔρωτα τοῦ εκτρέφειν τοῖς δὲ τραφεῖσθαι μέγιστον μὲν πόθον τοῦ ζήν, μέγιστον δὲ φόβου τοῦ θανάτου; Ἀμέλει καὶ ταῦτα ἔοικε μηχανήμασι τινος ζώα εἶναι βουλευσαμένου. 8. Σὺ δὲ σαυτὸν δοκεῖς τι φρόνιμον ἔχειν; Ἐρώτα γοῦν καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. "Αλλοθε δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὖδέν οἶει φρόνιμον εἶναι· καὶ ταῦτα εἴδως, ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι, πολλῆς οὐσίας, ἔχεις, καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχί, πολλοῦ δύντος, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων Ἰήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἐκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα συνήρρομοσται σοι· νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἅρα οὐδαμὸν ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλήθος ἀπειρά, δὲ ἀφροσύνην τινά, ὡς οἶει, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν; 9. Μά Δ'· οὐ γὰρ ὅρῳ τοὺς κυρίους, ὃςπερ τῶν ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων τοὺς δημομοργοὺς. Οὔδε γὰρ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ σὺ γε ψυχὴν ὅρις, ἢ τοῦ σώματος κυρ' ἐστίν· ἔστε κατά γε τοῦτο ἐξέστε σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὖδὲν γνώμη, ἀλλὰ τύχῃ πάντα πράπτεις. 10. Καὶ ο Ἀριστοδημος, Οὐτοι, Ἰση. ἔγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπεροῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο
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I.
19. MEMORABILIA.

μαντικής φράζωσιν, οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖς φράζειν αὐτούς, οὐδὲ δταν τοῖς Ἐλλησι τέρατα πέυποιντες προσημαίνωσιν, οὐδὲ δταν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώπους; ἀλλὰ μόνον σὲ ἐξαιρούντες ἐν ἀμελείᾳ κατατίθενται; 16. Οἶει δ' ἄν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφύσαι, ὡς ἰκανοὶ εἰσίν εὑ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δύνατοι ἦσαν, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατώμενοι τὸν πάντα χρόνον οὐδέποτ' ἄν αἰσθέσθαι; Οὐχ ὡρᾶς, οτι τὰ πολυχρωμώτατα καὶ σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, πόλεις καὶ θυνη, θεοσεβέστατα ἐστι, καὶ αἱ φρονιμώταται ἥλικια θεῶν ἐπιμελέσταται; 17. Ὡγαθέ, ἐφη, κατάμαθε, οτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνών τὸ σὸν σῶμα, ὅπως βούλεται, μεταχειρίζεται. Οἰεσθαί οὐν χρῆ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα, ὅπως ἄν αὐτῇ ἤδυ ἢ, οὕτω τίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μέν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξεικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀμα πάντα ὅραν, μηδὲ τὴν σὴν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λιγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι φρονίζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἰκανὴν εἶναι ἀμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 18. Ἡν μέντοι, ὅσπερ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύων γεγονός εἰς τοὺς ἀντιθεραπεύειν ἐθέλοντας, καὶ χαριζόμενος τοὺς ἀντιχαριζόμενους, καὶ συμπολυεύομενος καταμαθάνεις τοὺς φρονίμους, οὕτω καὶ τῶν θεῶν πείραν λαμβάνῃς θεραπεύων, εἰ τι σοὶ Θελήσουσι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνθρώπων συμβοῦ λεύειν, γνώσει τὸ θείον, ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον ἑστιν, ὦθο' ἀμα πάντα ὅραν, καὶ πάντα ἄκουειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἀμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτούς. 19. Ἐμοὶ μὲν ταῦτα λέγων οὐ μόνον τοὺς συνόντας ἐδόκει ροιεῖν, ὅποτε ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνθρωπων ὅραντο, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνοσίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ ἀληχρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποτε ἐν ἐρημῷ εἶν, ἐπείπερ ἡγήσαιντο μηδὲν ἂν ποτε ὄν πράπτοιεν, θεοὺς διαλαθεῖν.
CHAPTER V.

SUMMARY.

The virtue of self-control is commended on the following grounds:

The man who is destitute of self-control can be of no use either to himself or to others (§ 1-3); neither can such a one be at all pleasing or acceptable in the intercourse of society. (§ 4.) Self-control, in fact, forms the basis of all the other virtues, and ought, therefore, to be our chief study (ib.), since without it we can neither attain to nor practise any thing praiseworthy. (§ 5.)

Socrates not only commended this virtue in his discourses, but exemplified it most strikingly in all his words and actions. (§ 6.)

1. El δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καλὸν τε κἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὶ κτημα ἡστιν, ἐπισκεψώμεθα, εἰ τι προνύθαζε λέγων εἰς αὐτὴν τοιάδε. Ο̣ ἀνδρεὶς, εἰ, πολέμου ἡμῖν γενομένου, βουλούμεθα ἐλέσθαι ἄνδρα, ύφ’ οὗ μάλιστ’ ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν σωζότ’ μεθ’ αὐτὸσ βουλούμεθα, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους χειροίμεθα, ἀρ’ δυτὶν’ ἂν αἰσθανοίμεθα ἢττῳ γαστρός, ἢ οἶνον, ἢ πόνον, ἢ ὑπνον, τούτον ἂν αἱροίμεθα; καὶ πῶς ἂν οἰηθείμην τὸν τοιοῦτον ἢ ἡμᾶς σῶσαι, ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους κρατῆσαι; 2. Εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου γενόμενοι βουλοίμεθα τῷ ἐπιτρέψαι ἢ παιδὰς ἁρ- βενας παιδεύσαι, ἢ θυγατέρας παρθένον διαφυλάξαι, ἢ χρήματα διασώσαι, ἢ’ αξιόπιστον εἰς ταῦτα ηγησώμεθα τὸν ἀκρατή; δούλῳ δ’ ἀκρατεῖ ἐπιτρέψαμεν ἂν ἢ βοσκή- ματα, ἢ ταμεία, ἢ ἑργών ἐπίστασαι; διάκονον δὲ καὶ ἀγο- ραστὴν τοιοῦτον ἐθελήσαμεν ἂν προῖκα λαβεῖν; 3. Ἀλλὰ ἢν εἰ γε μηδὲ δούλον ἀκρατή δεξαίμεθ’ ἂν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτὸν γε φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; Καὶ γὰρ οὐχ, ὅσπερ οἱ πλεονέκται τῶν ἄλλων ἀφαιροῦμενοι χρήματα ἑαυτοὺς δοκοῦσι πλούσιειν, οὗτως ὃ ἀκρατής τοῖς μὲν ἄλ- λοις βλαβερός, ἑαυτῷ δ’ ὑφέλιμος, ἀλλὰ κακούργοις μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πολὺ κακουργότερος, εἰ γε κακουρ- γότατὸν ἑστὶ μὴ μόνον τὸν ὅλου τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φθειρεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. 4. Ἐν συννοσίᾳ δὲ τῖς ἂν ἥσθειν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὅν εἰδειν τῷ ὅψθεν τε καὶ τῷ οἷῳ καὶ ἱποτοῦντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς φίλοις; ἢρά γε οὐ χρή πάντα ἂν
CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY.

This chapter contains the substance of three conversations between Socrates and Antiphon the sophist:

Conversation First. Antiphon, intending to cast ridicule on the philosophy of Socrates, and thereby draw over his followers unto himself, reproaches him with the meaness and discomfort of his mode of life, and his taking no fee for his instructions, and remarks, that the only possible result of his labors must be to teach men how to be miserable. (§ 1-3.)

Socrates replies to this as follows:

1. He who imparts gratuitous instruction is master of his own time, and talks when and with whom he pleases. (§ 4, 5.)

2. A plain and simple diet is not only more conducive to health, and more easily procured, but is also more palatable to the wise man than all the costly dishes of the rich. (§ 5.) So, too, the only true object of attire is to counteract the effects of cold and heat, and for this purpose the simpler it is the better. (§ 6, 7.)

3. That man will never give himself up to the pleasures of the table, or to sloth, or libidinous indulgences, whose bosom is familiar with things which not only delight him while he makes use of them, but which also afford the pleasing hope of lasting utility. For if men rejoice when they see their affairs going on well, how much greater delight ought he to feel who is both conscious to himself of improving in the paths of virtue, and
perceives that he is making those better with whom he associates. (§ 8, 9.)

4. That man, moreover, will be far better able to discharge the duties which he owes to his friends and his country, who is content with little, than he who can not live except in the midst of costly profusion. (§ 9.)

5. Happiness does not consist in luxury and magnificence; on the contrary, he who stands in need of the fewest things comes nearest to the divine nature. (§ 10.)

Conversation Second. On another occasion, Antiphon having remarked that he thought Socrates a just man, indeed, but by no means a wise one in not receiving compensation for his instructions; and that by this very conduct, moreover, he himself virtually declared that what he imparted was not worth purchasing (§ 11, 12), Socrates replied as follows: He who sells his wisdom for a stipulated price, sullies and degrades wisdom; whereas he who, on seeing any one possessed of good abilities and good native principles, imbues him with the lessons of his own wisdom and makes him his friend, discharges the duty of a good citizen (§ 13); and such a one derives more true pleasure from the intercourse of good friends, and from the progress which they make under his guidance in the paths of virtue, than he could possibly receive from any pecuniary recompense. (§ 14.)

Conversation Third. At another time, on being asked by the same person how it happened that he professed to make others able to take part in public affairs, but took no part in them himself, Socrates replied, that he who made it his study to qualify as many as possible to engage in the management of the state, proved of more real service to the state than if he merely turned his own attention to public affairs. (§ 15.)

1. Ἀξίων δ’ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὃ πρὸς Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν σοφιστήν διελέχθη, μὴ παραλιπεῖν. Ὁ γὰρ Ἀντιφῶν ποτε βουλόθενος τοὺς συννοσιαστὰς αὐτοῦ παρελέσθαι, προσελθὼν τῷ Σωκράτει, παρόντων αὐτῶν, ἔλεγε τάδε: 2. Ὡ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ μὲν ὣμοι τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρήσαι γέγενθαι, σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τάναντα τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολειανκέναι. ζῆσ γοῦν οὕτως, ώς οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς δοῦλος ὑπὸ δεσπότη διαιτωμένος μείνεις, σιτία τε σιτῆ καὶ ποτὰ πίνεις τὰ φανλότατα, καὶ ἵπτιον ἰμφίσαι οὐ μόνον φαύλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμώνος, ἀνυπόδητός τε καὶ ἄχτιτων διατελεῖς. 3. Καὶ μὴν χρῆματα γε οὐ λαμβάνεις, ὃ καὶ κτωμένους εὐφραίνει, καὶ κεκτημένους ἐλευθερώτερόν τε καὶ ἥδιον ποιεῖς ζῆν. Εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων οἱ διδάσκαλοι τῶν μαθητῶν μιμητὰς εαυτῶν
1.6. § 9.]

MEMORABILIA.

29

ἀποδεικνύονσιν, οὕτω καὶ σὺ τοὺς συνόντας διαθήσεις, νῷ
μιζε κακοδαμονίας διδάσκαλος εἶναι. 4. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης
πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπε· Δοκείς μοι, ἡφι, ὡ Ἀντιφών, ὑπειληφέ-
ναι με σὺντος ἀνιαρῶς ζην, ὡστε πέπεισαι, σὲ μᾶλλον ἄπο-
θανεῖν ἄν ἐλέσθαι, ἦ ζῆν ὡσπερ ἐγώ. Ἡθι οὖν, ἐπισκεψώ.
νεθα, τι χαλεπῶν ζηοθήσαι τοῦμο βίου. 5. Πότερον, ὅτι
tοῖς μὲν λαμβάνουσιν ἀργύριον ἀναγκαίων ἐστιν ἄπεργά.
ζευθα τοῦτο, ὃς ᾧ ἂν μισθὸν λαμβάνοσιν, ἐμοί δὲ μὴ λαμ-
βάνωτε οὐκ ἄναγκη διαλέγεσθαι, ὥ ᾧ ἂν μὴ βούλωμαι; ἦ
τὴν διαιτάν μονο φαυλίζεις, ὡς ἦττον μὲν ὑγιεὶνα ἐσθίοντος
ἐμοὶ ἦ σοῦ, ἦττον δὲ ἴσχυν παρέχοντα; ἦ ως χαλεπώτερα
πορίσασθαι τὰ ἐμὰ διαιτήματα τῶν σών, διὰ τὸ σπανιότερὰ
τε καὶ πολυτελέστερα εἶναι; ἦ ὡς ἒδιώ σοι, δ ὡν παρα-
σκενάζει, ὄντα, ἦ ἐμοὶ ᾧ ἐγὼ; Ὁνκ ὡσθ' ὅτι, ὧ μὲν ἡδίστα
ἐσθίων ἡκίστα δῆσον δεῖται, ὧ δὲ ἡδίστα πῖνὼν ἡκίστα τοῦ
μὴ παρόντος ἐπίθυμεν ποτὸν; 6. Τὰ γε μὴν ἤρατα οἷοθ',
ὅτι οἱ μεταβαλλόμενοι ψύχοις καὶ θάλποις ἐνεκα μετα-
βάλλονται, καὶ ὑποδήματα ὑποδοῦνται, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τὰ
λυποῦντα τοὺς πόδας κωλύνουσα πορεύεσθαι· ἥδη οὖν
ποτε ἰσθον ἐμὲ ἦ διὰ ψύχοις μᾶλλον τὸν ἐνδον μένοντα, ἦ
διὰ θάλπος μαχόμενον τῷ περὶ σκίας, ἦ διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τοὺς
πόδας οὖ βαδίζοντα, ὅπου ἂν βούλωμαι; 7. Ὁνκ ὡσθ'
ὅτι οἱ φύσει ἄσθενεστατοί τῷ σώματι, μελετήσαντες, τῶν
ἰσχυροτάτων ἁμελησάντων κρείττονς τε γίγνονται πρὸς
ἀν μελετῶι, καὶ ἰἀν αὐτὰ φέρονσι; ἐμὲ δὲ ᾧρα οὔκ ὡς
τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ τὰ συντυγχάνοντα μελετῶν οἱ καρτερεῖν
πάντα ῥᾴνοι φέρειν οὐχ μὴ μελετῶντος; 8. Τοῦ δὲ μὴ
δουλεύειν γαστρί, μηδὲ ὑπνῷ, καὶ λαγνεία, οἴει τι ἄλλο
αἰτιώτερον εἶναι, ἦ τὸ ἕτερα ἔχειν τοὺτόν ἦδίῳ, δ ὡν μό-
νον ἐν χρείᾳ δῦνα εὑφραίνει, ἄλλα καὶ ἐλπίδας παρέχοντα
ωφελήσειν ἀεί; Καὶ μὴν τοῦτο γε οἶθα, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οἰό-
μενοι μηδὲν εὐ πράττειν ὡς εὑφραίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἢγούμε-
νοι καλῶς προχωρεῖν ἐαυτοῖς ἢ γεωργίαν, ἡ ναυκληρίαν, ἡ
ἀλλ' ὃ τι ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἐργαζόμενοι, ὡς εὐ πράττοντες
εὑφραίνονται. 9. Οἴει οὖν ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην
ηδόνην είναι, δισθν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίων γίγνεσθαι, καὶ φίλους ἀμείνους κτᾶσθαι; Ἡγῷ τοῖνυν δια-
τελῶ ταῦτα νομίζων. Ἡδὸν δὲ ἡ φίλους ἦ πόλιν ὅφελειν δή, ποτέρω ἡ πλείων σχολὴ τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῷ, ὡς ἕγω νῦν, ἢ τῷ, ὡς ὁ μικριζεῖς, διαιτωμένω; στρατεύοιτο δὲ πότερος ἄν ρᾶον, ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνευ πολυτελοῦς διαι-
τῆς σφῆν, ὁ ἦ τὸ παρὸν ἀρκοίη; ἐκπολιορκηθείη δὲ πότερος ἄν θάττον, ὁ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων εὑρεῖν δεόμενος, ἢ ὁ τοῖς ῥάμστοις ἐντυγχάνειν ἀρκοῦντος χρώμενος; 10. Ἔοικας, ὁ Ἀντιφών, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐλομένω τρυφήν καὶ πολυτέ-
λειαν εἶναι· ἡγῷ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δέεσθαι, θείον εἶναι, τῷ ὃς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἠθείον, κράτιστον, τῷ δὲ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου.

11. Πάλιν δὲ ποτε ὁ Ἀντιφών διαλεγόμενος τῷ Σώκρα-
τει εἶπεν· ὁ Σώκρατες, ἡγῷ τοι σὲ μὲν δίκαιον νομίζω, σοφὸν δὲ οὐδ’ ὑπωστιοῦν. Δοκεῖς δὲ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο γιγνόσκειν· οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συννοσίας ἄργυριον πράττει· καίτοι τὸ γε ἴματιον, ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν, ἢ ἄλλο τι, ὡς κέκτησαι, νομίζων ἄργυριον ἄξιον εἶναι, οὐδενὶ ἂν μὴ ὑπ’ ὅτι πρόκα δοῖς, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐλαττὸν τῆς ἄξιας λαῦν. 12. Δῆλον δὴ, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ τὴν συννοσίαν ὄν τινὸς ἄξιαν εἶναι, καὶ ταῦ-
της ἄν οὐκ ἐλαττὸν τῆς ἄξιας ἄργυριον ἐπράττον. Δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἶπη, ὅτι οὐκ ἔξαπατάς ἐπὶ πλεονεξία, σοφὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν, μηδενὸς γε ἄξια ἐπιστάμενος. 13. Ὁ δὲ Σώκρατης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν· ὁ Σύμβολον, παρ’ ἡμῖν νομίζεται, τὴν ὅραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν, ὁμοίως μὲν καλὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρόν, διατίθεσθαι εἶναι· εάν τις, δὴ ὃν γνῶς καλὸν τὰ κάγαθον ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τούτον φίλον ἐαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομί-
ζομεν· καὶ τὴν σοφίαν τοὺς μὲν ἄργυριον τῷ βουλομένως πιστεύοντας, σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν, δέτες δὲ, δὴ ὃν γνῶς ἐφυάν ὄντα, διδάσκοντα δὲ τι ἄν ἔχῃ ἁγαθὸν, φίλον ποιεῖται, τούτον νομίζομεν, ὃ τῷ καλῷ κάγαθῳ πολιτείᾳ προσέχει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν. 14. Ἡγῷ δ’ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὁ Ἀντιφών, διδορὸς τες, ἢ ἢππῳ ἁγαθῷ, ἢ κυνὶ, ἢ ὅρνυθι ἠδεια.
15. Καὶ πάλιν ποτὲ τοῦ Ἀντιφώντος ἔρωμένων αὐτόν, πῶς ἄλλους μὲν ἤγειται πολιτικοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ πράττει τὰ πολιτικὰ, εἰπέρ ἑπίσταται; Ποτέρως δὴ ἄν, ἐφη, δὴ Ἀντιφῶν, μᾶλλον τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττομι, εἰ μόνος αὐτὰ πράττομι, ἦ ἐπιμελοῦμην τοῦ ὡς πλείστους ἱκανοὺς εἶναι πράττειν αὐτά;

CHAPTER VII.

SUMMARY.

In this chapter we are informed in what way Socrates incited his friends to lay aside all habits of arrogance and vanity, and attend solely to the practice of virtue. The arguments employed by him with this view may be summed up as follows:

The best way of becoming eminent is, in whatever vocation one may wish to appear superior, to be in that actually superior. For, if a person be not intimately acquainted with a particular art, but possess only a superficial acquaintance with the same, that individual, when a trial is actually made of his ability, will not only incur the disgrace of being an empty pretender, but will have proved a source of injury to those who have suffered themselves to be deceived and imposed upon by him.

1. Ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἀποτρέπων τοὺς συνόντας, ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προέτρεπεν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔλεγεν, ὡς οὐκ εἰπ τὰ καλλίων ὁδὸς ἐπ᾽ εὐδοξία, ἡ δὲ ἦς ἂν τις ἄγαθος τοῦτο γένοιτο, δ καὶ δοκεῖν βούλοιτο. "Ωτι δ’ ἄληθῆ ἔλεγεν, ὡδε ἐδίδακεν. 2. Ἐνθυμώμεθα γὰρ, ἐφη, εἰ τις, μὴ ὡν ἄγαθὸς αὐλητὴς, δοκεῖν βούλοιτο, τί ἄν αὐτῶ ποιητέον εἰπ; ἄο οὐ τὰ ἔξω τῆς τέχνης μιμητέον τοὺς.
'Αγαθοῦς αὐλητάς; Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι ἐκείνοι σκεῦν τῇ καλᾷ κέκτηνται, καὶ ἀκολούθους πολλοὺς περιάγονται, καὶ τούτῳ ταύτα ποιητέον ἐπείτα, ὅτι ἐκείνους πολλοὶ ἐπαίνοοι, καὶ τούτῳ πολλοὺς ἐπαινέτας παρασκευαστέον. Ἄλλα μὴν ἔργον γε οὖδαμον ληπτέον, ἡ εὐθὺς ἐλεγχθῆ- σεται γελοίος ὄν, καὶ οὗ μόνον αὐλητής κακός, ἄλλα καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀλάζων. Καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν δαπανῶν, μηδὲν δὲ ὀφελούμενος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κακοδοξῶν, πῶς οὖν ἐπιτό- νικς τε, καὶ ἀλυσιτέλως, καὶ καταγελάστως βιώσεται; 3. Ἡμεῖς θ' αὐτῶς, εἰ τις βούλοιτο στρατηγὸς ἀγαθός, μὴ ὄν, φαίνεσθαι, ἢ κυβερνήτης, ἐννοώμεν, τί ἄν αὐτῷ συμβαίνοι. Ἀρ' οὖν ἂν, εἰ μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἰκανός εἶναι ταύτα πράττειν, μὴ δύναιτο πείθειν, ταύτῃ λυπηρόν; εἰ δὲ πεί- σεῖν, ἐτε ἀθλιώτερον; Δήλον γάρ, ὅτι κυβερνάν τε κατα- σταθείσι ο μὴ ἐπιστάμενος, ἢ στρατηγείν, ἀπολέσειεν ἄν οὖς ἥκιστα βούλοιτο, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀλχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς ἀπαλ- λάξειεν. 4. Ὡςαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ πλούσιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνδρείον, καὶ τὸ ἴσχυρόν, μὴ ὄντα, δοκεῖν ἀλυσιτέλες ἀπέφανεν· προστάττεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔφη μείζω, ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν, καὶ μὴ δυναμένους ταύτα ποιεῖν, δοκοῦντας ἰκανῶς εἶναι, συγγνώμης οὖν ἄν τυγχάνειν. 5. Ἀπατέωνα δ’ ἐκάλει οὐ μικρὸν μὲν, εἰ τις ἄργυριον, ἢ σκεῦος παρὰ τοῦ πειθοῦ λα- δῶν ἀποστερεῖς, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον, δεῖς μηδὲν ἄξιος ὄν ἔξηπατήκει, πείθων, ὡς ἰκανός εἰη τῆς πόλεως ἡγείσθαι. Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει καὶ τοῦ ἀλαζονευόσθαι ἀποτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας τοιάδε διαλεγόμενος.
SOCRATES, having suspected that a certain voluptuary, named Aristippus, was desirous of engaging in the management of public affairs, proves to him that one who cultivates such an intention ought first of all to be under strict self-control, lest, allured by the charms of pleasure, and disgusted at the same time by the toil and fatigue of public affairs, he may prove recreant to his duty. (§ 1-7.)

On Aristippus' having confessed, however, that his inclinations did not lead him to public affairs but to an inactive and pleasurable existence (§ 8, 9), Socrates starts a new inquiry, namely, which of the two lead happier lives, they who command, or they who are subjected to the command of others; in other words, masters or slaves. (§ 10.) Aristippus, however, declares that he himself wishes neither to command as a master nor to serve as a slave, but to be free, since freedom is the path that most of all leads to a happy existence. (§ 11.) Socrates thereupon proceeds to show that freedom, in the sense in which Aristippus understands the term, is at war with the first principles of human society, in which state the condition of either governing or being governed is a necessary one; and that he who is unwilling to submit to this condition either in public or private life, is eventually compelled by the more powerful to flee, as it were, to slavery for refuge. (§ 12, 13.)

When Aristippus, upon this, being still unwilling to yield the point declared that he confined himself to no one commonwealth, but moved about as a citizen of the world, Socrates proceeds to show both the other dangers that threaten him who keeps roaming from land to land, and especially the risk which he runs of falling into slavery; in which state as Socrates explains to him, a person like Aristippus, who wishes to do nothing, and yet expects to do well, is dealt with after a very summary fashion. (14-16.)

At length, driven to extremity, Aristippus charges those who engage
iu public affairs with folly, in voluntarily taking upon themselves a laborious and annoying task (§ 17); whereupon Socrates proceeds to show him that there is a wide difference between those who labor voluntarily, and those who labor because compelled so to do: that the former may desist whenever they please, but the latter not: and that the former, moreover, undergo all labors cheerfully, both from the consciousness of doing what is right and good in itself, and from the prospect of eventually receiving a rich recompense from others. (§ 17-19). And, besides, a life of indolent enjoyment is conducive to health neither of body nor of mind, whereas active exertion, whether corporeal or intellectual, always leads to the happiest results; it being a well-established rule that the gods give nothing good unto mortals without labor and care. Socrates then shows, both by the testimony of poets (§ 20), and that of Prodicus, also, in his beautiful apologue respecting the "Choice of Hercules," that true happiness can only be obtained by a temperate and virtuous career. (§ 21-34.)

1. 'ΕΔΟΚΕΙ δέ μου καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ, καὶ ποιοῦ, καὶ ὑπνου, καὶ βίους, καὶ θάλπους, καὶ πόνου Γνώς ἃ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἤχουν πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, Ἐπεί μοι, ἐφή, ὁ Ἀρίστιππε, εἰ δεός σε παιδεύειν παραλαβόντα δύο τῶν νέων, τὸν μὲν, ὅπως ίκανὸς ἔσται ἀρχεῖν, τὸν δὲ, ὅπως μηδ' ἀντιποθηται ἀρχής, πῶς ἂν ἔκατερον παιδεύοις; Βούλεις σκοπώμεν ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς, ὄσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν σταίχεων; Καὶ ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἐφή. Δοκεὶ γοῦν μοι ἡ τροφὴ ἀρχὴ εἶναι· οὖν δὲ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐν τις, εἰ μὴ τρέφοιτο. 2. Οὐκ οὖν τὸ μὲν βούλεον σιτίου ἀπεσθαίρετα, ὅταν ὃρα ἤκη, ἠφιέτεροι εἰκὸς παραγίγνεσθαι; Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἐφη. Τὸ οὖν προαιρέσθαι τὸ κατεπείγον μάλλον πράττειν, ἢ τῇ γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι, πότερον ἄν αὐτῶν ἰδίομεν; Τὸν εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖν, ἐφη, νῦν Ζή, παιδεύομεν, ὅπως μὴ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀπρακτά γίγνυται παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρχὴν. Οὐκ οὖν, ἐφη, καὶ ὅταν πιεῖν βούλωται, τὸ δύνασθαι διψώντα ἀνέχεσθαι τῷ αὐτῷ προσβεῦν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. 3. Τὸ δὲ ὑπνοῦ ἐγκρατη εἶναι, ὃς ὅνα σθαι καὶ ὅψε κοιμητήθηκαι καὶ πρῶτ ἀναστήναι, καὶ ἀγρυπνήσαι, εἰ τί δέοι, ποτέρω ἀν προσθείμην; Καὶ τούτο, ἐφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. Τὰ δὲ ἐφη, τὸ ἀφροδισίων ἐγκρατη εἶναι, ὃς ὅμ· διὰ ταύτα κολύεσθαι πράττειν, εἰ τί δέοι; Καὶ τούτο,
μένων ταξιν. Καὶ γὰρ πάνυ μου δοκεῖ ἀφρόνος ἀνθρώπων εἶναι τό, μεγάλου ἔργου ὑπός τοῦ ἐαυτῷ τὰ δέοντα παρα-
σκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ
tοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὧν δέονται, πορίζειν· καὶ ἐαυτῷ μὲν
πολλά, ὧν βοûλεται, ἐλλειπεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως προστῶτα,
ἐὰν μὴ πάντα, δοσά ἡ πόλις βοûλεται, καταπράττῃ, τούτων
dικὴν ὑπέχειν, τούτῳ πῶς οὐ πολλῇ ἄφροσύνῃ ἔστι; 9. Καὶ
gὰρ ἄξιον οἷς πόλεις τοῖς ἄρχονται, ὦτεπερ ἐγὼ τοῖς
οἰκέταις, χρῆσθαι. ἩΕγὼ τε γὰρ ἄξιον τοὺς θεράποντας
ἐμοῖ μὲν ἄφθονα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ
μηδενὸς τούτων ἀπετέθαι; αἱ τε πόλεις οἴονται χρὴν
τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μὲν ὡς πλείστα ἄγαθα πορίζειν,
αὐτοὺς δὲ πάντων τούτων ἀπέχεσθαι. ἩΕγὼ οὖν τοὺς μὲν
βουλομένους πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἄλλους
παρέχειν, οὕτως ἢν παρεδόθωσα εἰς τοὺς ἄρχικοὺς καταστή-
sαιμ· ἐμαυτόν τοῖς τάττων εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ὡς
φάστα τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν. 10. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐφη
Βούλει οὖν καὶ τούτῳ σκέψωμεθα, πότεροι ἥδιον ζῶσιν, οἱ
ἄρχοντες, ἢ οἱ ἄρχόμενοι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Πρῶτον
μὲν τοῖς διὰ τῶν ἔθνων, ὧν ἦμεις ἥσομεν, ἐν μὲν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ
Πέρσαι μὲν ἄρχουσιν, ἄρχονται δὲ Σύροι, καὶ Φρύγες, καὶ
Λυδοὶ· ἐν δὲ τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, Σκύθαι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Μαυρίται
dὲ ἄρχονται· ἐν δὲ τῇ Λιβύῃ, Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Λί-
δες δὲ ἄρχονται. Τούτων οὖν ποτέρους ἥδιον οἴει ζην; ἢ
τῶν Ἐλλήνων, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτός εἰ, πότεροι σοι δοκοῦσίν
ἥδιον, οἱ κρατοῦντες, ἢ οἱ κρατοῦμενοι, ζην; 11. Ἀλλ
ἐγὼ τοι, ἐφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν αὐτὸ
tῶν τάττων ἀλλ' εἶναι τὸς μοι δοκεῖ μέσῃ τούτων ὁδὸς, ἢν
πειρώμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς, οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ
di' ἐλευθερίας, ἦπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει. 12. Ἀλλ'
ei μέντοι, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦτεπερ οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς,
οὔτε διὰ δουλείας ἢ ὁδὸς αὕτη φέρει, οὔτως μηδὲ δι' ἀνθρώ-
pων ἵππος ἀν τι λέγοις· εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὡς, μήτε
ἄρχειν ἀξιωσέεις, μήτε ἄρχεσθαι, μήτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐκὼν
θεοπεύεσσις, οἴμαι σε ὅραν, ὡς ἐπίστανται οἱ κρείττονες
τοὺς ἤττονας καὶ κοινὴ καὶ ἱδία κλαίοντας καθίσαντες δούλοις χρήσθαι." 13. "Ἡ λανθάνουσι σε οἱ, ἄλλων σπειροσάντων καὶ φυτευσάντων, τὸν τε σιτὸν τέμνοντες καὶ δενδροκοποῦντες, καὶ πάντα τρόπον πολιορκοῦντες τοὺς ἤττονας καὶ μὴ θέλοντας θεραπεῦνες, ἡς ἀν πείσωσιν ἐλέεθαι δοφλεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοὺς κρείττοσι; καὶ ἱδία ἢν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἄδυνάτους ὅμως οὔσα ὑπὲρ καταδουλωσάμενοι καρπούνται; Ἄλλ’ ἐγώ τοι, ἤφη, ἴνα μὴ πάσχω ταῦτα, οὐδ’ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι. 14. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἤφη’ Τούτῳ μέντοι ἦδη λέγεις δεινὸν πάλαισμα· τοὺς γὰρ ξένους, ἢς οὐ δὲ τε Σίννους, καὶ ὁ Σκείρων, καὶ ὁ Προκροῦ στης ἀπέθανον, οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἄδικε; ἀλλὰ νῦν οῖ μὲν πολιτεύμενοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίαις, καὶ νόμους τίθενται, ἴνα μὴ ἄδικωνται, καὶ φίλους πρὸς τοὺς ἀναγκαῖους καλουμένους ἄλλους κτῶνται βοηθοῦς, καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐρύματα περιβάλλονται, καὶ ὅπλα κτῶνται, οἷς ἀμύνονται τοὺς ἄδικουντας, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτος ἄλλους ἐξωθεὶ συμμάχους κατασκεύαζονται· καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα ταῦτα κεκτημένοι ὅμως ἄδικονται. 15. Σὺ δὲ υδὲν μὲν τούτων ἔχων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀδοῖς, ἑνθα πλείστοι ἄδικονται, πολὶν χρόνον διατρίβων, εἰς ὁποῖαν ὅ’ ἂν πόλιν ἀφίκη, τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἦττων ὅν, καὶ τοιούτος, οἶκος μάλιστα ἐπιτίθενται οἱ βουλόμενοι ἄδικείν, ὅμως, διὰ τὸ ξένος εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν οἰεὶ ἄδικηθῆναι; ἢ, διότι αἱ πόλεις σοι κηρύττουσιν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ προσίοντι καὶ ἀπίστευται, θαρρεῖς; ἢ διότι καὶ δοῦλος ἂν οἱ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, οἶκος μηδὲν δεσπότη λυσιτελεῖν; τὰς γὰρ ἂν ἐθέλοι ἀνθρωπών ἐν οἰκία ἔχειν, πονεῖν μὲν μηδὲν ἐθέλοντα, τῇ δὲ πολιτευτοῦσθαι διατηρεῖ καθαρωτά. 16. Σκεφώμεθα δὲ καὶ τούτῳ, πῶς οἱ δεσπόται τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰκέταις χρῶνται· ἄρα οὐ τὴν μὲν λαγνεῖαν αὐτῶν τῷ λιμῷ σώφρονιζουσι; κλέπτειν δὲ κιλύσσοντι, ἀποκλείοντες δὲν ἂν τι λαβείν ἢ; τοῦ δὲ δραπετεύειν δεσμοῖς ἀπείρογοι; τὴν ἄργιαν δὲ πληγαῖς ἐξαναγκάζουσι; ἢ σὺ πῶς ποιεῖς, ὅταν τῶν οἰκετῶν τινὰ τοιούτον ὄντα καταμαθάνης, 17. Κω.
λάξω, ἐφη, πάντα κακοῖς, ἦς ἄν δούλευεν ἀναγκάσω Ἄλλα γάρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παρεδεχόμενοι, ἣν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζεις εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τὶ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθοῦντων, εἰ γε πεινήσουσιν, καὶ διψήσουσιν, καὶ μιγώσουσιν, καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσιν, καὶ τάλλα πάντα μοχθόσουσιν ἐκόντες; ἔγω μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ᾽, ὃ τι διαφέρει, τὸ αὐτὸ δὲρμα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἢ ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ σώμα πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα πολιορκεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγε ἢ ἀφροσύνη πρὸςετὶ τὸ δέλοντι τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν. 18. Τὶ δὲ; ὥ Ἀριστιππε, ὁ Σωκράτης ἐφη, οὐ δοκεῖς σοι τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρειν τὰ ἐκούσια τῶν ἄκονσιν, ἢ ὦ μὲν ἐκῶν πεινῶν φάγοι ἄν, ὅποτε βούλιοτο; καὶ ὃ ἐκῶν διψῶν πῖοι, καὶ τάλλα ὀραύντως· τῷ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ταῦτα πάσχοντο οὐκ ἔξεστιν, ὅποταν βούλιηται, παύεσθαι; ἐπειτὰ ὃ μὲν ἑκούσιως ταλαίπωροι ὡν ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῆ ἐλπίδι πονῶν εὐφραίνεται, οἰον οἱ τὰ θηρία θράωντες ἐλπίδι τοῦ λήψεθαι ἢδέως μοχλοῦσιν. 19. Καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἄθλα τῶν πόνων μικρὸν τινὸς ἀξία ἐστίν τούς δὲ πονοῦντας, ἵνα φίλους ἀγαθοὺς κτῆσωνται, ἢ ὅπως ἐχθροὺς χειρώσωνται, ἢ ἵνα δυνατοὶ γενόμενοι καὶ τοῖς σωμαῖ καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς, καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν οίκον καλῶς οἰκώσαι, καὶ τοὺς φίλους εὐ ποιώσαι, καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ἐνεργετώσι, πῶς οὐκ οἰεσθαί χρή τούτους καὶ πονεῖν ἢδέως εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ζήν εὐφραίνομένους, ἀγαμένους μὲν ἑαυτούς, ἑπαινομένους δὲ καὶ ζηλομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων; 20. Ἔτι δὲ αἱ μὲν ῥαδιουργίαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἥδοναί, οὔτε σώματε ἐνεξίαν ἴκαναι εἰσὶν ἐνεργάζεσθαι, ὡς φασιν οἱ γυνασταί, οὔτε ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμην ἀξίολογον οὐδεμίαν ἐμποιούσιν· αἱ δὲ διὰ καρτερίας ἐπιμέλειαι τῶν καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἐργῶν ἑξικνείεσθαι ποιοῦσιν, δὲς φασιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες· λέγει δὲ ποι καὶ Ἡσίοδος Ὁ λέγει δὲ τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδον ἔσην ἐλέεσθαι Ἡρίδως· λείη μὲν ὄδος, μάλα δ᾽ ἐγγισθε ναιεί. Ἡ τοῦ δ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προτάροιαν ἔθηκαν Ἀδάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὅρθιος ὁμος ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆν,
II. 1. § 24. MEMORABILIA.

Καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἴκητας.
'Ῥηίδην δὴ ἐπετα πέλει, χαλετὴ περ ἔσθα.

Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐν τῷ δὲ:
Τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἥμιν πάντα τάγαθ' οἱ θεῖοι.
Καὶ ἐν ἀλλῳ δὲ τόπῳ φησίν,
'Ω θυγνερέ, μὴ τὰ μαλακὰ μόει, μὴ τὰ σκλήρυνξ.

21. Καὶ Πρόδεικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται, ὡσαύτως περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπωφαίνεται, ὡδὲ πως λέγων, ὅσα ἐγὼ μέμνημαι· φησί γὰρ Ἡρακλέα, ἔπει ἐκ παῖδων εἰς ἦδην ὄρματα, ἐν ή οἷ νέοι ήδη ἀυτοκράτορες γυγνόμενοι δηλοῦσιν, εἴτε τὴν δ' ἀρετῆς ὀδὸν τρέψοντα ἐπὶ τῶν βίων, εἴτε τὴν διὰ κακίας, ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἥσυχαν καθῆσαι, ἀποροῦντα, ὁποτέραν τῶν ὀδῶν τράπηται. 22. Καὶ φανήναι αὐτῷ δύο γυναῖκας προΐνειν μεγάλας, τὴν μὲν ἔτεραν εὐπρεπῆ τε ἱδεῖν καὶ ἐλευθέριον, φύσει κεκασμημένην τὸ μὲν σῶμα καθαρότητι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα αἰδοῖ, τὸ δὲ σκῆμα σωφροσύνη, ἐσθῆτε δὲ λευκῆ· τὴν δὲ ἐτέραν τεθραμμένην μὲν εἰς πολυσαρκίαν τε καὶ ἀπαλότητα, κεκαλλωπισμένην δὲ τὸ μὲν χρώμα, ὡς τε λευκοτέραν τε καὶ ἐρυθροτέραν τοῦ ὄντος δοκεῖν φαίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ σκῆμα, ὡς τε δοκεῖν ὁρθοτέραν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἐχεῖν ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐσθῆτα δὲ, ἐξ ἡς ἄν μάλιστα ὁρα διαλάμπει, κατασκοπεῖσθαι δὲ θαμὰ ἑαυτὴν, ἐπισκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ, εἰ τὶς ἄλλος αὐτὴν θεᾶται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς σκιάν ἀποβλέπειν. 23. Ὡς δ' ἐγένοντο πλησιάτερον τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, τὴν μὲν πρόοθεν ῥήθεισαν λέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, τὴν δ' ἔτεραν, φθάσας βουλομένην, προσδραμεῖν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, καὶ εἰπεῖν· Ορῶ σε, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα, ποίαν ὀδὸν ἐπὶ τῶν βίων γράπτη· εάν ὦν ἐμὴ φέλῃ ποιησάμενος, ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδίστην τε καὶ ράστην ὀδὸν ἅξιω σε, καὶ τῶν μὲν τερτιῶν ὑδενός ἄγενστος ἔσει, τῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν ἀπειρος διαβιώσει. 24. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὗ πολέμων, οὐδὲ πραγμάτων φροντιεῖς, ἀλλὰ σκοπούμενος διέσει, τί ἂν κεχαρισμένον ἢ σιτίον ἢ
ποτόν εὔροις, ἢ τί ἂν ἰδών, ἢ τί ἀκούσας, τερβθείς, ἢ τίνων ὅσφαιρενενος, ἢ ἀπτόμενος ῥοθείς, καὶ πῶς ἂν μαλακῶτατα καθεύδοις, καὶ πῶς ἂν ἀπειφάτατα τούτων πάντων τυγχάνοις. 25. Ἡ θαν δε ποτε γίνεται τις υποψία σπάνεως, ἀφ' ἂν ἦσταί ταῦτα, οὔ φόδος, μή σε ἄγαγω ἐπί το, πονοῦντα καὶ ταλαιπωροῦντα τῷ σῶματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ, ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι· ἄλλ' οἷς ἂν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτους οὐ χρήσει, οὐδενός ἀπεχόμενος, θέν ἂν δυνατὸν ἢ τι κερδάναι· πανταχόθεν γὰρ ὕφελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐμοὶ ἐξουσίων ἐξουσίων ἐγωγε παρέχει. 26. Καὶ ὁ Ἱρακλῆς, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, Ὄ γυναι, ἐφε, οὐνομα δε σου τι ἔστιν; Ἡ δε· Οι μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι, ἐφη, καλοῦσι με Εὐδαμιονίαν, οἰ δὲ μισοῦν· τές με ὑποκορίζουμεν οὐνομάζουμει με Κακίαν. 27. Καὶ ἂν τούτω, ἡ ἐτέρα γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα εἶπε· Καὶ ἐγὼ ἦκω πρὸς σὲ, ὁ Ἰράκλεις, εἰδύκα τοὺς γεννήσαντάς σε, καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν σὴν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καταμαθοῦσα· ἔξ ὡν ἐλπίζω, εἰ τὴν πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁδὸν τράποιο, σφόδρον ἂν σε τῶν καλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν ἐργάτην ἁγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐμὲ ἔτε πολὺ ἐντυνωτέραν, καὶ ἔπ' ἁγαθοῖς διαπρεπέστεραν φανήσαι· οὐκ ἔξαπατήσω δε σε προσῳμίοις ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ', ἡπερ οἱ θεοὶ διέθεσαν, τὰ δυντα διηγήσομαι μετ' ἀληθείας. 28. Τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἁγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲν ἀνευ πόνου καὶ ἐπιμελείας θεοὶ δεδώσαν ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλ' εἴπε τοὺς θεοὺς ἱλεος εἶναι σοι βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς· εἴπε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις ἁγαπάσθαι, τοὺς φίλους ἐνεργετητέον· εἴπε ὑπὸ τινος πόλεως ἐπιθυμείς τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ἤφελητέον· εἴπε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἐλλάδος πάσης ἀξίως ἐπ' ἄρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τὴν Ἐλλάδα πειρατέον εὐ ποειν· εἴπε γῆν βούλει σοι καρποὺς ἀφόδους φέρειν, τὴν γῆν θεραπευτέον· εἴπε ἀπ' βοσκημάτων οἰει δειν πλουτίζεσθαι, τῶν βοσκημάτων ἐπιμελητέον· εἴπε διὰ πολέμων ὀρμᾶς αὐξήσεις, καὶ βούλει δύνασθαι τοὺς τε φίλους ἔλευθεροιν, καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς χειρομοίωσαι, τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὐτάς τε παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον, καὶ ὅπως αὐτάς δει χρῆσθαι ἀσκητεύον· εἰ δε καὶ τῷ σώματι θούλει δυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρε
N. I. § 32.] MEMORABILIA. 41

tein ethistetoun to syma, kai gvmnastetou syyn pounoi kai
drwti. 29. Kai h Kakia upolabousa eipen, ws fhsi Pro
dikos 'Evmnoeis, o 'Hrakleis, ws xalepeth kai makravan odou
et tacs eufrosynas h gynh sou auth dithetai; egw de
orhian kai braheian odoun eti tyn eudaimonian asw se.
Kai h 'Areti eipen. 30. 'O tlmoun, ti de sy agathon
xeis; ti te hyo oisab, meren toutw evneka prattew eth
lovas; htecs oude tyn ton 'hdeoun epitymiavan anameneis,
allla, prin epithymiasa, pantwn epimplasa, prin men pei-
nyn ethioun, prin de dysi pynousa, kai ina mev 'hdeos
fagh, onhposiouv mnhanomenv, ina de 'hdeos pinn, oinous
te poluteleis paraskevazei, kai tov therous khima peri-
thesousa zhtei; ina de kathunwshs 'hdeos, ou monon tacs
stroemvas malakas, allla kai tacs klinais kai to upobathri-
tais klinais paraskevazei; ou gar di to ponein, allla dia
to mheren exein, o te pojh, inou evthymias. 31. 'Athana-
tos de ouos, ek theon men apeirhiai, upo de anhropwv
agathon atimazei. tov de pantwv 'hdiston akoumato,
epainon evantis, anhikes ei, kai tov pantwv 'hdistov thea-
matoq atheatos oudean gar pwtote seantis ergon kalon
tebiasai. Tis de an sou legouo ti pisteusise; tis de an
demene tinod etharkseiane; ti tis de epl rovnoi tou sou
thiasou tolmhseiane inai; oI nvoi men wntes tois swmasin
odunatoi isai, presvbteroi de genomenvi, taiv psxhaii ano-
htoi, apowmen men liparoi dia neotetos trefomenvi, epist
wos de aikhmpoi dia yrrhos perawtes, tois mev peparagme-
nous aixochnymenvi, tois de prattomevnois barvinomenvi, ta
men 'hdeai en tyn neotetis diaadramontes, ta de xalastia eli to
yrhas apothemenvi. 32. 'Egyw de synevimi mev theois, synevimi
de anhropwv tois agathoi ergon de kalon, oute theio
outhe anhropwvnon, xwris emoi gignetai timwma de mal
sta pantwv kai parak theois kai para anhropwos oi prosh-
kei, agaphti mev syneregous tekhntais, pisth de wula ou-
kov dekptais, eumeneis de parasastatis oikeitas, agath de
sylleptria tov ev eirhyn pwnv, theiaia de twn ev pol.
CHAPTER II.

SUMMARY.

This chapter, which contains a conversation between Socrates and his eldest son, Lainprocles, who was angry with his mother, treats of the duty of children toward their parents. The points developed in the course of it are as follows:

1. They are called ungrateful men who do not make any return for favors received when able so to do.
2. Ungrateful persons must be ranked among the unjust. (§ 1, 2.)
3. The greater the benefit received, the more unjust must he be regarded who does not make a return for it. Those benefits, however, are to be viewed as the greatest, which are bestowed upon children by their parents, and more particularly by their mothers. (§ 3–6.) Hence it clearly follows that, even though a mother be violent and harsh of temper, she ought still to be loved and reverenced by a son, since he knows that she does not act from any evil intent, but has all the while the sincerest
wishes for his welfare. (§ 7–12.) How great a crime, then, ingratitude to parents is, may be seen even from this, that they who are guilty of the same are both punished by the laws and held in contempt by men. (§ 13, 14.)

1. Αἰσθόμενος δὲ ποτε Δαμπροκλέα, τὸν πρεσβύτατον υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ, πρὸς τὴν μητέρα χαλεπαίνοντα, Εἶπε μοι, ἐφη, ὦ παῖ, οἶοθά τινας ἀνθρώπους ἀχαρίστους καλομένους; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη ὁ νεανίσκος. Καταμεμάθηκας σὺν τούς τί ποιοῦντας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἀποκαλοῦσιν; Ἔγωγε, ἐφη· τοὺς γὰρ εὐ παθόντας, ὃταν, δυνάμενοι χάριν ἀποδόναι, μὴ ἀποδόσιν, ἀχαρίστους καλοῦσιν. Οὐκονν δοκούσι σοι ἐν τοῖς ἀδίκοις καταλογιζέσθαι τοὺς ἀχαρίστους, Ἐμοιγε, ἐφη. 2. Ἡδὴ δὲ ποτ’ ἐσκέψει, εἰ ἄρα, ὡσπερ τὸ ἀνθραποδίσεθαι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ἀδικον εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀχαριστεῖν πρὸς μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἅδικον ἐστι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους δίκαιον; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη· καὶ δοκεῖ μοι, ὦφ’ οὐ ἂν τὶς εὐ παθῶν, εἶτε φίλον εἴτε πολεμίῳ, μὴ πειράται χάριν ἀποδιδόναι, ἀδικος εἶναι.

3. Οὐκονν, εἰ γε οὕτως ἔχει τοῦτο, εἰλικρινὴς τις ἂν εἰη ἀδίκια ἡ ἁχαριστία; Συνωμολογεῖ. Οὐκονν, δῶς ἂν τὶς μειζὼς ἀγάθα παθῶν, μὴ ἀποδίδῃ χάριν, τοσοῦτῳ ἀδικώτερος ἂν εἴη; Συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. Τίνας οὖν, ἐφη, ὕπο τίνων εὐροιμεν ἂν μείζονα ενεργετημένους, ἡ παιδας ὑπὸ γονέων; οὐς οἱ γονεῖς ἐκ μὲν οὐκ δυντὸν ἐποίησαν εἶναι, τοσαῦτα δὲ καλὰ ἱδεῖν καὶ τοσοῦτων ἀγαθῶν μετασχεῖν, δοσα οἱ θεου παρέχουσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἃ δὴ καὶ οὕτως ήμῖν δοκεῖ παντὸς ἄξια εἶναι, ὡςτε πάντες τὸ καταλεπεῖν αὐτὰ πάντων μάλιστα φεύγωμεν· καὶ οἱ πόλεις ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀδικήμασι ζημίαν θάνατον πεποίηκασιν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν μείζονος κακοῦ φόβῳ τὴν ἀδικίαν παύσωντες. 4. Καὶ μὴν οὐ τῶν γε ἀφροδισίων ἔνεκα παιδοποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὑπολαμβάνεις· φανεροὶ δ’ ἐσμέν καὶ σκοτούμενοι, εὖ ὅποιων ἂν γυναικῶν βέλτιστα ἡμῖν τέκνα γένοιτο. 5. Καὶ ὁ μὲν γε ἀνήρ τὴν τε γυναικα τρέφει, καὶ τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἔσσεθαι πασι προπαρασκευάζει πάντα, ὥσα ἂν ἴηται συνοίσειν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν βίον καὶ ταῦτα ὡς ἂν
δήνηται πλείστα: ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ύποδεξαμένη τε ρέει τὸ φορτίον τούτο, βαρυνομένη τε, καὶ κινδύνεύουσα περὶ τοῦ βίου, καὶ μεταδιδοῦσα τῆς τροφῆς, ἢ καὶ αὐτὴ τρέφεται, καὶ σὺν πολλῷ πόνῳ διενέγκασα καὶ τεκοῦσα, τρέφει τε καὶ ἐπιμέλειται, οὔτε προτεπονθύνια οὐδὲν ἁγαθὸν, οὔτε γυγνῶσκον τὸ βρέφος ύφ᾽ ὅτου εὔ πάσχει, οὔδὲ σημαίνειν δυνάμενον, ὅτου δεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὴ στοχαζομένη τὰ τε συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ κεχαρισμένα πειράται ἐκπληροῦν, καὶ τρέφει πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς ύπομένουσα πονεῖν, ὦν εἴδυλλια, τίνα τοῦτον χάριν ἀπολήφηται. 6. Καὶ οὐκ ἁρκεῖ θρέψαι ὑμὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ, ἐπειδὰν δόξωσι ἱκανοὶ εἶναι οἱ παῖδες μανθάνειν τι, ὅ μὲν ἄν αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν οἱ γονεῖς ἁγαθὰ πρὸς τῶν βίων, διδάσκοντες· ὅ δὲ ἄν οἴωνται ἄλλον ἱκανότερον εἶναι διδάξαι, πέμπουσι πρὸς τοῦτον δαπανῶντες, καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, πάντα ποιοῦντες, ὅτως οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῖς γένωνται ὡς δύνατον βέλτιστοι. 7. Πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ νεανίσκος ἐφῆ· Ἀλλά τοι, εἰ καὶ πάντα ταῦτα πεποίηκε καὶ ἄλλα τούτων πολλαπλάσια, οὐδεὶς ἄν δύνατον αὐτής ἀνασχέσθαι τὴν χαλεπότητά. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· Πότερα δὲ οἶει, ἐφῆ, θηρίον ἁγριότητα δυσφωτέραν εἶναι, ἡ μητρός· Ἕγω μὲν οἶμαι, ἐφῆ, τῆς μητρός, τῆς γε τοιαύτης. Ἡδὴ πόσποτε οὖν ἡ δακούσα κακὸν τί σοι ἐδωκεν, ἡ λακτίσασα, οίᾳ ὑπὸ θηρίων ἡδὴ πολλοὶ ἔπαθον; 8. Ἀλλὰ, νῆ Δία, ἐφῆ, λέγει, ὅ οὐκ ἂν τις ἐπὶ τῷ βιῷ παντὶ βούλιοτο ἀκοῦσαι. Σὺ δὲ πόσα, ἐφῆ ὁ Σωκράτης, οἶει ταῦτῃ δυσάνεκτα, καὶ τῇ φώνῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις, ἐκ παίδου δυσκολαίνων, καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς πράγματα παρασχεῖν, πόσα δὲ λυπήσαι κάμινων; Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδεπώτοτε αὐτήν, ἐφη, οὔτ᾽ εἴπα, οὔτ᾽ ἐποίησα οὖδὲν, ἐφ᾽ ὃ φησινθη. 9. Τί δέ; οἶει, ἐφῆ, χαλεπώτερον εἶναι σοι ἀκούειν, ὅν αὐτὴ λέγει, ἡ τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς, ὅταν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἀλλήλους τὰ ἐσχάτα λέγωσιν; Ἀλλ᾽, οἶμαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ οἴονται τῶν λεγόντων οὔτε τὸν ἐλέγχοντα ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα ξημώσῃ, οὔτε τὸν ἀπειλοῦντα ἀπειλεῖν, ἵνα κακὸν τι ποιήσῃ, ῥαδίως φέρουσι. Σὺ δ᾽ εἰ εἰδὼς, ὡς δ᾽ τι λέγει σοι ἡ μήτηρ, οὐ μόνον οὐδὲν κακὰ νοοῦσα
λέγει, ἄλλα καὶ βουλουμένη σοι ἀγαθὰ εἰναι, ἵσα οὐδεις ἄλλω, χαλεπαίνεις; ἦ νορίζεις κακόνον τὴν μητέρα σοι εἰναι; Οὐ δήτα, ἐφη, τούτῳ γε οὐκ ὀἴμαι. 10. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ὅνκουν, ἐφη, σοὶ ταῦτῃ, εὗνουν τε σοι οὔσαιν, καὶ ἐπιμελημένην, ὥς μάλιστα δύναται, κάμνοντος, ὅπως ὑγιαίνῃς τε καὶ ὅπως τῶν ἐπιτηδείων μηδενὸς ἐνδείξῃς ἐσει, καὶ πρὸς τούτους, πολλὰ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχομένην ἀγαθὰ ὑπὲρ σοῦ, καὶ εὐχὰρ ἀποδιδοῦσαν, χαλεπὴν εἰναι φής; ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμῖν, εἰ τουαῦτῃ μὴ δύνασαι φέρειν μητέρα, τἀγαθά σε οὐ δύνασθαι φέρειν. 11. Εἴπε δὲ μοι, ἐφη, πότερον ἄλλον τινὰ οἴει δεῖν θεραπεύειν, ἡ παρεσκεύασαι μηδενὶ ἀνθρώ- πων πειράσαθαι ἀρέσκειν, μηδὲ ἐπεσθαί, μηδὲ πείθεσθαι μήτε στρατηγῷ, μήτε ἄλλῳ ἄρχοντι; Ναὶ μᾶ Δί', ἐγγυγε, ἐφη. 12. Ὅνκουν, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῷ γείτονι βούλει σοὶ ἀρέσκειν, ἕνα σοι καὶ πῦρ ἐναίη, δταν τοῦτον δέ, καὶ ἀγα- θοῦ τε σοὶ γίγνηται συλλήπτωρ, καὶ, ἄν τι σφαλλόμενος τύχης, εὐνοικῶς ἐγγύθεν βοηθῇ σοι; Ἐγγυγε, ἐφη. Τί δε; συνοδοιπόρον, ἡ σύμπλοκα, ἡ εἰ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἐντυγχάνοις, οὐ- δὲν ἄν σοι διαφέροι φίλον ἡ ἔχθρον γενέσθαι, ἢ καὶ τῆς παρὰ τούτων εὐνοίας οἰεί δεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; Ἐγγυγε, ἐφη. 13. Εἶτα τούτων μὲν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι παρεσκεύασαι, τὴν δὲ μητέρα τὴν πάντων μάλιστα σε φιλοῦσαν οὐκ οἴει δεῖν θε- ραπεύειν; οὐκ οἶος ὅτι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἄλλης μὲν ἁχαριστίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελεῖται, οὐδὲ δικάζει, ἄλλα περιορά τους εὐ τεπονθότας χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντας, ἐάν δὲ τις γονέας μὴ θεραπεύῃ, τούτω δίκην τε ἐπιτίθησα, καὶ ἀποδοκιμαζόνσα οὐκ ἔα ἄρχειν τούτων, ὡς οὔτε ἂν τὰ ἱερὰ εὐσεβῶς θυμένα ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, τούτων θύοντος, οὔτε ἄλλο καλῶς καὶ δικαίως οὐδὲν ἂν τοῦτον πράξαντος; Καὶ νῆ Δία ἐάν τις τῶν γονέων τελευτησάντων τοὺς τάφους μὴ κοσμή, καὶ τοῦτο ἔξετάζει ἡ πόλις ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἄρχωντων δοκιμασίαις. 14. Σὺ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, ἂν σωφρονῆς, τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς παραιτήσηι συγγνώμονάς σοι εἰναι, εἰ τι παρημέληκας τῆς μητρός, μὴ σε καὶ οὗτοι νομίσαντες ἀχάριστον εἰναι, οὔκ ἐθέλωσιν εὑ τοιεῖν· τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους αὐφ φυλάξει, μὴ σε αἰσθόμενον
CHAPTER III.

SUMMARY.

Socrates having observed that Charophon and Cherecrates, two brothers, with whom he was acquainted, were at variance, wished very much to reconcile them to each other, and employed for this purpose the following arguments:

1. A brother ought to be dearer to one than riches (§ 1); for the possession of riches is doubtful and uncertain, unless you have friends and companions, through whose aid you may be enabled to retain and enjoy these. (§ 2, 3.) The truest friend, moreover, is undoubtedly that one who has been given to you by nature, namely, a brother. For, in the first place, the being born of the same parents, and the being brought up under the same roof, ought to prove a powerful bond of union; and, in the next place, he who has a brother is less exposed to attacks from others than he who has none. (§ 4.)

2. This being the case, duty requires of us that, even if a brother entertain angry and hostile feelings toward us, still we must not imitate him in this, but must strive to conciliate and appease him (§ 5-9); and the true mode of conciliating will be by endeavoring to work upon his feelings through the medium of kind words and actions (§ 10-14); which course it will be the more incumbent upon you to pursue if you are the younger brother, since it is everywhere an established rule that the younger show respect to the elder. (§ 15-17.)

3. Brothers ought not to be in opposition to one another, but ought to live together in perfect harmony. And as, in the case of the body, two pairs of limbs, &c., such as, for example, hands, legs, feet, lend mutual aid; so no situation ought to hinder brothers who live in amity from rendering one another the most essential service. (§ 18, 19.)

1. Χαιρεφῶντα δὲ ποτε καὶ Χαιρεκράτην, ἀδελφῷ μὲν ὄντε ἄλληλου, ἐαυτῷ δὲ γνωρίμῳ, αλοθόμους διαφερομένω, ἱδὼν τὸν Χαιρεκράτην, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Χαιρεκράτες, οὐ δήποτε καὶ οὐ εἰ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων, οὐ ξυσιμωτέρον νομίζουσι χρήματα ἢ ἄδελφοὺς; καὶ ταῦτα, τῶν μὲν ἀφρόνων ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ φρονίμου, καὶ τῶν μὲν βοσθείας δεαμένων, τοῦ δὲ βοσθείν δυναμένου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὅπω
II. 3. § 8.]
MEMORABILIA.

μὲν πλειώνων ὑπαρχόντων, τοῦ δὲ ἐνος. 2. Θυμιαστὸν δὲ καὶ τούτο, εἰ τις τούς μὲν ἀδελφοὺς ζημίαν ἤγειται, ὡς ὁ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν κέκτηται, τοὺς δὲ πολίτας ὑπερήφανον ἤγειται ζημίαν, ὡς ὁ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐν ταύτα μὲν ὄνταν λογίζεσθαι, ὡς κρείττον σὺν πολλοῖς οἰκούντα ἁσφαλῶς ἀρκεύοντα ἔχειν, ἡ μόνον διαιτώμενον τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπικινδύνως πάντα κεκτησάθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὸ αὐτὸ τούτῳ ἀγνοοῦσι. 3. Καὶ οἰκείτικα μὲν οἱ δυνάμενοι ὦνούνται, ἣν συνεργοὺς ἔχωσι, καὶ φίλους κτώνται, ὡς βοηθῶν δεόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἀδελφῶν ἀμελεύσιν, ὧσπερ ἐκ πολιτῶν μὲν γεγονόμενος φίλους, ἐξ ἀδελφῶν δὲ οὐ γεγονόμενους. 4. Καὶ μὴν πρὸς φιλίαν μέγα μὲν ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν φύναι, μέγα δὲ τὸ ὄμοι τραφῆναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις πόθος τις ἐγγίγνεται τῶν συντρόφων· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι τιμῶσι τε μᾶλλον τοὺς συναδέλφους ὄντας τῶν ἀναδελφῶν, καὶ ἤττον τοῦ τού τοῖς ἐπιτίθενται. 5. Καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· Ἐλλ' εἰ μὲν, ὁ Σώκρατες, μή μέγα εἰη τὸ διάφορον, ἢς τον ἀν δεί φέρειν τῶν ἀδελφῶν, καὶ μή μικρῶν ἑνεκα φεύγειν· ἁγαθὸν γάρ, ὃςτε καὶ σὺ λέγεις, ἀδελφός, ὃν οἶν οὐδέ· ὅποτε μέντοι παντὸς ἐνδίδοι, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐναντιώτατον εἰη, τί ἂν τις ἐπιχειροί τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις; 6. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Πότερα δὲ, ὁ Χαιρεκράτης, οὐδὲν ἄρεσαι δύναται Χαιρεκράτης, ὃς τούτως σοι, ἡ ἐστὶν σοι καὶ πάνιν ἄρεσκες; Διὰ τούτω γάρ τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀξίον ἐστίν ἐμοὶ μισείν αὐτὸν, ὅτι ἄλλοις μὲν ἄρεσκεν δύναται, ἐμοὶ δέ, ὅπως ἄν παρῇ, πανταχοῦ καὶ ἐργῷ καὶ λόγῳ ζημία μᾶλλον, ἢ ὕφελεὶ ἐστίν. 7. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὃςτε ἢππος τῷ ἀνεπιστήμων μὲν, ἐγχειροῦντι δὲ χρῆσθαι, ζημία ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἀδελφός, διὰ τις αὐτῶ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος ἐγχειρῆ χρῆσθαι, ζημία ἐστίν; 8. Πῶς δ' ἂν, ἕγω, ἔφη ὁ Χαιρεκράτης, ἀνεπιστήμων εἰην ἀδελφῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπιστάμενος γε καὶ εὑ λέγειν τὸν εὑ λέγοντα, καὶ εὑ τοιεῖν τὸν εὑ ποιοῦν; τὸν μὲν τοι καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐργῷ πειράμενον ἐμῆ διόνυση, οὐκ ὃν δυνάμην οὗτ' εὑ λέγειν, οὕτ εὑ τοιεῖν, ἢλλ
ό γαί Ξενοφόντος ἐφη· Θαυμαστά γα
λέγεις, ὡς Χαιρέκρατς, εἴ κύνα μὲν, εἴ σου ἢ ἐπὶ προδή-
τος ἐπιτήδειος ἦν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ποιμένας ἥσπαξετο, σοὶ
δὲ προσίοντι ἐχαλέπαινεν, ἀμελήσας ἂν τοῦ ὀργίζεσθαι ὑπειρώ ἐν ποιήσας πράννευν αὐτῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδελφὸν φής μὲν
ιέγα ἂν ἀγαθόν εἶναι, δύνα πρὸς σὲ οἶνον δεῖ, ἐπίστασθαι
τῇ ὁμολογών καὶ εἴ ποιεῖν καὶ εἴ λέγειν, οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖς
μηχανάσθαι, ὅπως σοι ὡς βέλτιστος ἐσται; 10. Καὶ ὁ
Χαιρέκρατης, Δέδουκα, ἐφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἐγώ
τροσάτυν σοφίαι, ὡςτε Χαιρεφῶντα ποιήσαι πρὸς ἐμὲ οἶνον
ἶει. Καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γε ποικίλον, ἐφη ὁ Σώκρατης, οὐδὲ
εἰπών δεῖ ἐπι' αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, μηχανάσθαι, οἰς δὲ καὶ
ὑπὲρπάσας αὐτῶς, οἴορμαι ἂν αὐτῶν ἀλάντα περὶ πολλῶν
ποιεῖσθαι σε. 11. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις, ἐφη, λέγων, εἰ τῇ ἤθο-
παί με φίλτρον ἐπιστάμενον, ὅ ἐγώ εἰδὼς λέληθα ἐμαυτῶν.
Λέγε δὴ μοι, ἐφη, εἰ τινὰ τῶν γυνώριμων βοῦλου κατεργά-
σασθαι, ὅπτε θύου, καλεῖν σε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, τὶ ἂν ποιοῖς;
Δήλον, ὅτι κατάρχοιμι ἂν τοῦ αὐτῶς, ὃτε θύουμι, καλεῖν
ἐκεῖνον. 12. Εἰ δὲ βοῦλου τῶν φίλων τινὰ προτρέψασθαι,
ὅπτε ἀποδημοίης, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σῶν, τὶ ἂν ποιοῖς;
Δήλον, ὅτι πρότερος ἂν ἐγχειροῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ-
νον, ὅπτε ἀποδημοίης. 13. Εἰ δὲ βοῦλου τένων ποιήσαι
ὑποδέχεσθαι σεαυτῶν, ὅπτε ἐλθοῖς εἰς τὴν ἐκεῖνον, τὶ ἂν
ποιοῖς; Δήλον, ὅτι καὶ τούτον πρότερον ὑποδεχόμην ἂν,
ὅπτε ἐλθοὶ 'Ἀθήναζε· καὶ εἰ γε βούλοιμι αὐτῶν προσβύ-
μείσθαι διαπράττειν μοι ἐφ' ἂ ἦκοιμι, δήλον, ὅτι καὶ τούτο
δέοι ἂν πρότερον αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνοι ποιεῖν. 14. Πάντ' ἀρα σύ
γε τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις φίλτρα ἐπιστάμενος πάλαι ἀπεκρύπ-
tου· ἢ ὦκνείς, ἐφη, ἄρξαι, μὴ ἀλχρός φανῆς, εὰν πρότερος
τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ εὐ ποιῆς; καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἂν ἰπαῖνον ἄξιος εἶναι, δς ἂν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κα-
κῶς ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ἐνεργεῖον· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐδοκεῖ
μοι Χαιρεφῶν ἡγεμονικότερος εἶναι σοῦ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν
τατήν, ἐκεῖνον ἂν ἐπειρώμην πείθειν πρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν
τῷ σε φίλου ποιεῖσθαι· νῦν δὲ μοι σὺ δοκείς ἡγούμενος
48 XE[NOPHON'S
μάλλον ἂν ἐξεργάζεσθαι τούτῳ. 15. Καὶ ὁ Χαίρεκράτης εἶπεν· Ἱτοπά λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐδαμῶς πρὸς σοῦ ὃς γε κελεύεις ἐμὲ νεώτερον ὑπὸ καθηγεῖσθαι· καίτοι τοῦ τοῦ γε παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώπως τάναντία νομίζεται, τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἥγεισθαι παντός καὶ ἔργου καὶ λόγου. 16. Πῶς; ἔφη ὁ Σώκρατής· οὐ γὰρ καὶ ὁδὸν παραχωρήσαι τὸν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερῳ συντυγχάνοντι πανταχοῦ νομίζεται, καὶ καθήμενον ὑπαναστήναι, καὶ κοίτη μαλακῇ τιμήσαι, καὶ λόγων ὑπείξαι; ἡγαθε, μὴ δικεῖν, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἐγχείρει τὸν ἄνδρα καταπράνειν, καὶ πάνω ταχὺ σοι ὑπακούσεται· σύχθρα, ὡς φιλότιμος ἐστι, καὶ ἐλευθερίως; τὰ μὲν γὰρ πονηρὰ ἀνθρώπια οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως μάλλον ἔλοις, ἢ εἰ διδοῖς τι, τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς κάγαθος ἀνθρώποις προσφέλεις χρώμενος μάλιστα ἂν κατεργάσαι. 17. Καὶ ὁ Χαίρεκράτης εἶπεν· Ἐάν οὖν, ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ποιοῦντος, ἑκείνος μηδὲν βελτίων γίγνεται; Τί γὰρ ἄλλο, ἔφη ὁ Σώκρατής, ἢ κινδυνεύσεις ἐπιδείξαι, οὐ μὲν χρηστὸς τε καὶ φιλάδελφος εἶναι, ἑκείνος δὲ φαβλὸς τε καὶ οὐκ ἄξιος εὐφρενίας; ἀλλ' οὐδὲν οἴμαι τούτων ἑσεθαί· νομίζεις γὰρ αὐτὸν, ἐπειδὰν ἀδόθηταί σε προκαλοῦμεν έαυτὸν εἰς τὸν ἄγωνα τούτου, πάνω φιλονεκησων, ὅπως περιγένηται σοι καὶ λόγω καὶ ἔργῳ εὗ τοιῶν. 18. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη, διάκεισθον, ὥσπερ εἰ τῷ χείρε, ἢς ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τὸ συλλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλαιαν ἐποίησεν, ἀφεμένῳ τούτῳ τράποιντο πρὸς τὸ διακωλύειν ἀλλήλων, ἢ εἰ τῷ πόδε, θεία μοίρα πεποιημένων πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλους, ἀμελήσαντες τούτου ἐμποδίσοιες ἀλλήλων. 19. Οὐκ ἂν πολλῇ ἀμαθίᾳ εἰς κακοδαιμονία τοῖς ἐπὶ ὑφελείᾳ πεποιημένοις ἐπὶ βλάβει χρήσαται; Καὶ μὴν ἀδελφῷ γε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν ἐπὶ μείζονι ὑφελείᾳ ἀλλήλους, ἢ χείρε τε, καὶ πόδε, καὶ ὀφθαλμῷ, τάλλα τε, ὅσα ἀδελφὰ ἐφυσεν ἀνθρώποις. Χείρες μὲν γάρ, εἰ δέοι τυτᾶς τὰ πλέον ὀργιαῖς διέχοντα ἄμα ποιῆσαι, οὐκ ἂν δύναντο, πόδες δὲ τῦδ' ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ ὀργιαὶ διέχοντα ἐλθοῦσεν ἄμα, ὀφθαλμοὶ δὲ, οἱ καὶ δοκοῦντες ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐξικείσθησαν, οὕτ' ἂν τῶν ἐπὶ ἐγγυτέρω ὄντων τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ἄμα C
CHAPTER IV.

SUMMARY.

In this chapter, as well as in many of those that follow, the theme is Friendship. In the present chapter the value of friendship is considered:

1. Many persons are more intent upon any thing else rather than upon the acquiring and preserving of friends. (§ 1-4.)

2. And yet there is no possession more valuable, or more stable, or more directly useful than a good friend. For he takes care of the affairs and interests of another as if they were his own; he shares with him not merely prosperous, but also adverse fortune; and he provides for the safety and prosperity of another as much as, and sometimes even more than, for his own. (§ 5-7.)

1. Ἡκουσά δὲ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ φίλων διαλεγομένου, ἐξ ὧν ἐμοιγε ἐδόκει μάλιστ' ἄν τις ὠφελείσθαι πρὸς φίλων κτήσιν τε καὶ χρείαν· τούτο μὲν γὰρ δή πολλῶν ἐφή ἀκού- ειν, ὡς πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον ἄν εἰς φίλος σαφῆς καὶ ἁγαθὸς, ἐπιμελουμένους δὲ παντὸς μᾶλλον ὁρὰν ἐφή τοὺς πολλοὺς ἡ φίλων κτήσεως. 2. Καὶ γὰρ οἰκίας, καὶ ἀγροῦς, καὶ ἀνδράποδα, καὶ βοσκήματα, καὶ σκεῦς κτωμένους τε ἐπιμελῶς ὁρᾶν ἐφη, καὶ τὰ ὄντα σῶζειν πειρωμέ- νους, φίλον δὲ, δὲ μέγιστον ἁγαθὸν εἶναι φασιν, ὁρᾶν ἐφή τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐτε ὁπως κτήσονται φροντίζοντας, οὔτε ὁπως οἱ ὄντες ἐαυτοῖς σῶζονται. 3. Ἀλλὰ καὶ, καμόνυ- των φίλων τε καὶ οἰκετῶν, ὁρᾶν τινας ἐφη τοῖς μὲν οἰκέ- ταις καὶ λατροῖς ἐλεγομένας, καὶ τάλλα πρὸς ὑγείαν ἐπι- μελῶς παρασκενάζοντας, τῶν δὲ φίλων ὄλγυρωντας· ἀπο- θανόντων τε ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς οἰκέταις ἀγαθομένους καὶ ξημίαν ἤγουμένους, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φίλοις οὐδὲν οἰομένους ἐλαττόνοσθαί, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων οὐδὲν ἑωντας ἀθεράπευτον, οὐδ' ἀνεπίσκεπτον, τῶν δὲ φίλων ἐπιμελείας δεομένων ἀμελοῦντας. 4. Ἐτε δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὁρᾶν ἐφη τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων, καὶ πάνω πολλῶν
αὐτοῖς ὄντως τὸ πλῆθος εἰδότας, τῶν δὲ φίλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς πυθανομένοις τούτῳ καταλέγειν ἐγχειρήσαντας, οὕς ἐν τοῖς φίλοις ἐθεσάν, πάλιν τούτους ἀνατίθεσαί· τοσούτων αὐτοῖς τῶν φίλων φροντίζειν. 5. Καὶ τοῦ πρὸς ποιοῦ κτήμα τῶν ἀλλων παραβαλλόμενος φίλος ἀγαθός οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ κρείττων φανεῖν; ποιοὶ γὰρ ἦσσος, ἢ ποιοὶ ζεύγος οὕτω χρήσιμον, ὦσπερ ὁ χρηστὸς φίλος, ποιοὶ δὲ ἀνδράποδοιν οὕτως εὔνουν καὶ παραμόνιμουν, ἢ ποιοῖ ἄλλο κτήμα οὕτω πάγχρηστον; 6. Ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος έαυτὸν τάττει πρὸς πᾶν τὸ ἐλλειπον τῷ φίλῳ, καὶ τῆς τῶν ιδίων κατασκευῆς, καὶ τῶν κοινῶν πράξεως, καὶ, ἃν τε τινα εὔ ποιήσαι δεξη, συνεπισχύει, ἃν τε τις φόδος τάραττῃ, συμβοθεῖ, τὰ μὲν συναναλίσκων, τὰ δὲ συμπράττων, καὶ τὰ μὲν συμπείδων, τὰ δὲ βιαζόμενος, καὶ εὔ μὲν πράττοντας πλείστα εὐφράϊνων, σφαλλομένους δὲ πλείστα ἐπανορθῶν. 7. Ἄ δὲ αἱ τε χεῖρες ἐκάστῳ υπηρετοῦσι, καὶ οἱ όφθαλμοί προορῶσι, καὶ τὰ ἃτα προακουόνσι, καὶ οἱ πόδες διανύτουσι, τούτων φίλος εὐεργετῶν οὐδενὸς λείπεται· πολλάκις δὲ, ἃ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τις οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο, ἢ οὐκ εἰδεν, ἢ οὐκ ἤκουσεν, ἢ οὐ διήνυσεν, ταῦτα ὁ φίλος πρὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐξήρκεσεν. Ἄλλ' ὅμως ἐνιὸι δένδρα μὲν πειράται θεραπεύειν τοῦ καρποῦ ἐνεκεν, τοῦ δὲ παρμορφωτάτου κτήματος, ὁ καλεῖται φίλος, ἄργως καὶ ἀνεμιένως οἱ πλείστοι εἰμιέλονται.

CHAPTER V.
SUMMARY.

The main point involved in the present chapter is, that we should look well into ourselves, and see in what estimation we may reasonably hope that our friends are holding us, and should also strive to be of as much use as possible to them.

On account of the brevity of the discussion, many things are left to be concluded by the reader, rather than expressly stated by Socrates. His object, however, is to reprove one of his followers for having deserted a friend who was oppressed with penury.
CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY.

The subject of friendship is continued, and the following inquiries are instituted with regard to it:

1. What kind of persons are we to choose as friends? (§ 1-5.)

2. In what way before we make men our friends, ought we to put them
to the test, in order to ascertain whether they will make good friends or not? (§ 6, 7.)

3. In what way, after a person has been ascertained to be worthy of our friendship, are we to proceed to make him our friend? (§ 8–28.)

These questions having been answered, Socrates makes the following remarks in addition: 1. In choosing friends, we must be guided, not by mere fairness of exterior, but by internal excellence. (§ 29-32.) 2. Friendship must necessarily spring from an admiration of what is virtuous (§ 33.) 3. This admiration inspires a kindly feeling (§ 34), and this kindly feeling impels us to strive in every way to bind the individual unto us as a friend. (§ 35.) 4. Now the basis of real friendship is truth and candor (§ 36-38) and hence the shortest, and safest, and best road to friendship is this, to strive to be in reality such as you may wish your friends to consider you to be. (§ 39.)

1. 'Εδοκεὶ δὲ μοι καὶ εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν φιλοὺς, ὅποιοὶς ἄξιοιν κτάσθαι, φρενοῦν τοιάδε λέγων· Εἰπέ μοι, ἐφη, ωθεὶ τῆς ἱκτηδούλε, εἰ δεισίμηθα φίλον ἀγαθοῦ, πῶς ἢ ἵππειροιή-μεν σκοτείν; ἀρα πρῶτον μὲν ἦπτητέον, δότις ἄρχει γα- στρός τε, καὶ φιλοποσίας, καὶ λαγνείας, καὶ ὑπνοῦ, καὶ ἀργίας; ἢ γὰρ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατοῦμενος οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ δύνατ' ἢν οὐτε φίλῳ τὰ δέοντα πράττειν; Μὰ Δ', οὖ δῆτα, ἐφη. Ὁโดยเฉพาะ τοῦ μὲν ὑπὸ τούτων ἀρχομένοι ἄφεκ- τέον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. 2. Τί γὰρ; ἐφη, δότις δαπανηρός ὃν μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἂεί τῶν πλησίον δεῖται, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν, μὴ δύναται ἀποδιδόναι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ, τῶν μὴ διδόντα μισεῖ, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ οὕτως χαλέπος φίλος εἶναι; Πάνυ, ἐφη. Ὁโดยเฉพาะ τοῦ μὲν ὑπὸ τούτων ἀρχομένοι ἄφεκ- τέον καὶ τούτου, Ἀφεκτέον μὲντοι, ἐφη. 3. Τί γὰρ; δότις χρηματίζεσθαι μὲν δύναται, πολλῶν δὲ χρημάτων ἐπιθυμεί, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυσχυμβολὸς ἐστί, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν ἦδεται, ἀποδιδόναι δὲ οὐ βούλεται; Ὁμοίοι μὲν δοκεῖ, ἐφη, οὐτος ἐτε πονηρότερος ἐκείνοι εἶναι. 4. Τὶ δὲ; δότις διὰ τὸν ἑρωτα τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι μὴ δὲ ποιεῖ, ἐν ἀλλο σχο- λήν ποιεῖται, ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτὸς κερδανει; Ἀφεκτέον καὶ τούτου, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· ἀνωφελὴς γὰρ ἄν εἰῇ τῷ χρωμένῳ. Τὶ δὲ; δότις στασιώθης τὲ ἐστὶ, καὶ θέλων πολλοὺς τοῖς φίλοις ἑχθροὺς παρέχειν; Φενκτέον, νὴ Δ', καὶ τούτου. ἐὶ δὲ τὶς τούτων μὲν τῶν κακῶν μηδὲν ἔχοι, εὐ δὲ τάσχων
ἀνέχεται, μηδὲν φροντίζων τοῦ ἀντενευργετεῖν; Ἀνωφελῆς ἢν ἐι ἦν καὶ οὗτος ἀλλὰ ποίον, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, ἐπιχειρήσομεν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι; 5. Οἴμαι μὲν, διὸ πάντων ἐγκρατής, μὲν ἐστὶ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, εὐορκὸς δὲ καὶ εὐξύμβολος ἢν τυγχάνει, καὶ φιλόνεικος πρὸς τὸ μῆλον ἐλλειπεσθαί εὐ ποιῶν τοὺς ἐνεργοῦντας αὐτῶν, ὡστε ἀνετελεῖν τοῖς χρωμένοις. 6. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ταύτα δοκιμάσαμεν, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, πρὸ τοῦ χρησθαί; Τοὺς μὲν ἀνδριαντοποιούσας, ἐφή, δοκιμάζομεν, οὐ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαρχόμενοι, ἀλλ' ἢν ἢν ὅρωμεν τοὺς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντας καὶ λῶς εἰργασμένον, τούτῳ πιστευόμεν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς εἰ ποιήσειν. 7. Καὶ ἀνδρα δὴ λέγεις, ἐφή, δι' ἢν τοὺς φίλους τοὺς πρόσθεν εὐ ποιῶν φαίνηται, δήλον εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ύστέρους εὐρετήσοντα; Καὶ γὰρ ἐπίποις, ἐφή, ἢν ἢν τοὺς πρόσθεν ὄρῳ καλῶς χρωμένοιν, τοῦτον καὶ ἄλλοις οἴμαι καλῶς χρησθαί. 8. Εἰεν, ἐφή· δι' ἢν ἢμῖν άξιός φελίας δοκῇ εἶναι, πῶς χρῆ φίλον τοῦτον ποιεῖσθαι; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐφή, τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐπισκεπτεῖν, εἰ συμβουλεύονσαι αὐτῶν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι. Τί οὖν; ἐφή, δι' ἢν ἢμῖν τε δοκῇ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ μὴ ἑναντίωνται, ἓχεις εἰπειν, ὅπως οὗτος ἑπρατέος; 9. Μᾶ Δι', ἐφή, οὐ κατὰ πόθα, ὥσπερ ο λαγώς, οὐδ' ἀπάτη, ὥσπερ αἰ ὀρνιθές, οὐδὲ βία, ὥσπερ οἱ ἔχθροι· ἀκοντα γὰρ φίλον ἑλεῖν ἐργώδεις· χαλέποιν δὲ καὶ δήσαντα κατέχειν, ὥσπερ δούλοιν· ἔχθροι γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοι γίγνονται ταύτα πάσχοντες. Φίλοι δὲ πῶς; ἐφή. 10. Εἰναι μὲν τινάς φασίν ἐποδάς, ἢς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι ἐπάδοντες οἷς ἢν βούλωνται φίλους ἑαυτοῖς ποιοῦνται· εἰναι δὲ καὶ φίλτρα, οῖς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι πρὸς οὓς ἢν βούλωνται χρωμένοι φιλοῦνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν. 11. Πόθεν οὖν, ἐφή, ταύτα μᾶθομεν ἢν; Ἄ μὲν αἱ Σειρήνες ἐπῆδου τῷ Ὁδυσσεῖ, ἱκονισάς Ὀμήρου, ἢν ἣστιν ἀρχὴ τοιάδε τις· 

Διὸ ἂγε ἢ, πολίων Ὁδυσσεί, μέγα κέδος Ἀχαίων. 

Ταύτην οὖν, ἐφή, τὴν ἐπιφήν, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἀνθρώποις αἱ Σειρήνες ἐπάδοντας κατείχον, ὥστε ἡ ἀπεινάν ἢ π' αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐπισθέντας; Οὔκ̄ ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐπ
12. Σχεδόν τι λέγεις τοιαύτα χρήναι έκάστω επάθειν, ολα μη νομείς ακούουν τον ἐπαινοῦντα καταγελώντα λέγειν· οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἐχθῆ-
ων τ' ἂν εἰπή, καὶ ἀπελαύνοι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀφ' έαντοῦ, εἰ τὸν εἰδότα, διτι μικρός τε καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ άσθενής ἔστιν, ἐπαινοῦν
λέγων, ὅτι καλὸς τε καὶ μέγας καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἔστιν.
13. *Αλλὰς δέ τινας οἶς ἐπιφάς; Οὐκ· ἀλλ' ἦκουσα μὲν, ὅτι Περικλῆς πολλάς ἐπίστατο, ὡς ἐπάθων τῇ πόλει ἐποίει αὐτὴν φιλείν αὐτὸν. Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ ποιῆσε τὴν πόλιν φιλείν αὐτὸν; Μὰ Δή οὐκ ἐπάθων, ἀλλὰ περι-
ἀφας τι ἄγαθον αὐτῇ. 14. Δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὅ Σωκρα-
τες, ὡς, εἰ μέλλομεν ἄγαθον τινα κτήσασθαι φίλον, αὐτοῦς ἡμᾶς ἄγαθος δεὶ γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν. Σὺ δ' ἄ-
φων, ἐφι ο Σωκράτης, οἶον τ' εἶναι πονηρὸν ὄντα χρηστοὺς
φίλους κτῆσασθαι; 15. 'Εώρων γάρ, ἐφὶ ο Κριτόβουλος, ὅ-
ήτορὰς τε φαύλους ἄγαθος δημηγορίας φίλους ὄντας, καὶ στρατηγεῖν ὀνχ ἱκανοὺς πάνω στρατηγικοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐταί-
ρους. 16. 'Αρ' οὖν, ἐφὶ, καὶ, περὶ οὐ διαλεγόμεθα, οἷσθα τινας, οὐ ἀνωφελεῖς ὄντες ὀψελίμους δύνανται φίλους
ποιεῖσθαι; Μὰ Δῆ οὐ δήτ', ἐφὶ· ἀλλ' εἰ ἀδύνατὸν ἐστι, πο
νηρὸν ὄντα καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς φίλους κτήσασθαι, ἐκεῖνο ἡ-
δὴ μέλει μοι, εἰ ἐστίν, αὐτὸν καλὸν κάγαθὸν γενόμενον, εἰ ἄτοιμον τοῖς καλοῖς κάγαθοις φίλον εἶναι. 17. Ὁ τα-
ράττει σε, ὁ Κριτόβουλε, ὅτι πολλάκις ἄνδρας καὶ καλὰ
πράττοντας, καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀπεχομένους ὀρᾶς, ἀντὶ τοῦ
φίλους εἶναι, στασιάζοντας ἀλλήλους, καὶ χαλεπώτερον
χρωμένους τῶν μηδενὸς ἄξιων ἀνθρώπων. 18. Καὶ οὐ κρυ-
νον γ' ἐφὶ ο Κριτόβουλος, οἶ ἴδεται τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, αἱ, τῶν τε καλῶν μάλιστα ἐπιμελῶμεναι, καὶ τὰ
αἰσχρὰ ἦκιστα προσέμεναι, πολλάκις πολεμικῶς ἔχουσι
πρὸς ἀλλήλας. 19. Ἄ λογιζόμενος, πάνυ ἄθεμως ἐχω
πρὸς τὴν τῶν φίλων κτῆσιν· οὔτε γὰρ τοὺς πονηροὺς ὀρῶ
φίλους ἀλλήλους δυναμένους εἶναι· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἢ ἀχάρι-
στοι, ἢ ἀμέλεις, ἢ πλεονέκται, ἢ ἀπιστοί, ἢ ἀκρατεῖς ἀν-
θρωποὶ δύνασθαι φίλοις γενέσθαι; Οὐ μὲν οὖν πονηροὶ
πάντως ἐμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἄλληλοις ἰχθροὶ μάλλον ἢ φίλο
πεφυκέναι. 20. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὅσπερ ὁ λέγεις, οὐδὲν ἁν τοῖς
χρηστοῖς οἱ πονηροὶ ποτὲ συναρμόσειαν εἰς φιλίαν· πῶς
γὰρ οἱ τὰ πονηρὰ ποιοῦντες τοῖς τὰ τωιάτα μισοῦσι φίλοι
gένοιτ' ἂν; Ἐλ δὲ δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄρετὴν ἄκοιντες στασιά
ζουσι τε περὶ τοῦ πρωτεύειν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ θυνοῦν
tες ἑαυτοῖς μισοῦσιν ἄλληλους, τίνες ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται,
καὶ ἐν τίσιν ἄνθρωποις εὕνοια καὶ πίστις ἔσται; 21. Ἀλλ’
ἐχει μὲν, ἐφ’ ὦ Σωκράτης, ποικίλως πως ταῦτα, ὁ Κριτό-
δουλος· φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικά·
δέονται τε γὰρ ἄλληλων, καὶ ἔλεοςι, καὶ συνεργοῦντες
φιλοῦσιν, καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἄλληλους·
tὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τά τε γὰρ αὐτά καλὰ καὶ ἥδεα νομίζοντες,
ὑπὲρ τοὺτων μάχονται, καὶ δισυγνωμονοῦντες ἐναντίον
ται· πολεμικόν δὲ καὶ έρις, καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ο
τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φύνος. 22. Ἀλλ’
ὅμως διὰ τούτων πάντων ἡ φιλία διαθομὴν συνάπτει
tοὺς καλοὺς τε κἀγαθοὺς· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἄρετὴν ἀριθμοῦν
μὲν ἄνευ πόνου τὰ μέτρια κεκτῆθαι μᾶλλον, ἢ διὰ πολέ-
μου πάντων κυριεύειν, καὶ δύνανται πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶν-
tες ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν. 23. Δύνανται δὲ
καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον, τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπεχόμενοι, νομί-
μως κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἄλληλοις· δύνανται δὲ
καὶ τὴν ἔριν οὐ μόνον ἀλύπως, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφερόντως ἄλ-
ληλοις διατίθεσθαι, καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν κωλύειν εἰς τὸ μεταμε-
lησόμενον προῖεναι· τὸν δὲ φθόνον παντάπασιν ἀφαιροῦσι,
tὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἁγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχοντες, τὰ δὲ
tῶν φίλων, ἑαυτῶν νομίζοντες. 24. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰκὸς
τοῖς καλοῖς τε κἀγαθοῖς καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν μὴ
μόνον ἄκλαβεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφελίμονος ἄλληλοις κοινωνοῦν
εἶναι; οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τιμᾶσθαί τε
καὶ ἄρχειν, ὅνα ἔχουσιν ἔχωσι χρήματα τε κλέπτειν, καὶ
ἀνθρώποις βιάζεσθαι, καὶ ἢδυπαθεῖν, ἄδικοι τε καὶ πονηροὶ
ἀν εἰεν, καὶ ἀδύνατοι ἄλλω συναρμόσαι. 25. Εἴ δὲ τις, ἐν
πόλει τιμᾶσθαι Βουλόμενος, ὅπως αὐτὸς τε μὴ ἅδησται, καὶ
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G. MEMORABILIA.

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τοῖς φίλοις τα δίκαια βοηθεῖν δύνηται, καὶ ἀρξας ἀγαθόν τι ποιεῖν τὴν πατρίδα πειρᾶται, διὰ τί οί τοιοῦτοι ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν ὄνται συναρμόσαι; Πότερον τοὺς φίλους ἀφελεῖν μετὰ τῶν καλῶν κάγαδων ἦττον ὅννησεται, ἡ τὴν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν ἀδυνατώτερος ἦσται, καλοὺς τε κάγαδους ἔχων συνεργοὺς; 26. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγώσι δήλων ἦστιν, ὅτι, εἰ ἐξῆν τοῖς κρατίστοις συνθεμένους ἐπὶ τοὺς χείρους λέναι, πάντας ἂν τοὺς ἁγώνας οὔτοι ἑνίκως, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄθλα οὗτοι ἑλάμβανον. Ἔπει οὖν ἐκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἔδωσι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἐν διὸ οἱ καλοὶ κάγαδοι κρατιστεύουσιν, οὔθεις κωλύει, μεῦ οὐ ἂν τις βούληται, τὴν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν, πῶς οὖν οὐν \[\text{Με} \] συτελεῖ τοὺς βελτίστους φίλους κτησάμενον πολιτεύεσθαι τοῦτοις κοινωνοὶ καὶ συνεργοὶ τῶν πράξεων μᾶλλον ἃνταγωνισταῖς χρῶμεν; 27. Ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκεινο δήλων ὅτι, κἂν πολεμῇ τίς τινι, συμμάχων δεησεται, καὶ τούτων πλειόνων, ἔὰν καλοὶς κάγαδοις ἀντιτάτηται. Καὶ μὴν οὐ συμμαχεῖν ἐθέλουσιν εὐ ποιητεῖ, ἦνα θέλωσι προθυμεῖσθαι πολὺ δὲ κρείττον τοὺς βελτίστους ἐλάττονας εὐ ποιεῖν, ἢ τοὺς χείρονας πλείστοσας ὅντας· οἱ γὰρ πονηροὶ πολὺ πλειόνων εὐεργεσίων, ἢ οἱ χρηστοὶ, δέουνται. 28. Ἀλλὰ θαδ ῥών, ἠφή, ὁ Κριτόδουλε, πειρὼ ἀγάθος γέγνεσθαι, καὶ τοῖς οὔτος γιγνόμενος θηρᾶν ἐπιχείρει τοὺς καλοὺς τε κάγαθος. Ἰσως δὲ ἂν τὶ σοι κἀγὼ συλλαβεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν καλῶν τα κάγαδων θῆραν ἔχομι, διὰ τὸ ἑρωτικὸς εἶναι δεινοῦς γάρ, ὅν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσω ἄνθρώπων, ὅλως ὄρισμα ἔπ τὶ φιλῶν τὴν αὐτοὺς ἀντιφλεισθήσε ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ ποθῶν ἀντιποθεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἀντεπιθυμεῖσθαι τῆς ἕνυνοσίας. 29. Ὁρὼ δὲ καὶ σοὶ τούτων δήσουν, ὅταν ἐπιθυμήσῃς φιλίαν πρὸς τινας ποιεῖσθαι. Μή συ οὖν ἀπε- κρύπτου με, οἷς ἂν βούλουσι φίλος γενέσθαι· διὰ γὰρ τὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀρέσει τῷ ἀρέσκοντί μοι, οὐκ ἄπειρος οἶ- μαι ἔχειν πρὸς θῆραν ἄνθρώπων. 30. Καὶ ὁ Κριτόδουλος ἠφή· Ἐ μή καὶ, ὁ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἐγὼ τῶν μαθημάτων πάλαι ἐπιθυμῶ. 33. Καὶ ο Ὁ σωκράτης ἠφή· Ὅταν οὖν, ἃ
Κριτόδουλε, φίλος τενί βούλη γενέσθαι, εάσεις με κατεπείν σου πρὸς αὐτὸν, διτί ἀγασάε τε αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖς φίλος αὐτὸν εἶναι; Κατηγόρει, ἐφὴ ὁ Κριτόδουλος, οὐδένα γὰρ οἶδα μισοῦντα τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας. 34. 'Εὰν δέ σου προσκατηγορήσω, ἐφη, διτί, διὰ τὸ ἀγασάει αὐτὸν, καὶ εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχεις πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἀρα μὴ διαβάλλεσθαι δόξεις ὑπ' ἐμοῦ; 'Αλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶ μοι, ἐφη, ἐγγίγνεται εὐνοια, πρὸς οὐς ἁν υπολάθω εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχειν πρὸς ἐμε. 35. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἔξεσται μοι λέγειν περὶ σοῦ, πρὸς οὗς ἁν βούλη φίλους ποιῆσασθαί: ἐὰν δέ μοι ἐτὶ ἐξονιάν ὃς λέγειν περὶ σοῦ, διτὶ ἐπιμελῆς τε τῶν φίλων εἰ, καὶ οὐδὲνι οὕτω χαίρεις ὡς φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς ἔργοις τῶν φίλων ἀγάλλει οὐχ ἦττον, ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀεατοῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῶν φίλων χαίρεις οὐδὲν ἦττον, ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀεατοῖς ὡς τοῖς φίλοις, ὡς τοῖς μὲν φίλους εὗ ποιῶντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, πάνω ἀν οἰμαί σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι με σύνθηρον τῶν ἀγαθῶν φίλων. 36. Τι οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Κριτόδουλος, ἐμοὶ τοῦτο λέγεις, ὡσπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοὶ ὅν, ὃ τι ᾧ βούλη, περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγειν; Μὰ Δι' οὐχ, ὡς ποτε ἐγὼ Ἀσπασίας ἱκονοὺσα· ἐφη γὰρ τάς ἀγαθός προμηνστρίδας, μετὰ μὲν ἀληθείας τάγαθα διαγγελλόμενα, ἐπ' ὑμάς εἶναι συνάγειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς κρισίαν, ψευδομένας δ' οὐκ ὦφελείν ἐπαινοῦσας· τοὺς γὰρ ἔξαπατηθέντας ἀργοὶ μισεῖς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τὴν προμη- σαμένην· το δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ πεισθεῖς ὅτι ἐγώμαι οὐκ ἔξειναι μοι περὶ σοῦ λέγειν ἐπαινοῦντες οὐδέν, ὃ τι ᾧ ἡ ἀληθεῖα. 37. Σῡ μὲν ἄρα, ἐφη ὁ Κριτόδουλος, τοιοῦτός μοι φίλοις εἰ, ὁ Σωκράτης, οἶος, ἀν μὲν τι αὐτὸς ἐχω ἐπιτή- δειον εἰς τὸ φίλους κτήσασθαι, συλλαμβάνειν μοι· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἀν ἔθελος πλάσας τι ἐπείν ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ωφελείᾳ. Πότερα δ' ᾧ, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ Κριτόδουλε, δοκῶ σοι μᾶλλον ὦφελείν σε τὰ ψευδὴ ἐπαινῶν, ἢ πείθων πιεράσθαι σε ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα γενέσθαι; 38. Εἴ δὲ μῆ φανερόν οὕτω σοι, ἐκ τῶνδε σκέψαι· εἰ γὰρ σε βουλόμενος φίλον ποιῆσαι
CHAPTER VII.

SUMMARY.

XENOPHON, having in the previous chapters given the precepts of Socrates in relation to friendship, now proceeds to show in what way the latter strove to aid his friends, when they were in want or difficulty of any kind; namely, both by imparting useful instruction and advice (chapters vii.-ix.), and by exhorting them to lend aid to one another (chapter x.).

In the present chapter Socrates lays down the rule, that if a person, liberally brought up, be overtaken by want, it is not only not disreputable, but even honorable, in such a case, to practise those employments that may be useful for the support of existence, even though these may not be what the world would call liberal, or would deem it worthy for a free man to pursue.

1. Καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀπορίας γε τῶν φίλων, τὰς μὲν δὲ ἄγνων αὑν, ἑπειράτο γνώμη ἀκείσθαι, τὰς δὲ δὲ ἐνδεικνυμα, διδασκὼν κατὰ δύναμιν ἀλλήλους ἐπαρκεῖν. Ἐρῶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, καὶ σύνοιδα αὐτῶ. Ἀρίσταρχον γὰρ ποτὲ ὅρῶν σκυθρωπῶν...
έχοντα, 'Εσικα, ἐφη, ὥ 'Αρισταρχε, βαρέως φερειν τι χρη δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδίδοναι τοῖς φίλοις. ἵως γὰρ ἃν τί σε καὶ ἤμεις κοινφιάσαμεν. 2. Καὶ ὁ 'Αρισταρχος, Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη, ὥ Σώκρατες, ἐν πολλῇ γε εἰμι ἀπορία. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐστασίας ἡ πόλις, πολλῶν φυγόντων εἰς τὸν Πειροία, συνεληλύθασιν ὡς ἐμὲ καταλελειμέναν ἀδελφοί τε, καὶ ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ ἄνεφαι τοσαῦτα, ὡς εἶναι εἰν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τεσσαρεκαίδεκα τοὺς ἐλευθέρους. λαμβάναμεν δὲ οὗτε ἐκ τῆς γῆς οὐδέν. οἱ γὰρ ἐναντίοι κρατοῦσιν αὐτῆς. οὕτε ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκίων ὡλιγανθωπία γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἁστεί γέγονε, τὰ ἐπιπλα δὲ οὐδεὶς οὐκέτι δανείσσασθαι οὐδαμῶθεν ἔστιν ἀργύριον, ἀλλὰ πρότερον ἂν τίς μοι δοκεί ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ξητῶν εὑρεῖν, ἦ δανειζόμενος λαβεῖν. Χαλεπὸν μὲν ὁν ἔστεν, ὥ Σώκρατες, τοὺς οἰκείους περιορὰν ἀπολλυμένους, ἀδύνατον δὲ τοσοῦτος τρέφειν ἐν τοιούτος πράγμασιν. 3. Ἀκούσας οὖν ταῦτα ὁ Σωκράτης, Τί ποτέ ἐστιν, ἐφη, διτ ὁ Κεράμων μὲν πολλοὺς τρέφων, οὐ μόνον ἐαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῦτος τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ὑποῦται παρέχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περι ποιεῖται τοσαῦτα, ὡςτε καὶ πλουτεῖν, οὐ δὲ πολλοὺς τρέφων δεδοικας, μὴ δι' ἐνδειαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἄπαντες ἀπόλησθε; Ὅτι νὴ Δῆ, ἐφη, ὁ μὲν δούλους τρέφει, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐλευθέρους. 4. Καὶ πότερον, ἐφη, τοὺς παρὰ σοι ἐλευθέρους οἰεὶ βελτίους εἶναι, ἡ τοὺς παρὰ Κεράμων δούλους; Ἐγὼ μὲν οὔμαι, ἐφη, τοὺς παρὰ ἐμοὶ ἐλευθέρους. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, ἀλαξχρων τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ποιητερῶν εὐπορεῖν, σὲ δὲ πολλὰ βελτίους ἔχοντα εἰς ἀπορίας εἶναι; Νὴ Δῆ, ἐφη, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τεχνώτας τρέφει, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐλευθερίως πεπαιδευμένους. 5. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἐφη, τεχνώτας εἰςον οἱ χρήσιμοι τι ποιεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι; Μάλιστα γ', ἐφη. Οἱ κοινὸν χρήσιμα γ' ἀλφιτα; Σφόδρα γε. Τί δ' ἀρτοι; Οὐδὲν ἦττον. Τί γὰρ; ἐφη, ἰματία τε ἀνδρεία καὶ γνωαίεια, καὶ χιτωνείςκοι, καὶ χλαμύδες, καὶ εξωμίδες; Σφόδρα γε, ἐφη, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα χρήσιμα. Ἐσπειτα, ἐφη, οἱ παρὰ σοι τούτων οὐδὲν ἐπιστάνται ποιεῖν; Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ως ἐγὼμαι. 6 Ἐἴτ' οὖ κύθα, διτ ἀφ' ἐνὸς μὲν τούτων, ἀλφετοποιίας
Ναυσικώδης ού μόνον ἐαυτόν τε καὶ τους οἰκέτας τρέφει, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ύς πολλὰς καὶ βοῦς, καὶ περιποιεῖται τοσάντα, ὡστε καὶ τῇ πόλει πολλάκις λειτουργεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ ἀρτοποιίας Κύρηθος τήν τε οἰκίαν πᾶσαν διατρέφει, καὶ ζῇ δαψιλῶς, Δημέας δὲ ὁ Κολυντεύς, ἀπὸ χλαμυδουργίας, Μένων δ', ἀπὸ χλαμυδοποιίας, Μεγαρέων δὲ οἱ πλείστοι, ἐφη, ἀπὸ ἐξωμυδοποιίας διατρέφονται; Νή Δῆ', ἐφη, οὕτωι μὲν γάρ ὄνομενοι βαρβάρους ἀνθρώπους ἔχουσιν, ὡστ' ἀναγκάζειν ἐργάζεσθαι, δ' καλῶς ἔχει, ἐγὼ δ' ἐλευθέρους τε καὶ συγγενεῖς. 7. Ἡ Επείτ', ἐφη, ὅτι ἐλευθεροὶ τ' εἰσὶ καὶ συγγενεῖς σοι, οὐεὶ χρήναι μηδὲν αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν ἄλλο, ἦ ἐσθίειν καὶ καθεῦδειν; Πότερον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθέρων τούς οὔτως ζώντας ἁμεινον διάγοντας ὀρᾶς, καὶ μάλλον σύ-δαμονίζεσι, ἦ τοὺς, ὥστε ἐπιστανται χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον τούτων ἐπιμελομένους; 8. Ἡ τήν μὲν ἀργίαν καὶ τήν ἀμε.λειαν αἰθοῦναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τὸ μαθέειν ἄ προς ἑνε καὶ ἐπιστασθαι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ μυθομενείν ἄν μάθωσι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαινεῖν τε καὶ ἰσχύειν τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ετήσιον τε καὶ σώζειν τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον, ὧμε.λίμα ὡντα, τῆν δὲ ἐργασίαν καὶ τήν ἐπιμέλειαν οὐδὲν χρή- σιμαι; 9. Ἔμαθον δέ, ἀ φής αὐτῶς ἐπίστασθαι, πότερων ὡς οὔτε χρήσιμα ὡντα πρὸς τὸν βίον, οὔτε ποιησοῦσι αὐτ.τῶν οὐδέν, ἦ τοι αντιντ, ὡς καὶ ἐπιμεληθησόμενα τούτων, καὶ ὠφεληθησόμεναι ἄπ' αὐτῶν; Ποτέρως γὰρ ἄν μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπου σωφρονίζει, ἀργοῦντες, ἦ καὶ τηρήματι οὕπομεναι; Ποτέρως δ' ἄν δικαίοτεροι εἰέν; εἱ ἐργάζοντο, ἢ εἰ ἀργοῦντες βουλεύοντο περὶ τῶν ἐπιτηρεῖν οὕπομενα; 9. Ἄλ.λα καὶ νῦν μὲν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐκεῖνας φιλεῖς, οὔτε ἐκεῖνα σέ· σὺ μὲν ἡγοῦμενος αὐτῶς ἐπιζηγίως εἰναι σεαντ.τῷ, ἐκεῖναι δὲ σὲ ὁρῶσαι ἀχθομενον ἐφ' ἑαυταῖς. Ἐκ δὲ τούτων κίνδυνος μείξο τε ἀπέχθειαν γέγρεσθαι, καὶ τήν προγεγοννίαν χάριν μειοῦσαι. Ἐὰν δὲ προστάτης ὑπὸς ἑνεργοὶ ἰστι, σὺ μὲν ἐκεῖνας φιλήσεις, ὡρῶν ὠφελ.μους σεαυτῷ οὕςες, ἐκεῖναι δὲ σὲ ἀγαπήσουσιν, αἰσθόμεναι γαίροντα σὲ αὐταῖς, τῶν δὲ προγεγοννιῶν ἑνεργεσιῶν ἦδιον
μευνημένη την ἀπ’ ἐκεῖνων χάριν αὐξήσετε, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ϕιλικώτερον τε καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀλλήλοις ἐξετε. 10 Ἐλ μὲν τούνα αἰσχρόν τε ἐμελλὸν ἐργασάσθαι, θάνατον ἀντ’ αὐτοῦ προαιρετέον ἦν· νῦν δὲ, ἄ μὲν δοκεῖ κάλλιστα καὶ πρεποδέστερα γυναικί εἶναι, ἐπίστανται, ὡς ξοικε· πάντες δὲ, ἀ ἐπίστανται, ἱδατά τε, καὶ τάχιστα, καὶ κάλλιστα, καὶ ἡδίστα ἐργάζονται. Μὴ οὖν ὁκνεῖ, ἐφη, ταῦτα εἰσηγεῖσθαι αὐταῖς, ὧ σοί τε λυσιτελήσει κάκειναι, καὶ, ὡς εἰκός, ἡδέως ὑπακούσονται. 11. Ἀλλά, νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἐφη ὁ Ἀρισταρχος, οὕτως μοι δοκεῖς καλῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥστε πρόσθεν μὲν οὐ προκείμην δανείσσασθαι, εἰδὼς, ὅτι ἀναλώσας, ὅ τι ἄν λάβω, οὐχ ἔξω ἀποδοῦναι, νῦν δὲ μοι δοκῶ εἰς ἐργών ἀφορμήν ὑπομένειν αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι.

12. Ἐκ τούτων δὲ ἐπορίσθη μὲν ἀφορμή, ἑωνήθη δὲ ἔρα· καὶ ἐργαζόμεναι μὲν ἡρίστων, ἐργασάμεναι δὲ ἐδείπνον, ἱλαρι πὲ ἀντὶ σκυθρωπῶν ἠσαν· καὶ ἀντὶ υφορωμένων ἐστάς, ἢδέως ἀλλήλας ἐώρων· καὶ αἱ μὲν ὡς κηδεμόνα ἐφίλουν, ὁ δὲ ὡς ωφελίμους ἡγάτα. Τέλος δὲ ἐλθὼν πρὸς τὸν Σωκράτην, χαῖρων διηγεῖτο ταῦτα τε, καὶ ὅτι αἰτεῖν ται αὐτὸν μόνον τῶν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἄργον ἐσθίειν. 13. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐφῆ· Ἐίτα οὐ λέγεις αὐταῖς τὸν τοῦ κυνὸς λόγον; φασὶ γάρ, ὅτε φωνήνετα ἦν τὰ ἄξω, τὴν δειν, πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην εἰπείν· θαυμαστὸν ποιεῖς, δς ἡμῖν μὲν ταῖς καὶ ἔρια σοι, καὶ ἄρνας, καὶ τυρόν παρεχοῦσας οὐδὲν δίδως, δ τι ἄν μή ἐκ τῆς γῆς λάβωμεν· τῷ δὲ κυνί, δς οὐδὲν τοι- ούτων σοι παρέχει, μέταδίδως οὐπερ αὐτὸς ἔχεις σῖτον. 14. Τὸν κύνα οὖν ἄκουσάντα εἰπείν· Ναὶ μᾶ Δία· ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμί ὁ καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτάς σώζων, ὡςτε μήτε ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων κλέπτεσθαι, μήτε ὑπὸ λύκων ἀρπάζεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ὑμεῖς γε, εἰ μή ἐγὼ προφυλάττωμι ὑμᾶς, οὔδ’ ἄν νέμεσθαί δύναισθε, φοβοῦμεν μη ἀπόλησθε. Οὔτω δὴ λέγεται καὶ τὰ πρό- ὅποτε συγχωρήσαι τὸν κύνα προτιμάσθαι. Καὶ οὐ οὖν ἐκεῖ- νας λέγε, ὅτι ἅντι κυνὸς εἰ φύλαξ καὶ ἐπιμελητής, καὶ διὰ σε οὖδ’ ύφ’ ἐνὸς ἀδικούμεναι. ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἡδέως ἐργα- ζόμεναι ζῶσιν.
CHAPTER VIII.

SUMMARY.

Socrates advises his friend Eutherus, who had been obliged, in consequence of the loss of his property by the war, to labor for his own support, to seek out some employment that might enable him to lay up a little for his old age. He recommends him, for instance, to endeavor to procure the situation of steward or superintendent to some wealthy individual; and, on the other's objecting to the servile nature of such an employment, he proceeds to point out to him that it is hard to find any situation in life where one is not in some degree amenable to or controlled by others. He shows him, therefore, that all which he has to do is to pursue whatever employment he may enter upon with steadiness and alacrity.

1. "Ἀλλὰ κάποιον δὴ ποτὲ ἄρχαιον ἔταίρον διὰ χρόνου ἰδων, Πόθεν, ἐφη, Εὐθηρε, φαίνει; Ἐκ τῆς κατάλυσι τοῦ πολέμου, ἐφη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐκ τῆς ἄποδημίας, νυνὶ μέντοι αὐτόθεν· ἐπειδή γὰρ ἀφηρέθημεν τὰ ἐν τῇ ὑπεροπίᾳ κτήματα, ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὁ πατήρ μοι οὐδὲν κατέλεπεν, ἀναγκαζομαι νῦν ἐπιδημήσας, τῷ σώματι ἐγγαζέμουν τὰ ἐπιτη- δεια πορίζεσθαι. δοκεῖ δὲ μοι τοῦτο κρεῖττον εἶναι, ἢ δει- σθαι τινὸς ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα, ἐφὶ ὅτι ἀν δανειζώμην. 2. Καὶ πόσον χρόνον οἷς οἱ, ἐφη, τὸ σῶμα ἰκανῶν εἶναι μισθοῦ τὰ ἐπιτηδεία ἐγράξεσθαι; Ἡ τῶν Δί', ἐφη, οὐ πολὺν χρόνον. Καὶ μὴν, ἐφη, ὅταν γε πρεσβύτερος γένη, δῆλον, ὅτι δαπάνης μὲν δεήσει, μισθὸν δὲ οὐδέςι σοὶ θελήσῃ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐργῶν διδόναι. Ἀκολούθη λέγεις, ἐφη. 3. Οὐκον, ἐφη, κρεῖττον ἐστιν αὐ- τόθεν τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν ἐργῶν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἢ καὶ πρεσβυ- τέρῳ γενομένῳ ἐπαρκέσσει, καὶ προσελθόντα τῷ τῶν πλείονα χρήματα κεκηρυκτον, τῷ δεομένῳ τοῦ συνεπιμελησμονοῦ, ἐργῶν τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦντα, καὶ συγκομιζόντα καρπούς, καὶ συμφαλὰ κτλ. τῆν οὐσίαν, ὥφελοντα ἀντωφελεύσθαι. 4. Χαλεπάς ἂν, ἐφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, δούλειάν ύπομεί- ναιμι. Καὶ μὴν οὐ γε ἐν ταῖς πόλεις προστατεῦσοντες καὶ τῶν δημοσίων ἐπιμελήμενοι οὐ δουλοπρεπέστεροι ἔνεκα τούτου, ἀλλ' ἐλευθερώτεροι νομίζοντα. 5. Ὅλως μὴν
C H A P T E R  I X.

SUMMARY.

Crito, a wealthy individual, complains to Socrates of the difficulty of leading a quiet life at Athens, since he is constantly annoyed by lawsuits, brought, apparently, for no other purpose than to extort money from him. Socrates thereupon recommends him to employ the services of Archidemos, a poor man, but able and eloquent, who will protect him from informers and vexatious litigations of every kind. This advice is followed, and proves so eminently successful, that those friends of Crito, who were similarly situated with himself, requested as a favor that they also might avail themselves of the services of Archidemos.

1. Oídá dé tote autn kai Krítwnos akouásanta, ós xalépod ó Blos 'Athiníasin eíth anbri bouloímewn tâ éanvó prátttein. Nûn gár, éph, émê tines eis díkas ágyousin, oux ótì. ádikouúnta uí' émou, álλ' ótì nümiçousin, ëdion an me áryúríon teilei, ë prógmata ëxein. 2. Kai ó Swkrátŷs, Eipê mo, éph, ó Krítwn, kûnas dé trfieis, ëna suí toûs lúkous apò tòn prôbåtwn ñperúkswi; Kai màla, éph: màllon gár mo léusitelei trfieis, ë mh. Oúk an ón ðrëfais kai ãndra, ðzìs ñtheloi te kai dûnaito sou
II. 9. § 8.] MEMORABILIA. 65

ἀπερύκειν τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀδικεῖν σε; 'Ἡδεως γ' ἂν, ἐφη, εἰ μὴ φοβοῦμην, ὃπως μὴ ἔπ' αὐτὸν με τράποιτο. 3. Τι δ’; ἐφη, οὐχ ὃρας, ὅτι πολλῷ ἤδιον ἔστι, χαριζόμενον οἷς σοι ἀνδρὶ, ἢ ἀπεχθόμενον, ὥφελεῖσθαι; εὖ ὧθι, ὅτι εἰςίν ἐνυάδε τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀνδρῶν οἱ πάνω ἂν φιλοτιμηθείειν φίλω σοι χρῆσαί.

4. Καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀνευρίσκουσιν 'Αρχέδημον, πάνυ μὲν ἱκανὸν εἴπειν τε καὶ πράξαι, πένητα δε· οὐ γὰρ ἦν οἷος ἀπὸ παντὸς κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ, φιλόχρηστος τε καὶ εὐφυε- στερος ὄν, ἀπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν λαμβάνειν. Τούτῳ οὖν ὁ Κρίτων, ὅποτε συγκομίζοι ή σίτον, ἤ ἐλαιον, ἤ οἶνον, ἤ ἐρεία, ἢ ἅλλο τῖ τῶν ἐν ἀγρῷ γυνομένων χρησίμων πρὸς τὸν βίον, ἀφελῶν ἐδωκε· καὶ ὅποτε θύοι, ἐκάλει, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἐπεμελεῖτο. 5. Νομίσας δὲ ὁ 'Αρχέδημος ἀποστροφῆν οἱ τὸν Κρίτωνος οἶκον, मάλα περείπεν αὐτὸν· καὶ εὐθὺς τῶν συκοφαντοῦντων τὸν Κρίτωνα ἀνευρήκει πολλὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα, πολλοὺς δ’ ἐχθροὺς· καὶ αὐτῶν τινα προσεκαλέσατο εἰς δίκην δημοσίαν, εὖ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔδει κριθῆναι, δ τι δει παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι. 6. 'Ο δὲ, συνειδῶς αὐτῷ πολλὰ καὶ πονηρά, πάντ’ ἐποίει, ὡστε ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ 'Αρχεδήμου. 'Ο δὲ 'Αρχέδημος οὐκ ἀπηλλάττετο, ἐὼς τὸν τε Κρίτωνα ἀφῆκε, καὶ αὐτῷ χρήματα ἐδωκεν. 7. 'Επεὶ δὲ τούτῳ τὲ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ὁ 'Ἀρχέδημος διεπρά- ξατο, ἦδη τότε, ὡσπερ, ὅταν νομέες ἀγαθῶν κύνα ἔχῃ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι νομεῖς βούλονται πλησίον αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀγέλας ἰστά- ναι, ἵνα τοῦ κυνὸς ἀπολαύσωσι, οὕτω καὶ Κρίτωνος πολλοὶ τῶν φίλων ἐδέσοντο καὶ σφόνι παρέχειν φύλακα τὸν 'Ἀρχέ- δημον. 8. 'Ο δὲ 'Αρχέδημος τῷ Κρίτωνι ἥδεως ἐχαρίζετο, καὶ οὐχ ὃτι μόνος ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ φι- λοὶ αὐτοῦ· ei δὲ τις αὐτῷ τούτων, οἷς ἀπήχθητο, οὐνειδίζοι, ὡς ὑπὸ Κρίτωνος ὥφελοφιμένος κολακεύοι αὐτόν· Πότερον οὖν, ἐφη ὁ 'Ἀρχέδημος, αἰσχρὸν ἐστίν εὑρεγετούμενον ὑπὸ χρηστῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀντενεργετοῦντα, τοῖς μὲν τοιοῦ- τους φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς διαφερέσθαι, ἢ τούς μὲν καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἀδικεῖν πειρώμενον ἐθεροὺς ποιεῖσθαι
CHAPTER X.
SUMMARY.

Socrates exhorts Diodorus, a wealthy Athenian, to lend aid to Hermogenes, a friend of the latter, and an upright and honest man, but laboring under poverty. For he shows him that if, when a slave runs away, we exert ourselves to recover possession of him by the offer of rewards; and if, when a slave is sick, we call in a physician, and endeavor to save his life; how much more ought we to strive to recover a friend, and to rescue him from want, seeing that a good friend is superior in value to a thousand slaves.

1. Οἶδα δὲ καὶ Διοδώρῳ αὐτῶν ἐταίρῳ ὄντι τοιάδε διαλεγόμενο Εἰπε μοι, ἐφη, ὁ Διόδωρε, ἂν τις σοι τῶν οἰκετῶν ἀποδῆ, ἐπιμελεί, ὡς ἀνακομίσῃ; 2. Καὶ ἄλλους γε νὴ Δί', ἐφη, παρακαλῶ, σῶστρα τοῦτον ἀνακηρύσσον. Τί γὰρ; ἐφη, εάν τίς σοι κάμνῃ τῶν οἰκετῶν, τοῦτον ἐπιμελεί, καὶ παρακαλεῖς ἵπτρούς, ὡς μὴ ἀποθάνῃ; Σφόδρα γ', ἐφη. Εἰ δὲ τίς σοι τῶν γνωρίμων, ἐφη, πολὺ τῶν οἰκετῶν χρησιμώτερος ὄν, κινδυνεύει δι' ἐνδειαν ἀπολέσθαι, οὐκ οἰεί σοι ἄξιον εἶναι ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὡς διασωθῇ; 3. Καὶ μὴν οἰοθά γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἄγνώμον ἔστιν Ἔρμυγένις, αἰσχύνοιτο δ' ἄν, εἰ ὁφελούμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ, μὴ ἀντωφελοῦρ σε καίτοι τὸ ὑπηρέτην ἐκόντα τε καὶ εὐνοῦν, καὶ παραμοῦν, καὶ τὸ κελευόμενον ἰκανὸν ποιεῖν, ἔχειν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τὸ κελεύομενον ἰκανὸν ὄντα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενον καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ χρήσιμον εἶναι, καὶ προνοεῖν, καὶ προδοπαλέοντας, πολλῶν οἰκετῶν οὖμαι ἀντάξιον εἶναι. 4. Οἱ μὲντοι ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι, ὅταν τὸ πολλοῦ ἄξιον μικρὸν ἐξῆ πρίσθαι, τότε φασί δεῖν ὑνείσθαι· νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰ πράγματα εὐνοο τάτις ἐστὶ φίλους ἀγαθοὺς κτήσασθαι. 5. Καὶ οἱ Διόδωροι, Ἔλλα καλῶς γε, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ κέλευ
II. 10. § 6.] MEMORABILIA. 67

σον ἐλθεῖν ὡς ἐμὲ τὸν Ἐρμογένην. Μὰ Δῆ, ἔφη, οὖν ἐγὼ-γε· νομίζω γάρ ὅτε σοι κάλλιον εἶναι τὸ καλέσαι ἐκείνον, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνον, οὐτε ἐκεῖνῳ μεἰζον ἁγαθὸν τὸ πραχθῆναι ταύτα, ἢ σοὶ. 6. Οὗτῳ δὴ ὁ Διόδωρος ὄχετο πρὸς τὸν Ἐρμογένην, καὶ οὗ πολὺ τελέσας ἐκτῆσατο φί-λον, δς ἐργον εἰχε σκόπειν, ὃ τι ἄν ἢ λέγων ἢ πράττων, ὧφελοὶ τε καὶ εὐφραῖνοι Διόδωρον.
XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA
OF
SOCRATES.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

SUMMARY.

XENOPHON now proceeds to relate in what way Socrates was useful to such of his friends as aimed at any public employment, by exciting them to the attainment of that knowledge which alone could qualify them to discharge its duties properly.

And, first, the discussion turns upon the duties of a commander. He who wishes to fill the office of a commander, must make himself well acquainted with the military art, and this is the more necessary, because, since in time of war the safety of the whole community is intrusted to the commander, either good or evil must result to the state according as he discharges his duties with ability or with unskillfulness. (§ 1-5.)

The art of arranging and marshalling an army, though of great importance in itself, forms but a small part of what is required in a commander. On the contrary, he who wishes to fill such a station in a becoming manner must be possessed of many acquirements, and also of many endowments of intellect. (§ 6-11.)

1. "ΟΤΙ δὲ τοὺς ὀρεγομένους τῶν καλῶν, ἐπιμελεῖς ὡν ὀρέγοιντο ποιῶν, ὥφελει, νῦν τοῦτο διηγήσομαι· ἀκαύσας γάρ ποτε Διονυσίδωρον εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἤκειν, ἐπαγγελλόμενον στρατηγεῖν διδάξειν, ἐλέγε ν τινα τῶν εὐνόμων, δὺς θανατοβουλόμενον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης ἐν τῇ πόλει τυγχάνειν. 2. Λάσχρον μέντοι, ὦ νεανία, τὸν βουλόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει στρατηγεῖν, ἐξὼν τούτο μαθεῖν, ἀμελήσαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ δικαίως ἄν οὕτω ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ζημιοῦτο πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἣ εἰ τις ἀνδριάντας ἐργολαβοῖν, μὴ μεμαθῆκὼς ἀν- δριαντοποιεῖν. 3. "Ολης γὰρ τῆς πόλεως ἐν τοῖς πολεμι-
κοῖς κινδύνως ἐπιτρεπομένης τῷ στρατηγῷ, μεγάλα τὰ τε ἀγαθὰ, κατορθοῦντος αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ κακά, διαμαρτάνοντος, εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι· πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ὅ τοι μὲν μανθάνει τούτῳ ἀμελῶν, τοῦ δὲ αἱρεθήναι ἐπιμελόμενον, ἥμων· τοιαύτα μὲν ὅ ἄγων ἐπεισεν αὐτὸν ἐλθόντα μανθάνειν. 4. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μεμαθηκὼς ἦκε, προσέπαιξεν αὐτῷ, ἄγων· Οὐ δοκεῖ ὡμίν, ὧ ἄνδρες, ὃστερ ὁ Ομήρος τῶν Ἀγαμέμνονα γεγαρόν ἔφη εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως δὲς στρατηγεῖν μαθῶν, γεραρώτερος φαίνεσθαι; καὶ γὰρ ὃστερ ὁ κιθαρίζειν μαθῶν, καὶ εάν μὴ κιθαρίζῃ, κιθαριστής ἢστι, καὶ ὁ μαθῶν λάθαι, κἀν μὴ λατρεύῃ, ὅμως λατρός ἢστιν, οὕτω καὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦτο τοῦ χρόνου διατελεῖ στρατηγὸς ὃν, κἀν μηδείς αὐτὸν ἠληταί· ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος, οὔτε στρατηγὸς, οὔτε λατρός ἢστιν, οὐδὲ εάν ἢπά πάντων ἀνθρώπων αἱρεθῇ. 5. Ἀτάρ, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ, εάν ἤμων τις ταξιαρχῇ, ἦ λοχαγῇ σοι, ἐπιστημονέστεροι τῶν πολέμικῶν ὤμεν, λέξων ἤμιν, πόθεν ἴρματο σε διδάσκειν τὴν στρατηγίαν. Καὶ δς, Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἔφη, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ ἑτελεύτα· τά γάρ τακτικὰ ἐμὲ γε, καὶ ἄλλο οὕτως ἐδίδαξεν. 6. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τοῦτο γε πολλοστάν μέρος ἢστι στρατηγίας· καὶ γὰρ παρασκευαστικῶν τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν στρατηγὸν εἶναι χρή, καὶ ποριστικῶν τῶν ἐπιτηθείων τοὺς στρατιώτας, καὶ μηχανικῶν, καὶ ἐργαστικῶν, καὶ ἐπιμελῆ, καὶ καρτερικῶν, καὶ ἀγχύνουν, καὶ φιλόφρονα τε καὶ ὡμόν, καὶ ἀπλοῦν τε καὶ ἐπίθοιλον, καὶ φυλακτικῶν τε καὶ κλέπτην, καὶ προετοικῶν καὶ ἀρπαγα, καὶ φιλόδωρον καὶ πλεονέκτην, καὶ ἁσφαλῆ καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἐπιστήμη δεὶ τὸν εὗ στρατηγήσουτα ἐχεῖν. 7. Καλὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ τακτικὸν εἶναι· πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει στράτευμα τεταγμένον ἀτάκτον· ὃστερ λίθοι τε, καὶ πλίνθου, καὶ ξύλα, καὶ κέραμος, ἀτάκτως μὲν ἐρριμέμα, οὐδὲν χρήσιμα ἢστιν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ταχθῇ κἀτῳ μὲν καὶ ἐπιτολὴς τὰ μῆτε σημένα, ῥήτε τυκόμενα, οἱ τε λίθοι, καὶ ὁ κέραμος, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ αὐτὸ τὲ πλίνθου, καὶ τὰ ξύλα, ὃστερ ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ, συντίθεται, τότε γιγνεται πολλοὶ αξίου κτῆμα, οἰκία. 8. Ἀλλὰ πάνω, ἔφη
CHAPTER II.

SUMMARY.

A good commander should take care that his soldiers be in a healthful condition; that they be provided with all things necessary; and that their condition be bettered, in a greater or less degree, by victory over their foes. Nor does the duty of a good general consist merely in this, that he alone contend bravely against the foe, but in his leading also his whole army to victory, and in his striving in all things to procure advantages not for himself only, but for all those under his command.
CHAPTER III.

SUMMARY.

The duty of a good commander of cavalry is twofold, namely, to make both horses and riders better. As regards the horses, he should not leave the care of them entirely to the individual horsemen, but should take an active part himself in the same. (§ 1-4.) And again, as regards the horsemen, he will best take care of these by making them mount their
norses readily, and by exercising them in riding, not only over level, but also over rugged ground, and by instructing them in the art of throwing the javelin from on horseback. He will also animate their courage, and, above all, will render them obedient to his authority. (§ 5-8.)

For the attainment of these ends, it will be necessary, above all things, that he show himself skilful and able in the discharge of his own duties (§ 9), and convince them that both their glory and safety depend on their obedience to his commands. (§ 10.) It will be requisite, also, for him to add the art of speaking to his other acquirements, in order that he may both animate them with the love of glory, and urge them on to the performance of actions from which advantage may accrue to both himself and the state at large. (§ 11-15.)

1. Καὶ ἰππαρχεῖν δὲ τινὶ ήρημένῳ οἶδα ποτε αὐτὸν τοιάδε διαλεξθέντα. Ἐξείος ἀν, ἐφή, ὃ νεανία, εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν, ὅτου ἐνεκα ἐπεβύμησας ἰππαρχεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ πρῶτος τῶν ἰππέων ἐλαύνειν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἰπποτοζόται τοῦτον γε ἀξιοῦνται, προελαύνουσι γοῦν καὶ τῶν ἰππάρχων. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕδε τοῦ γνωσθῆναι γε, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ μανιώμενοι γε ὑπὸ πάντων γγυνώσκονται. Ἀληθῆς, ἐφη, καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις. 2. Ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα ὅτι τὸ ἰππικόν οἶει τῇ πόλει βέλτιον ἀν ποιήσας παραδοῦναι, καὶ, εἰ τις χρεία γίγνοιτο ἰππέων, τούτων ἡγούμενος, ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἰτείος γενέσθαι τῇ πόλει; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Καὶ ἔστι γε, νὴ Δέ, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καλόν, ἐὰν δύνη ταῦτα ποιῆσαι. Ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ ποιεῖν την ής ἱρησθαι, ἰππων τε καὶ ἀμβατῶν ἔστιν; Εἴτε γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη. 3. Ἡδὲ δὴ λέξον ἡμῖν πρῶτον τοῦτο, ὅποις διανοῆ τοὺς ἰπποὺς βελτίστους ποιῆσαι; Καὶ δές, Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν, ἐφη, οὐκ ἔμοι οἴμαι τὸ ἐργὸν εἰναι, ἀλλὰ ἵδια ἐκαστὸν δεῖν τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ἰπποῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. 4. Ἐάν οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, παρέχωνται σοι τοὺς ἰπποὺς οἱ μὲν οὕτως κακότοδας, ἡ κακοσκελεῖς, ἡ ἀσθενεῖς, οἱ δὲ οὕτως ἀτρόφους, ὡςτε μὴ δύνασθαι ἀκολουθεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὕτως ἀναγώγους, ὡςτε μὴ μένειν, ὅπου ἄν οὐ τάξις, οἱ δὲ οὕτως λακτίστας, ὡςτε μηδὲ ταξίς δυνάτον εἰναι, τί σοι τὸ ἰππικὸν ὁφελος ἐστιν; ἡ πῶς δυνάσθαι τοιούτων ἡγούμενος ἀγαθὸν τι ποιῆσαι τῇ πόλιν; Καὶ δές, Ἀλλὰ καλῶς τε λέγεις, ἐφη, καὶ πειράσομαι -όν ἰππῶν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἐπι.
III. § 11.

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μελείσθαι. 5. Τί δὲ; τοὺς ἵππεας οὐκ ἐπιχειρήσεις, ἐφη, βελτίωνας ποιήσαι; Ἐγώγ', ἐφη. Οὐκον δὲν ἀναβατικωτέρους ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους ποιήσεις αὐτοῖς; Δει γοῦν, ἐφη· καὶ γάρ, εἴ τις αὐτῶν καταπέσοι, μᾶλλον ἂν οὕτω σῶζοιτο. 6. Τί γάρ; ἐὰν πον κυνδυνεύειν δέχι, πότερον ἐπαγαγεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμμον κελεύσεις, ἐνδαπερ εἰσώθατε ἵππευες, ἡ πειράσει τὰς μελέτας ἐν τοιούτως ποιεῖσθαι χωρίοις, ἐν οἰςπέρι οἱ πολέμιοι γίγνονται; Βελτίων γοῦν, ἐφη. 7. Τί γάρ; τοῦ βάλλειν ὡς πλείστους ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ἐπιμελεῖαν τινα ποιήσει; Βελτίων γοῦν, ἐφη, καὶ τούτο. Ὅθεγεν δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἵππων καὶ ἐξοργίζειν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰπτέρ ἀλειμωτέρους ποιεῖν, διανενόγαι; Εἰ δὲ μῆ, ἄλλα νῦν γε πειράσομαι, ἐφη. 8. Ὅπως δὲ σοι πειθωνταί οἱ ἵππεις, πεφροντικάς τι; ἀνευ γάρ ὅτι τούτον οὔτε ἤππων, οὔτε ἤππεων ἁγαθῶν καὶ ἀλκί- μων οὐδὲν ὄφελος. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἐφη· ἄλλα πῶς ἂν τις μάλιστα, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπὶ τούτῳ αὐτοὺς προτρέψαιτο; 9. Ἐκεῖνο μὲν δήπον οίσθα, δι τιν παντὶ πράγματι οἱ ἀνθρω- ποι τούτως μάλιστα ἐξέλουσι πειθοῦσα, οὐς ἂν ἡγώνται βελτίστους εἶναι· καὶ γάρ ἐν νόσῳ, ἂν ἂν ἡγώνται λατρε- κότατον εἶναι, τούτῳ μάλιστα πειθοῦνται, καὶ ἐν πλοίῳ οἱ πλέοντες, ὑν ἂν κυβερνητικότατον, καὶ ἐν γεωργίᾳ, ὅν ἂν γεωργικότατον. Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Οὐκον εἰκός, ἐφη, καὶ ἐν ἵππει, δς ἂν μάλιστα εἰδὼς φαίνεται ὅ δει ποιεῖν, τού- τῳ μάλιστα ἐξέλεεν τοὺς ἄλλους πειθοῦσα. 10. Ἐάν οὖν, ἐφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Σώκρατες, βελτίστος ὅν αὐτῶν ὤηλος ὦ, ἀρ- κέσαι μοι τούτῳ εἰς τὸ πειθοῦσα αὐτοὺς ἔμοι; Ἐάν γε πρὸς τούτῳ, ἐφη, διδάξεις αὐτοὺς, ὡς τὸ πειθοῦσα σοι καλ- λεῖν τε καὶ σωτηριώτερον αὐτοῖς ἔσται. Πώς οὖν, ἐφη, τούτῳ διδάξω; Πολὺ νή Δλ', ἐφη, ῥᾶον, ὡ εἰ σοι δεό δι- δάσκεις, ὡς τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἀμείνω καὶ λυστελεστέρα ἐστι. 11. Δέγεις, ἐφη, σὺ τὸν ἱππαρχὸν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖν καὶ τοῦ λέγειν σύνασθαι; Σὺ δ' ζω, ἐφη, χρήναι σιωπὴ ἱππαρχεῖν; ὑ οὐκ ἐντεθύμησαι, διτ, ὑ αν τὸ ἀναλμαθήκαμεν κάλλεστα δύνατα, δι' ἂν γε ξῆν ἐπιστά-
NICOMACHIDES, who was well skilled in the military art, having complained to Socrates that the Athenians had chosen, as one of their commanders, not himself, but Antisthenes, who had never distinguished himself in warfare, and who knew nothing else save how to get money, Socrates undertakes to show unto him, that, if a person, in whatever employment he may have taken upon himself, knows well what is required for executing that employment in a proper manner, this man will make a good leader, either of a chorus, a state, or an army.

Since, then, remarks Socrates, Antisthenes is skilled in the management of his private affairs, and is, at the same time, ambitious of praise, and since he has discharged successfully the duties of a choragus, there can be no doubt but that he, although unskilled in military affairs, will nevertheless make a good commander (§ 1-5); for a choragus, and he who is skilled in managing private affairs, have very many things in common with a commander. (§ 6-12.)
III. 4. § 7.]  

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1. Ἡδῶν δὲ ποτὲ Νικομαχίδην ἥξις ἀρχαιοσιω ἀπιόντα, ἤρετο. Τίνες, ὦ Νικομαχίδη, στρατηγοὶ ἦρηνται; Καὶ δς, ὦ γὰρ, ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς τοις ἐμὲ μὲν οὐχ ἐξελοῦτο, δς ἐκ καταλόγου στρατευμὸν κατατέριμμαι, καὶ λοχαγῶν, καὶ ταξιαρχῶν, καὶ τραυματά ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμιῶν τοσάττα ἔχουν· ἀμα δὲ τὰς οὐλὰς τῶν τραυμάτων ἀπογυμνούμενος ἐπεδεικνύει. Ἀντισθένην δὲ, ἐφη, ἐξελοῦτο, τὸν οὐτε ὑπλίτην πῶς τοτε στρατευσάμενον, ἐν τε τοῖς ἵππευσιν οὐδὲν περίβλεπτον ποιῆσαντα, ἐπιστάμενον τε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ χρήματα συλλέγειν. 2. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη ὦ Σωκράτης, τούτο μὲν ἁγαθὸν, εἰ γε τοῖς στρατιώτας ἰκανὸς ἔσται τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πορίζειν; Καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐμποροί, ἐφη ὦ Νικομαχίδης, χρήματα συλλέγειν ἰκανοὶ εἰσὶν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνεκα τούτον καὶ στρατηγεῖν δύναντ' ἂν. 3. Καὶ ὦ Σωκράτης ἐφη· Ἀλλ' καὶ φιλόνεικος Ἀντισθένης ἐστίν, ὁ στρατηγὸς προσέγειν ἐπιτήδειαν ἔστιν· οὐχ ὁρᾶς, δτι καί, ἐσάκις κεχορήγηκε, πᾶσι τοῖς χροῖς νευκίκηκε; Μὰ Δί', ἐφη ὦ Νικομαχίδης, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ὁμοίων ἔστι χροῦ τε καὶ στρατεύματος προστάναι. 4. Καὶ μὴν, ἐφη ὦ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲ θόδης γε ὦ Ἀντισθένης, οὐδὲ χρόον διδασκαλίας ἐμπειρός ὦν, ομως ἐγένετο ἰκανὸς εὑρεῖν τοὺς κρατίστους ταῦτα. Καὶ ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ οὖν, ἐφη ὦ Νικομαχίδης, ἀλλοὺς μὲν εὐρήσει τοὺς τάξοντας ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλοὺς δε τοὺς μαχουμένους. 5. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη ὦ Σωκράτης, ἐὰν γε καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς τοὺς κρατίστους, δισπερ ἐν τοῖς χορικοῖς, ἐξευρήσακε τα καὶ προαιρήται, εἰκότως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον νικηφόρον εἰη· καὶ διαπανάν δ' αὐτὸν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον ἄν ἐθέλειν εἰς τὴν ξύν ὅλη τῇ πόλει τῶν πολεμικῶν νίκην, ἥ εἰς τὴν ξύν τῇ φυλῇ τῶν χορικῶν. 6. Δέγεις σύ, ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἄστι χορηγεῖν τα καλῶς καὶ στρατηγεῖν; Δέγω ἐγωγ', ἐφη, ὡς, ὅτον ἄν τις προστατεύη, ἕαν γιγνώσκῃ τε ὄν δει, καὶ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι δύνηται, ἁγαθὸς ἄν εἰη προστάτης, εἰτε χροῦ, εἰτε οἶκου, εἰτε πόλεως, εἰτε στρατεύματος προστατεῦοι. 7. Καὶ ὦ Νικομαχίδης, Μὰ Δί', ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄν ποτὲ φιλην ἓγω.
σου ἀκούσαι, ὡς ἀγαθὸι οἰκονόμοι ἀγαθοὶ στρατηγοὶ ἂν εἶν. Ἡδη δὴ, ἔφη, ἐξετάσωμεν τὰ ἔργα ἐκατέρων αὐτῶν, ἕνα εἰδῶμεν, πότερον τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστίν, ἢ διαφέρει τι. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. 8. Ὄδκουν, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν τοὺς ἄρχομένους κατη- κόσις τε καὶ εὐπειθεῖς εὐαυτοὶ παρασκευάζειν ἀμφιτέρων ἐστὶν ἔργον; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τὸ προστάτειν ἐκαστὰ τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πράττειν; Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τοὺς κακοὺς κολάζειν, καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, ἀμφιτέρως οἵμα προσῆκειν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 9. Τὸ δὲ τοὺς ὑπηκόους εὐμενεῖς ποιεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐ καλὸν ἀμφι- τέρως; Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη. Συμμάχους δὲ καὶ βοηθοὺς προς- ἀγεσθαί δοκεῖ σοι συμφέρειν ἀμφιτέρως, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν ὠντών οὐκ ἀμφιτέρους εἰναι προσῆκει; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Οὔκοιν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖς καὶ φιλοσόφους ἀμφιτέρους εἰναι προσῆκει περὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα. 10. Ταύτα μὲν, ἔφη, πάντα ὁμοίως ἀμφιτέρων ἐσ- τίν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μάχεσθαι οὐκέτι ἀμφιτέρων. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐχθροὶ γε τοι ἀμφιτέρους γίγνονται; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, τοῦτο γε. Οὔκοιν τὸ περιγενέσθαι τοῦτων ἀμφιτέρως συμφέρει; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. 11. Ἀλλ᾽, ἐκεῖνο παρεῖς, ἂν δὲν μάχεσθαι, τί ὑφελήσει ἡ οἰκονομική; Ἑνταῦθα δὴποι καὶ πλείστον, ἔφη· ὅ γάρ ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος, εἰδῶς, ὅτι οὐδὲν οὗτω λυσι- τελές τε καὶ κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ μαχόμενον τοὺς πολε- μίους νικάν, οὔδε οὗτως ἀλυσιτελές τε καὶ ζημιώδες, ὡς τὸ ἠττᾶσθαι, προθύμως μὲν τὰ πρός τὰ νικάν συμφέροντα ζη- τήσει καὶ παρασκευάζεται, ἐπιμελῶς δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ ἠττᾶσθαι φέροντα σκέφτεται καὶ φυλάζεται, ἑνεργῶς δ’, ἂν τὴν παρα- σκευὴν ὀφρα νικητικὴν οὖσαν, μαχεῖται, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ τοῦ των, ἐὰν ἀπαράσκευος ζ’, φυλάζεται συνάπτειν μάχην. 12. Μὴ καταφράνει, ἔφη, ὦ Νικομαιχίδη, τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἄν- δρῶν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν ἱδίων εἰμιέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παραπλῆσια ἔχει· τὸ δὲ με- γιστὸν, ὅτι οὕτε ἄνευ ἄνθρώπων οὐδετέρα γίγνεται, οὔτε δ’ ἄλλων μὲν ἄνθρώπων τὰ ἰδία πράττεται, δι’ ἄλλων δὲ τὰ κοινά· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις τισίν ἄνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν
CHAPTER V.

SUMMARY.

In this chapter Socrates converses with Pericles the Younger (the son of the celebrated statesman of the same name) on the way by which the Athenians may be recalled to the glory and success of former days. He shows him, in the first place, that the Athenians ought to be reminded of the virtues and achievements of their forefathers. (§ 1-12.) In the next place he points out to him the causes of their present degeneracy. (§ 13.) He then shows that the virtues and discipline of their ancestors ought to be recalled by them, or, at least, the example of the Lacedaemonians ought to be imitated. (§ 14.) That their chief care, however, should be bestowed on military affairs, and, in particular, that competent commanders ought to be set over their forces, who may teach the soldiers strict discipline and obedience to command. (§ 15-25.) He explains to him, finally, how well adapted Attica is, from its situation, to resist the incursions of a foe. (§ 26-28.)

1. Περικλῆι δὲ ποτε, τῷ τοῦ πάννυ Περικλέους υἱῷ, διαλεγόμενος, Ἐγώ τοι, ἐφή, ὦ Περικλῆις, ἐλπίδα ἔχω, σοῦ στρατηγήσαντος ἁμείνω τε καὶ ἐνδοξότεραν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὰ πολεμικὰ ἐσέθαι, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων κρατῆσεν. Καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς, Βουλοίμην ἄν, ἐφη, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἅ λέγεις· ὅπως δὲ ταῦτα γένοιτ᾽ ἄν, οὐ δῦναμαι γνώναι. Βούλει οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, διαιλογιζόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπισκοπῶμεν, ὅπως ἢδη τὸ δυνατὸν ἔστιν; Βούλομαι, ἐφη. 2. Οὔκοιν οἴδα, ἐφή, ὅτι πλήθει μὲν οὐδὲν μείος εἰσίν Ἀθηναῖοι Βοιωτῶν; Οίδα γάρ, ἐφη. Σώματα δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ πότερον ἐκ Βοιωτῶν οἷς πλεῖον ἄν ἐκλεχθῆναι, ἢ ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν; Οὐδὲ ταύτη μοι ὅκουσί λειπεσθαι. Εὐμενεστέρους δὲ ποτέοις ἑαυτοῖς εἰσίν νομίζεις; Ἀθηναίους ἐγώγω· Βοιωτῶν μὲν γάρ πολλοῖ, πλεονεκτούμενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων, δυσμενῶς αὐτοῖς ἐχουσίν· Ἀδήμησι δὲ οὐδὲν ὅρῳ τοιοῦτον. 3. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φιλοτιμότατοι γε καὶ φιλοφρονέστατοι πάντων εἰσίν,
άπερ οὖχ ἤκιστα παροξύνει κυνδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας τε καὶ πατρίδος. Ὅψε ἐν τούτοις Ἀθηναίοι μεμπτοί. Καὶ ὦν προγόνων γε καλὰ ἐργα οὖν ἔστιν οἷς μεῖξκαὶ πλείω ὑπάρχει, ἢ Ἀθηναίοις, ὥς πολλὸς ἐπαιρόμενοι προτρέπονται τε ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλκίμοι γίγνεσθαι. 4 Ἡ αὐτὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις πάντα, ὁ Ἔσκρατες ἀλλ᾽ ὅρμη, ὑπὲρ οὗ ἦν τοὺς Τολμίδας τῶν χιλίων ἐν Λεβαδείᾳ συμφορὰ ἐγένετο, καὶ ἢ μεθ᾽ Ἰπποκράτους ἐπὶ Δηλίω, ἐκ τούτων τεταπείνωται μὲν ἢ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δόξα πρὸς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς, ἐπίρηται δὲ τὸ τῶν Ἰθαίων φρόνημα πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὡστε Βοιωτοὶ μὲν, οἱ πρόσθεν οὕδ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἕαυτῶν τοιμῶντες Ἀθηναίοις ἄνευ Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων ἀντιτάττεσθαι, νῦν ἀπειλοῦσιν αὐτοῖς καθ᾽ ἐαυτοὺς ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, Ἀθηναίοι δὲ, οἱ πρόστερον, ὅτε Βοιωτοὶ μόνοι ἐγένοντο, πορθοῦντες τὴν Βοιωτίαν, φοβοῦνται, μὴ Βοιωτοὶ δησώσωσι τὴν Ἀττικήν. 5. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἀλλ᾽ αἰσθάνομαι μὲν, ἐφ᾽ ἡπα, ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα· δοκεῖ δὲ μοι ἄνδρι ἀγαθῷ ἄρχοντι νῦν εὐαρεστοτέρως διακείσθαι ἡ πόλις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ θάρσος ἀμελεῖαν τε καὶ ῥαθυμίαν καὶ ἀπείθειαν ἐμβάλλει, ὃ δὲ φόβος προσεκτικώτερος τε καὶ εὐπειθεστέρους, καὶ εὐτακτότερους ποιεῖ. 6. Τεκμήριοι δ᾽ ἂν τούτο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ δήποτε μηδὲν φοβῶνται, μεστοὶ εἰσίν ἀταξίας, ἐστὶν ἂν δὲ ἡ χειμώνα ἡ πολεμίους δείσωσιν, οὗ μόνον τὰ κελευόμενα πάντα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σιγώς καραδοκούντες ταῖς προσταχθησόμενα, ἀὕτερο χρεοῦται. 7. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφ᾽ ὁ Περικλῆς, εἰγέ νῦν μάλιστα πείθοιον, ὥρα ἂν εἰς λέγειν, πῶς ἂν αὐτοῦς προτερεφαίμεθα πάλιν ἀνερεδίσθηναι τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀρετῆς τε καὶ εὐκλείας, καὶ εὐδαιμονίας. 8. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφ᾽ ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ μὲν ἑβουλόμεθα χρημάτων αὐτοῦς, ὅν οἱ ἄλλος εἶχον, ἀντιποιείσθαι, ἀποδεικνύντες αὐτοῖς ταῦτα πατρώα τε ὡντα καὶ προσήκοντα, μάλιστα ἂν οὕτως αὐτοὺς ἐξορμήμεν ἀντέχεσθαι τούτων ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς πρωτεύειν αὐτοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι Βουλόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐ δεικτέον ἐκ παλαιοῦ μάλιστα προσήκον
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αὕτως, καὶ ὡς τοῦτον ἐπιμελοῦμενοι, πάντων ἄν εἰνεν κράτιστοι. 9. Πός οὖν ἐν τούτῳ διδάσκομεν; Οἷμαι μὲν, εἰ τοὺς γε παλαιοτάτους, ἃν ἀκούμεν, προγόνους αὐτῶν ἀναμμηνήσκομεν αὐτούς ἀκηκοότας ἀριστους γεγονέναι.

10. Ἄρα λέγεις τὴν τῶν θεῶν κρίσιν, ἢν οἱ περὶ Κέκροπα δι’ ἀρετὴν ἔκριναν; Ἀγὼ γάρ, καὶ τὴν Ἦρεσθέως γε τροφήν καὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν ἑπ’ ἐκείνου γενόμενον πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἐχομένης ὑπείρου πάσης, καὶ τὸν ἐφ’ Ἦρακλειδῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θησέως πολεμηθέντας, ἐν οἷς πάσιν ἐκείνοι δήλου γεγόνασι τῶν καθ’ ἐαυτοὺς ἀνθρώπων ἀριστεύσαντες. 11. Ἡ δὲ βούλεια, ὡς ὑπερέων οἱ ἐκείνων μὲν ἀπόγονοι, οὐ πολύ δὲ πρὸ ὡμῶν γεγονότες, ἔσπραξαν, τὰ μὲν αὐτοί καθ’ ἐαυτοὺς ἀγωνιζόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς κυριεύοντας τῆς τ’ Ἀσίας πάσης καὶ τῆς Ἑλερώπης μέχρι Μακεδονίας, καὶ πλείστην τῶν προγεγονότων δύναμιν καὶ ἀφορμὴν κεκτημένους, καὶ μέγιστα ἔργα κατεργασιμένους, τὰ δὲ καὶ μετὰ Πελοποννησίων ἀριστεύσαντες καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν: οἱ δὴ καὶ λέγονται πολύ διενεγκείν τῶν καθ’ ἐαυτοὺς ἀνθρώπων. Δένονται γάρ, ἐφη. 12. Τοιγαροῦν πολλῶν μὲν μεταναστάσεων ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι γεγονοῦσα, διέμειναν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν, πολλοὶ δὲ υπὲρ δικαιῶν ἀντιλέγοντες ἐπέτρεπον ἐκείνους, πολλοὶ δὲ ὑπὸ κρειττόνων ὑβριζόμενοι κατέφευγον πρὸς ἐκείνους. 13. Καὶ οἱ Περικλῆς, Καὶ θαυμάζω γε, ἐφη, ὡς Ἐκρατείς, ἢ πόλις ὅπως ποτ’ ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον ἐκλινεν. Ἡγὼ μὲν, ἐφη, οἷμαι, ὡς Ἐκράτης, δεσπερ καὶ ἀθλητὰς τινές, διὰ τὸ πολὺ ύπερενεγκείν καὶ κρατιστεύσαι, καταρθομήσαντες υπερίζονσι τῶν ἀντιπάλων, οὕτω καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πολὺ διενεγκόντας ἀμελήσαι ἑαυτῶν, καὶ διὰ τούτο χείρους γεγονέναι. 14. Νῦν οὖν, ἐφη, τῇ ἄν ποιούντες ἀναλάβοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἀρετήν; Καὶ ὁ Ἐκράτης. Οὐδὲν ἀπόκρυφον δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἔξευρόντες τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἐπιτηδεύματα, μηδὲν χείρον ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύσει, οὔτεν ὁ χείρος ἐκείνων γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, τοὺς γε νῦν πρωτεύοντας μμούμενοι, καὶ τούτους τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύσειν.
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[III. 5. § 20]

δεύοντες, ὁμοίως μὲν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρώμενοι, οὐδὲν ἀν χεῖρος ἑκείνων εἰς· εἰ δ' ἐπιμελέστερον, καὶ βελτίωσ. 15 Ὀλευθερίας, ἐφη, πόρρω που εἶναι τῇ πόλει τῇν καλοκἀγαθίᾳ πότε γὰρ ὅτως Ἀθηναῖοι, ὃς ἄλλημα Ἀκαδεμόνιοι, ἢ προσβύτεροι αἰσθέονται; οὐ ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἀρχοντα καταφρονεῖ τῶν γεραιτέρων· ἢ σωμασκήσουσιν ὄφως; οὐ δέ μόνον αὐτοὶ ἐνεξίας ἀμελοῦσιν, ἄλλα καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελουμένων καταγελώσι. 16. Πότε δὲ ὅτως πείσονται τοῖς ἀρχοῦσιν; οὐ καὶ ἀγάλλουν τιπ τῷ καταφρονεῦν τῶν ἀρχόντων· ἢ πότε ὅτως ὁμονόησουσιν; οὐ γε, ἀντὶ μέν τοῦ συνεργεῖν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ συμφέροντα, ἐπηρεάζοσιν ἅλληλους, καὶ φθονούσιν ἑαυτοῖς μᾶλλον, ἢ τοῖς ἅλλοις ἀνθρώποις· μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ἐν τῇ ταῖς ἱδίαις συνόδοις καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς διαφέρονται, καὶ πλείστας δίκας ἅλληλοις δικάζονται, καὶ προαιροῦνται μᾶλλον ὅτως κερδαίνειν ἄτ' ἅλληλων, ἢ συνωφελοῦντες αὐτοὺς· τοῖς δὲ κοινοῖς ὃς ἄλλοτρίους χρώμενοι, περὶ τούτων οὐ μάχονται, καὶ ταῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα δυνάμεις μάλιστα χαίροσιν. 17. Ἐξ ὅν πολλῇ μὲν ἀπερία καὶ κακία τῇ πόλει ἐμφύεται, πολλῇ δὲ ἔχθρᾳ καὶ μίσῳ ἅλληλων τοῖς πολίταις ἐγγίγνεται, ὅτι ἡ γεωγραφία μάλα φοβοῦμαι ἄει, μή τι μείζον, ἢ ὅστε φέρειν ὅν νασθαι, κακόν τῇ πόλει συμβῇ. 18. Μηδαμῶς, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ Περίκλεις, οὕτως ἡγοῦ ἀνηστήρες πονηρὰ νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίοις· οὐχ ὁρᾶς, ὡς εὐτακτοὶ μὲν εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς, εὐτάκτως δ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγώσι πεινάσονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις, οὐδένως δὲ καταδέστερον ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ὑπηρετοῦσι τοῖς διδασκάλοις; 19. Τούτῳ γὰρ τοι, ἐφη, καὶ θανμαστὸν ἐστι, τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοιοῦτοις πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ὀπλίτας καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς, οἱ δοκοῦσι καλοκἀγαθία προκεκρίθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι πάντων. 20. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐφη· Ἡ δὲ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή, ὁ Περίκλεις, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν διδοκιμασμένων καθίσταται; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Οἶσθα ὅν τινας, ἐφη, κάλλιον, ἢ νομιμότερον, ἢ σεμυν-ερον, ἢ δικαιότερον τάς τε δίκας δικάζοντας, καὶ τάλλα πάντα πράττοντας; Οὐ μέμφομαι
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εφη, τούτως. Οὐ τοῖνυν, ἐφη, δεῖ ἀθυμεῦν, ὡς οὐκ εὐτάκτων ὄντων Ἀθηναίων. 21. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς, ἐφη, ἐνδὰ μάλιστα δεῖ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ εὐτακτεῖν, καὶ πειθαρχεῖν, οὐδὲν τούτων προσέχουσιν. Ἰσως γάρ, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐν τούτοις οἱ ἡκιστὰ ἐπιστάμενοι ἀρχουσιν αὐτῶν· οὐχ ὀράς, ὅτι κιθαριστῶν μὲν, καὶ χορευτῶν, καὶ ὀρχηστῶν οὐδὲ εἰς ἐπιχειρεῖ ἀρχεῖν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος, οὐδὲ παλαιστῶν, οὐδὲ παγκρατιαστῶν; ἀλλὰ πάντες, ὅσοι τούτων ἀρχουσιν, ἔχουσι δεῖξαι, ὅποθεν ἐμαθον ταύτα, ἐφ' όις ἐφεστάσας, τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν οἱ πλείστοι αὐτοσχεδίαζοσιν. 22. Οὐ μεντοι σὲ γε τοιούτων ἐγὼ νομίζω εἰναι, ἀλλ' οἷμαι σε οὐδὲν ἦττιν ἐχειν εἰπεῖν, ὅποτε στρατηγεῖν, ἢ ὅποτε παλαιεῖν ἡρξω μανθάνειν· καὶ πολλὰ μὲν οἷμαι σε τῶν πατρών στρατηγημάτων παρειληφότα διασώζειν, πολλὰ δὲ πανταχόθεν συνενηνοχέναι, ὅποθεν οἶον τε ἦν μαθεῖν τι ωφέλιμον εἰς στρατηγίαν. 23. Οἷμαι δὲ σε πολλὰ μεριμνᾶν, ὅπως μὴ λάθης σεαυτὸν ἀγνοῦτι τι τῶν εἰς στρατηγίαν ωφελίμων· καὶ εάν τι τοιούτων αἰσθη σεαυτὸν μὴ εἰδότα, ζητεῖν τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ταύτα, οὔτε δόρων οὔτε χαρίτων φειδόμενον, ὅπως μάθης παρ' αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ ἐπίστασαι, καὶ συνεργούς ἁγαθοὺς ἐχῆς. 24. Καὶ ὁ Περίκλης, Οὐ λανθάνεις με, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, ὅτι οὐδ' ολόμενός με τούτων ἐπιμελείσθαι ταύτα λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐγχειρῶν με διδάσκειν, ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα στρατηγεῖν τούτων ἀπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ· ὁμολογῷ μέντοι κἀγὼ σοι ταύτα. 25. Τούτῳ δ', ἐφη, ὁ Περίκλεις, κατανεόνηκας, ὅτι πρόκειται τῆς χώρας ἡμῶν ὅρη μεγάλα, καθήκοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Βουωτίαν, δι' ὃν εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσοδοι στεναί τε καὶ προσάντεις εἰσί, καὶ ὅτι μέσῃ διέξωσται ὅρεαι ἐρυμνοῖς· Καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφη. 26. Τί δὲ; σὺ ἐκεῖνο ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Μυσοὶ καὶ Πισίδαι ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ κατέχοντες ἐρυμνᾶ πάνυ χωρία, καὶ κούφως ὀπλισμένοι, δύνανται πολλὰ μὲν τὴν βασιλέως χώραν καταθέντες κακοποιεῖν, αὐτοῖ δὲ ζῆν ἐλεύθεροι; Καὶ τούτῳ γ', ἐφη, ἀκόου. 27. Ἀθηναίους δ' οὐκ ἂν οἶει, ἐφη, μέχρι τῆς ἐλαφράς ἡλικίας ὀπλισμένους κοψετέρους ὀπλοῖς, καὶ
CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY.

GLAUCO, the son of Aristo, was so strongly possessed with the desire of being a statesman, that, although not yet twenty, he was continually making orations to the people, and thereby exposing himself to ridicule. Socrates, therefore, endeavors to cure him of this delusion, and by a series of questions succeeds in convincing him that he is altogether ignorant of what appertains to the character of a true statesman; and he then shows him that, unless one be acquainted with this, he can neither prove of any advantage to the state, nor acquire any reputation for himself.

1. Αρίστωνος, ὁ ἴδος τοῦ Προκέιμενα τῆς χώρας δρή κατέχοντας, βλαστερούς μὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι, μεγάλην δὲ προβολήν τοῖς πολίταις τῆς χώρας κατεσκευάσθαι; Καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς, Πάντι οὖνα, ἐφη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, καὶ ταῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι. 28. Εἰ τοῖς, ἐφη ο Σωκράτης, ἀρέσκει σοι ταῦτα, ἐπιχείρει αὐτοῖς, ὁ Αρίστων: τι μὲν γὰρ ἄν τούτων καταπράξῃς, καὶ σοι καλὸν ἔσται, καὶ τῇ πόλει ἀγαθὸν· εάν δὲ τι ἄδυνατος, οὔτε τῇ πόλιν βλάψεις, οὔτε σεαυτὸν κατασχυνεῖς.
Ταύτι οὖν ἄκοινον ὁ Γλαύκων ἐμεγαλύνετο, καὶ ἕδέως παρέμενε. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Σωκράτης, Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, τούτο μέν, ὁ Γλαύκων, δήλον, ὅτι, εἰπερ τιμᾶσθαι βούλει, ἁφελήτεα σοι ἡ πόλεις ἐστίν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Πρὸς θεῶν, ἐφη, μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκρύψη, ἀλλὰ εἰπευ ἥμιν, ἐκ τῶν ἀρξεύ τὴν πόλιν ἐνεργευτεῖν; 4. ἩΕπεὶ δὲ ὁ Γλαύκων διεισώπησεν, ὡς ἀν τότε σκοπῶν, ὅποθεν ἀρχιτο- Ἀρ', ἐφη ὁ Σω- κράτης, ἐστιν, φίλου οίκον εἰ αὐξῆσαι βούλει, πλουσιώτε- ρον αὐτὸν ἐπιχειροῖς ἂν ποιεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν πόλιν πει- ράσει πλουσιωτέραι ποιῆσαι; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. 5. Οὐκοῦν πλουσιωτέρα γ' ἀν εἰη, προσόδων αὐτῇ πλειόνων γενομένων; Ἐλκὸς γούν, ἐφη. Δέξοι δ', ἐφη, ἐκ τῶν νῦν αἱ προσόδι τῇ πόλει, καὶ πόσαι τινές εἰσι; δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι ἐσκέψαι, ίνα, εἰ μὲν τινες αὐτῶν ἐνδεὼς ἔχουσιν, ἐκ- πληρώσῃς, εἰ δὲ παραλείπονται, προσπορίσῃς. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἐφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ταῦτα γε οὖν ἐπέσκεμμαι. 6. Ἀλλ', εἰ τούτῳ, ἐφη, παρέλιπες, τὰς γε δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως ἥμιν εἰπέ· δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι καὶ τούτων τὰς περιττὰς ἀφαίρειν διανοεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἐφη, οὐδὲ πρὸς ταῦτα πω ἐσχό- λασα. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, το μὲν πλουσιωτέραν τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖν ἀναβαλοῦμεθα· τῶς γὰρ οἶν τε μὴ εἰδότα γα τὰ ἀναλόματα καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἐπιμεληθήναι τούτων; 7. Ἀλλ', ὁ Σωκρατες, ἐφη ὁ Γλαύκων, δυνατὸν ἔστι καὶ ἀπὸ πολε- μίων τὴν πόλιν πλουτίζειν. Νὴ Δία, σφόδρα γ', ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐὰν τὶς αὐτῶν κρείττων ή· ἦττων δὲ ὄν καὶ τὰ ὄντα προσαποδάλου ἄν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἐφη. 8. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, τὸν γε βουλευόμενον πρὸς οὐστινας δὲι πολεμείν, τὴν τε τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἰδέναι δει, τα, ἐὰν μὲν ή τῆς πόλεως κρείττων ή, συμβουλεύη ἔπιχει- ρεῖν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐὰν δὲ ήττων τῶν ἐναντίων, εὐλαβεῖσθαι πείθη. Ὁρῆσος λέγεις, ἐφη. 9. Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν, ἐφη, λέξοι ήμὶν τῆς πόλεως τὴν τε πεζικὴν καὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν δύναμιν, εἶτα τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἐφη, οὐκ ἀν ἔχομι σοι οὕτως γε ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπέν. Ἀλλ', ἐγέραται σοι, ἐνεγκε, ἐφη· πάνω γὰρ ἥδεως ἄν τοίτο
Χηνωφόρους. 'Αλλά μά τὸν Δί', ἑφη, οὖνδε γέγραπται μοι πω. 10. Οὐκοῦν, ἑφη, καὶ περὶ πολέμου συμβουλεύειν τὴν γε πρώτην ἐπισχήσομεν· ἦσος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν, ἀρτι ἄρχόμενος τῆς προστατείας, οὕτω ἐξήτακας. 'Αλλά τοι περὶ γε φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας οἶδ᾽ ὅτι σοι μεμέληκε, καὶ οἴσθα, ὀπόσαι τε φυλακι ἐπίκαιροι εἰσὶ καὶ ὀπόσαι μή, καὶ ὀπόσοι τοις φρουροῖς ἰκανοὶ εἰσὶ καὶ ὀπόσοι μὴ εἰσαι καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐπικαιροὺς φυλακὰς συμβουλεύσειν μεῖζονας ποιεῖν, τὰς δὲ περιττὰς ἀφαιρεῖν. 11. Νὴ Δί', ἑφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ἀπάσας μὲν οὐν ἐγγυεῖ, ἑνεκά γε τοῦ ὀὗτως αὐτάς φυλάττεσθαι, ὡςτε κλέπτειν τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας. 'Εἰων δὲ τις ἀφέλγ γ', ἑφη, τὰς φυλακάς, οὐκ οἴει καὶ ἀρτάζειν ἐξουσίαιν ἐσεθαί τῷ βουλομένῳ; ἀτάρ, ἑφη, πότερον ἐλθὼν αὐτὸς ἐξήτακας τοῦτο, ἢ πῶς οἴσθα, ὅτι κακῶς φυλάττονται; Ἐλκάζω, ἑφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἑφη, καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὅταν ῥηκέτο εἰκαζῷμεν, ἀλλ' ἤδη εἰδῶμεν, τότε συμβουλεύσομεν; Ἰοσς, ἑφη ὁ Γλαύκων, βέλτιον. 12. Εἰς γε μήν, ἑφη, τάργυρα οἴδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἄφιξαι, ὡςτ᾽ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, δἰότι νῦν ἐλάττω, ἢ πρόσθεν, προσέρχεται αὐτόθεν. Οὐ γὰρ οἶν ἐλήλυθα, ἑφη. Καὶ γὰρ νὴ Δί', ἑφη ὁ Σωκράτης, λέγεται βαρὺ τὸ χωρίον εἶναι, ὡςτε, ὅταν περὶ τούτον δέχ συμβουλεύειν, αὕτη σοι ἢ πρόφασις ἄρκεσεί. Σκὼπτομαι, ἑφη ὁ Γλαύκων. 13. 'Αλλ᾽ ἐκείνου γε τοι, ἑφη, οἴδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἡμέληκας, ἀλλ᾽ ἐσκεψαί, καὶ πόσον χρόνον ἰκανός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τῆς χώρας γιγνόμενον σίτος διατρέφειν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πόσον εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν προσδέσται, ἐνα μὴ τούτο γε λάθη σὲ ποτὲ ἢ πόλις ἐνδεής γενομένη, ἀλλ᾽ εἰδώς, ἔχεις ύπὲρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων συμβουλεύων τῇ πόλει βοηθεῖν τε καὶ σώζειν αὐτήν. Δέγεις, ἑφη ὁ Γλαύκων, παμμέγεθες πράγμα, εἰγε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δήσει. 14. 'Αλλὰ μέντοι, ἑφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδ᾽ ἀν τὸν ἐαυτὸν ποτὲ οἰκον καλῶς τις οἰκήσειν, εἰ μὴ πάντα μὲν εἰσεται, ὄν προσδέσται, πάντων δὲ ἐπιμελόμενος ἐκπληρώσει· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεί ἢ μὲν πόλις ἐκ πλειόνων ἢ μικρῶν οἰκίων συνεστηκε, χαλεπῶν δὲ ἐστιν ἀνα τοιούτων οἰκῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐχ ἕνα, τὸ
to the younger man, industriously declined any office in the govern-
m en, though a man of far greater abilities than many of those employed in the administration. Socrates thereupon exhorts him to lay aside this aversion to public affairs, and shows him that he who is possessed of any
acquaintance, by the exercise of which he may procure reputation for himself and glory for his country, ought not to allow it to remain inactive. (§ 1, 2.) And he then states how well qualified, in his opinion, Charmides is to take part in public affairs, from what he has seen of him in his conferences with the leading men of the state. (§ 3-9.)

1. Χαρμίδης δὲ τὸν Γλαύκωνος ὁρῶν ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἀν- ὅρα ὑντα, καὶ πολλῷ δυνατώτερον τῶν τὰ πολειτικὰ τότε πραττόντων, ὁκνοῦντα δὲ προσέναι τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, Εἰπὲ μοι, ἐφι, ὁ Χαρ- μίδη, κἂ τις ἰκανὸς ὃν τοὺς στεφανίτας ἀγώνας νικάν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς τε τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ἐν τῇ Ἑλ- λάδι εὐδοκιμωτέραν ποιεῖν, μὴ θέλοι ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ποιόν τινα τούτον νομίζοις ἂν τὸν ἀνδρὰ εἶναι; Δὴλον, οὕτω, ἐφι, μαλακόν τε καὶ δειλόν. 2. Εἶ δὲ τίς, ἐφι, δυνατὸς ὃν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελόμενος τὴν τε πόλιν αὐξεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τοῦτο τιμᾶσθαι, ὁκνοῖ οὕτῳ τοῦτο πράπτειν, ὥσ τι ἐκόπτως δείλος νομίζοιτο; Ἐσος, ἐφι, ἀτὰρ πρὸς τί με ταῦτ' ἐρωτᾶς; Ὁτι, ἐφι, οἶμαι σε, δυνα- τὸν ὑντα, ὁκνεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα, ὃν ἀνάγκη σου μετέχειν, πολίτη γε ὑντι. 3. Τὴν δὲ ἐμῆν δύναμιν, ἐφι ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἐν ποιῷ ἐργῷ καταμαθῶν, ταῦτα μου καταγγε- σκεῖς; Ἐν ταῖς συνυοσίαις, ἐφι, αἷς σύνε τοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττονσι καὶ γάρ, ὅταν τι ἀνακοινώνται σοι, ὥσ τε καλῶς συμβουλεύοντα, καὶ διὰ τὰ ἀμπτάνωσιν, ὅρθως ἐπιτιμῶντα. 4. Οὐ ταῦτον ἔστιν, ἐφι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἰδίᾳ τε διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἀγωνίζεσθαι. Καὶ μὴν, ἐφι, ὃ γε ἀριθμεῖν δυνάμενος, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐν τῷ πλή- θει, ἢ μόνος ἀριθμεῖ, καὶ οἱ κατὰ μόνας ἀρεστὰ κιβαρίζον- τες, οὕτως ἐπιτιμῶντα. 5. Αἰδώ δὲ καὶ φόβουν, ἐφι, οὐχ ὁρᾶς ἐμφυτά τε ἀνθρώποις ὑντα, καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὁχλοῖς ἢ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις ὀμιλίαις παρεστάμενα; Καὶ σὲ γε διδάξων, ἐφι, ὁρμημαί, οὕτω τούς φρονιμωτάτους αἴδούμενος, οὕτω τούς ἰσχυροτάτους φιλούμενος, ἐν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τε καὶ ἀσθενεστάτοις αἰσχύνει λέγειν. 6. Πότερον γὰρ τοὺς γυναῖκες αὐτῶν, ἢ τοὺς σκυτεῖς, ἢ τοὺς τέκτονας, ἢ τοὺς ἀρκεῖς, ἢ τοὺς
CHAPTER VIII.

SUMMARY.

Aristippus, being desirous of retaliating in kind for having been, on a previous occasion, put to silence by Socrates, proposes some captious questions to the latter concerning the good and fair. Socrates, in reply, shows him that nothing is good or fair in itself, but only so as regards the things for which it is intended; and that, therefore, goodness and fairness are identical with usefulness.

1. 'Arístípp’ou δ’ επιχειροῦντος ἐλέγχειν τὸν Σωκράτην, ὦσπερ αὐτὸς ὑπ’ ἑκείνου τὸ πρότερον ἠλέγχετο, βουλομένος τούς συνόντας ὡφελεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀπεκρίνατο, οὐχ ὦσπερ οἱ φιλαττόμενοι, μή τι δ’ λόγος ἐπαλαχθῇ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἄν

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πεπεισμένοι μάλιστα πράττοιεν τα δέοντα. 2. 'Ο μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἤρετο, εἰ τι εἰδείη ἄγαθόν, ἐνα, εἰ τι εἴποι τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἡ σιτίον, ἡ ποτόν, ἡ χρήματα, ἡ ύψιειαν, ἡ ὀρϑήν, ἡ τόλμαν, διεκνύοι δῇ τούτο κακὸν ἐνιστε ὄν ὃ δὲ εἶδὼς, ὅτι, εάν τι ἐνοχλῇ ἡμᾶς, δεόμεθα τῷ παύσοντος, ἀπεκρίνατο, ἢπερ καὶ ποιεῖν κράτιστον. 3. 'Αρά γε, ἕφη, ἐρωτᾶς με, εἰ τι οἶδα πυρετοῦ ἄγαθόν; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἕφη. 'Αλλ' ὀφαλμίας; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. 'Αλλὰ λιμοῦ; Οὐδὲ λιμοῦ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἕφη, ἐγί' ἐρωτᾶς με, εἰ τι ἄγαθὸν οἶδα, ὁ μηδενὸς ἄγαθὸν ἐστίν, οὔτε οἶδα, ἕφη, οὔτε δέομαι.

4. Πάλιν δὲ τοῦ 'Αριστέππου ἐρωτώντος αὐτὸν, εἰ τι εἰδείη καλὸν; Καὶ πολλά, ἕφη. 'Αρ' οὖν, ἕφη, πάντα ὅμως ἄλληλαις; 'Ὡς οἶνον τε μὲν οὖν, ἕφη, ἀνομοιότατα ἔνια. Πώς οὖν, ἕφη, τὸ τῷ καλῷ ἀνόμοιον, καλὸν ἄν εἰ; 'Ὅτι, νὴ Δί', ἕφη, ἐστι μὲν τῷ καλῷ πρὸς δρόμον ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλος ἀνόμοιος, καλὸς πρὸς τάλην, ἐστὶ δὲ ἀστίας, καλὴ πρὸς τὸ προβαλέσθαι, ὡς ἐν ἀνομοιοτάτῃ τῷ ἀκοντίῳ, καλῷ πρὸς τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχὺ φέρεσθαι. 5. Οὐδὲν διαφερόντως, ἕφη, ἀποκρίνει μοι, ἦ δὲ σε ἡρώτησα, εἰ τι ἄγαθὸν εἰδείης. Σὺ δ' οἶει, ἕφη, ἄλλο μὴν ἄγαθὸν, ἄλλο δὲ καλὸν εἶναι; οὔκ οἴσθ, ὅτι πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα καλὰ τε κἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ; Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἁρετή οὐ πρὸς ἄλλα μὲν ἄγαθον, πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ καλὸν ἐστίν· ἔπειτα οἱ ἀνθρώπων τὸ αὐτὸ τε καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καλὰ τε κἀγαθὰ φαίνεται, πρὸς ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τάλλα πάντα, οἷς ἀνθρώπων χρώνται, καλὰ τε κἀγαθὰ νομίζεται, πρὸς ἀπερ ἄν εὐχρηστὰ ἦ. 6. 'Αρ' οὖν, ἕφη, καὶ κόφινος κοπροφόρος καλὸν ἐστίν; Νὴ Δί', ἕφη, καὶ χρυσῆ γε ἀσπίδες αἰλόχρον, εὰν, πρὸς τὰ ἐαυτῶν ἐργα, ὃ μὲν καλὸς πεποιημένος ἦ, ἦ δὲ κακὸς. Δέγεις οὖ, ἕφη, καλὰ τε καὶ αἰλόχρα τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι; 7. Καὶ νὴ Δί ἐγὼ', ἕφη, ἄγαθὰ τε καὶ κακά· πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ τε λιμοῦ ἄγαθὸν, πυρετοῦ κακὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ πυρετοῦ ἄγαθὸν, λιμοῦ κακὸν ἐστι, πολλάκις δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς δρόμον καλὸν, πρὸς πάλην αἰλόχρον· τὸ δὲ πρὸς πάλην καλὸν, πρὸς δρόμον
CHAPTER IX.

SUMMARY.

In this chapter are contained various Socratic definitions, namely, of fortitude, wisdom and self-control, madness, envy, idleness, commend, and good fortune.

1. Πάλιν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος, ἢ ἀνδρία πότερον εἶη διδακτὸν ἢ φυσικὸν; Ἐμιμι μὲν, ἐφη, ὡσπερ σῶμα σῶματος ἵσχυρο- γερον πρὸς τοὺς πόνους φύεται, οὕτω καὶ ψυχῆν ψυχῆς ἐφρώμενεστέραν πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ φύει γίγνεσθαι· ὅρω γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμαι τε καὶ ἔθεσι προεφομένους, πολὺ διω·
φερόντας ἄλληλων τί λυρ. 2. Νομίζω μέντοι πᾶσαν φύσιν μαθήσει καὶ μελέτῃ πρὸς ἀνδρίαν αὐξεσθαι· δὴλον μὲν γὰρ, ὅτι Σκύθαι καὶ Θρᾴκες οὐκ ἂν τολμῆσειν ἀσπίδας καὶ δόρατα λαξάντες Δακεδαμονίς διαμάχεσθαι· φανερῶν δέ, ὅτι καὶ Δακεδαμόνιοι οὔτε ἂν Θρᾴξεν ἐν πέλταις καὶ ἀκουνίσισθαι, οὔτε Σκύθαις ἐν τόξοις ἐθέλοιεν ἂν διαγωνίζεσθαι. 3. Ὄρω δ’ ἐγγέγει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ὁμοίως καὶ φύσει διαφέροντας ἄλληλων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ πολὺ ἐπιδειδόντα· ἐκ δέ τούτων δὴλον ἐστιν, ὅτι πάντας χρῆ καὶ τούς εὐφυεστέρους καὶ τοὺς ἁμβλυτέρους τὴν φύσιν, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἄξιόλογοι βούλωνται γενέσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ μελετάν.

4. Σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σοφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἄλλα τῶν τὰ μὲν καλὰ τε καὶ ἁγαθᾶ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι, σοφὸν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἐκρίνειν. Προφερωτῶμενος δὲ, ἐλ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ὃ δὲι πράττειν, ποιοῦντας δὲ τάναντια, σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἐγκρατείς εἶναι νομίζοι. Οὐδὲν γε μάλλον, ἔφη, ἡ ἁσοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀκρατείς· πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι, προαιρομένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ὁ οὖνται συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν. Νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὁρθῶς πράττοντας, οὔτε σοφοὺς, οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι. 5. Ἐφῆ δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρέτην, σοφίαν εἶναι· τὰ τε γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ πάντα, θὰς ἀρετῆ πράττεται καὶ τὰ καὶ ἁγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὔτ’ ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλα ἄντι τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἄλλα καὶ, ἕαν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν· οὕτως καὶ τὰ καλὰ τε καὶ ἁγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφοὺς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἄλλα καὶ, ἕαν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν· ἐπει οὖν τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καλὰ τε καὶ ἁγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετῆ πράττεται, δὴλον εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πάσα ἀρετή, σοφία ἐστὶ. 6. Μανίαν γε μὴν ἐναντίον μὲν ἔφη εἶναι σοφία, οὐ μέντοι γε τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζε, τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτόν, καὶ μὴ δ’ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἰδοθαὶ γιγνώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω
μανίας ἐλογιζετο εἶναι· τοῦς μέντοι πολλοὺς ἔφη, ἀ μὲν οἱ πλείστοι ἀγνοοῦσι, τοὺς διημαρτηκότας τούτων οὐ φάσκεν μαίνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ διημαρτηκότας, ὅποι οἱ πολλοί γεγυνωσκοῦσι, μαίνομένους καλείν· 7. Ἐάν τε γάρ τις μέγας οὔτως οἶηται εἶναι, ὡςτε κύπτειν τὰς πύλας τοῦ τείχους διεξιόν, ἐάν τε οὔτως ἱσχυρὸς, ὡςτε ἐπιχειρεῖν οἰκίας αἴρεσθαι, ἦ ᾧλλῳ τῷ ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῶν πάσης δήλων ὅτι ἀδύνατά ἦστι, τούτοις μαίνεσθαι φάσκεν, τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν διαμαρτάλλωντας οὐ δοκεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς μαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὡςτε τὴν ἱσχυρὰν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔρωτα καλοῦσιν, οὔτω καὶ τὴν μεγάλην παράνοιαν μανίαν αὐτοῦς καλείν. 8. Φθόνον δὲ σκοπῶν, ὡς τι εἰς, λύπην μὲν τινα ἔξευρισκεν αὐτόν ὤντα, οὕτε μεντοὶ τὴν ἐπὶ φίλων ἄτυχίας, οὕτε τὴν ἐπὶ ἔχθρῶν εὐτυχίας γεγυνομένην, ἄλλα μόνους, ἔφη, φθονεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίας ἀνικόμενους. Θαυμαζόντων δὲ τινῶν, εἰ τις φιλῶν τινα ἐπὶ τῇ εὐπραξίᾳ αὐτοῦ λυποῖτο, ὑπεμιμησκεν, ὅτι πολλοὶ οὔτως πρὸς τινας ἔχουσιν, ὡςτε κακῶς μὲν πράττοντας μὴ δύνασθαι περιορᾶν, ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖν ἄτυχούσιν, εὐτυχοῦσιν δὲ λυπεῖσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ φρονίμῳ μὲν ἀνδρὶ οὖκ ἂν συμβήναι, τοὺς ἡλιθίους δὲ ἀεὶ πάσχειν αὐτό. 9. Σχολὴν δὲ σκοπῶν, τί εἰς, ποιοῦντας μὲν τι θλῆς ἀπαντας, σχολάζοντας μέντοι τοὺς πλείστους ἔφη εὐρίσκειν· καὶ γάρ τοὺς πεπετεύοντας, καὶ τοὺς γελωτοποιούντας ποιεῖν τι· πάντας δὲ τούτους, ἔφη, σχολάζειν· ἔξεινα γάρ αὐτοῖς λένα πράξεσάς τα βελτιώς τούτων. Ἀπὸ μέντοι τῶν βελτιώνων ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω λέναι, οὐδένα σχολάζειν· εἰ δὲ τίς ὅιος, τοῦτος, ἁσχολεῖσα αὐτῷ σοφιας, κακῶς, ἔφη, τούτῳ πράττειν. 10. Βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων αἱρεθέντας, οὐδὲ τοὺς κλήρῳ λαχόντας, οὐδὲ τοὺς βιασμάτων, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξαπατήσαντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν. 11. Ὁπότε γὰρ τις ὁμολογήσει τοῦ μὲν ἄρχοντος εἴναι τὸ προστάτευν ὦ τι χρῆ ποιεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἁρχομένου τὸ πείθεσθαι, ἐπεδείκνυεν ἐν τῇ νηὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιστάμενον, ἄρχοντα, τοῦ δὲ ναύκληρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηὶ πάντας,
XENOPHON'S

III. 9. § 15

πειθομένους τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ, καὶ ἐν γεωργίᾳ, τοὺς κεκτημένους ἄγροὺς, καὶ ἐν νόσῳ, τοὺς νοσοῦντας καὶ ἐν σωμασκοῦντας, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας, οίς ὑπάρχει τι ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον, ἂν μὲν αὐτοὶ ἡγῶνται ἐπιστασθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις οὐ μόνον παροῦσι πειθομένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντας μεταπεμπομένους, ὅτις ἐκείνοις πειθόμενοι τὰ δέοντα πράττοσιν· ἐν δὲ ταλασίᾳ καὶ τὰς γυναικὰς ἐπεδείκνυεν ἀρχούσας τῶν ἄνδρῶν, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν εἰδέναι, ὅτις χρὴ ταλασιοφιγεῖν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδέναι. 12. Εἰ δὲ τις πρὸς ταῦτα λέγοι, ὅτι τῷ τυράννῳ ἐξεστὶ μὴ πειθεσθαι τοῖς ὀρθῶς λέγοντι, Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ἐφη, ἐξειν ἡμὶ πειθεσθαι, ἐπικειμένης γε ζημίας, εἰν τις τῷ εὐ λέγοντι μὴ πείθηται· ἐν δὲ γὰρ ἂν τις πράγματε μὴ πείθηται τῷ εὐ λέγοντι, ἀμαρτήσεται ἁστεο, ἀμαρτάνων δὲ ζημιωθήσεται. 13. Εἰ δὲ φαίη τις τῷ τυράννῳ ἐξεἰναι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν εὐ φρονοῦντα, Τὸν δὲ ἀποκτεῖνοντα, ἐφη, τοὺς κρατίστους τῶν συμμάχων οἰεί αὐτίμιον γίγνεσθαι, ἦ, ὡς ἐτυχε, ζημιοῦσθαι; πότερον γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον οἰεί σώζεσθαι τὸν ταῦτα ποιοῦντα, ἦ οὔτω καὶ τάχιστ' ἂν ἀπολέσθαι; 14. Ἐρομένου δὲ τινὸς αὐτόν, τὸ δοκοί αὐτῷ κράτιστον ἄνδρι ἐπιτήθενμα εἰναι, ἀπεκρίνατο, Εὐπραξιάν. Ἐρομένου δὲ πάλιν, εἰ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἐπιτήθενμα νομίζοι εἰναι, Πάν μὲν οὖν τούναντίον ἐγώ', ἐφη, τύχην καὶ πράξειν ἤγομαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ζητοῦντα ἐπιτυχεῖν τινι τῶν δεόντων, εὐτυχίαν οἴμαι εἰναι, τὸ δὲ μαθόντα τε καὶ μελετήσαντά τι εὐ ποιεῖν, εὐπραξίαν νομίζω, καὶ οἱ ταύτα ἐπιτηθεῦντες δοκοῦσι μοι εὖ πράττειν. 15. Καὶ ἄριστοι δὲ καὶ θεοφιλεστάτους ἐφη εἰναι, ἐν μὲν γεωργίᾳ, τοὺς τὰ γεωργικὰ εὖ πράττοντας, ἐν δὲ ἱατρείᾳ, τοὺς τὰ ἱατρικὰ, ἐν δὲ πολιτείᾳ, τοὺς τὰ πολιτικὰ· τὸν δὲ μηδὲν εὐ πράττοντα, οὔτε χρήσιμον οὐδὲν ἐφη εἰναι, οὔτε θεοφιλή.
CHAPTER X.

SUMMARY.

Socrates was also serviceable to artists, in the conversations which he held with them concerning their respective arts. In the first place, he showed in what the chief excellence of a painting consists. The art of painting, for example, is not confined to the mere representation of objects that are visible in their nature, but it seeks to express also the various emotions of the breast, by means of the eyes, the countenance, and the gestures. (§ 1–5.)

In statuary, again, we must not merely seek to imitate the various positions and movements of the human frame, but we must also breathe life into the statue by expressing the emotions of the soul. (§ 6–8.)

In another and third conversation, he shows in what the εὐρυθμία of a corslet consists. (§ 9–15.)

1. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ ποτε τῶν τὰς τέχνας ἐχόντων, καὶ ἔργασίας ἕνεκα χρωμάτων αὐταίς, διαλέγοιτο τιν, καὶ τοῦ τοις ὁφέλιμος ἢν· εἰσελθὼν μὲν γάρ ποτε πρὸς Παρράσιον τὸν ζωγράφον, καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, Ἄρα, ἐφη, ὡς Παρράσιε, γραφική ἐστιν ἡ εἰκασία τῶν ὀρωμένων; τὰ γούν κοίλα καὶ τὰ υψηλά, καὶ τὰ σκοτεινὰ καὶ τὰ φωτεινά, καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ καὶ τὰ μαλακά, καὶ τὰ τράχεια καὶ τὰ λεία, καὶ τὰ νέα καὶ τὰ παλαιὰ σώματα διὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεῖσθε. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις, ἐφη. 2. Καὶ μὴν τά γε καλὰ εἰδὴ ἀφομοιώσεις, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ράδιον ἔνι ἀνθρώπῳ περιτυχεῖν ἀμερίπτα πάντα ἔχοντι, ἐκ πολλῶν συνάγοντες τά ἐξ ἐκάστου κάλλιστα, οὕτως ὀλὰ τά σώματα καλὰ ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι; Ποιοῦμεν γάρ, ἐφη, οὕτως. 3. Τί γάρ; ἐφη, τὸ πιθανῶτατον τε καὶ ἥδιστον, καὶ φιλικότατον, καὶ ποθεινῶτατον, καὶ ἐρασιμότατον ἀπομιμεῖσθε τῆς ψυχῆς ἱθος; ἢ οὐδὲ μιμητὸν ἐστι γοῦτο; Πῶς γάρ ἂν, ἐφη, μιμητὸν εἴη, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὃ μῆτε συμμετρίαν, μῆτε χρώμα, μῆτε ὡν ὕπας ἄρτι μηδὲν ἔχει, μηδὲ ὀλως ὅρατον ἐστιν; 4. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἐφη, γίγνεται ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ τε φιλοφρόνως καὶ τὸ ἐχθρῶς βλέπειν πρὸς τινας; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη. Οὐκον τούτο γε μιμητὸν ἐν τοῖς ὁμοιωσίν; Καὶ μάλα,
εφη. 'Επὶ δὲ τοῖς τῶν φίλων ἀγαθοίς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς
ουμοίως σοι ὁδούσιν ἔχειν τὰ πρόσωπα οἱ τε φροντίζοντες,
καὶ οἱ μὴ; Μὰ ΔῈ οὐ δήτα, ἐφη· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἀγα-
θοῖς φαίνετο, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς σκυνδρωποὶ γίγνονται.
Οὐκον, ἐφη, καὶ ταῦτα ὑμνατὸν ἄπεικάζειν; Καὶ μάλα,
ἐφη. 5. Ἀλλὰ μή καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς τε καὶ ἐλενθέ-
ρειον, καὶ τὸ ταπεινὸν τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερον, καὶ τὸ σωφρονη-
tικὸν τε καὶ φρόνιμον, καὶ τὸ ὑβριστικὸν τε καὶ ἄπειροκά-
λον, καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ
ἐστάτων καὶ κινουμένων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνει. Ἄληθῆ
λέγεις, ἐφη. Οὐκον καὶ ταῦτα μιμητά; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη.
Πότερον οὖν, ἐφη, νομίζεις ἢδιον ὅραν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, δι'
ὡν τὰ καλὰ τε κἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀγαπητὰ ἢθη φαίνεται, ἢ δ' ὥν
τὰ αἰσχρά τε καὶ πονηρὰ καὶ μισητά; Πολὺ νὴ ΔῈ', ἐφη,
διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

6. Πρὸς δὲ Κλείτωνα τὸν ἀνδριαντοποιὸν εἰσελθὼν ποτε,
καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, "Ὅτι μὲν, ἐφη, ὦ Κλείτων, ἄλ-
λοίους ποιεῖς,δρομεῖς τε καὶ παλαιστάς, καὶ πύκνας,
καὶ παγκρατιστάς, ὁρῶ τε καὶ οἶδα· ο δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ
dιὰ τῆς ὑφεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ ἄκομον φαίνεσθαι, πῶς
tοῦτο ἑνεργάζει τοῖς ἀνδριάσιν; 7. 'Επεὶ δὲ ἄπορῶν ὦ
Κλείτων ὦ ταχὺ ἀπεκρίνατο, ὦ Ἀρ', ἐφη, τοῖς τῶν ἄνω
τῶν εἴδεσιν ἄπεικάζων τὸ ἔργον, ἄκομον ἐστίν τοις
ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνδριάντας; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Οὐκον
τὰ τε ὑπὸ τῶν σχημάτων καταστώμενα καὶ τὰ ἀναστώμα
ταὶ σώμασι, καὶ τὰ σύμπειξόμενα, καὶ τὰ διελκομένα, καὶ τὰ
ἐντελώμενα καὶ τὰ ἀνείμενα ἄπεικάζων, ὡμοιότερα τα τοῖς
ἄλθινοις καὶ πιθανότερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν
οὖν, ἐφη. 8. Τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰ πάθη τῶν ποιούσιν τοις σωμα-
tων ἀπομιμεῖσθαι οὐ ποιεῖ τινα τέρψιν τοῖς θεωμένοις,
Εἰκὸς γὰρ, ἐφη. Οὐκον καὶ τῶν μὲν μαχομένων ἀπειλη-
tικά τὰ ὁμάτα ἄπεικαστέον, τῶν δὲ νενικηκότων εὐφρα-
νομένων ἢ ὤμοις μιμητέα; Σφόδρα γ', ἐφη. Δεὶ ἀρα, ἐφη,
tὸν ἀνδριαντοποιὸν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τῷ εἰδο προσεικά-
ζων.
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III. 10. § 15.]

9. Ἑρᾶς δὲ Πιστίαν τὸν θωρακοποίον εἰσελθών, ἐπιδείξαντος αὐτοῦ τῷ Σωκράτει θώρακας εὑς ἐλγασμένους, Νῆ την Ἡρᾶν, ἔφη, καλὸν γε, ὦ Πιστία, τῷ εὐθείᾳ, τῷ τὰ μὲν δεόμενα σκέψης τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σκεπάζειν τὸν θώρακα, ταῖς δὲ χερσὶ μῆ κωλύειν χρῆσθαι. 10. Ἀτάρ, ἔφη, λέξον μοι, ὦ Πιστία, διὰ τὶ οὕτω ισχυροτέρους οὔτε πολυτελεστέρους τῶν ἄλλων ποιῶν τοὺς θώρακας πλείονος ποιλείς; Ὡσπερ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὐσιμοτέρους ποιῶ. Τὸν δὲ ῥυθμὸν, ἔφη, πότερα μέτρῳ ἡ σταθμὴ ἐπιδεικνύουν πλείονος τιμᾶ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ᾨσυς γε πάντας, οὐδὲ ὁμοίους οἴμαι σε ποιεῖν, εἰγε ἀρμόττοντας ποιεῖς. Ἀλλὰ νὴ Δ', ἔφη, ποιῶ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄφελός ἐστι θώρακος ἄνευ τοῦτον. 11. Ὅυκουν, ἔφη, σώματά γε ἀνθρώπων, τὰ μὲν εὐρυθμὰ ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ ἀρρυθμα; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τῷ ἀρρυθμῷ σώματι ἀρμόττοντα τὸν θώρακα εὐρυθμὸν ποιεῖς; Ὡσπερ καὶ ἀρμόττοντα, ἔφη· ὃ ἀρμόττων γὰρ ἐστὶν εὐρυθμός. 12. Δοκεῖς μοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τῷ εὐρυθμὸν οὐ καθ' ἐαντὸ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν χρώμενον, ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ φαίης ἀσπίδα, ἢ ἄν ἀρμόττῃ, τούτῳ εὐρυθμὸν εἶναι, καὶ χλαύδα, καὶ τὰλλα ὦσκαύτως ἔοικεν ἔχειν τῷ σῷ λόγῳ. 13. Ἰσως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τι οὐ μικρὸν ἄγαθὸν τῷ ἁρμόττειν πρόσετι. Δίδαξον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ τι ἔχεις. Ἡττον, ἔφη, τῷ βάρει πιέζουσιν οἱ ἁρμόττοντες τῶν ἀναρμόστων, τὸν αὐτὸν σταθμὸν ἔχοντες· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάρμοστοι, ἡ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων κρεμάμενοι, ἡ καὶ ἂλλο τι τοῦ σώματος σφόδρα πιέζοντες, δύσφοροι καὶ χαλεποὶ γίγνονται, οἱ δὲ ἁρμόττοντες, διειλημμένοι τῷ βάρος, τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν κλειδῶν καὶ ἐπωμίδων, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμῶν, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ στῆθους, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νότου, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς γαστρῆς, ὄλιγον δεῖν οὐ φορῆματι, ἀλλὰ προσθήματι ἐοίκασιν. 14. Εἰρηκας, ἔφη, ὡστο, δὲ ὄπερ ἐγγεία τὰ ἐμα ἐργα πλείστον ἀξία νομίζω εἶναι· ἕνοι μὲντοι τοὺς ποικίλους καὶ τοὺς ἐπιχρύσους θώρακας μᾶλλον ὄνομυνται. Ἀλ. ἢ μή, ἔφη εἰγε διὰ ταῦτα μῆ ἁρμόττοντας ὄνομυνται, κακὸν ἐμοίγε δοκοῦν ποικίλον τε καὶ ἐπιχρυσον ὄνεισθαι. 15. Ἀτάρ, ἔφη, τοῦ
In a conversation with the hetairētēs Theodota, Socrates discourses on the value of friends, and on the art of gaining and preserving them.

1. Γυναικὸς δὲ ποτὲ οὖσης ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῆς, ἢ ὅνομα ἡν Θεοδότη, μυηθεντὸς αὐτῆς τῶν παρόντων τινός, καὶ εἰπόντος, ὅτι κρείττον εἰς λόγον τὸ κάλλος τῆς γυναῖκός, καὶ ζωγράφος φήσαντος εἰςεῖναι πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπεικοσμενονος, Ἰτέον ἄν εἰς θεασομένοις, ἐφ' ὁ Σωκράτης· οὕ γὰρ δὴ ἄκουσαί γε τὸ λόγον κρείττον ἐστὶ καταμαθεῖν. Καὶ ὁ διηγησάμενος, Οὐκ ἄν φθάνοιτ', ἐφ', ἀκολουθοῦντες. 2. Οὔτω μὲν δὴ πορευθέντες πρὸς τὴν Θεοδότην, καὶ καταλαθόντες ζωγράφῳ τινὶ παρεστηκνιαν, ἐθεάσαντο· πανσαμνον δὲ τοῦ ζωγράφου, Ὡ ἀνδρες, ἐφ' ὁ Σωκράτης, πότερον ἡμᾶς δεὶ μᾶλλον Θεοδότη χάριν ἔχειν, δεὶ ἡμῖν τὸ κάλλος ἐαυτῆς ἐπέδειξεν, ἢ ταύτην ἡμῖν, δεὶ ἐθεασάμεθα; ἃρ' εἰ μὲν ταύτη ὥφελιμωτέρα ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπίδειξις, ταύτην ἡμῖν χάριν ἐκτεόν, εἰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἢ θέα, ἡμᾶς ταύτη; 3. Εἰπόντος δὲ τινος, δεὶ δίκαια λέγοι, Οὐκοῦν, ἐφ', αὐτὴ μὲν ἦδη τε τὸν παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπαίνον κερδαίνει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν εἰς πλείους διαγγείλωμεν, πλείω ὥφελησεται. Ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰκός, μᾶς μὲν θεραπεύειν, ταύτην δὲ θεραπεύεσθαι. Καὶ ἡ Θεοδότη, Νὴ Δ' ἐφ', εἰ τοῖσιν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἐμὲ δὲν δέοι ὑμῖν τῆς θέας χάριν ἔχειν. 4. Ἐκ δὲ τούτοι οὐ Σωκράτης, ὅρων αὐτὴν τε πολυτελῶς κεκοσμημένην, καὶ μητέρα παρμύσαν αὐτὴ ἐν ἐσθήτι καὶ θεραπεύα οὐ τῇ τυχοῦσῃ, καὶ θεραπαίνας πολλὰς καὶ εὐειδές, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας ἡμελημένως ἐχούσας, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῇν οἰκίαν ἀφθόνως κα
III. 11. § 10.] MEMORABILIA.

τεσκευασμένην; Εἰπέ μοι, ἐφή, ὁ Θεοδότη, ἔστι σοι ἁγρός; Οὐκ ἔμοιγ', ἐφη. Ἀλλ' ἄρα οἰκία προσόδους ἔχουσα; Οὐδὲ οἰκία, ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴ χειροτέχναι τινές; Οὐδὲ χειροτέχναι, ἐφη. Πόθεν οὖν, ἐφη, τάπιτήδεια ἔχεις; Ἐὰν τις, ἐφη, φίλος μοι γενόμενος, εὖ ποιεῖν ἐθέλη, οὗτός μοι βίος ἔστι. 5. Νὴ τὴν Ἡραν, ἐφη, ὁ Θεοδότη, καλὸν γε τὸ κτήμα, καὶ πολλῷ κρείττον ὄνων τε καὶ βοῶν καὶ αλγῶν, φίλων ἀγέλην κεκτῆθαι. Ἀτάρ, ἐφη, πότερον τῇ τύχῃ ἐπιτρέπεις, ἐὰν τίς σοι φίλος, ὅσπερ μυῖα, προσπτήται, ἢ καὶ αὐτή τι μηχανά; 6. Πώς δ' ἂν, ἐφη, ἐγὼ τούτου μηχανῆν εὑρομι; Πολὺ νὴ Δί, ἐφη, προσηκόντως μᾶλλον, ἢ αἱ φαλαγγές· οἰσκα γάρ, ὡς ἐκείναι θηρῶσι τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀράχνια γάρ δῆπον λεπτὰ υφηνώμενα, ὅ τι ἂν ἐνταῦθα ἐμπέσῃ, τούτῳ τροφή χρύνται. 7. Καὶ ἐμοὶ οὖν, ἐφη, συμβουλεύεις ύφήνασαι τὶ θηράτρον; Οὐ γάρ δὴ οὕτως γε ἀτεχνῶς οἰσθαί χρῆ τὸ πλείστον ἄξιον ἀγρευμα, φίλους θηράσειν· οὐχ ὅρας, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἄξιον, τοὺς λαγῶς, θηρῶντες πολλὰ τεχνάζουσιν; 8. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῆς νυκτὸς νέμονται, κύνας νυκτερευτικὰς πορισάμενοι, ταύτας αὐτοῦς θηρῶσιν· ὅτι δὲ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀποδεδράσκοισιν, ἀλλὰς κτῶνται κύνας, αἰτίνες, ἢ ἂν ἐκ τῆς νομῆς εἰς τὴν εὐνύχην ἀπέλθωσι, τῇ ὁμὴν αἰσθανόμεναι εὐρίσκοισιν αὐτοὺς· ὅτι δὲ ποδώκεις εἰςιν, ὅτε καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανερῶν τρέχοντες ἀποφεύγειν, ἄλλας αὐτὸς ταχείας παρασκευάζονται, ἵνα κατὰ πόδας ἀλίσκωνται· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ταύτας αὐτῶν τινες ἀποφεύγουσι, δίκτυα ἱστασίν εἰς τὰς ἀτραποὺς, ἢ φεύγον- σιν, ἵνα ταῦτα ἐμπίπτοντες συμποδίζονται. 9. Τίνων οὖν, ἐφη, τοιοῦτῳ φίλως ἂν ἐγὼ θηρών; Ἐὰν νὴ Δί' ἐφη, ἀντὶ κυνὸς κτήση, ὅστις σοι ἱχνεύων μὲν τοὺς φιλοκά λους καὶ πλουσίους εὐρήσει, εὐρῶν δὲ μηχανήσεται, ὅπως ἐμβάλῃ αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰ σὰ δίκτυα. 10. Καὶ ποία, ἐφη, ἐγὼ δίκτυα ἔχω; Ἐν μὲν δήπον, ἐφη, καὶ μάλα εὐ περιτπελκό- μενον, τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ καταμανθάνεις, καὶ ὡς ἂν ἐμβλέποισα χαρίζοι, καὶ τῇ ἂν λέγουσα εὐφραίνοις, καὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸν ἐκν ἐπιμελόμενον ἀσμένως ὑποδέχεσθαι, τὸν δὲ τρυφῶντα
ἀποκλείειν καὶ ἁρφωτῆσαντός γε φίλου φαντασμικῶς ἐπισκέψασθαι, καὶ καλὸν τι πράξαντος σφόδρα συνηθήναι, καὶ τῷ σφόδρα σου φαντάζοντι ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ κεχαρίσθαι. Μά τὸν Δί', ἔφη ἡ Θεοδότη, ἔγω τούτων οὐδὲν μηχανώμαι.

11. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, πολὺ διαφέρει τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ὁρ-θώς ἀνθρώπῳ προφέρεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ δὴ βίᾳ μὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἔλοις, οὔτε κατάσχος φίλου, εὐεργεσία δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴ τὸ θηρίον τούτῳ ἀλώσιμον τε καὶ παραμόνιμον ἔστιν. Ἀλήθη λέγεις, ἔφη. 12. Καὶ ἡ Θεοδότη. Τι οὐν οὔ σὺ μοι, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐγένουν συνθηρατής τῶν φίλων; Ἐάν γε νη Δί', ἔφη, πείθης με σὺ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν, ἔφη, πείσαμί σε; Ζητήσεις, ἔφη, τούτο αὐτῇ καὶ μηχανήσει, ἐάν τι μου δέῃ. Εἰςιθε τοίνυν, ἔφη, θαμινά. 13. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώ-πτων τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην, Ἀλλ', ὃ Θεοδότη, ἔφη, οὐ πάντως ἢ ἡδονή ἢ συλλάβω ὁμοίως πολλά, καὶ δημοσία, παρέχει μοι ἀσχολίαν· εἰς δὲ καὶ φίλαι μοι, αἱ οὔτε ἡμέρας, οὔτε νυκτὸς ἢφ' αὐτῶν ἑάσοντι με ἀπιέναι, φῖλτρα τε πανθάνουσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐπωδάς. 14. ᾿Επίστασαι γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ ταύτα, ὃ Σώκρατες; ᾿Αλλα διὰ τί οἰεί, ἔφη, Ἀπολλόδωρον τε τόνδε καὶ Ἁντισθένην οὐδέποτε μοι ἀπολείπεσθαι; διὰ τί δὲ καὶ Κέβητα καὶ Σιμμίαν Θήβηθεν παραγίγνεσθαι; εὗ ἐσθι, ὃτι ταύτα οὐκ ἀνεν πολλών φίλτρων τε καὶ ἐπωδῶν καὶ ἑγγόν τε ἐστί. 15. Χρῆσον τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, τὴν ἐγγα, ἴνα ἔπι σοὶ πρῶ-τον ἔλκω αὐτῆν. ᾿Αλλα μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὖκ αὐτῶς ἐλκεσθαι πρὸς σε βούλομαι, ᾿αλλα σὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ πορεύεσθαι. ᾿Αλλα πορεύσομαι, ἔφη· μόνον ὑποδέχον. ᾿Αλλ' ὑποδέξομαι σε ἔφη, ἐὰν μὴ τις φιλωτέρα σου ἐνδον ἤ.
CHAPTER XII.

SUMMARY.

The value of gymnastic exercises in not only strengthening the body, but also imparting a healthy tone to the mind.

1. 'Επιγένην δὲ τῶν ξυνόντων τινά, νεον τε ὄντα καὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶς ἔχοντα, ἵδων, 'Ως ἰδιωτικῶς, ἔφη, τὸ σῶμα ἔχεις, ὧ 'Επίγενες. Καὶ δός, 'Ηδιότης μὲν, ἔφη, εἰμὶ, ὧ Σώκρατες. Οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τῶν ἐν Ἑλληνικῇ μελλόντων ἀγωνίζεσθαι: ἢ δοκεῖ σοι μικρὸς εἶναι ὁ πετρί τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀγῶν, ὅν Ἀθηναίοι θήρουσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν: 2. Καὶ μὴν οὐκ ὀλίγον μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων κακεξίαν ἀποθεόκουσος τῇ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνους, καὶ αἰσχρῶς σώζονται, πολλοὶ δὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ζῶντες ἀλλόκονται, καὶ ἀλόντες ἢτοι δουλεύοντος τὸν λοιπὸν βίον, ἐὰν οὖτω τύχωσι, τὴν χαλεπωτάτην δουλείαν, ἢ εἰς τὰς ἀνάγκας τὰς ἀλγεινότατας ἐμπεσόντες, καὶ ἐκτίσαντες ἐνίοτε πλεῖο τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς, τὸν λοιπὸν βίον ἐνδεείς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄντες καὶ κακοπαθοῦντες διαζώσι, πολλοὶ δὲ δόξαν αἰσχρῶς κτάνται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀδυναμίαν, δοκοῦντες ἀποδειλιάν. 3. Ἡ καταφρονεῖς τῶν ἐπιτιμίων τῆς κακεξίας τούτων, καὶ ῥαδίως ἀν οἷοι φέρειν τὰ τοιαῦτα; καὶ μὴν οὔμαί γε πολλῷ ῥάῳ καὶ ἠδῶν τοῦτον εἶναι, ὃ δέι ὑπομένειν τὸν ἐπιμελόμενον τῆς τοῦ σώματος ενέξειας. ἢ ὑγειενότερον τε καὶ εἰς τὰλλα χρησιμώτερον νομίζεις εἶναι τὴν κακεξίαν τῆς ενέξειας; ἢ τῶν διὰ τὴν ενέξειαν γεγονόμενων καταφρονεῖς; 4. Καὶ μὴν πάντα γε τάναντια συμβαίνει τοῖς εὔ τὰ σώματα ἔχονσιν, ἢ τοῖς κακῶς· καὶ γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσιν οἱ τὰ σώματα εὐ ἔχοντες, καὶ ἱσχύσουσι, καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀγώνων σώζονται τε εὐσχημώνως, καὶ τὰ δεινὰ πάντα διαφεύγουσι, πολλοὶ δὲ φέλος τε βοηθοῦσι, καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ἐνεργευτοῦσι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα χάριτος τε ἀξιοῦνται καὶ δόξαν μεγάλην κτάνται, καὶ τιμῶν καλλίστων τυγχά
CHAPTER XIII.

SUMMARY.

This chapter contains various pithy remarks of Socrates to various individuals.

1. We should not be offended at want of civility in another, any more than at personal deformity.  (§ 1.)

2. The best remedy for a want of relish in eating, is to stop eating before satiety supervenes.  (§ 2.)

3. In eating and drinking, be not too hard to please.  (§ 3.)

4. If you wish to punish a slave for any faults or vices, first see whether you yourself may not be laboring under similar ones.  (§ 4.)
5. He who can walk about during one or more days in succession, can likewise perform a journey of one or more days. When you undertake a journey, moreover, it is best to set out in time, so as not to be too much hurried in the course of it. (§ 5)

6. It is disgraceful for a man who has gone through all gymnastic exercises, and been well trained in these, to be surpassed in enduring fatigue and labor by his slave. (§ 6)

1. 'Orygiçoμένου δὲ ποτὲ τινος, ὁτι προσειπών τινα χαί-ειν, οὐκ ἀντιπροσερήθη, Γελοίοιν, ἐφη, τό, εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα κάκιον ἔχουτι ἀπήντησάς τω, μὴ ἂν ὁργίζεσθαι, ὃτι δὲ τὴν ψυχήν ἀγροικότερως διακείμενω περιέτυχες, τούτο σε λυ-πεῖ.

2. "Ἄλλου δὲ λέγοντος ὃτι ἀηδώς ἔσθιον, Ἀκουμενός, ἐφη, τούτων φάρμακων ἄγαθον διδάσκει. Ἕρρημένου δὲ, Ποίον; Πάυσασθαι ἐσθίοντα, ἐφη· καὶ ἥδιον τε καὶ εὐτε-λέστερον, καὶ ψυχεινότερόν φησι διάξειν παυσάμενον.

3. "Ἄλλου δ' αὖ λέγοντος, ὃτι θερμῶν εἴη παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑδρώ, ὃ πίνοι, "Ὅταν ἀρ', ἐφη, βούλῃ θερμῷ λουσάσθαι, ἔτοιμον ἔσται σοι. Ἀλλὰ ψυχρόν, ἐφη, ἄςτε λουσάσθαι, ἐστίν. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἐφη, καὶ οἱ οἰκέται σου ἀχθοῦνται πίνον-τές τε αὐτῷ καὶ λούσαμεν αὐτῷ; Μὰ τὸν Δ', ἐφη· ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλάκις τεθαὐμάκα, ἃς ἡδέως αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀμφότερα ταῦτα χρῶνται. Πότερον δὲ, ἐφη, τὸ παρὰ σοι ὑδρω θερ-μότερον πιείν ἐστίν, ἦ τὸ ἐν Ἀσκληπιοῦ; Τὸ ἐν Ἀσκλη-πιοῦ, ἐφη. Πότερον δὲ λουσάσθαι ψυχρότερον, τὸ παρὰ σοὶ, ἦ τὸ ἐν Ἀμφιαράου; Τὸ ἐν Ἀμφιαράου, ἐφη. Ἐν-θυμοῦ οὖν, ἐφη, ὅτι κινδυνεύεις ὀμασσεστότερος εἶναι τῶν τε οἰκετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρρωστούντων.

4. Κολάσαντος δὲ τινος ἰσχυρῶς ἀκόλουθον, ἦρετο, τι χαλεπαίνοι τῷ θεράποντι. "Ὅτι, ἐφη, ὁφοφαγίστατός τε ὄν, Βλακίστατός ἐστι, καὶ φιλαργυρώτατος ὄν, ἥργοτατος. Ἡδὴ ποτὲ οὖν ἐπεσκέψω, πότερος πλειώνων πληγών δει ται, σὺ, ἦ ὁ θεράπων;

5. Φοιοευμένου δὲ τινος τὴν εἰς 'Ολυμπίαν ὅδον, Τι, ἐφη, φοβεῖ σὺ τὴν πορείαν; οὐ καὶ οἰκοι σχεδόν ὅλην τὴν ἡμέ-ραν περιπατεῖς; καὶ ἐκείσε πορευόμενος, περιπατήσας ἀμι
CHAPTER XIV.

SUMMARY.

In this chapter are contained various remarks of Socrates in praise of frugality.

1. In the first place we are informed in what way he brought it about that, at feasts of contribution, no one of the party should strive to surpass another in abundance of supply. (§ 1.)

2. Definition of an ὑστηρίζον. (§ 2-4.)

3. Remarks of Socrates on a person who tasted of various dishes, and employed, at the same time, but a single piece of bread. (§ 5, 6.)

4. Explanation of the term εὐχυνόντως. (§ 7.)

1. 'Οπότε δὲ τῶν ξυνιόντων ἐπὶ δείπνον οἱ μὲν μικρὸν ὅψον, οἱ δὲ πολὺ φέροιεν, ἐκέλευς ὁ Σωκράτης τῶν παιδα τὸ μικρὸν ἢ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέναι, ἢ διανείμειν εἰκάστῳ τὸ ἱέρος. Οἱ οὖν τὸ πολὺ φέροντες ἵσχυνόντο τὸ τε μὲ κοι-
III. 14. § 6.] MEMORABILIA. 103

nuovine νοὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθεμένον, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀντιποιούμενον τὸ ἕαυτῶν· ἐπίθεσαν οὖν καὶ τὸ ἕαυτῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν· καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν πλέον εἶχον τῶν μικρὸν φερομένων. ἐπαύνυτο πολλοῦ ὑψωνύτες.

2. Καταμαθών δὲ τινα τῶν ξυνδειπνοῦντων τοῦ μὲν σιτου πεπαυμένου, τὸ δὲ ὄψεν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐσθίοντα, λόγου ὄντος περὶ ὁνομάτων, ἐφ’ οἷς ἐργῷ ἐκαστὸν εἶη, Ἔχοι-μεν ἄν, ἐφη, ὡς ἄνδρες, εἰπεῖν, ἐπὶ ποῖῳ ποτὲ ἔργῳ ἀνθρω-πος ὑποφάγος καλεῖται; ἐσθίουσι μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες ἐπὶ τῷ σίτῳ ὄψεν, ὅταν παρῇ· ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἰμῶ ποι ἔπι γε τοῦτῳ ὑποφάγος καλοῦνται. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη τις τῶν παρόντων. 3. Τὸ γὰρ; ἐφη, εάν τις ἀνευ τοῦ ἑτοῦ τὸ ὄψεν αὐτὸ ἐσθίει, μὴ ἁσκήσεως, ἀλλ’ ἕδουν ἔνεκα, πότερον ὑποφάγος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἢ οὐ; Σχολή γ’ ἄν, ἐφη, ἀλλὸς της ὑποφάγος εἰη. Καὶ τῆς ἄλλος τῶν παρόντων, ὁ δὲ μικρῷ σίτῳ, ἐφη, πολὺ ὄψεν ἐπεσθίων; Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ἐφη ο Σωκράτης, καὶ οὐ-τος δοκεῖ δικαίως ἂν ὑποφάγος καλεῖσθαι· καὶ ὅταν γε ο’ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχωνται πολυκαρπίην, εἰκότως ἂν οὔτος πολυφιάν εὐχοτο. 4. Ταύτα δὲ τοῦ Σωκρά-τους εἰπόντος, νομίσας ὁ νεανίσκος εἰς αὐτὸν εἰρήθαι τὰ λεχθέντα, τὸ μὲν ὄψεν οὐκ ἐπαύσατο ἐσθίων, ἄρτον δὲ προελάβει. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης καταμαθὼν, Παρατηρεῖτ’, ἐφη, τούτον οἱ πλησίον, ὁπότερα τῷ σίτῳ ὄψε, ἢ τῷ ὄψε σίτῳ χρήσεται.

5. Ἀλλον δὲ ποτε τῶν συνδείπνων ἴδων ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ψωμίῳ πλείονών ῥᾷν γενόμενον, Ἄρα γένοιτ’ ἄν, ἐφη, πολυτελεστέρα ὑψοποιία, ἢ μᾶλλον τὰ ψαρὰ λυμαινομένη, ἢ ἢν ὑποποιεῖται ὁ ἄμα πολλά ἐσθίων, καὶ ἄμα παντοδευτέρα ἡδούματα εἰς τὸ στῦμα λαμβάνων; πλείω μὲν γε τῶν ὑψο-ποιῶν συμμυγνύων, πολυτελέστερα ποιεῖ, ὅ δὲ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ συμμυγνύοντο, ὡς οὐχ ἀρμόττοντα, ὁ συμμυγνύων, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνοι ὥρθος ποιοῦσιν, ἀμαρτάνει τε καὶ καταλύει τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν. 6. Καίτοι πώς οὐ γελοιόν ἔστι, παρασκευαζόμεθα μὲν ὑψοποιοὺς τοὺς ἀρίστα ἐπισταμένους, αὐτὸν δὲ μηδ’ ἀντιποιοομένου τῆς τέχνης ταύτης, τὰ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων
τοιούμενα μετατιθέναι; καὶ ἄλλῳ δὲ τι προσγίγνεται τῷ ἁμα πολλά ἐπεσθεῖν ἐθισθέντι· μή παρόντων γὰρ πολλῶν μειονεκτεῖν ἂν τι δοκοῖ, πολὺν τὸ σύνηθες· ὦ δὲ ἀνεθεσθεῖ; τὸν ἐνα ψωμὸν ἐνὶ ὑψῳ προπέμπειν, ὅτε μὴ παρεῖη πολλὰ, δύναιτ' ἂν ἀλέπως τῷ ἑνὶ χρῆσθαι.

7. Ἐλεγε δὲ καὶ, ὡς τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ Ἀθηναῖοι γλώττῃ ἐσθείεν καλοῖτο· τὸ δὲ εὗ προσκείσθαι, ἐφη, ἐπὶ τῷ ταύτα ἐσθείεν, ἀτινα μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν μήτε τὸ σῶμα λυποῖη, μήτε δυσεύρετα εἰη· ὡστε καὶ τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι τοῖς κοσμίως διαιτωμένοις ἀνετίθει.
XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA

OF

SOCRATES.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

SUMMARY.

This chapter contains an account of the various modes by which Socrates drew the young unto him, and, while he studied their various characters, excited them all to the love and practice of virtue.

1. Οὕτω δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης ἦν ἐν παντὶ πράγματι καὶ πάντα τρόπον ὄφελιμος, ὥστε τῷ σκοπουμένῳ τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ μετρίως αἰσθανομένῳ, φανερὸν εἶναι, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελιμωτέρον ἦν τοῦ Σωκράτει συνεῖναι, καὶ μητ ἐκείνῳ διατρίβειν ὑπονοοῦν, καὶ ἐν ὁτιόν πράγματι ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκείνου μεμνημαθαι μὴ παρόντος οὐ μικρὰ ὄφελει τοὺς ἐλθότας τε αὐτῷ συνεῖναι, καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ἐκείνον ἐκαί γὰρ παίζων οὐδὲν ἣττον ἢ σπουδάζων ἐλνυστέλει τοῖς συνδιατρίβοις.

2. Πολλάκις γὰρ ἐφή μὲν ἂν τινὸς ἔραν, φανερὸς δ' ἦν οὐ τῶν τὰ σώματα πρὸς ὄραν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐ περυκότων ἐφιέμενος ἐτεκμαίρετο δὲ τὰς ἀγαθὰς φύσεις ἐκ τοῦ ταχὺ τε μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχοιειν, καὶ μηνιμονεύειν ὃ ἂν μάθαιειν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μαθημάτων πάντων, ὅπ' ᾧ ἦστιν οἰκίαν τε καλῶς οἰκεῖν, καὶ πόλιν, καὶ τὸ δ' ὄλον ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους πράγμασιν εὐ χρήσαται τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους ἡγεῖτο παιδευθέντας οὐκ ἂν μόνον αὐτοὺς τε εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν οἴκους καλῶς οἰκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν. 3. Οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἐπὶ πάντας ἤει ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἰομένους φύσει ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι.
μαθήσεως δὲ καταφρονοῦντας, ἐδίδασκεν, ὅτι αἱ ἁρισταὶ δο-
κοῦσαι εἶναι φύσεις μάλιστα παιδείας δέονται, ἐπιδεικνύων
τῶν τε ἔπιπων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ σφο-
δροὺς ὄντας, εἰ μὲν ἐκ νέων διαμισθεῖν, εὐχρηστοτάτους
καὶ ἁρίστους γιγνομένους, εἰ δὲ ἀδάμαστοι γένοιτο, δυσ-
καθεκτοτάτους καὶ φαντοτάτους· καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐ-
φυεστῶν, φιλοτόμων τε συσών, καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν τοῖς θη-
ρίοις, τὰς μὲν καλὰς ἁρθείς ἁρίστας γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὰς
Θήρας, καὶ χρησιμωτάτας, ἀναγώγους δὲ γίγνομένας, μα-
ταῖους τε καὶ μανώδεις καὶ δυσπειθεστάτας. 4. Ὄμοιως
dὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, ἐφρομενεστάτους
tε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντας, καὶ ἐξεργαστικῶτάτους ὅπως ἂν ἐγ-
χειρωσί, παιδευθέντας μὲν καὶ μαθόντας, ἃ δὲ πράττειν
ἀρίστους τε καὶ ὕφελμωτάτους γίγνεσθαι· (πλείστα γὰρ
καὶ μέγιστα ἁγαθά ἐργάζεσθαι·) ἀπαιδεύτους δὲ καὶ ἁμα-
θείς γενομένους, κακίστους τε καὶ βλαδερωτάτους γίγνε-
σθαι· κρίνειν γάρ ὅπως ἐπισταμένους, ἃ δὲ πράττειν, πολ-
λάκις πονηραῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμασι, μεγαλείους δὲ καὶ
σφοδροὺς ὄντας, δυσκαθεκτοὺς τε καὶ δυσαποτρέπτους εἰ-
ναι· διὸ πλείστα καὶ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζονται. 5. Τοὺς
δ’ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ μέγα φρονοῦντας, καὶ νομίζοντας οὔδὲν
προσδείσθαι παιδείας, ἔξαρκεσιν δὲ σφιν οἰομένους τὸν
πλοῦτον πρὸς τὸ διαπράττεσθαι τε ὁ τι ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ
τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐφρένους, λέγων, ὅτι μωρὸς
μὲν εἰ, εἰ τις οἶται μὴ μαθῶν τὰ τε ὕφελμα καὶ τὰ βλα-
θερὰ τῶν πραγμάτων διαγνώσθαι, μωρὸς δ’, εἰ τις μὴ διὰ
γιγνώσκων μὲν ταῦτα, διὰ δὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ὁ τι ἂν βούλη-
ται ποριζόμενος, οἶται δυνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα
πράττειν· ἥλιθιος δ’, εἰ τις μὴ δυνάμενος τὰ συμφέροντα
πράττειν, εἰ τε πράττειν οἶται καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον αὐτῷ
ὁ καλὸς ἢ λικανὸς παρασκευάσθαι· ἥλιθιος δ’ καὶ, εἰ τις
οἶται διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον, μηδὲν ἐπισταμένος, δόξειν τι ἁγα-
θός εἶναι ἢ μηδὲν ἁγαθός εἶναι δοκῶν εὐδοκιμῆσειν.
MEMORABILIA.

CHAPTER II.

SUMMARY.

The same subject continued, and illustrated still further by the case of Euthydemus, a young man who fancied himself far superior in wisdom and acquirements to all others of the same age with himself. Socrates, in the course of a conversation with him, compels him to confess his ignorance of the very things on the knowledge of which he had previously prided himself so much.

1. Τοῖς δὲ νομίζοντι παιδείας τε τῆς ἀρίστης τετυχηκέναι, καὶ μέγα φρονοῦσιν ἐπὶ σοφία, ὡς προσεφέρετο, νῦν διηγήσομαι. Καταμαθών γὰρ Εὐθύδημον τὸν Καλὸν γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμωτάτων, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη τα νομίζοντα διαφέρειν τῶν ἥλικιωτῶν ἐπὶ σοφία, καὶ μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα πάντων διοίσειν τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν, πρῶτον μὲν, αλοθανόμενος αὐτὸν διὰ νέαττα οὖσα εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν εἰςιόντα, εἰ δὲ τὶ βούλοιτο διαπράξασθαι, καθίζοντα εἰς ἡμιοποιεῖν τι τῶν ἐγγύς τῆς ἀγορᾶς, εἰς τούτο καὶ αὐτὸς ἱκεῖ τῶν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν τινὰς ἑχων. 2. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν πυθανομένου τινὸς, πότερον θεμιστοκλῆς διὰ συνουσίαν τινὸς τῶν σοφῶν, ἡ φύσει τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε τῶν πολιτῶν, βοστε πρὸς ἐκείνους ἀποδέπειν τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν σπουδαίον ἀνδρὸς δεθείη, ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόμενος κινεῖν τὸν Εὐθύδημον, εὐθές ἔφη εἰναι τὸ οἴεσθαι, τὰς μὲν ὅλην ἄξιας τέχνας μὴ γίγνεσθαι σπουδαίους ἀνεῖ διδασκάλων ἰκανῶν, τὸ δὲ προεστάναι πόλεως, πάντων ἐργών μέγιστὸν δὲν, ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου παραγιγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. 3. Πάλιν δὲ ποτε παράντο τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου, ὅρων αὐτὸν ἀποχωροῦντα τῆς συνεδρίας, καὶ φυλαττόμενον, μὴ δόξῃ τὸν Σωκράτην θαυμάζειν ἐπὶ σοφία, Ἡς μὲν, ἐφε, ὁ ἀνδρες, Εὐθύδημος οὗτοι ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενόμενος, τῆς πόλεως λόγον περί τινος προτιθείς, οὐκ ἀφεῖται τοῦ συμβουλεύειν, εὐθηλὼν εἶτεν εἶ ὡν ἐπιτηδεύειν· δοκεῖ δὲ μοι καλὸν προοίμον τῶν δημηγορίῶν παρασκευάσασθαι, φυλαττόμενος, μὴ δόξῃ μανθάνειν.
τι παρά τοῦ· δήλον γάρ, διτί λέγειν ἀρχόμενος ὡδε προσυμίστηκα· 4. Παρ' οὖνδενὸς μὲν πώποτε, ὡς ἀνδρὲς 'Ἀθηναῖοι, οὖν δέμαθον, οὖν ἀκούων τινὰς εἶναι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν ἰκανοῦς, ἐξήτησα τρύπος ἐντυχείν, οὖν ἐπεμελήθην τοῦ διδάσκαλον μοι τινὰ γενέσθαι τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τάναντι· διατετέλεκα γὰρ φεύγων οὐ μόνον τὸ μαθῆναι τε παρὰ τῶν τινών, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δόξαν· ὅμως δὲ δι τὴν ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου ἑπίθη μοι, συμβουλέσω ὑμῖν. 5. 'Αρμόσει δ' ἂν οὖν προσῳμίαζοθαι καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις παρὰ τῆς πόλεως λατρικὸν ἔργον λαβείν· ἐπιτηδείου γ’ ἂν αὐτοῖς εἰη, τοῦ λόγου ἄρχεσθαι ἐντεῦθεν· Παρ' οὖνδενὸς μὲν πώποτε, ὡς ἀνδρὲς Αθηναῖοι, τὴν λατρικὴν τέχνην ἐμαθον, οὐδ’ εξήτησα διδάσκαλον ἐμαυτῷ γενέσθαι τῶν λατρῶν οὖνδένα· διατετέλεκα γὰρ φυλαπτόμενος οὐ μόνον τὸ μαθεῖν τι παρά τῶν λατρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δόξαν μεμαθηκέναι τῇ τέχνῃ ταύτην· ὅμως δὲ μοι τὸ λατρικὸν ἔργον ὅτε· πειρασθομεῖ γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἀποκινδυνεύων μαθήσει. Πάντες οὖν οἱ παρόντες ἐγέλασαν ἐπί τῷ προσῳμίῳ. 6. Ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸς ἦν ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἡδή μὲν, οἷς ὁ Σωκράτες λέγοι, προσέχων, ἐκεῖ δὲ φυλαπτόμενος αὐτοῖς τε φόβεγγεσθαι, καὶ νομίζων τῇ σωφρὸναν τοῖς δόξαν περιβάλλεσθαι, τότε ὁ Σωκράτης, βουλόμενος αὐτὸν παύσαι τοῦτον, Θαυμαστόν γάρ, ἐφη, τε τοτε οἱ βουλόμενοι κιθαρίζειν, ἡ αὐλεῖν, ἡ ἱππεύειν, ἡ ἀλλοι τι τῶν τοιούτων ἰκανοῦ γενέσθαι, πειρώνται ὡς συνεχέστατα· τοις ποιεῖν δὲ τι τοὺς βουλοῖντες δυνατοῖς γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἀρίστοις δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πάντα πτυοῦντες καὶ ὑπομενούντες, ἑνεκα τοῦ μὴ δὲν ἄνευ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἄν ἄλλως ἀξίολογοι γενόμενοι τῶν δὲ βουλομένων δυνατῶν γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά, νομίζοις τινὲς ἄνευ παρασκευῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας αὐτόματοι εξαίφνης δυνατοὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἔσσεθαι. 7. Καὶ τοῖς γε τοσοῦτω ταῦτα ἐκείνων δυσκατεργαστῶτερα φαίνεται, διὸ δι περὶ πλείονων περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευομένων, ἐλάπτους οἱ κατεργαζόμενοι γίγνονται· δήλον οὖν, ὃτε καὶ ἐπιμελείας δέονται πλείονος καὶ ἱσχυρότερος οἱ τοῦτων
IV. 2. § 11.] MEMORABILIA.

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εφιέμενοι, ἥ οἱ ἐκεῖνων. 8. Κατ' ἀρχάς μὲν οὖν, ἀκούον
tος Εὐθυδήμου, τοιούτους λόγους ἐλεγε Σωκράτης· ώς δ' ἦσθε
tοις ἐν βουλήσεως ὑπομένοντα, ὁτε διαλέγοιτο, καὶ προθυμότερον ἀκούοντα, 
μόνος ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ ἴσον πολιτείαν· παρακαθεξομένου δ' αὐτῷ τοῦ Εὐθυ
dήμου, Εἰπέ μοι, ἐφη, ὃ Εὐθύδημε, τῷ ὄντι, ὦστερ ἐγὼ ἀκούω, 
tολλά γράμματα συνῆχας τῶν λεγομένων σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γεγονέναι; Νή 
tὸν Δῦ', ἐφη, ὡ Σώκρατες· καὶ ἔτι γε συνάγω, ἢς ἄν κτή
σωμαι, ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι, πλείστα. 9. Νή τὴν Ἡραν, ἐφη ὁ 
Σωκράτης, ἀγαμάζει γέ σον, διότι οὐκ ἄργυριόν καὶ χρυσίον 
προεῖλον ἤθεαροις κεκτήσθαι μᾶλλον, ἡ σοφίας· δήλω 
γάρ, ὅτι νομίζεις ἄργυριον καὶ χρυσίον οὐδὲν βελτίους ποι 
eῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὰς δὲ τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμα 
ἀρετῆς πλουτίζειν τοὺς κεκτημένους. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος 
ἔχαρεν ἀκούων ταῦτα, νομίζων δοκεῖν τῷ Σωκράτει ὁρθῶς 
μετέναι τὴν σοφίαν. 10. Ὅ δὲ καταμαθῶν αὐτῶν ἠθέντα 
tῶ ἐπαίνοι τούτῳ, Τί δὲ δὴ βουλόμενος ἁγάθος γενέσθαι, 
ἐφη, ὃ Εὐθύδημε, συνέλεγες τὰ γράμματα; Ἐπεὶ δὲ διεσ 
ώπησεν ὁ Εὐθύδημος, σκοπῶν ὃ τι ἀποκρίναστο, πάλιν ὁ 
Σωκράτης, 'Αρα μή ἰατρός; ἐφη· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἰατρῶν 
ἔστι συγγράμματα. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Μᾶ Δῦ', ἐφη, οὐκ 
ἐγώγε. 'Ἀλλὰ μή ἀρχιτεκτὼν βούλει γενέσθαι; γνωμον 
κοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τούτο δεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγώγε', ἐφη. 'Ἀλλὰ 
mή γεωμέτρης ἐπιθυμεῖς, ἐφη, γενέσθαι ἁγάθος, ὦστερ ὁ 
Θεόδωρος; Οὐδὲ γεωμετρίς, ἐφη. 'Ἀλλὰ μή ἀστρολόγος, 
ἐφη, βούλει γενέσθαι; 'Ως δὲ καὶ τούτο ἡρνεῖτο, 'Ἀλλὰ 
mή ῥαψωδός; ἐφη· καὶ γὰρ τὰ 'Ὀμήρου σὲ φασιν ἐπη πάντα 
κεκτήσθαι. Μᾶ Δῦ' οὐκ ἐγώγε', ἐφη· τοὺς γαρ τοις ῥαψ 
ωδοὺς οἶδα τὰ μὲν ἐπη ἄκριβούντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάντα ἠλίθι 
ους ὄντας; 11. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐφη· Οὐ δῆπον, ὃ Εὐθύ 
δημε, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίεσαι, δὴ ήν ἀνθρωποὶ πολιτικοὶ 
γίγνονται, καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ, καὶ ἄρχειν ἰκανοὶ, καὶ ὑφέλιμοι 
τοῖς τε ἀλλοις ἀνθρώπως καὶ ἔαντοις; Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, 
Σφόδρα γ', ἐφη, ὡ Σώκρατες ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς δέομαι 
Νή Δῦ', ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τῆς καλλιστῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ μεγί.
στης ἐφίέσαι τέχνης· ἐστι γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὐτῆς, καὶ καλεῖται βασιλικὴ· ἀτάρ, ἐφη, κατανενήκας, εἰ οἶνον τ' ἐστί, μὴ ὅντα δίκαιον, ἀγαθὸν ταύτα γενέσθαι; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη, καὶ οὐχ οἶνον τέ γε ἀνευ δικαιοσύνης ἀγαθὸν πολίτην γενέσθαι. 12. Τί οὖν; ἐφη, σὺ δὴ τοῦτο κατείργασαι; Οἶμαι γε, ἐφη, ω Σωκράτες, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἦττον φανῆναι δι' καίος. 'Αρ' οὖν, ἐφη, τῶν δικαίων ἐστὶν ἔργα, ὀστέρ τῶν τεκτόνων; Ἐστι μέντοι, ἐφη. 'Αρ' οὖν, ἐφη, ὀστέρ οἱ τέκτονες ἐχονοὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔργα ἐπιδείξας, οὕτως οἱ δίκαιοι τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχομεν ἂν διεξηγήσασθαι; Μὴ οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ δύναμαι ἐγώ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα ἐξηγήσασθαι; καὶ νὴ Δ' ἐγώγε τὰ τῆς ἁδικίας· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ὅλεγα ἐστί καθ' ἐκάστην ἤμεραν τοιαύτα ὀραν τε καὶ ἀκούειν. 13. Βούλει οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, γράψωμεν ἐνταυθῷ μὲν Δ', ἐνταυθῷ δὲ Λ; εἰτά δ' τι μὲν ἄν δοκῇ ἢμῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργων εἶναι, πρὸς τὸ Δ' τιθῶμεν, δ' τι δ' ἄν τῆς ἁδικίας, πρὸς τὸ Λ; Εἰ τ' σοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, προδείην τούτων, ποιεῖ ταύτα. 14. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης γράφας, ὀσπερ ἐπέν, Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, ἐστιν ἂν ἀνθρώπως τὸ ψεύδεσθαι; Ἐστι μέντοι, ἐφη. Ποτέρωσε οὖν, ἐφη, θῶμεν τούτο; Δῆλον ἐφη, δι' τε πρὸς τὴν ἁδικίαν. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, καὶ τὸ ἐξαπατᾶ ἐστί; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Τούτο οὖν ποτέρωσε θῶμεν; Καὶ τούτο δῆλον δι' τε, ἐφη, πρὸς τὴν ἁδικίαν. Τί δέ; τὸ κακογιέν; Καὶ τούτο, ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ ἀνθραποδίζεσθαι; Καὶ τούτο. Πρὸς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ οὐδὲν ἢμῖν τούτων κεισταῖ, ὁ Ἐυθύδημος; Δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ἐφη.) 15. Τί δ'; εάν τις στρατηγὸς αἰρεθείς, ἁδικὸν τε καὶ ἔχθραν πόλιν ἐξαντραποδίσθηται, φήσομεν τοῦτον ἁδικεῖν; Οὐ δῆτα, ἐφη. Δίκαια δὲ ποιεῖν οὐ φήσομεν; Καὶ μάλα. Τί δ'; εὰν ἐξαπατᾶ πολεμῶν αὐτοῖς; Δίκαιον, ἐφη, καὶ τούτο. 'Εάν δὲ κλέπτη τε καὶ ἀρπάζῃ τὰ τούτων, οὐ δίκαια ποιήσει; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σε τὸ πρῶτον ὑπελάμβανον πρὸς τοὺς φίλους μόνον ταύτα ἐρωτᾶν. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, δει πρὸς τῇ ἁδικίᾳ ἑθήκαμεν, πάντα καὶ πρὸς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ θετέον ἂν εἴη; Ἐσοικεν, ἐφη. 16. Βούλει οὖν, ἐφη, ταύτα οὗτω
θέντες, διορισώμεθα πάλιν, πρός μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους δι·
καίον εἶναι τὰ τοιαύτα ποιεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς φίλους ἀδίκον,
ἀλλὰ δεῖν πρὸς γε τούτους ὡς ἀπλούστατον εἶναι; (Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν, ἐφ᾽ ὁ Εὐθύδημος. 17. Τί οὖν; ἐφ᾽ ὁ Σωκράτης
ἐάν τις στρατηγὸς ὁρῶν ἀθύμως ἔχον τὸ στράτευμα, ψευ
σάμενος φήσῃ συμμάχους προσέναι, καὶ τῷ ψεύδει τούτῳ
παύσῃ τὰς ἀθυμίας τοῦ στρατεύματος, ποτέρῳ τὴν ἀπά
την ταύτην ἠήσομεν; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφ᾽, πρὸς τὴν δικαίος
νην. Ἐάν δὲ τις νῦν ἑαυτὸν δεόμενον φαρμακείας, καὶ
μὴ προσιέμενον φάρμακον, ἐξαπατήσας, ὡς σιτέον τὸ φάρ
μακὸν δῷ, καὶ τῷ ψεύδει χρησάμενος ύπότος ύγίᾳ ποιήσῃ,
ταύτην αὐ τῇ ἀπάτῃ ποῖ δετέον; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφ᾽, καὶ
tαύτην εἰς τὸ αὐτό. Τί δ᾽; εάν τις, ἐν ἀθυμίᾳ οὗτος φί
λον, δείσας μὴ διαχρῆσθαι ἑαυτόν, κλέψῃ ἡ ἀρπάσῃ ἡ ἕξιος
ἡ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, τούτο αὐτὸν ποτέρῳς δετέον; Καὶ τοῦ
tο νῦ Ἔζε, ἐφ᾽, πρὸς τὴν δικαιοσύνην. 18. Δέγεις, ἐφ᾽, σι
οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἀπαντάντα δεῖν ἀπλοῖξεοςδαί; Μὰ Δέ
οΥ δήτα, ἐφ᾽· ἀλλὰ μετατίθεμαι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ἔξεστι.
Δεὶ γέ τοι, ἐφ᾽ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐξεῖναι πολὺ μάλλον, ἢ μὴ
ὁρθὸς τιθέναι. 19. Τῶν δὲ δὴ τοὺς φίλους ἐξαπατῶντων
ἐπὶ βλάβη, ἕνα μηδὲ τούτο παραλιπόμενον ἀοκεπτόν, πότερος
ἀδικώτερός ἑστιν, ὁ ἐκών, ἢ ὁ ἄκων; 'Ἀλλ᾽, ὁ Σώκρατες,
οὐκέτι μὲν ἐγὼνε πιστεύω, οὐς ἀποκρίνομαι· καὶ γὰρ τὰ
πρόσθεν πάντα νῦν ἄλλως ἔχειν δοκεῖ μοι, ἡ ὡς ἐγὼ τότε
φόμην· διὸς δὲ εἰρήθωθ αὐτὸς δικαίωτερον εἰναι τὸν ἐκόντα
ψευδόμενον τοῦ ἀκοντος. 20. Δοκεῖ δὲ σοι μάθησις καὶ
ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δικαίου εἰναι, ὡςπερ τῶν γραμμάτων; "Εμοι
γε. Πότερον δὲ γραμματικότερον κρίνεις, δς ἂν ἐκών μὴ
ὁρθῶς γράψῃ καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκῃ, ἢ δς ἂν ἄκων; "Ος ἂν
ἐκών, ἐγὼνε· δύναιτο γὰρ ἂν, ὅπως θεολογοῖ, καὶ ὅρθως
ἀυτὰ ποιεῖν. Οὐκόνον ὁ μὲν ἐκών μὴ ὅρθως γράφων γραμ
ματικός ἂν εἰη, ὁ δὲ ἄκων, ἀγράμματος; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τὰ
dίκαια δὲ πότερον ὁ ἐκὼς ψευδόμενος καὶ ἐξαπατῶν οἴδεν,
ὁ ἄκων; Δῆλον, ὅτι ὁ ἐκών. Οὐκόνον γραμματικότερον
μὲν τὸν ἐπιστάμενον γράμματα τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου φής

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εἶναι; Ναλ. Δικαιότερον δὲ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου; Φαίνομαι· δοκῶ δὲ μοι καὶ ταύτα, οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως, λέγειν. 21. Τί δὲ δή, δς ἂν βουλόμενος τάληθη λέγειν, μηδέποτε τα αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁδὸν τε φράζων τὴν αὐτήν, τοτε μὲν πρὸς ἐω, τοτε δὲ πρὸς ἐσπέραν φράζῃ, καὶ λογισμὸν ἀποφαίνομεν τὸν αὐτόν, τοτε μὲν πλείω, τοτε δ᾽ ἑλάττω ἀποφαίνηται, τί σου δοκεῖ ὁ τοιοῦτος; Δῆλος νη Δι᾽ εἶναι, ὅτι, ἄ γετο εἰδέναι, οὐκ οἴδεν. 22. Οἴσθα δὲ τινὰς ἀνδραποδώδες καλουμένους; 'Εγγαγε. Πότερον διὰ σοφίαν, ἣ δ᾽ ἄμαθίαν; Δήλον, ὅτι δ᾽ ἄμαθίαν. 'Αρ' οὖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ χαλκεύνει ἀμαθίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου τυγχάνουσιν; Οὐ δήτα. 'Αλλ᾽ ἁρὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ τεκταίνεσθαι; Οὐδὲ διὰ ταύτην. 'Αλλὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ σκυτεύειν; Οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἐν τούτων, ἐφη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούναυτίον) οἱ γὰρ πλείστοι τῶν γε τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπισταμένων ἀνδραποδώδεις εἰσίν. 'Αρ' οὖν τῶν τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια μὴ εἰδότων τὸ ὄνομα τούτ' ἐστίν; 'Εμοι γε δοκεῖ, ἐφη. 23. Οὐκοῦν δὲν παντὶ τρόπῳ διατειναμένοις φεύγειν, ὅπως μὴ ἀνδράποδα ὤμεν. 'Αλλὰ νὴ τοὺς ὑποῦς, ἐφη, ὡ Σώκρατες, πάνω ὑμην· ἐιλουσοφεῖν φιλοσοφίαν, δι᾽ ἢς δὴ μάλιστα ἐνόμιζον παιδευθῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἄνδρι καλοκάγαθίας ὁμογενῶς· νῦν δὲ πῶς οἰεὶ με ἄθυμως ἔχειν, ὄρωντα ἐμαυτὸν διὰ μὲν τὰ προπετυμημένα οὐδὲ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι δυνάμενον, ὑπὲρ ὃν μάλιστα χρὴ εἰδέναι, ἄλλην δὲ ὁδὸν οὐδεμίαν ἔχοντα, ἣν ἄν πορευόμενος βελτίων γενοίμην; 24. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἐπεὶ μοι, ἐφη, ὡ Ἐυθύδημε, εἰς Δελφοὺς δὴ ἡ ὅη πῶπιε άφίκον; Καὶ δἰς γε νη Δια, ἐφη. Κατέμαθες οὖν πρὸς τῷ ναῷ ποιν γεγραμμένον τὸ ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΙΤΩΝ; 'Εγγαγε. Πότερον οὖν οὐδέν σου τοῦ γράμματος ἐμέλησεν, ἢ προεξῆς τε καὶ ἐπεχείρησας σαυτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν, ὅστις εἶχής; 'Μα Δι᾽ οὐ δήτα, ἐφη· καὶ γὰρ δὴ πάντα τοῦτο γε ὑμην εἰδέναι· σχολῆ γὰρ ἄν ἄλλο τι ἤθειν, εἴη μηθ' ἐμαυτὸν εγγνωσκον. 25. Πότερα δὲ σου δοκεῖ γιγιγώσκειν ἑαυτὸν, ὅστις τούνομα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ὑμὸν οἴδεν, ἢ ὅστις, ὀσπερ οἱ τεῖς ἐπιποῦς ὑνοῦμε
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νοι οὐ πρότερον οἴονται γιγνώσκειν, ὃν ἄν βούλωνται γιγνώναι, πρὶν ἄν ἐπισκέψωνται, πότερον εὐπειθής ἑστιν, ἡ δυσπειθής, καὶ πότερον ἱσχυρός ἑστιν, ἡ ἀσθενής, καὶ πότερον ταχύς, ἡ βραδύς, καὶ τάλλα τά πρὸς τήν ἕπον χρείαν ἐπιτήδεια τε καὶ ἀνεπιτήδεια ὅπως ἔχει, ὡς τως, ὁ ἐαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος, ὁποῖος ἑστὶ πρὸς τήν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν, ἤγγικε τήν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν; Οὕτως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφή, ὁ μὴ εἰδῶς τήν ἐαυτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀγνοεῖν ἐαυτὸν. 26. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ φανερὸν, ἐφη, ὅτε διὰ μὲν τὸ εἰδέναι ἐαυτοὺς, πλείστα ἀγαθὰ πάσχονσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐφεύγαθαι ἐαυτῶν, πλείστα κακά; οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰδότες ἐαυτοὺς, τὰ τε ἐπιτήδεια ἐαυτοῖς ἰσασί, καὶ διαγιγνώσκονσιν, ἀ τε ὀνυναται, καὶ ἡ μὴ καὶ ὃ μὲν ἐπίστανται πράττοντες, πορίζονται τε ὅν δέονται, καὶ εὐ πράττονς, ὁν δὲ μὴ ἐπίστανται ἀπεχώμενοι, ἀναμάρτητοι γίγνονται, καὶ διαφεύγουσι τὸ κακῶς πράττειν· διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους δυνάμενοι δοκιμάζειν, καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων χρείας τά τε ἀγαθά πορίζονται, καὶ τά κακά φυλάττονται. 27. Οἱ δὲ μὴ εἰδότες, ἀλλὰ διεφεύρεμενοι τῆς ἐαυτῶν δυνάμεως, πρὸς τε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ τάλλα ἀνθρώπων πράγματα ὁμοίως διάκεινται· καὶ οὕτε ὡν δέονται ἰσασίν, οὕτε ὃ τι πράττονσιν, οὕτε οἷς χρῶνται, ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων διαμαρτάνοντες, τῶν τε ἁγαθῶν ἀποτυγχάνουσι, καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς περιπίπτουσι. 28. Καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰδότες ὃ τι ποιοῦσιν, ἐπιτυγχάνοντες ὃν πράττονσιν, εὐδοξοὶ τε καὶ τίμιοι γίγνονται· καὶ οἱ τε ὁμοίως τοῦτοι ἰδέως χρῶνται, οἳ τε ἀποτυγχάνοντες τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιθυμοῦσι τοῦτος ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ πρὸ στασθαι τε ἐαυτῶν τούτων, καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐν τοῦτοι ἐχοῦσι, καὶ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα πάντων μάλιστα τοῦτος ἀγαπώσιν. 29. Οἱ δὲ μὴ εἰδότες ὃ τι ποιοῦσι, κακῶς δὲ αἰροῦμενοι, καὶ οἷς ἄν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν ἀποτυγχάνοντες, οὐ μόνον ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις ζημιοῦνται τε καὶ κολάζονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδοξοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, καὶ καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται καὶ καταφρονοῦμενοι, καὶ ἀτυμαζομενοί ξώσιν· ὅρας δὲ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ὅτι δοσι ἄν
ἀγνοήσαι τίνι ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν κρείττοσι, πολεμήσωσιν, ἂν μὲν ἀνάστατοι γίγνονται, αἱ δὲ ἔλευθεροι δοῦλαι.

30. Καὶ ὁ Ἐυθύδημος, 'ὅπερ πάντων μικροῦν, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκρατες, περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέων εἰναι το ἑαυτῶν γιγνώσκειν, οὔτως ἰσθι· ὁπόθεν δὲ χρὴ ἄρξασθαι ἐπισκοπεῖν ἑαυτὸν τοῦτο πρὸς σὲ ἀποδείξει εἰ μοι ἐθελήσως ἂν ἐξηγήσασθαι.

31. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν ἄγαθα καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὅποια ἔστι, πάντως ποι γιγνώσκεις. Νη Δι', ἐφη· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ταύτα οἶδα, καὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων φαυλότερος ἂν εἶχεν Ἰθι δή, ἐφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐξήγησαί σοι αὐτά. 'Ἀλλ' οὖν χαλεκιόν ἐφη· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ, αὐτὸ τὸ ὑγίαινεν ἄγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζω, τὸ δὲ νοσεῖν, κακὸν· ἐπειτα τὰ αἰτία ἐκατέροιον αὐτῶν, καὶ ποτά, καὶ βρωτά, καὶ ἐπιτηθεύματα, τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαινεῖν φέροντα, ἄγαθὸν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ νοσεῖν, κακὰ.

32. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, καὶ τὸ ὑγίαινεν καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, ὅταν μὲν ἄγαθον τινος αἰτία γίγνηται, ἄγαθὰ ἂν εἴη, ὅταν δὲ κακοῦ, κακά. Πότε δ' ἂν, ἐφη, τὸ μὲν ὑγίαινεν κακοῦ αἰτίον γενοτο, τὸ δὲ νοσεῖν, ἄγαθοῦ; ὁταν νὴ Δι', ἐφη, στρατείας τε αἰσχρᾶς, καὶ ναυτιλίας βλαβερᾶς, καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τοιούτων οἱ μὲν διὰ ῥώμην μετασχόντες ἀπόλοιπονται, οἱ δὲ δ' ἄσθενειαν ἀπολειφθέντες σωθῶσιν. 'Ἀλήθει' λέγεις· ἀλλ' ὡρᾶς, ἐφη, δαὶ καὶ τῶν ὕφελίμων οἱ μὲν διὰ ῥώμην μετέχουσιν, οἱ δὲ δ' ἄσθενειαν ἀπολείπονται. Ταῦτα οὖν, ἐφη, ποτὲ μὲν ωφελοῦντα, ποτὲ δὲ βλάπτοντα μᾶλλον ἄγαθα ἢ κακὰ ἐστίν; Οὐδὲν μὰ Δία φαίνεται, κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. 33. 'Ἀλλ' ἦ γέ τοι σοφία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀναμφισβητῶς ἄγαθόν εἰσιν· ποιον γὰρ ἂν τὸς πράγμα σὺ βέλτιον πράττοι σοφὸς ἢν, ἢ ἀμαθῆς· Τί δαί; τὸν Δαιδάλον, ἐφη, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, δαὶ ληφθεῖς ὑπὸ Μῖνω διὰ τῆς σοφίας, ἦναγκαζότο ἐκεῖνο δουλεύειν, καὶ τῆς τε πατρίδος ἀμα καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστερῆθη, καὶ ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδιδράσκειν μετὰ τοῦ νιὸν, τὸν τε παιδὰ ἀπόλεσε, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡμινήσῃ σωθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἀπενεχθεῖς εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους, πάλιν ἐκεὶ ἐδούλευεν; Δέγεται νὴ Δι', ἐφη, ταύτα. Τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδους οὐκ ἀκήκοας πάθη; τούτον γὰρ δὴ πάντως
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ημυόνισιν, ὡς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθείς ἐπὶ -οῦ 'Οδυσσέως ἀπόλλυται. Δέγεται καὶ ταῦτα, ἐφη. Ἀλλος δὲ πόσους οἱ εἰς διὰ σοφίαν ἀναρτάστους πρὸς Βασιλέα γεγονέναι, καὶ ἐκεῖ δουλεύειν; 34. Κινδυνεύει, ἐφη, ὥς Σῶκρατες, ἀναμ-

φιλογῶτατον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Ἐγεί μῆ τις αὐτό, ἐφη, ὥς Εὐθύδημε, ἐξ ἀμφίλογων ἀγαθῶν συντιθεῖ. Τι δ' αὖ, ἐφη, τῶν εὐδαιμονικῶν ἀμφίλογον εἰ; Οὐδέν, ἐφη, εἴγε μὴ προσθήσομεν αὐτῷ κάλλος, ἢ ἰσχύν, ἢ πλού-

τον, ἢ δόξαν, ἢ καὶ τὶ ὄλλο τῶν τοιούτων. 'Ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία προσθήσομεν, ἐφη· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις ἄνευ τούτων εὐδαιμο-

νοιῇ; 35. Νὴ Δ' ἐφη, ἐφη, προσθήσομεν ἀρὰ, εἴ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ καλετά συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· πολλοί μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ κάλλος διαφθείρονται, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἰσχῦν μείζονιν ἐργοῖς ἐπιχειροῦντες, οὐ μικροῖς κακοῖς περιπέπτοντοι, πολ-

λοὶ δὲ διὰ τὸν πλούτον διαθρυπτόμενοι τε καὶ ἐπιδουλευό-

ινοὶ ἀπόλλυνται, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ δόξαν καὶ πολιτικὴν δύ-

ναμιν μεγάλα κακὰ πεπόνθασιν. 36. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη, εἴγε 

μηδὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπαινῶν ὤρθῶς λέγω, ὁμολογῶ μηδὲ δ' τι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐχεσθαι χρῆ εἰδέναι. 'Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα 

μὲν, ἐφη δ' Σωκράτης, ἵσως διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἰδέ-

ναι, οὐδ' ἐσκεψαι· ἐπεὶ δὲ πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης παρα-

σκενάζει προεστάναι, δήλου, δὴτ δημοκρατίαν γε οἶδα τί ἐστι. Πάντως δὴπον, ἐφη. 37. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι δύνατον 

εἶναι δημοκρατίαν εἰδέναι, μὴ εἰδότα δὴμον; Μὰ Δ' οὖν ἐμολύγη. Καὶ τὶ νομίζεις δήμον εἶναι; Τοὺς πένητας τῶν 

πολιτῶν ἐγώγη. Καὶ τοὺς πένητας ἁρὰ οἴσθα; Πῶς γὰρ 

οὐ; 'Αρ' οὖν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους οἴσθα; Οὐδὲν γε ἢττον 

ὅτι καὶ τοὺς πένητας. Ποίους δὲ πένητας, καὶ ποίους πλου-

σίους καλείς; Τοὺς μὲν, οἴμαι, μὴ ἰκανὰ ἔχοντας εἰς ἡ δεὶ 

teleῖν, πένητας, τοὺς δὲ πλεῖω τῶν ἰκανῶν, πλουσίους. 

38. Καταμεμάθηκας οὖν, ὅτι ἐνίοις μὲν πάνν ὁλίγα ἔχου-

σιν οὐ μόνον ἄρκει ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ περποιοῦνται ἀπ' αὐ-

τῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ πάνν πολλὰ οὐχ ἰκανὰ ἐστι; Καὶ νὴ Δ', 

ἐφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, (ὁρθῶς γὰρ μὲ ἀναμμυνήσκεις,) οἶδα γὰρ 

καὶ τυράννους τινάς, οὐ δ' ἐνδειαν, ὃςπερ οἱ ἀπορῶτατω,
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Αναγκάζονται ἄδικείν. 39. Οὐκοψ, ἐφή ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰγε ταῦτα οὖτως ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν τυράννους εἰς τὸν δῆμον θήσομεν, τοὺς δὲ διλύγα κεκτημένους, εὖν οἰκονομικὸν ὦσιν, εἰς τοὺς πλουσίους; Καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμος ἐφή: Ἀναγκάζει με καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν δηλονότι ἢ ἐμὴ φανλότης· καὶ φρουτίζω, μὴ κράτιστον ἢ μοι σιγάν· κινδύνευοι γὰρ ἄπλως οὐ- δέν εἰδέναι. Καὶ πάνω ἀδύμως ἔχων ἀπήλθε, καὶ καταφρονήσας ἐκαυτοῦ, καὶ νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι 40. Πολλοί μὲν οὖν τῶν οὖτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτος οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσήσαν, οὕς καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνόμιζεν· ὁ δὲ Εὐθυδήμος ὑπέλαβεν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀνήρ ἀξιόλογος γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ὅτι μάλιστα Σωκράτε ζωνείη· καὶ οὐκ ἀπελεύθετο ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον εῇ· ἕνια δὲ καὶ ἐμμεῖτο ὅν ἐκεῖνος ἐπετήθευεν· ὁ δὲ ὡς ἐγνω αὐτοῦ οὖ- τως ἔχοντα, ἥκιστα μὲν διετάρατον, ἀπλούστατα δὲ καὶ σαφέστατα ἐξήγειτο, ὅ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἰδέναι δεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτη δεὐεὶν κράτιστα εἶναι.

CHAPTER III.

SUMMARY.

It was a settled rule with Socrates, that the young should never be urged to engage in public affairs, or in any other vocation whatsoever, until their minds had been moulded by virtuous precepts, and especially until they had been inspired with piety toward the gods. He therefore shows unto Euthydemus, in the present chapter, that the gods consult for the welfare of men, and ought therefore to be worshipped by them.

1. Τὸ μὲν οὖν λεκτικοὺς, καὶ πρακτικοὺς, καὶ μηχανικοὺς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς συνόντας οὐκ ἔσπευδεν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον τούτων ἠμετο χρήναι σωφροσύνην αὐτοῖς ἐγγενεσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ ἄνεν τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ταῦτα δυναμένους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ δυνατωτέρους κακουργεῖν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. 2. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς ἐπειράτο σωφρόνας ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας. "Αλλοι μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλους οὖτως ὁμιλοῦντι παραγενόμενοι δηηγοῦντο· ἐγὼ δὲ, ὅτε πρὸς Εὐθύ δῆμον τοιάδε διελέγετο, παραγενόμην. 3. Εἴπε μοι, ἐφή,
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ω Εὐθύδημε, ἥδη ποτὲ σοι ἐπήλθεν ἐνθυμηθήναι, ὡς ἐπιμελῶς οἱ θεοὶ, ὡν οἱ ἄνθρωποι δέονται, κατεσκενάκασι; Καὶ ὃς, Μᾶ τὸν Δῆ, ἐφη, οὐκ ἔμοιγε. 'Ἀλλ' οἰσθά γ', ἐφη, δὴ πρῶτον μὲν φωτὸς δεόμεθα, ὅ ἦμιν οἱ θεοὶ παρέχονσιν; Νὴ Δῆ', ἐφη, ὅ γ' εἰ μὴ ἐξομεν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς τυφλοῖς ἄν ἦμεν, ἐνεκά γε τῶν ἠμετέρων ὀφθαλμῶν. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀναπάσεως γε δεομένοις ἦμιν νῦκτα παρέχονσι, κάλλιστον ἀναπαυτήριον. Πάνυ γ', ἐφη, καὶ τούτο χάριτος άξιον. 4. Οὐκοιν καὶ, ἐπειδὴ ὁ μὲν ἠλιος φωτεινὸς ὃν τὰς τε ὀρας τῆς ἡμέρας ἦμιν καὶ τάλλα πάντα σαφὴνζεί, ἢ δὲ νύξ, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὴ εἶναι ἁσαφεστέρα ἐστίν, ἀστρα ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ἀνέφηναν, ὅ ἦμιν τὰς ὀρας τῆς νυκτὸς ἐμφανιζεί, καὶ διὰ τούτο πολλά, ἦν δεόμεθα, πράττομεν. 'Εστε ταῦτα, ἐφη. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἦ γε σελήνη ὑφί συνεν τῆς νυκτος, ἄλλα καὶ τοῦ μνῆς τὰ μέρη φανερὰ ἦμιν ποιεῖ. 5. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Τὸ δ', ἐπεὶ τροφῆς δεόμεθα, ταῦτην ἦμιν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναδύόνας, καὶ ὀρας ἀριστοτύπος πρὸς τοῦτο παρέχειν, αἰ ἦμιν οὐ μόνον, ἦν δεόμεθα, πολλά καὶ παντοῖα παρασκενάζον σιν, ἄλλα καὶ οὗς εὐφραίνομεθα; Πάνυ, ἐφη, καὶ ταῦτα φιλάνθρωπα. 6. Τὸ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ ἦμιν παρέχειν, οὔτω πολλοῦ άξιον, ὡςτε καὶ φυτεύειν τε καὶ συναντέιν τῇ γῇ καὶ ταῖς ὀρας πάντα τὰ χρήσιμα ἦμιν, συντρέφειν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἢμᾶς, καὶ μιγνύμενοι πάσι τοῖς τρέφονσιν ἢμᾶς, εὐκατεργαστέρα τε καὶ ωφελιμώτερα, καὶ ἦδίω ποιεῖν αὕτα, καὶ, ἐπειδὴ πλείστον δεόμεθα τούτον, ἀφθονέστατον αὐτῷ παρέχειν ἦμιν; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἐφη, προνοητικόν. 7. Τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ πορίσας ἦμιν, ἐπίκουρον μὲν ψῦχοις, ἐπίκουρον δὲ σκότους, συνεργοῦν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσαν τέχνην, καὶ πάντα, ὅσα ωφελείας ἐνεκα ἀνθρωποι κατασκενάζονται; ως γὰρ συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, οὔδεν ἀξιόλογον ἄνευ πυρὸς ἀνθρωποί τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον χρησίμων κατασκενάζονται. 'Ὑπερβάλλει, ἐφη, καὶ τοῦτο φι'ἀνθρωπία. 8. Τὸ δὲ καὶ ἀέρα ἦμιν ἀφθόνως οὔτω πανταχοῦ διαχύσας, οὐ μόνον πρόμαχον καὶ σύντροφον ζωῆς, ἄλλα καὶ πελάγη περάν δ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἄλλους ἠλλαχόθι καὶ ἐν ἀλλοδαπῇ στελλομένων.
Το δὲ τὸν ἣλιον, ἐπειδὰν ἐν χειμῶνι τράπηται, προσεῖναι τὰ μὲν ἀδρύνοντα, τὰ δὲ ἐξηραίνοντα, δὲν καίρος διελήλυθεν, καὶ ταύτα διαπραζόμενον μηκέτι ἐγγυτέρω προσεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἀποτρέπομεθα, φυλαττόμενον, μή τι ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος θερμαῖνον βλάψῃ· καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸς πάλιν ἄπιων γένηται, ἐνθα καὶ ἡμῖν δὴλον ἔστιν, ὅτι, εἰ προσωτέρω ἀπεισῶν, ἀποπαγησόμεθα ύπὸ τοῦ ψύχους, πάλιν αὐτὸ τρέπομεθα καὶ προσχωρεῖν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀναστρέφομεθα, ἐνθα δὲν μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ὑφελοί; Νὴ τὸν Δῆ', ἐφη, καὶ ταύτα παντάπασιν ἐοικεῖν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκα γεγομένους. 9. Τὸ δ' αὖ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τούτο φανερόν, ὅτι ὅν ἐν υπενέγκαμεν οὕτε τὸ καῦμα, οὕτε τὸ ψύχος, εἰ ἐξαπίνης γίγνοιτο, οὕτω μὲν κατὰ μικρὸν προσεῖναι τὸν ἢλιον, οὕτω δὲ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀπιέναι, ὡστε λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς εἰς ἐκάτερα τὰ ἱσχυρότατα καθισταμένους; Ἑγὼ μὲν, ἐφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἦδη τοῦτο σκοτῶ, εἰ ἄρα τί ἐστιν τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον, ἢ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύειν· ἐκεῖνο δὲ μὸνον ἐμποδίζει με, ὅτι καὶ τάλλα ζῶα τούτων μετέχει. 10. Οὐ γὰρ καὶ τούτ', ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, φανερὸν, ὅτι καὶ ταύτα ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκα γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀνατρέφεται; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ζῶον αἰγών τε καὶ ὅιων, καὶ ἵππων, καὶ βοῶν, καὶ ὄνων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἀπολαύει, δοσά ἀνθρώπων; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ πλεῖω τῶν φυτῶν· τρέφονται γοῦν καὶ χρηματίζονται οὐδὲν ἕτετον ἀπὸ τούτων, ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνων· πολύ δὲ γένος ἀνθρώπων τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένους εἰς τροφὴν οὐ χρώνται, ἀπὸ δὲ βοσκημάτων γάλακτι, καὶ τυρῷ, καὶ κρέασι τρεφόμενοι ζῶσι· πάντες δὲ τιθασσέωντες καὶ δαμαζόντες τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ζῴων, εἰς τε πόλεμον καὶ εἰς ἀλλὰ πολλὰ συνεργοίς χρῶνται. Ὁμογνωμονώ σοι καὶ τούτ', ἐφη· ὅρω γὰρ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πολὺ ἱσχυρότερα ἡμῶν, οὕτως ὑποχείρια γεγομένα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὡστε χρῆσαι αὐτοῖς δ' τι ἂν βούλωνταί. 11. Τὸ δ', ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ μὲν καλὰ καὶ ὑφέλιμα, διαφέροντα δὲ ἅλληλων ἐστί· προσθέιναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀποθέσεις ἀρμοττούσας πρὸς ἐκαστα, δι' ἃν ἀπολαύσωμεν πάν-
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των τῶν ἀγαθῶν. τὸ δὲ καὶ λογισμὸν ἡμῖν ἐμφύσαι, ὥς περὶ ὧν αἰσθανόμεθα, λογιζόμενοι τε καὶ μηνομενύοντες, καταμανθάνομεν, ὅτι ἐκαστα συμφέρει, καὶ πολλὰ μηχανὰ μεθα, δὴ ὧν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἀπολαύσειν, καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἄλεξομεθα. τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐρμηνείαις δοῦναι, δὲ ἡς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδίδομεν τε ἀλλήλους διδάσκοντες καὶ κοινωνοῦμεν, καὶ νόμους τιθέμεθα, καὶ πολιτεύομεθα; Πανταπασίν εὐίκασιν, ὡ Σώκρατες, οἱ θεοὶ πολλὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι. 12. Τὸ δὲ καὶ, εἰ ἀδυνατοῦμεν τὰ συμφέροντα προσεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων, ταύτην αὐτοῦ ἡμῖν συνεργεῖν, διὰ μαντικῆς τοῖς πυθανομένοις φράζοντας τὰ ἀποθησόμενα, καὶ διδάσκοντας, ἢ ἂν ἁρίστα γίγνοντο; Σοι δ', ἐφε, ὡ Σώκρατες, εὐίκασιν ἐτί φιλεκώτερον ἡ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησθαι, εἰ γε μηδὲ ἑπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σον προσημαίνονοι σοι, ἃ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ἡ μὴ. 13. Ὅτι δὲ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνῶσει, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς, ἢς ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῆ σοι, τὰ ἐργά αὐτῶν ὀρῶντι σέδεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς. Ἑκνοίει δὲ, δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ θεοὶ οὕτως ὑποδεικνύοντι· οἱ τε γὰρ ἄλλοι ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ διδόντες οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τοῦμανένιοι λιντες διδάσαι, καὶ ὃ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν φι πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἂει μὲν χρωμένοις ἀτριβῆ τε καὶ ὑγία, καὶ ἀγήρατονπαρέχων, θάττων δὲ νοήματος ἀναμαρτήτως ὑπηρετούντα, οὕτος τα μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τάδε δὲ οἰκονομῶν ἄρατος ἡμῖν ἑστίν. 14. Ἑκνοίει δ', δὲ καὶ ὁ πάσι φανερὸς θοκῶν εἶναι ἤλιος, οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐαυτοῦ ἀκριβῶς ὀρᾶν, ἀλλ', εάν τις αὐτῶν ἀναιδῶς ἐγχειρῆ θεᾶσθαι, τὴν δὴν ἀφαίρεται. Καὶ τοὺς ὑπηρέτας δὲ τῶν θεῶν εὐρήσεις ἀφανεῖς οὖνας· κεραυνὸς τε γὰρ δὴ τε μὲν ἀνωθὲν ἀφίεται, ὅπλων, καὶ δὴ τοῖς ἀν ἐντύχη, πάντων κρατεῖ, ὁρᾶται δ' οὕτ' ἐπίων, οὕτε κατασκήνας, οὕτε ἁπλῶν· καὶ ἅνεμοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὕχ ὀρῶνται, ἃ δὲ ποιοῦσι φανερὰ ἡμῖν ἑστί, καὶ προσιόντων αὐτῶν αἰσθανόμεθα. Ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἥ, εἰπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ
Summary.

1. 'Alla μὴ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου γε οὐκ ἀπεκρύπτετε: ἥν εἰχε γνώμην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργῳ ἀπεδείκνυτο, λόγια τε πάσα νομίμως τε καὶ ωφελίμως χρώμενος, καὶ κοινῇ, ἀρχουσί τε ὃ ὁ νόμοι προστάτωσεν πειθόμενος, καὶ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις οὕτως, ὡστε διάδηλος εἶναι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐυτακτῶν. 2. Καὶ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπιστάτης.
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gενόμενος, οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς νόμοις ἡναντιώθη τοιαύτη ὑφή τοῦ δήμου, ἦν οὐκ δὲ, ὅμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα ἄνθρωπον ὑπομείναι. 3. Καὶ ὅτε τριάκοντα προσέταττον αὐτῷ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τι, οὐκ ἐπείθετο· τοῖς τε γὰρ νέοις ἀπαγορευόντων αὐτῶν μή διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ προσταξάντων ἐκεῖνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλοις τιοῦ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀγαγεῖν τινα ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, μονος οὐκ ἐπείσθη, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτῷ προστάτεσθαι. 4. Καὶ ὅτε τὴν ὑπὸ Μελήτου γραφῆν ἐμεγένε, τῶν ἀλλῶν εἰσώρωτών ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις πρὸς χάριν τε τοῖς δικασταῖς διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ κολακεύειν, καὶ δείσθαι παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν ἀφιμενών, ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰσώρωτῶν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μεδίως οὐ ἀφεθείς ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν, εἰ καὶ μετρίως τοὺς τούτων ἐποίησε, προείλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων ἀποθανεῖν, ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν. 5. Καὶ ἐλεγε δὲ οὗτος καὶ πρὸς ἀλλοὺς μὲν πολλάκις· οὗδα δὲ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Ἰππίαν τὸν Ἡλείον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τοιάδε διαλεξέντα· διὰ χρόνου γὰρ ἀφικόμενος ὁ Ἰππίας· Ἀθήναζε, παρεγένετο τῷ Ὑσκράτει λέγοντι πρὸς τινας, ὡς θαναμαστὸν εἰ ὁ, εἰ μὲν τῆς βούλουκτο σκυτέα διδαξασθαί τινα, ἢ τέκτονα, ἢ χαλκεό, ἢ ἰππέα, μη ἀπορείν, ὅποι ἄν πέμψας τούτον τὸν θείον· φασὶ δὲ τινες καὶ Ἰππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίους ποιῆσα σθαι, πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι τῶν διδαξόντων· καί δὲ τῆς βοῦ ληται ἢ αὐτος μαθεῖν τὸ δίκαιον, ἢ νῦν ἢ οἰκετόν διδαξασθαι, μη εἰδέναι, ὅποι ἄν ἐλθὼν τὸν θείον τούτον. 6. Καὶ ὁ ἴμιον Ἰππίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα, ὅσπερ ἐπισκόπτων αὐτῶν, Ἔτι γὰρ σὺ, ἐφη, ὁ Ὑσκράτες, ἐκεῖνα τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις, ἢ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτὲ σου ἥκουσα· Καὶ ὁ Ὑσκράτης, ὁ δὲ γε τούτου δεινότερον, ἐφη, ὁ Ἰππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· σὺ δ' ἵσως, διὰ τὸ πολυμαθῆς εἶναι, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις Ἀμέλει, ἐφη, πειρώμαι καὶνόν τι λέγειν ἀεί. 7. Πότερον ἐφη, καὶ περὶ ὄν ἐπίστασαι; οἶον περὶ γραμμάτων, εὰν τις
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ἐπηταὶ σε, πόσα καὶ ποιὰ Σωκράτους ἑστίν, ἀλλὰ μὲν πρότερον, ἀλλὰ δὲ νῦν πειρά λέγειν; ἡ περὶ ἄριθμοι τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν, εἰ τὰ δὲς πέντε δέκα ἑστίν, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ νῦν, ἢ καὶ πρότερον, ἀποκρίνει; Περὶ μὲν τοῦτων, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡσπερ σὺ, καὶ ἐγὼ ἂν τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω· περὶ μέντοι τοῦ δι- καίου πάνυ οἴμαι νῦν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, πρὸς ἃ οὔτε σὺ, οὔτ' ἃν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς δύνατ' ἀντειπεῖν. 8. Νὴ τὴν Ἡραν, ἐφη, μέγα λέγεις ἁγαθὸν εὐρηκέναι, εἰ παύσονται μὲν οἱ δικα- σταὶ δίχα ψηφιζόμενοι, παύσονται δὲ οἱ πολίται περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντες τε καὶ ἀντιδικοῦντες καὶ στασιάζον- τες, παύσονται δὲ αἱ πόλεις διαφερόμεναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων, καὶ πολεμοῦσαι· καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν ἀπολειφθεῖ- 

νι σοῦ, πρὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι τηλικοῦτον ἁγαθὸν εὐρήκοτος. 9. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δῆ, ἐφη, οὐκ ἀκούσει, πρὶν γ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποφήνῃ, ὥ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι· ἄρκει γὰρ, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾶς, ἐρωτῶν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δ' οὐ- δενὶ θελῶν ὑπέχειν λόγον, οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενός. 10. Τί δέ; ὡ Ἰππία, ἐφη, οὐκ ᾧδησαί, ὅτι ἐγὼ, ἢ δοκεῖ μοι δίκαια εἶναι, οὐδὲν παύομαι ἀποδεικνύμε- νος; Καὶ ποίος δὴ σοι, ἐφη, οὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἑστίν; Ἐι δὲ 

μὴ λόγῳ, ἐφη, ἀλλ' ἐργῷ ἀποδεικνύμαι· ή οὔ δοκεῖ σοι ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἐργόν εἶναι; Πολὺ γε 

νῆ Δη', ἐφη· δίκαια μὲν γὰρ λέγοντες πολλοὶ ἄδικα ποιοῦ- σι, δίκαια δὲ πράττων οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἀδίκος εἰη. 11. Ἡσθὴ 

σαι οὖν πῶς τοτὲ μοι ἡ ψευδομαρτυροῦντος, ἡ συκοφα- 

τοῦντος, ἡ φίλους ἡ πόλις εἰς στάσιν ἐμβάλλοντος, ἡ ἄλλω 

τι ἀδίκον πράττοντος; Οὐκ ἐγὼγε, ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀδί- 

κων ἀπέχεσθαι οὐ δίκαιον ἤγει; Δῆλος εἰ, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκρα- 

τες, καὶ νῦν διαφεύγειν ἐγχειρῶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύσθαι γνώ- 

μην, ὥ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ἃ πράττονσιν οἱ δι- 

καιοῦ, ἀλλ' ἃ μὴ πράττονσι, ταῦτα λέγεις. 12. Ἀλλ' ὃμην 

ἐγώγε, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸ μὴ θέλειν ἄδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν δικαί- 

ουν ἐπίσειγμα εἶναι· εἰ δὲ σοι μὴ δοκεῖ, σκέψαι, ἢν 

ὦδε σοι μᾶλλον ἄρεσκη· φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δικαίου 

εἶναι. Ἀρα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, νόμιμον τε καὶ
αίκαιον εἶναι; Ἐγγωγε, ἐφη. 13. Οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνομαι σοι, ὅποιον νόμιμον, ἣ ποιον δίκαιον λέγεις. Νόμους δὲ πό- λεως, ἐφη, γεγυνώσκεις; Ἐγγωγε, ἐφη. Καὶ τίνας τούτους νομίζεις; Ἄ οἱ πολίται, ἐφη, συνθέμενοι ἃ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὃν ἀπέχεσθαι, ἐγράψαντο. Ὀδίκου, ἐφη, νόμιμος μὲν ἂν εἰη ὁ κατὰ ταῦτα πολιτευόμενος, ἄνομος δὲ ὁ ταῦτα παραβαίνων; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Ὀδίκου καὶ δίκαια μὲν ἂν πράττοι ὁ τούτως πειθόμενος, ἀδίκα δ’ ὁ τούτως ἀπειθῶν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ὀδίκου ὁ μὲν τὰ δίκαια πράτ- των, δίκαιος, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἀδίκα, ἀδίκος; Πῶς γὰρ οὖν; Ὁ μὲν ἂρα νόμιμος δίκαιος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ ἄνομος ἀδίκος. 14. Καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Νόμους δ’, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, πῶς ἂν τις ἡγήσαιτο σπουδαῖον πράγμα εἰναι, ἡ το πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὐς γε πολλάκις αὐτοὶ οἱ Θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατί- θενται; Καὶ γὰρ πόλεμον, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πολλάκις ἀράμεναι αἳ πόλεις, πάλιν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται. Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Διάφορον οὖν τε οἱ ποιεῖν, ἐφη, τοὺς τοῖς νόμοις πειθόμενοις φανέλιζον, ὅτι καταλυθεῖσθαι εἰναι οἱ νόμοι, ἡ εἰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις εὐτακτοῦντας ψέγους, ὅτε γένοιτ' ἂν εἰρήνην; ἡ καὶ τούς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ταῖς πατρίσι προθύ- μοις βοηθοῦντας μέμφει; Μά Δι' οὖν ἔγωγ', ἐφη. 15. Λυ- κόρυγον δὲ τὸν Δακεδαμίδουν, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καταμεμά- θηκας, ὅτε οὔδεν ἂν διάφορον τῶν ἔλλων πόλεων τὴν Ἐπάρτην ἐπείσθης, εἰ μὴ τὸ πείθεσθαι τοὺς νόμοις μάλιστα ἐνεργάσαστο αὐτῇ; τῶν δὲ ἀρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐκ οἴσθα, ὅτι, οἴσθας ἂν τοῖς πολίταις αἰτητάτατο ὅσι τοῦ τοίς νόμοις πειθόμενος, οὕτως ἀριστοὶ εἰσὶ; καὶ πόλεις, ἐν ἡ μά- λιστα οἱ πολίται τοῖς νόμοις πειθόνται, ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε ἀριστα διάγει, καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀνυπόστατος ἐστίν; 16. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὁμονόια γε μέγεστον τὸ ἁγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἰ- ναι, καὶ πλειστάκις ἐν αὐτάς αἱ τε γεροντίται καὶ οἱ ἀρι- στοὶ ἄνδρες παρακελεύονται τοῖς πολίταις ὁμονοεῖν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἐλλάδι νόμος κεῖται, τοὺς πολίτας ὁμόνω- ναι ὁμονόησειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ὁμόνοιαι τὸν ὅρκαν τούτων ὁμαί δ’ ἐγὼ ταῦτα γέγνειν, οὐχ ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρ
ούς κρίνωσιν οἱ πολίται, οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς αὐλητὰς ἐπαίνωσιν, οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιητὰς αἰρώνται, οὐδ' ἔνα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἤδωνται, ἀλλ' ἐνα τοῖς νόμοις πείθωνται. τούτους γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμμενόντων, αἱ πόλεις ἰσχυρόταται τε καὶ εὐθαμονέσταται γίγνονται· ἄνεν δὲ ὁμονοίας, οὔτ' ἂν πόλεσ εὐ πολιτευθείη, οὔτ' οἶκος καλῶς οἰκηθείη.

17. 'Ιδία δὲ πῶς μὲν ἂν τις ἤττον ὑπὸ πόλεως ζημιοῖτο, πῶς δ' ἂν μᾶλλον τιμῶτο, ἢ εἰ τοῖς νόμοις πείδουσι; πῶς δ' ἂν ἤττον ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἤττοτο; ἢ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον νικῇ; τίνι δ' ἂν τις μᾶλλον πιστεύει παρακαταθέσθαι ὑπὸ χρήματα, ἢ νίος, ἢ ὑγιατέρας· τίνα δ' ἂν ἡ πόλις ὡλη ἀξιοπιστότερον ἡγήσατο τοῦ νομίου; παρὰ τίνος δ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῶν δικαίων τύχωσιν ἡ γονείς, ἢ οἰκεῖοι, ἢ οἰκεῖαι, ἢ φίλοι, ἢ πολῖται, ἢ ἐχέναι; τίνι δ' ἂν μᾶλλον πολεμοῖο πιστεύεσθαι ἢ ἀνοχάς, ἢ σπονδάς, ἢ συνθῆκας περὶ εἰρήνης· τίνι δ' ἂν μᾶλλον, ἢ τῷ νομίῳ, σύμμαχοι ἐθέλοιεν γίγνεσθαι; τῷ δ' ἂν μᾶλλον οἱ σύμμαχοι πιστεύεσθαι ἢ ἡγεμονίαν, ἢ φροντισθίαι, ἢ πόλεις· τίνα δ' ἂν τις εὐεργετήσας ὑπολάβοι χάριν κομιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον, ἢ τὸν νόμιμον· ἢ τίνα μᾶλλον ἂν τις εὐεργετήσειν, ἢ παρ' οὐ χάριν ἀπολήφθησαι νομίζει; τῷ δ' ἂν τις βούλιοτο μᾶλλον φίλος εἶναι, ἢ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ἢ τῷ ἤττον ἔχθρός; τῷ δ' ἂν τις ἤττον πολεμήσειν, ἢ ὁ ἂν μᾶλλον μὲν φίλος εἶναι βούλιοτο, ἢκίστα δ' ἔχθρός, καὶ ὃ πλείστοι μὲν φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι βούλιοντο εἶναι, ἐλάχιστοι δ' ἔχθροι καὶ πολέμιοι;

18. 'Εγώ μὲν οὖν, ὡ 'Ιππία, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιδείκνυμι νόμιμον τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· σοὶ δ' εἰ τάναντια γιγνώσκεις, δίδασκε. Καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, 'Ἀλλά, μά τὸν Δία, ἐφη, ὡ 'Σώκρατες, οὐ μα δοκῶ τάναντια γιγνώσκειν οἷς εἰρήνας περὶ τοῦ δίκαιον. 

19. 'Αγράφουσι δὲ τίνας οἴσθα, ἐφη, ὡ 'Ιππία, νόμους; Τοὺς γ' ἐν πάσῃ, ἐφη, χώρα κατὰ ταύτὰ νομιζομένους. 'Εχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἐφη, ὅτι οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ αὐτοὺς ἔθεντο; Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ἐφη, οἱ γε οὐτε συνελθεὶν ἀπαντῆσεν ἂν δυνηθεὶς, οὔτε ὁμόφωνοι εἰσι; Τίνας οὖν, ἐφη, νομίζεις τεθεικέναι τοὺς νόμους τοῦτος; 'Εγώ μὲν, ἐφη, θεοὺς οἴμαι τοὺς
νόμους τούτους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θείαι· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ πάσιν ἀνθρώποις πρώτων νομίζεται θεοῦς σέβειν. 20 Οὐκον καὶ γονέας τιμῶν πανταχοῦ νομίζεται; Καὶ τούτῳ ἔφη. Οὐκέτι μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὁ Ἑρμής, σύτος θεοῦ νόμος εἰναι. Τί δή; ἐφη. Ὁτε αἰσθάνομαι τινας, ἐφη, παραβαίνοντας αὐτόν. 21. Καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα πολλά, ἐφη, παρανομοῦσιν· ἀλλ’ οὖν δίκην γέ τοι διδόσιν οἱ παραβαίνοντες τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν κειμένους νόμους, ἵνα οὐδεὶς πρόπω δύνατον ἀνθρώπων διαφυγεῖν, ὡσπερ τοὺς ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων κειμένους νόμους ἔνιοι παραβαίνοντες διαφεύγουσι τὸ δίκην διδόναι, οἱ μὲν λαυθάνοντες, οἱ δὲ βιαζόμενοι. 22. Τί δέ; τοὺς εὐ ποιοῦντας ἀντενεργετείν οὐ πανταχοῦ νόμων ἔστι· Νόμιμον, ἐφη· παραβαίνεται δέ καὶ τοῦτο. Οὐκον καὶ οἱ τοῦτο παραβαίνοντες δίκην διδόσι, φίλων μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἔρημοι γιγνόμενοι, τοὺς δὲ μισοῦντας ἑαυτοῖς ἀναγκαζόμενοι διώκειν· ή οὖν οἱ μὲν εὐ ποιοῦντες τοὺς χρωμένους ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀντενεργετοῦντες τοὺς τοιοῦτος, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἁραρτίαν μισοῦνται ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, διὰ δὲ τὸ μάλιστα λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις χρῆσθαι, τούτους μάλιστα διώκουν; Νὴ τὸν Δί’, ὁ Ἑρμής, ἐφη, θεοῖς ταῦτα πάντα ἑοικε· τὸ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς τοῖς παραβαίνονσι τὰς τιμωρίας ἑχειν, βελτίωνοι ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρωπὸν νομοθέτον δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι. 23. Πότερον οὖν, ὁ Ἰππία, τοὺς θεοὺς ἦγεῖ τὰ δίκαια νομοθετεῖν, ἡ ἄλλα τῶν δικαίων; Οὐκ ἄλλα μὰ Δί’, ἐφη· σχολῆ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος γέ τις τὰ δίκαια νομοθετήσειν, εἰ μὴ θεοὶ. Καὶ τοὺς θεοῖς ἁρα, ὁ Ἰππία, τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ νόμων εἶναι ἄρεσκεν. Τοιαῦτα λέγων τε καὶ πράττων δικαιοτέρους ἐποιεῖν τοὺς πλησιάζοντας.
CHAPTER V.

SUMMARY

The advantages resulting from habits of self-control, and the evils attendant upon an opposite course of life.

1. Ὡς δὲ καὶ πρακτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας ἑαυτῷ, νῦν αὐτὸ τοῦ λέξιν νομίζων γὰρ ἐγκράτειαν ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθόν εἰναι τῷ μέλλοντι καλὸν τι πράξειν, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς φανερὸς ὡς τοῖς συνονύσιν ἡσικηκῶς ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἐπειτα διαλεγόμενος προετρέπτετο πάντων μάλιστα τοὺς συνόντας πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν. 2. 'Αεὶ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν τρόδος ἁρετὴν χρησίμων αὐτὸς τε διετέλει μεμνημένος, καὶ τοὺς συνόντας πάντας ὑπομυνήσκων· οἶδα δὲ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Εὐθύδημον περὶ ἐγκράτειας τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· Ἐπὶ μοι, ἐφὶ, ὡς Εὐθύδημα, ἃρα καλὸν καὶ μεγαλείον νομίζεις εἰναι καὶ ἀνδρὶ καὶ πόλει κτήμα ἐλευθερίαν; Ἡς οὖν τέ γε μάλιστα, ἐφὶ. 3. Ὁστὶς οὖν ἀρχεῖαι ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σῶματος ἡθονῶν, καὶ διὰ ταύτας μὴ δύναται πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, νομίζεις τούτον ἐλευθερον εἰναι; Ἡκιστα, ἐφὶ. Ἡδος γὰρ ἐλευθερον φαίνεται σοι τὸ πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, εἶτα τὸ ἔχειν τοὺς κωλύσοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν ἀνελεύθερον νομίζεις. Παντάπασι γε, ἐφὶ. 4. Παντάπασιν ἀρα σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀνελεύθεροι εἰναι; Ἡ τὸν Δι', ἐφὶ, εἰκότως. Πότερον δὲ σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς κωλύσονται μόνον τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, ἢ καὶ ἀναγκάζονται τὰ αἰσχῦντα ποιεῖν; Οὔδὲν ἢττον ἢμοιγ', ἐφὶ, δοκοῦσιν ταύτα ἀναγκάζοντας, ἢ ἐκεῖνα κωλύσονται. 5. Ποίοις δὲ τινας δεσπότας ἡγεῖται τοὺς τὰ μὲν ἀριστα κωλύνοντας, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα ἀναγκάζοντας; Ὡς δυνατὸν νῦν Δί', ἐφὶ, κακίστους. Δουλείαν δὲ ποίειν κακίστην νομίζεις εἰναι; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἐφὶ, τὴν παρὰ τοῖς κακίστοις δεσπότας ἃν κακίστην ἃρα δουλείαν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς δουλεύσοντι; Ἐμοιγέ δοκεῖ, ἐφὶ. 6. Σοφίαν δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἱγαθόν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀπείρουσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἀκρασία
IV. 5. § 10. ] MEMORABILIA. 127

εἰς τούναντίον αὐτοῦς ἐμβάλλειν; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι προσέχειν τε τοῖς ὠφελοῦσι καὶ καταμανθάνειν αὐτὰ κωλύειν, ἀφέλεκόνσα ἐπὶ τὰ ἡδέα, καὶ πολλάκις αἰσθανομένους τῶν ἁγαθῶν τε καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἐκπλήξασα, ποιεῖν τὸ χείρον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίονος αλρείσθαι; Τίγνεται τοῦτ', ἐφη. 7. Σωφροσύνης δὲ, ὁ Εὐθύδημε, τίνι ἂν φαίμην ἤττον, ἢ τῷ ἄκρατεὶ, προσήκειν; αὐτὰ γὰρ δήποτα τὰ ἐναντία σωφροσύνης καὶ ἄκρασίας ἐργα ἐστίν. Ὀμολογῶ καὶ τούτο, ἐφη. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιμελείσθαι, ὡν προσήκει, οἶει τε κωλυτικῶτερον ἄκρασίας εἰναι; Οὐκοιν ἔγωγε, ἐφη. Τοῦ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ὠφελοῦντων τὰ βλάπτοντα προαρείσθαι ποιοῦντος, καὶ τούτων μὲν ἐπιμελείσθαι, ἐκεῖνων δὲ ἀμελεῖν πειθόντος, καὶ τοῖς σωφρονούσι τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν ἀναγκάζοντος, οἶει τε ἄνθρωπω κάκιον εἰναι; Οὐδὲν, ἐφη. 8. Οὐκοιν τὴν ἐγκράτειαν τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τὴν ἄκρασίαν εἰκὸς τοῖς ἄνθρωποις αἰτίαν εἰναι; Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Οὐκοιν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ αἰτίον εἰκὸς ἀριστον εἰναι; Ἐλκὸς γὰρ, ἐφη. "Εοικεν ἄρα, ἐφη, ὁ Εὐθύδημε, ἀριστον ἄνθρωπῳ ἢ ἐγκράτεια εἰναι; Ἐλκότως γάρ, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες. 9. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ, ὁ Εὐθύδημε, ἦδη πώποτε ἐνεπιθήνης; Ποίον; ἐφη. "Ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἡδέα, ἐφ' ἀπερ μόνα δοκεῖ ἢ ἄκρασία τοὺς ἄνθρωπους ἅγειν, αὐτή μὲν οὖ δύναται ἅγειν, ἢ δ' ἐγκράτεια πάντων μάλιστα ἡδεσθαι ποιεῖ. Πώς; ἐφη. "Ὡςπέρ ἢ μὲν ἄκρασία, οὐκ ἔδαις καρτερεῖν οὔτε λιμὸν, οὔτε δίφαν, οὔτε ἀγρυπνίαι, δι' ἄν μόνων ἔστιν ἡδέως μὲν φαγεῖν τε καὶ πιεῖν, ἡδέως δ' ἀναπαύσασθαι τε καὶ κοιμηθῆναι, καὶ περιμείναντας καὶ ἀνασχομένοις, ἐως ἂν ταῦτα ὡς ἐν ἰδιοντα γένηται, κωλύει τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις τε καὶ συνεξεστάτοις ἄξιολογο ἡδεσθαι ἢ δ' ἐγκράτεια μόνῃ ποιοῦσα καρτερεῖν τὰ εἰρημένα, μόνη καὶ ἡδεσθαι ποιεῖ ἀξίως μνήμης ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Παντάπασιν, ἐφη, ἀληθὴς λέγεις. 10. 'Αλλὰ μήν τοῦ μαθεῖν τι καλὸν καὶ ἄγαθον, καὶ τοῦ ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῶν ποιοῦσι τινός, δι' ἂν ἂν τις καὶ τὸ ἔαυτον σώμα καλῶς διοικήσει, καὶ τὸν ἔαυτον οἰκον καλῶς οἰκονομήσει, καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο
CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY.

SOCRATES strove to teach those who associated with him the true art of reasoning, since he always held that whoever had acquired clear ideas himself of any matter, could, with equal clearness, explain those ideas to others; while, on the other hand, it was not to be wondered at if such as were deficient in that particular should not on’v be led into error themselves, but likewise mislead others.

1. Ὡς δὲ καὶ διαλεκτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας, πειράσομαι καὶ τούτῳ λέγειν. Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας, τί ἔκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων, ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις...
IV. 6. § 6. [MEMORABILIA.]

 يون ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι, τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας, οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμαστῶν εἶναι αὐτοῦς τε σφάλλεσθαι, καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλειν· ὥν ἔνεκα σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνυόσι, τί ἐκαστὸν εἶ ὁ τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτε ἐλπιζέτο, πολὺ ἐργον ἢν εἶ ὕδει διεξελθεῖν, ἐν δόσις δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἴμαι, τοσαύτα λέξω. 2. Πρῶτον δὲ περὶ εὐσεβείας ὅδε πως ἐσκόπεί. Ἐπεὶ μοι, ἔφη, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ποιόν τι νομίζεις εὐσέβειαν εἶναι; Καὶ δς, Κάλλιστον νῦν Δι', ἔφη. "Εσχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὑποίος τις ὁ εὐσεβής ἔστιν; 'Εμοί μὲν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμῶν. 'Εξεσθ. δὲ, ὃν τις βούληται τρόπον, τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν; Οὐκ ἄλλὰ νόμοι εἰσι, καθ' οὐς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν. 3. Οὐκον δὲ τοὺς νόμους τούτους εἰς ὑ, εἰςίη ἢν, ὡς δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν; Οἴμαι ἐγώ', ἔφη. 'Δρ' οὖν ὁ εἰδώς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμῶν, ὥς ἄλλως οἴεται δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἢ ὡς οἴεν; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. "Αλλως δὲ τις θεοὺς τιμᾷ, ἢ ωσ οἴεται δεῖν; Οὐκ οἴμαι, ἔφη. 4. 'Ο ἁρα τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἶδός, νομίως ἢν τοὺς θεοὺς τιμῶ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, οὐκον δὲ γε νομίμως τιμῶν, ως δεὶ τιμᾷ; Πώς γὰρ οὖ; 'Ο δὲ γε, ως δεὶ τιμῶν, εὐσεβής ἔστι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 'Ο ἁρα τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἰς ὑ, ὅρθως ἢ υ ἢμιν εὐσεβῆς ὧρισμένος ἔι; 'Εμοί γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκεί. 5. 'Ανθρώποις δὲ ἁρα ἐξεσθίν, ὃν ἢν τις τρόπον βούληται, χρῆσθαι; Οὐκ ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τούτους ὁ εἰδώς, ὃ ἢστι νόμιμα, καθ' δὲ δεὶ πως ἄλληλοις χρῆσθαι, νόμιμος ἂν ἔι. Οὐκον οἱ κατὰ ταῦτα χρώμενοι ἄλληλοις, ὃς δεὶ, χρῶνται; Πώς γὰρ οὖ; Οὐκον οἱ γε, ὡς δεὶ, χρώμενοι, καλῶς χρῶνται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκον οἱ γε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καλῶς χρώμενοι, καλῶς πράττουσι τανθρώπεια πράγματα; Εἰκος γ', ἔφη. Οὐκον οἱ τοῖς νόμοις πειθόμενοι, δίκαια οὕτω τοιοῦται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 6. Δικαίωμα δὲ οἴοθα, ἔφη, ὅποια καλεῖται; "Α οἱ νόμοι κελεύον- σιν, ἔφη. Ὅδε προοῦντες δὴ οἱ νόμοι κελεύονται, δίκαια τε ποιοῦσι, καὶ δεὶ; Πώς γὰρ οὖ; Οὐκον οἱ γε τὰ δι- καία ποιοῦντες, δίκαιοι εἰσίν; Οἴμαι ἐγωγ', ἔφη. Οἶχ.
οὖν τινας πείθεσθαι τοὺς νόμοις, μὴ εἰδότας ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύονσιν; Ὅνυκ ἔγωγ', ἐφη. Εἰδότας δὲ ἃ δεὶ ποιεῖν οἶει τινὰς οἴεσθαι δεῖν μὴ ποιεῖν ταῦτα; Ὅνυκ ὁμαί, ἐφη. Οἱ δας δὲ τινὰς ἄλλα ποιοῦντας, ἦ ἃ οἴονται δεῖν; Ὅνυκ ἔγωγ', ἐφη. Ὅ. ἀρα τὰ περὶ ἀνθρώποις νόμιμα εἰδότες, τὰ δίκαια οὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν οἱ γε τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦντες, δίκαιοί εἰσι; Τίνες γὰρ ἄλλοι; ἐφη. Ὁρθὸς ἂν ποτε ἀρα ὀριζόμεθα, ὀριζόμενοι δικαίους εἰναι τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ περὶ ἀνθρώπους νόμιμα; 'Εμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη.

7. Σοφίαν δὲ τί ἂν φήσαμεν εἰναι; εἰπὲ μοι, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφοὶ, ἃ ἐπιστάνται, ταῦτα σοφοὶ εἰναι, ἢ εἰσὶ τινες, ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάνται, σοφοὶ; 'Α ἐπιστάνται δῆλον ὅτι, ἐφη· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις, ἢ γε μὴ ἐπιστάτητο, ταῦτα σοφὸς εἶν; 'Αρ' οὖν οἱ σοφοὶ ἐπιστήμη σοφοὶ εἰσι; Τίνι γὰρ, ἐφη, ἄλλῳ τις ἂν εἰη σοφὸς, εἰ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμη; 'Αλλο δὲ τι σοφίαν ολει εἰναι, ἢ ὃ σοφοὶ εἰσιν; Οὐκ ἐγγε. 'Επιστήμη ἁρα σοφία ἐστιν; 'Εμοιγε δοκεί. 'Αρ' οὖν δοκεί σοι ἄνθρωπῳ δυνατὸν εἰναι τὰ δύναμεν ἐπιστάσας; Οὐδὲ μὰ Δι' ἐμοιγε πολλοστὸν μέρος αὐτῶν. Πάντα μὲν ἄρα σοφὸν οὐχ οἶον τε ἄνθρωπον εἰναι; Μὰ Δι' οὐ δήτα, ἐφη. Ὁ ἀρα ἐπιστάταται ἐκαστος, τούτο καὶ σοφὸς ἐστιν; 'Εμοιγε δοκεί.

8. 'Αρ' οὖν, ὦ Εὐνόημε, καὶ τάγαθον οὕτως ζητητεον ἑστὶ; Πώς; ἐφη. Δοκεί σοι τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ὄφελομον εἶναι; Οὐκ ἐμοιγε. Τί δέ; τὸ ἄλλῳ ὄφελομον οὐ δοκεί σοι ἑνίοτε ἄλλω βλασφερὸν εἰναι; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. 'Αλλο δ' ἂν τι φαίης ἀγαθον εἰναι, ἦ τὸ ὄφελομον; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἐφη. Τό ἀρα ὄφελομον, ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, δτω ἂν ὄφελομον ἦ; Δοκεί μοι, ἐφη.

9. Τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἔχομεν ἂν πως ἄλλως εἰπεῖν, ἦ, εἰ ἐστὶν, ὄνομαζες καλὸν ἦ σῶμα, ἦ σκεῦς, ἦ ἄλλ' ὀτείον, δ οίσθα πρὸς πάντα καλὸν ὑν; Μὰ Δι' οὖν ἔγωγ', ἐφη 'Αρ' οὖν, πρὸς δ' ἂν ἐκαστον χρήσιμον ἦ, πρὸς τοῦτο ἐκάστῳ καλῶς ἔχει χρήσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Καλὸν δὲ
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'Ανδρίαν δέ, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἀρά τῶν καλῶν νομίζεις εἶναι; Κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν ἔγωγ', ἐφη. Χρήσιμον ἄρα οὐ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάχιστα νομίζεις τὴν ἀνδρίαν; Μᾶ Δί', ἐφη, πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα μὲν οὖν. 'Ἀρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτά; Ἡκιστὰ γ', ἐφη. Οἱ ἄρα μὴ φοβούμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τί ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν; Νὴ Δί', ἐφη, πολλοὶ γὰρ ἄν οὐτοὶ γε τῶν τε μανομένων καὶ τῶν δειλῶν ἀνδρείοι εἰεν. Τί δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ μὴ δεινὰ δεδοκίτες; Ἔτι γε, νὴ Δία, ἦττον, ἐφη. 'Ἀρ' οὖν τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθούς πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα δύνατος, ἀνδρείους ἤγει εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς, δειλοὺς; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. 11. 'Ἀγαθοὺς δὲ πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα νομίζεσσαν ἄλλους τινάς, ἡ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτοῖς καλῶς χρήσαι; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τούτους, ἐφη. Κακοὺς δὲ ἄρα τοὺς οἶνους τοῦτοις κακῶς χρήσαι; Τίνας γὰρ ἄλλους; ἐφη. 'Ἀρ' οὖν ἐκαστῷ χρῶνται, ὡς οὖνται δειν; Πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως; ἐφη. 'Ἀρα οὖν οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι καλῶς χρήσαι Ἰσαίαν, ὡς δεῖ χρήσαι; Οὐ δήποτε γε, ἐφη. Οἱ ἄρα εἰδότες, ὡς δεῖ χρήσαι, οὖτοι καὶ δύνανται; Μόνοι γ', ἐφη. Τί δὲ; οἱ μὴ διημαρτηκότες ἄρα κακῶς χρῶνται τοῖς τοιοῦτοις; Οὐκ οἴομαι, ἐφη. Οἱ ἄρα κακῶς χρώμενοι διημαρτηκασιν; Εἰκὼς γ', ἐφη. Οἱ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρήσαι ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοὶ; Ἐμοῖγε δοκοῦσιν, ἐφη.

12. Βασιλείαν δὲ καὶ τυραννίδα, ἄρχας μὲν ἀμφοτέρας ἤγειτο εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐνόμιζε· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἄρχὴν, Βασιλείαν ἤγειτο, τὴν δὲ ἀκόντων τε καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἄλλ' ὅπως ὁ ἄρχων βούλοιτο, τυραννίδα· καὶ δπνοι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελοῦντων αἱ ἄρχαι καθέστανται ταὐτὴν τὴν πολιτείαν ἀριστοκρατείαν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, ὅποι
SUMMARY

Socrates always showed himself solicitous to have his friends become capable of performing their own business, that they might not stand in need of others to perform it for them. For this reason, he made it his study, more than any other man, to find out wherein any of his followers were likely to excel in things not unbecoming a wise and good man; and in such points as he himself could give them any instruction about, he did so with the utmost readiness, and where he could not, he was always ready to carry them to some more skilful master. Yet was he careful to
lix the bounds in the case of every science, having in view merely what was useful for the practical purposes of life.

1. "Оτι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γε ὑμην ἀπεφαίνετο Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ὁμιλοῦντας αὐτῷ, δοκεῖ μοι δὴλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων εἶναι· ὅτι δὲ καὶ α. τάρκεις ἐν ταῖς προσηκούσαις πράξεισαν αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπεμελεῖτο, νῦν τοῦτο λέξω· πάντων μὲν γάρ, ὃν ἐγὼ οἶδα, μᾶλλον ἐμελεῖν αὐτῷ εἰδέ ναι, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων εἰ ἑτὸν συνόντων αὐτῷ· ὃν δὲ προσήκει αὐρί καλῶ κἀγαθῶ εἰδέναι, ὃ τι μὲν αὐτὸς εἰδείη, πάντων προσθεμότατα ἐδίδασκεν, ὅτου δὲ αὐτὸς ἀπειρότερος εἰη, πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιστημώνων ἤγεν αὐτοὺς. 2. Ἐδίδασκε δὲ καὶ μέχρι ὅτου δέοι ἐμπειρὸν εἶναι ἐκάστου πράγματος τὸν ὅρθον πεπαιδευμένον· αὐτίκα γεωμετρίαν μέχρι μὲν τοῦτον ἔφη δεῖν μανθάνειν, ἔως ἰκανός τις γένοιτο, εἰ ποτε δεήσει, γήν μέτρω ὅρθως ἢ παραλαθεῖν, ἢ παραδοῦναι, ἢ διανείμαι, ἢ ἐργον ἀποδείξασθαι· οὔτω δὲ τούτῳ ῥάδιον εἶναι μαθεῖν, ὡστε τὸν προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν τῇ μετρήσει, ἀμα τὴν τε γῆν, ὑπόσει ἑστίν, εἰδέναι, καὶ ὃς μετρεῖται ἐπιστήμων ἤπειναι. 3. Τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσξυνών διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μανθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν· ὃ τι μὲν γὰρ ὑφελοίη ταύτα, οὐκ ἔφη ὀραν· καίτοι οὐκ ἀπειρός γε αὐτῶν ἢ· ἔφη δὲ ταύτα ἰκανὰ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου βίον κατατρίβειν, καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τε καὶ ὑφελιμῶν μαθημά των ἀποκωλόειν. 4. Ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτης μὲντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτὸς τε ὀραν, καὶ μηνὸς, καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν δύνασθαι γεγνώσκειν, ἤνηκα πορείας τε καὶ πλοῦ, καὶ φυλακῆς, καὶ δοσα ἄλλα ἢ νυκτὸς, ἢ μηνὸς, ἢ ἐνιαυτὸν πράττεται, πρὸς ταύτ’ ἐχειν τεκμηρίας χρήσθαι, τὰς ὀρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγιγνώσκοντας· καὶ ταύτα δὲ ῥάδια εἶναι μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦτον νυκτοθηρῶν, καὶ κυβερνητῶν, καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οἷς ἐπιμελές ταύτα εἰδεί ναι. 5. Τὸ δὲ μέχρι τούτου ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν, μέχρι τοῦ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορῇ δυτα, καὶ τοὺς πλάνη τάς τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους ἀστέρας γνώναι, καὶ τὰς ὑποστά σεις αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τὰς πειδόδους, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας
αὐτῶν ἵπτοντις καταπρίδεσθαι, ἵσχυρός ἀπέτρεπεν· ὠφέλειαν μὲν γάρ οὐδεμίαν οὐδ’ ἐν τούτοις ἐφη ὄραν· καίτοι οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκος ἢν· ἐφη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἰκανά εἶναι καταπρίδειν ἄνθρωπον βίον, καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὤφελίμων ἀποκωλύειν. 6. Ὅλος δὲ τῶν οὐρανών, ἦ ἐκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανάται, φροντιστὶν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὔρετά ἄνθρωπος αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἃν ἡγεῖτο τῶν ἵπτοντα, ἀ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίζασι οὐκ ἐδοξήθησαν· κινδυνεύσαν δ’ ἃν ἐφή καὶ παραφρονήσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνώντα, οὔδὲν ἦττον ἦ Ἀναζαγώρας παρέφρονησεν, ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τάς τῶν θεῶν μηχανᾶς ἐξηγεῖσθαι. 7. Ἐκείνος γὰρ, λέγων μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον, ἥγνοεί, ὡς τοῦ πῦρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὅδιώς καθορόσιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἥλιον οὐ δύνανται ἀντιβλέπειν, καὶ ὅπο μὲν τοῦ ἥλιον καταλαμπόμενοι τὰ χρώματα μελάντερα ἔχουσιν, ὅπο δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς οὗ· ἥγνοει δὲ, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυσικῶν ἀνευ τοῦ ἥλιον αὐγῆς οὐδὲν δύναται καλῶς αὐξεῖσθαι, ὅπο δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς θερμαίομενα πάντα ἀπόλλυται· φάσκων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἥγνοει, ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πυρὶ ὕπ οὔτε λάμπει, οὔτε πολύν χρόνον ἀντέχει, ὅ δὲ ἥλιος τὸν πάντα χρόνον πάντων λαμπρότατος ὄν διαμένει. 8. Ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ λογισμοὺς μανθάνειν, καὶ τούτων δὲ ὅμοιως τοῖς ἅλλοις ἐκέλευεν φυλάττεσθαι τὴν μάταιον πραγματείαν, μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὄφελίμοι πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεπεσκόπει, καὶ συν- διεξῆς τοῖς συνόνσι. 9. Προέτρεπε δὲ σφόδρα καὶ ὑγείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς συνόντας, παρά τε τῶν εἰδότων μανθα- νοντας δος ἐνδέχετο, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἐκαστὸν προσέχοντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, τί βρώμα, ἦ τί πόμα, ἦ ποῖος πόνος συμ- φέροι αὐτῷ, καὶ πῶς τούτοις χρώμενος ὑγειονότατ’ ἃν διά- γοι· τοῦ γὰρ οὕτω προσέχοντος ἑαυτῷ, ἐργον ἐφὴ εἶναι εὐρεῖν λατρὴν τά πρὸς ὑγίειαν συμφέροντα αὐτῷ μᾶλλον διαγιγνωσκοντα ἑαυτῶν. 10. Εἶ δὲ τις μᾶλλον, ἦ κατὰ τὴν ἄνθρωπίνην σοφίαν, ὥφελείσθαι βούλοιτο, συνεδουλευε μαντικῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ εἰδότα, δὲ ὅν οἱ θεοὶ τοῖς
XENOPHON proceeds to show in this concluding chapter that the death of Socrates was no proof of his having been guilty of falsehood in relation to the internal monitor, under whose guidance he professed to act.

The work concludes with a brief recapitulation of the arguments that have been advanced throughout it.

1. Et δὲ τις, δι' ὅτι φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν, ἂ τε δέοι, καὶ ἃ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν, ὑπὸ τῶν δι- καστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος, ὀλεταὶ αὐτὸν ἐλέγχεσθαι· τοὺς δι'- τὸς ἰδίως Ὑσίαμον ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον μὲν, δι' ὅτι οὕτως ἦδη τότε πώρρῳ τῆς ἡλικίας ἦν, ὡς' εἰ καὶ μὴ τότε, οὔκ ἂν πολλῷ ὑστερον τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον· εἰ, δι' ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀχθεινότατον τοῦ βίον, καὶ ἐν ἃ πάντες τῆς διάνοιαν μειοῦσαι, ἀπέλευσεν, ἀντὶ δὲ τούτον τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ρώμης ἐπιδειξάμενος, εὐκλειαῖν προσεκτῆσατο, τῆν τε δίκην πάν- των ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἔλευθρωτάτα καὶ δικαιό- τατα εἰπόν, καὶ τὴν κατάγωσιν τοῦ θανάτου πρὸστετα καὶ ἀνδρωδέστατα ἑγεκόμων. 2. Ὅμολογείται γάρ, οὐδένα πω τῶν μνημονευμένων ἀνθρώπων κάλλιον θάνατον ἑνεγκε- εῖν· ἀνάγκη μὲν γάρ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ, μετὰ τὴν κρίσιν τριά- κοντα ἡμέρας βιώναι, διὰ τὸ Δήλια μὲν εἰκόνιν τοῦ μνῆς εἶναι, τὸν δὲ νόμον μηδένα εὰν δημοσίᾳ ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔως ὅν ὡς τὴ θεωρία ἐκ Δήλου ἐπανέλθη· καὶ τῶν χρόνων τούτων ἀπασι τοῖς συνήθεις φανερὸς ἐγένετο οὐδὲν ἀλλωστέρον διαστείν, ἃ τὸν ἐμπροσθεν χρόνου· καίτοι τὸν ἐμπροσθέν γε πάντων ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα ἑθαυμάζετο, ἐπὶ τῷ εὐθύμως τε καὶ εὐκόλως χζήν. 3. Καὶ πώς ἂν τὶς κάλλιον ἡ οὕτως ἀποθάνοι; ἢ ποῖος ἂν εἰς θάνατος καλλίων, ἢ δὲν ἂν κάλ- λιστα τις ἀποθάνοι; ποῖος δ' ἂν γένοιτο θάνατος εὔδαι- μονέστερος τοῦ καλλίστου; ἢ ποῖος θεοφιλέστερος τοῦ εὐ.
δαμιουστάτου; 4. Δέξω δὲ καὶ ἅ Ἐρμογένους τοῦ Ἰππονίκου ἥκουσα περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἐφῄ γὰρ, ἦδη Μελήτου γεγραμμένον αὐτὸν τὴν γραφὴν, αὐτὸς ἀκούων αὐτοῦ πάντα μᾶλλον, ἦ περὶ τῆς δίκης διαλεγομένου, λέγειν αὐτῷ, ὡς χρή σκοτείν ὁ τι ἀπολογήσεται· τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν· Οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι τούτο μελετῶν διαθεωρῆκεναι; ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἦρετο, ὅπως· εἰπεῖν αὐτόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιῶν διαγεγένηται, ἦ διασκοπῶν μὲν τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, πράττων δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τῶν ἄδικων ἀπεχόμενος, ἤντερ νομίζοι καλλίστην μελέτην ἀπολογίας εἶναι. 5. Αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν εἰπεῖν· Οὐχ ὅρας, ὥς Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δικασταὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἦδη μηδὲν ἄδικουντας, λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄδικοντας ἀπέλυσαν; Ἀλλὰ νῦ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτὸν, ὅ Ἐρμόγενες, ἦδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας, ἦναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον. 6. Καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν· Θαυμαστά λέγεις· τὸν δὲ· Θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τὸ τεῦχο δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι, ἐμὲ τελευτάν τοῦ βίου ἦδη; οὐκ οὖσθ', ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦτο τοῦ χρόνου ἐγὼ οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἄν, οὔτε βέλτιον, οὔθ' ἦδον ἐμοὶ βεβιωκέναι; ἁρίστα μὲν γὰρ οἴμαι ξῆν τοὺς ἁρίστα ἐπιμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἦδιστα δὲ, τοὺς μᾶλλον αἰσθανομένους, ὅτι βελτίον γίγνονται. 7. ἂν ἐγὼ μέχρι τοῦτο τοῦ χρόνου ἴσθανόμην ἐμαυτῷ συμβαίνοντα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐντυγχάνων, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους παραθεωρῶν ἐμαυτόν, οὕτω διατετέλεκα περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ γιγνώσκων· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐγώ, ἄλλα καὶ οἱ ἔμοι φίλοι οὕτως ἔχοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ διατελοῦσιν, οὗ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἐμὲ, καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοῦν τες οὕτως ἂν εἶχον πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φίλους, ἄλλα διότερα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἂν οὗνταί ἐμοὶ συνόντες βέλτιστοι γίγνεσθαι. 8. Ἐλ δὲ διωύσσαμι πλείω χρόνον, ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τα τοῦ γῆρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅραν τε καὶ ἀκούειν ζητοῦν καὶ διανοεῖσθαι χείρον, καὶ δυσμαθέστερον καὶ ἐπιλησιονεστερον ἀποβαίνειν, καὶ ἂν πρότερον βελτίων ἂν, τούτων χειρω γίγνεσθαι· ἄλλα μὴν ταῦτα γε μὴ αἰσθανομένω μὲν
IV. 8. § 11.] MEMORABILIA.

άδίωτος ἄν εἴη ὁ βίος, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ πάς οὐκ ἀνάγκη χείρον τε καὶ ἀγδέστερον ζῆν; 9. Ἀλλὰ μήν εἴ γε ἄδικος ἀποθανοῦμαι, τοῖς μὲν ἄδικος ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνασιν αἰσχρὸν ἄν εἴῃ τοῦτο· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἄδικείν αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ, πῶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἄδικως ὥτιον ποιεῖν; ἐμοί δὲ τὶ ἀἰσχρὸν, τὸ ἐτέρους μὴ δύνασθαι περὶ ἐμὸν τὰ δίκαια μήτε γνώναι, μήτε ποιῆσαι; 10. Ὅρος δὲ ἐγγευ καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων ἐν τοῖς ἐπιγεννομένοις οὐχ ὤμοιαν κατελειτομένην τῶν τε ἀδικησάντων καὶ τῶν ἀδικηθέντων· οἴδα δὲ, ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπιμελείας τεύξομαι ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἐάν νῦν ἀποθάνω, οὐχ ὤμοιος τοῖς ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνασιν· οἴδα γὰρ ἀεὶ μαρτυρήσεσθαι μοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἡδίκησα μὲν οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ χεῖρα ἐποίησα, βελτίωσε δὲ ποιεῖν ἐπειρώμην ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐμοὶ συνόντας. Τοιαῦτα μὲν πρὸς Ἑρμογένην τῇ διελέχθῃ, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. 11. Τῶν δὲ Σωκράτην γυγνοσκόντων, οὗς ἦν, οἱ ἄρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθόντες ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὕφελιμώτατον ὡντα πρὸς ἄρετῆς ἐπιμελείαν Ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ, τοιοῦτος ἄν, οὖν ἐγὼ διήγημαι, εὐσεβῆς μὲν οὗτως, ὡς τε μηδέν ἄνεν τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν, δίκαιος δὲ, ὡς τε βλάπτειν μὲν μηδὲ μικρὸν μηδένα, ὅφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ, ἐγκρατῆς δὲ, ὡς τε μηδέποτε προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ ἤδιον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίωνος, φρόνιμος δὲ, ὡς τε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω, μηδὲ ἄλλου προδέεσθαι, ἅλλ’ αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνώσιν, ἰκανοὶ δὲ καὶ λόγω εἴπειν τε καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ τοιαύτα, ἰκανοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους δοκιμάσαι τε καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντας ἐξελέγξαι, καὶ προτρέψασθαι επ’ ἄρετὴν καὶ καλοκαγαθίαν, ἐδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι, οἷς ἰδ’ ἄρεστὸς τε ἄνήρ, καὶ εὐδαιμονεστάτος· εἰ δὲ τῷ μὴ ἀρέσκει ταύτα, παραβάλλων τὸ ἄλλων ᾦδος πρὸς τούτῳ οὖν κρινέτω.
NOTES.
NOTES.

The Greek title of this work is Ἀπομνημονεύματα, that is, narratives from memory of sayings and doings, which we have either heard or seen ourselves, or else have learned from others who have been ear or eye witnesses of the same. It corresponds, therefore, strictly to the Latin term Commentarii, and the English "Memoirs;" for Xenophon’s object in writing the work was not to act the philosopher, but to support the character of a simple narrator, and, in describing the life and teaching of his master, to defend him against the accusations of his enemies. Hence the remark ascribed to Xenophon in one of the Epistles of the Socratics (Ep. xv., p. 38, ed. Leo Allat.): δοκεὶ μὲντοι χρῆναι ἡμᾶς συγγράφειν ἄ ποτε εἶπεν ἀνήρ καὶ ἐπεξεῖν· καὶ αὐτῇ ἀπολογία γένοιτ' ἐν αὐτοῦ βελτίστη εἰς τὸ νῦν τε καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα.

The term Memorabilia, "things worthy of being remembered," which has for a long time back been given to the present work, is by no means a correct translation of Ἀπομνημονεύματα; still, however, its employment in the present case is so sanctioned by custom, that it appears pedantic to change it. Besides, although it does not give an accurate idea of the Greek title, it still expresses very well the general scope and spirit of the work.

It may be asked whether Xenophon merely inscribed this work Ἀπομνημονεύματα, or whether (what would be more usual with us at the present day) something was added by him in farther explanation of the term, as, for example, Σωκρατικά, or Σωκράτους. It is more than probable, both from the simple titles given by this writer to his other works, and which promise much less than the works themselves actually contain, and from the circumstance of the term Ἀπομνημονεύματα alone being employed by the Greek writers in designating the present work, that this latter appellation was used by Xenophon without any appendage. (Dionys. Hal., Art. Rhet., p. 67 Compare Dieg. Laert., iii., 34. Weiske, ad h. l.)
BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

§ 1

Τισι πορε λόγους. "By what arguments in the world," i.e. by what possible arguments. Observe the intensive force which πορε here gives to the interrogative, and, moreover, that τισι is here put for ἀλλοτιος, since sometimes, in indirect questions, the simple interrogative forms are used for the compound, when the indirect question assumes the character of the direct. (Kühner, § 877, Obs. 2, Jelf.)—οἱ γραφήμενοι Σωκράτην. "They who accused Socrates." Observe the force of the middle voice. The expression γραφεσθαι τίνα properly means, to cause the name of an accused person to be written down before a magistrate, and, as this was virtually done by the accuser's handing in a written indictment, the full form of expression is γραφὴν γράφεσθαι τίνα, the verb governing, in fact, a double accusative. But γραφὴν is commonly omitted. (Stallb. ad Plat., Euthyphr., c. 1, B. Schömann, de Comit. Athen., p. 179.) The accusers of Socrates were Meletus, a young tragic poet; Lycon, a public orator; and Anytus, a tanner, but a man of great influence in the state. (Consult Wiggers' Life of Socrates, p. 407 of this volume.)—ὡς ἄξιος εἶναι διανύσω τῇ πόλει. "That he was deserving of death with regard to the state," i.e., at the hands of the state. The dative is here employed to express a general reference. (Matthiae, § 387.)—εἰν. Observe the employment of the optative to indicate what others asserted, not what the writer himself believed. (Kühner, § 802, 3, b., Jelf.)

ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραφὴ. "For the accusation." The particle μὲν is here what the grammarians term solitary, that is, without its usual concomitant δέ. (Kühner, § 766, Jelf.)—γραφὴ. The accusation, as the word imports, was in writing, which was always the case in public actions. The term γραφὴ means properly nothing more than a writ. It was necessary, in the first place, that the date should be affixed, then the name of the magistrate before whom it was brought, then those of the accused and the accuser, or accusers, then the heads of the indictment, and, lastly, the names of the witnesses. (Schömann, de Comit. Athen., p. 179.)—τοῦτος τις ἦν. "Was some such a one (as this)," i.e., was in substance as follows. Xenophon
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gives here merely a general summary of the indictment, divested of all technicalities. Observe the indefinite air which ἦς imparts to τούτῳ. (Kühner, § 659, 4, Jelf.)

ἀδικεῖ. "Is a wrong-doer," i. e., does wrong in the eye of the law.—οὗτος μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει, κ. τ. λ. "In not acknowledging (as such) those whom the state acknowledges as gods," i. e., in not acknowledging by acts of worship, or, in other words, in not worshipping according to the νόμοι, or established usages of the state. This part of the charge then meant, that Socrates neglected the accustomed worship of his country. As regards this peculiar employment of νομίζει, consult Stallb. ad Plat., Euthyphr., c. 11, B., and Alresch. ad Esch., Choëph., 994; ad Pers., 497.—ἐτέρα καὶ νυ δαιμόνια. "Other strange divinities." The allusion here is principally to what was called the genius, or δαιμόνιον, of Socrates.—ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ. "Moreover, he is a wrong-doer also."

§ 2.

πρῶτον μὲν ὄν. "In the first place, then," i. e., as regards the first charge. Observe that μὲν here stands opposed in fact to δὲ in the commencement of chap. ii.—ὁς. In the sense of ὁς. (Viger, viii., § 10, 7.)—ποίω ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίω; "What possible kind of proof did they make of?" i. e., where in the world did they find any proof in support of this? Observe the indefinite force of ποτέ, and compare note on τίς ποτέ, § 1.—θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἴμ. "For he was both openly seen sacrificing." Instead of the personal forms δῆλον ἐστι, φανερὸν ἐστι, &c., the Greeks use the personal, as δῆλος εἰμί, φανερός εἰμί, &c., and the participle is construed with the subject thus created. (Kühner, § 684, Obs. 1, Jelf.)—οἶκοι. The domestic sacrifices of the Greeks were performed in the αὐλή an open and airy court, around which were arranged the apartments of the male members of the family. The Romans, on the other hand, had their domestic altar in the compluvium, which formed an open square in the centre of the atrium.—μαντικῇ. "Divination.” The Greek term μαντικῇ is much more extended in meaning than the Latin divinatio, since it signifies any means by which the decrees of the gods can be discovered, the natural as well as the artificial; that is, the seers, and the oracles, &c., where the will of the gods is revealed by inspiration, as well as the signs which the gods throw in the way of man. (Dict. Ant., s. v. Divinatio.)

dιετεθρύλητο. "It was commonly reported," i. e., it was a matter of common conversation. The reading of the ordinary text, διετεθρύλητο, is now deservedly rejected by the best editors. (Com-
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pare Bornemann, ad loc.)—ὡ.  "How that."—φαν. The optative in the indirect narration (oratio obliqua), to denote the assertion of another. (Kühner, § 885, 2, Jel.)—τὸ δαμόνιον ἐκατοτ σμαίνειν. "That the deity gave intimations unto him." The term δαμόνιον, in general, signifies the same as θεῖον,  "divine," or whatsoever proceeds from the gods. Hence the expression τὸ δαμόνιον (with the article) has the same meaning as τὸ θεῖον, "the deity," "the divinity." (Compare Proleg., ch. v.)—αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι εἰςφέρ-

κεν. "To have accused him of introducing." The verb αἰτιάσα
e often construed, as here, with an accusative and an infinitive. (Compare ii., 7, 12.)

§ 3.
καὶνότερον τῶν ἄλλων. Observe that ἄλλων here takes the place of ἣν ἄλλοι. The Greeks are so fond of the genitive with the comparative, that they even put in the genitive an object to which the comparison does not directly refer. (Bultmann, § 132, note 5, ed. Rob.)—μαντικὴν νομίζοντες. "Acknowledging the existence of an art of divination," i. e., believing in divination.—οἰωνοὶ τε καὶ φή-
nαις, κ. τ. λ. "Omens from birds, and voices, and signs, and sac-
rifices." By φήμαι are meant omens taken from the voices of men, and hence some supply ἵνα ἄρτιν ὁικον here. By σύμβολα are meant signs of various kinds, such as thunder, lightning, the meeting a person, &c. By ὅσια are indicated the omens and presages de-

rived from inspecting the entrails of victims.—οὐτοὶ τε. The par-

ticle τε here stands opposed to the καὶ in κάκεινος, so that οὐτοὶ τε γάρ . . . κάκεινος is the same, in fact, as saying ὡς γάρ οὐτοὶ . . . οὐτω καὶ κέκεινος.—τοὺς ὑποθέσας οὖδὲ τοὺς ὑπαντώντας. "That the birds (which they see), or the persons that meet them."—τοῖς μαν-

τευμένοις. "To those who consult by divination."—κάκεινος ὅ ἐ

οὐτοὶ ἐνόμιζεν. "And so, likewise, did he think" (Compare note on οὐτοὶ τε.)

§ 4.

ἄλλη οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι. "The majority of persons, however." The particle ἄλλα here introduces a limitation to the preceding clause, the writer now proceeding to show how it was that Socrates, though entertaining these sentiments respecting divination in com-

mon with the multitude, yet incurred the accusation of impiety. (Herbst, ad loc.)—ὡποτρῆσθαι τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι. "That they are both diverted (from some things) and urged on (to others)."—

ἕστερ ἐγγύωσκεν. "As he really thought," i. e., as he really be-
heved.—καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προηγόρευε. “And he used to forewarn many of those who associated with him.” Socrates never established any particular school, and hence had no disciples, strictly so called. A circle of inquisitive men and youths, however, were soon assembled around him, and, charmed with his conversation and instruction, were attached to him with incredible affection. These are Xenophon’s of ξυνόντες Σωκράτει. (Consult Wiggers’ Life of Socrates, c. iv., p. 387 of this volume.)

ὁς τῶν δαμονίων προσημαίνοντος. “Asserting that the deity had given him a previous intimation on the subject.” Equivalent to λέγων τὸ δαμονίων προσημαίνειν. When we assign or suggest some reason in the mind of another person why he does any thing, it is usually expressed by ὡς with an accusative or genitive absolute; and then, in translating, some explanatory term or clause must be inserted. (Buttmann, § 145, note 5, ed. Rob.) Xenophon, in the present passage, and in many others, asserts that Socrates was not only prevented by his so-called genius from undertaking himself, or recommending in others any act, but was also urged to undertake or recommend certain acts. Plato, on the other hand, expressly declares that the genius had only a dissuasive power, never a persuasive. This extraordinary discrepancy may be removed, if, with Tenennmann, we suppose that Xenophon did not accurately distinguish between the results to which the divine voice referred, and those which Socrates himself inferred from its silence. If this voice, whenever it was heard by Socrates, was a sign of discouragement, it follows, of necessity, that, as often as the voice was silent, its silence was a sign of encouragement and exhortation. (Kühner, ad loc. Consult Proleg, ch. v.)

τοῖς δὲ μὴ πεποιημένοις μετέμελε. “While it repented them if any did not obey him,” i.e., while, if any disobeyed his warnings, they had reason to repent of this. Observe the force of the conditional negative μὴ. This negative is joined with a participle when they can be resolved into a conditional clause. Thus the Latin here would be si qui autem non parebant. (Kühner, § 746, 2, Jelf.)

§ 5.

καίτοι. “And yet.” Xenophon here departs from the immediate subject of discussion, and turns to a new statement, not referred to in the accusation. The charge was that Socrates introduced new deities, not that he wholly disbelieved in the gods.—ἐδόκει oriously ὑπό φωτερα ταῦτα. “Now he would have appeared (to be) both of these.” Imperfect for the pluperfect, *ιο indicate the repetition of an action.
That is, as often as the circumstances mentioned in the succeeding clause occurred, so often would he have appeared, &c. (Kühner, t loc. Kühner, G. G., § 424, β., Jelf. )—ei προαγορεύων ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ, &c. "If, in forewarning them of things as shown (unto him) by some deity, he were thereupon even openly uttering what was else. Observe the employment of ἐφαίνετο with a participle, and its supplying in this way the place of an adverb, while the participle is to be rendered by a tense. (Buttmann, § 144, note 8, ed. Rob.)—κάτα. Contracted for καὶ εἴρα. The forms κάτα and καπείτα (καὶ ἐπείτα) are often introduced before participles where we would expect the simple εἴρα and ἐπείτα. In such cases καὶ is not expletive, as some imagine, but has the force of "even." (Heindorf ad Plat., Plph. 89, D. Stallb. ad Plat., Gorg., 457, B.)—ὅτι σὺν ἀν προελεγεν. The imperfect, again, of an action often repeated.—ei μὴ επισενεν ἀληθεύειν. "If he had not believed that he was about to speak the truth," i. e., that these predictions of his would actually come to pass.

ταῦτα δὲ. "Now with regard to these things," i. e., his believing that he was about to foretell what would come to pass. The train of ideas is as follows: A sure knowledge of the future is an attribute of deity alone. If, then, any man believes that he is going to predict the future truly, he must, of course, refer this to the inspiration of deity, that is, he must, of course, believe in the existence of deity. (Kühner, ad loc.)—προσεύων δὲ θεοῦ. "Now, if he trusted in gods," i. e., if he were sure that his predictions would come to pass, because they were foreshown unto him by the deity.—πῶς ἐνόμιζεν "How did he believe," i. e., how could he possibly think.

§ 6.

ἄλλα μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τάδε. "But, in truth, he did this also." The particles ἄλλα μὴν are here employed to express a strong affirmation or asseveration, and serve to introduce a new argument, and that, too, a very weighty one, for the purpose of proving that Socrates believed in the existence of gods. The adversative ἄλλα is aimed at the calumnies of his accusers, while μὴν serves to show the confidence of his defender.—τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαία. "The things that were necessary to be done," i. e., whatever might be their issue. The reference is to things that must be done, as a matter of course, and which are required either by duty, or sound reason, or necessity. These follow fixed and certain rules, without which they can not be performed.—καὶ πράττειν. "Even (so) to do." Equivalent to ὁ νῦν καὶ πράττειν.—ἐνόμιζεν. Ernesti reads ἐνόμιζον, the conjecture οὐ
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Leunclavius; but, as Weiske correctly remarks, if this word referred to the friends of Socrates, it should have been νουίζομεν.—περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄδηλων, κ. τ. λ. "With regard, however, to things that were uncertain in their nature how they would eventuate," i. e., with regard to things of uncertain event.—μαντευσομένους. "To consult the oracles."—εἰ ποιητέα. "Whether they were to be done (or not)."

§ 7.

καὶ. "Accordingly." The particle καὶ is here explanatory, and introduces examples to illustrate the foregoing paragraph.—τῶν μὲν λοιπὰς καλὸς οἰκίσειν. "That they who intend to regulate advantageously." The verb οἰκέω here has very nearly the same force as διοικέω. Leunclavius prefers οἰκίζειν to οἰκίσειν, and Ernesti actually edits οἰκίσειν. The reference, however, is not to mere building, for in this no oracle would be needed, but ὑποκατάστασιν after building.—προσβείσθαι. "Stand in need, besides other things." Observe the force of πρός in composition.—τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ, κ. τ. λ. "For, as to a man's becoming a good builder, or smith," &c. Supply ἀνθρωπον as the accusative before γενέσθαι, and observe the force of the termination ἐκός in denoting ability or fitness.—τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικόν. "An accurate investigator of such pursuits as these." Adjectives denoting capability, fitness, skill, including those in ἐκός, are construed with a genitive. (Matthiae, § 344.) By ἐξεταστικός is meant one who can discover and demonstrate the excellences or defects of different works or pursuits, although he never personally engaged in them: one, in other words, who is occupied in ἰδεωρή (speculation), not in πράξει (action, or work).

λογιστικόν. "An able reasoner." Less correctly referred by some to mere ability in reckoning or computation.—πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα, κ. τ. λ. "He thought that all such things as these were results of learning, and were to be attained to by the understanding of man," i. e., by the mere exercise of human understanding, without our seeking for or expecting any aid from on high. Observe here the force of ἀληθέα, which refers to the grasping or mastering of a thing, not as some suppose, to the mere choosing of it. We have placed a comma after μαθήματα, supplying εἶναι from the subsequent clause. Kühner and others, however, have no comma here, and give καὶ the force of "even," which makes a much less natural arrangement, and one not in accordance with the usual simplicity of Xenophon's style.
§ 8.

ta de megista tov ev touc, k. t. l. "He said, however that the gods reserved unto themselves the most important of the things connected with these pursuits," i. e., the more important results arising from their exercise. Supply after touc the words tois madoxasiv dntov.—Δήλων ελαι. "Was manifest." In Greek, any dependent clause, in an oratio obliqua, may stand in the accusative and infinitive, depending on a verb of saying. In Latin, this is restricted to such clauses of the oratio obliqua as are introduced by relative pronouns or relative conjunctions. (Kühner, § 889, Jelf.)—φυτευσαμένως. Observe the force of the middle in this word and in εἰκοδομησαμένως, as referring to the doing of a thing for one's self.

el συμφέρει. "Whether it be advantageous (or not)." The particle el is neither affirmative nor negative, but we must always ascertain from the context whether affirmation or negation is to be implied.—ίνα εὐφραίνηται. "In order that he may be gladdened," i. e., that he may enjoy happiness. Observe the employment of the subjunctive after the aorist participle, to indicate an event continued into present time. (Heindorf ad Plat., Protag., p. 29.)—εἰ διὰ ταύτην ἄνωσται. "Whether he shall not be grieved on her account." Observe the negative force of el as required by the context; and, moreover, that ἄνωσται, the future middle, is to be taken in a passive sense. (Kühner, ad loc.)—κηδεστάς. "Relatives." Connections by marriage.—εἰ στερισται. "Whether he shall not be deprived." The future middle again in a passive sense.

§ 9.

ελαῖ τα δαιμόνιον. "Appertains to the deity." Observe that daimónion (literally "divine") is here opposed to all that springs from the operation of the human intellect.—τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης. "Are within the reach of human intellect." Supply ελαι.—δαιμονίαν. "Are mad." The primary meaning is, "to be possessed by an evil spirit," and hence "to be driven to madness." As daimoniān, then, is equivalent to ὑπὸ δαιμονικά κατέχεσθαι, observe the oxymoron implied by it as opposed to δαιμόνιον.—α τοίς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν, k. t. l.

"(Respecting those things) which the gods have given unto men to discern by learning," i. e., by exerting their own reasoning powers. The participle here expresses the means, and is put in the same case with ἀνθρώπος. So in Latin, nobis dedit esse beatīs. In other words, μαθεῖν, though it does not belong immediately to ἀνθρώπος, but to διακρίνειν, stands in the dative by a species of attraction. Buttman, § 144, note 5, ed. Rob.)
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οἶνο. "As for example." Compare ii., 1, 4.—ἐπερωτήσα. The optative in -oμεν, particularly in contracted verbs, has also in Attic the termination -οεν, -ών. (Matthia, § 198, 2.)—ἐπὶ ζευγασ. "To drive a chariot," or, more freely, "for driving." Equivalent, as Kühner remarks, to ad vehendum, on account of the absence of the article; whereas, in ἐπὶ τῇ ναίν, immediately after, the article expressed has the force of a possessive pronoun, and we must translate, "on board his ship," equivalent to "in navem quain quis habet." (Kühner, ad loc.)—ἡ ἄξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας, κ. τ. λ. "Or, (as regards those matters), which it is permitted us to become acquainted with by having counted, or measured, or weighed them." Here the participle is in the accusative, because the dative ἀνθρώποις is not expressed. (Matthia, § 536.) Even when the dative is expressed, an accusative sometimes follows, as in Latin, "vobis expedit esse bonos.—τοὺς τὰ τοιοῦτα, κ. τ. λ. The insertion of these words converts the preceding clause, ἥ ἄξεστιν, κ. τ. λ., into an anacoluthon. (Herm. ud Vig., p. 894.)

ἀ μὲν μᾶθοντας, κ. τ. λ. The participle is again put in the accusative, because the dative ἀνθρώποις is not expressed.—τοὺς ἑυούς γὰρ οἷς ἄν, κ. τ. λ. An answer in effect to those, who complained that the gods did not signify the future to all men without distinction.—ιλερ. Attic for ἱλαοι. On the accentuation, consult Matthia: § 70, 6.

§ 10.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔκεινος γε. "But certainly he at least." Compare note on ἀλλὰ μὴν, in § 6.—ἀεὶ μὲν. The particle μὲν is here opposed to δὲ at the commencement of § 11, and the whole passage is worthy of notice on account of another μὲν and δὲ intervening, namely, ἔλεγε μὲν . . . . . τοῖς δὲ βουλομένοις.—τοὺς περιπάτους. "The public walks." The term περιπάτου properly means "a walking about;" here, however, by περιπάτου are meant porticoes, or covered places for walking, built for the use of the public, to take air and exercise in, and intended especially for those who walked for the benefit of their health. The school of Aristotle was called the peripatetic, because he taught walking in a περιπάτου of the Lyceum at Athens.—γυμνάσια. The Greek gymnasia were not only schools of exercise, but also places of meeting for philosophers, and all persons who sought intellectual amusements.—πληθοῦσις ἀγορᾶς. "At the time of full market," i. e., at the time of day when the market-place was usually crowded. The expression πλῆθος ἀγορᾶ was employed to signify the time from about nine to t'velve o'clock. The earlier
part of the morning, previous to this, was termed πρωτ., or ποιεῖ τῆς ἡμέρας. Compare Anab., i., 8, 1.

ὅπως πλείστους μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι. "Where he would be likely to hold intercourse with the greatest number of persons," i. e., where he thought he would meet with most. Sometimes the oratio obliqua is used in the dependent clauses of an oratio recta, when it is to be marked. that a statement is made, not as by the speaker himself, but as passing in another person's mind. (Kühner, § 585, Obs., Jelf.)—καὶ ἔλεγε μὲν ύς τὸ πολὺ. "And he was for the most part engaged in conversation." Socrates never delivered any complete discourse, but conversed with his hearers in a friendly manner, on topics just as they were suggested by the occasion.

§ 11.

Σωκράτους . . . . οὔτε πράπτοντος εἶδεν, οὔτε λέγοντος ἥκουσεν. "Either saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying." Verbs of seeing are not properly construed with the genitive except in poetry. Here, however, εἶδεν is construed with πράπτοντος, in order to preserve the symmetry of expression, since λέγοντος ἥκουσεν immediately follows. (Kühner, 529, Anm., 3, Germ. ed.)—τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως. "The nature of the universe." The inquiries of Socrates were turned away from the speculative questions which had engaged previous philosophers, such as the origin and formation of the world, the unity of the first cause and the variety of its operations, in short, from divine to human affairs.


—ὅπως ὃ καλοῦμενος, κ. Τ. Ἡ. "How that which was called κόσμος by the professors of wisdom was brought into being." By κόσμος is here meant "the world," or "universe," so called from its perfect arrangement and order, and hence opposed to the indigesta moles of Chaos. The term is said to have been first employed in this sense by Pythagoras. The Latin mundus corresponds exactly to this (Phot., Biblioth., cod. 659. Compare Bentley, Phal., p. 391, ed. Dyce.)—σοφιστῶν. Employed here in the sense of φιλοσόφων. The earlier philosophers were all called σοφισταί, in the better sense of the term. Pythagoras first modestly styled himself φιλόσοφος, or a lover of knowledge or wisdom for its own sake, an amateur. We must not confound these σοφισταί with the later sophists in the time of Socrates.—ἐφο. This reading occurs in one MS., and in the early editions. Most of the MSS. have ἐχεῖ, which Zeune, Schneider, Bor aemann, Dindorf, and others have adopted. Consult, however, Kühner's note.
CHAPTER

§ 13. 

τὸν ἀνάγκαις. "By what fixed laws." By ἀνάγκη is meant "necessity," and by ἀνάγκαι, in the plural, parts of that necessity, i. e., fixed laws, or, as we say, "laws of nature."—τῶν οὐρανῶν. "Of the heavenly phenomena," i. e., of the appearances and movements in the heavens, namely, the changes of day and night, the courses of the stars, sun, and moon, &c.—τοὺς φροντιζοντας. "That they who scrutinized into," i. e., busied themselves about.

§ 12.

καὶ πρῶτον μέν. The particle μέν is here opposed to δε in the commencement of § 15, ἔσκόπει δε, κ. τ. λ.—αὐτῶν ἔσκόπει. "He used to consider with regard to them," i. e., he used in their case to indulge in the following train of reflection and inquiry. The reference in αὐτῶν is to οἱ φροντιζοντες τὰ τοιαύτα, mentioned at the close of the preceding section. The genitive αὐτῶν itself is not, however, a partitive one, as Seyffert explains it, but is to be taken in its general sense of "with regard to," "in respect of." (Matthia, § 337.) Sometimes this idea is expressed still more clearly by the addition of περί, as at the beginning of § 15. (Compare Kühner, § 486, Obs. 1, Jelf.)—πότερά τοτε. "Whether possibly."—τάνθρωπων. "Human affairs," i. e., the things relating to man as a moral and social being, his duties, &c. Schneider and others read τὰνθρώπεια, from some MSS., but without any necessity, since τάνθρωπων and τάνθρωπεια are often used the one for the other. (Kühner, ad loc.) The strict distinction between the two forms, though very seldom observed, and neglected also in the present instance, is as follows: τάνθρωπων means things done by man; and τάνθρωπεια, things that belong to, or benefit man’s nature.

ἐρχονται ἐπί τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων φροντιζέων. "They enter into the investigation of such topics as these," i. e., they proceed to speculate on physical phenomena.—παρέντες. "By having neglected," i. e., by having considered them unworthy their notice.—τὰ δαίμονια. "Celestial matters," i. e., the phenomena of the heavens, the changes of seasons, &c. Compare the latter part of § 15, ποιήσειν, ὅταν βουλώνται, καὶ ἀνέμους, κ. τ. λ.—τὰ προσκόπτα. "Their duty." More literally, "the things that become them," i. e., as men and moral beings.

§ 13.

εἰ μὴ φανερῶν αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. "If it is not manifest unto them." The particle εἰ is commonly said to be employed, in such constructions as the present, after ἰδίᾳ and some other verbs expressing
NOTES TO BOOK I.—CHAPTER I.

emotions of the mind, in place of δις. Strictly speaking, however εἰ is purposely used in such cases, to carry with it an expression of uncertainty and doubt. The Attic custom of avoiding a tone of decision in discourse was the occasion of this and, in accordance with this custom, εἰ is used of things not only highly probable, but, as in the present instance, entirely certain. (Buttmann, § 149, Rob.) —ἐπει καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας, κ. τ. lığ. “Since that even they who pride themselves most upon discoursing concerning such matters as these.” For the construction here with the infinitive δοξά-ζειν, consult note on δῆλον εἶναι, § 8. The verb φρονεῖν, with ἐπί and a dative, signifies “to pride one’s self upon something.” It is usually accompanied by the adverb μέγα. (Compare Matthiae, § 585, b.)—διακείσθαι. “Are affected,” i. e., act.

§ 14.

τῶν τε γὰρ μανομένων. The particle τέ here corresponds to τέ in the words τῶν τε μεριμνῶν, and the two sentences are to be regarded as parallel to one another. The τέ in the first sentence is to be rendered “as,” and in the second “so.” Xenophon rarely connects by means of τέ . . . . τέ. Such an arrangement occurs more frequently in poetry; whereas, in prose, we generally find it only when whole sentences, or, at least, complete portions of sentences, are to be connected. (Kühner, 754, 3, Jelf.)—τὰ μὲν φοβερὰ φοβεῖσθαι. Compare Horat., Sat., ii., 3, 53: “Ist genus unum Stultitiae nihilum metuenda timentis.”—ἐν δὲ φίλῳ. “Amid a crowd,” i. e., before a large concourse.—οὕτω εἰσητησένει εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι. “That they must not even go out among men,” i. e., go into public. With εἰσητησένει supply αὐτοῖς. Neuter verbs in τένον denote necessity, and answer to the Latin gerund in dum.

λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα. “Stones and common pieces of wood,” i. e., stocks and stones. The participle τυχῶν is often used to signify any thing common or comparatively worthless; any thing which may be met with anywhere. Hence ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα will mean literally “pieces of wood that meet us, (i. e., with which we meet), any where and at any time,” in which observe the force of the aorist. Schneider thinks that by λίθους and ξύλα statues of stone or wood are here meant, but the epithet τὰ τυχόντα clearly disproves this. Xenophon, on the contrary, aludes, as Kühner correctly remarks, to the principle of Fetichism, that is, the worship of material substances, such as stones, plants, weapons, &c., a species of idolatry still common among the negro tribes in some of the western parts of Africa.
CHAPTER 1

The verb μεριμνάω is much stronger than φορον-τιζω, and means, properly, "to take anxious thought" about any thing, "to think earnestly upon," and hence, "to scan minutely," &c.—έν μόνον τὸ δὸν εἶναι. "That there is one world alone." More literally, "that whatever exists is one alone." The meaning is, that all parts of nature form one grand whole, one world or universe, or, as Cicero expresses it (Acad., ii., 37), "unum esse omnia." This was the doctrine of Thales, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and others, namely, ἕν τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, or ἐν εἶναι τὰ πάντα καλοῦμενα.—ἀπειρα τὸ πλήθος. "That there are worlds infinite in number." More literally, "that the things which exist are infinite in number." Supply τὰ δὸντα εἶναι. As τὸ δὸν in the previous clause is equivalent to κόσμον, ἕν τὰ δὸντα here will be the same as κόσμον. This was the doctrine of Anaximander, Anaximenes, Archelaus, &c. Compare Stobæus, Eclog. Phys., i., 22: 'Ἀναξίμανδρος, Ἀναξιμένης, Ἀρχέλαος . . . . ἀπείρως κόσμους ἐν τῷ ἀπειρι. ἅνει κινεῖσθαι πάντα. "That all things are in a state of constant motion." This was, in particular, the doctrine of Heraclitus, who maintained that there was no such thing as rest in the universe, but that all things were involved in constant vicissitude and change, which he called τὴν τῶν πάντων ὑλήν. Compare Stobæus, Ecl. Phys., i., 20: 'Ἡράκλειτος ἤρεμιαν μὲν καὶ στάσιν ἐκ τῶν ὀλων ἀνέρει, κίνησιν δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀπεδιδον.—οὐδὲν ἐν ποτε κινηθήναι. "That nothing could ever have been set in motion." This was, in particular, the doctrine of Zeno of Helea or Velia, in southern Italy, and the founder of the Eleatic sect. He is said to have argued with great subtlety against the possibility of motion. Observe here the employment of ἐν with the infinitive, giving to that mood the same signification as the optative with ἦν would have in the resolution by means of the finite verb. (Matthiae, § 597, 1, a.)—πάντα γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ἀπόλινεσθαι. "That all things are both produced and destroyed," i. e., have an origin and consequent destruction. The allusion is to the doctrine of Leucippus, the author of the Atomic theory, and his pupil Democritus, who maintained that all things were produced from the concourse (σύγκρισις) of atoms, and destroyed again by their separation from one another, or decomposition (διάκρίσις).—τούς δὲ οὕτ' ἄν γενέσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "Unto others, that nothing ever could have been produced or will perish," i. e., ever could have had a beginning or will have an end. This was the doctrine of Zeno, the founder of the Eleatic sect, already referred to.
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§ 15.

ἐσκόπει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ. Compare note on the commence-

ment of § 12.—ἀρ. "Whether."—γ' ἀνθρώπεια. "Human arts." Literally, "the things appertaining to man."—τούθ', δ' τι ἄν μὴθωσίν, ποιήσων. "That they will practice that, whatsoever they may have

learned."—οἱ τὰ θεία ζητούντες. "They who seek to investigate


also." Observe the force of δὲ.—ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἐκαστα. "In what

way each of such things as these." Supply ὅδοι after ἦ.

§ 16.

tῶν ταῦτα πραγματευομένων. "Those who busied themselves

about these things." The verb πραγματεύομαι properly means "to

make any thing one's business," "to work at it," "to take it in

hand."—αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄν ἀεὶ διελέγετο. "He him-

self, however, was always, as often as an opportunity occurred,

conversing on subjects relative to man." We have given ἄν here,

with the imperfect indicative, the meaning assigned to it by Her-

mann (ad Vig., p. 820. Compare Reisig, de vi et usu ἄν particular,

p. 115). Our common English idiom, however, would answer just

as well, and would, besides, harmonize better with ἀεί, "He himself,

however, would always be conversing," &c.—τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Soc-

rates, as we have already observed, strove to turn the attention of

his countrymen from speculative questions of a physical nature to

the subject of moral duties, and to the love of virtue; and hence

Cicero might well say of him that he was the first who called down

philosophy from heaven to earth, and introduced her into the cities

and habitations of men, that she might instruct them concerning

life and manners, concerning good and evil things. (Tusc. Quast.,

v., 4.)

σκοπῶν. "Considering," i. e., investigating.—τι σωφροσύνη, τι

μανία. "What self-control, what mad desire." Μανία here stands

opposed to σωφροσύνη, as in Plato's Protagoras (323, B.): δ' ἐκεῖ σω-

φροσύνην ἤγοντο εἶναι, . . . . ἐνταῦθα μανίαν.—ἀνδρεία. "Manli-

ness." For ἀνδρεία in this place, Stephens and Zeune write ἄνδρεια,

contrary to all the MSS. Ἀνδρεία is properly "fortitude," whereas

were the idea of courage is required, in opposition to cowardice or

κολια. (Consult Kühner, ad loc., and compare iv., 6, 10.)—πολιτι-

κός. "A statesman." Literally, "one skilled in regulating the

affairs of a state."—ἀρχ κός ἀνθρώπων. "One skilled in governing

men"—καλοὺς κάγαθν. "Honorable and worthy." The ethical
meaning of this well-known form of expression must of course be here adopted, as required by the context. As regards its political meaning, consult Grote's History of Greece, vol. iii., p. 62, note, where some excellent remarks will be found on the frequent confounding of the two significations.—άνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαιώς κεκλησθαι. "Might justly be called slavish," i.e., of servile spirit, low minded, and hence unable to appreciate the beauties of moral excellence.

§ 17.

δικαίως κεκλησθαι. "With regard, then, to as many things as it was not manifest how he thought respecting them," i.e., with respect to things about which it was not clear what the sentiments of Socrates were. Observe the employment of the personal φανερός for the impersonal φανερόν, and compare note on φύον τε γὰρ φανερός ἦν, § 2.—οὗτος τούτων. For περὶ τούτων, because περὶ αὐτοῦ immediately follows.—παραγιγνώσκω means properly "to decide beside the right," i.e., not in a line, or in accordance with it.—δικαίως. The trial of Socrates took place in the court called Heliaea (Ἡλεία), where all the more important cases were tried. The whole number of dicasts present at any one time was usually about five hundred; on some occasions, however, it was diminished to two hundred, or four hundred, while on others it rose to one thousand or one thousand five hundred.—εἰ μὴ τούτων ἐνεβεθυμήθησαν. The verb ἐνεβεθυμήθησα is construed with the genitive of the thing, with or without the preposition περὶ, in the sense of "to think upon;" whereas with an accusative, it signifies "to lay to heart," "to consider well," "to weigh any thing in the mind."

§ 18.

βουλεύσας γάρ ποτε. "For having, on one occasion, been chosen a senator." Observe here the force of the aorist; βουλεύσας being equivalent to senator factus, whereas βουλεύων would mean "being a senator." The Athenian senators (βουλευταί) were chosen by lot. The senate itself consisted of five hundred members, chosen in fifties from each of the ten tribes. These five hundred were divided, according to their tribes, into ten bodies of fifty each, called πρυτανεῖα. Each Prytaneia presided over the state for thirty-five or thirty-six days, and from them were elected by lot ten πρόεδροι, for each seven days, whose office it was to preside in the senate. One of these πρόεδροι was chosen daily, by lot, to sit as ἐπιστάτης.
or "presiding officer," in both the senate and the assembly of the people, and he had the power of passing or rejecting any thing that was proposed to him. He had also the key of the treasury. As his office involved very important powers, it lasted for only a single day τὸν βουλευτικὸν ὄρκον. "The senatorial oath."—ὁμώας...γενόμενος. Observe the asyndeton. Two or more participles often stand in the same sentence without being connected by a copulative conjunction καὶ or τέ. This is the case when the participles are opposed to each other, or in a climax, or where (as in the present instance) two or more single actions are brought forward in rapid succession. (Kühner, § 706, Jelf.)

ἐν ὑ ἡν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους βουλεύσεων. "In which it was (contain ed), that he will discharge the duties of a senator according to the laws," i. e., in which there was a clause to that effect. The expression κατὰ τοὺς νόμους βουλεύσεων is the subject of ἡν—ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ. "Over the people," i. e., in the assembly of the people. Literally, "among the people."—παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἑννέα στρατηγοὺς, κ. τ. λ. "To put to death by a single vote, in violation of the laws, all the nine commanders, namely, Thrasylus and Erasinides, with their colleagues." The Athenian commanders here referred to had gained a brilliant naval victory over the Lacedæmonians, near the islands called Arginusa, B.C. 406. After the battle, however, a tempest arose, which prevented the Athenian leaders from saving the shipwrecked sailors and soldiers, and from taking up and burying the dead. For this omission they were publicly accuse, and six of them, who had returned to Athens, were put to death. A discrepancy, however, exists with regard to the number of these commanders. The text here says nine (ἑννέα), but Xenophon himself, elsewhere, makes the number only eight (Hist. Gr., i., 7), and this last would appear to be the more correct sum. (Compare Kuhn ad El., V. H., iii., 17.) The whole number of commanders was originally ten (Diod. Sic., xiii., 74); but one of them, Archestratus, died at Mytilene, and Conon, another, was not present at the fight. (Xen., Hist. Gr., i., 6, seqq.)

μιὰ ψῆφῳ. This was illegal, because, according to law, each commander ought to have been tried separately. (Xen., Hist. Gr., i., 7, 37.) Observe, moreover, that these words are placed immediately after ἑννέα στρατηγοὺς, to render the opposition more striking.—τοὺς ἁμφὶ Θρασύλλου καὶ Ἐρασινίδην. A well-known Greek idiom. (Matthew, § 583.) Thrasylus and Erasinides are here specially named, because they were the two most prominent objects of attack. It seems that after the victory the Athenian commanders...
spent very little, if any time, in pursuit of the flying enemy, but, having returned to their station at the Arginusae, held a council on the course to be next adopted. On this occasion, Diomedeon, one of their number, thought that their first care should be to save as many as they could of their own people and of the disabled vessels, and that the whole fleet ought for this purpose to sail immediately to the scene of the action. Erasinides, however, contended that it was of greater importance to proceed directly with the utmost speed to Mytilene, that they might surprise and overpower the enemy's squadron, which was still blocking it. But Thrasyllus suggested that both these objects might be accomplished, if they detached a squadron sufficient to take care of the wrecks, and sailed with the rest of their forces to Mytilene. His advice was adopted. Erasinides and Thrasyllus, therefore, became particularly obnoxious to popular resentment. (Xen., Hist. Gr., i., 7, 31, seqq. Thirlwall's Hist. of Greece, vol. iv., p. 123, 12mo ed.)

{oùκ ἠθέλησεν ἑπιψηφίας. "He refused to put it to vote." As ἐπιστάτης, he had full power to pursue such a course, and his refusal saved the accused for that day. The other πρόεδροι, however, did not dare to imitate his noble firmness.—δραγγυμένον μὲν τοῦ δήμου. "Although the people were incensed against him." —δυνατῶν. In particular, Theramenes and Callixenus. (Compare Xen., Hist. Gr., i., 7. Plat., Apol., c. 20.)—περὶ πλείονος ἑποίησατο. "He deemed it of far more importance to himself." Literally, "he made it for himself a thing above more (than ordinary)." Observe the force of the middle voice.—καὶ φυλάξασθαι τοὺς ἀπεξεύθυνται. "And to take heed of those who threatened," i. e., to consult his personal safety by obeying their behests. Literally, "to guard himself against those who threatened." Observe again the force of the middle.

§ 19.

καὶ γὰρ ἐνόμιζεν. "And (no wonder he acted thus), for he thought.' Observe the elliptical force of καὶ γὰρ, like that of the Latin enim—ɪπιμελεῖσθαι ἄνθρωπον. "Exercise a superintendence over men."—οὐχ ὅν τρόπον. "Not in the way in which." The accusative is here employed absolutely, with a kind of adverbial force. (Compare Matthia, § 425.)—τὰ μὲν εἶδέναι, τὰ δὲ οὐκ εἶδέναι. Some of the ancient philosophers thought that the gods took notice merely of the more important class of actions, and neglected those of minor importance. Compare Cicero, N. D., ii., 66: "Magna dii curant, parva negligunt;" and again (iii., 35): "At enim minora dii neglegunt, neque agellos singulorum nec vitulcas persequentur."—καὶ τὰ
CHAPTER II.

§ 1.

καὶ τὸ πεισθῆναι τίνας. "The circumstance, also, that certain persons were persuaded." This is taken as the subject to φανεραί, the infinitive with the neuter of the article having the force of a substantive. (Matthia, § 539.)—πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους. "In addition to the things that have been mentioned," i.e., to what has been already said of him in the preceding chapter.—ἀφροδισιῶν, καὶ γαστρός, κ. τ. λ. "Was the most temperate of all men as regarded sensual pleasures and appetite." Kühner observes that ἀφροδισιῶν and γαστρός, being without the articles, have the force of verbs, a remark altogether out of place here, and only calculated to mislead.—πρὸς χειμώνα. On Socrates' endurance of cold, consult Wiggers' life of him, p. 397 of this volume.—πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "So trained to want but little." Literally, "to the wanting of moderate things." The infinitive with the neuter of the article again employed as a noun.—παῦν μικρὰ κεκτημένος. "Although possessing very trifling means." In the Economicus of Xenophon (i 3), Socrates remarks to Critobulus, that, if he could find a reasonable purchaser, he should perhaps get five minae for all his property, including his house. Five minae are equal to §88, the mina being
equivalent to §17 60. Observe the construction here of the nominative κεκτημένος with the infinitive ἐχεῖν. The particles ὅς and ὅς τε, with an infinitive, are joined with a nominative, when the verb on which the particle depends is one referring to the same thing of person as that nominative. (Kühner, § 863, Obs. 5, Jelf.; — ὑρκοῦντα. "A sufficiency." Literally, "sufficient things."

§ 2.

αὐτός ἄν τοιοῦτος. "Being such a one himself," i. e., when such was his own character.— ἄν ἐποίησεν. "Could he have made," i. e., could he have been likely to make.—πρὸς τὸ πονεῖν μαλακοὺς. "Effeminate with regard to undergoing labor."— ἄλλα ἐπανεσ μὲν τούτων τοῖς τοῖς. "(He did not do this), on the contrary, he caused many to cease from these (habits)." Observe, that ἄλλα here refers to the answer of the foregoing question in the negative. The verb παύω, in the active voice, is, "to cause another to cease;" in the middle, "to cause one's self to cease," or simply, "to cease." The particle μὲν refers to § 3.— ἄν ειναί τοιοῦτον ἐπιμελῶνται. "If they take care of themselves." Observe that ἄν is here the conditional particle contracted from ἄν, which usually begins a proposition or clause, and is thus distinguished from the potential or radical ἄν, which commonly stands after one or more words in a clause.—καὶ ὁπερ καὶ ἔγαθον. Compare notes on § 16.

§ 3.

κατοιχεῖν. "Although indeed." Equivalent to the Latin quanquam guidem. Compare iv., 2, 7.—τῶν φανερῶν εἶναι τοιοῦτος ἄν. "By his being manifest that he was such a person," i. e., by its being manifest that he was, &c. The nominative with the infinitive by attraction. Compare Kühner, § 672, 2, Jelf.—συνδιατριβοῦντας. Socrates never called his followers μαθητάς, but συνόντας, συνδιατριβοῦντας, γνωρίμους, ἐπιτηδείους. (Weiske, ad loc.) In this way he placed himself in direct opposition to the sophists, who vainly boasted that they could effect all things by their pretended lessons of wisdom. (Kühner, ad loc.)—ἐκείνος. In place of αὐτός. This change of ἐκείνος for ἀυτός often takes place, but always where strong opposition is to be marked, an idea which αὐτός itself does not express. (Kühner, ad loc.)—τοιοῦτος. "Such as he was," i. e., of similar character.

§ 4.

ἄλλα μὲν καὶ τοῦ σώματος, κ. τ. λ. "But, in truth, he was both himself not neglectful of the body also," &c. The idea is, that he
NOTES TO BOOK I.—CHAPTER II.

attended not only to the mind, but also to the body. With regard to ἄλλα μὲν, consult notes on i., 1, 6.—τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπερεσπιοῦντα, κ. τ. ἡ. “He did not approve, accordingly, that one eating above measure labor above measure,” i. e., he did not approve of over-exercise in connection with over-eating. The allusion appears to be to the ancient Athletē, whose voracity was as proverbial as their exercises and training were severe. Compare Athenaeus, x., 5: πάντες οἱ ἀθλητητές, μετὰ τῶν γυμνασμάτων, καὶ ἐσθίειν πολλὰ διάδοκονται; and also Upton ad Epictet., Diss. iii., 15, 3.—τὸ δὲ, διὸ ἡ γεύσις, κ. τ. ἡ. “But he approved of duly digesting by sufficient exercise those things, as many as the appetite receives with pleasure.” Observe that ψυχῇ denotes not only the soul, but also its desires, propensities, appetites, &c. A similar usage prevails in the case of the Latin animus.—ἐκπονεῖν. Literally, “to work off,” i. e., to digest by labor.—ἐξιν. “Habit,” i. e., mode of life.—ὦντες ἴνα ἱκανώς εἶναι. “Was both conducive to health in a sufficient degree.” Adverbs placed after adjectives, like ἱκανός in the present instance, are intended to have an emphatic force. (Stallb. ad Plat., Phaedr., p. 256, E.)—τῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμήκειαν. “The proper care of the intellect,” i. e., its due cultivation.

§ 5.

ἄλλ' οὗ μὴν ἤ. “But yet, most assuredly, he was not.” The particles οὗ μὴν are often employed when something is opposed, with a strong assertive force, to what has gone before. It was stated in the previous section that Socrates was neither neglectful of the body himself, nor commended those who were; still, however, it is here remarked, he was by no means an effeminate man. (Kühner, ad loc.)—ἄλαζονικὸς. A covert hit at the Sophists, who were famed for ostentatious display of all kinds.—ὑμετέχων. “In his upper garment.” The ὑμετέχων was a robe, or fine upper garment, worn by women and effeminate men. The terms ὑμετέχων and ὑπόδεις comprehend, as Heindorf remarks, the whole ordinary attire of the Greeks, as far as externals were concerned. (Heind ad Plat., Hipp. Maj., p. 291.) On the form ὑπόδεις, with the short penult, consult Lobez ad Phryn., p. 445.—διαίτη. “Habits of life.” οὗ μὴν οὗτ' ἐποιεί. “No, truly, nor did he make.”—ἐπαυε. “He caused them to cease.” Observe the force of the active here, as contrasted with that of the middle, ἐπαύερο, “he caused himself to cease,” i. e., he ceased.—τοῦτ' ἐκεντοῦ, κ. τ. ἡ. “And he exacted no compensation from those who desired his instruction.” Literally, “who were desirous of him” This whole passage i. remak-
ably concise. As Socrates endeavored to restrain his pupils from all desires, he checked the passion of cupiditv on their part by showing himself to be above the ruling desire for money. Here too, therefore, there is a covert allusion to the contrary practice of the Sophists. The verb πρόσεω, and more particularly the middle voice, is often used in the sense of exacting from another a fine, compensation, &c. The literal meaning is "to work out," and hence the literal rendering here would be, "and he was not accustomed to work out money from those who," &c., the construction being with the double accusative. (Blomf. ad Æsch., Pers., 482.)

§ 6.

τοντον δ' ἀπειχόμενος, κ. τ. λ. "By refraining, moreover, from this, he considered that he was securing his own freedom," i. e., by refraining from exacting any compensation for his instructions. The old editions have ἀπειχόμενος. The present reading is found in six MSS., and in the margin of Stephens's edition; it is followed, also, in the version of Leunclavius.—τῆς ὀμιλίας. "For their instruction," i. e., for their lectures. More literally, "for their inter-course (with their disciples)."—ἀνθραποδιαστής ξαντῶν ἀπεκάλει. "He stigmatized as enslavers of themselves," i. e., as sellers of their own independence. The term ἀνθραποδιαστής properly denotes a slave-dealer, one who kidnaps free men or slaves to sell them again. Hence, generally, an enslaver.—διαλέγεσθαι. "To converse with those."—ἀν λάβον. The optative with ἀν has the force of a potential, and is used as well in direct as in indirect narration. (Kuhner, § 832, Jelf.)

§ 7.

θαύμαζε δ' εἰ. On this usage of εἰ after a verb of wondering, consult notes on i., 1, 13.—τει ὁρεῖν ἐπαγγέλλομενος. "Any one professing (to teach) virtue." The verb ἐπαγγέλλομαι in this sense, namely, to make a show of, to profess, &c., is especially said of the Sophists. Compare Plato, Protag., 319, A.; and Gorg., 447, C.—ἀργύριον πράττοιτο. Supply τινά, the verb being, as already remarked (§ 5), construed with a double accusative.—κτισώμενος. "On having acquired," i. e., by having secured for himself.—μὴ ὁ γενόμενος, κ. τ. λ. "Lest he who thus became excellent and worthy might not entertain the liveliest gratitude toward the one who had most essentially benefited him," i. e., toward his greatest benefactor. The usual construction after a verb of fearing, like ἀφοβεῖν here, is with μὴ οὐ. In the present case, however, we have μὴ.
\( \nu \), so that the former \( \iota \) is a conjunction ("lest"), and the latter a repetition of the negative notion in the principal clause. (Kühner, § 750, Obs. 2.)

§ 8.

\( \tau \omega \nu \zeta \nu \nu \nu \tau \nu \nu \nu \, \nu \alpha \nu \tau \delta, \, k. \, t. \, \lambda. \) "That those of the persons, who associated with him, that received the opinions which he himself maintained," i.e., those of his followers who listened to and acted upon his instructions. Literally, "who received the things which he himself approved of."—\( e i \, \mu \eta \, \dot{\alpha} \rho a. \) "Unless forsooth." Observe the ironical use of \( \dot{\alpha} \rho a. \) (Kühner, § 788, 5, Jelf.)

§ 9.

\( \alpha \lambda \lambda \alpha, \nu \eta \, \Delta \iota, \, \delta \, \kappa \alpha \tau \gamma \iota \gamma \rho o \iota \, \varepsilon \eta. \) "But, in very truth, said the accuser," i.e., but, said the accuser, it is a positive fact, that, &c. Literally, "but, by Jove," &c. \( \nu \eta \) is a particle of affirmative ad- juration, and the accusative \( \Delta \iota \) depends on some verb, such as \( \delta \mu \eta \, \nu \nu i \mu i, \) &c., which is readily supplied by the mind. (Kühner, § 566, 2, Jelf.) Some commentators regard \( \nu \eta \, \Delta \iota \) a coming from Xenophon, not from the accuser, and give it an ironical force. This, however, is decidedly inferior. Compare the explanation of Heinze: "Ja, allerdings ist Sokrates ein Verführer der Jugend."—\( \delta \, \kappa \alpha \tau \gamma \iota \gamma \rho o \iota \, \varepsilon \eta. \) The more usual order would have been \( \varepsilon \eta \, \delta \, \kappa \alpha \tau \gamma \iota \gamma \rho o \iota, \) since \( \varepsilon \eta \) is commonly placed before its nominative. The same remark applies to the Latin inquit. The accuser referred to here is probably Meletus, who first laid the charge before the king-archon.—\( \upsilon \, \pi e \, \rho o \, \rho \alpha \nu \, \tau o \nu \, \kappa a \, b e \, s t \omega \tau \omega n \, \nu \omicron \, \omicron \nu o n. \) "To despise the established laws."—\( \omega \zeta \, \mu \omega \rho o \, \varepsilon \eta, \, k. \, t. \, \lambda. \) "That it was a foolish thing (for a people) to appoint the rulers of their state by means of a bean." Observe the employment of the optative in the oratio obliqua, as indicating the alleged sentiments of Socrates. The force of the middle, also, in \( \kappa a \, \iota \tau a \, s \tau a i, \) must be particularly noted. The active, \( \kappa a \, \iota \tau a \, \tau a i \, \tau i \nu a, \) would be, to appoint one over another; whereas the middle, \( \kappa a \, \iota \tau a \, s \tau a i \, \tau i \nu a, \) is to appoint one over one's self, and is here employed with reference to a people appointing their own rulers. In place of \( \kappa a \, \iota \tau a \, s \tau a i, \) Bornemann, Dindorf, and Sauppe read \( \kappa a \, \iota \tau a \, \tau a i, \) without any propriety. Most of the old editions, moreover, have \( \mu \omega \rho o i, \) "that it was the part of fools."—\( \upsilon \, \pi o \, \kappa \nu \omicron \, \omicron \nu o n. \) The Athenian magistrates were elected by lot, the lots employed being white and black beans. The names of the candidates were placed in one urn, and black and white beans in another. Those whose names were drawn out with the white beans were elected. (Hermann, Polit. Ant., § 149.)
κυβερνητης κεχρησοαι κυαμευτω. “To keep using a bean-chosen pilot,” i.e., a pilot chosen by lot. Observe the employment here of the perfect to denote continuance, so that κεχρησοαι has nearly the force of the Latin habere. (Kühner, § 399, Obs., 2, Jelf.)—μηθ αυλητη. Omitted by Kühner without remark.—μηθ έτρ έλλα τωιαντα. Kühner supplies κεχρησοαι κυαμευτω τινι.—υ πολλω ελαίττονας βλάδας, κ. τ. λ. “Which, when erred in, produce far less injury than those things erred in respecting the state,” i.e., which, when mismanaged, cause less injury than errors in the management of the state.—ἐφη. Referring to the κατηγορος.—της καθεστώσις πολιτειας. “The established form of government.”—βιαίονς. “Violent,” i.e., lawless.

§ 10.

tως φρόνησιν ἀσκοῦντας. “That they who cultivate the intellect.” We have followed here the explanation of Kühner: “eos, qui animi cultui operam dant.”—ικανοίς έσσεσθαι. “That they will be able eventually.” The future is here very elegantly employed to indicate a matter that will take place on certain conditions, that is, if time and circumstance permit. Compare the explanation of Kühner: “si temporā vel res ita ferant futuros esse.” Schneider and Dindorf read ειναι.—πρόσεειαν. “Are always attached,” i.e., always accompany.—ταυτά γίνονται. “The same results are produced,” i.e., are gained.—οι μέν γαρ βιασθέντες, κ. τ. λ. “For they who have been forced by compulsion, hate as if they had been robbed, whereas, they who have been led by persuasion, love as if grateful for services received.” Literally, “love as if affected by favors (received).” Observe that βιασθέντες is here taken in a passive sense. Deponent verbs which have the aorist as well of the passive as the middle form, employ the passive aorist generally, though not always, in a passive signification. In βιάζομαι, however, this distinction regularly obtains. Thus, ἐλιασάμην is coegi, but ἐλιάσθην, coactus sum. (Kühner, § 368, b. Jelf.)—κεχαρισμένοι. In a passive sense. Compare Herod., viii., 5: τοις Εὐδικεσσι ἐκεχαριστο. “It was done to please the Euboeans.”

οὗκ οὖν τὸν φρόνησιν, κ. τ. λ. “To employ violence, therefore, is not the part,” &c. It is generally laid down that οὗκονν means “not therefore,” and οὗκονν “therefore,” the accent being placed over that part of the word the sense of which prevails; more accurately, perhaps, when the meaning is “not therefore,” we should write οὗκ οὖν separately. (Kühner, § 791, Obs., Jelf.)—ιαχυν άνευ γυμνης. “Brute force without intellect.”—τα τοιαυτα πράττειν. This is the reading ο̣ all the MSS. and old editions. Bornemann gives το του-
\[ \text{NOTES TO BOOK I.—CHAPTER II.} \]

\[ \text{\textit{adj} \textit{prάττειν}, from a conjecture of Schläfer's (\textit{ad} Dion. Hal., p. 111) but in his note proposes \textit{τौ τύ τοιαδύτα prάττειν}. Kühner, however, successfully defends the ordinary reading.} \]

\[ \text{\textsection 11.} \]

\[ \text{\textit{άλλὰ μὴν καὶ συμμάχων, k. t. \textit{λ.}}} \text{ “But, in very truth, the man that dares to employ open force would need allies not a few.” With regard to \textit{άλλὰ μὴν}, consult notes on i., 1, 6.—\textit{οὐδένως}. “Not a single one.” The full construction would be \textit{οὐδένως συμμάχων δέοιτ᾽ \textit{άν}.—καὶ γὰρ μὸνος ἥγοιτ᾽ \textit{άν}, k. t. \textit{λ.} “For he would think himself, even though unaided, able to persuade.” More literally, “even though all alone.” Observe the construction of the nominative with the infinitive, the reference being to the same person that forms the subject of the verb. Observe also the force of \textit{καὶ} in connection with \textit{μὸνος}.—\textit{Καὶ φονεύειν δὲ τοῖς τοιοῦτοῖς, k. t. \textit{λ.} “Moreover, at least of all accords with the character of such persons as these to slay a man.”—\textit{ἡ ζωντι πειθομένῳ χρήσθαι. “Than to have him living and voluntarily obedient.” Literally, “than to use him a living persuaded one.”} \]

\[ \text{\textsection 12, 13.} \]

\[ \text{\textit{άλλ᾽ ἔφη γε ὃ κατῆγορός. “But, said the accuser in particular.” The force of \textit{γε} here must be noted, and the idea intended to be conveyed may be stated thus: “What you say is well enough on general grounds; I will mention, however, a particular instance, as regards two of the followers of Socrates, which will show how inapplicable your remarks are to the ease of that philosopher.”—\textit{ομηλητὰ γενομένω. “After having been intimate companions,” i. e., intimate as followers. Observe the employment of the dual to give more precision to the sense. ‘Ομηλητά is the nominative dual of \textit{ομηλητής}.} \]

\[ \text{\textit{Kριτίας. Critias, the son of Callæschrus, was a follower of Socrates, by whose instructions he profited but little in a moral point of view, and, together with Alcibiades, gave a color by his life to the charge against the philosopher of corrupting the youth of the day. He became eventually one of the thirty tyrants, and was conspicuous above all his colleagues for rapacity and cruelty. He was slain at the battle of Munychia, fighting against Thrasybulus and the exiles. He is said to have been a vigorous speaker (\textit{Cic., de Orat.}, ii., 22), and he composed, also, some elegies and dramatic pieces. In philosophy he was but a dabbler and dilettante. (\textit{Smith, Dict. Biogr.}, s. v.)—\textquoteleft \textit{Alκιβιάδης. Alcibiades was the son of Clinias, and nephew}} \]
of Pericles. He was remarkable for intelligence and sagacity as a statesman, and great ability as a commander, but was characterized by a total want of principle. In early life he was the favorite follower of Socrates, who saved his life at the battle of Potidaea.

πλείστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην. To do good or evil is expressed, in Greek, by τοιοῦτον and two accusatives, one of the person and another of the thing; or with an accusative of the person and εὖ of κακῶς. (Matthiae, § 415, a, b.)—ἐν τῇ διλεγαρχίᾳ. The allusion is to the government of the thirty tyrants, which the term διλεγαρχίᾳ is often employed in Xenophon to denote. (Sturtz, Lex. Xen., s. v.)—πλευγαίστατος. On this form of the superlative, consult Matthiae, § 129. Dindorf and Bornemann read here κλεπτιστάτος τε καὶ βιαστάτος καὶ φοινικώτατος ἐγένετο.—'Αλκιβιάδης δὲ αὖ. "While Alcibiades, on the other hand." From the notion of repetition and opposition implied in αὖ is derived its copulative force, whereby it can join together two clauses, and place them in opposition, like δέ. In this case it is usually strengthened, as here, by the addition of δέ. (Kühner, § 771, 2, Jelf.)—ιδριστότατος. On this form, consult the remarks of Lobeck, Paralip., p. 40, seq.—βιαιότατος. "Most reckless."

οὖκ ἀπολογήσομαι. "Will not make any defence for them."—τὴν δὲ πρὸς Σωκράτην, κ. τ. λ. "I will relate, however, the intercourse of both of them with Socrates, how it was." For ἡ ανωσσία αὐτοῖν ὡς ἐγένετο διεγήσομαι. An idiom of common occurrence.

§ 14.

ἐγενέσθην μὲν γάρ δὴ, κ. τ. λ. "Now these two men, indeed, were by nature," &c. The particle γάρ is here explanatory, while δὴ is to be connected, not with γάρ, but with what follows, and serves to add emphasis to this. (Compare Hartung, i., p. 287.)—δομαστοῦτω πάνων. "Most celebrated of all."—'Ἡδεσαν, i. e., ἱδεσαν.—ἀπ' ἐλαχίστων μὲν χρημάτων, κ. τ. λ. "As one living most contentedly on the most trifling means," i. e., they knew that he lived, &c. Observe the participial construction here after a verb signifying "to know," where in Latin we would have the accusative with the infinitive. (Matthiae, § 548, 2.) The preposition ἀπὸ, moreover, is often employed with its case to denote the means or instrument by which any thing is effected. (Kühner, § 620, Jelf.)—ἐντα. "As being."—τοῖς δὲ διαλεγομένοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι, κ. τ. λ. "And as swaying, in the discourses (which took place), all those who held converse with him, (exactly) as he would," i. e., as swaying at pleasure, &c. This is well explained by the following passage from the Laches of
Plato (187, E.): οὐ μοι δοκεῖς εἰδέναι ὅτι, δὲ ἂν ἐγγυτάτω Σωκράτους ὑ λόγω, καὶ πλησιάζῃς διαλέγόμενος, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, ἵνα ἄρα καὶ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ πρότερον ἀρξηται διαλέγεται, μὴ παύσασθαι ὑπὸ τοῦτον περιαγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, πρὶν ἂν ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγου, κ. τ. λ.

§ 15.

ὅρωντε. It is neater to make ὅρωντε and ὄντε nominatives absolute, the construction changing in the accusative αὐτῷ before ὅρωντε, than to construe them as accusatives after αὐτῷ and agreeing with it.—ὅντε οἰω προεληφθον. "Being such as they have before this been said to be."—πότερον τις αὐτῷ φη. The subjunctive here stands alone and independent, in a question implying doubt, and thus forms what is technically termed the deliberative subjunctive. (Matthiae, § 515, 2. Kühner, § 417, Jelf.)—τοῦ βίου τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπιθυμήσαντε. "Because they desired (to lead) the life of Socrates." Literally, "having become desirous of the life of Socrates." The participle is here employed to denote the cause or reason. (Kühner, § 697, a., Jelf.)—καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης. "And (to possess) the self-control." Literally, "and of the self-control." With regard to the Socratic σωφροσύνη, compare iv., 3, 1.—ὅρωντε αὐτῷ τῆς ὅμιλας αὐτόν. "Were eager for his intimacy." The verb ὥρων, in the middle voice, means properly "to stretch one's self out after a thing," "to desire a thing with outstretched hands," and is construed with a genitive of the object desired. (Matthiae, § 350.) Compare § 16: Σωκράτους ὅρεξθήτην.—νομίσαντε. "Because they thought." Compare note on ἐπιθυμήσαντε, above.

§ 16.

ὅς οὖσί διδόντος αὐτῶν. "That, if the deity had granted unto them both." Literally, "the deity giving unto them two."—ἐλέσθαι ἄν αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ. "They two would, without any hesitation, have chosen rather to die." Observe the force of the aorist here in denoting rapidity of determination, and the absence of all hesitation. —ὅλω δὲ ἐγενέσθην, κ. τ. λ. "Now they both became manifest (in this respect) from the things which they (subsequently) did," i. e., now this was rendered manifest by their subsequent conduct; they proved the truth of this remark by the acts which they subsequently perpetrated. Compare, as regards the construction of ὅλω here, the notes on i., 1, 2, υόν τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν.—ὅς τἄχιστα. "As soon as."—τῶν συγγενομένων. Their fellow-disciples are meant.—ἀποτελήσαντε. "Having bounded away from." A strong expression in place of ἀποφαίτησαν. Jacobs (Socr., p. 19) compares Phi-

§ 17.

τὰ πολιτικά. "The science of public life." Literally, "the things appertaining to the state or government."—σωφρονείν. "To practice self-restraint."—οὐκ ἀντιλέγω. "Make no reply at present." This accusation Xenophon does not now answer. It is fully met, however, in book iv., 3, 1.—ὁρῶ δὲ. "I see, however."—αὐτούς. In the old editions αὐτοῖς, which is far inferior.—ἡπερ αὐτὸ τοιου- σίν. "In what way they themselves practice."—τῷ λόγῳ προσβιβάζοντας. "Bringing them over (to the same line of conduct) by their arguments," i. e., training them up to similar conduct by arguments. The common editions have προσβιβάζοντας. Our present reading is Schneider's emendation, from some of the MSS. The idea implied is a leading toward the things that are taught.

§ 18.

ολὰ δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην, κ. τ. λ. "I know, too, of Socrates also showing himself unto those who associated with him as being," &c. Observe the force of καὶ, the idea being, "As I know this of other teachers, so also do I know it of Socrates;" and hence καὶ has here a force very like that of "accordingly."—δεικνύοντα . . . διαλέγομε- νου. These are both imperfect participles, and have reference to an oft-repeated action. As regards the participial construction here, consult notes on § 14.—ολὰ δὲ κύκεινα σωφρονοῦντε, κ. τ. λ. "I know, too, of those two men also practicing self-control as long as they associated with Socrates."—εξε. Not εξε τε, since it stands for εξ εῖτε, Dorice ἐξετε.—φιλοσοφεῖν . . . . . οἰομένω. "Because they feared . . . . . because they thought."

§ 19.

τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφείν. "Of those who say that they are philosophers." He appears to allude to the Sophists.—ἐθριεσθής. "Licentious." This meaning is here deduced from τις being placed in direct opposition to the idea implied by σωφρον.—οὐδὲ ἄλλο νῦνε, κ. τ. λ. "Nor could he, who had once become acquainted with it, ever become ignorant of any other one of those things of which there is a learning," i. e., which are capable of being acquired from the teaching of others. Observe that ἄλλο νῦνε depends on ἄν-
"Even though they be."—ως την μὲν τῶν χρηστῶν, κ. τ. λ. "Because (as they are convinced) their intercourse with the virtuous is a practice of virtue, whereas that with the bad is a destruction (of the same)." Observe here the employment of the accusative absolute with ως. This particle is joined to the simple participle, or the genitive or accusative absolute, when we assign or suggest some reason, in the mind of another person, why he does a certain thing. (Bullmann, § 145, note 5, Rob.)—εὐθλόν μὲν γάρ, κ. τ. λ. This distich is taken from Theognis (v. 35, 36). Socrates appears to have been fond of quoting it. Compare Xen., Conviv., ii., 4. Plat., Men., 95, D. The first line of the couplet is a hexameter, the second a pentameter.— diá. Observe the anastrophe.— οὐδὲ οὐ. You will learn." Literally, "you will cause yourself to be taught." Observe the force of the middle.—αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸν ἐντά νόον. "You will destroy even the intellect you have."—καὶ ὁ λέγων. The author of the hexameter, which follows after this, is unknown.—αὐτάρ ἄνηρ ἄγαθός, κ. τ. λ. "The good man, however, is at one time erring, at another time excellent." The object of this last quotation is to show the necessity of the constant and unremitting exercise of virtue, since even the good man, if he neglect this for a moment, is liable to be surprised by his intrusions of vice.

§ 21.

κάγω δὲ. Compare i., 1, 3.—ὁρῶ γάρ, ἡσπερ, κ. τ. λ. Compare notes on § 19.—τῶν ἐν μέτοχοι πεποιημένων ἐπί τον, κ. τ. λ. "That they
who do not keep up their practice, forget the metrical composition of verses." Literally, "forget verses composed in accordance with (regular) metre."—τῶν διδασκαλικῶν λόγων. "Of the precepts of instruction." The genitive here depends on λήθην, and ἀμελεύσια governs αὐτῶν understood.—τῶν νοθετικῶν λόγων. "The words of admonition."—ἐπιλέλεσται καὶ ὁ, κ. τ. λ. "He forgets, also, (those emotions) under the influence of which the soul became desirous of moderation." Literally, "which the soul suffering," i. e., by which being affected. Observe that ὁ is by attraction for ἂ, the regular construction being επιλέλεσται καὶ τούτων ἂ, κ. τ. λ.

§ 22.

τοῖς προατέντας. "That those who are led on."—τοῖς εἰς ἐρωτας ἐγκυκλισθέντας. "Those who are involved in love-affairs." The common text has ἐκκυκλισθέντας, "plunged headlong," but MS. authority is in favor of the former.—τῶν δεότων. "Of the things that ought to be done," i. e., their necessary duties.—ἐρασθένες. "On having become enamored of it." The prose writers employ the passive aorist ἔρασθην, of ἔρω, exactly in an active signification.—καταναλώσαντες. "After having spent." The participle is used to express the time which is defined by some action or state. (Kühner, § 696, Jelch.)—κερδών. "Sources of gain."—αἰσχρὰ νομίζοντες εἶναι. "Because they thought that these were disgraceful." Another instance of the employment of the participle to assign a reason.

§ 23.

πῶς οὖν οἶκ ενδέχεται. "How, then, is it not possible."—ἀσκητα ἐστὶ. "Are attainable by exercise." Observe that ἀσκήτας, in this sense, is opposed to διδακτός. Weiske reads ἀσκητεία, which Schneider and Kühner very properly condemn. We must first ascertain that a thing is attainable by exercise, before we say that it ought to be made a subject of exercise.—οὐχ ἥκιστα δέ. "And not least," i. e., and especially.—ἐν τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ σώματι, κ. τ. λ. "For voluptuous pleasures, implanted in the same body with the soul." Observe here the employment of ἠδοναί, like voluptates in Latin, to denote the desires of pleasure.

§ 24.

καὶ Κριτίας δή καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης. "Both Critias, accordingly, and Alcibiades." The particle δή is often thus employed in resuming an interrupted discourse; and hence Kühner paraphrases it here-
by jam, ut rem paucis complectar.—συμμάχω. "As an ally."—ιτεινως η' ύπαλλαγέντε. "But when they had departed from him." Observe here the anomalous construction of the participles in the nominative dual, as indicating the whole, while the two subjects follow separately, each with its own adjuncts and verb. Grammarians explain this by the figure called το σχήμα καθ' άλον και μέρος. (Kühner, § 478, § 708, 2, Jel.f.)—φυγὼν εἰς Θεσσαλίαν. This was in B.C. 406 probably (the year in which the generals who had conquered at the Arginusæ were put to death), for we find him at that time in Thessaly, fomenting a sedition of the Peloponnesians, or serfs, against their lords. According to Xenophon, in his Grecian History (ii., 3, 15, 36), he had been banished by a decree of the people, and this it was which afterward made him so rancorous in his tyranny, when one of the thirty, in B.C. 404.—ώνομιρ μάλλον ή δικαιοσύνη χρωμέναις. "Living in lawlessness rather than just-dealing." Literally, "making use of lawlessness;" &c. The Thessalians were proverbial for their licentiousness, perfidy, and treachery. Compare Plato, Crit., 53, D.

'Αλκibiάδης η' αὖ. "But Alcibiades, on the other hand." Compare § 12.—διὰ μὲν κάλλος. Alcibiades was remarkable at every period of his life for the extraordinary beauty of his person.—υπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν. "By many and respectable females." The Greeks regularly join πολίτες with another adjective, expressing praise or blame. (Matthews, § 444.)—υπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δινατῶν κολακών, κ. τ. λ. "Being corrupted by many men, and these skilful in flattery," i. e., by the arts of many adroit and skillful flatterers. We have given δινατῶν κολακών its natural signification here, with Jacobs (Socri., p. 23). Compare iv., 2, 6, where ὃ τι ὃν βούλωντας δινατοὶ γενέσθαι is made to correspond in meaning to ἰκανοὶ γενέσθαι πειρώντας. Kühner is clearly wrong when he makes δινατῶν κολακών refer here to those whose flattery had weight with Alcibiades; on the contrary, δινατῶν is precisely equivalent to δέινων. Compare Schneider, ad loc., and Fischer, Ind. ad Theophrast. Charact., 3. τ. δινατος διακονηθα.—τῶν γυμνων ὑγώνοι. "In the gymnastic contests."—οὕτω κάκεινος, κ. τ. λ. The demonstrative pronoun is often repeated, for the sake of emphasis, in the second member of a comparison. (Kühner, § 658, Jel.f.)

§ 25.

стр. 171. — кай гегουντε. "Ан having also been." — ἀπὸ Συκράτους. Börnemann writes ἀπο, as if put for ἄπωθεν; but consult Kühner, ad loc.

§ 26.

εἴτα. Expressive here, as often elsewhere, of mingled surprise and indignation.—εἰ μὲν τι ἐπλημμελησατην. "If they two did any thing wrong," i. e., were guilty of any outrage. The verb πλημμελησατην means, properly, "to make a false note in music," and hence "to err," "to do wrong," &c.—ὅτι δὲ νέω δύνε αὐτῷ. "But because Socrates rendered them both discreet when they were young," &c. Observe that παρέσχε (literally "afforded") is here nearly equivalent to έθηκε, or the Latin reddidit.

§ 27.

οὐ μὴν τὰ γε ἄλλα οὕτω κρίνεται. "The other things (in life surely are not judged of in this way." Observe the strong and in dignant affirmation expressed by the particle μήν.—τίς δὲ κιθαριστής. Render δὲ in this clause "too," and in the succeeding one "or."— ἵκανοις. "Proficients."—φανῶσιν. "They appear."—αἵτιν ἦσε τρύτου. "Has blame for this."—συγνιατρίβων τῷ. "On passing his time with any one," i. e., with any instructor. Observe that τῷ is the Attic contracted form for τῶι. With συγνιατρίβων we may under stand χρώνον. (Bos, Ellips., ed. Sch., p. 550.)—συγγενόμενος. "On having been with."—τὸν πρῶσθεν. "The former," i. e., the master who taught him previously.—ἄλλον ὀνη διο γν, κ. τ. λ. "But does not, by how much the worse he may appear with the latter, by so much the more praise the previous one?"—ἄλλον οὗ γε πατέρες αὐτοῖ, κ. τ. λ. "Nay, even those fathers themselves who are always with their sons," i. e., who take charge themselves of the education of their sons. Compare Heinze, "die Väter, die ihre Söhne selbst erziehen," and also Sturz, Lex. Xen., s. v., "Nullo alio magistro adhibito." Commentators, in general, make this clause refer merely to fathers as being so much more in company with, and connected by so much closer a tie with their sons, than mere instructors are. But they overlook in this the peculiar force of the article with the participle. The argument is as follows: if even those fathers who educate their own sons, and between whom and their children there is, therefore, the closest connection, are not blamed if those children subsequently err, provided they themselves be sober-minded, why blame an instructor, between whom and his pupil the connexion is so much less intimate?
§ 28.

οὕρω δὲ. "In this same way, too."—ἐι μὲν αὐτὸς ἐποιεῖ, κ. τ. λ. "If he himself were accustomed to do any thing evil, he would naturally have appeared on all such occasions to be an evil man." Observe the employment of the imperfect to denote the repetition of an action, and also the peculiar arrangement of the protasis and apodosis to express impossibility or disbelief, that is, ἐι with the imperfect in the former, and ἄν with the same tense in the latter; so that it is necessarily implied, "but he was not accustomed to do any thing evil." (Bullmann, § 139, 9, 4, Rob.)—ἐι δ’ αὐτὸς σωφρόνων διετέλει. "If, however, he himself was always practicing self-control." Here we have ἐι with the indicative, in the protasis, to indicate a condition that is certain, followed by ἄν with the optative in the apodosis, to mark a result as utterly uncertain. (Kühner p 853, Jelf.)

§ 29.

ἄλλα ἐι καὶ, κ. τ. λ. "But if, even though doing nothing evil himself," &c. This period forms part of the previous section in the old editions.—Κριτίαν μέν. The particle μέν is added, because Xenophon had intended to mention Alcibiades also; and the particle τοῖνν is here, as often elsewhere, used to mark a transition to the example or instance which the writer is proceeding to adduce. (Hartung, ii., p. 348, seq.)—Εὐθυδήμου. This was Euthydemus, surnamed ὁ καλός, the son of Diocles. (Compare Plato, Sympos., § 37.) Mention is again made of him in iv., 2, 1; nor does he appear different from the one who is spoken of in the third and fifth chapters of the same book. He must not be confounded, however, with Euthydemus, the brother of Dionysodorus mentioned in iii., 1, 1. —ἀπέτρεπε λέγων. "He endeavored to dissuade him by saying." Literally, "endeavored to turn him away," i. e., from his object. Observe the force of the imperfect.

§ 30.

tοὐ δὲ Κριτίου, κ. τ. λ. "But he, Critias, not hearkening to such admonitions as these." Supply νοὐθετήμασι, or something equivalent. Observe, moreover, the presence of the article with the proper name, for the purpose of making the opposition a stronger one.—καὶ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου. "And, in particular, Euthydemus." The conjunction καὶ has here an increasive or emphatic force. (Kühner, § 759, Jelf.)—ὕικον πάσχειν. "To be swinishly affected." One MS. gives τι βοσκό υἱκόω, which some few editions, without any necessity,
adopt. Consult Fritzsch, Quast. Lucian., p. 92, seq., who shows that τε is often thus omitted.—δοκοιν. The optative in the oratia obliqua, as indicating the sentiments of the speaker.

§ 31.

ἐξ ὧν δὴ. "On account of which same things." The particle δὴ is here appended, to add explicitness to the relative.—δὲ τῶν τρι-άκουντα ὧν, κ. τ. λ. "When, being one of the thirty, he had become nomothete along with Charicles." Under the regular constitution of Athens, the νομοθέται were a legislative committee, who inquired into the defects of the existing code, and the alterations proposed thereeto, and who also examined into every bill before it became a law. When the thirty tyrants subsequently came into power, it was by virtue of a regulation, which ordained that the supreme power should for the present be lodged with thirty persons, who should be authorized to draw up a new code of laws. (Xen., Hist. Gr., ii., 3, 2.) Strictly speaking, therefore, the thirty tyrants were all νομοθέται, but the legislative power, or, in other words, the chief authority, soon centered in Critias, next in power to whom was Charicles, and hence these two are alone mentioned here. Jacobs regards ὧν ἐγένετο as equivalent here to ἡν, and refers to Mutthia, § 559; but this is quite unnecessary.

ἀπεμνήμονεσεν αὐτῷ. "He bore it in mind against him." Observe that ἀπομνήμονεσεν τινὶ τι is, "to bear a thing in mind for one," either for good or for evil, and hence is said both of a person intending to do a kindness, and of one determined to do an injury. The latter meaning prevails here.—λόγων τέχνην. "The art of disputation." This does not mean rhetoric merely, but the art of disputing on all questions, public or private, which had reference to philosophy or general literature. Hence, as Socrates alone is not meant, but all philosophers of this class generally, the article is omitted. The law here referred to was abrogated on the expulsion of the thirty.—μὴ διδάσκειν. "That no one teach."

ἐπηρεάζων ἐκεῖνῳ. "Seeking to cast contumely upon him." Compare the explanation of Morus (ad Isocr., Paneg., 31, p. 62): "insolenter cùm tractare cupiens." On the general meaning of ἐπηρεάζω, consult Wasse, ad Thucyd., i., 26, and Schleusner, Lex. N. T., s. v.—καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ὅπη ἐπιλάβοιτο. "And not having where he might take held of him," i. e., and having no pretext for seizing him.—τὸ κοινῷ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, κ. τ. λ. "The taunt uttered in common by the multitude against the philosophers," i. e., uttered against all philosophers. The taunt here referred to was their making the worse
appear the better side, or, in other words, black appear white. (Stallb. ad Plat., Apol., 18, B.; Aristoph., Nub., 95, seqq.) The charge, however, was only just against the Sophists. (Compare Wiggers' Life of Socrates, p. 418 of this volume.)—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγεν, οὐτε αὐτός, κ. τ. λ. "For neither did I, for my part, either myself ever hear this from Socrates, or learn it from another, who said that he had heard it (from him)," i. e., for neither did I, &c., ever hear Socrates himself profess to teach the art of disputation, &c. The common text has οὐτε γὰρ, which Bornemann adopts; but the true form is οὐδὲ γὰρ, which corresponds, in negative propositions, to καὶ γὰρ in affirmative ones.

§ 32.

ἐδήλωσε δὲ. "But it soon appeared evident (that Socrates was the person aimed at)." Observe here the force of the aorist in denoting quickness of result; and, moreover, that ἐδήλωσε itself is taken in an intransitive sense, as equivalent to δῆλον ἐγένετο. (Compare Matthia, § 360, 2, and Kühner, § 373, 1, Jelf.) Lange, with less correctness, makes ἐδήλωσε transitive, and refers it to Critias.—καὶ οὐ τοὺς χειρίστον με. "And these not the worst," i. e., not persons of the lowest or common stamp. A litotes, for "persons of high standing." Compare Seneca, de Tranq. An., c. 3: "Triginta tyranni mille trecentos cives, optimum quemque, occiderant." The persons who were now singled out for destruction were men of unblemished character, without any strong political bias, who had gained the confidence of the people by their merits or services, and might be suspected of preferring a popular government to the oligarchy under which they were living. (Thirlwall, iv., p. 184.)—πολλοὶς δὲ προτρέποντο ἀδικεῖν. "And impelled many to be guilty of injustice." Observe here the employment of the middle in an apparently active sense, but in reality with a full middle force, "impelled for themselves," i. e., to gratify their own base views, by making others accomplices in their wickedness. An illustration of the text is afforded by Plato, Apol., 32, C., where Socrates tells the story of his having been ordered by the thirty, along with four others, to bring Leon of Salamis to Athens. "That government," he adds, "though it was so powerful, did not frighten me into doing any thing unjust; but, when we came out of the Tholos, the four went to Salamis and took Leon, but I went away home."

εἰπέ τε πεύ. "Casually observed."—δοκοῖν. The optative again, as expressing the sentiments of the speaker.—νομεύσ. "A keeper."—μὴ ἐμολογοῖν εἶναι. "Would not confess that he was." The
optative is here employed because the case adduced is a mere sup-
position; but in αἰσχύνεται, farther on, the indicative is used, be-
cause there Socrates refers to what is passing under his own eyes.
(Kühner, ad loc.)—μὴ αἰσχύνεται, μὴ οἴεται. The common text has
μὴ αἰσχύνετο, μὴ οἴετο; but the optative is wrong, for the reason
just stated. (Compare Kühner, § 855, Jelf.)

§ 33.

καλέσαντες ... ἐξεικύνησιν. A plural participle with a dual verb.
(Kühner, § 387, Jelf.)—ἐπευπέτησιν μὴ διαλέγεσθαι. “Forbade him to
hold any converse.” With verbs of prohibition as well as those of
denial, preventing, &c., the infinitive is used with μὴ. This is not
a pleonasm, but the negative notion of the verb is increased thereby.
(Kühner, § 749, 1, Jelf. Compare Hermann ad Vig., § 271, p. 811.)
—πωθόθεσθαι. “To ask a question,” i.e., to ask for information.
We have here a specimen of the Socratic elpæveia, to which that
philosopher was accustomed to have recourse, whenever he had to
deal with those who were puffed up with erroneous ideas of their
own consequence or wisdom. (Compare Wiggers’ Life of Socrates,
p. 388 of this volume.)—εἰ τι ἀγνοῖτο τῶν προαγορευμένων. “In
case any one of the things proclaimed (by them) should not be clear
(to him),” i.e., any one of their enactments.—τῶ δ’ ἐφύτησιν. “And
they said (that it was allowed),” i.e., that he might. Observe that
ἐφύτησιν is equivalent here to ἐξειλαῖ ἐλεξαν. (Jacobs, ad loc.)

§ 34.

ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἔφη, κ. τ. λ. “Well, then, said he, I am prepared,”
&c. Observe that τοίνυν is a particle of transition, and is often
used in answers, especially when one replies promptly to the dis-
course of another. (Compare Hartung, p. 350, 3.)—διὸς δὲ μὴ δὲ
ἀγνοοῖ ἐλάβω, κ. τ. λ. “But, in order that I may not in any respect
unconsciously transgress them through ignorance.” The verb λαν-
τᾶω is construed with a participle, which participle may be trans-
lated as a verb, and the verb as an adverb, in the signification of
the Latin clam. (Kühner, § 694, Jelf.)—πότερον τιν τῶν λόγων τέχ-
nυν, κ. τ. λ. “Whether considering the art of disputation to be
auxiliary to those things that are rightly said, or to those that are
not rightly (said), you order me to refrain from it,” i.e., whether
you order me to refrain from the art of disputation because you con-
consider it to be auxiliary to reasoning rightly or not rightly. Observe
that σὺν τινὶ εἶλαι signifies “to be auxiliary to” “to assist any
thing.” (Kühner, § 623, Jelf.)
δῆλον ὅτι.. Examples are extremely rare of a present tense (δῆλον ἐστι), followed by ὅτι and an optative (ἀφεκτέον εἰη) in place of an indicative. The true employment of the optative is when the words of another are given in past time or in the oratio obliqua. (Compare Kühner, ad loc.)—δῆλον ὅτι πειρατέον ὑμιῶς λέγειν. The meaning of the whole passage is given as follows by Kühner: "You interdict the art of speaking. The question then presents itself, whether you mean the art of speaking rightly or not rightly. If you interdict the art of speaking rightly, such as I practice, then one must abstain from speaking rightly, which is absurd. If, on the other hand, you interdict the art of not speaking rightly, such as the Sophists practice, we must strive to speak rightly, and, consequently, my mode of speaking, which teaches how to speak rightly, must be approved of; for it can not be imagined that you interdict the art of speaking both rightly and not rightly. Your interdict, therefore, can have no reference to me, who teach to those who associate with me the art of speaking rightly."

§ 35.

ἐπειδὴ. The common text has ἐπειδᾶν, but the indicative ἐγνοεῖς with ἐπειδᾶν would be solecistic. (Compare Matthiae, § 521, Obs. 1.)—τώδε σοι εἰμιθέατερα, κ. τ. λ. "We proclaim the following things unto you as being more easy to understand: not to converse with the young at all," i.e., we give you now an order more easy to understand, &c. Compare iv., 4, 3, where it is stated that Socrates paid no obedience to this order.—ὡς ἄλλο τι ποιῶ, κ. τ. λ. "As I may do something else than the things which have been ordered." We have given ὡς here the force of a comparative conjunction, with Kühner, making it equivalent to the German wie, "as." Jacobs, however, explains it by ὡς τε μὲ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν, and Sauppe by "adeo ut faciam."—μέχρι πόσων ἐτῶν. "To what number of years," i.e., until what age. Compare the Latin "intra quot annos."—διὸκε περ, εἰπὲ, χρόνου, κ. τ. λ. "For even as long a time, replied he, as it is not permitted one to be a senator." Citizens could not be elected to the office of senator until they were thirty years old. Observe here the employment of the genitive of time. A space of time is put in the genitive, when it is regarded as the necessary condition of the notion of the verb. (Kühner, § 523, Jels.)—νεντεροῖς πριὼκουτα ἐτῶν "With persons younger than thirty years."

§ 36.

ἂν τι ἀνώμαυ. "If I am inclined to buy any thing," Observe the conditional ἂν beginning, as usual, a clause—ἦν πωλῇ. The
condi<>'enal ᾗv appears here again under the form ᾗv, which is more usual with the Attic writers, except Plato, and is always employed by the tragedians. (Ellendt, Lex. Soph., s. v.) Schneider, offended at the employment here of the two forms of this particle so near each other, proposes to read kai for ᾗv, unless ᾗv be referred to time, and ᾗv be taken as implying a condition. There is no need, however, of any change. Compare Kühner, ad loc.; and observe, also, that πωλη in this clause, and πωλει in the succeeding one, denote willingness to sell.—ναί τά γε τοιαύτα. “Yes, such things as these (you may ask about).”—علامα τοι σύ γε, κ. τ. λ. “But, in very truth, you yourself are accustomed, although knowing how they are constituted, to ask questions respecting the most of them.” This seems to have reference to Socrates’ method of disputation, that is, of interrogating his hearers, and appearing to instruct himself, rather than pretending to instruct others; in other words, of calling forth ideas rather than communicating them. (Compare Wiggers’ Life of Socrates, p. 390 of this volume.)—ἐώς εἰδώ, ἀλώ. “If I know, for example.” Compare, as regards the force of ἀλώ here, Viger, iii., 9, 12.

§ 37.

τῶνδε ἀπέχεσθαι, τῶν σκυτέων, κ. τ. λ. “To refrain from those people, the leather-dressers, namely, and carpenters, and smiths.” Observe here, in τῶνδε, what is called the prospective use of the demonstrative pronoun, that is, it directs the reader’s attention to some substantive or substantives that are to follow, and serves to prepare the way for them. (Kühner, § 657, Jelf.) In his disputation, Socrates was wont to derive illustrations for his statements from common life, from fullers, leather-dressers, cobblers, &c., and was often accustomed, moreover, to engage in converse with this very class of persons. The Sophists pursued a directly contrary method, being fond of expressing themselves in dazzling theses and antitheses, and frequently ridiculed what they considered the philosopher’s vulgar taste in this respect. (Compare Plat., Symp., 221, E.; Gorg., 491, A.)—καὶ γὰρ οἱμαί αὐτοῦς, κ. τ. λ. “And with good reason, for I think that they are, by this time, quite worn out, being continually had in your mouth,” i. e., that they are talked def by your loquacity. Properly speaking, the illustrations ought to be said to be worn threadbare; here, however, the persons themselves who afforded them are said to be worn out, by a half-sneering, half-jocular form of expression.

οὐκοῦν, ἔφι ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων τούτως “(Will it be
incumbent on me), then, said Socrates, (to refrain) also from the things that follow these (examples),” i. e., to refrain from all reasonings which follow from these illustrations, namely, on justice, &c.—τῶν άλλων τῶν τοιοτῶν. After τὰ άλλα, or οἱ άλλοι, the article is often repeated. The common text has τῶν άλλων τῶν δικαίων, which Schütz interprets “de iis, quae justis sunt opposita;” but the true reading is τοιοτῶν, the reference being to the other virtues, namely, wisdom, temperance, fortitude, &c.—καὶ τῶν βουκόλων ἃς. “And in particular from herdsmen.” Compare § 32, in explanation of this allusion.—ὅπως μὴ ποιήσῃς. So in all the MSS. and printed editions. This is one of the many passages which are cited against Dawes’ canon, “that the particles ὅπως μὴ are not joined with the 1st aor. subjunctive active or middle, but that in place thereof the future indicative is used.” As this canon rests on no grammatical or logical grounds, so it is shaken by the fact that in many passages, by the agreement of the MSS., ὅπως is joined with the 1st aor. subj. active; for, since a change of ΗΙ into ΕΙ, and of Ω into Ο, is all that is required to make the 1st aor. subj. a future indicative, great opportunities were thereby opened to the inaccuracy of transcribers. (Käh- ner, § 812, 1, Jelf.)—ἐλάττους τὰς βο̂δες. Some think this refers to an Athenian coin, having on it the figure of an ox, as if Charicles had threatened Socrates with a fine. (Compare Rasche, Lex. R. N., i., col. 1587.) Others translate βο̂δες “cattle,” supposing that Socrates is here threatened with death. This is certainly the better view of the subject. Compare § 32.

§ 38, 39.

τοῦ περὶ τῶν βο̂ων λόγου. “His remark respecting the cattle,” i. e., the simile he had uttered respecting them. Compare § 32.—ολα μὲν οὐν ἡ συνονοια, κ. τ. λ. “Of what nature, then, was the intercourse of Critias with Socrates,” &c.—σαίην δ’ ἄν ἤγωγε, κ. τ. λ. “I indeed, for my part, would say, that no one ever derived any instruction from a person that did not please him,” i. e., any thing that exercised a lasting effect on his subsequent conduct.—οὐκ ἀρτέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους ὑμιλησάτην. “Did not, because Socrates pleased them, associate (with him).”—εἶθεὶς ἐξ ἀρχῆς. The same with the Latin “statim ab initio.”—οὐκ ἄλλως τοις μᾶλλον, κ. τ. λ. “They strove to hold discussions with none others but those most versed in state affairs.” Literally, “with not any others rather than with those,” &c. As regards the expression πράττονσι τὰ πολιτικά, compare i., 6, 15
πρὶν εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν εἶναι  The conversation here detailed coincides  with the time of Plato's First Alcibiades. Compare chapter xli. of that dialogue.—Περικλεί, ἐπιτρόπω μὲν ὄντι οὖντος, κ. τ. λ. “Held a conversation such as this with Pericles, who was his guardian, and chief minister of the state, on the subject of law.” On the death of his father, Alcibiades was left to the guardianship of his relations, Pericles and Ariphron. Agariste, the mother of Pericles and Ariphron, was the daughter of Hippocrates, whose brother Cleisthenes was the grandfather of Deinomache, the mother of Alcibiades. (Herod., vi., 131. Isocrit., de Big., 10. Boëckh ad Pind., Pyth., vii., p. 302.) At the age of eighteen his minority ceased, and he entered upon the possession of his fortune.

φάναι. As the verb φημί has not the second aorist, the imperfect ἐφην is used in its stead, with the force of the aorist. In a continued narrative ἐφην, and, in the oblique structure, its infinitive φάναι, both with the power of an aorist, are often introduced parenthetically, the latter especially, like the English “said he.” (Kühner, § 263, 7, Jelf.)—πάντως ὄντως. “Certainly, I think (I could).” In the form ὄντως, both particles, ὄν and τως, preserve their natural force, the assertion implied by the former being blended with the doubt expressed by the latter, and hence the two combined are employed when one distrusts, or affects to distrust, his own opinion. So that here πάντως is qualified by ὄντως, in the sense of “I think,” “if I mistake not,” &c.—διδάσκων ὄν. “Teach me, then.” The particle ὄν is very frequently added to imperatives, in the sense of “now,” “then,” and indicates haste and impatience. (Kühner, § 721, 1, Jelf.)—νόμιμοι. “Observant of law.”—οἵμαι μὴ ἀν δικαίως, κ. τ. λ. “Think that one could not justly obtain this praise who knows not what law is.”

οὐδὲν τι χαλεποῦ πράγματος ἐπιθυμεῖς. “You desire nothing at all of a difficult matter,” i. e., no very difficult matter. Observe that οὐδὲν τι is equivalent to the Latin nihil quicquam. (Herbst, ad loc. Jacobs, ad Achill. Tat., p. 728.) On the construction of τι with οὐδὲν, consult Matthiae, § 487, 4.—βουλόμενος. “In wishing,” i. e., by your wish.—πάντες γὰρ οὖντο νόμοι εἰσίν. Attraction, for πάντα γὰρ ταυτά ἐστι νόμοι. So we have in § 43, ταύτα νόμος ἐστὶ.—συνελθὼν καὶ δοκιμώσαν, κ. τ. λ. “Having assembled and approved of, enact, de
claring thereby,” &c. Literally, “write down,” i. e., cause to be written down or enrolled. The middle voice (ἐγράφατο) would be more regular here, since γράφειν νόμον, in the active, is properly applied to those who propose or enact laws for others, not for themselves. Compare Sturz, Lex. Xen., s. v. γράφειν, i., 9. Observe moreover, the employment of the aorist here to denote what is customarily done, and which requires it to be rendered by a present.—πότερον ἄ: τάγαθα νομίσαι δειν ποιεῖν. “But whether (do they so enact), after having made up their minds that we ought to do the things that are good.” The common text has ἐνόμισαι, but the best editions now admit in place of it the elegant emendation of Reiske, namely, νομίσαιν. The participle apparently stands by itself, but the finite verb is, in reality, to be supplied from the previous sentence. For other instances of this construction, consult Matthiae, § 556, Obs. 1—δ μειράκιον. “My boy.”

§ 43.

ἀςπέρ ὅποιον. “As (happens) where.” Supply γίγνεται after ἀςπέρ.—ταῦτα τί ἵστων; “what are these (enactments)?”—δος ἄν τὸ κρατῶν, κ. τ. λ. “Whatsoever the controlling power of the state, after having deliberated, what it is incumbent to do,” i. e., what the several members of the state ought to do.—κρατῶν. “Ruling over.”—καὶ ταῦτα. “These things also,” i. e., these enactments.

§ 44.

ἀνομία. “Lawlessness.”—ἄρ’ ὁχὶ διαν. “Is it not when.”—ἄ κρατείτων ἥττω. “The stronger, . . . . the weaker.”—ἀνατίθεμαι γὰρ, κ. τ. λ. “For I retract (the assertion), that whatever things a tyrant prescribes, without having persuaded (the citizens), is a law.” Observe that the article τὸ belongs here to the whole phrase following after. Кühner, § 457, 1, Jelf.) The old editions less correctly have τοὶ in place of it. Observe, moreover, that ἀνατίθεμαι is a metaphor from the game of draughts, in which ἀναθείναι πεττόν signifies “to take up,” i. e., “to remove” or “withdraw a man,” and place it elsewhere. Compare ii., 4, 4, ane. iv., 2, 33. The verb μετατίθεσθαι occurs, in the same sense, in iv., 2, 18.

§ 45, 46.

κρατοῦντες. “By the strong hand.” Literally, “exercising authority.”—ἐλεῖ γράφον, εἰτε μή. “Whether making it the subject of a written enactment or not.” Supply γράφον in the second clause. —κρατοῦν τῶν τὰ χρήματα ἑξόντων. “Lording it over these having
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wealth,” 1. e., over the wealthy classes.—μάλα τοι. * Most assuredly.” The enclitic particle τοι lays a particular emphasis on the word to which it is attached. It is often equivalent to the Latin 

ulance, “truly,” “verily.” (Kühner, § 736, Jelf.) Coray changes the colon after Ἀλκιβιάδης into a comma, and connects μάλα τοι with δεινὸι; but, in the first place, μάλα τοι is naturally required as an answer to the question of Alcibiades, and, in the next, μάλα is too far removed from δεινὸι here to be neatly connected with it. (Kühner, ad loc.)—καὶ ἡμεῖς, τηλικοῦτοι, κ. τ. λ. “We also, when of your age, were skilled in such things as these,” 1. e., in the art of disputing on such topics as these; in investigating such matters as these. Many adjectives expressing ability, fitness, &c., are construed with an accusative, which, however, is sometimes more accurately defined by a preposition, ἐις, πρὸς, &c. (Kühner, § 579, 1, Jelf.) The expression καὶ ἡμεῖς is a modest use of the plural, conceding a participation in merit to his equals in age. Compare ii., 7, 1.—ἐμελετῶμεν καὶ ἐσοφίζομεθα. “We discussed and philosophized upon”—εἰδε σοι. If a wish relate to any thing past, the indicative aorist is used with εἰ γὰρ, or εἰδε, without ἄν. Compare Matthiae, § 513, Obs. 2.—οὕτε δεινότατος σαυτοῦ, κ. τ. λ. “When you surpassed yourself in these things.” The superlative is frequently accompanied, not by the genitive plural of a class of objects, but by the genitive of the reflective pronoun, by which, in this case, is expressed the highest degree to which a thing or person attains. (Matthiae, § 460.) Fritzsche proposes to read δεινότερος, “when you were more powerful in these studies than now.” (ad Aristoph., Thesmoph., 838.)

§ 47.

ἐπεί τοῖνυν τάξιστα, κ. τ. λ. “As soon, therefore, as they thought themselves to be superior to those who were at the head of public affairs,” 1. e., superior to the statesmen of the day. On this meaning of πολιτεύονται, consult Sturtz, Lex. Xen., s. v. The narrative now returns to Critias and Alcibiades, and the particle τοῖνυν is therefore employed, since it serves to resume an interrupted discourse. (Compare § 29.)—οὕτε γὰρ ἄυτος, κ. τ. λ. “For neither did he please them in other respects; and, in case they did approach him, they were chagrined at being reproved for the things in which they were accustomed to err,” 1. e., at being reproved for their errors and vicious conduct. The verb ἐλέγχω properly carries with it the idea of putting to shame, and hence of confuting, reproving, &c. Observe, moreover, that verbs which, like ἔχοντο, denote a state of feeling, are construed with a participle. (Kühner, § 685
The preposition ἄνερ, in a causal sense, mostly coincides with περί although more rarely thus employed. (Compare Buttmann, Ind. aa Midiam, p. 188.)—ἀνέρ ἐνεκεν καὶ. The Greeks frequently insert καὶ ("even," "also") after relative pronouns, to mark a certain gradation. (Hartung, i., p. 136.)

§ 48.

Κρίτων. Crito was a wealthy Athenian, who became an intimate friend and disciple of Socrates, having discovered his eminent talents, and who induced him to give up the profession of his father, namely, sculpture. (Wiggers' Life of Socrates, p. 374 of this volume.)—Χαῖρεφῶν, καὶ Χαῖρεκράτης. Chārephon and Chārecreates were brothers, natives of Athens, and followers of Socrates. (Compare ii., 3, 1 and 15. Schol. ad Aristoph., Nub., 104, 144, 146, 504.)—καὶ Ἐρμοκράτης. These words have been inserted by Schneider from two MSS. Who this Hērmocrates was, however, is unknown. He certainly ought not to be confounded with the Syracusan general of that name, who fought against Nicias, the Athenian, during the Peloponnesian war. Van Prinsterer thinks that we ought to read Ἐρμογένης, Hermogenes having been a friend and follower of Socrates. (Prosopogr. Plat., p. 225, seq.)—Σμυῖος. Simmias was a native of Thebes, who went to Athens to study under Socrates.—Χέβης. Cebes was a Theban philosopher, and a follower of Socrates, with whom he was connected by intimate friendship. He is introduced by Plato as one of the interlocutors in the Phaedo, and as having been present at the death of the philosopher. One of his works, the Πίναξ, or Picture of Human Life, is still extant, and much admired.—Φαῖδωνῆς. Thus in several MSS. This Phaedones was a Cyrenian, according to Ruhnken (ad loc.); but, according to Heindorff (ad Plat., Phaed., p. 13) and Wytenbach (ad Phaed., p. 118), a Theban. The common text has Φαῖδων ὅ, where ὅ has the force of ἐτ. 

 hoşηγορικοί καὶ δικανικοί. "Able popular speakers or skillful advocates."—καὶ ὀλκρ, καὶ οἰκέταις, κ. τ. λ. "They might be able to conduct themselves in a becoming manner toward their families and domesties, and relations," &c. Literally, "to make a becoming use of family," &c. Observe that οἰκέταις strictly means an inmate of one's house, but most usually a house-slave or domestic. On the other hand, οἰκεῖος means a relation, and answers to the Latin propinquus or cognatus.—οὐτε νεώτερος οὔτε πρεσβύτερος ᾧν. "Either in youth or in more advanced age." As regards νεώτερος ἄρε, where we would expect νέος, compare Kühner, § 784, Jelf.
CHAPTER

§ 49.

εἰλικτικώς γε. Compare § 12.—προσπήλακίζειν. "To treat th contumely." The verb προσπήλακίζω means properly "to be-watter with mud," or, as Buttman prefers (Lexil., p. 497, Fishl.), "to trample in the mire;" and hence "to treat with contumely," "to insult," &c. (Compare Aristoph., Nub., 1407.) Those persons who were condemned to ἀτύμια were exposed to such treatment as is indicated by the literal meaning of προσπήλακίζω. (Compare Bremai ad Demosth. de Cor., p. 229, 12.)—αὐτῷ. Bornemann reads εἰαντὶ, but there is no need whatever of any change, since either pronoun will answer. The distinction between them appears to be this, namely, that the reflexive pronoun refers to what is passing in the mind of the person spoken of, but αὐτῷ to what is passing in the mind of the speaker. (Compare Kühner, ad loc.)—φύσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμουν ἔξειναι, κ. τ. λ. "And also by asserting that it was allowable, according to law, for a person who had convicted him of derangement even to bind his father," i. e., to consign him to safe keeping. The main object of this law was to enable those next of kin to get the control of the property and prevent its being squandered. The process was a public one, and a regular trial ensued. (Compare Meier, and Schömann, der Att. Proc., p. 296, seqq.)—τεκμηριώθηκεν τούτῳ χρώμενος. "Using this as a sure argument," i. e., making use of the fact that such a law existed as a sure proof, &c.—δεδεσθα. "To be kept bound." Observe the continued action indicated by the perfect, and compare the explanation of Kühner, "vin ciri vinetumque teneri."

§ 50, 51.

tοῦ μὲν δεσμεύοντα. "That he who consigned another to bonds."—πολλάκις ἐσκόπει, τι διαφέρει, κ. τ. λ. "He often made it a subject of investigation in what respect ignorance differs from madness." Though the nature of the oratio obliqua would seem to require the optative, as the proper expression of a supposition, yet it is not always used, and the indicative (as here διαφέρει) is employed far more frequently; so that objects are brought before the mind not as mere conceptions, but as facts, which gives great power of representation to the language. (Kühner, § 886, Jelf.)—συμφερόντως. "With advantage."—ἐν ἀτύμια εἶναι. "To be held in dishonor."—τοῖς δικαζομένοις. "Those who are involved in law-suits." Observe here the force of the middle voice. The active, δικάζειν, is "to dispense justice;" the middle, δικαζομαι, "to cause justice to be dispensed unto one's self," "to go to law."—οἱ συνδικεῖν επιστάμενοι. "Those
who know how to act as advocates." The verb ουνειεϊν means properly, to be a συνδικος or advocate; and συνδικος itself, one who takes hold of a case along with another (συν, δίκη), an assistant in a cause, &c. (Compare Hermann, Pol. Ant., § 142, 14.)

§ 52.

η δε. Supply ὁ κατηγορος.—ως ουδεν δικει, κ. τ. λ. "That it is no advantage for them to be well disposed." Supply ετι after δικει.—φυσειν δε αυτοιν. "And that he frequently remarked." Observe the frequentative force of φυσει.—ἐρμηνευσαι. "To explain them," i. e., to teach them clearly unto others. Compare Sturz, Lex. Xen., s. v.—ουτω διαπιειναι. "So disposed," i. e., succeeded in exerting such an influence over.—ωτε μηδαμου περα αυτοικ, κ. τ. λ. "That all others were in no estimation with them in comparison with himself," i. e., were held in no account by them, &c. With μηδαμου Weiske supplies λογου αν τιμηματος, of which Kühner approves. It is much neater, however, to regard μηδαμου as the simple adverb; literally, "were no where in comparison with him." Compare the remark of Hermann on ου and αυτοιν. (De Ellips. et Pleon. in Ling. Gr., p. 151.)—προς καυτον. A similar construction occurs in Latin. Thus, Terent., Eun., ii., 3, 69: "At nihil ad nostram."

§ 53.

και των άλλων συγγενων. The common text has τε after συγγε
νων, which, as Herbst remarks, can not be endured. We have thrown it out, therefore, with Weiske, Herbst, and other editors. Kühner seeks to defend it, but on very feeble grounds, making συγγενων and φιλων to be in apposition with άλλων, and attempting to account for the presence of περι before άλλων by the circumstance of the latter word's denoting a class of persons distinct from both πατερων and συγγενων.—και προς τουτως γε δη. "And in addition to these things in very truth," i. e., and besides, what is still more to the purpose. Xenophon here concedes even more than the accuser alleges, and proceeds to adduce other instances of apparent paradoxes in the remarks of Socrates; from all which, however, he deduced sound and useful conclusions. Observe the strengthening effect of δη. (Kühner, § 722, Jelf.) The editions prior to that of Weiske have προς τουτως Γε διοτι. Our present reading is the conjectural emendation of that scholar.—γλυνεται φρονησις. "Intelligence exists." The general idea intended to be conveyed here is more fully developed in § 55.—δεν χαντες. The second sorist of
this verb is more usual with the Attics. The first aorist, however, occurs again, ii., 2, 5; iii., 6, 18; iv., 8, 1. (Kühner, ad loc.)— ἦφανενόμενον. "Inter." The literal meaning of ἦφανενόμενον  is "to make unseen," "to hide from sight," and hence "to inter," "to bury," &c.

§ 54.

ελεύε σδε, ὅτι καὶ ζῶν, κ. λ. "He used to say, also, that each one, while living, both himself removes, and affords unto another (to remove), whatever may be useless or unavailable of his own body, which he loves most of all." Kühner removes the comma after ἐκαυνόν, and explains as follows: ἐκαστὸς ἦφανεν τοῦτον ὅ πάντων μᾶλιστα ἐκαυνόν φιλέμ (τοῦ σῶματος λέγω) ὅ τι δὴ ἄνρειόν ήτο. This, however, is much less natural.—αὐτοὶ τε γὰρ. The common text has αὐτοὶ τέ γε, for which we have given Ernesti's correction, sanctioned by one of the MSS. There can be no doubt but that γὰρ is the true reading here, since, as Buttmann remarks (ad Demosth., Mid., § 21, n. 7), an example or illustration is adduced, not an argument. Ernesti's correction is adopted by Schneider, Bornemann, Herbst, and in the Paris edition of Xenophon from the press of Didot. Kühner, however, retains and seeks to defend the common reading.

—τὸλονος. "Callosities."—καὶ ἀποτέμνειν καὶ ἀποκάλειν. "Both to cut off and burn away." After verbs of giving, &c., the infinitive active is commonly found, where we would expect the passive. (Kühner, § 669, Obs. 2, Jel.) This, however, must not be regarded as the active used for the passive merely, but as an attempt to express by means of the active a more distinct and emphatic idea of the action of the verb, and one brought more immediately into present view.—ἐκνόν. "While within."—βλαπτεῖ δὲ πολὺ μάλλον. "But rather does considerable harm."

§ 55.

οὐ διδάσκων. "Not teaching (thereby)," i. e., not for the purpose of teaching.—ἐκαυνόν δὲ κατατέμνειν. "Or to cut one's self in pieces." Observe the strengthening force of κατά in composition.—ὅτι τὸ ἄφιν ἀτιμῶν ἔστι. "That what is without intelligence is without honor," i. e., that no honor or respect is paid to want of understanding.—παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "He exhorted (each one) to be careful to become as discreet and as useful as possible," i. e., to study to become. Observe here the peculiar employment of the article, which belongs, not to εἶναι alone, but to the whole clause, of which εἶναι merely forms part.—ἠῶν τε ... ἐῶν τε. "If either . . . or if." Like the Latin sive . . . sive (Kühner, § 778, Jel.)
—μή, ὁ οἰκείος εἶναι πιστεύων, κ. τ. λ. “He be not neglectful of them, relying upon the circumstance of his being a relation, but endeavor,” &c. Observe that the subject of discourse from § 54 onward is ἐκ στός, and compare the remark of Kühner: “Dictum est, quasi antecesserit παρεκάθει ἐκαστὸν ἐπιμελείσθαι.”—πειρᾶται. Sub junctive present.

§ 56.

τὰ πονηρῶτα. “The worst passages.” Supply μέρη or ἔπη.—τούτοις μαρτυροῖς χρώμενων. “Using these as proofs.” Compare § 49.—Ἡσίοδον μὲν τό. “That the line of Hesiod, for instance.” The apodosis is found at the commencement of § 58, the particle μὲν here marking the first instance cited, and δὲ, in τὸ δὲ Ὀμήρου, the second. Observe, moreover, that τό in the present passage (with which supply ἔπος) is the accusative, and was intended to depend on λέγειν coming after, but, in consequence of the line’s intervening, τοῦτο is inserted for perspicuity’ sake, which takes the place of τό, and the particle δὲ serves to mark this change of construction. We have, therefore, an anaecoluthon in Ἡσίοδον μὲν τό. Hesiod was an ancient Greek poet, whose name is often mentioned by the ancients in connection with that of Homer. He was a native of Ascrac in Boeotia, whence he is often called the Ascrean bard.

ἐργον δ’ οὐδὲν ὑνειδος, κ. τ. λ. “For work is no disgrace, but idleness, on the other hand, is a disgrace.” On the peculiar force of the particles δὲ τέ, when in juxtaposition, consult Hartung, i., p. 71. The line of Hesiod here quoted is from the Works and Days, v. 311. The poet is treating of agriculture, and by ἐργον means labor in the fields, which, he says, is no disgrace. The enemies of Socrates, however, understood, or pretended to understand, ἐργον as signifying any action whatever, and joined οὐδὲν with it, although it belongs to ὑνειδος. According to this view, the meaning of the line would be, “no work is a disgrace, but idleness (of any kind) is a disgrace.” The measure of the verse is hexameter.—τοῦτο δὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν, ὶς, κ. τ. λ. “That this line, then, he explained (in such a way), as if the poet bids us,” &c. Supply οὐσιως in the first clause, to which ᾧς becomes opposed in the second. There is no need, therefore, of our giving λέγειν, with Seyffert, a double object, namely, τοῦτο and ὶς, “diesen Vers nennen, und sagen dass,” &c.—καὶ ταῦτα. “Even these.”

§ 57.

Σωκράτης δ’ ἐπειδὴ ὑμολόγησατο, κ. τ. λ. “Now, whenever Socrates allowed that the being a worker was both useful and good for
The optative is used after temporal particles (as here after ἑπειδή), to express, not an individual circumstance, but a case of frequent recurrence. Hence ἑπειδή has here the force of "whenever," or "as often as." (Kühner, 6 843, b.)—τό δὲ ἄργον. "But that the being idle." Observe that elnav is twice to be supplied in this clause, once after ἄργον, and again after κακόν.—ἐργάζεσθαι τε καὶ ἐργάτας ἄγαθος elnav. "Both worked and were good workmen." Weiske objects to ἄγαθος as superfluous here, and that the notion of good is already implied here in ἐργάζεσθαι and ἐργάτας, and Schneider, agreeing with Weiske, incloses it in brackets, which Bornemann allows to remain. But ἄγαθος here carries with it an air of energy and emphasis which the context seems naturally to demand.—ἄργος ἀπεκάλει. "He stigmatized as idle."—ἐκ δὲ τῶν των. "And in accordance with these sentiments."—τό. "The line." Supply ἐπος.

§ 58.

τό δὲ 'Ομήρου. "The following passage, also, of Homer."—λε. γεν. "Quoted." The passage referred to occurs in the Iliad, ii. 188, seqq.—ὁτι. "How that."—κιλείη. "He chanced to find," i. e., as often as he met with any king, &c. The optative with the relative is used to indicate the recurrence or repetition of an act. (Kühner, 6 831, 4, Jelf.)—τὸν δ'. "This one thereupon." Observe the Homeric demonstrative pronoun τὸν, which became the later article. The particle δὲ here is not in the apodosis to μὲν in the preceding line. This apodosis occurs in δν δ' αὐ δήμων, farther on.—ἐρητύσασκε. 3d sing. of the iterative form (Epic and Ionic) of the 1st aor. ind. act. of ἐρητύω, "to restrain," and, consequently, for ἐρητυσε. The iterative form is employed to denote a repeated action, which is at the same time momentary in its nature. Thus, in the present instance, the meaning is, as often as he met such a person so often he restrained him. Compare the remarks of Buttmann, Ausf. Gr. Spr., vol. i., p. 395, note.)—δαμόνι. "Strange man." The term δαμόνιος always carries with it, in Homer, some degree of objurgation, and is to be translated according to the rank or condition of the party addressed.—κακόν ὃς. "Coward like." Observe the accentuation of ὃς, which particle takes the accent here because coming after the word (κακόν) with which it is connected in construction.—καὶ ἁλλοις ἰδονε λαοῦς. "And cause the rest of the people to take scats." Observe the force of the active in ἰδονε. The middle, ὑϕεσθαι, means "to cause one's self to take a seat," "to sit."—ὦδι . . . ἐφείροι. Compare note on κιλείη, in the first
verse of the extract.—τὼν ἐλίῳσακεν. "This one he smote." The term ἐλίῳσακεν is iterative for ἠλασσεν, from ἠλάνω. The reference is properly to a *driving back by blows.*—ὑμωκλῆσακε. Iterative form for ὑμόκλησε, from ὑμοκλέω, "to reprove," "to chide."

... δαμων'. "Fellow." Consult note on δαμων' in verse 3.—ἀτρήμας ἦσο. "Sit quietly," i. e., take a seat and be quiet.—σὺ δέ. "For thou art." Supply eli.—οὗτε τοῦτ ἐν πολέμῳ, κ. τ. λ. "Neither at any time counted in war nor in council," i. e., neither numbered among the brave in war, nor admitted to the council of chieftains.—ἔξηγεισθαί. "Interpreted."—ὡς ὁ ποιήτης ἐπαινοίη. "As if the poet recommended."—ἵμημω. "The common people." According to the lexicon of Zonaras, as quoted by Ruinken, ἱμημως, in the sense in which it is here employed, is peculiar to the Ionic writers, and Xenophon is the only one of the Attic authors who uses it in this meaning. The regular Attic term is Ἰημωτικὸς.

§ 59.

καὶ γάρ ἔαυτόν οὕτω, κ. τ. λ. "And (no wonder), for in this way he would have inferred," &c., i. e., by this same train of reasoning he must have inferred, &c.—ἄλλως τ' ἵν πρὸς τοῦτω. "Especially if, in addition to this." The expression ἄλλως τε is here of the same force as ἄλλως τε καί. (Kühner, ad loc.) The καί after τοῦτω belongs to ὑρασεῖς.—ὑρασεῖς. "Bold of deportment," i. e., of insolent spirit.—κάν τυγχάνωσιν δυτεῖ. "Even though they happen to be.'

§ 60.

ἄλλα Σωκράτης γε, κ. τ. λ. "Socrates, however, for his part, in opposition to all this, was evidently both a friend of the common people and a lover of mankind." The particle ἄλλα refers to the negation, οὐ ταῦτ' ἔλεγε, in § 59. Observe also the peculiar force of γε, and compare the explanation of Kühner, "Socrates tamen, si quis alius," &c.—φανερὸν ἦν ὃν. Literally, "was manifest as being."—πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμητάς καὶ ἀστούς. κ. τ. λ. "Although he received numbers of persons desirous of hearing him, both citizens and strangers." Observe here the force of ἐπιθυμητάς, and compare Apol. Socr., § 28: Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐπιθυμήτης μὲν ἵσχυρος αὐτοῦ (Consult notes on § 5.)—μισθὸν ἐκρύβατο. Compare § 5.—ἄλλα πᾶσιν ἄφθονος, κ. τ. λ. "But ungrudgingly bestowed a share of his instructions upon all." Observe that τῶν is here the partitive genitive. (Kühner, § 535, Jell.)—δν τινες, μικρὰ μέρη, κ. τ. λ. He hints at Aristippus and some others of Socrates' followers, who taught to pay. Aristippus was the first that did this. (Ruhnke, ad loc.) Com
§ 61.

πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους. "Among foreigners," i. e., in other lands. Literally, "with respect to the rest of men."—ἡ Λίχας τῆς Λακεδαίμονών. Lichas, the Lacedaemonian, and son of Arcesilaus, is meant, who was contemporary with Socrates.—ἐπὶ τούτω. "On the following account." The pronoun ὁτας generally refers to something that goes before. Occasionally, however, as in the present instance, it has relation to what follows. (Kühner, ad loc. Compare i., 2, 3; ii., 2, 27.)—τὰς γυμνόπαιδιὰς τοὺς ἑπιθεμοῦντας, κ. τ. λ. "Banqueted at the Gymnopaedia all the strangers then sojourning in Lacedaemon." The Gymnopaedia, or the festival of the "naked youths," was celebrated at Sparta every year in honor of Apollo Pythaeus, Diana, and Latona. The festival lasted for several, perhaps for ten days, and the whole season of its celebration was one of great merriment and rejoicing, during which Sparta was visited by large numbers of strangers. (Consult Dict. Ant., s. v.) It was for his hospitality on this occasion that Lichas became renowned throughout Greece. (Compare Plut., Vit. Cim., 10.) Observe, moreover, that γυμνόπαιδιὰς is here the dative of time. (Kühner, § 606, Jels.)—τὰ μέγιστα πάντας. According to the analogy of ποιεῖν τινα κακά, "to do any one harm," the verbs ὕφελειν, βλάπτειν, and others in which the idea of doing is implied, take, besides the accusative of the person, another accusative neuter plural of an adjective, where the English language employs the adverbs more, very, &c. (Matthiae, § 415, Obs. 3.)

§ 62.

ἐμοὶ μὲν δή. When δή follows μὲν, it refers to something previously mentioned, and may be rendered "then," "therefore," "accordingly." (Matthiae, § 603.) The δέ clause is omitted, which may be explained thus: "To me, therefore, he seemed, &c., but to some perhaps otherwise."—καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, κ. τ. λ. "And if one were to consider the subject with reference to the existing laws."—κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους. "For, according to the laws."—πανερός γεννηται. "Be openly caught." Literally, "may have become manifest."—λωποδύτων. "Stealing garments." The verb λωποδύτων is properly applicable to the stealing of the garments of bathers from the thermæ or public baths. In a more general sense.
however, it refers to the operations of thieves and highwaymen of all classes. The offence was published with death if the articles stolen or taken were of the value of ten drachmae. (Meier und Schöm., Att. Proc., iii., 1, p. 229, 359, seqq.)—τούτων. "For these offenders." The pronoun is here in the plural, after the collective τις, because a whole class of offenders are referred to. (Matthia, § 434.)—όν πάντων. "From all which offences."

§ 63.

ἀλλὰ μήν. Compare i., 1, 10.—συμβάντος. "Having resulted."—πρόδοσίας. "Of treason."—οὗδε μήν. Compare i., 2, 5.—ἵδια γε. "In a private capacity."—οὔτε κακοίς περιβάλειν. "Or involve him in evils." Compare Demosth., de Fals. Leg., p. 216, 9: τὸν φανερὸν τι ποίησα βουληθέντα . . . τηλεκαίχη καὶ τοιαύτη συμφὰρ περιβάλλειν. "Id. c. Timocr., p. 740, 22: τοιούτων γ' ὄντα καὶ οὕτως οἰκερχοίς ὀνείδεσα περιβαλλοντα ἐκείνου.—ἀλλ' οὖδ' αἰτίαν, κ. τ. λ. "Nay, he never even was charged with any one of the acts that have been mentioned."

§ 64.

πῶς οὖν ἐνοχὸς ἄν εἰπ τῇ γραφῇ: "How, then, could he be liable to the indictment (brought against him)?"—δὲ ἄντι μὲν. After an interrogative clause, the relative pronoun is often put for the demonstrative οὗτος, or οὗτος γάρ. (Kühner, § 834, Jelf.) And sometimes without a preceding interrogation, as in iii., 5, 11. With the particle γε it becomes more emphatic. Compare iii., 5, 16.—γέγραπτο. This is Bornemann's reading, from one of the best MSS., in place of the common lection έγέγραπτο. Grashof, cited by Kühner, has satisfactorily proved, that the second or syllabic augment of the pluperfect is often omitted, not only by the poets, but also by prose writers, for the sake of euphony, when, in the case of simple verbs, a vowel precedes which can not be elided; and when, in the case of compound ones, the preposition with which they are compounded ends in a vowel. (Kühner, ad loc. Matth., § 165.)—φανερὸς ἵνα δερ-απείνων. Compare i., 1, 2.—ὕτιάτῳ. According to Kühner, γέγραπτο refers to what was stated in the written indictment, and ὄτιάτῳ to the time when the verbal accusation was made, on which the written one was founded. The distinction, however, does not appear to be a tenable one.

tούτων μὲν παύων. Verbs signifying "to cause to cease," "to cease," &c., such as παῦω, παῦσας, λάγω, are construed with a genitive. (Matthia, § 355.)—τῆς δὲ καλλιστῆς, κ. τ. λ. Verbs signify
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"to desire," "to long after," take a genitive of that whence the desire arises. (Kühner, § 498, Jelf.)—εὐ ὀίκοιν. "Men regulate well."—προτρήτων. Compare i., 7, 1; ii., 1, 1; iii., 3, 15. The middle form occurs in the same sense in i., 2, 32; ii., 3, 12; iii., 3, 8 &c. Compare Matthiae, § 496, 497.—τῇ πόλει. Compare i., 1, 1.

CHAPTER III.

§ 1.

ὦ δὲ δὴ, κ. τ. λ. "But how, indeed, he also seemed to me," &c. We have seen that Socrates did not injure his pupils; we are now to consider whether he did not greatly benefit them. Hence καὶ refers here to a suppressed clause, "how he not only did not corrupt," but also, &c.—τὰ μὲν . . . . τὰ δὲ. "Partly . . . partly."—ἐργῳ. "By example."—δεικνὺς εἰςτὸν οἶκον ηὖν. For δεικνύων οἶκος αὐτὸς ἦν.—διαλεγόμενος. "By his discourses."—ὅπως ἦν διαμνημονεύωσω. "As many as I may have held in remembrance." Observe that διαμνημονεύωσω is not the future, but the aorist subjunctive.—τὰ μὲν τοῖνυν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς." The things then appertaining to the gods."—ὑπερ Ἡ Πυθία ύποκρίνεται. "In the way in which the Pythoness answers unto those," &c., i. e., in the way which the Pythoness mentions in her answers, &c. Eight MSS. and the early editions have ύποκρίνεται, as we here give it. The modern editions, on the other hand, have ἄποκρίνεται. Kühner has brought back ύποκρίνεται, which is used in this sense not only by the Ionic writers (as, for example, Herodotus, i., 78, 91, &c.), but also in Thucydides, vii., 44, 5.—προγόνων θεραπείας. "The worship of ancestors."—ἡ τε γὰρ Πυθία, κ. τ. λ. "For both the Pythoness answers, that men, if they act (on these occasions) in conformity with the law of the state, will act with piety." Observe here the peculiar force of ἀνατρέω, properly "to take up a matter, and give an answer thereon," and usually said in this sense of oracles.

ὄντως καί. "In this way also." This is the reading of Bornemann, from several MSS. and early editions, and is adopted also by Kühner. The common text has οὖντω καί, but the Attic writers use οὖντως even before a consonant when emphasis is required. (Kühner, ad loc.)—παρῆνει. Supply οὖντο ποιεῖν.—ἄλλως πως. "In any other way."—περιέργους καὶ ματαιοὺς. "Over-busy and wasting their labor."

§ 2.

καὶ εὖχετο δὲ, κ. τ. λ. "Farthermore, also, he prayed unto the gods simply to give (unto him) the things that were good, since he
thought that the gods knew best what kinds of things are good," i. e., are real blessings. With regard to the combination καὶ δὲ, compare 1, 1, 3. Observe, to 1, the employment of ὧς with the accusative absolute, as indicating a reason existing in the mind of another. Compare note on i., 2, 20.—ἀπλάζει τἀγαθή διδόναι. As regards the Socratic precept here involved, consult Plato, Aleiβ., ii., c. 9, where are found the following well known and beautifully-expressed lines:


νῦδὲν διάφορον εἴχεσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "Prayed for nothing different than if they should pray for a gambling affair," &c., i. e., prayed as unreasonably as if they should pray for success in a gambling affair, &c.—φανερῶς ὑδύλλων δπως ἀποθήσοιτο. "Manifestly uncertain in what way they would be likely to result." Compare i., 1, 6.

3.

ὦνιάς δὲ θύσων, κ. τ. λ. "In offering up, moreover, humble sacrifices from humble means," i. e., and when, moreover, from his humble means he offered up humble sacrifices. The means or material, by or from which any thing is done or made, is often expressed in Greek, for the sake of greater distinctness, by ἄντο and a genitive. Compare i., 2, 14.—νῦδὲν μειονάθαι. "That he was in no respect inferior to." Verbs derived from comparatives are construed with a genitive, as here, τῶν θυόντων. (Matthiae, § 357.)—οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς, κ. τ. λ. "For he said that it would neither be becoming in the gods if they took delight," &c. Literally, "that it would neither have itself becomingly for the gods," &c. The particle ἄν is omitted here before the infinitive εἴχειν. In such expressions as indicate propriety, duty, necessity, &c., that is, in clauses where καλὸς εἴχε, ἔδει, χρὴ, &c., are employed, it accorded with the genius of the Greeks as well as Latins to represent that which was becoming, necessary, &c., as unconditionally true, its not happening being partially kept out of sight. (Kühner, § 558, 3, Jelf.)

ἀν εἶναι μᾶλλον κεχαρισμένα. "Would be more acceptable."—οὖτ' ἀν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, κ. τ. λ. Kühner thinks that ἄν might also have been omitted here. It seems, however, to be required by the context: "nor would it in all likelihood be," &c. The idea intended to be conveyed by the whole clause is simply this, that if the gods take more delight in the offerings of the bad than those of the good, life becomes unto the good not worth leading, since the bad, in that event, will be the recipients of all the more important favors of the
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gods.—τοῦ ἔπους τούτου. "Of this verse." The verse that follows is taken from the Works and Days of Hesiod (v. 336).—καὶ δῶναιν ὡς ἐρεῖν, κ. τ. λ. "Offer up sacrifices, moreover, to the immortal gods, according to your ability." The infinitive is here used for the imperative, as is frequently the case with the poets. This is probably a remnant of the ancient simplicity of the language, the action required being expressed by means of the verb taken absolutely. (Matthia, § 516.) Some, however, explain it by supposing the infinitive to depend on a verb of "bidding," "directing," &c., in the mind of the speaker. (Kühner, § 671, Jelf.) Observe that καί is Epic for κατά.—καὶ πρὸς φίλους δέ, κ. τ. λ. "And he said that the doing according to one's ability' was an excellent exhortation as regarded friends, and those connected with us by the ties of hospitality, and as regarded the regulation of the rest of life," i. e., and as regarded the other relations of life. The expression τῆς καὶ δῶναιν ἐρεῖν is for το καὶ δῶναιν ἐρεῖν, the article being attracted into the gender of παραίνεσιν. (Compare Matthia, § 280, and Kühner, § 457, 3, Jelf.)

§ 4.

εἶ δέ τι δοξεῖν, κ. τ. λ. "But, whenever any thing appeared to him to be intimated from the gods, he could less be persuaded, &c., than if one were to strive to persuade him," &c. Observe here the employment of the optative in the protasis with εἰ, to denote an indefinite frequency of action. (Kühner, § 855, β., Jelf.)—παρὰ τὰ σημαινόμενα. Observe here the meaning of παρὰ with the accusative, as indicating "against," "contrary to," &c., and being directly opposed to κατὰ with the same case.—Ἀντὶ βλέποντος καὶ εἰδότος. Supply αὐτήν.—καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ μωρίαν κατηγόρει. "And he charged folly against the rest of men," i. e., he censured the folly of others.—παρὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, κ. τ. λ. There is a species of κακοφωνία here, as Herbst remarks, by no means infrequent among the Greek writers. The idea intended to be conveyed, however, is borrowed from the early lyric poet Ibycus, as referred to by Plato, Phaedr., 242, C.: καὶ πώς ἐνεσπαύῃν κατ' Ἰβυκον μη τι παρὰ θεῶν ἁμπλακῶν τιμῶν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείψω. (Compare Ruhn. ad Tim., Lex., p. 90.)—φυλαττόμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδόξαι. "Guarding against ill repute with their fellow-men," i. e., lest they meet with the derisive sneers of mankind."—πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν συμβουλήν. "In comparison with the counsel received from the gods," i. e., given him from on high, as he thought, by his so-called genius.
§ 5.

διαίτη δὲ, κ. τ. λ. There appears to be a want of connection between this section and the previous one; the transition from piety toward the gods to every-day life appears harsh. Kühner thinks that Xenophon naturally passes from the duties of men toward the deity to their duties toward their fellow-men.—ἐπαίδευσε. "He trained."—ἐλ μὴ τι δαιρώνου εἰη. "Unless there were some divine interference," i. e., unless some obstacle were opposed from on high. More literally, "unless there were something proceeding from the deity."—τοσαύτης δασάνης. "So much money" (as would suffice to lead such a life as that of Socrates). Observe that δασάνη has here the signification of "money for spending."—οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἐργάζομαι. "Could obtain so little by his labor." Observe here the peculiar force of ἐργάζεσθαι, "to earn by one's exertions," and compare Herod., i., 24, ἐργασιάμενον δὲ χρήματα μεγάλα.—ἐχρήζο. "He consumed."—ἡδέως. "With pleasure," i. e., with an appetite.—ἐπὶ τοῦτο. "For this," i. e., that he might eat with an appetite. Dindorf reads ἐπὶ τούτων, i. e., σῖτων.—ὀψιν αὐτῷ εἶναι. "Served as a relish for him." Any thing eaten with bread was called ὀψιν, and even without bread, as flesh-meat, fish, &c., and hence every sort of more delicate food, sauces, condiments, &c. Compare Cicero, Tus. Disp., v., 34, 97: "Socratem ferunt, quum usque ad vesperum contentus ambularet, quasitumque esseet ex eo, quare id suceret, respondisse, se, quo melius canaret, opsonare ambulando famem."

§ 6.

ἐλ δὲ ποτε κληθείς ἐθελήσεις, κ. τ. λ. Compare § 4.—ὀψετε φυλάξα σθαί, κ. τ. λ. "Namely, so as to guard against the being filled above measure," i. e., the being surfeited. A simple infinitive, or, what is more forcible, an infinitive with ὀψετε, is often added, to explain an antecedent word, or clause, more accurately and fully. (Matthew, § 531, Obs. 2. Kühner, § 669, Jelf.)—ὑπέρ τοῦ καὶροῦ. The term καιρός is often employed to denote the measure of a thing Compare Ages., Vit., 5, 1: σιτών δ' ὑπέρ καὶροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι ἑτερo χρή ναι.—τὰ πείδουτα μὴ πεινώντας ἠθείειν. "Those viands which per suade men to eat when not hungry."—τὰ λυμαίνομενα γαστέρας, κ. τ. λ. "Which ruin stomachs, and heads, and minds." Observe here the employment of the plural, the reference being to the case of many individuals. (Kühner, ad loc.)

§ 7.

ἐπιτκώπτων. "In sportive mood," i. e., jovocularly. Literally "joking."—καὶ τὴν Κυρίαν ἐς ποιεῖν. "That Cicero also made 'men"
swine.” Alluding to the Homeric fable of Circe’s transforming those who feasted at her table into filthy swine. (Od., x., 230, seqq.)—τοιούτους πελλοῖς. “With many such (incentives),” i. e., things which persuade us, when not hungry, to eat, &c.—ὑποθηματικόν. “By the suggestion.” Ulysses, according to the legend, was fortified against the enchantments of Circe by an herb called moly, which he received from Mercury; but his companions were changed into swine.—καὶ αὐτὸν ἐγκρατῆ δύτη. “And being himself under the influence of self-control,” i. e., and through his own self-restraint.—τὸ ὑπὲρ τῶν καιρῶν, κ. τ. λ. Ernesti reads τοῦ in place of τό, after Brodaeus and others. A rash change, however; for those verbs in Greek which are usually construed with a simple infinitive, are sometimes joined with an accusative of the article and an infinitive. This construction, as being emphatic, is very often used in antithesis. (Kühner, § 670, Jelf. Compare iii., 6, 6 iv., 3, 1; iv., 7, 5.)

CHAPTER IV.

§ 1. τεκμαίρομενοι. “Forming mere conjectures,” i. e., from mere conjecture. Not knowing, namely, the nature of his doctrine and sentiments, but forming opinions from mere conjecture.—προτρήψασθαι μὲν . . . κράτιστον γεγονέναι. “Was very influential in exhorting.”—προσαγαγεῖν. “To lead the way.” Socrates was supposed, by the persons here alluded to, merely to have been able to excite in his followers a love of virtue, but not to show the path to it practically.—σκεφτόμενοι . . . δοκιμαζόντων. “Let them, after having considered, &c., determine.” Observe that δοκιμαζόντων is the abbreviated form of the imperative for δοκιμαζέωσαν. This being especially and almost exclusively adopted from the old Homeric language by the Attic writers, is called the Attic imperative, though it is found frequently in the other dialects. (Kühner, § 196, Obs. 3, Jelf.)—μὴ μόνον ἄ. “Not only the things in which.” Observe that μὴ, not οὐ, is here employed, on account of the imperative δοκιμαζόντων.—κολαστηρίου ἐνεκα. “For the sake of chastisement,” i. e., in order to check them.—τοὺς πάντας οἰκομένους εἰλήναι. Alluding to the Sophists, who laid claim to universal knowledge.—ἐρω ὑλήγειν. “Confuted by his interrogations.” Literally, “interrogating confuted.” The allusion is to the Socratic mode of arguing by question and answer.—ὁ λέγων συνημέρευε. “(Those) about which he daily conversed.” Literally, “about which conversing he spent the day with.”
\section*{Notes to Book I.—Chapter IV.}

\section*{§ 2}

περὶ τοῦ ὑαμονίου. "Concerning the deity."—Ἀριστόδημος τοῦ Μικρὸν ἐπικαλούμενον. "Aristodemus, surnamed the Little." Aristodemus was a most devoted friend, and constant companion of Socrates. He is described as an austere man, and always walking barefoot, which he seems to have done in imitation of Socrates. (Plat., Symp., 173, B. Compare Davis. ad Max. Tyr., diss. 3, p. 504.)—καταμαθὼν αὐτόν. "Having observed him."—οὐτ' εἰχόμενον. The editions previous to that of Ernesti have μηχανώμενον, "when undertaking any thing." Leunclavius, however, ingeniously conjectured οὐτ' εἰχόμενον, which Ernesti introduced into the text.—ἐστὶν οὕτως ἀνθρώπους, κ. τ. λ. "Do you admire any men for their intelligence." The form έστιν οἷς was so firmly established, that neither the number of the relative had any influence on the verb ἐστι, nor is the tense changed, though the time spoken of be past or future; hence this form assumed the character of the substantival pronoun ἐνοι, and by means of the cases of the relative has a complete inflexion. And then, as a question, ἐστίν οἴτινες is employed. (Kühner, § 817, 5, Jelf.)—τεθαύμακας. Observe the continued meaning implied by this tense: "have you admired and do you still admire," i. e., do you admire? (Matthiae, § 497.)—ἐγώγε. Supply τεθαύμακα.

\section*{§ 3.}

καὶ ὅς. "And he." The pronoun ὅς, of the same origin as ὁντος, is used as a demonstrative or personal pronoun, frequently in Homer and also by the Attics, at the beginning of a proposition. (Kühner, § 816, 3, 4., Jelf.)—ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖνυ ἐπών ποιήσει. "For the composition, then, of epic verse," i. e., in epic poetry, then. Observe that ἐπὶ here with the dative has a causal signification, answering to the Latin propter.—ἐπών ποιήσει. Homer every where applies the term ἡωθή to the delivery of poems, while ἐπη merely denotes the every-day conversation of ordinary life. On the other hand, later authors, from Pindar downward, use the term ἐπη frequently to designate poetry, and especially epic, in contradistinction to lyric, or μέλη. (Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit., iv., 3.)—ἐπὶ δὲ διθυράμβῳ. "For the dithyramb, on the other hand." The dithyramb was a kind of choral song, of a lofty but usually inflated style, originally in honor of Bacchus, afterward also of other gods. Cobet conjectures that we ought to read διθυράμβων, understanding ποιήσει, because, according to him, διθύραμβος, like ἔπος and μέλος, is not used in the singular when expressive of poetry, but in the plural. Dithyrambic
poetry, however, can very well be implied here in the term διηφόρομ- 

οδος.—Μελανιππίδην. Melanippides was a native of Melos, and one 
of the most celebrated lyric poets in the department of the dithy-

ramb. His date can only be fixed within rather uncertain limits. 
He may be said, somewhat indefinitely, to have flourished about 
the middle of the fifth century B.C.—Σοφοκλέα. Sophocles, as has 
been well remarked, is the summit of Grecian art; but one must 
have scaled many a steep before one can estimate his height. It 
is because of his classical perfection that he has generally been the 
least admired of the great ancient poets. (Theatre of the Greeks, p 
78, 4th ed.)—Πολύκλειτον. Polycletus was a celebrated statuary of 
Sicyon, and flourished about B.C. 430.—Ζεύξιν. Zeuxis, a native 
of Heraclea, was the most celebrated painter of antiquity. He 
flourished at the same time with Polycletus.

§ 4.

eιδώλα ἕφρονα τε καὶ ἰκίνητα. "Representations devoid of both 
intelligence and the power of self-motion."—ἐμφρονά τε καὶ ἑνεργά 
"Possessed of reason and activity."—οἱ ξώα. Supply ἀπεργαζόμενοι 
—ἐπιερ γε μὴ τύχη, κ. τ. λ. "If, at least, these results are in real-
ity brought about, not from any chance, but through actual design." 
Observe the force of εἰπερ, "if, in reality." The cases are beauti-
fully varied here, τύχη the dative denoting the instrument or means, 
and ὑπὸ γνώμης referring to an effecting cause. (Kühner, ad loc.)— 
τῶν δὲ ἀπεκμαρτῶς ἐχόντων, κ. τ. λ. "But of those things which af-
ford us no sure indication on what account they exist." Literally, 
"which have themselves in a condition without sure indication."
—πρέπει μεν. "It is right (to think)." —γνώμης ἔργα εἶναι. "Are 
works of design."

§ 5.

οὐκον δοκεῖ σοι, κ. τ. λ. "Does not then he who made men from 
the very first," &c. For the difference in signification between 
οὖκον and οὐκόν, compare note i., 2, 10.—προσθεῖναι. "To add," 
i.e., in every case to add. Observe the employment of the aorist 
to indicate what is accustomed to take place.—δι' ὧν αἰσθάνονται 
ἐκαστα. "Each (of those members) by means of which they ob-
tain a perception (of external objects)."—δομῶν γε μὴν, κ. τ. λ. 
"What advantage, in very truth, would these have been unto us 
from odors at least, if nostrils had not been added? The combi-
nation γε μην differs from the simple μην merely in this, that γε adds
emphasis to the word which precedes it. (Hartung, ii., p. 383.)—προσετέθησαν. The aorist again refers to what is customary in the case of each one of our species. So also ἐνεφρύνη, farther on.—ὡν διὰ στόματος ἤδειν. "The pleasant things procured by means of the mouth." Literally, "by means of a mouth;" and hence the absence of the article in the Greek, the reference being a general one to the whole species. So γλῶττα immediately after, not ἡ γλῶττα.—εἷ πὴ γλῶττα, k. t. λ. "If a tongue had not been formed within as an indicator of these."

§ 6.

προονοιάς ἐγρῶ ἐνικέναι. "To resemble a work of preceience. We have not hesitated to recall ἐγρῶ, the reading of the modern editions. Kühner adopts ἐγρῶν, which appears in many MSS. and several early editions, and gives ἐνικέναι the force of haberi, or putari. This, however, appears extremely far-fetched, and wanting in energy.—τὸ, ἐπεὶ ὠδηνός, κ. τ. λ. "(Namely), since the sight is delicate, the guarding it with eye-lids like doors." The v. b ϑυρόω properly denotes, "to furnish with doors." Observe, again, the employment of the norist to denote what is customary.—ἀνθ' χρύσθαι τι. "To use it in any respect."—ἀναστᾶννυνται . . . συγκλεῖται. Middle voice.—ἡθμόν βλεφαρίδας ἰμφέωςαι. "The implanting of eyelashes as a sieve." The ἡθμός properly was a kind of sieve or strainer, used by the Greeks to strain or percolate their wine. We have given ἡθμός the rough breathing with Ernesti and others, on the authority of the scholiast to Apollonius Rhodius (i., 1294) and the Siganæan inscription. (Böckh, Corp. Inscr. Græc., i., p. 19, seqq.) Ruhnken prefers ὑρεγκόν, "a fence," the conjecture of Victorius, but the allusion to the winds in the previous clause suits better the idea conveyed by ἡθμόν, namely, the shielding of the eye from the fine particles of dust, &c.—ὁφύσι τε ἀπογειώσασαι, κ. τ. λ. "And the causing the parts above the eyes to jut out with eye-brows like the eaves of a house." The verb ἀπογειώσω is to make to jut out like a cornice or coping, or like eaves. The root γείσον is said to be of Carian origin, the term γίσα in the Carian language being equivalent to λίθος in Greek. (Steph. Byz., s. v. Μονόγισσα. Ruhnk. ad Tim., Let., p. 65.)

τὸ δὲ, τὴν ἀκοήν δέχεσθαι. "And, again, this circumstance, (namely), that the hearing receives." We have placed a comma after τὸ δὲ with Weiske, as making a neater construction than joining τὸ at once with τὴν ἀκοήν δέχεσθαι. Observe that we have now a ἀ-ωςείσαςion of independent clauses, forming, as it were, so many num-
natives, until we reach ταύτα, when this last takes the place of all of them, and thus converts what precedes into an anacoluthon.—καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρόσθεν ὀδόντας, κ. τ. λ. "And that the front teeth in all animals are adapted for cutting (the food)." Observe that τὸ δὲ is, in fact, understood after καὶ, literally, "and this other circumstance, that the front teeth," &c. The full construction in οὖν is τοιούτον οὖν, literally, "such as." (Kühner, § 823, Obs. 3, Jelf.)—καὶ στόμα μὲν καταθείναι. "And the placing of a mouth."—τὰ ὀποχωροῦντα. "The faces."—διιεχεῖ. Supply ἐστίν. The ellipsis of εἶναι is comparatively rare after conjunctions, as here after δὲ. (Kühner ad loc.)—ἀποστρέψαι . . . . ἀπενεγκεῖν. "The turning away . . . . the removing."—οὖτω προνοητικῶς. "With so much forethought." πότερα. "Whether."

§ 7.

οὖτω γε. "In this particular light," i. e., with reference to the principle of utility.—πάνυ ἐδοκεί ταύτα, κ. τ. λ. "These things altogether resemble a contrivance of some wise architect, and one benevolent to living things."—τὸ δὲ, ἐμφύσαι, κ. τ. λ. We have here a construction similar to that in the previous section, namely, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἁκολὴν δέχεσθαι, κ. τ. λ., excepting that, when we reach the end of the clause, μέγιστον δὲ φόδον θανάτου, the words ταύτα οὖτω προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα, κ. τ. λ., are not again added, but are left to be implied—ἐρωτα τῆς τεκνοποιίας. "A love of progeny."—ταῖς γειναμέναις. "In mothers." The 1st aor. mid. of the deponent γεινομαῖ is used in an active sense.— ',', "Certainly." This is the beginning of the answer of Aristodemus. Socrates recommences his interrogatories with the next section. 'Ἀμέλει is properly the imperative of ἀμέλειω, and therefore signifies, primarily, "never mind," "do not trouble yourself." (Compare Aristoph., Nub., 488, 875.) Thence, like other imperatives, it takes the nature of a particle of exhortation or encouragement, and is also affirmative. It may therefore be rendered, according to circumstances, "doubtless," "certainly," "truly," &c.—μηχανημασί γενος, κ. τ. λ. "The ingenious devices of one who had resolved within himself that animals should exist."

§ 8.

οὐ δὲ σαυτὸν δοκεῖς, κ. τ. λ. "And do you think that you yourself possess a certain portion of intelligence?" i. e., that you are endowed with reason. According to the general rule, when the same person is both the subject of the infinitive and of the govern-
ing verb, the subject of the infinitive is omitted, and is in the
nominaive. But, whenever an emphasis is required, the subject of the
infinitive is expressed, and is then in the accusative, as here, ἐαυτὸν
(Buttmann, § 142, Rob.)—ἐρωτα γοῦν καὶ ἀποκρινομα. These words
are omitted by Bessarion (in his version) and by Ernesti, on the
suggestion of Ruhnken. They were first thrown out of the Greek
text by Schütz, whom Schneider and others follow. The objection
against them is, that they mar the regular flow of the passage; but
they are found in all the MSS., without a single exception, and
could hardly, therefore, have proceeded from any other than Xen-
ophon himself. Lange gives the following explanation of the words
in question: "Since modesty prevented Aristodemus from express-
ly affirming, and truth prevented his denial, he answers guardedly
and cautiously thus: 'Interrogate then, and I will answer;' i.e., by
my answers you will know that I φρονιμον τι εξω."

καὶ ταῦτα εἶδὼς. "And that, too, when you know."—πολλῆς ἀβ-
ογη. "While, at the same time, there is much of it," i.e., while, at
the same time, it is so boundless in extent.—καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔρηπον,
κ. τ. λ. "And that your body has been compacted for you by your
having received a scanty portion of each of the other elements, that
are, as is well known, immense in their nature." Observe the force
of ἔρηπον here, answering to the Latin ut notum est, or scient, and
consult Sturz, Lex. Xen., s. v.—νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἔρα, κ. τ. λ. "And do
you think that you alone have, by some lucky chance or other,
cought a mind, existing nowhere else?" Compare Cicero, N. D.,
11, 6: "Unde enim hanc (mentem) homo arripuit? ut ait apud Xen-
ophonem Socrates."—σε συναρπᾶσαι. The accusative with the in-
nitive, not the nominative, because emphasis is required. Compare
note on σῦ δὲ σαυτὸν δοκεῖς, κ. τ. λ., at the commencement of this
section.—καὶ τάδε τά. Thus in three MSS., in place of the common
reading καὶ τά.—δὲ ἀφροτόνην τινά, κ. τ. λ. "Hold on in their
course of order through some idle folly, as you suppose"

§ 9.

μὰ Δ;? "Certainly." Má is a particle of swearing, like the Latin
per, and by itself neither affirms nor denies, but simply exercises a
strengthening influence. Hence it is used in both affirmation and
negation. In affirmation it is joined with ναί, as ναὶ μὰ Δία, and in
negations, with οὐ, as οὐ μὰ Δία. But when μὰ Δία is used simply,
without οὐ, a negative either precedes or follows. In the present
instance it refers to what has gone before, namely, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὖδα-
μοῦ οὐδὲν φρόνιμον εἶναι, and οὐ γὰρ belongs to what follows.—τοῖς
NOTES TO BOOK I.—CHAPTER IV. 201

κυρίονες. "The lords (of the universe)," i. e., its creators and governors.—δημιουργοῦς. "The makers."—οὖδὲ γὰρ. This form of expression, in response and dialogue, refers to something understood, as ὅθεως ἄγετες, οὐ θαυμαστόν, or something similar. In the present passage it has an ironical force: "(Quite right), for neither do you see," &c.—ἐαυτῷ. Several MSS. have σεαυτόν, a few σεαυτοῦ, but ἐαυτῷ is here, by a usage not unfrequent in Attic, employed itself for the second person. This occurs in cases where the reference is easily determined from the context. In like manner, ἐαυτῷ is also not unfrequently employed for the first person. (Matthiae, § 489, 2. Kühner, § 653, Jelf.)—κυρία. "The mistress."—κατὰ γε τοῦτο. "As far, at least, as this point is concerned," i. e., by parity of reasoning.—γνώμῃ. "By reason."

§ 10.

οὗτοι ἐγὼ, ὁ Σώκρατες, κ. τ. λ. "Indeed, Socrates, I do not despise the deity."—μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἢ ὅς προσδείσθαι. "Too glorious to need." Literally, "more glorious than so as to need." Observe that ἢ ὅς is for ἢ ὅστε; and mark, also, the force of πρός in προσδείσθαι, literally, "to need in addition," i. e., in addition to that of the rest of his creatures.—ἄφω μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἄξιοι. "By how much more glorious he is, and yet deigns." Literally, "by how much more glorious being he deigns." Supply ὅν after μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. Wytenbach, indeed (ad Plut., de S. N. V., p. 36), wishes ὅν to be added here to the text, but the participle of εἶναι is often omitted. (Comp. Lobeck ad Phryn., p. 277.)

§ 11.

ἐπείτα. Compare i. 2, 26.—οἷς πρῶτον μέν. After an interrogative clause, the relative pronoun is often put for the demonstrative οὗτος, or οὗτος γάρ. (Compare i., 2, 64.)—ὅρθον ἀνέστησαν. The aorist, as before, refers here to what is customary or always takes place, and hence has the force of a present. As regards the idea itself, compare Cic., N. D., 11, 56: "Quae primum eos humo excitatos eis loci et erectos constituit, ut deorum cognitionem caulum intuentes captivum posseint."—ἡ δὲ ὅρθότης. "And this uprightness of stature."—μάλλον. "With more convenience."—καὶ ἦτον κακοπαθεῖν, οἷς, κ. τ. λ. "And that those parts suffer less injury, in which they (the gods) have constructed a faculty of vision, and of hearing, and of speaking." The true reading here is extremely doubtful. Almost all the MSS. and editions have κακοπαθεῖν· καὶ δψυν, κ. τ. λ. omitting οἷς. We have inserted this last-mentioned word, in ao
ORDANCE WITH THE INGENIOUS EMENDATION OF KÜHNER, AND HAVE PLACED A COMMA AFTER *KAKOΠAΘΕΙΝ* INSTEAD OF A COLON.—ΕΤΕΙΤΑ. "IN THE NEXT PLACE." MORE COMMONLY ΕΤΕΙΤΑ ΔΕ. (COMPARE VIGER, VIII., 8. 10.)—ΤΟΙΣ ΜΕΝ ἈΛΛΟΙΣ ΕΡΠΕΤΟΙΣ. "TO THE REST OF ANIMALS." OBSERVE THAT ΕΡΠΕΤΟΙΣ IS HERE EMPLOYED IN ITS GENERAL SENSE OF THINGS THAT MOVE UPON THE EARTH, SINCE ΕΡΜΩ MEANS "TO WALK" AS WELL AS "CREEP." THIS, HOWEVER, IS RATHER ITS POETICAL USAGE; IN PROSE, IT COMMONLY MEANS "REPTILES."—ΤΟ ΠΟΡΕΥΣΑΘΑΙ. "THE POWER OF PROCEEDING," I. E., THE FACULTY OF MOTION—ΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΑΝ. "THEY ADD" "OBSERVE THE FORCE OF THE AORIST.

§ 12.

καὶ μήν. "AND IN TRUTH." THESE ARE PARTICLES HERE OF TRANSITION. COMPARE II., 3, 10.—ΜΟΥΝ ΤῌΝ ΤῸΝ ἌΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ, κ. τ. λ. "THEY HAVE MADE THAT ALONE OF MEN SUCH, AS, BY TOUCHING THE MOUTH AT DIFFERENT TIMES IN DIFFERENT PARTS, BOTH TO ARTICULATE THE VOICE," &C., I. E., TO UTTER ARTICULATE SOUNDS. BEFORE ΟΙΑΝ, SUPPLY, AS BEFORE, ΤΟΙΑΥΤῌΝ. COMPARE § 6.—ΚΑΙ ΣΧΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ ΠΆΝΤΑ, κ. τ. λ. THE SAME AS ΚΑΙ ΟΙΑ ἩΜΑῖΣ ΣΧΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ ΠΆΝΤΑ, κ. τ. λ. WHEN THERE ARE TWO OR MORE ADJECTIVAL CLAUSES IN SUCCESSION, DEPENDING ON THE SAME VERB, OR ON DIFFERENT VERBS, BUT IN THE SAME GOVERNMENT, THE RELATIVE IS GENERALLY USED BUT ONCE, AND THEREBY THE TWO SENTENCES ARE UNITED INTO ONE.

COMPARE (KÜHNER, § 833, JELF.)

§ 13.

the construction. Thus ἀνθρώποι here governed by ἡσθηται, when the regular construction would have been ἡσθηται ὅτι ἰδιί εἰσι, οἷ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα συνεταξαν. Compare Matthia, § 349; Kuhner, § 898, Jelf; and, as regards the sentiment itself expressed in the text, consult Cicero, N. D., ii., 6: —τὰ μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα. The reference is to the universe. Compare Plato, Leg., x., Op., vol. x., p. 74, ed. Bip.

ηθαπεδούσα. Here the verb agrees in number, not with φύλον, out, by attraction, with ἄνθρωποι. Kühner refers, in illustration, to Sallust, Jug., c. 50. Sin opportunior fuga collis, quam campi fuentant," and also to Cicero, Phil., iv., 4: "Quis igitur illum consulem, nisi latrones putant." — ἦ ψυχή ὑδατητὴ. Observe here the employment of the plural, as indicating different degrees or varieties of cold and heat. (Compare Kühner, § 355, J., Jelf) — ῥόμην ἀκῆσαι. "To acquire strength by exercise." Literally, "to exercise strength." — πρὸς μάθησιν ἔκπονησαι. "To toil after instruction," i. e., to toil to acquire instruction. Observe that ἔκπονεως is here used intransitively. Its more common employment is that of a transitive verb with the accusative. (Kühner, ad loc.) — διαμεμνησαί. "To keep in memory."

§ 14.

οὐ γὰρ. "Is it not then." These particles are interrogative in demonstration and argument, and are equivalent to the Latin nonne igitur.—παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα. "In comparison with the rest of animals." (Matthia, § 588, c.) — φύσει κρατιστεύοντες. "Naturally excelling them." — οὕτε γὰρ βοῦς ἄν ἔχων σῶμα. "For neither would one if he had an ox's body." From the plural ἄνθρωποι, which precedes, we may supply ἄνθρωπος or τίς with ἔχων. (Kühner, ad loc.) Observe, moreover, that the particle ἄν is sometimes found repeated in a sentence, as here, where it is first attached to the word βοῦς, on which the greatest emphasis is laid, and is again placed after the verb which it modifies. (Kühner, § 432, b.) — δοσά. Supply ζῶα. The reference is to what we would term quadrumanous animals, or the monkey tribe. — πλίον οὐδὲν ἔχει. "Possess any advantage (over the rest)." Supply ᾧ τὰ ἄλλα.— ὑμοφατέρων τῶν πλείστων ἄξιον τετυχυγκώς. "Who have obtained both of these in the greatest excellence." Literally, "worthy of most." The reference is to the body and the mind.— ἄλλ' ὅταν τί ποιήσως, κ. τ. λ. "But, whenever they shall have done what, will you think that they care for you!" i. e., out what must the gods do to make you believe that they care for you! A dependent clause, introduced by a conjunction, often as.
sumes a direct interrogatory form, still retaining the conjunction: Numerous instances of this construction are given by Fritzsch's Quaest. Luc., p. 134, seqq. (Compare Kühner, § 882, Jelf.) — νομιείς Attic for νομίσεις.

§ 15.
συνδεούλον. "Advisers." This is the reply of Aristodemus, who alludes particularly to the so-called genius of Socrates. — δεν ε' 'Αθηναίος, κ. τ. λ. The answer of Socrates. — πυθανομένους τι διὰ μαντικής. "Inquiring about any thing by means of divination." This refers not only to the consulting of omens, but also of oracles.
—οὐ δοκεῖς. "Do you not think." — τέρατα. "Portents." — ἀλλα μόνον σὲ ξαίροντες, κ. τ. λ. "But picking you alone out (from all mankind), do they hold you in neglect?" Literally, "do they put you down in neglect," i.e., put you down and have done with you.

§ 16.
olei ὃ ἄν τοὺς θεοὺς ἐμφύσαι. "Do you think, moreover, that the gods would have engendered." — εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἴσαν. That is, εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν. — ἕξαπατωμένους. That is, in the opinion they had formed, that the gods were able to benefit and to injure. — τὰ χρονιώτατα καὶ σοφώτατα τῶν ὑπερσύνων. "The most abiding and the wisest of human institutions." — αἰ φρονιμώταται ἥλικια. "The most discreet periods of life." Compare Cicero, N. D., ii., 3.—θεῶν ἐπὶ υελίσταται. The adjective here governs the genitive, because the verb to which it corresponds (ἐπιμελεῖον) governs the same case. (Matthiae, § 348, Obs. 1.)

§ 17.
ἀγαθ. "My good friend." Contracted from ὁ ἀγαθ. This expression has always a slight shade of irony or sarcasm, like O bone in Latin. (Compare Viger, iii., 3, 1, and Hermann, ad loc.) — εὐν. "While it is within you." — καὶ τὴν ἐν παντὶ φρόνησιν, κ. τ. λ. "That the intelligence, also, which pervades every part of the universe, disposes that universe in such a way as may be pleasing unto it." — γαί, μη. "And (you ought) not (to suppose)." Supply οἰσθαί χρή.— δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδα καζυκνεῖοια. "Can reach the length of many stadia." The stadium was 600 Greek, or 606½ English feet. The preposition ἐπί is employed in definitions of place, answering to the question "how far?" (Matthiae, § 586, c.) — περὶ τῶν ἐνθύδε. Observe that φροντίς is also construed with the simple genitive. The present arrangement, however, carries with it an air of greater precision. (Matthiae, § 348, Obs. 2.)
§ 18.

ἤν μέντοι. "If, indeed." Observe that μέντοι is a confirmative particle, and is often used to make a new sentence more emphatic. (Kühner, § 730, Jelf.)—ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπωνς θεραπεύων, κ. τ. λ. "Even as by paying attentions unto men you discover those who are inclined to pay you attentions in return."—συμβούλευόμενος. "By consulting along with others."—οὖτω καὶ τῶν θεῶν, κ. τ. λ. "So, by serving them, you make trial of the gods, as to whether," &c.—γνώσει τοῦ θείου, ὅτι ἐστιν. "You will know the godhead, that it is," i. e., you will know that the godhead is. This construction has already been alluded to in § 13.—αὐτοὺς. The gods implied in τοῦ θείου. There is no need, therefore, of our omitting αὐτοὺς with Ernesti, or of reading αὐτό, with others, from a few MSS. Observe, moreover, the air of emphasis which the pronoun αὐτούς carries with it at the close of the sentence; so that its presence is far from being pleonastic.

§ 19.

ἐμοὶ μέν. "Unto me, I confess." Observe the employment of the emphatic form of the personal pronoun, and its position at the beginning of the sentence. Schneider and Dindorf read ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, from one MS.—ὀπότε ὁρῶντο. "Whenever they might be seen." (Compare i., 2, 57.)—ἐν ἱπημίᾳ. "In solitude."—μηδὲν ἥν ποτὲ, κ. τ. λ. "That no one, at any time, of those things which they might be doing, would escape for an instant the observation of the gods." Observe the force of the aorist in διαλαθεῖν.

CHAPTER V.

§ 1.

eἰ δὲ δὴ, κ. τ. λ. "Since, moreover, in very truth, self-control, also, is both an honorable and an excellent possession for a man.' The particle εἰ has here the force of ἐπειδή, the reference being to a case that admits of no doubt; and this case is made still clearer by the addition of δὴ, which is often employed in this way for the purpose of imparting more explicitness to the clause, and then answers to the Latin vero.—εἰ τι προθίβαζε λέγων, κ. τ. λ. "Whether he in any degree urged on others to its attainment by saying such things as follows."—ἀρ' δύναν' ἂν αἰσθανώμεθα, κ. τ. λ. "Whether, whomsoever we should perceive subservient to gluttony or wine, or incapable of enduring labor, or given to sleep, this one would we select!" i. e., whether, if we should perceive any one subservient.
\&c. The genitives ἀαστρῶς, οἶνου, \&c., are genitives of comparison, and ἡππ ἀαστρῶς, \&c., means, literally, "inferior to," or "less than gluttony," \&c. (Matthiae, § 361, a.) So in Latin we have "inferior voluptatibus." Observe, moreover, the absence of ὄντα after ἡππ, the omission of the participle of εἰμί being common in such cases, where the adjective has a predicative force. (Kühlner, § 682, 3, Jelf.)—τῶς πολεμίως κρατάσαι. The verb κρατάω has the meaning of "to subdue," "to master," when joined with the accusative; whereas, when it governs the genitive, it means "to rule over," \&c.

§ 2.

εἰ δὲ γενόμενοι. "And if, on having arrived."—τῷ ἐπιτρέψαι, κ. τ. λ. "To commit unto any one either male children to educate, or maiden daughters to protect, or money to preserve." Observe that the infinitive is used frequently after verbs in themselves of complete meaning, but which would not be sufficiently defined with out such an addition, to express a purpose; as here, παιδεύσαι, διαφώ- λάσαι, διασώσαι. (Matthiae, § 532.)—ἀξιόπιστον εἰς ταῦτα. "Worthy of confidence for these things," i. e., in these matters.—ἡγούμενα. Observe the indicative in the apodosis, after εἰ with the optative in the protasis, and hence expressing a positive certainty that we will not regard him as such. (Kühlner, § 855, b., Jelf.)—ταμεία. "Our granaries."—ἐγγόν ἐπιστασιν. "The superintendence of agricultural labors." Observe that ἐγγόν, like the Latin opus, is often used to denote agricultural operations, or laboring in the fields. (Compare Ruhnken ad Ter., Eun., ii., 1, 14.)—διάκονοι καὶ ἄγοραστὴν τοι- ούτων. "An agent and purveyor of such a character." The ἄγορα- στής was a slave who purchased provisions for the family; a family purveyor. Zeune and Bornemann read τὸν τοιοῦτον, from Stobaeus and Athenæus. The article, however, is added to this word only when it refers to a person already known. (Compare ii., 8, 3, and Matthiae, § 265, 7.)

§ 3.

ἀκρατή. "If intemperate."—πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον, κ. τ. λ. "How is it not worth one's while that he himself guard against becoming such." Observe the effect of the particle γέ on οὐτόν, giving the pronoun a species of reflexive force.—καὶ γάρ, οὐχ ἐξέπερ, κ. τ. λ. The order's, καὶ γάρ ἐξέπερ οὐλ πλεονέκται, κ. τ. λ., οὕτως ὃ ἁκρατῆς οὐ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις, κ. τ. λ.—τῶν ἄλλων ἄφαιρομενοι χρήματα. The verb ἀφαι- ρισθαι is usually construed with two accusatives. (Matthiae, § 418.) An example of its construction with a genitive of the person occurs
NOTES TO BOOK I.—CHAPTER V.

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Thucydides, iii., 58.—*κακοὐργος. "An injurer." Taker. substantively.—ei γε *κακοὐργύαστατον λατι. "Since it is (as all must admit) most injurious." Observe the employment of the indicative with ei to express positive certainty, which we have indicated, in translating, by a parenthetical clause; and compare the explanation of Ernesti: "*Σιγιδημ περνιοισισσιμον est, ut nemo dubitat."—τον ὀλκον τον λαυτον. "One's own substance." Observe here the repetition of the article. The common form of expression would be τον λαυτον ὀλκον; but when the adjunct of the substantive is placed after it, either for emphasis or perspicuity, the article must be repeated. (Buttmann; § 125, 3, Rob.)

§ 4, 5.

ἐν συννουσία δέ. "In society, too."—ἀρι γε οὐ χρή. "Does it not, in short, behove!" Hartung and Kühner give the particle γε in such constructions as the present the meaning of am Ende; it answers rather, however, to our "in short."—κρητίδα. "The foundation."—ἡ τίς οὐκ ἄν, ταῖς ἡδοναῖς δοιλεύων, κ. τ. λ. "Or who would not, by being a slave to his pleasures, be basely disposed as to both his body and his mind," i. e., be degraded both in body and mind.—νη τίν Ἡραν. "By Juno." This form of swearing or adjuration, almost peculiar to women, was often used by Socrates. Compare Menag. ad Diog. Laert., ii., 40,—ἐλευθέρῳ μὲν ἄνδρι εὐκτῶν εἶναι. "That a freeman should pray." Literally, "that it is a thing to be prayed for by a free man." By a free man is here meant one in the truest sense of the term, as free from the influence of all degrading propensities.—ἐκεντεύεν. "Should supplicate." The construction with verbal adjectives often changes to the infinitive alone (Kühner, § 613, Obs. 5, Jell.)—δεσποτῶν ἄγαθῶν. "Good masters," i. e., who would by their manner of living show good examples, and exercise a salutary influence in reclaiming the vicious.

§ 6.

tουαῦτα δὲ λέγων, κ. τ. λ. "And yet, while accustomed to say such things, he exhibited himself as still more continent in his acts than in his words," i. e., while these were his expressed sentiments, he exhibited his own continence still more forcibly by his life and actions than by his mere words.—διὰ τοῦ σώματος. "Enjoyed through the agency of the body," i. e., of the bodily senses.—τορι τοῦ τυχόντος. "From every casual person." Compare note on τὰ τυχόντα, i., 1, 14.—δεσπότην λαυτοῦ καθιστάναι. "Made (that person) a master over himself." Compare i., 2, 6.—οὐδεμίας ἢττω
CHAPTER VI.

§ 1.

"Not less disgraceful than any other." For οἷς ἡττον ἀἰσχρῶν ἠ ἀλήθεια νεών, compare iii., 5, 18; iv., 2, 12.

CHAPTER VI.

§ 2.

tάναντια τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολειλακέναι. "To have enjoyed the opposite from your philosophy," i. e., to have reaped fruits of a directly opposite kind, namely, hardship and wretchedness. Observe that ἀπολαίω is construed with the accusative and genitive. (Matthiae, § 327.)—ζήσ γοῦν ὀθως. "At any rate, you live in such a way." The component parts of γοῦν, namely, γέ and οὖν, are both perceptible here, "at least, for the matter of that," i. e., at any rate. —οὐδ' ἃν εἰς. More emphatic than οὐδεὶς ἃν.—διατόμενος. "Being except."—tà φαυλότατα. "That are of the worst description." Observe the force of the article.—ἡμίτιον ἡμίφεσι. "You are clad in an outer garment." The ἡμίτιον was an outer garment, cloak, or mantle, worn above the χιτῶν or tunic. It was, in fact, a square piece of cloth, thrown over the left, and brought round over or under the right shoulder.—ἀννυπόδητος. At the siege of Potidæa, in particular, he is said to have walked barefoot through snow and ice. (Diog. Laert., ii., 12.)—ἄχιτον. This must not be so understood as if he covered his naked body with only the outer cloak or ἡμίτιον. Socrates usually wore only the shirt, ὑπενδύτης, but not the second covering over that, namely, the ἐπενδύτης, which κατ' ἐξοχὴν the ancients called the "tunic" or χιτών. (Ernesti, ad loc.)
Greek: 

καὶ μὴν. Compare i., 4, 12.—αὶ καὶ κτωμένους ἐθφαίνει, κ. τ. λ. "Which both gladden me in acquiring them, and cause them, on having become possessed of them," &c. Observe the force of the perfect in κτωμένους.—οὕτω καὶ σὺ διαδήσεις. "In this same way, also, you will dispose," i. e., will inspire them with the desire of imitating your comfortless mode of life.—νόμιζε εἶναι. "Consider yourself to be," i. e., you must regard yourself as being.—δοκεῖς μοι, ἔφη Some MSS. and early editions omit ἔφη. The Greeks, however, often insert ἔφη, even when a verb of saying has preceded. In like manner, igitur is sometimes redundant in Latin. (Compare Kühner ad Cic., Tusc., V., 36, 105.)—δεπιληφέναι. "To have concluded."—ὁστε πέπεισομαι. "That I am persuaded."—ὁστερ ἤγγ. "As I do." For ὡσπερ ἤγ. ζ. In the construction with ἦ, the word with which another is compared is usually put in the same case with the word compared, or subject of the comparison. Sometimes, however, after ἦ, the nominative is used, as in the present instance, if another verb can be supplied. (Matthiae, § 448, 1, a.)—τῇ χαλεπὸς ἥσθησα τοῦ μοῦ βίον. "What particular hardship you have discovered in this life of mine." (Matthiae, § 317.)

§ 5.

πότερον, δις, κ. τ. λ. "Have you perceived this hardship in my mode of life, in that, &c. Supply, for a full construction, χαλεπὸν ἥσθησα τοῦτο τοῦ μοῦ βίον.—ἀπεργάζοσαί. "To work out."—ἐμοὶ δέ. "While unto me, on the other hand." The more regular, but less emphatic form of enunciating the whole clause would have been as follows: ἐκείνως λαμβάνοντας ἄργυριον ἀναγκαίον ἐν... ἐμοὶ μὴ λαμβάνοτε σού ἀνύγκη διαλέγοσάι, κ. τ. λ. Two clauses, however, of the same construction are sometimes, as here, opposed to each other by μὲν and δέ, in order to connect the former, which ought to have been expressed by a clause dependent on the context, by putting it in contrast with the latter. And it is this opposition of μὲν and δέ, and this independent enunciation of the two clauses, which imparts an air of greater energy and vigor to the whole sentence. (Dissen ad Demosth., de Cor., c. 97. Matthiae, § 622, 4. Kühner, § 764, c., Jelf.)

τήν διαιτάν μου. "This diet of mine."—ὡς ἦττον μὲν ῥγεινά, κ. τ. λ. "Because I eat, as you think, less wholesome things than you do." Observe, as before, the construction of ὡς with the genitive absolute, to indicate, not a fact, but a supposition or idea occurring to another; and compare i., 1, 4.—ἢ ὡς χαλεπώτερα τορίσα
CHAPTER VI.

σθαί, κ. τ. λ. "Or because my viands are, as you suppose, more difficult to supply one's self with, in consequence of their being," &c. We have here, again, with ὄς, a construction similar to that in the preceding clause, ὄντα being understood after χαλεπῶτερα, except that we have now the accusative absolute instead of the genitive absolute.—πρὸς σθαί. An active or middle infinitive is often used in Greek, where a passive supine would be expected in Latin. This occurs particularly after adjectives, and more especially after ὁδίως and χαλεπῶς. (Matthew, § 535.)—ἐμοὶ ἄ ἐγώ. A correction of Ernesti's, confirmed by two MSS. The common text has ἐμοῦ λέγω.—διὶ ὁ μὲν ἡδίκα ἑσθίων, κ. τ. λ. "That he who eats with the greatest relish requires condiments least."—τοῦ μὴ παρόντος πατοῦ. "Drink difficult to procure." Literally, "drink that is not present," i. e., not ready at hand.

§ 6.

ήματια. Governed by μεταβαλλόμενοι.—καὶ ὑποδήματα ὑποδούνται. "And bind sandals under their feet." More freely, "put on sandals." The ὑπόδημα was merely a sole bound to the foot. Observe the force of the middle in ὑποδούνται.—διὰ τὰ λυποῦντα τοὺς πόδας. "By the things which annoy the feet."—ἡδῆ οὖν ποτε ἡσθοῦν. "Now, then, have you ever perceived."—μᾶλλον τοῦ ἑνδον μένοντα. "Remaining at home more than any other," i. e., more than any other who was more seasonably clad. Observe that τοῦ is Attic for τινὸς. So, presently, τῷ, for τινί.—διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τοὺς πόδας. "On account of any annoyance to my feet."

§ 7, 8.

μελετήσαντες. "On having practiced," i. e., by dint of exercise.—μελησάντων. "Who neglect (exercise)."—πρὸς ἄν μελέτωσί. Observe that ἄν is for ἄν. The common reading is πρὸς ὁ μελέτωσι.—ἐμὲ δὲ ἄρα οὔκ οἴει, κ. τ. λ. "And do you not think that I, by constantly practicing to endure with my body every thing that may befall it," &c.—τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλέψειν γαστρί, κ. τ. λ. "Think you, moreover, that there is any more effectual cause of my not being a slave to appetite, &c., than my regarding those other things as more pleasing than these, which (other) things," &c.—ἐν χρείᾳ δοντα. "When used."—ἄλλα καὶ ἐλπίδας, κ. τ. λ. "But also (de-light) as affording hopes," &c. Observe that εὐφραίνει belongs also to this clause, being understood with it.—καὶ μὴν τούτο γε. Compare i., 4, 12.—ὅτι οἱ μὲν οἰομένοι, κ. τ. λ. "That they who think they are in no respect prosperous are not delighted."—καλῶς ἔρ
γιγνεσθαι. "That one is becoming."—καὶ φίλοις ἦμεινον κτάσθαι. "And is acquiring friends of superior character."—ἀγω τοινυν δια- τελῶ, κ. τ. λ. "I accordingly will continue to hold to these opinions."—ποτέρῳ ἡ πλείων σχολή, κ. τ. λ. "Which of the two will have the more leisure to concern himself about these things?" With ποτέρῳ supply ἄν εἰπή, which actually appears in one MS., and is introduced into several editions.—ἐκπολιορκηθεὶς ἄν ὑμττον. "Would sooner be captured." The verb ἐκπολιορκεῖσθαι is here taken in a somewhat subdued sense. It properly means "to take a city, or strong place, by storm." In its application to persons, however, it approximates to the meaning of αἴρεω.—χαλεπωτάτων εὑρεῖν. Compare § 5.—ὑρκαύντως χρώμενός. "Using contentedly," ι. ε., contented with, and equivalent to ὑρκαύντως.

§ 10.

ἔσικας οἰσμένῳ. "You seem to think." Literally, "you appear like one thinking." The participle is often put for the infinitive. In many cases it is quite indifferent which construction is chosen Ἐσικέναι, "to appear," takes the infinitive; but since it signifies, also, "to resemble," it may take the same action, which is other wise in the infinitive, in the dative of the participle. (Matthia, § 655, Obs. 2. Kähner, § 682, 2; § 684, Jelf.)—τρήφῃ καὶ πολυτέλειαν. "Mere luxury and extravagance."—δεσσάι. Two MSS. have δεί- σαθαι, but without any necessity, since Xenophon, in this verb, is fond of the open or uncontracted forms. Compare Matthia, § 52, and Krüger ad Ἀναβ., vii., 4, 8.—Θείων. "A divine attribute." We have here one of the most celebrated maxims of the Socratic school. It is copiously illustrated by Ruhnken, ad loc.—το δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων, κ. τ. λ. "And that, to be in want of the fewest things possible, is nearest to the divine nature," ι. ε., resembles it most closely.—καὶ τὸ μὲν θείων. Weiske reads, from conjecture, καίτοι τὸ μὲν, rendering καίτοι by the Latin particle atque.

§ 11.

ἐγώ τοι. "I, for my part." Compare note on μάλα τοι, i., 2, 46.—σοφὸν δὲ οὖν ὑπωστιοῦν. "But not even in any way whatsoever wise," ι. ε., but not in the least wise.—οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνουσίας κ. τ. λ. "At least, for the matter of that, you exact no fee for the holding converse with you." On the force of γοῦν, consult note τι.
γοῦν, § 2, and with regard to πράττη, compare note on τοῖς δὲ ἐκντο, κ. τ. λ., i., 2., 5.—καίτοι. "And yet."—νομίζων. "If you considered it."—οὖντι ἄν μὴ δότι, κ. τ. λ. "You would not only not give to any person gratis, but not, indeed, if you received any thing less than the value," i. e., so far from giving to any one gratuitously, you would not part with it unless you received its full equivalent. The construction here is elliptical, the full form being μὴ λέγω δότι, κ. τ. λ. "Not to say that you would not give," &c., as in Latin, ne dicam. (Matthiae, § 610, 2. Kühner, § 762, 2, Jelf.)—ἐλαττον τῆς ἁξίας. The regular construction would be ἐλαττον ἢ ἡ ἁξία τούτων τῶν χρημάτων ἐκτι: oftentimes, however, when, as here, we ought to have ἢ followed by an entire proposition, the substantive of this is alone employed, and put in the genitive. (Matthiae, § 451. Kühner, § 783, h., Jelf.)

§ 12.

ὁδηλον ὦ. "It is evident, then."—εἰ καὶ. Observe that καὶ does not belong to ἐλ, but to συνονείαν in the signification of also. (Compare Kühner, § 861, Jelf.)—ὁου, 2d sing. imperf. ind. of οἶομαι.—καὶ ταύτης ἄν οὐκ ἐλαττον, κ. τ. λ. "You would exact for this, likewise, no less money than it is worth."—δικαιος μὲν οὖν ἄν εἰς. "You may, perchance, then be," &c.—ἐπὶ πλεονεξία. "For your own advantage."—σοφός δὲ οὐκ ἄν. "A wise man, however, you can not in all likelihood be." Supply εἰς after ἄν. (Kühner, § 430, 1, Jelf.)—μηθένως γε δέξια. "Things worthy of nothing, indeed," i. e., worth nothing at all; of no practical value. Observe the emphasis which γε imports here to μηθένως.

§ 13.

παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται, κ. τ. λ. "With us it is thought that it is alike honorable and alike disgraceful to dispose of one's beauty and wisdom (unto others)." More freely, "that beauty and wisdom may be disposed of alike honorably and alike disgracefully," i. e., it is disgraceful to sell either for lucre's sake; it is honorable to employ either in gaining a firm friend. The verb διατίθεσαι is properly used of merchants who expose their goods for sale; here, however, it is applied in part to the Sophists, who sold their knowledge to all who could afford to pay. Observe the force of the middle in this verb: "to set forth or arrange as one likes," i. e., as he thinks may tempt others to buy.—καλὼς τε κἀγαθὸν ἔραστην. "Both an honorable and worthy admirer."—καὶ τὴν σοφίαν τοὺς μὲν, κ. τ. λ. "And they stigmatize as Sophists those who sell wisdom for money to whosoever wishes (to buy)." Socrates means, that from their inor-
ordinate love of gain, the name of *Sophist* was marked with the infamous idea of the grossest venality; in other words, they were so many prostitutes of wisdom. Observe that the words in the text, τὴν σοφίαν τοὺς μὲν πωλοῦντας, are so placed as to strengthen the opposition, instead of τοὺς μὲν τὴν σοφίαν πωλοῦντας. A substantive which depends on an article and participle, in place of being put between them, is often set before the article, for greater emphasis (Compare iv., 4, 7, and Bornemann *ad Anab.*, v., 6, 7.)—εὐφύς. “Of a noble disposition.” Three MSS. and the old editions have εὐφύς. Both forms, however, as Kühner remarks, are found in Plato, although the termination in ἀ is the more frequent of the two.—δὲ ἀν ἔχω ἄγαθὸν. “Whatever good thing he may know.” Observe that ἔχω, from its signification “to possess,” is used sometimes in the sense of “to know,” “to be skilled in.” (Compare Herbst, *ad loc.* Stallb. *ad Plat.*, *Euthyphr.*, p. 18.)—φίλον ποιήται. We have given ποιήται with Dindorf from two MSS. The common text has φίλον ποιήται, where Matthiae endeavors, though not very successfully, to account for the absence of ἀν, by supposing that the preceding ἀν belongs to ποιήται also. (*Matthiae*, § 527, Obs. 2.)

§ 14.

ἐγὼ δ’ οὖν καὶ αὐτός. “And, therefore, I myself also.”—δρυμβι. “Falcon.”—καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι. “And I recommend them to others,” i. e., for farther instruction. In illustration of the force of συνίστημι here, Kühner refers to Bornemann in *Ind. ad Anab.*, p. 673, &c.—ὤφελήσεθαι. Future middle in a passive sense. Compare ἀνώσεται and στερήσεται in i., 1, 8. Dindorf reads ὀφελήθεσαί.—τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἐνόρων. “Of the wise men of old.” C. F. Hermann refers this to the poets, but it may mean, also, the earlier philosophers, whose works were studied by Socrates, in order to select any good thing he might find contained in them. Observe that the adverb πάλαι, thus placed between the article and its clause, has an adjectival force. (*Matthiae*, § 272, a.)—ἐν βιβλίοις γράφαντες. ‘Having written them in volumes.’—ἐὰν ἄλλοις φίλοις γινόμεθα. “If (thus) we become (dearer) friends to one another,” i. e., we were before this bound to one another by the ties of amity, and this communion of studies renders us still more so. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—αὐτός. “Himself.” Referring to Socrates.—ἐπὶ καλοκαγαθίαν. “To all that was good and honorable.”

§ 15.

ποτὲ. “On one occasion.”—πῶς ἥγεται ποιεῖν. “How he thinks of making,” i. e., how he thinks he can make. We have given here
in ἤγειται the reading of most MSS. In three MSS. and some old editions we have ἤγειτο. Ernesti and other more recent editors read ἤγειτο . . . . πράττοι, from three MSS.—αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ πράττει, κ. τ. λ. “And yet does not himself engage in public affairs, if, indeed, he knows (aught about them).” Observe the air of sarcasm in εἰπερ επίστατα. For επίστατα some have επίστατο, others ἤπιστατο.—ποτέρως δέ. “But whether.” The particle δέ in interrogations often refers to something to be supplied by the imagination. Thus, in the present instance, the full form of expression would be, Αὐγεῖς μὲν ἠμὲ τὰ· πολετικὰ μὴ πράττειν· ποτέρως δέ, κ. τ. λ.—ἡ ἐν ἐπι- μελοῦσιν τού, κ. τ. λ. “Or if I should exercise care about the making as many as possible fit to engage in them,” i. e., if I should endeavor to train as many as possible to a fitness for engaging in them.

CHAPTER VII.

§ 1.

εἰ καὶ. Compare i., 6, 12.—ἀλαζόνειας. “From arrogant assumption.”—προαίτρεπεν. Compare i., 2, 64.—ἐν εὐδοξία. “To a fair reputation.” Schneider, Reiske, Dindorf, and Ernesti read ἐν εὐδοξίαν, but the dative denotes more of what is abiding and permanent.—ἄγαθὸς τοῦτο, δ, κ. τ. λ. “Actually good in that, in which,” &c. Observe that τοῦτο and δ are accusatives of nearer definition.—δὲ δεδόσκεν. “He proved in the following way.”

§ 2.

ἐνθυμώμεθα γὰρ. The particle γὰρ refers to the previous discourse of Socrates, in which incidental mention was made of arrogance and ostentation.—ἀρ’ οὐ τὰ ἐξω τῆς τέχνης, κ. τ. λ. “Must he not imitate good flute-players in all the external appendages of their art?” Literally, “with reference to the things without their art.”—σκεύης καλά. “Splendid attire.” Some think that instruments are meant; but these are not ἐξω τῆς τέχνης. The musicians of ancient Greece were accustomed to go about dressed in the most splendid and costly habiliments.—ἐπείτα. For. Compare i., 2, 1.—ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔργου, κ. τ. λ. “But yet he must nowhere undertake any open performance (of skill).”—γελαίος. “A fit subject of ridicule.”—ἀνθρωπος ἀλαζῶν. “A vain-boaster.”—καλταλ. “An- yet.”—κακοδοξῶν. “Being in bad repute.”

§ 3.

ὡς δʼ αὐτώς. “In this same way, moreover.” So in several MSS., in place of the common reading ἡσαύτους.—ἐννοοῦμεν, τι ἄλ
κατ' ὁμοθέτην. "Let us consider what would happen unto him," i.e., what would be the natural result in his case.—ἀφ' ὁν ἄν. Compare i., 2, 4.—ταύτην λυπηρῶν. With ταύτην supply ὁδῷ, and εἰς after λυπηρῶν. For ταύτη, Heindorf reads τούτ' εἰς.—κυβερνῶν τε κατασταθεῖς. For the infinitive after verbs signifying "to appoint," "to choose," &c., consult Matthia, § 532, b. Dindorf omits the conjunction τε.—καὶ αὐτὸς αἰσχρῶς, κ. τ. λ. "And he himself would come off both disgracefully and with loss," i.e., would have to retreat from, or abandon, his post. Literally, "would depart." The Latins use male discedere nearly in the same sense.

§ 4.

ἔσαυτός δὲ, κ. τ. λ. "In like manner, also, he showed that both for one to appear to be rich," &c. With δοκεῖν supply εἶναι.—ἀλυστέλες. "Was productive of no advantage." Supply ὁν. After verbs of declaring, showing, &c., the participle of the verb εἰναι is often omitted. (Kühner, § 582, 3, Jelf.)—προστάττεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς, κ. τ. λ. "For he said that duties were (thus) imposed upon them greater than accorded with their strength." As regards μελζω, ἐκατὰ δύναμιν, consult Matthia, § 449. A similar construction occurs at iv., 4, 24, and iv., 7, 10.—δοκοῦντας Ικανοῖς εἶναι. "While appearing to be capable."—ὁν ἰν τυχόνειν. "Would not be likely to meet with." Observe the force of ὅν in denoting mere contingency or possibility.

§ 5.

ἀπατῶν δ' ἐκάλει, κ. τ. λ. "He called him, moreover, no trifling impostor, in case one having obtained money or equipment from any person by dint of persuasion, should defraud him of these." Supply αὐτὸν ταύτα after ἀποστερολη.—πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον. "But by far the greatest (impostor he pronounced him to be)."—μηδενὸς ἄξιος ὅν. "Being a good-for-nothing fellow."—ἐξηπατήκει. Supply τὴν πόλιν, and translate τῆς πόλεως in the succeeding clause as equivalent to αὐτῆς. Weiske conjectures ἐξηπατήκαι, and Schneider ἐξαπατήη; but, as Kühner correctly remarks, Socrates apparently states a case as having actually occurred, and therefore the indicative is employed.—τοιῶδε διαλεγόμενος. "By such discourses as these (just mentioned)." As Kühner remarks, we would expect τοιαῦτα here; but τοιῶδε has here a more graphic force, and places the narrative, as it were, before the very eyes of the reader; hence τοιῶδε διαλεγόμενος becomes equivalent to "durch die vorliegenden Reden." (Kühner, ad loc.)
BOOK II.

CHAPTER I

§ 1.

το άρτα λέγων. "By the following arguments." Literally, "by saying such things" as follow.—προτρέπειν. Compare i., 2, 64.—ισχεῖν εγκράτειαν, κ. τ. λ. “To practice continence as regarded the desire of food, and drink, and sleep, and (to exercise) endurance of cold, and heat, and toil.” The original contains some difficulty here, r, though we may correctly say εγκράτεια πρὸς ἐπιθυμιάν βρωτοῦ, αἰ ποιεῖ, καὶ ἐπιτ νοεῖ, yet we can not so well explain the connected words εγκράτεια πρὸς ἐπιθυμιάν ἔργους, καὶ θάλπους, καὶ πόνου. Sauppe supposes Xenophon to have negligently blended together two constructions, intending to say ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ, κ. τ. λ., and then, as if πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν did not precede, to add ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν ἔργους, κ. τ. λ. This is the simplest explanation, and is adopted also by Kühner. Similar instances of neglect of strictness in style occur in the best authors. Dindorf, however, reads καὶ ἔργος, καὶ θάλπος, καὶ πόνον, but, if Xenophon had intended this, he would undoubtedly have repeated the preposition πρὸς, and would have said καὶ πρὸς ἔργος, κ. τ. λ. (Wheeler, ad loc.)

γνοὺς δέ. Observe that δέ has here the force of γὰρ.—ἀκολοσσο-τέρως ἔχοντα, κ. τ. λ. “Was disposed, after a more intemperate manner than usual, toward such things as these.” Literally, “as having himself,” &c.—Ἀρίστιππε. This was the celebrated Arisippus, a native of Cyrene, and the subsequent founder of the Cyrenaic school. He remained with Socrates almost up to the time of his execution. Though a disciple of the philosopher, he wandered both in principle and practice very far from the teaching and example of his great master. He was luxurious in his mode of living, indulged in sensual gratifications, and was the first of the followers of Socrates who afterward took money for his teaching. The doctrine of his school was, that pleasure formed the chief good, and pain the chief evil. The anecdotes which are told of him, however, by no means give us the notion of a person who was the mere slave of his passions, but rather of one who took a pride in extracting enjoyment from all circumstances of every kind, and in controlling adversity and prosperity alike. (Smith, Dict. Biogr., vol. i., p. 208.)
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τῶν νέων. “Of the young men of the day.” Observe the force of the article.—όπως. “In what way,” i. e., in such a way that.—υπερ ἀντιποίησεται ὑπέχεις. “He shall not even seek after authority.” Observe the force of the middle.—βούλει σκόπουμεν, κ. τ. λ. “Do you wish that we consider the subject by having commenced with their nutriment.” The subjunctive is used without a conjunction, and without ἄν after βούλει in interrogations. (Matthiae, § 516, 3.)—ὑρζήμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς. With this verb, the genitive, without a preposition, marks the action, or condition itself, which is commencing; but the genitive with ἀπὸ marks the individual point which is the first in a continued action or condition. Hence τροφῆ, and, after it, στοιχεῖα, mark the point whence the inquiry commences. Compare Matthiae, § 336, Obs., 2.—δοκεῖ γοῦν μοι, κ. τ. λ. “Nutriment certainly appears to me to be the first rudiment.” Observe the force of γοῦν. Literally, “at least, for the matter of that”

§ 2.

οὐκον τὸ μὲν βουλεσθαει, κ. τ. λ. “Is it not natural, then, that the desire to partake of food be present unto both, whenever the proper time may have come? (You are right), for it is natural, replied the other.” Observe the elliptical construction of γὰρ, and compare i., 4 9. —τὸ οὖν προαιρεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ. “Which one of them, then, should we habituate to the preferring to accomplish that which is urgent, rather than to gratify the appetite?” The adverb μᾶλλον is often added, by pleonasm, to the verb προαιρεῖσθαι. (Compare iii., 5, 16; iv., 2, 9.) Observe, moreover, that the verb ἐβίζειν is here construed with two accusatives, one of the person, and the other of the thing; but the latter accusative consists in the present case of an article with the infinitive. Compare Hist. Gr., vi., 1, 4, where the accusative of the thing is a pronoun. Elsewhere the thing is in the dative (Compare Kühner, § 583, 56, Jelf.)—νη Δία. “Certainly.”—όπως ὑπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, κ. τ. λ. “In order that the affairs of the state may not be left undone during his government,” i. e., be left neglected. Compare Kühner, “ne res publica infecta vel neglecta relinquantur.” Observe, moreover, that παρὰ is here temporal, and refers to extension in time. (Kühner, § 637, iii., 2, B., Jelf.)—τὸ δύνασθαι διψῶντα ἀνέχεσθαι. “The being able, when thirsting, to endure it,” i. e., to endure thirsting, or, in other words, the power of enduring thirst.—πάντων μὲν οὖν. “Most assuredly.”
§ 3.

ἐπνοι ἐγκρατῆ. "Temperate in sleep." Adjectives, derived from verbs which govern a genitive, are construed also with the same case. Compare i., 5, 6; ii., 6, 1; and Matthia, § 361.—κομηθήναι. "To lie down." Passive in a middle sense.—ἀγρυπνησαί. "To remain awake (all night long)."—τί δέ. "But what?" i. e., but further. This combination of particles serves for the purpose of passing on quickly to a fresh point, and is analogous to the Latin quid vero.—τῷ αὐτῷ. Supply προσθετέων.—τὸ ὄφρος ὅπων ἐγκράτη εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. At the end of this clause we must mentally supply ποτέρω ἄν προσθεῆμεν.—ἀρχεῖν. "For governing." Observe the employment of the infinitive to express a purpose, and compare Matthia, § 532, a.—τὸ μαθεῖν, εἰ τι ἐπιτηθεῖον ἐστι, κ. τ. λ. "If there be any branch of instruction adapted to the mastering of our antagonists, unto which it would be more proper that the learning of this be added?"—ἄνευ τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων. "Without instruction of this kind."

§ 4.

ἡττον ἄν ἀλίσκεσθαι. "Would be less likely to be ensnared."—σούτων γὰρ δῆποι, κ. τ. λ. "For some of these, namely, being alured by appetite, and certain ones (of this number), though very shy, being yet attracted to the bait by the desire of gratifying their gluttony, are captured, while others are entrapped by drink." The words ἐνία δυσωπούμενα are subjoined to the preceding words τὰ μὲν γαστρὶ δελεάζομενα by the figure called by grammarians σχῆμα καθ' ὀλον καὶ μέρος. Thus, τὰ μὲν γαστρὶ δελεάζομενα refer to the whole, of which ἐνία δυσωπούμενα indicate a part, and the verb ἀλίσκεσθαι is joined to the clause which denotes the part, while the clause that refers to the whole is left without any verb. (Kühner, § 708, 2, Jelf.)—ολον. "As, for instance."—συνέφη καὶ ταύτα. "He assented to these things also."

§ 5.

taυτὰ πάσχειν, κ. τ. λ. "To be affected in the same way with the most senseless of wild creatures." Literally, "to suffer the same things with," &c. Observe that ταύτα here is for τὰ αὐτὰ. All words denoting coincidence, equality, similarity, &c., take the dative. (Kühner, § 594, 2, Jelf.)—ὁσςερ. "As, to cite an instance."—εἰς τὰς εἴρκτας. "Into the private apartments (of dwellings)." By εἴρκτας are here meant the γυναικεῖα, or women's apartments, where, in accordance with Grecian custom, the females of the fam-
ly were kept secluded; for ἐφρκτή properly denotes a shut place or inclosure.—κένδυνος. Supply ἐστι.—ἀ τε ὁ νόμος, κ. τ. λ. As regards the punishment inflicted for this offence by the Athenian law, consult Smith, Dict. Ant., s. v. Adulterium.—ὑδραθήναι. “Of being most violently treated”—δῆμος εἰς τὰ ἐπικινδύνα φέρεσθαι. “For one, nevertheless, to be borne headlong into the midst of those things that are fraught with danger.” In the editions before that of Schneider, we have ἐλαϊνεται δῆμος, κ. τ. λ., but ἐλαϊνεται is now omitted on the authority of two MSS.—ἀρ' οὐκ ἥδη τούτο, κ. τ. λ. “Is not this now the part of one altogether possessed?” i. e., of an utter madman. The verb κακοδαιμονίω means, properly, to be transformed by an evil genius.

§ 6, 7.

τὸ δὲ εἶναι μὲν, κ. τ. λ. “Again, does it not appear to you to gross neglect, that the greatest number of the most necessary employments of men are performed in the open air!” &c.—τοὺς δὲ πολλούς, κ. τ. λ. “And yet, that the majority of mankind are untrammelled to bear cold and heat.” As regards the plural forms ψύχη and θάλπη, vid. note on i., 4, § 13.—ἀσκεῖν δεῖν καὶ ταῦτα, κ. τ. λ. “Should practice to endure with ease these hardships also.”—οὕκουν εἰ τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς, κ. τ. λ. “Shall we not, then, if we class those who are disciplined in all these points with men fitted to command, class those incapable of doing these things with those,” &c.—ἀντιποιοσινένους. The common text has ἀντιποιοσιμένους, for which we have given the future participle with Schneider.—ἐπειδὴ καὶ τούτων ἑκατέρου, κ. τ. λ. “Since you even know the rank of each class of these men, have you ever yet considered with yourself,” &c.

§ 8.

οὐδαμὸς γε. “By no means, I can assure you.”—τὸ, μεγάλον ἔργον δυνομέω, κ. τ. λ. “When it is a great trouble to procure for one’s self the necessaries of life, that this occupation does not prove sufficient for him, but that he impose upon himself the additional task of procuring,” &c. The substantive ἔργον is omitted in one MSS. Kühner incloses it in brackets. With ἔρκειν supply αύτῷ. The verb ἔρκειν is often found without the dative of the person, as in ii., 2, 6 ; iv., 4, 9. Nothing is of more frequent occurrence in the Greek writers than for the subject of the preceding clause to become the object in the succeeding, and that, too, in such a way as not even to be indicated by the pronoun. (Kühner, ad loc.)—καὶ ἐντῷ μὲν ἐλλεπεῖν. “And to deny himself.”—ὦν βούλετω. The subject of
NOTES TO BOOK II.—CHAPTER 1.

Βούλεται is to be deduced from the words ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπως which precede. Observe, moreover, that ὅν is by attraction for τούτων ὃ—προστάτω. "On becoming the presiding officer."—τούτων διὰν ὑπέχειν. "To have to give an account of this," i. e., to render himself liable to punishment for this.

§ 9.

καὶ γὰρ ἄξιοσίν αἱ πόλεις. "And, (no wonder), for states think it right."—ἐγώ τε... αἱ τε. Compare i., 1, 14.—ἀφθονα. "In abundance." Marking the predicate, as is shown by the position of the article with ἐπιτήδεια. (Matthews, § 277, b.)—ὡς πλείωτα ἡγαθά. "As many advantages as possible."—πολλὰ πρώγματα ἔχειν, κ. τ. λ. "To have much trouble for themselves, and to afford it unto others." Many alterations of the text have been proposed here, but without any necessity; for those engaged in official duties are of necessity obliged to impose their respective duties on their subordinates, and to excite in them a spirit of activity and energy. (Wheeler, ad loc.)—οὕτως παιδεύσω. "After having thus trained them," i. e., after they had been thus trained.—γὰρ ἡστά τε καὶ ἥστατα βιοτευών. "To pass their lives in the way in which (it is) both most easy and agreeable." With γὰρ apply ὅπως.

§ 10, 11.

βούλει σκεψώμεθα. Compare § 1.—πότεροι. Some read πότερον—ὅν ἄρχόμενον. So in five MSS. The article is omitted in the common editions.—ὡν ἡμεῖς ἴσομεν. Observe that ὅν is here by attraction for οὗς.—Σύροι, καὶ Φρύγες, καὶ Αὐδοί. Jacobs aptly remarks, that Socrates designedly mentions, out of several nations, those held in the greatest contempt among the Greeks.—Μαωται. The Maeotians dwell near the Palus Maeotis, or Sea of Asop. They are distinguished from the Scythians by Herodotus, iv., 123.—Αἴβες. By the Libyans are here meant the roving tribes in the interior of Africa.—ἄλλα ἐγώ τοι. "Nay, I indeed." A formula of objection in reply.—οὕδε ἐς τὴν βούλειαν, κ. τ. λ. "Neither, on the other hand, do I consign myself unto slavery," i. e., assign myself to the class of those who are ruled over by others. The αὐ in this clause refers back to, and connects itself with the commencement of § 8. The meaning is, as I am not inclined, on the one hand, to assign myself a place among those desirous of ruling, so, on the other, am I as little inclined to belong to the class of the subjugated.—τίς μέση τούτων ὀδύς. "A middle kind of path." The pronoun τίς is often separated from its substantive by the interposition of several words—οὕτε δὲ ἄρχης. Supply ἀγωνισ.
NOTES TO BOOK II.—CHAPTER I.

§ 12.

υλλ' ει μέντοι, κ. τ. λ. "But if, in very truth, replied Socrates, even as this same path (of ours) leads neither through command nor subjection, so it were to lead through human society, you would, perhaps, be saying something to the same purpose," i. e., something that carried weight with it. After δι' ἄνθρωπων supply φέρου, and observe, moreover, that μέντοι has here a confirmative force. The μέν-οι, however, which commences the next clause, has an adversative force, and must be rendered "however." (Kühner, ad loc.) —ὅν. "While you are."—μήτε ἄξιώσεις, κ. τ. λ. "You will neither think it meet to command yourself, or be commanded, nor will willingly show respect to those in authority." We have given ἄξιώσεις and θεραπεύσεις with Bornemann and others, in place of the common reading ἄξιωσις and θεραπεύσις. The latter, indeed, has all the MSS. in its favor; but as the terminations σεις and σης are often confounded by the copyists, and as the sense evidently requires the indicative here (the reference being to an express and definite opinion avowed before this by Aristippus), the old reading must yield to the new. (Kühner, ad loc.)

ὅς ἐπίσταναι οἱ κρείττονες, κ. τ. λ. "That the powerful know, by having made their inferiors both publicly and privately to weep, how to treat them as slaves." We have given καθίσαντες with Schneider, from Xen., Cyrop., ii., 2, 14, in place of καθίσαντες, the reading of other editors. Consult Plato, Ion, 505, E., and Stallbaum, ad loc. The verb καθίζω properly means "to set down," "to make to sit down," and hence, "to put into a state or condition," or simply "to make," "to render," and hence κλαίοντας καθίσαντες is here equivalent, as Coray remarks, to κλαίειν ποιήσαντες.—δούλοις χρήσθαι. Zeune and others read ὅς δούλοις χρήσθαι. This, however, changes the meaning, for it renders the slavery doubtful, whereas the omission of ὅς makes it real. (Kühner, ad loc.)

§ 13.

ἡ λανθάνουσα, κ. τ. λ. "Do those escape your observation, who, after others have sown and planted, cut down their corn, and fell their trees, and harass in every way their inferiors," &c., i. e., have you never seen persons, who, after others have sown and planted, have cut down their corn. &c.—πυλώρκοιντες. The verb πολυρκέω properly means "to besiege," &c., and is then applied to all other violent and oppressive conduct. (Jacobs, ad loc.)—καί ἕδις αὖ. "And again in private life."—οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι καὶ ἄνωτοι, κ. τ. λ. The order is, σὺν οἴσθα δτε οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι, κ. τ. λ.—καρπούνται. "Reap the fruit
of the latter's labor."—οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλεῖω " Do not shut myself up in any one state."—ξένος. "A temporary guest."

§ 14.
τουτο μέντοι ἡδή, κ. τ. λ. "Now, truly, you mention in this an admirable artifice." Ironical. By πάλαιον is properly meant a trick or artifice peculiar to wrestlers, by which they endeavored to trip up their antagonists. Here, however, it denotes any cunning and artful device in general.—ἐξ οὗ. "Since."—Σίννες, καὶ ὁ Σκεί-ρων, &c. These were celebrated robbers destroyed by Theseus. There is a pleasant irony in this speech of Socrates. He means, in fact, to say, although such cruel robbers as Sinnis, Seiron, and Procrustes no longer infest the public roads, yet there are not wanting other men to injure you. Hence, though he uses the expression οὐδείς ἔτι ἀδικεῖ, he means directly the reverse. We have retained the ordinary orthography in the name Σίννες, although the more correct form would appear to be Σίνις. Compare Valek. ad Eurip., Hippol., 977.—οἱ μὲν πολιτεύομεν ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι. "They who live as free citizens in their native states." The idea intended to be conveyed is this: If the most careful endeavors, on the part of the citizens of states, to repress wrong-doing, are nevertheless insufficient, how little can unprotected strangers reckon on personal security.—πρὸς τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καλομένοις. "In addition to those who are called relations by blood." The term ἀναγκαῖος answers to the Latin necessarii, and denotes those that are connected with us by necessary or natural ties, or, in other words, those related by blood.—οἱ ἀμώνονται. "By which they seek to repel."—ὡς ἀδικο-οὐντες. "Are nevertheless wronged."

§ 15.
ἐν ὑς ταῖς ὁδοῖς. This and εἰς ὁποιαν δέ are opposed to οὐδέν μέν, &c. Hence the double δέ.—πολὺν χρόνον ἄπαθεν. "Spending much time," i. e., in passing from state to state, and from city to city.—ἡττών. "Inferior," i. e., as being a mere stranger.—καὶ τοι-ούτος, τίοις, κ. τ. λ. "And that, too, when you are such a character as," &c. Observe the employment of the plural in οἶκοι after the singular τοιοῦτος, the reference in οἶκος being to an entire class, and not to any definite individual. (Kühner, § 819, 2, a., Jelf.) The reference, moreover, in τοιοῦτος is to one who is a mere vagrant, who roams about without any settled abode, who is the citizen of no one state, and is, therefore, unprotected by any. (Kühner, ad loc.)—ὅδε ὡς ξένος εἶναι. Observe the nominative with the infinitive, the ref-
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...ence being to the same person who is the subject of the finite verb.

—ὑ διστί καὶ δοῦλος, κ. τ. λ. “Or is it because you think that you would be such a slave as to be profitable to no master?” The mode of life led by Aristippus was most costly and expensive, nor had he any inclination to work; hence he imagined that no one would be likely to reduce him to slavery, as his maintenance would cost more than his earnings were worth. Socrates soon shows the futility of this idea.—τῇ δὲ πολυτελεστάτη, κ. τ. λ. “And yet, delighting in the most sumptuous fare.”

§ 16.

χρωνται. “Manage.”—ἀρα οὖ. These particles, like the Latin nonne, require an answer in the affirmative; while ἀρα μή, like numne, require an answer in the negative. (Kühner, § 873, 3, Jelf.)—σωφρονίζοντι. “Check,” i. e., cool down.—ἀποκλειόντες δὲν. “By detaining them (from all places) whence.”—ἡ. In the sense of εἰς. “It may be possible.”—τοῦ δραπετεύειν. “From running away.”—ἐξαναγκάζονσιν. “They drive out.”

§ 17.

τᾶςι κακοῖς. “With all kinds of punishments.”—δουλεύειν. “To act as becomes a slave.” Compare the explanation of Jacobs: “sich als Sklaven benemen.”—ἄλλα γὰρ. “But then.” Answering to the Latin at enim. (Compare Kühner, § 786, Obs. 6, Jelf.)—τῶν εἰ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθοῦντων. “From those who suffer hardships of necessity.”—ἐλ γε πεινήσουσι, κ. τ. λ. “Since they will have voluntarily to endure hunger, and thirst,” &c., i. e., since they are destined to endure, &c. The future is here employed to express not merely a future action, but one which is considered as predetermined by circumstances and the state of affairs. Compare Matthia, § 498, b.—ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ', κ. τ. λ. “Since I do not know in what respect it differs, for a person willing or unwilling to be lashed as to the same skin,” i. e., what difference it makes, when the same skin is lashed, whether it is lashed voluntarily or involuntarily. Observe that δέρμα is the accusative of nearer definition.—πολυροκείσθαι. “To be harassed.”—ἄλλα γε ἢ ὑφροσύνη, κ. τ. λ. “Other, indeed, than that folly attaches to the person,” &c. On the adverbial employment here of ἄλλα, consult Kühner, § 595, Jelf, and Matthia, § 635.

§ 18.

οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, κ. τ. λ. The construction is οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὰ ἐκούσια ἐὼν τοιοῦτων δ' ἀφέρειν τῶν ἰκούσιων, κ. τ. λ.—ἡ. “Inasmuch as,'
1. e., so far forth as this, that. Analogous to the Latin quatenus — ο μὲν ἐκών πεινῶ. "He who, from choice, suffers hunger."—πίει. Supply ἔν. Compare Matthiae, § 515, Obs.—ὅποταν βούληται. In the previous clause we had ὅποτε βούλητο, the optative being employed because an uncertain doubtful condition was implied: here, however, we have the subjunctive, because the present εξεταίν precedes. (Matthiae, § 521, Obs. 2; Kühner, § 844, a., Jelf.)—εἰπ’ ἄγαθον ἑλπίδοι πονὼν εὐφραίνεται. "Relying on a good hope, takes delight in laboring." The preposition ἐπὶ with the dative is employed here to denote the ground of mental affection. (Kühner, § 634, e., Jelf.) The reading πονὼν is a conjectural emendation of Taylor on Lysias, p. 491, confirmed by MSS. The old editions have φρονών.—τοῦ λόγουςα. "Of being about to seize the prey."

§ 19.
καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαύτα, κ. τ. λ. "And yet, such rewards of toil are worth but little." The indefinite τις, when joined with adjectives, &c., brings the notion of these words more prominently forward, by either increasing or weakening that notion, according as the meaning of the word or the context requires. Here the effect is a weakening one. (Kühner, § 659, 4, Jelf.)—ὅπως χειρόσωνται. Schneider reads, from two MSS., χειρόσωνται, in compliance with Dawes’ can on. But compare i., 2, 37.—καλῶς οἰκῶσι. "They may regulate well." Compare i., 1, 17.—φίλοις εὐ ποιῶσι. To do a person good or evil is construed in Greek with two accusatives, or with an accusative of the person and the adverb εὖ ορ κακῶς. Εὐφραίνοντειν κακούργειν are construed with an accusative of the person. Compare iv., 4, 17.—εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα. "For such objects as these."—εὐ-

§ 20.
αἱ μὲν ραδιοφυγί. "Slothful habits."—ἐκ τοῦ παραχοῦμαι ἥδειν. "Easily obtained pleasures," i. e., obtained at the moment of desire. Such is the interpretation of Straub, adopted by Kühner, and supported by the whole connection of the passage. "Voluptates ejusmodi, quas, ubi concupiveris, statim, utpote sine ullo labore parabiles, percipere licet." The old interpretation was "pleasures of moment ary duration," and so Schneider, "eas voluptates, quae statim perceptiuntur, et quorum usus brevem tempus durat." (Wheeler, ad loc.)—σῶμας εὐεξίαν κυρράξεσθαι. "To work out a good habit for the body," i. e., a good habit or condition of body. The old editions have ἐν-


γάζεσθαι, for which Zeune gives ἐνεργάζεσθαι, from four MSS.—ὑξὶ ὀλογον. “Worth mentioning.” The epithet ὰξιόλογον is here added because αἱ παραυτικὰ ἡδοναί cannot be said to convey no knowledge whatever to the mind. For who denies that music, paintings, and other pleasures of the same kind give us some sort of knowledge (Kühner, ad loc.—Wheeler, ad loc.)—αἱ δὲ διὰ καρπηρίας ἐπιμελείαι, κ. τ. λ. “Whereas pursuits requiring constant perseverance cause us eventually to reach all that is beautiful and good.” The verb ἐξικνείσθαι, like τυγχάνειν, λαγχάνειν, &c., is construed with a genitive.—ποιν. “Somewhere.” The passage occurs in the “Works and Days” (Εργα καὶ Ημέραι, ν. 285, seqq., or 287, seqq., ed. Göttl. τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα, κ. τ. λ. “You may easily obtain vice for yourself even in one dense mass,” δ. κ., you may easily get it all at once. We have adopted here the explanation of Buttmann, (Lexil. Σ. τ. εἰλείῳ, p. 270, Fishl.), who derives the force of ἱδαν in the present passage, not from the idea of crowds or troops, but from that of a dense compressed mass. The explanation of Göttling, which is as follows, is very unsatisfactory: “ἣν sunt comissatio-

num antiquae sodalitates (Pind., Ἕμ., ν., 86). Hoc igitur voluit poeta: si vitio potiri vis, facilis est aditus, neque opus est ut solus vitii vian inaeas, sed multos habebis socios comissationum amantes.”—

λείη. “Level.” The common editions of Hesiod have ὀλιγη.—τῆς ἀρετῆς προπάρωθεν. “In front of virtue,” d. κ., before virtue’s thresh-

old.—ἐπὶν δ’ εἰς ἀκρον ἰκηταί. “But when one shall have reached the summit,” δ. κ., the summit of the hill of virtue, unto which the steep and rugged path leads. The subject of ἰκηταί is contained in the verb itself, and refers to him who shall have selected this path. (Göttling, ad loc.)—καθεπῆ περ ἐνοῦ. “Though difficult before.” Observe that here, and in ἡγεῖν, at the commencement of the line, there is a sudden transition from the masculine to the feminine. Thus arises, not from the circumstance of ὀμος being of both gend-

ers, as Kühner maintains, but because the reference now becomes a direct one to ἀρετῆς, as Seyffert more correctly supposes.

μαρτυρεῖ. “Bears testimony to the same effect.”—Επιχαρμος Epicharmus was the chief comic poet among the Dorians, and a native of the island of Cos, having been born there about B.C. 540. He subsequently resided at Syracuse, and spent there the remainder of his life. Hence he is often called the Sicilian.—τῦν πόνων παλοῦ-

σιν, κ. τ. λ. “The gods sell unto us all the good things of life for our labors,” δ. κ., it is a law of heaven that happiness is to be pur-

chased only by toil. Observe that πόνων is the genitive of price
The line here quoted is a trochaic tetrameter catalectic, and scanned as follows:

\[ \tau\nu \tau'\nu|\tau'\nu \tau\nu | \eta\mu\nu | \tau\nu \tau\tau | \tau\gamma\alpha\upsilon|\omega | \theta|\omicron|\omicron. \]

\[ \omega \ \nu\nu\eta\nu|\epsilon, \ | \mu\nu | \tau\tau | \nu\mu\lambda\mu\kappa | \mu\nu\omega\delta, | \mu\nu | \tau\tau | \sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho|\epsilon \chi|\iota. \]

The entire clause, from \( kai \in \alpha\lambda\lambda\omega \ \delta \tau\rho\sigma \) to the end of the line, is regarded as an interpolation by Valckenaer \( ad \ Herod, ii., 117 \), because the ancient writers are not accustomed to employ \( \tau\rho\sigma \) when speaking of a passage of any book or writer. Schütz and Schneider concur in this opinion, and Dindorf even goes so far as to regard the whole passage in the light of a spurious addition, from \( \nu\alpha\rho\tau\nu\rho\epsilon|\delta \ kai \ 'E\pi\iota\chi\alpha\rho\mu\omicron\sigma \). Voigtlaender, however, has successfully defended the ordinary text. \( \text{Obs.}, \text{pt. 1, p. 13.} \)

\( \delta \ 21. \)

\( kai \ \Pi\rho\delta\iota\kappa\omicron\kappa \\delta \ \dot{o} \ \sigma\sigma\phi\omicron, \ k. \ t. \ \lambda. \ " \)Moreover, Prodicus the wise also, in the work which he has composed concerning Hercules." Observe the force of the article as repeated after \( \sigma\gamma\gamma\rho\alpha\mu\mu\alpha\tau\iota \), and here rendered for perspicuity' sake by an entire clause, as if \( \gamma\varepsilon\gamma\rho\alpha\mu\nu\epsilon\nu\psi \), or something equivalent, were understood. Prodicus was a native of Iulis, in the island of Ceos, and was eminent as a Sophist and rhetorician; although here, as Welcker observes, Xenophon separates him from the rest of the Sophists by the more honorable appellation of \( \dot{o} \ \sigma\sigma\phi\omicron. \) \( \text{Welcker, Kleine Schriften, ii., p. 466.} \) Prodicus visited Athens frequently, for the purpose of transacting business on behalf of his native city. Socrates was one of his pupils in rhetoric. \( \text{Plato, Meno, 96, D.} \) — \( \sigma\gamma\gamma\rho\alpha\mu\mu\alpha\tau\iota \). Xenophon merely refers to the work in question under the general appellation of \( \sigma\gamma\gamma\rho\alpha\mu\mu\alpha \). Its true title, however, was \( \Omega\varphi\alpha\iota \), which Welcker refers to the youthful bloom of Hercules. \( \text{Suidas, s. v. } \Omega\varphi\alpha\iota, \text{ Welcker, l. c.} \) The apologue itself is generally known, at the present day, by the title of "The Choice of Hercules."

\( \dot{o}\pi\epsilon \ \delta\nu \ kai \ \pi\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\tau\iota \ \epsilon\pi\iota\delta\epsilon\kappa\nu\nu\tau\iota. \ " \)Which, as is well known, he is accustomed to read unto very many." Literally, "he exhibits." The verb \( \epsilon\pi\iota\delta\epsilon\kappa\nu\nu\mu \) is properly employed in the sense of
making an exhibition of skill, or giving a specimen of one's art. The exhibition, in the present instance, consisted in reading the work aloud unto others. Declamations or recitations held by the Sophists and others, in order to show their power of language, skill, and invention, were called επίδειξεις. (Kühner, ad loc.) Observe the force of ὧν in this clause, and compare the explanation of Kühner, "ut constat inter omnes." — ὅσαυτως ἀποφαίνεται. "Declares his sentiments in a similar manner." Literally, "shows himself." Thucydides (ii., 42) uses the active voice in the same sense, but the middle is more usual.—ἐπεὶ ὣμως. "When he was advancing." — ἐν ὑ. "At which period." Supply ὅρα.—αὐτοκράτορες. "Their own masters."—εἶτε τὴν ὅτι ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν, κ. τ. λ. "Whether they will turn themselves toward life along the path leading through virtue," &c., i. e., whether they will enter on the course of actual life by the path of virtue, &c.—ἐλεγχὺν. "Into a solitary place." Compare Cic., Off., i., 32.—πρᾶγμα. "He shall turn himself." The deliberative subjunctive. Compare notes on i., 2, 15.

§ 22.

μεγάλας. "Large of form."—εὐπρεπῇ τε ἢδείν καὶ ἐλευθεροῖν. 'Both engaging to behold and lady-like," i. e., of an engaging and lady-like appearance. Gaisford reads ἐλευθερίαν, from a MS. of Stobaeus. Xenophon, however, uses in the feminine both ἐλευθεροῖα and ἐλευθερία. Compare Conviv., ii., 4; Greg. Cor., p. 62, seqq., ed. Schaeff.—προϊέναι. "To come forward." Schneider, Dindorf, and Bornemann give προσέναι, "to come toward," from a single MS. The idea, however, implied in προϊέναι, is well expressed by Kühner, "ex occulto prodire."—φύει κεκαλλωπισαμένην, κ. τ. λ. "Adorned by nature as to her person with purity, as to her eyes with modesty, as to her demeanor with becoming reserve, and in white attire." We have rendered ἐσθήτι δὲ λευκῷ as a simple and independent clause. Jacobs, Kühner, and others, make it depend on κεκαλλωπισαμένην, and miss from the sentence some word corresponding to σώμα, δόματα, and σχῆμα, and then ground upon this alleged omission a charge of want of elegance against Xenophon, than which nothing can be more unjust.—τεθραμμένην μὲν εἰς πολυσαρκίαν, κ. τ. λ. "Pampered into a full and enervated habit of body."—κεκαλλωπισαμένην δὲ τοῦ μὲν χρώμα, κ. τ. λ. "Set off, moreover, as to her complexion, so as to seem to appear both fairer and more florid than the reality," i. e., than she really was. Lange thinks δοκεῖν φαίνεσθαι pleonastic, and, as δοκεῖν follows immediately after, he regards φαίνεσθαι as alone correct here. But δοκεῖν φαίνεσθαι is
well explained by Kühner, "ut . . . pra se ferre (φαίνεσθαι) videre tur (δοκείν).");

τὰ δὲ ὀματά ἐχειν ἀναπεπταμένα. "That she had her eyes, moreover, opened widely." This is the bold, immodest stare, opposed to the modest and retiring look.—κοθήτα δὲ, ἓς ἤς, κ. τ. λ. "And an attire, through which youthful beauty might most shine forth," i. e., attire, the texture of which allowed the youthful beauty of her limbs to be clearly apparent. The reference is to what was termed the Coan robe or attire, and which had a great degree of transparency. Consult Dict. Ant., s. v. Coan vestis.—κατασκοπεῖσθαι δὲ δημᾶ ἑαυτήν. "That she frequently, also, looked down at herself," i. e., surveying her dress and person.—αὐτὴν ἑαυτὰ. If the optative were here employed in the place of the indicative, we would have αὐτήν. (Kühner, ad loc.) Compare i., 2, 49.—ἀποδείξειν. "She looked back."

§ 23.

πλησιάσετερον. Thus in several MSS. and early editions. The common reading is πλησιάστερον.—ἐίναι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. "Proceeded in the same manner (as before)," i. e., with the same quiet gait, neither slower nor faster. Observe here the construction of the accusative (τὴν μὲν πρόσθεν ρηθεῖσαν) with the infinitive, the reference being still to what Prodicus says.—φόραι. "To get before her," i. e., to anticipate her.—ἀποροῦντα. "At a loss."—ἐὰν σῶν ἐμὲ φιλὴν ποιησάμενος. "If, then, (you shall turn yourself thither) after having made you my friend." Supply, from the previous clause, ἐπὶ τὸν βιον τρόπῃ. Compare Heßmann, ad Vig., § 227, p 776, seqq. Five MSS. give ποιήσῃ, and two ποιήσει. The common text has ποιήσῃς. We have given ποιησάμενος, on good MS. authority, with Bornemann, Kühner, and others.—καὶ τῶν μὲν τερπνῶν αὐθέντος, κ. τ. λ. "And you shall taste of every pleasure." Literally, "and you shall be without tasting of no one of the things that are delightful." Observe that ἀγευστὸς takes the genitive on the same principle that γείωνται, "to taste," is construed with it.—τῶν χαλεπῶν ἀπειρος. "Without any experience of troubles."

§ 24, 25.

οὐ φροντιεῖς. "You shall not concern yourself about." Observe that φροντιεῖς is the Attic form of the future for φροντίσεις.—πραγματικῶν. "Public affairs."—σκοπούμενος διέσει. "You shall be always considering." There is some doubt about the true reading here. We have given διέσει (with the more Attic termination) from
almost all the MSS. Jacobs, however, conjectures ὅει ἔσοι. and Budeus ὅει ἔσοι. One MS. has διάεις, which is evidently a mere gloss.—κεχαρισμένον. "Gratifying to the taste."—ἵοθεις. "You may experience pleasure."—ἀπονώτατα. "With the least degree of trouble."—τίς ὑποψία σπάνεως, κ. τ. λ. "Any suspicion of a scarcity of the means whence these (blessings) are to arise." Observe that σπάνεως ὄφ' ὄν is for σπάνεως τοῦτων ὄφ' ὄν, and compare i., 2, 14.—οὖ φόδος. "There is no fear." Supply ἐκτί, and compare Seyffert, "non est quod metuas."—ἐπὶ τὸ πονοῦντα, κ. τ. λ. "To the procuring of these things by laboring and undergoing privations," &c.—ἀλλ' οἷς ἡν ὁι ἄλλοι, κ. τ. λ. Observe that οἷς is here for ἃ, being attracted by τοῦτος.—ἀν ἔργαζονται. "May obtain by their labor."—πανταχόθεν ὥφελείσθαι ἐξονίαν "Authority to benefit themselves from every side," i. e., from every possible source.

§ 26.

ἔφη. The verb ἔφη, like inquit in Latin, is commonly separated from its subject by some of the words quoted. (Matthiae, § 306, Obs.)—ὅνομα δὲ σοι τί ἔστιν. The particle δέ in interrogations often refers to something to be supplied by the imagination. Thus, in the present instance, we may suppose the full sentence to run as follows: "All this sounds fairly enough, O lady, but what is your name?"—Εὐθαμονίαν. "Happiness."—ὑποκοριζόμενοι. "Nicknaming." The verb ὑποκορίζομαι means, properly, "to play the child," and especially, "to talk child's language," i. e., to use terms of endearment, such as diminutives. Then reversely, "to call something good by a bad name," "to disparage," "to nickname," &c.—κακίαν. "Vice."

§ 27.

ἐν τούτῳ. Supply τῷ χρόνῳ. "During this time."—καὶ ἐγὼ. "I, too."—εἰδνία. "Because I know." Observe here and in καταμαθέσα the causal force of the participle. (Kühner, § 697, a, Jcfl.)—φύσιν. "Disposition."—ἐν τῷ παιδεία. "During your early training," i. e., in the training of your youth.—σφόδρ' ἡν σε τῶν καλῶν, κ. τ. λ. "You would assuredly become a noble doer of the things that are honorable and dignified." Observe that σφόδρα has here the force of protecto or omnino, and consult Sturz, Lex. Xen., s. v. 3.—ἐ.ι πολὺ ἐντιμοτέραν, κ. τ. λ. "Still far more held in honor, and more illustrious on account of the advanced ages (which I shall obtain for you)."—προοιμίως ἡδονῆς. "With any preludes regarding pleasure," i. e., by any introductory remarks, holding out to you,
for the purpose of securing your attention, the promise of pleasurable enjoyment. Observe that προοίμια ἡδονῆς stands here opposed to τὰ δόντα, that is, τὰ ἀληθῶς, just as μετ’ ἀληθείας stands opposed here to ἐξαπατήσω.—τὰ δόντα. "The things that are," i. e., the existing state of things.—ἡπερ οἱ θεοὶ διεθεσαν. "Even as the gods have ordained (them to be)."

§ 28.

τῶν δόντων ἁγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν συνέν. "No one of the things that are good and honorable."—ἲλεως. Attic for ἱλίων.—θεραπευτέον τὸς θεοῦ. "You must worship the gods." Supply σοί ἐστι. Verbs in τίον are construed like the Latin gerund in dum, with the substantive verb and the dative of the personal pronoun; and though passive in derivation, they nevertheless govern the cases of the verbs from which they are derived, like actives. (Matthia, § 447, 2.)—ἄξιοις ἐπ’ ὑπερήθειαν καταγαίνουσαν. "You claim to be admired for virtue." Compare ἐπ’ ἁγαθοῖς, § 27.—τὴν γὰρ θεραπευτέον. "You must till the earth."—ἐρμῆς ἀμεθησαί. "You are eager to increase your means." Observe the force of the middle.—τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὑτὰς τε, κ. τ. λ. "You must both learn the arts of war themselves from those who are acquainted with them, and must practice how you ought to use them," i. e., you must not only learn, but must practice them.—εἰ δὲ καὶ. After a succession of members of a discourse, beginning with εἰτε, the concluding member, which is the most important one, commences with εἰ δὲ. (Compare Kühner, § 778, Obs., Jelf.) So in Latin, after a repetition of sive, the final member begins with si vero. (Kühner, ad Cic. Tusc. i., 41, 97.)—τὴν γυνῆν ὑπηρετεῖν ἔστις τοῦ σώμα. "You must accustom your body to render obedience to your mind." Cicero gives the explanation of this passage in the De Officiis (i., 23), as cited by Victorius: "Exercendum corpus, et ita afficiendum est, ut obediire consilic et rationi possit."—σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἀρωτί. The preposition σὺν with the dative of the instrument is of rare occurrence. (Compare Kühner, § 623, Jelf.)

§ 29.

ὦς χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὀδὸν, κ. τ. λ. "How painful and tedious a road to her joys this woman tells you of." Observe the force of the article in τίς εὐφροσύνας, the joys which she promises.—ἐπὶ τῶν εὐθαμομοναν. "Unto the happiness which I have in store," i. e., unto my happiness. Observe again the force of the article.
30. *τι δὲ σὺ ἄγαθόν ἐχεις;* "But what good thing dost thou possess?" Compare § 26.—ἐθέλονσα. "Since thou art willing."—ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡδέων ἑπιθυμιαν. "The desire for the things that are pleasing," *i. e.*, the natural desire of pleasures.—πάντων ἐμπιπλασαί. "Sate yourself with all things." Observe the force of the middle.—ὑφοποιός μη-χανωμένν. "Contriving (to procure) skillful cooks." For the transection here from the finite verb to the participle, consult *Matthia*, § 632, 4; *Kühner*, § 705, 4, *Jelf*. The regular mode of expression would have been as follows: καὶ, ἵνα μὲν ἡδέως φάγης, ὑφοποιός μη-χανφ, ἵνα δὲ ἡδέως πινης, οἶνους . . . παράσκευάζει. (Kühner, *ad loc.*)—χιώνα. Snow was used by the ancients to cool their wines. They frequently preserved it in subterranean caverns. (Plin., *H. N.*, ix., 4; Athen., iii., p. 124; Martial, xiv., 115.)—τὰς στρωμαίας μαλακάς. "Your soft beds," *i. e.*, your beds of down. Observe the force of the article here, the reference being to things accustomed to be employed by the effeminate and luxurious.—τὰς κλίνας. "Your couches," *i. e.*, those costly couches of yours, on which the beds of down were placed.—τὰ ύπόβαθρα ταῖς κλίναις. "The rockers beneath your couches." By ύπόβαθρα ταῖς κλίναις commentators generally suppose that Xenophon means carpets spread under the feet of couches, to prevent noise when the latter are moved or disturbed in any way. The true explanation, however, is the one which we have adopted, and is due to Schneider, who compares three passages of the physician Antyllus (*Frag. Medic. Oribas.*, *ed. Matth.*, p. 114, 170, 172), from which it appears that by ύπόβαθρα are here meant a kind of diagonal rockers attached to the feet of couches, for the purpose of producing a gentle motion and thus inviting repose. (Kühner, *ad loc.*)—οὐ τοιχίς. The deliberative subjunctive. In other words, the subjunctive is used, in such cases as the present, to express a question implying doubt or deliberation, where the speaker considers with himself what, under present circumstances, is best for him to do (Matthia, § 516; Kühner, § 417, *Jelf*.)

31. ἀθάνατος δὲ οὖσα. "Moreover, though immortal."—τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίσταν ἵππούσιατος, κ. τ. λ. "The sweetest strain, too, of all that the ear takes in, thy own praise, thou never hast heard." Literally, "in respect of the sweetest thing heard of all, the praise of yourself, you are without hearing." As regards the employment of εἶναι for the pronoun of the second person, consult *Matthia*, § 489, 11.—τοῦ σοῦ θαύμαν τομήσαιεν εἶναι. "Would dare to be one of
thy train of revelers.” By θίασον is properly meant a band or company engaged in celebrating some festival, chiefly of Bacchus, with dancing, singing, &c. It is here employed in an ironical sense, to denote a noisy and licentious crew of the votaries of vicious indulgence. Observe that θίασον is the partitive genit. ve.—οἱ νέοι μετά βντες. The plural here refers to θιασωται as implied in θίασον.—ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἄνδητοι. “Mere dotards in their intellects,” i. e., enfeebled by dotage by licentious excesses.— auprèsς μὲν λῃπαροί, κ. τ. λ. “Maintained throughout early life in idleness amid abundance of all kinds,” i. e., maintained by the labors of others, such as parents or relations. We have given λῃπαροί here the meaning assigned to it by Kühner, “in omnium rerum affluentia.”—τρεφόμενοι. In place of this, which is the reading of all MSS. and early editions, many later editors have given φερόμενοι, the conjecture of Ruhnken. The emending, however, is altogether unnecessary. The votaries of vicious pleasure are described as being maintained by others in their youth, and being compelled to maintain themselves in age, at which latter period their previous excesses have left them broken down in body and mind, and little able to do any thing for their own support. (Kühner, ad loc.)

ἐπιπόνως δὲ αὐχμηροί, κ. τ. λ. “And passing through old age with heavy toil, amid all the squalidness of penury.” Observe the opposition between αὐχμηροί and λῃπαροί, and also between ἀπόλως and ἐπιπόνως.—τοῖς μὲν πετραγμένοις. “On account of the things done by them,” i. e., their past excesses. Observe the employment of the dative to express the cause of the action. (Matthia, § 399.)—τοῖς δὲ πραττόμενοις βαρυνόμενοι. “And weighed down by the things that are at present getting done,” i. e., oppressed and broken down by the weight of their present labors.—τὰ μὲν ἡδέα. “Pleasures.”

τὰ χαλεπὰ. “Hardships.”

§ 32.

τονεῖμι. “Associate with.”—καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ὦς προσήκε. “And by men by whom it is becoming to be honored,” i. e., by the good among men. Supply παρ’ before ὦς, and τιμᾶσθαι after προσήκε. This omission of the preposition is common in both Greek and Latin. Thus, iii., 7, 3: ἐν τοῖς συνονείασι, αἰς σύνει, and Concin., iv., 1: ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ, ὣ γὰρ ἡκὼν. So in Latin, Corn. Nep., Cim., 3, 1: “Incident in eadem invidiam, quam pater suis,” &c.

§ 33.

ἡδέα μὲν καὶ ἀπράγμων ἀπελαυνίς. “A sweet and simple enjoyment.” The term ἀπράγμων refers to the absence of all labored
NOTES TO BOOK I.—CHAPTER I.

preparations, and al. incentives to a jaded appetite.—ἀπολείποντες. Verbs which, like ὑθωνται, denote a state of feeling, are construed with a participle. (Kühner, § 685, Jelf. Compare i., 2, 47.)—ταῖς τῶν νέων τιμαῖς. “With the honors shown them by the young.” Observe here the employment of the genitive to denote the authors of a thing, so that the genitive is taken, as the grammarians term it, in an active sense. (Matthiae, § 375.)—τῶν παλαιῶν πράξεων “Their former actions,” i. e., their past course of life.—εὖ δὲ τὰς παρόντας, κ. τ. λ. “And take delight in the successful performance of the business of the present.” Literally, “in performing well their present ones.”—τὸ πεπρωμένον τέλος. “The destiny is ended.”—ἀτιμοί. “Unhonored.”—ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης, κ. τ. λ. “But, being celebrated in song, they bloom in memory throughout all time.” Observe the adjectival force of ἀεὶ as placed between the article and noun.—θάλλουσι. Cicero uses a similar word (Tusc., i., 49): “Harmodius in ore et Aristogiton, Lacedemonius Leonidas, Thebanus Epaminondas vigent.”—μακαριστοτάτην. This form of the superlative is to be assigned to a positive μακαριστός, from the verb μακαρίζω ἢ is a form peculiar to Xenophon. Compare Apol., c. 32.

§ 34.

dιόκει τὴν παῖδευσιν. “Relates the instruction,” i. e., the training.—ἐκθάμησε μέντοι τὰς γυνῶν. “He ornamented, however, his sentiments.”—πειράσθαι τι καὶ τῶν, κ. τ. λ. “To endeavor in some degree to bethink yourself of those things also which relate to the future period of your life.”

CHAPTER II.

§ 1.

Ἀμπροκλέα. Socrates had three sons by his wife Xanthippe, namely, Lamprocles, Sophroniscus, and Menexenus.—χαλεπαίνοτα. Verbs signifying “to perceive,” “observe,” &c., are construed with a participle. (Matthiae, § 549.)—καὶ μᾶλα. “Certainly (I do).” The expression καὶ μᾶλα is equivalent to the Latin “maxime,” “vel maxime,” “maxime vero,” “omnino.” Compare iii., 3, 9.—καταμεμάθηκας ὧν τοὺς τί πιστούντας, κ. τ. λ. “Have you ascertained, then, those who do what men stigmatize by this name?” i. e., have you ascertained, then, whom men stigmatize by this name, and what they do whom they thus stigmatize? Observe here the conciseness of the Greek form of expression. The full mode of enunciating the clause would be as follows: καταμεμάθηκας ὧν, τίνας τὸ δνομα τοῦτο.
NOTES TO BOOK II.—CHAPTER I.

υποκαλούσιν, καὶ τί ποιοῦσιν οὕτως, εὖς τὸ δύναμι τοῦτο ὑποκαλούσιν
(Con.pare Matthia, § 567; Kühner, § 883, 2, Jelf.) For the double
accusative after ὑποκαλούσιν, consult Matthia, § 420. Obs. 2, b.—
tοὺς εὖ παθόντας. "Those who have received a kindness."—οὖκοιν
δοκοῦσι σοι, κ. τ. λ. "Do they not, then, deem it right to class the
ungrateful among the unjust?" Zeune thinks that δεῖν ought to be
supplied after δοκοῦσι. But this is quite unnecessary, since δοκοῦσι
itself implies the notion of what is fit or becoming. (Kühner, ad loc.
Compare Kühner, § 665, Jelf.)

§ 2.

ἡδη δὲ ποτ' ἵσκεψη. "And have you ever hitherto considered."
—εἰ ἄρα ... ἀδικών ἠτι. In case of reality, εἰ is used with an
indicative; but in case of a future event, yet to be investigated,
εἰν with the subjunctive is employed after σκέψασθαι. (Matthia,
§ 526.)—καὶ τὸ ἄχριστείν πρὸς μὲν τοὺς φίλους, κ. τ. λ. "So the act-
ing with ingratitude toward our friends is unjust."—καὶ δοκεῖ μοι,
ὑς σοῦ ἄν, κ. τ. λ. "And from whomsoever, whether friend or foe,
one, on having received a favor, does not try to make a grateful re-
turn, (that one) appears to me to be an unjust person." The pec-
culiar construction of this sentence arises from a species of attrac-
tion, the relative clause being in construction with the dependent
clause. (Kühner, § 825, 1, Jelf.) The more simple arrangement
would have been as follows: καὶ δοκεῖ μοι, ὅτις ἄν, ὑπὸ τινος εὖ
παθῶν, μὴ πειράται χάριν ὑποδοθόναι, ἀδικος εἶναι. A similar struc-
ture occurs in Cicero (Tusc., i., 34.)

§ 3.

eἰ γε οὕτως ἔχει τοῦτο. "If, indeed, this be so." The particle εἰ
with an indicative is often followed by an optative with ἄν in the
apodosis, when the result is to be represented as uncertain, as only
possible, not decided upon in the speaker's mind; and hence, this
is a less decided way of expressing the notion of the future indica-
tive, ἄν referring to the condition of the former sentence. (Kühner,
§ 853, b., Jelf.)—εἰλικρινής της ὑδίκια. "A kind of sheer injustice."
The primitive meaning of εἰλικρινής is, "examined by the sun's
light" (ἐἰλη, κρίνω), "tested," "found genuine." Hence arise the
significations of "unmixed," "pure," "clear," "palpable," "sheer,"
&c. The common form is εἰλικρινής, for which we have not hesi-
tated to substitute εἰλικρινής, with the initial aspirate, as more in
accordance with etymology, and as usually found in the best MSS.
of Plato.—διορ τις μείζω ὕγαθα παθόν. "By how much one having
ceived greater favors." (Compare Matthiae, § 599, d.) Observe that πᾶσχειν properly means "to be affected" by external objects or circumstances, either good or bad.—τίνας οὖν, ἐφί, ὑπὸ τίνων, κ. r. λ. "Whom then, said he, could we find benefited in greater things by whom, than children by parents?" i. e., whom then could we find more benefited, and by whom, &c. In Greek, two, or even more interrogative words may be attached to the same verb, so that two or more questions on different points are expressed in one sentence. (Kühner, § 883, 1, Jelf.)—ἐκ μὲν οὖν ὄντων. "From not being," i. e., from non-existence.

ἀ δὴ. "Which, it is well known." Observe the force of ἀ, and compare the explanation of Kühner: "Quae, uti satis constat."—οὕτως παντὸς ἄξια. "So valuable in every point of view." Literally, "so worthy of every thing."—ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀξιόκλημα. "For the greatest offences."—ὡς οὖν ἄν μείζωνος κακοῦ, κ. τ. λ. "Thinking that they will not, in all likelihood, cause wrong-doing to cease by the fear of any greater evil." Observe that παύσοντες agrees with πολίται, implied in πόλεις, and also that ὃ here with the participle refers to an opinion formed or something thought of. (Kühner, § 701, Jelf.)—ἄν παύσοντες. The particle ἄν is joined with infinitives and participles, and gives to them the same signification that the optative, subjunctive, or indicative with ἄν would have in the resolution by means of the finite verb. (Matthiae, § 598; Kühner, § 429 Jelf.)

§ 4, 5.

τῶν γε ὑφροδισών ἑνεκα παιδοποιεῖσθαι. "Beget children through mere sensuality."—σκοπούμενοι. "Carefully considering."—βλέπτειν. "The most robust."—καὶ ὃ μὲν γε. Thus in several MSS. In some early editions we find καὶ ὃ μὲν γάρ. The common text omits γε.—καὶ ταῦτα ὃς ἄν ὄνηται πλείστα. "And these in as great abundance as he may be able."—ὑποδεξαμένη. "Having both received it within herself."—καὶ μεταδίδουσα τῆς τροφῆς, κ. τ. λ. "And imparting a portion of the nourishment by which she herself is even supported." Many MSS. and all the early editions give ἦς καὶ αὐτή, but the attraction of the pronoun in the dative is so rare that we have preferred following Stobæus, and the edition of H. Stephens, with Bornemann, Dindorf, and other recent editors, and giving ἦ καὶ αὐτή. On the attraction of the dative of the relative, consult Kähner, § 822, Obs. 4, Jelf.—ὅπεργεγυμνάσα. "Having carried it her full time."—οὔτε προσεπονθεῖνα οὐδὲν ὕγαθον. "Having neither experienced as yet a single advantage"—οὔτε γεγυμνώσκον τὸ βρέφος,
τ. λ. "Nor the infant knowing by whom it is fondly tended." The best view of this much-contested clause is to regard ἱμηνύσκοι ἐν δια βρέφος as a nominative absolute. (Compare Wanneneski, de Construct. quæ dictur absoluta, p. 6.) Kulmer, with much less propriety, regards it as a sort of oratorical anacoluthon, and that Xenophon used the nominative instead of the genitive, "membrorum concinnitatis servanda causa."—σταχαζομένη. "Guessing." A beautifully appropriate term to denote a mother's fond sagacity.—ἐκπληροθέν. "To satisfy it."—τίνα χάριν. "What return."

§ 6.

ἀ μὲν ἄν αὐτοί ἐξωσιν, κ. τ. λ. "Whatever good rules for the conduct of life the parents themselves may have, they teach unto them." Observe the employment here of ἐξειν in the sense of possessing, and compare i., 6, 13.—δαπανώντες. "Incurring expense." ἐπιμελοῦνται. "Exercise an anxious care."—ὡς δυνατὸν βιλτιστοι. "As far as possible the best." In order to strengthen the significance of superlatives, particles and clauses are often added (Matthiae, § 461.)

§ 7.

αλλά τοι, εἴ καί. "But, in truth, although."—πεποίηκε. Supply ἡ ἐμὴ μὴτηρ, which Lamprocles had in his mind, the whole previous discourse being in reference to her.—τὴν χαλεπότητα. "Her harshness of temper." Xanthippe, the wife of Socrates, was notorious for her violent temper. Consult Wiggers' Life of Socrates, p. 396 of this volume.—ἀγριότητα. "The wild temper."—ἡ μητρός. The article is not added, because Socrates speaks of mothers in general. Lamprocles, however, uses the article in the succeeding clause, τὴς μητρός, because he means his own mother.—τῆς μητρός, τῆς γε τοιαύτης. "That of my mother, at least of such a mother as she is."—ἡ δακούσα, ἡ λακτίσασα. "By having either bitten or kicked you."

§ 8.

ἀλλὰ, νῦν Δία, ἐφη, κ. τ. λ. "(No), but in very truth she utters, replied the other, things which one would not wish to hear for his whole life," i. e., though he must lose his life unless he be willing to hear them. Observe that ἐπὶ here marks condition. (Matthiae, § 585, β.) The particle ἀλλὰ at the beginning of the present clause as elliptical, the full idea being, νῦν κακῶν τι μοι ἐδώκειν, ἀλλὰ, κ. τ. λ.—οὐ δὲ πόσα, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ. "And yet, how much trouble replied Socrates, difficult to endure, do you think you have caused
unto this (mother)."—πόσα δὲ λυπήσαι κάμνων. "And how much sorrow (do you think) you have occasioned her by your illness" Literally, "when laboring (under sickness)." Observe the employment of the nominative with the infinitive, the reference being to the same individual that forms the subject of the leading verb.—ἐφ᾽ ὅσα χύνθη. "At which she blushed," i. e., that could call the blush to her cheeks.

§ 9.

ἂν αὐτῆ λέγει. Observe the attraction of ἂν for ἂ.—ἡ τοῖς ὑπωκριταῖς. “Than it is for stage-players.”—τὰ ἐσχατα. "The worst reproaches." Literally, “the last,” i. e., in degree of reproaching. Observe in this clause the construction of ἐλέγωσιν with the double accusative, and compare Matthiae, § 416, Obs. 2, β.—ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ὁλονταί, κ. τ. λ. “Since they do not think that either he of the speakers, who reviles, reviles that he may injure," &c.—νοῶσα. “Intending.”—ὢλλὰ καὶ βουλομένη, κ. τ. λ. “But even wishing that there be for you (so many) blessings, as many as (she wishes that here may be) for no one else," i. e., wishing you to have blessings more numerous than any other person. Observe that before ἄγαθά we are to supply τῶσα, the correlative of ὅσα.—οὔ δήτα. “No, assuredly.”

§ 10.

ἐπιμελημένηι κάμνοντος. “Taking care of you when sick.”—δπως υγιαίνῃς, κ. τ. λ. Schneider, Herbst, and Dindorf read ὑγιανείς, on account of έσει following, in order that the two moods may agree, but no change of the kind is needed. The subjunctive υγιαίνῃς, as Kühner well remarks, has reference to that the issue of which is in the hands of the gods, and therefore altogether uncertain; whereas the indicative έσει is employed to express what is more within a mother's control, and therefore of more certain issue.—πολλὰ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχομένη, κ. τ. λ. “Praying in thy behalf unto the gods for many blessings.” The dative here is expressed elsewhere by τρος τοῖς θεοῖς. Sauppe makes θεοῖς equivalent to παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, "a Diis," in which Kühner concurs. The version, however, which we have given, is decidedly superior to this.—εὑχὰς ἀποδόθοσαν. "Pay- ing the oblations she has vowed."—τάγαθά. "Any thing that is good." Literally, "the things that are good."

§ 11, 12.

θεραπεύειν "To pay respect to."—ἡ παρεσκευασαί. "Or are you prepared." Observe the continued action denoted by the perfect.
Literally, "have you been prepared," and are you still prepared.—εγώγε. "I would, indeed, endeavor to please." Supply ἄν πειράματι ἄρεσκεν.—ἄγαθον συλλήπτωρ. "An assistant in the acquisition of good."—καὶ, ἄν τι σφαλλόμενος τέχνης, κ. τ. λ. "And, if you may have enanced to stumble in any respect, may kindly lend aid to you from near at hand."—συνδοκτόροι, ἡ σύμπλον, κ. τ. λ. "Would it make no difference to you, that a fellow-traveler, or fellow-passenger, or if you should meet with any one else, (in any other station of life, that such an one) be a friend or an enemy!" i. e., or whatever person you should come in contact with.—τῆς παρὰ τούτων εὐνοίας. "Of the benevolence proceeding from these."—εγώγε. Supply οἴσηι δείν.

§ 13.

elτα. Compare i., 2, 26.—ἄλλης μὲν ἀχαριστίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελειται, κ. τ. λ. "Takes no cognizance of any other species of ingratitude, nor gives judgment against (any other)." After δικάζει supply ἄλλην.—πεπιορφά. "Overlooks."—εν πεπιορφάς. Compare § 3.—γονέως μὴ θεραπεύῃ. An action was allowable for any neglect or insult toward a parent, and was termed γραφὴ κακώνες γονέων. Compare Meier and Schömann, Att. Proc., p. 288, seqq.; and Hermann, Gr. Ant., § 133, 11.—δίκην. "A fine."—καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζουσα, κ. τ. λ. "And, rejecting, does not permit this one to be an arehon, thinking that the sacrifices in behalf of the state would neither be duly offered if this one were to offer them," &c. Observe again the employment of ὡς with the absolute case of the participle, with reference to something thought of, &c.—οὕτε ἄλλο καλός καὶ δικαίως. Complete the sentence as follows: οὕτε ἄλλο καλός καὶ δικαίως οὖθεν ἂν πραττόμενον, τούτων πράξαντος, ὥστε as to correspond with οὕτε ἂν θύομενα, τούτων θύοντος. Compare Matthia, § 566, 3—καὶ τούτο ἔξετάζει ἡ πόλις ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχῶντων δοκιμασίαις. "The state examines into this also in the scrutinies of candidates for offices of magistracy." More literally, "in the scrutinies of magistrates." By δοκιμασία at Athens was meant an examination or scrutiny into the life and character of candidates for magisterial offices. If the examination took place in the senate, it was called ἀνάκρισις; if in the forum, before the regular court of investigation, δοκιμασία. In either case, however, the investigation was held after the election, and before the candidate elect entered upon office.

§ 14.

ἄν σωφρινῆς. "If you are wise."—παρημέληκας τῆς μητρός. Verbs signifying "to neglect," or "be careless about" any thing, are fol-
lowed by a genitive. (Matthia, § 348.)—τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους αὐ .phi-
λαῖζει. "And, on the other hand, you will have respect for the
opinion of mankind." More literally, "you will take care of men."
—κἀτα. The common text has εἰτα, which is too abrupt. We have
adopted Zeune's conjectural emendation κἀτα, deduced from καλ
εἰτα, the reading of eight Parisian MSS.—τοὺς γονεῖς. Thus in eight
MSS., in Stobaeus, and also in the older editions. Zeune and
Schneider read τοὺς γονέας, but the accusative in εἰς is not unusual
in Xenophon. Compare iii., 5, 19; iii., 7, 16; iv., 4, 20. (Kühner
§ 90, Obs. 3, Jell.)—εὖ σε ποιήσας χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι. "That he,
after having done you a kindness, will obtain from you a grateful re-
turn." Observe the employment of the nominative with the infini-
tive, the reference being to the subject of the previous verb.

CHAPTER III.

§ 1.

Χαίρεισκοίτα. Compare i., 2, 48. Plato, in his Charmides (15a,
B), describes Cláerephon as a violent and passionate man.—γνωρίμω.
"Well known."—διαφέρομένω. "At variance with each other." Observe the force of the middle.—οὐ δέπου καὶ σὺ, κ. τ. λ. "You,
too, surely, are not one of such men as those." The particles οὐ
dέπου are thus used in ironical interrogation, when a negative an-
swer is expected. (Kühner, § 724, 2, § 874, 3, Jell.)—οἱ χρησιμώτε
ουν, κ. τ. λ. "Who consider property a more useful thing than
brethren." An adjective, as a predicate, not as an epithet, of things
and persons, often stands in the neuter singular, although the sub-
ject is masculine, or feminine, and in the plural. It is usual in such
cases to supply χρὴμα or κτήμα.—χρῆματα. Compare the explana-
tion given in the Lex. Seg. (Bekker, Anec. Gr., i., p. 316): σημαίνει
καὶ τὸ ὑπόγροιν, καὶ τὰ χρήματα, καὶ τὴν διὰν σύσιαν.—καὶ τάτα, τῶν
μὲν ἀφρόνων δύτων, κ. τ. λ. "And that, too, though the former are
devoid of reason, while the latter, (a brother), has reason."—βοη-
θείας δεημένων. Socrates means that property requires care on the
part of the possessors to guard and preserve it.—πλειώνων. "Man-
ifold."—ἐνός: "But one."

§ 2, 3.

τοὺς μὲν ἀδελφοὺς ξημίαν ὣγείται. "Thinks his brothers a det-
riment to him."—τὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν. "The property of these brothers.
—ὑπαίθα. "In the latter case."—ἀσφαλῆς ἀρκοῦντα ἐχειν. "To
ἐνόν a competency with security."—μόνον διατόμενον. "By lead-
ing a solitary life.”—ἐπικενθήσαντες. “In an insecure state.”—ἐπὶ ἁπάντων ἁδελφῶν, κ. τ. λ. “While in the case of brothers men are ignorant of this same thing.” The construction often changes from singular to plural, as here, and vice versa. We may here supply ἄνθρωποι. (Matthiae, § 293. Kühner, § 390, 1, a., Jelf.)—οἱ δυνάμενοι. “The rich.” Literally, “they who are able (so to do).”—τῶν ἁδελφῶν ἄμελοσσον. Compare ii., 2, 14; iv., 3, 15.—ὦσπερ ἐκ πολτῶν, κ. τ. λ. “As if friends were made from citizens only.” The absolute case is often put by the Attics in the accusative, with ὦσπερ, when it marks the motive of an action. (Compare Matthiae, § 568, 569. Kühner, § 704, Jelf.)

§ 4, 5.

καὶ μὴν. “And yet.” In a simple sentence, καὶ μὴν would merely signify, “and in very truth,” &c.; here, however, it is employed to mark an opposition to what precedes, and the meaning changes in consequence. (Kühner, § 729, Jelf.)—μέγα μὲν ὑπάρχει. “Greatly conduces”—ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἡθολοις, κ. τ. λ. “Since even among wild animals there springs up a sort of affection toward those that are fostered with them.” The genitive is here used objectively. Compare Matthiae, § 367.—ἀλλ' εἶ μὲν, ὥς Σῶκρατες, κ. τ. λ. “Why, my good Socrates, if the difference between us were not great,” &c.—καὶ μὴ φένγειν. “And not to avoid him.”—ἀγαθόν. “Is a good thing.” Supply ἵστη, and consult note on χρησιμώτερον, § 1.—ὡν ὅλον δεῖ. “Provided he is such as he ought to be.”—ὁπότε μεντοι παντὸς ἐνδείκτης, κ. τ. λ. “But when he might fail in every particular, and might be in every respect the very opposite (to what he ought to be), why should one attempt impossibilities?” The common version renders ὁπότε μεντοι παντὸς ἐνδείκτης by “at si plane desit officio,” which is opposed to the usage of the verb. The true idea is given by Weiske, and approved of by Kühner: “When as yet he is infinitely in fault; when he is the direct opposite of a brother.” (Wheeler, ad loc.)

§ 6.

πόρεα δέ. Compare i., 6, 15, and Matthiae, § 446.—ἡ ἐστιν οἷς καὶ πάνυ ὠρέσκει. “Or are there some whom he even altogether pleases.” Observe in ἐστιν οἷς the peculiar idiom that prevails, and that ἐστι, not εἰσί, is employed, though the relative following be in the plural. (Matthiae, § 482.) This is imitated in Latin. Thus we have in Propertius (iii., 9, 17) the following.

"Est quibus Elea concurririt palma quadriga:
Est quibus in celeres gloria nata pedes."
Compare also the note on ἔστιν οὕτων τινας, i., 4, 2.—διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ τοι, κ. τ. λ. “(Yes), replied he, for on this very account, O Socrates, is it right for me to hate him.” Observe the elliptical employment of γὰρ.—ζημία μᾶλλον, ἢ ὑφελειά ἔστιν. “He is an injury rather than a benefit.”

§ 7, 8.

ἀφ’ οὖν. “Pray, then”—ἀφτέρ ἵππος τῷ ἀνεπιστήμων, κ. τ. λ. “As a horse is an injury to him who is unskilful indeed, and yet undertakes,” &c., i. e., who, not knowing how, yet tries to manage him.—πῶς δ’ ἄν ἐγὼ, κ. τ. λ. “But how, replied Chaerecrates, should I be ignorant of the mode of conducting myself toward my brother.”—ἐν λέγειν τὸν ἐν λέγουτα. Compare ii., 1, 19.—ἄλλ’ οὐδὲ πειράσω-ναι. “Nay, I will not even try.” Literally, “(I not only will not do this), but I will not even try.”

§ 9.

ei κύνα μέν, ei σοι ἤν, κ. τ. λ. “If, with respect to a dog, in case you had one well fitted for (guarding) flocks, and he fawned upon the shepherds,” &c. Kühner points out the elegant collocation of the particles μέν . . . μέν, δὲ . . . δὲ, μέν . . . δὲ. Compare i., 2, 3.—ἐμεληθας ἀν τοῦ ὄργησθαι ἐπειρ. “Having foregone the getting angry, you would endeavor.”—αὐτόν. Schütz and Schneider im properly reject αὐτόν. It is added, however, for perspicuity’s sake, because κύνα is too far away from the governing verb, and this latter, therefore, becomes the accusative absolute, while αὐτόν takes its place. Compare Matthiae, § 472, 1, a.—τὸν δὲ ὄδελθων φής μέν, κ. τ. λ. “While, on the other hand, you acknowledge that you brother would be a great advantage, if he were such toward you as he ought to be, and yet, although confessing that you know how both to act and to speak kindly, you do not try to contrive in what way he shall be for you as excellent as possible.” The more regular arrangement and form of expression would have been with the participle φάς instead of the indicative φής, but it would also have been less forcible. (Kühner, ad loc.)

§ 10.

dέδοικα, ὁ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὖκ ἔχω ἐγώ. “I am afraid, O Socrates, lest I may not have,” i. e., I fear I hardly have. After verbs of fearing, &c., μὴ in μὴ οὖκ expresses suspicion or doubt as to what is feared. (Kühner, § 750, 1, Jell.)—πρὸς ἐμε. “‘Toward me.’ (Matthiae, § 591, c.)—καὶ μὴν οὔδέν γε ποικίλον, κ. τ. λ. “Yet, truly, there is no need of contriving as appears to me, any nice or nove

L
plan against him." By ποικίλον is here meant something nicely planned, or carefully and skillfully arranged. Compare Bremi, and Jacobs, *ad Demosth. c. Phil., iii., p. 120, 37, and Stallbaum, *ad Plat., Symposium., 182, B. (Kühner, *ad loc.*)—οίς δὲ καὶ σὺ. By attraction, for τούτους ἡ καὶ σὺ.—ἄλωτα. "On having been gained over."—περὶ πολλοῦ ἄν ποιεῖσθαι σε. "Would esteem you very highly." Literally, "would make you for himself (something) above much." Observe the force of the middle, and consult Matthia, § 589.

§ 11.

οὐκ ἀν φθάνοις, ἔφη, λέγων, κ. τ. λ. "You could not tell me too soon, said he, whether you have perceived me acquainted with some love-charm, with which I have been ignorant that I am acquainted," i. e., possessing some love-charm which I have been ignorant of having. The expression οὐκ ἀν φθάνοις λέγων means literally, "you could not anticipate by telling me," and hence more freely, "now do tell me at once, without any hesitation." Compare Matthia, § 553, 2. Kühner, § 694, Jelf. So, again, ὅ εὖ ἐλάδος λεληθα ἐμαντόν means literally, "which I have escaped my own observation in knowing."—καταργάσασθαι. "To bring it about," i. e., to cause. On the construction καταργάσασθαι τινα καλεῖν σε, consult Matthia, § 531—ὅποτε θύσι. A banquet usually followed a sacrifice. (Dict. Ant. s. v. Sacrificium.)—κατάρχουμι ἄν τοῦ αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ. "I would make you begin with inviting him," &c. Verbs signifying "to begin," such as ἀρχεῖν, ἀρχεθαι, ὑπάρχειν, κατάρχειν, &c., are construed with a genitive. Compare Matthia, § 335, 9.

§ 12, 13.

προτρέψασθαι. "To urge."—ὅποτε ὑποδημοῖς. "Whenever you might be going abroad."—ξένων ποιήσαι ὑποδέχεσθαι σεαυτόν. "To cause any host to receive you under his roof," i. e., to give you a hospitable reception. Observe the force of ὑπό in composition.—εἰς τὸν ἐκεῖνον. Supply πόλιν.—Ἀθήναζε. For Ἀθήναζε, the final letter σ coalescing with the de into ζε. (Kühner, § 332, Obs. 5, Jelf.)—ἐι γε βουλοίμην αὐτὸν προθυμεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "If, indeed, I should wish him to be desirous of accomplishing for me the things for which I might have come," i. e., the objects of my journey thither.—αὐτόν ἐκεῖνον ποιεῖν. With αὐτόν supply ἑμεῖς.

§ 14.

πάντες ἰπα σὺ γε, κ. τ. λ. "Then, (according to your own showing), you, for your part, though acquainted with all the love-charms among
mankind, were accustomed for a long time back to conceal your acquirements from them," i. e., you, for your part, were all along, without their knowing it, acquainted with all the love-enarms among mankind. Observe the force of the middle in ἀπεκρύπτουν, and also the reference in the imperfect to something customary and continued. Compare also, as regards ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, the explanation of Sturz, Lex. Xen., s. v. "Occulare scientiam suam," &c.—ἡ δὲνεῖτι, ἥφι, ἄρξαι, κ. τ. λ. "Or do you hesitate, said he, to make the first advance, lest you seem degraded in case you take the lead in benefiting a brother?" As the particle ᾧ, like the Latin an, is never, properly speaking, employed save in the second clause of an interrogative sentence, we must suppose πάντ' ἄρα, at the commencement of the section, as equivalent in effect to ᾧ πάντ' ἄρα, or, in other words, ἄρα as standing for ᾧ ἄρα. (Kühner, ad loc.)—καὶ μὴν "And yet, indeed."—δὲ ἂν φθάνει. Compare § 11.

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει μοι, κ. τ. λ. "If, then, Chærephon had appeared to me to be more inclined to take the lead unto this frame of mind, I would have endeavored to persuade him to attempt the making you his friend first; but, as the case now stands, you appear to me, by taking the lead, more likely to effect this." The connection of ideas in the whole passage is as follows: "Chærephon is the elder, and you, Chærecrates, are the younger. But in all countries it is the established usage that the juniors should pay reverence and render respect to their seniors. From this it results that you should show your respect for your elder brother by anticipating him in kindly offices;" in other words, it was the duty of Chærecrates, though junior, so to regulate his temper and conduct as to be the first to court the favor of his brother, by anticipating him in performing services, and, by so doing, conciliate him. (Kühner, ad loc Wheeler, ad loc.)

§ 15.

ὑποσα. "Things quite out of place."—καὶ οὐδαμῶς πρὸς σοῦ "And by no means in accordance with your usual manner." Supply ὅντα, and compare Matthiae, § 590, a.—καθηγεῖσθαι. "To take the lead in this matter."—τοῦτον γε τὰναντία νομίζεται. "The very reverse of this, indeed, is established by custom," i. e., established custom on this particular head is quite the reverse.

§ 16.

οὗ γάρ. Answering to the Latin "nonne igitur." The particle γάρ, in interрогations, has a conclusive signification. Compare § 17, and also i., 4, 14.—ὁδοὺ παραχωρῆσαι. "Should step aside from the
path," i. e. should make way for.—ὑπαναστήναι. The genitive θα-κον, which is otherwise usually added, is omitted here on account of the presence of the participle καθίμενον.—καὶ κολή μαλακῇ τιμήσαι. "And should honor him with a soft seat." Compare Hom., II., ix., 617, 659; Od., xxiv., 254.—καὶ λόγον ὑπείςαι. "And should yield to him in conversation." More literally, "should draw back from," &c.—ὡγαθέ. "My good friend." Compare i., 4, 17.—μὴ ὑκνεῖ. "Be not averse."—τὸν ἄνδρα. "This man." Much more emphatic than ἐκεῖνον would have been. Kühner thinks that the term is perhaps intended to indicate the full-grown manhood of Chærephon, as opposed to the youth of Chæreocrates.—σοὶ ὑπακούσεται. The verb ὑπακούω is construed with a genitive or dative. So, also, κατακόω. (Matthiae, § 362, § 398.)—φιλότιμος. "Fond of honorable distinction." Taken here in a good sense.—ἰλενθέρως. "Liberal of spirit."—τὰ μὲν γὰρ πονηρὰ ἄνθρωπα, κ. τ. λ. "For worthless wretches you could not in any other way more effectually allure," &c. The particle γὰρ gives a reason here for what went before, namely, καὶ πάνυ ταχῦ, κ. τ. λ.—ἄνθρωπα. The term ἄνθρωπος, like the Latin homunculus, is always indicative of contempt or inferiority.—μάλιστ' ἂν κατεργάσαι. "You could most effectually gain over."

§ 17.

τὶ γὰρ ἀλλα, ἐγγ. ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ. "Why, what else will result, said Socrates, save that you will stand a chance of showing," &c., i. e., save that you will perhaps show. The verb κινδυνεῖω signifies, "to run a risk," "to stand a chance," &c. A negation is often more strongly expressed by a question. So τὶ ἀλλα, ἵ is used with a finite verb for σο蒋介石 ἀλλα, where we must not repeat the preceding or following verb with τὶ ἀλλα, but supply in the mind a general verb, such as γίγνομαι, ποιώ, πάσχω. Compare Matthiae, § 488, 11. Hence, the full expression here would be τὶ γὰρ ἀλλα γενήσεται.—ἐπιδεῖξαι, συ μὲν χρηστός, κ. τ. λ. The verb δεῖκνυμι, and its compounds ἐπιδείκνυμι, &c., in the sense of "to show," take properly a participle, and in the sense of "to teach," an infinitive. But they also take the infinitive when the object of the verb indicates something not clearly perceived, but merely thought of as possible. (Kühner, ad loc.)— eius τὸν ἄγωνα ταῦταν. "To this (fraternal) contest."—πάνυ φιλονεκών-σειν. "Will strive most emulously."

§ 18.

οὗτος διάκεισθον. "You two are so affected (toward one another)," i. e., are as unnaturally affected.—τῶ γερέ. A feminina
substantive, in Attic, in the dual is often joined with a masculine article, adjective, &c. (Matthia, § 436.)—ἀφεμένω τούτου. "Having ceased from this office."—τείγ μοίρα. "By divine appointment."—τὸ συνεργεῖν. "The co-operating."

§ 19.

οὐκ ἂν πολλὴ ἀμαθία, κ. τ. λ. "Would it not be great folly and madness," &c. Observe here the asyndeton, giving an abrupt air to the commencement of the paragraph, and leading Zeune to suspect that we ought to read ὁδὸν for οὐκ ἂν. There is no need, however, of any change, as Schneider and Bornemann have shown by a comparison of other passages of Xenophon.—ἐπὶ ὑφελέγα . . . ἐπὶ βλάβει. "For benefit . . . for injury."—διὰ ἀνελθὰ ἐφυσεν ἂν ἑρότος. "As many as he has formed in pairs for men."—εἶ δέοι αὐτὰς τὰ πλέον ὑγινὰς, κ. τ. λ. "If it should behoove them to do at one and the same time things farther apart than a fathom." The ὑγινὰ was equal to six feet one inch, and therefore about one fathom. It was so called from ὑγέω, and strictly denotes the length of the outstretched arms, including the space across the breast.—εἶ καὶ δοκοῦντες. "Which even seem." The article and participle are equivalent to the relative and indicative in our idiom.—οὐδὲ ἂν τῶν ἐπὶ ἑγγυτέρω ὄντων, κ. τ. λ. "Would not be able to see, at one and the same time, those before and those behind of the things that are still nearer."—καὶ πολὺ διεστώτε. "Even though far apart," i. e., even though widely severed.—πρῦττετον ἀμα, κ. τ. λ. "Act in concert, and that, too, for the benefit of one another," i. e., and that, too, for mutual aid. Socrates means to say, that two brothers, even though separated by a wide interval of space, can unite their strength to accomplish any object, and that, too, in such a way, that each can assist and promote the welfare of the other.

CHAPTER IV.

§ 1.

περὶ φίλων διαλεγομένων. "Making certain remarks, in the course of conversation, about friends."—ἐμοιγε ἐδόκει μάλιστ', κ. τ. λ. "One appeared to me, I confess, likely to be very essentially benefited," &c. Observe the force of ὄν with the infinitive, as denoting what is likely, &c.—τούτο μὲν δή. "This very thing." Observe that δή increases the force of τούτο.—ἄν εἰ. "Would be." Observe the employment of the optative here, as referring to a latent condition in σαφῆς καὶ ἀγαθῆς, equivalent to εἰ σαφῆς καὶ ἀγαθῆς εἰ.—ἐπιστέλλων.
άνους. Dindorf reads ἐπιμελουένους. But the shorter form of this verb is less frequent in Attic.

§ 2.

καὶ γὰρ οἰκίας, κ. τ. λ. Compare Cicero, de Am., xv., 55: "Quid autem stultius, quam, cum plurimum copiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quae parantur pecunia, equos, famulos, testem egregiam, vasa pretiosa; amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam vitæ, ut ita dicam, supellectilem?" Cicero has here evidently imitated the Greek of Xenophon.—ὅπως ἐφη. Although ἐφη has just preceded, yet it is here repeated, in accordance with a very ordinary Greek usage, arising from the language of daily converse. (Kühner, ad loc.)—φιλον δὲ, δ. The neuter δ is put here by a species of attraction for ὅν.—οὕτε ὅπως κτήσονται φροντίζοντας. "Neither caring how they shall acquire." For κτήσονται, which is supported by MS authority, the common text has κτήσωνται.—οὕτε ὅπως οἱ ὄντες, κ. τ. λ. "Nor in what way those who are (already their friends) may be preserved to for themselves." The old editions, with four Paris MSS., have ὅπως οἰόν τε καντοῖς σώζοντας.

§ 3.

ἀλλὰ καὶ. "Nay, more."—τἀλλα πρὸς υμείαν. "The other things conducive to health," i.e., to convalescence. Some recent editions have, with one MS., τάλλα τά.—ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς οἰκέταις. "In the case of their domestics." More literally, "on account of their domestics."—ζημίαν ἡγομένους. "Thinking it a loss."—οὐδὲν ἔλαττοσθαί. "That they were in no respect worse off (than before)."—ἀπεφάντευτον οὐδ' ὀνείσκαστον. "To be unattended to, or not looked after."

§ 4.

καὶ πάνυ πολλῶν αὐτοῖς ὄντων. "Although they had very many.—τῶν δὲ φίλων, κ. τ. λ. Compare Cicero, de Am., xvii., 62: "Sæpe (Scipio) querebatur, quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent, ut capras et oves quot quisque haberet, dicere posset: amicos quot haberet, non posset dicere."—ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς πυνθανομένοις, κ. τ. λ. "But that, even on having attempted to recount this to those making the inquiry, (the persons) whom they placed among their friends, these they take up again." They enumerate persons at first, but correct themselves, and reject them on second thoughts. The allusion in ἀνατίθεσθαι is to the movements on a draught-board, when, after having put down a piece, we take it up again, and alter or take back our move. Observe, moreover, that the infinitive ἀνατίθεσθαι is put here for
the participle ἀνατιθεμένους, on account of the preceding ἐγχειρήσαντας.—τὸσοῦτον. "So much," i. e., so little. Observe that τὸσοῦτος here, like tantus occasionally in Latin, is employed to denote a quality merely, without any accompanying idea of enlargement or in increase.

§ 5.

καίτοι πρὸς ποῖον κτήμα, κ. τ. λ. "And yet, with what possession of all others being compared, would not a good friend appear far more valuable?" Literally, "with what possession of the rest."—οὕτω χρῆσιμον, ὥσπερ ὁ χρηστὸς φίλος. "Is so useful as the useful friend," i. e., as the true or good friend. Observe the alliteration in χρῆσιμον . . . χρηστός.—παραμόνιμον. "Constant in his attachment."—πάγχρηστος. "Useful in every respect."

§ 6.

ἐαντὸν τἀττει πρὸς πάν, κ. τ. λ. "Adapts himself to every thing that is deficient in his friend, both as regards the furnishing of private means and the discharge of public duties." We have not hesitated to adopt, with Sauppe, Dindorf's correction of πράξεως, for the common reading πράξεων. If we read πράξεων, we must supply κατασκευῆς.—συνεπίσχυει. "He helps him with the means."—συμβοηθεῖ. "He lends his aid."—τὰ μὲν συναναλίσκων. "In some things sharing his expenses." Literally, "spending some things along with him."—συμπεἶθεν. "Helping to persuade." Compare Heinze: "hilft er zureden."—βιαζόμενος. "Urging," i. e., employing gentle violence.—εὗ μὲν πρῶτοντας, κ. τ. λ. "Most (of all) gladdening the prosperous, and most (of all) setting upright again those who are thrown down," i. e., prostrated by misfortune. Thomas Magister (p. 333) says, ἐπανορθοῦμαι κάλλιον ἢ ἐπανορθῶ; but consult Fritsche, ad Aristoph., Thesmoph., p. 619.

§ 7.

προορῶσι. "See beforehand." The Latin prospicient. —προεκουσα. "Hear beforehand." Weiske maintains that προακοίνων here means, "sonos e remoto loco pericpere," and he is followed in this by Herbst. But Kühner correctly remarks, that as προορῶν is to see beforehand, so προακοίνων is used of him who hears any thing before another. Observe, moreover, that ὅτα, the neuter plural, is here joined with a plural verb. This is done, as Bornemann remarks, for the sake of concinnity, since a plural verb precedes.—τούτων φίλος εὐρυγετῶν οὐδένος λείπεται. "In no one of these does
a friend fail to prove kindly serviceable." For the construction of the participle, consult Matthia, § 554, et al., and, as regards of δένος in the genitive, § 317. -πρό αὐτοῦ. "For himself." Compare Matthia, § 575. -ταύτα ὁ φίλος πρό τοῦ φίλου εξήρκεσεν. "These things the friend is wont to supply amply for his friend." Observe here the force of the aorist in denoting what is habitual. Commentators generally supply participles here from the finite verbs which precede, such as ἐξεργαζόμενος, &c., but Kühner considers this quite unnecessary, since the idea implied by εξήρκεσεν is sufficiently full without them. -ὁ καλείται φίλος. Here the neuter relative δ agrees with the antecedent κτήματος, as being the most emphatic word. Compare § 2.

CHAPTER V.

§ 1.
ἀλλον αὐτοῦ λόγον. "Another conversation of his." -εξετάζειν εαυτόν. "To examine himself," i.e., excited him to the task of self-examination. -ὅποσον τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος είη. "As to of how much value he might be unto his friends," i.e., in the estimation of his friends. -πεν' ἐπιζημένων. "When pinched by poverty." -Ἀντισθενῆς. Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates, and after his death the founder of the Cynic sect. This form of the accusative is more common with Plato than with Xenophon, who generally employs the form ending in ην. Thus we have Ἄντισθενῆν, iii., 11, 17, and Symp., 11, 12. So Σωκράτης in Plato, but Σωκράτην in Xenophon. (Kühner, ad loc.) -ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀμελοῦντας αὐτοῦ. "In the presence of the neglectful person himself."

§ 2.
ἀρ', ἐφ', ὃ Ἀντισθενῆς, εἰσι τινες ἄξιαι φίλων, κ. τ. λ. "Are there, said he, O Antisthenes, any values of friends, even as (there are) of domestics?" i.e., is there any standard of value for friends, as there is for domestics? -ὁ μέν παν. "One, perhaps." -ὁν μναίν. The Attic mina (μνά) was equivalent to one hundred drachmae, or seventeen dollars sixty cents of our currency. Sixty mina made the ordinary talent. The market-price of slaves at Athens, exclusively of the variations caused by the greater or less demand and supply, was very different according to their age, health, strength, beauty, natural abilities, mechanical ingenuity, and moral qualities. Compare Böckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, vol. i., p. 92.-Νικτας. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, whose life has been written by Plutarch. His
wealth is alluded to by Thucydides, vii., 86.—ἐπιστάτην εἰς τὰργύρια, κ. τ. λ. “To have purchased an overseer for the silver mines for a talent,” i. e., to have given no less than a talent for an overseer, &c. The Athenian silver mines were at Laurium; they were farmed out to private individuals, and produced a considerable income to the state. Nicias is said by Xenophon elsewhere (de Vectig., iv., 14), to have had a thousand slaves employed in these mines, and to have hired these out to Sosias the Thracian at an obolus a day each.—ταλάντων. The ordinary Attic talent, which is here meant, was equal to one thousand and fifty-six dollars sixty cents.—σκοποῦμαι δὴ τούτο. “I proceed now to investigate this question.”

§ 3.

ναὶ μὰ Δία. “Certainly, indeed, there are.” Supply εἰσὶ.—ἐγὼ γονὸν βουλομένην ἥν, κ. τ. λ. “At any rate, I would wish some one person to be my friend rather than have two minæ, while, on the other hand, I would not prefer some other one even to half a mina; and some other one again I would choose even before ten mina; and some other one I would purchase to be a friend unto me for all my means and all my labor.” Observe the peculiar force of πρό here, which we have endeavored to adapt to our own idiom. For πόνων some read πόρων, the notion of which is already included in χρημάτων, besides πόροι could not be used in reference to Antisthnes, who was known to be exceedingly poor. (Weiske, ad loc.)

§ 4, 5.

καλῶς ἣν ἔχων. “It would be well.” Literally, “it would have itself well.”—ὡς πλείοστοι ἄξιος εἶναι. This might have been ἄξιοι, as ἐρετάζειν τινὰ ἐκτόν ἦν προθετωσαν. “May be less inclined to abandon him.”—ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦ. “For I indeed.”—ἀκοῦω τοῦ μὲν. “Hear from one,” i. e., hear one say.—μνᾶν ἄνθ' ἐκάνον μᾶλλον ἔλεετο. “Preferred a mina to his friendship.” Literally, “chose a mina instead of himself.”—τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα σκοπῶ, μή, κ. τ. λ. “Taking into consideration all such points as these, I am apprehensive lest,” &c. The verb σκοπῶ here contains in it the additional idea of a verb of fearing, as is indicated by the particle μή, and is equivalent, therefore, to σκοπῶν φοβοῦμαι. (Seyffert, ad loc.)—καὶ ἀποδίδω-αι τοῦ εὐρύντος. “And parts with him for what he will bring.” Literally, “for that which he (the slave) finds (in the shape of a price).” Compare he explanation of Kühner: “Scilicet τὸ I. 2
CHAPTER VI.

$1.$

φρενοῦν. "To give wise instruction." More literally, "to make wise."—Κριτόβουλε. Critobulus was the son of Crito, and a follower of Socrates. Compare 1., 2, 48; ii., 9, 1.—τῶς ἄν ἐπιχειροῖμεν σκοπεῖν. "How should we undertake to look out for one?" i. e., how should we proceed to search for one? The Attic form of the optative of verbs in ἐώ is rarely used in the plural. (Rost, 6 77, p. 227;)—ἄρα πρῶτον μὲν ζητητέου, κ. τ. λ. "Must we, in the first place, seek for one who," &c. Many commentators consider ἄρα, in cases like the present, equivalent to ἄρ' οὗ, or the Latin nonne. This, however, is not correct. It is true, ἄρα implies doubt, and hence is for the most part used negatively, or, in other words, prepares one for a negative answer, being then equivalent to the Latin num. Attic urbanity, however, employs this particle even in interrogations where no doubt whatever is implied, that is, where, as in the present instance, the interrogator knows for certain that the person interrogated will give an affirmative answer. Hence it thus often subserves the purposes of delicate irony. (Kühner, ad loc.)—ἀρχεῖν. "Holds in subjection."—ὑπνοῦ. "Love of sleep."—ὁ κρατοῦμενος "He who is subjugated."—μὰ Δί', οὖ δῆτα. "No, surely, he could not indeed."—Supply ὕπνων ὅν.—τοῦ μὲν ὑπὸ τούτων, κ. τ. λ. The particle μὲν is solitary here, as in ἦ μὲν γὰρ γραφή, in i., 1, 1.—ὑφεκτεον εἴρην. "That we must refrain from," i. e., must avoid. Supply ἤμιν.

$2.$

τί γὰρ; "What then? Observe that τί is found in many combinations, especially with particles, to give greater animation to the discourse. The literal force of τί γὰρ appears to be "what, for (we have not yet done with the subject)?" In the previous section we have πρῶτον μὲν, and would here naturally expect εἴρη δὲ, but the place of this last is supplied by the more animated and impressive.
"He who, being extravagant in his expenditures, has not sufficient resources of his own (to supply those expenditures)." Before δετις supply έκεινος, which becomes a nominative absolute, its place being supplied by ούτως, farther on in the sentence.—των άνθρωπων δείται. "Needs his neighbors' aid." Literally, "needs those that are near," i. e., his neighbors.Supply ουτων.—ου δοκεί σοι καὶ ούτως, κ. τ. λ. "Does not this one also appear to you to be a troublesome friend?"—ἀφεκτέων. Supply ήμιν εστίν.

§ 3.

χρηματίζεσθαι. "To make money." More literally, "to enrich himself."—ους άμβολός εστί. "Is hard to have dealings with." Compare the explanation of Sturz, Lex. Xen., s. v.: "In pactis faciendis, in amicitia, &c., se difficilem prebens."—αποδίδοναι δε ου βούλεται; After these words we must mentally supply, though not translate, ου δοκει σοι καὶ ούτως χαλεπῶς φίλος είναι; —έκεινον. "Than that other," i. e., than the one mentioned in the previous section.

§ 4.

τι δέ; "But what?" Equivalent, in fact, to "still farther." The combinations τι γάρ and τι δέ often succeed each other in continuation of a discourse, and denote transition.—μηδέ προς ἐν ἄλλα, κ. τ. λ. "Does not even afford leisure unto himself for any one thing else." Observe that μηδέ ἐν ἄλλα is more emphatic than μηδέν ἄλλα would have been.—κερδανεί. "Shall be a gainer," i. e., hopes to gain something. We have the indicative here in an indirect interrogation, where in Latin the subjunctive would be employed. This is owing to the idea of something actually existing as implied in κερδανει. Compare Matthiae, §507, 2.—στασιώδης. "Quarrelsome."—παρέχειν. "To raise up."—τούτων τὸν κακὸν. "Of these evil qualities."—ἀνέχεται. "Endures it."—φίλον ποιεῖσθαι. "To make a friend unto ourselves." Observe the force of the middle.

§ 5.

ολμαι μέν, κ. τ. λ. "(Him), I think indeed, who, directly contrary to this," &c. Observe the force of μέν here, "I think indeed," but it may be otherwise.—γυγράθης μέν ἐστί τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονών. "Is master over the pleasures (enjoyed) through the agency of the body," i. e., over all corporeal gratifications.—ἐυφραῖκος. "Just." Literally, " a person adhering to his oath." Ruhnken ingeniously conjectures ἐυφραῖκος, "good tempered," "easy to be appeased" But
as Kühner remarks, εὐφορκός is used in opposition to the character of the avaricious man, § 4, who, in his eagerness for gain, cares nothing for justice nor for his covenants, and who, in § 19, is called ἀπ.ατος. —καὶ φιλόνεικος πρὸς τὸ μή, κ. τ. λ. "And emulous as regards the not being behind-hand in doing good," &c. Verbs signifying "to be inferior," or "to fail," are construed with a participle. (Matthiae, § 554, g.)—τοῖς χρωμένοις. "Unto those who make use of him," ε., unto those friends who avail themselves of his services.

§ 6, 7.

οὐ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαίρόμενοι. "Not drawing an inference from their words." The dative is used with some verbs, with which, in Latin, no instrument or means is signified. The verb τεκμαίρομαι is sometimes construed with ἀπό, or ἔκ and a genitive. Compare Matthiae, § 396.—εἰργασμένον. "To have made." Literally, "as having made."—τούτῳ πιστεῦομεν. "In this one we place confidence." We have here a kind of attraction, for τούτῳ πιστεῦομεν ποιήσειν.—καὶ ἀνάρα δὴ λέγεις, κ. τ. λ. "And do you mean, then, said he, that a man who is seen benefiting his former friends, is manifest as intending to serve his subsequent ones?" i. e., that the man who has openly benefited his previous friends will clearly be inclined also to serve his future friends. Many verbs, and verbal expressions, which are used impersonally in other languages, particularly in the construction of the accusative with the infinitive, in Greek usually take the chief word of the following proposition as a subject. The expressions δὴλον ἔστι, "it is clear;" ὁδίκαιον ἔστι, "it is right," &c., are most usually thus construed. (Matthiae, § 297.)—καὶ γὰρ ἵπποις, κ. τ. λ. "I do, replied Socrates, for whom soever I see using even former horses well, I think that this one uses others also well." Observe that γὰρ is here elliptical, referring to λέγω, or something equivalent understood, while καὶ, on the other hand, is to be construed with ἵπποις. There is no need, moreover as the context plainly shows, of our reading χρῆσεσθαι instead of γρῆσθαι, with Valckenaeer.

§ 8.

elev. "Well, be it so." Attic for εἰσαγ, but used adverbially as a mere particle of transition.—ἐφη. "Said Critobulus."—πρῶτον μὲν, ἐφη, κ. τ. λ. "In the first place, replied Socrates, we must look to the omens from the gods, whether," &c. Literally, "to the things from the gods."—δὲν ἄν ἦμιν τε δοκῇ, κ. τ. λ. "As regards him whom it may appear good unto us (to make our friend—
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(the making whom our friend) the gods may not oppose," i. e., by sending unfavorable omens. The full form of expression will be as follows: ἐν φίλοι ποιεῖσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν τε δοκῇ, καὶ ἐν φίλοι ποιεῖσθαι οὕτω μὴ ἐκαντιώνται.

§ 9, 10.

μὰ Δ’, ἔφη, οὐ κατὰ πόδας. "Assuredly, replied Socrates, not by tracking his footsteps." The expression κατὰ πόδας is rendered by Herbst, "velocitate pedum," "cursu." This, however, is erroneous, although retained in Didot's edition. The true idea is better given in the version of Leunclavius, "insistendo vestigiis ejus." Compare iii., 11, 8, and Livy, xxvii., 2: "Marcellus ... vestigiis institit sequi." (Kühner, ad loc.)—οἶ ἔχθροι. The same here as οἱ πολέμιοι. The strict distinction is, that ἐκθρός means a private enemy, but πολέμιος a public enemy, in arms. There is the same difference in Latin between inimicus and hostis.—ἀκοντα γὰρ φίλον, κ. τ. λ. "For to seize a friend against his inclination is troublesome."—ταῦτα πάσα χοντες. "On being treated in this way."—φίλοι δὲ πῶς. "(Yes), but how do they become friends?" Supply γίγνονται.—ἐπιφῶς. "Incantations," i. e., charms in verse.—ἐπφάσοντες. "Chanting."—φιλαρα. "Love-spells." The idea intended to be conveyed by the whole passage down to, and including § 14, is simply this: If you wish any one to become your friend, first show attachment to him in words, and then indicate the same also by deeds.

§ 11.

ἀ μέν. With this corresponds ἄλλας δὲ τινας, § 12.—ἡκουσας Ὀμήρου. "You have heard from Homer." The poems of Homer were accustomed to be recited; hence the employment here of ἡκουσας. The passage referred to occurs in Od., xii., 184.—τοιώδε τις. "Is some such a one as this." Xenophon seems to have cited the verse that follows from memory. All the known copies of Homer have Δεῳ ἀγ' ἵνων instead of δεῳ ἀγε δή. Hence the force of τοιώδε τις.—τοῦτην οὖν, ἔφη, τήν ἑπιφωνίαν, κ. τ. λ. "Did the Sirens, then, O Socrates, said he, by chanting this same charm unto the rest of men also, detain them so effectually, that those once charmed never departed from them?"—οὐκ ἄλλα. Thus in all the MSS., contrary to the rule of the grammarians, which says, that οὐ at the end of a sentence does not take κ, whether followed by a vowel or consonant. Many similar instances occur, equally supported by MS. authority, as, for example, § 13, § 36, and those collected by Bornemann, ad Symp., p 168, seq. In all these cases there appears to
be a rapid transition from one clause to the other, especially when the second clause begins, as in the present instance, with ἀλλὰ (Kühner, ad loc.)—ῥοῖς ἐπ’ ἀρετῆ φιλοσοφοῦντος. “To those (only who were ambitious after virtue,” i. e., who were eager in the pursuit of virtue.

§ 12, 13.

σχεδόν τι λέγεις, κ. τ. λ. “You seem to say nearly (as follows), that we ought to use, as charms unto each, such expressions, as one, on hearing him that praises, will not think that he utters laughing at him all the while,” i. e., that we ought to use, as charms to each, such praises, as that when one hears them he will not think himself mocked.—οὔτω μὲν γάρ. That is, if he thought he were ridiculed.—τὸν εἰδότα. “The one that was conscious.”—λέγων. “By telling him.” —οὐκ ἀλλ’ ἥκουσα. Compare note on οἷκ · ἀλλά, § 11.—ἥκουσα μὲν. “I, for my part, have heard.” Observe the force of μὲν, and compare note on οἷοι μὲν, § 5.—ἐπίστατο. The optative, as Kühner remarks, is aptly employed here, because the reference is to something which Socrates had heard from others, but did not know of himself, and hence Bornemann makes the clause equivalent to ἥκουσα λεγόντων, ὅτι Περικλῆς ἐπίστατο.—ἐποίει. Observe the sudden change to the indicative, occasioned by the transition from the oratio obliqua to the recta, that is, from the indirect narration to the direct.—περιώψας τι ἀγαθὸν αὑτῆ. “By having attached some advantage to it.”

§ 14.

καὶ μελλομεν. “If we should be about.” Schneider, following the conjecture of Heindorf, reads καὶ μελλομεν, “if we are about,” implying certainty; but the optative is preferable, as leaving it undecided whether the thing is about to take place or not.—λέγεις τε καὶ πράττειν. “Both in speaking and in acting.” Herbst considers λέγειν to refer to the oratorical powers of Pericles, and πράττειν to the illustrious deeds of Themistocles; but both statesmen were remarkable for these qualities united. Socrates had already compared the oratory of Pericles with the music of the Sirens, to show the power of language; he now introduces, in the exploits of Themistocles (πράττειν), and in his admirable counsels for the state (λέγειν), the effect of both in gaining affection. (Kühner, ad loc. Wheeler, ad loc.)—σὺ δ’ φῶ. “And did you think.”—εἶδον τ’ εἶκαί. “That it was possible.”
15, 16.

"Yes," for I saw, said Critobulus, both worthless rhetoricians to be friends unto worthy public speakers." Observe the elliptical employment of γάρ, and supply the simple particle of affirmation, ναί, or the fuller form of expression, ὥμην οὖν τε εἶναι.—πάντων στρατηγικοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐταίρους. "Companions unto men admirably skilled in military tactics."—περὶ ὀθ διαλεγόμεθα. "As regards the point about which we are discoursing." Critobulus, both worthless rhetoricians to be friends unto worthy public speakers. Observe the elliptical employment of yap, and supply the simple particle of affirmation, vai, or the fuller form of expression, ὑπὲρειν. "Companions unto men admirably skilled in military tactics."—κεῖσαν ἡδή μελετή μοι, κ. τ. λ. "This is now a subject of concern unto me, whether it is possible for a man who has become honorable and worthy himself, easily to be a friend," &c. On the force of εἰς ἐκτόθμον, which answers to the Latin facile, consult Viger, p. 91.

17, 18.

δ ταράττει σε. Supply τοῦτο ἐστίν. The common editions have ἡ ταράττει σε. The reading which we have given is that of Bornemann, Kühner, and others, and rests on good MS. authority.—καὶ χαλεπώτερον χρωμένος, κ. τ. λ. "And acting with more harshness toward one another than toward the worthless of men." Literally, "using one another with more harshness than the worthless of men." Supply ἀλλήλων after χρωμένος, and observe, moreover, that τῶν μηδένος ἄξιων ἀνθρώπων is a concise form of expression for ἡ τοῖς μηδένος ἄξιοις ἀνθρώπων.—ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις αἱ, κ. τ. λ. "But cities also, which, although both having the highest concern for the things that are becoming," &c. Observe the force of the article after πόλεις. We have given in ἐπιμελόμεναι the reading of four MSS. The common editions have ἐπιμελούμεναι. Compare Kühner, ad 1, 2, 22, and with him Lobeck, Addend. to Buttman, Gr. Gr., ii., p. 242.—ἡμίστα προσιέμεναι. "Tolerating least."—πολεμικὸς ἔχοναι. "Are hostilely disposed." Adverbs are often put with the verb ἔχειν in the same sense as the adjectives corresponding to those adverbs would be with the verb εἶναι. For πολεμικὸς Ernesti would read πολεμικὸς. The strict distinction between the two forms is certainly in favor of the change, although probably the one is used here in the sense of the other. The form πολεμικὸς is used in praise, and is equivalent strictly to "belllicose," "fortiter;" whereas πολεμικὸς is used in dispraise, "hostilitier."
πάντως ἄθυμως ἔχω. "I am altogether despondent." Compare note on πολεμικῶς ἐχουσι, § 18.—οὗτε γὰρ τοὺς πονηροὺς, κ. τ. λ. An anacoluthon, for in § 20 there ought to follow, οὕτ' ἂν τοῖς, &c.—πλούνεκται. "Avaricious."—ἀκρατεῖς. "Incontinent."—πάντως. The common text has πάντες.—πεφυκέναι. "To be by their very nature." ἀλλὰ μὴν. Compare i., 1, 6.—οὐδ' ἂν τοὺς χρηστοῖς, κ. τ. λ. "The bad could never harmonize with the worthy for friendship."—ἐι δὲ δή. "But if then, (as you say)." Compare § 18.—στασιάζουσί τε περί τοῦ πρωτεύειν. "Are both at variance (with each other) for pre-eminence."—φθονοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς. "From mutual envy."—ἑαυτοῖς . . . . . ἀλλήλους. The reflexive and reciprocal pronouns are often used promiscuously, merely for the purpose of varying the language. (Kühner, § 654, 2, Jelf.)—τίνες ἐτι. "Who any longer," i. e., who after this.

§ 21.

ιππί ἐξει μὲν, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ. "These things, however, my good Critobulus, replied Socrates, are somewhat diversified in their character," i. e., do not all follow one and the same rule. Compare the explanation of Ernesti: "In hoc genere quaedam varietas deprehenditur." The question here arises as to what Socrates means by ταύτα, whether he has in view the φιλικά and πολεμικά, or whether he refers to the difference existing between the really good among men and the pretendedly so. The latter is undoubtedly the more correct view, and the point which he wishes to establish is this, that although differences and dissensions may arise among the really good, because the φιλικά are by the very constitution of our nature intermingled with πολεμικά, yet these differences are soon allayed by the influence of correct and virtuous principles. (Lange, ad loc.)—τὰ μὲν φιλικά. "Principles of love."—συνεργοῦντες. "By co-operating."—καὶ τοῦτο συνείντες, κ. τ. λ. "And, understanding this, entertain a grateful feeling toward one another," i. e., feel mutual gratitude.—τὰ δὲ πολεμικά. "And also principles of hostility."—ἐναντιοῦντα. "Oppose one another." Observe the force of the middle.—πολεμικῶν. "Are productive of hostility." Literally, "are a hostile thing." Observe that πολεμικῶν is a neuter adjective without a substantive in the predicate. Compare ii, 3, 1.—δυσμενεῖς. "Begets ill will."—μισητῶν. "Is deserving of hatred." We have followed Kühner in rendering this. Commentators generally, but less correctly, explain it by "producing," or "causing hatred."
NOTES TO BOOK II.—CHAPTER VI.

§ 22.

diē τούτων πάντων διαυδομένη. "Insinuating itself through all these obstacles."—diā tēn ὑπετήν. "Through virtuous principles."—πάντων κυριεύειν. "To be masters over all things."—καὶ δύνανται πεινώντες, κ. τ. λ. "And they are able, by enduring hunger and thirst patiently, to share in food and drink without occasioning any pain unto others." Some editions less correctly have τότον. Compare Arcad. de Accent., p. 78, ed. Bark. : τότος τὸ συμπόσιον, ποτὸς δὲ τὸ πινόμενον.

§ 23.

tou ἀλονεκτείν. "From exercising a grasping spirit."—χρηματον νομίμως κοινωνεῖν. "To participate in pecuniary matters as far as justice allows," i. e., lawfully, justly. Kühner, whom we have followed, correctly explains νομίμως by δικαίως. Compare iv., 4, 1. Bornemann less correctly thinks, that Socrates meant to express the lending of money at legal interest, legitimis usuris.—τὴν ἐρων ὁμόν ἀλήπως, κ. τ. λ. "To settle strife, not only without giving pain, but even with advantage to each other."—εἰς τὸ μετομελημένον προϊέναι. "From proceeding to what shall be repented of." Participles are used substantively when they have the article joined with them. (Matthiae, § 570.)—ἐαυτῶν. "Their own."

§ 24.

πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰκός. "How, then, is it not natural."—τῶν πολιτειών τιμῶν. These genitives depend on κοινωνιών εἶναι. The adjectives ἀθλαθείς and ἀφέλιμοις are used here adverbially, "without injury," "with advantage."—οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦντες. "For they who desire."—χρήματα κλέπτειν. "To peculate."—ἡδοπαθεῖν. "To indulge in luxury."—ἀδύνατοι ἄλλω συναρμόσαι. "Incapable of friendly union with another."

§ 25.

ei δὲ τις. Join this with πειράται. It should have been, as Matthiae remarks, ei δὲ τις . . . . βουλόμενως, ὅπως . . . . πειράται, οὕτω πράττοι, but this conclusion of the conditional proposition, on account of the parenthesis, and because οὕτω πράττοι expresses only generally what was previously declared more definitely, is omitted. (Matthiae, § 556, Obs. 2.)—τοῖς φίλοις τῷ δίκαιῳ βοηθεῖν. "To assist his friends in just things."—ἀρχαῖς. "Having been elected an archon."—ἀγαθῶν τι ποιεῖν τίν πατρίδα. Compare i., 2, 12.—ἄλλω τοιούτῳ. "With another of similar disposition."—μετὰ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν. "If united with the honorable and worthy."
§ 26.

συνθεμένοις ἐπὶ τοὺς χείρονς ἰέναι. "To unite together and advance against the weaker." Construe the participle and infinitive as two infinitives united by the copulative καὶ.—πάντας ἄν τοὺς ἀγώνας, κ. τ. λ. "The former would conquer in all the contests, and they would obtain all the prizes." When the condition and consequence are both past actions, whose relation to each other shows that any action would have taken place if another had happened, the indicative of past time is used twice, in the protasis with ei alone (hence here el έξην), and in the apodosis with ἄν (hence here ἰέν ἐλάμβανον).—εἰκεὶ μὲν. Equivalent to ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγώνισιν—ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς. "In those political contests," i. e., in those states. Supply ἀγώνισιν.—οὐδεὶς καλεῖει, κ. τ. λ. "No one prevents a man from benefiting the state in concert with whomsoever he may please."—κτησάμενον. "For a person who has acquired."—πολιτεύεσθαι. "To conduct public affairs."—κοινωνοῖς καὶ συνεργοῖς τῶν πράξεων. "As sharers and co-operators in his proceedings."

§ 27.

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§ 28.

καὶ τοιοῦτος γενόμενος. "And in endeavoring to become such." Compare the explanation of Kühner: "dum talis fieri studes." Bornemann and others, from three MSS., read γενόμενος.—συλλαβεῖν ἥξομι. The verb ἥξειν with an infinitive is equivalent to ὑπάσχει.—διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι. "From my being prone to love." He means the love of real loveliness, namely, of truth, virtue, and honor, with which he endeavored also to inspire his followers.—δεινῶς γὰρ, ἄν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ ἀνθρώπων, κ. τ. λ. "For with regard to whatsoever persons I may desire, I am all impelled in a powerful degree to the being loved in turn by them, because loving them; and to the being longed for, because longing for; and to the being even desired in turn for the sake of my intercourse, because desirous of holding in
NOTE S TO BOOK II.—CHAPTER VI. 259

tercourse," i. e., impelled to love, that I may be loved in turn; and to long for, that I may be longed for in return, &c. We have given ύπονοίας here the explanation assigned to it by Kühner, who makes it the genitive of cause, and equivalent to consuetudinis causa.

§ 29.

ὅρω δὲ καὶ σοί τούτων δεῦσον. "And I see that even to you there will be a need of these characteristics." Observe the employment of the participle where the Latins employ the infinitive: "Quibus et tibi opus fore vide".—μη σὺν ἀποκρύπτον με. Verbs signifying "to conceal" are construed with two accusatives, as in Latin, one of the thing, and the other of the person from whom it is concealed. The accusative of the thing is not expressed here, but understood. —οὐκ ἀπελέγοι δόματε ἔχειν, κ. τ. λ. "I do not think I am inexperienced as regards a hunting after men," i. e., after friends. Compare note on πολεμικῶς ἔχουσι, ii., 6, 18.

§ 30–33.

καὶ μὴν. Compare ii., 3, 4.—τούτων ἔγω τῶν μαθημάτων, κ. τ. λ. "I have long been desirous of these same branches of learning," i. e., of this same science of acquiring friends, in all its ramifications.—κάσεις με κατειπεῖν σου, κ. τ. λ. "Will you permit me to accuse you unto him (by saying)," &c Observe that κατειπεῖν is here indicative of playful irony; the meaning being, in fact, "will you permit me to say of you unto him," &c. The idea intended to be conveyed by Socrates is this: "Will you so think, speak, and act, that I may say all this with truth concerning you?"—ὁτι ἄγασαι τε αὐτοῦ. "That you both admire him." Compare Mau/i̊α, § 317, Obs. Weiske calls attention to the gradation in the means of obtaining friendship that are here enumerated by Socrates: 1. Admi- ratio (ἄγασαι αὐτοῦ): 2. Benevolentia (ἐνιαίκος ἔχεις πρὸς αὐτόν): 3. Studium promerendi (ἐπιμελῆς τῶν φίλων).

§ 34.

ἐὰν δὲ σου προσκατηγορήσω. "If, however, I shall bring this additional accusation against you." Observe the force of πρὸς in com- position.—καὶ εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχεις. "You also feel well disposed."—ωρα ἦν δόξεις. "Will you not think."—διαβάλλεσθαι. Another speci- men of Socratic irony.—ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι, κ. τ. λ. "(No), on the contrary, said he, there arises," &c Observe the elliptical employ- ment of ἄλλα, as referring to a negative understood.—πρὸς οὐς ἄν ὑπαλάβω, κ. τ. λ. For πρὸς τούτους, οὔς, κ. τ. λ. This is the sim-
plest form of attraction, the relative depending on a preposition, and yet being in the same case as is required by the verb. (Kühner, § 822, 2. Jelf.)

§ 35.

ταῦτα μὲν ὑή. "These things, then."—πρὸς οὖς. For πρὸς τούτων, οὖς.—ἐφιλος ποιήσασθαι. "To make friends unto yourself." Observe the force of the middle.—καὶ ἐπὶ τε τοῖς καλοῖς ἔργοις, κ. τ. λ. "And exult at the noble actions of your friends no less than at your own." Observe that ἑαυτοῦ has here the force of σεαυτοῦ. (Matthiae, § 489, 2.)—ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. "At the prosperity."—οὐκ ἀποκύμνεις μηχανώμενος. "Are not weary in contriving."—καὶ ὅτι ἐγνωκας, κ. τ. λ. "And that you consider it to be a manly virtue." Kühner is offended with the repetition of the conjunction ὅτι here and ascribes it to negligence on the part of the writer. For the employment of the infinitive after ἐγνωκας, consult Matthiae, § 530, 2.—πάνυ ἐπιτήδειον. Observe that πάνυ is separated from its adjective for the purpose of making it more emphatic. Compare Kühner, § 904, 1. Jelf. —ολμαι εἶναι με. Observe here the accusative with the infinitive, where we would regularly expect the nominative, the subject being the same with that of the preceding verb. This is done, however, because emphasis is required. Compare Matthiae, § 536,Obs.

§ 36.

Ἀσπασίας ὅψ εἶπεν σοι διὸ. "As if it were not in your own power." The case absolute is often put by the Attics in the accusative with ἀσπασίας when it marks the motive of an action, &c. (Matthiae, § 568.)—μυν Δίου ὡς, ἂς ποτε, κ. τ. λ. "No, indeed, (it is not in my power), as I once heard Aspasia (say)." Literally, "as I once heard from Aspasia." With ὡς supply ἐπὶ μοι ἔστι. The allusion is to the celebrated Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles, who is said by some to have been the preceptress of Socrates in the art of speaking. This story, however, is most probably untrue, and has arisen from a misconception of a passage in the Menexenus of Plato, p. 235, E. (Consult Wiggers' Life of Socrates, p. 377 of this volume.) Weiske maintains that Socrates praises this female as his teacher solely on the principle of irony, and that he never intended to mean that he really heard the lessons of Aspasia. The same point is ably argued by C. F. Hermann (Disp. de Socr. Mag, &c. p. 19, seqq.). ἀγαθὰς προμηθησθῆς. "That upright match-makers."—τάγαθα. "The good qualities (of individuals)"—δεινὰς εἶναι αὐνάγειν, κ. τ. λ.
NOTES TO BOOK II.—CHAPTER VI.

"Are very influential in bringing together persons into affinity, but that, uttering falsehoods, they proved of no service when they praised," i. e., proved of no service when uttering false praises.—τὴν προμηθαμένην. "Her that brought about the match."—αὐτῇ καὶ ἐγώ, κ. τ. λ. "With regard to which things, then, I, being persuaded that they were correct, think," &c., i. e., I then being persuaded that her views with regard to these things were correct, &c.

§ 37.

οἶος... συναλλαμβάνειν μοι. "As to aid me." Compare Matthew, § 533, 3.—οὐκ ἂν ἥθελοι, κ. τ. λ. "You would not be inclined, having feigned any thing, to utter it for my advantage," i. e., to feign any thing and utter it, &c.—τὰ ψευδή ἐπαίνων. "By praising you falsely." Literally, "by praising (you) with reference to the things that are false." Observe the accentuation of ψευδή, showing it to be the adjective from ψευδός. Had it been the noun, from ψεύδος, the accentuation would have been ψεύδη.

§ 38.

ἐκ τῶν δὲ σκέψεως. "Consider it from the following illustrations," i. e., consider it still farther from the following points of view.—εἰ γὰρ. The particle γὰρ, like the Latin nempe, serves for the explanation of a preceding proposition, in which was contained a demonstrative proposition, preparing the way for that which follows. (Matthew, § 615.)—ψευδόμενος ἐπαίνοιν. "I should falsely praise you." Compare ψευδόμενας... ἐπαινοῦσας, § 36.—τὴν ναῦν. "His ship." Observe the force of the article.—μὴ ἂν ἀπολέσαι. "That you would not soon destroy." Observe the force of the aorist in denoting a rapid result.—κοινῆ. "In its public capacity."—ψευδόμενος. "Being guilty of falsehood all the while."—ὡς ἂν στρατηγικός, κ. τ. λ. "As if qualified to conduct an army, as well as to dispense justice, and to manage the affairs of the state." Observe that ὡς is to be supplied from the following sentence. We must not, however, refer ὡς to this participle, but to πείσειν also understood, and which we are to elicit from πείσαμι that precedes; so that the full form of expression would be, εἰ τὴν πολὺν ψευδομένος σοι κατην ἐπιτρέψα, πείσαμι, ὡς ἂν τις αὐτὴν πείσεις, εἰ σὺ εἰς στρατηγικός. Weiske conjectured ὡς ὡς στρατηγικός, in opposition to all the MSS., and has been followed by most recent editors.—ὡς ὡς οἰκονομικός τε. "As being both a skillful manager of domestic affairs."—πείρας διδάσκως. "On affording a trial (of your qualifications)."
CHAPTER VII.

§ 1.

καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀπορίας γε, κ. τ. λ. "And, indeed, as regarded the difficulties of his friends, those which arose through ignorance he endeavored to remedy by advice." — διδάσκων. "By teaching (his followers)." — ἑρῶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, κ. τ. λ. "And, among these, I will mention those instances to which I am privy from having been with him." Literally, "which I know along with him." Compare Kühner: "Dicam ea, quibus, cum ab eo dicernatur, interfui, sive quorum testis auritus sum." — 'Αρίσταρχον. Of this Aristarchus nothing is known. He must not, however, be confounded with the oligarchical leader of that name, who is mentioned by Thucydides, viii., 90.—σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα. "Having a gloomy countenance." Compare ii., 6, 18, and 36.—τοῦ βύρους μεταδίδοναι. "To impart the cause of your heaviness." Verbs signifying "to impart," or "communicate," are construed with a genitive of the thing, and a dative of the person. (Matthew, § 326, 3.)—ὑμεῖς. He modestly refers to others along with himself, though, in fact, he himself alone is meant.
CHAPTER VII.

§ 2.

αλλὰ μήν. "Why, to be candid."—ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐστασίασεν ἡ πόλις.

"For ever since the state broke out into revolt," i. e., ever since the insurrection in the state against the power of the thirty tyrants. After Lysander had captured Athens, and established the thirty tyrants, the Athenian refugees and liberal party, under Thrasybulus, arose, and seized on the Piræus, or harbor of Athens, a town, in fact, in itself. Observe the employment here of πόλις, as indicating the state, whereas ἄστυ is used farther on to denote the city itself.—εἰς Ἄρη Πειραιᾶ. Thus in several MSS., in place of the old reading ὥς τὸν Πειραιᾶ. The preposition ὦς, or, as some term it, ὦς for εἰς, is used only of persons and the names of towns when standing for the inhabitants thereof. (Kühner, § 626, Jelfi)—ὁς ἐμ. "Unto me."—καταλελειμέναι. "Left behind," i. e., by their more immediate protectors.—ὑπερ ἐν ἡ τῆς ὀικίας, κ. τ. λ. "That there is in my house fourteen free-born persons." The infinitive is employed here with ὦτε, not the indicative, because ὦτε refers to τοσαῦτα. Compare Kühner, § 863. Observe the force of the article in τοὺς ἐλευθεροὺς, literally, "fourteen who are free-born persons," i. e., fourteen, and these free-born persons, to say nothing of slaves. (Ernesti, ad loc.) In ἐλευθεροὺς, moreover, the worthier gender prevails. (Matthia, § 436, 2.)

ἐκ τῆς γῆς. "From the country," i. e., from our possessions in the country.—ὕπο τῶν οἰκίων. "From the rents of our houses."—οὐγανανθρωπία. For many of the citizens had been put to death by the thirty tyrants, and some had fled into the Piræus, others to Megara and Thebes. Compare Xen., Hist. Gr., ii, 4. Sallust, Cat., c. 51.—τὰ ἐπιπλα. "Our furniture."—δανείσασθαι. Observe that δανείζω, in the active, is to lend money at interest; but δανείζεσθαι, in the middle, to borrow money at interest, that is, to cause money to be lent unto one's self.—πρότερον. "Sooner."—τοὺς οἰκείοις περι ορᾶν ἀπολλυμένοις. "To suffer my relatives to perish." The verb περιορᾶν, in the sense of "to overlook, " to neglect," and hence "to suffer" or "permit" any thing through negligence, is construed with a participle expressing the result of that negligence. (Matthia, § 550. Kühner, § 687, Jelfi)—ἐν τοιούτωι πράγμασιν. "In such a state of affairs (as the present)," i. e., in times like these.

§ 3.

τί ποτε ἐστιν. "What possibly is the cause," i. e., what can possibly be the reason.—ὁ Κεράμων. "That Ceramon." The article here indicates him as a well-known person, and is analogous to θ
Latin *ille.* Of the individual in question, however, we at the present day know nothing.—τρέφων. "Though supporting"—
tὰ ἐπιτήδεια. "The necessaries of life."—ἅλλα καὶ περιπουεῖται τοσαῦτα. "But also makes so much." More literally, "makes so much over and above (this) for himself," i.e., lays up so much.—πολλὸς τρέφων. "Supporting many," i.e., who support many.—ὅτι νῦν Δί' "Yes, because."

§ 4.

τὸν μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ποιηρ槿ων εὐπορεῖν. "That he should become wealthy by means of the more worthless."—νῦν Δί', ἕφη. "Certainly, (it is disgraceful), replied Aristarchus." The connection in the train of ideas is this: Certainly it is disgraceful that I should be in poverty, for I have to support free citizens, well brought up and tenderly reared, who ought to live in a manner superior to common slaves. (Kühner, ad loc.)—ἐλευθερῶς πεπαιδευμένους. "Persons liberally educated."

§ 5.

ἀρ' ὄν. For ὁρ' ὃν ὅν. Just as the simple ἀρὰ is sometimes put for ὁρ' ὃν. Consult Heindorf, ad Plat., Cratyl., p. 388, B.; Herm., ad Soph., Antig., 628.—ἀλφατα. "Barley meal."—τί δ' ὑποτε; "Bu'what of bread?"—τί γάρ; ἕφη, κ. τ. λ. "What then! said he; are both male and female articles of apparel (useful), and inner vests, and cloaks, and sleeveless tunics?" Several species of garments are here mentioned. The ἱμάτιον was, properly speaking, an upper garment, outer robe, or gown, worn above the χιτών, and answering in the case of males nearly to the Roman toga. Here, however, the term is used in the plural of clothes or articles of apparel generally. The χιτώνισκος was a small χιτών, or tunic, worn next the body. The χαλμύς was a thick, warm cloak, worn loosely, and chiefly by soldiers. (Poll., x., 124. D’Orrville, ad Charit., p. 384.) The ἐξωμὶς was a man’s tunic, without sleeves, leaving the shoulders bare. Sometimes the ἐξωμὶς had one sleeve, and left one shoulder bare; this last, however, was usually the dress of slaves, poor men, cynics, &c. The first kind is here meant.—ἐπείτα, ἕφη, οἱ παρὰ σοι, κ. τ. λ. "Then, said he, do those with you know how to make no one of these things? Nay rather, all, as I think." Observe that μὲν ὃν, or μενοῦν, seems to answer to the Latin *immo,* and is almost entirely confined to replies, affirmative, negative, or corrective. (Kühner, § 730, b.; § 880, 9.)—ἐγώμαι. For ἐγὼ ὁμαι.
§ 6.

εἰτ' οὐκ οἶδα. "Do you not know, then." The particle εἰτα is thus used in questions of impatience or sarcasm. Compare i., 2, 26.—ζῳ ἐνός. The way, means, or instrument, is often expressed by the preposition ἀπό with the genitive. (Kühner, § 620, f.)—Ναν σικύδης. All we know of this person is, that he was an Athenian miller, and became rich by the manufacture of barley-meal. He is called ἱλιταμοιδής, "a barley-meal merchant," by the scholiast on Aristophanes, Eccl., 426.—λειτουργεῖν. This verb signifies here "to lend money" to the state in order to relieve the public wants. Compare Xen., Κεν., ii., 6; de Rep., i., 3, and 13. For its more general meaning, consult Dict. Ant., s. v. Leitourgia.—Κύρηβος. Nothing farther is known of this person. We have given the form of the name as restored by Bornemann, who regards it as one coined from κυρῆβια, "bran," "husks," &c. Something like Bentley's emendation of Nummidius for Ummidius, from Nummus. (Wheeler, ad loc.)

Δημέας δὲ ὁ Κολλυτηῖς. "And Demeas, of the borough of Collytus." This borough, the name of which is variously spelled, belonged to the tribe Αἰγίς (Ἀληγίς). The person here referred to is unknown.—Μεγαρέων. "Of the Megarians." Megaris was a small territory of Greece, lying to the west and northwest of Attic. Its capital was Megara. The Megarians paid considerable attention to woollen manufactures, which they used to carry to the Athenian market. Compare Elmsley, ad Aristoph., Acharn., 493.—οὖτοι μὲν γὰρ ὄνομαν, κ. τ. λ. "For these have with them barbarians, obtaining them by purchase, so that they can compel them to work at the things which are advantageous for themselves." More freely, "these hold barbarians by purchase."—ἔγω δὲ. "I, however, have with me." Supply ἔχω.

§ 7.

πότερον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, κ. τ. λ. "Do you see those of the remainder of free persons also, who live in this (idle) way, passing their time more pleasantly, and do you deem them happier," &c.—ἡ τὴν μὲν ἄργιαν, κ. τ. λ. "Or do you imagine that idleness and carelessness are useful unto men as regards both," &c. Observe that ἄφελμα is neuter here, because ἄργιαν and ἄμελειαν denote things without life. So χρήσιμα, farther on, as referring to ἐργασίαν and ἐπιμέλειαν.—ἰσχύειν τοῖς σώμασι. The dative is used after certain verbs in answer to the question whence? Compare Matthiæ, § 400.† The preposition ἐπὶ is expressed with the dative, iv., 2, 1.
NOTES TO BOOK II.—CHAPTER VII.

§ 8.

ἐμαθὼν δὲ, ἃ φύς, κ. τ. λ. The verb ἐμαθὼν is here placed before the interrogative particle ποτερον for the sake of greater emphasis. (Kühner, § 903, Jelf.)—ὡς οὖτε χρήσμα ὑπα, κ. τ. λ. "Because they thought that they were neither useful for life, nor that they themselves would ever practice any of them." Literally, "as being neither useful ..... nor as being (themselves) about to practice," &c.—ἐπιμεληθοµέναι. One MS. has ἐπιμεληθοµένα, which is the common form of the future of this verb.—ποτέρως γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον, κ. τ. λ. "For in which case would men be more likely to be under the influence of self-control! when idle! or," &c.

§ 9.

ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν μέν. "But now, too." Schneider incloses καὶ here in brackets, as savoring of interpolation. It is well defended, however, by Bornemann and Kühner. The train of ideas is as follows: You and the other members of your family not only are stained in the means of subsistence, but ποτερον, τοσὁ, as I imagine, you entertain unfriendly feelings toward one another.—ἐκεῖνα δὲ σε ὁρῶσαι, κ. τ. λ. "And they, seeing you annoyed with them."—ἐκ δὲ τούτων κλινόνως, κ. τ. λ. "And from these feelings there is danger that both (present) hostility be increased, and previous affection be diminished." Observe that κλινόνως is usually construed with ὑπ' and a subjunctive or an optative. Schneider (ad Anab., vi., 1, 21) has collected some examples of its construction with an infinitive.—ἐάν δὲ προσταχῆσθας, κ. τ. λ. "But if you shall take care that they be employed," i. e., shall make arrangements to provide them active employment.—ὁρῶν. "On seeing."—ἀλεθοµέναι. "On having perceived."—τὴν ἀν' ἐκεῖνων χάριν αὐξήσετε. "You will increase the kind feeling resulting from these (services)." With ἐκεῖνων supply ἐνεργειῶν.—φιλικότερων ἐξέτη. Compare ii., 6, 18, and 36.

§ 10.

θάνατον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ προαιρετῶν ἢν. "Death were preferable to it." Observe here the omission of ἂν. This ellipsis is most usual in expressions of necessity, duty, propriety, &c., as here with the verbal adjective in τέος, since it accorded with the genius of the Greeks as well as Latins to represent that which was necessary. &c., as unconditionally true, its not happening being partially kept out of sight. (Kühner, § 858, 3, Jelf.) It will be borne in mind here that προαιρετῶν is the neuter singular, governing θάνατον in the accusative—κάλλιστα· καὶ πρεπώδεστεον γνωσκε. "Most honorable
and more becoming a woman (than any other art)." Fır πρεπῶδεστερὰ some read, from three MSS., πρεπῶδεστατα.—ταῦτα ἑιςγείσθαι αὕτας. "To recommend this course unto them."—ἠδεῶς ὑπακούσονται. "They will with pleasure obey your suggestion."

§ 11.

Διὰλα νῦ τοῦς θεούς. Compare i., 2, 9.—ὡστε πρόσθεν μὲν, κ. τ. λ. "That before this, indeed, I was not inclined to borrow," i. e., that whereas I did not heretofore permit myself to borrow.—οὖχ ἦξω ἀποδοῦναι. "I would not have wherewith to pay back." Compare ii., 6, 28.—νῦν δὲ μοι δοκῶ, κ. τ. λ. "Now, however, I think I can endure to do this for a means of commencing my works," i. e., in order to gain means, &c. Observe that ἀφορμὴ properly means that point whence one sets out to do any thing; and hence it is applied to the means by which he can commence any undertaking.

§ 12.

ἐκ τοῦτων δὲ. "Upon this, then."—ἐωνήθη δὲ ἐρια. "And wool was purchased." Several deponents have, besides a first aorist middle, a first aorist passive also. Compare Kühner, § 368, 3, Jelf—ἔργαζόμεναι. "While engaged in working," i. e., in the daytime—ἔργαζόμεναι. "After having finished their work," i. e., in the evening.—ἀντὶ ψφορομένων ἑαυτός. "Instead of eyeing one another with suspicious looks." More literally, "instead of persons eyeing, &c.—ὡς κηδεμόνα . . . ὡς ὕφελλομος. Supply αὐτὸν to the former clause, and αὑτός to the latter.—ὁτι αἰτίωνται. The indicative for the optative, the direct narration being substituted for the indirect.—ἰργόν ἑαυτίεν. "Eats the bread of idleness." Literally, "eats as an idle one."

§ 13.

τὸν τοῦ κυνὸς λόγον. "The fable of the dog," i. e., the story told of the dog. It may also be rendered "the speech of the dog," i. e., what the dog said to the sheep. But the former is preferable.—οὔτε φωνῆσαντα ἕν τὰ ζώα. "That (once upon a time), when the animals were endowed with speech."—δὲ δίδως. "Who give," i. e., in that you give. Compare Kühner, § 836, 3, Jelf.—ταῖς παρεχούσαις. "Who afford."—οὔπερ αὐτῶς ἔχεις αἰτοῦ. Attraction for ὅπερ αὐτῶς ἔχεις αἰτοῦ.

§ 14.

ναι μὰ Δία. "Yes, indeed, (he acts rightly)." Supply ὄρθος ἀπείκ, as Ernesti directs.—ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐμι ὁ καὶ ἡμᾶς, κ. τ. λ. "For
am he who preserves you yourselves also," i. e., you yourselves as well as your wool, lambs, cheese, &c. This is Weiske's explanation. Schneider, however, refers καὶ to καὶ αὐτῶν, "et dominum," which he makes to be understood. This, however, is inferior to the former. —προφυλάττομι υμᾶς. Stephens for υμᾶς would read here υμῶν, but Hindenburg opposes to this the passage in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, 539; νηόν δὲ προφύλαξθε.—φοβούμεναι μὴ ἀπόλησθε. When the principal verb is in the optative, with or without ἀν, the dependent verb is generally in the optative, if the aim proposed is merely a supposition, without any notion of its realization; but if this notion does come in, the subjunctive is employed. Here, then, the dog insinuates, that if he himself did not guard the sheep, they would most certainly have reason to fear lest they might perish. Compare Kühner, § 808, Jelf.—ὅτι ἀντὶ κυνῶς, κ. τ. λ. "That you are a guardian and protector unto them as valuable as a dog."—οἶδ' ιφ' ἵνος "No; even by any one."—ἐργαζόμεναι. "Plying their tasks."

CHAPTER VIII.

§ 1.

δὲ χρόνον. "After some interval of time." Like the Latin 'interjecto aliquo tempore." Compare Matthiae, § 580.—πόθεν φαίνει. "Whence do you show yourself," i. e., whence come you. A familiar mode of addressing an old friend. Compare Plato, Protag...mit: πόθεν, & Ἐκκρατεῖς, φαίνει, which Cicero (ap. Prisc., vi., p. 106) renders by "Quid tu? unde tandem apparse, O Socrate?"—Εὕθηρε. Nothing farther is known of this individual.—οῦτο μὲν τὴν κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου, κ. τ. λ. "Just before the close of the war, said he, O Socrates, (I came) from abroad; now, however, (I come) from the city here," i. e., at present, however, I am dwelling in the city here. In speaking of the termination of the war, Eutherus very probably alludes to the peace of Theramenes, by which the Athenians lost all their possessions beyond the confines of Attica. Compare Hist. Gr., ii., 2; Plut., Vit. Lys., c. 14. This was in B.C. 406. Simpson, however, refers it to the fifty years' peace, B.C. 422.—ἀφηρεθηκεν. The passive αφαίρετος, "to be deprived," is construed with an accusative of the thing taken away.—ἐν τῇ ὑπεροφίᾳ. "In the country beyond the confines (of Attica)." Observe that ὑπεροφία has a general reference to all foreign parts both within Greece and without. —ἐπιδημίας. "Sojourning here."—τῷ σώματι ἐργαζόμενος. "By bodily labor." Literally, "by laboring with my body."—δοκεῖ ὅτι...οι...ἐχουσι Compare note on ἡ ἄ ξεσιν ἀρβύφαντας, i., 1, 9.
"To ask aid." So in several MSS. and old editions The common text has δεισθαι.—ἀλλως τε καί. Compare i., 2, 59.—

§ 2.

tὸ σῶμα ἰκανὸν εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. "That your body will be sufficiently strong to earn hire by the necessaries of life." Ernesti, Weiske, and Schneider have inclosed τὰ ἐπιτήδεια in brackets as an interpolation, denying that τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔργαζεσθαι is Greek. But Hindenburg and more recent editors have successfully defended the ordinary reading, by a comparison with Hesiod, Op. et D., 43, Andocides, Myst., 144, Bekk.; and Herod., i., 24.—καί μὴν. "And yet, indeed."—τὼν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων. "For your bodily labors."

§ 3, 4.

αὐτόθεν. "Forthwith."—ἐπιτίθεσθαι. "To apply yourself."—ἐπαρκέσσει. "Will assist you."—καί προσελθόντα τῷ τῶν πλείονα, κ. τ. λ. "And that you, having gone to some one of those who possess more abundant means, who is in need of one that will aid him in taking care of them, both superintending (for him) agricultural labors," &c. The verb ἐπιστατέω is more usually construed with a dative.—ἀφελοῦντα ἀντωφελείσθαι. "By benefiting him, be benefited yourself in turn."—διούσελαν. "Slavery (such as this)."—καί μὴν οὐ γε, κ. τ. λ. "And yet they, who in the different states act as presiding officers, and take care of the public moneys," &c.

§ 5.

ἀλως μὴν, ἕφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, κ. τ. λ. "Nevertheless, in short, said ae, O Socrates, I do not at all like the being liable to censure from any one." Five MSS. omit ἀλως, and it is also suspected by Schnei der. But Bornemann correctly defends it, explaining the passage as follows: "Although I can not deny what you say, nevertheless (μὴν), to be brief (ἀλως), I greatly dislike any situation in which I may be subject to the will of another."—ἐὑρεῖν ἔργον, κ. τ. λ. "To find any occupation in which one would not have blame," i. e., in which one would not be exposed to censure.—μὴ ἄγνωμοι κριτή περιτυχεῖν. "To meet with a judge who is not harsh (in his decisions)."—οἷς νῦν ἔργαζεσθαι. For ἐν τοῖς ἔργαζεσθαι.—ἀνέγκλητον διαγίγνεσθαι. "To go through them without blame."

§ 6.

οις φιλατίνους. "Those who are fond of blaming," i. e., the censorious.—διώκειν. "To seek after."—ὑπομένειν. "To take upon
you."—φυλάττεσθαι. "To avoid."—οὕτω γὰρ ἥκεστα, κ. τ. λ. "For in this way I think that you will be least involved in censure, and will most effectually find aid in your poverty."—διαρκέστατα. Most independently."

CHAPTER IX.

§ 1.

οἶδα δὲ ποτε αὐτόν, κ. τ. λ. "I know, also, of his having once heard from Crito," i. e., I remember, also, his having once heard Crito say.—τὰ κανόνα πράττειν. "To attend to his own affairs." All the orators and comedians prove the truth of Crito's complaint. Life, indeed, was harassing and full of trouble at Athens, on account of the swarm of sycophants or informers, whom the people permitted to accuse and harass the better class, erroneously thinking that it tended to preserve the purity of their democracy. A peculiar term σείειν was used to denote the assaults of these calumniators upon the rich. (Schneider, ad loc. Wheeler, ad loc.)—ἐμὲ ἐν ἀδικάς ἄγονσιν. "Are bringing actions against me." Literally, "are leading me into actions."—ἡ πράγματα ἔχειν. "Than have any trouble (about the matter)," i. e., than be involved in the trouble of a lawsuit.

§ 2, 3.

κόνας δὲ τρέφεις; The particle δὲ in interrogations often refers to something to be supplied by the imagination. So here, "(what you say is bad enough), but do you keep dogs," &c. Compare i., 6, 15. —ἀπὸ τῶν προβατῶν. The Greeks, as well as the Latins, often repeat the preposition of a compound word before the case of the substantive.—οὐκ ἄν οὖν θρέψαις καὶ ἄνδρα, κ. τ. λ. "Would you not, then, support a man also," &c.—εἰ μὴ φοβοίμην, ὅπως μὴ, κ. τ. λ. "If I were not afraid that he might in some way turn upon myself." Literally, "how he might turn," &c. After verbs of fearing we sometimes find, in Attic, ὅπως μὴ instead of the simple μὴ, with the force of the Latin quomodo non. (Kühner. § 814, Obs. 4, Jell.)—χαριζόμενον οἶω σοι ἄνδρί, κ. τ. λ. "For a person gratifying such a man as you are, rather than being hated by him, to be benefited." Observe that οἶω σοι ἄνδρί is for ἄνδρι τοιοῦτῳ οἶας σι ἐι.—τῶν τοιούτων ἄνδρῶν. These genitives, according to Schneider, depend on τινὲς understood. But Kühner more correctly makes them depend on ἐι.—πάνν ἃν φιλοτιμήσειν. "Would deem it a great honor"
§ 4.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦτων ἀνευρισκομένων Ἀρχέδημον. "Now, after this conversation, they discover, by inquiry, one Archedemus." This is the person who accused the generals for not saving the shipwrecked sailors and soldiers, and burying the dead after the battle of Arginusae. (Compare Thirlwall's account of his movements on that occasion, Hist. Gr., vol. iv., p. 129, 12mo ed.)—οὗ γὰρ ἦν ὅλος, κ. τ. λ. "For he was not such a person as to make gain by every means." Literally, "from every thing." Supply τοιούτος before ὅλος.—ἀλλά, φιλοχρηστός τε, κ. τ. λ. "But, being both a lover of honesty, and possessed of a larger share of keen ready wit than ordinary, just the man to make money out of the informers themselves," i. e., by bringing actions against them for false accusations of individuals, and compelling them to pay a sum of money to him for being allowed to escape. Observe that λαμβάνειν depends on ὅλος, at the beginning of the sentence. We have referred ἐνφυέστερος to acuteness of intellect, not, as Kühner does, to elevation of character, which is already implied in φιλοχρηστός. The common text, in the place of ἐνφυέστερος ὃν, has ἔφη ῥήστον εἶναι. Observe, moreover, that ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν cannot refer, as some think, to a receiving of bribes from informers, for then the preposition παρὰ would have been employed instead of ὑπὸ.

ὅποτε συγκομίζω. "Whenever he gathered in." Observe here the employment of the optative with ὅποτε, to denote indefinite frequency. (Kühner, § 843, a., Jelf.)—ἀφελῶν ἔδωκε. "Having taken a portion, gave it." Kühner reads from conjecture ἀφελῶν ἂν ἔδωκε, which forms no bad emendation.—ἐκάλει. "Invited him." After the performance of a sacrifice, an entertainment was usually prepared, to which relations and friends were invited.

§ 5.

νομίσας ὅτι Ἀρχέδημος, κ. τ. λ. "Now Archedemus, having concluded (from all this) that the house of Crito was a (sure) refuge unto him," i. e., that he would always have a refuge in the house of Crito.—μάλα περιείπεν αὐτὸν. "Paid great attention to him." Compare Timaeus, Lex. Plat.: περιείπον· περὶ τινα ἦσαν θεραπευτικῶς καὶ φυλακτικῶς, and consult Ruhnken, ad loc.—ἀνευρήκη. Castalia and Dindorf, with four Parisian MSS., read ἀνευρίσκει, but the pluperfect denotes the celerity of Archedemus's proceedings.—εἰς δίκην δημοσίαν. "To a public suit." The summons in such cases was called πρόσκλησις, or simply κλήσις. The verb is προσκαλεῖσθαι, or καλεῖσθαι. (Meier u. Schömann, Att. Proc., p. 576;
NOTES TO BOOK II.—CHAPTER IX.

—by ἵνα αὐτὸν ἔδει κρίθηναι, κ. τ. λ. "In which he must, if found guilty, be condemned (to the punishment) which he must suffer, or (to the fine) which he must pay," i. e., in which it would be decided what bodily or pecuniary mulct he should render as atonement. Observe that παθεῖν and ἀποτίσαι are technical terms, peculiar to the formula employed in Athenian trials, the first having reference to bodily punishment, the second to a pecuniary fine (Compare Att. Proc., p. 739.)

§ 6, 7.

παλλὰ καί πονηρά. The Greeks regularly join πολὺς with another adjective expressing praise or blame. (Matthiae, § 444.)—πάντες ἐκτολεῖ, κ. τ. λ. "Did every thing in his power to get rid of Archedemus."—οὖν ἀπηλλάττετο. "Did not leave him alone." More literally, "did not depart from him."—ἐγώ τὸν τε Κρίτωνα ὑφίκε. "Until he had both ceased to annoy Crito."—αὐτῷ. "To (Archedemus) himself."—ὁδη γύτῃ. "Then, indeed." The Latin tum vero. —ίνα τὸν κυνὸς ἀπολαύωσιν. "That they may have the benefit of his dog."—φύλακα. "As a protector."

§ 8.

τῷ Κρίτωνι ἡδέως ἐχαρίζετο. "Gladly gratified Crito (in this),"
1. e., acceded to his wishes in protecting his friends also.—καὶ οὔ δὲ μόνος, κ. τ. λ. "And I do not say that Crito alone was left in tranquillity, but also his friends." Equivalent to καὶ οὖ λέγω δὲ μόνος, κ. τ. λ. A more emphatic mode of expression than καὶ οὖν μόνον ὁ Κρίτων, κ. τ. λ. These are the words of Xenophon.—εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῷ τούτων, κ. τ. λ. "And if any one of those by whom he was hated, sought to make it a source of reproach unto him, that he, being benefited by Crito, fawned upon him." Observe here the employment of the optative, as denoting the sentiments of those who made the charge in question. The common reading is decidely inferior.—τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς διαφέρεσθαι. "And to be at variance with the bad."—πειράσθαι. This infinitive is objected to by Kühner: but this is found in all the MSS. and printed editions.
CHAPTER X.

§ 1.

Δισθάρω. Who this person was is not known.—ἀν τις σοι τῶν ὀλεθρῶν, κ. τ. λ. “If any one of your domestics runs away, do you take care in what way you may recover him?” Observe that σοι here is governed by ἀποδρᾶ, and not connected with ὀλεθρῶν, literally, “runs away for you.” It is in fact, therefore, the dativus in-commodi. (Matthiae, § 412, 9.)

§ 2.

καὶ ἄλλος γε νῦν Δι, κ. τ. λ. “(Yes), by Jove, and, indeed,” &c. Observe that καὶ here implies an answer in the affirmative; and the particle γε is added for the sake of emphasis.—σώστρα τοῦτον. “A reward for bringing this one back.”—ἔαν τις σοι κάμνῃ, κ. τ. λ. Observe that here again σοι depends on κάμνῃ, not on ὀλεθρῶν.—κινδυνεῖ ἀποθέσαι. “Runs a risk of perishing.”—σοι ἄξιον εἶναι. “That it is worth your while.”—ἐπιμεληθῆναι. For the middle ἐπιμελήσασθαι. Compare i., 4, 13, and ii., 7, 8.

§ 3.

καὶ μὴν οἰσθά γε. Compare ii., 3, 4. These words to § 5 belong to Socrates, though otherwise marked in the edition of Bornemann.—ἀγνώμων. “Insensible (to favors).”—Ἐρμογένης. Hermogenes was the son of a wealthy citizen of Athens, named Hipponicus. His brother Callias inherited all the property of his father, so that he himself was in very great poverty. He was a faithful friend of Socrates.—τὸ ύπηρέτην . . . ἔχειν. “The having an agent.”—παράμοιον. Valckenaer conjectured παραμόιον, which actually occurs at ii., 4, 6, and iii., 11, 11. The present, however, is the rarer form, and is found also in Pindar, Nem., viii., 28. As Xenophon is fond of introducing occasionally poetic forms of expression into his prose, we have allowed the text to remain unaltered, with Kühner and others.—καὶ τὸ κελευόμενον ἱκανόν ποιεῖν. Schneider and Dindorf put these words in brackets. Weiske and Schütz reject them.

§ 4, 5.

οἱ μὲντοι ἄγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι. “Good economists, foiirsooth.” Observe that μὲντοι is here ironical. Compare Hermann, ad V. p. 844.—διὰν τὸ πολλοῦ ἄξιον, κ. τ. λ. “When you have it in you,
power to purchase for a small sum what is worth a large one.' Literally, "to buy for little what is worth much."—διὰ τὰ πράγματα. "In consequence of the present state of affairs," i.e., in such times as the present.—νομίζω γὰρ οὖτε σοι, κ. τ. λ. "For I think that neither is your inviting him to come more honorable to you than your going yourself unto him, nor is your doing these things a greater boon to him than to yourself," i.e., while the making him your friend is not more for his advantage than for your own.—οὐ ἄντων ἔλθειν. Here, the attraction being neglected, ἄντων is for ἄντω. (Kühner, § 675, Jelf.)

§ 6.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

§ 1.

τοὺς ὑπερηφάνους τῶν καλῶν. "Those who were desirous of public honors," i. e., the high offices in the state. Observe here the peculiar force of τὰ καλὰ, and compare the explanation of Weiske: καλὰ hic sunt munera publica, honores.—ἐπιμελεῖς ὑπ ὑπερήφανον ποιῶν. "By making them diligent with regard to the offices which they might desire," i. e., careful in qualifying themselves to fill these stations properly. The optative here expresses indefinite frequency, and hence the reference is to whatever offices they might desire, at whatever time.—Διονυσόδωρος. Dionysodorus was a native of Chios, and brother of the Euthydemus after whom one of Plato's dialogues is entitled. He first assumed the office of a professed teacher of military tactics at Athens, but afterward turned Sophist. Compare Codet, Prosopogr. Xen., p. 38, as cited by Kühner.—ἐπαγγελμένου. "Professing."—στρατηγεῖν. "The art of generalship." Literally, "to be a general."—τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης. "This employment," i. e., that of general.

§ 2, 3.

αλαξρόν μεντι. "It was disgraceful, indeed." The particle μεντι has here a confirmatory force, like the Latin verò.—στρατηγεῖν. "To be a general."—ἐξόν. "When he has it in his power." Accusative absolute. (Kühner, § 700, Jelf.)—ἀνδριάντας ἐργολαβοῖν. "Should contract to make statues." In Latin, "statuas conduceret faciendas."—μεγάλα τὰ τε ἀγαθά, κ. τ. λ. "It is natural that both the advantages should be great, if he be successful, and the evils great, if he totally fail."—τοῦτο. So in several MSS. The common text has τούτον.—ἐπιμελόμενος. Thus in four Parisian MSS., in place of the common reading ἐπιμελούμενος.—κλόντα μαθάνειν. "To go and learn."

§ 4.

προσεπαιξεν αὐτῷ. "He used to sport with him." The imperfect here is correct, as it marks a repetition. Stephens reads from the Aldine edition, and four MSS., ποσεπαίξεν, a form not used by the
Attics. For the dative after προσπαίζω, consult Lobeck ad Plutyn., p. 463. In the signification of deriding, it is construed with an accusative in Plato, Menex., p. 235, C., and Phaedr., p. 265, C.—ώφες Ὀμηρος, k. τ. λ. The passage occurs in II., iii., 169, seq.—γεραυος. "Of stately bearing."—καὶ οὕτως οὖν. "Even in this same way, our friend here."—ἀγραπτείνει μιθών. A little before we have μεράθωλος ἥκε. The aorist participle signifies that a person has learned; he perfect, however, signifies more, namely, that he has learned nd understands, i. e., is master of his subject.—καὶ ἐάν. "Even if."—διατελεῖ δὲν. "Continues to be." The verb διατελεῖ, in place of an infinitive, is construed with a participle. Compare Kühner, § 694, Jelf.

§ 5.

ίνα καλ. Supply ἡμείς from the following ἡμῶν, i. e., ίνα καὶ ἡμείς, εάν, κ. τ. λ.—ταξιαρχῇ, ἡ λοχαγὴ σοι. "Command a company or section under your command." Literally, "for you." The τάξεις, in Xenophon, is a body of infantry containing usually one hundred and twenty-eight men. Once, in the Cyropaedia, however (ii., 1, 14), it is made to consist of one hundred men. The λόχος was a subdivision of the τάξεις. Consult the commentators on Anab., i, 2, 25.—πόθεν ὠρξατο σε διδάσκειν, κ. τ. λ. "With what did he begin to teach you generalship?" The verb ὄρχεσθαι is used with an infinitive when the notion of the dependent verb is only in intention not in act. (Kühner, § 688, Jelf.)—καὶ δς. Consult note on i., 4, 3—εκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, εἰς δισερ; κ. τ. λ. "With the same thing with which he even concluded."—τὰ τακτικὰ. "Tactics." The art of arranging and disposing the men and the ranks on all occasions and under all circumstances.

§ 6.

ἄλλα μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ. "Yet assuredly, said Socrates, this, indeed, is the smallest part of strategy." The adjective πολλοστὶς means, properly, "one of many," answering to the Latin multesusimus; hence, generally, "very little," "smallest," "least."—παρασκευαστικόν τῶν. Adjectives denoting capability, fitness, skill, including those in ἴκος, are construed with a genitive. (Matthiae, § 344.)—μηχανικῶν. "Quick in contrivances," i. e., inventive.—ἐγγαστικῶν. "Hard-working."—ἀγχινουν. "Shrewd."—καὶ φυλακτικῶν τε καὶ κλέπτην. "And both conservative and a thief," i. e., both well qualified to guard and take care of his own, and yet, at the same time, craftily to deprive his adversaries of what is theirs.——καλ
καλὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ τακτικὸν εἶναι. "The being a tactician, moreover is also advantageous." — τεταγμένον. "Properly marshalled." — ἀτάκτων. "From one in disorder." — κέραμος. "Tiles." The singular for the plural. The singular, thus used, has a collective force. This arose from a poetical way of looking at plurality as unity (Kühner, § 354, Jelf.).

§ 7.

πάνω δύοιοι εἰρήκας. "You have adduced a very exact parallel." Literally, "you have mentioned a thing altogether similar." — τοὺς τε πρῶτους, κ. τ. λ. "We must form both the front and rear of the bravest." Observe that, in this sentence, τοὺς πρῶτους and τοὺς τελευταίους are the subjects, and ἁρίστους is the predicate. — ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν. "By the former," i. e., by the van. — ὑπὸ τῶν. "By the latter," i. e., by those in the rear.

§ 8.

εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν, κ. τ. λ. At the close of this sentence, after ἐδίδαξεν, supply καλῶς ἔχει. "It is well." — τί σοι δίδωλος ὃν ἔμαθες. "What advantage has accrued to you from the things which you have learned." Observe that ὃν ἔμαθες is by attraction for τοὺτον ὃ ἐμαθες.— ἐς ὧν ἠγαφών ἐκέλευσε, κ. τ. λ. "If he had ordered you to range the purest silver first and last," i. e., in the foremost and hindermost row.— ἀλλὰ, μὰ Δ' ἔφη. The reply of the young man.— ὡςτε αὐτοῦ ὃν ἠμᾶς, κ. τ. λ. "So that it would be incumbent for ourselves to separate," &c. The optative with ὃν is used after ὡςτε, when the result is to be represented as a supposition or possibility depending on conditions. (Kühner, § 865, Jelf.)
\[ \Phi 10. \]

τὶ ὁν ὑ ὁ σκοποῖμεν. "Why, then, do we not consider." A formula of exhortation, by way of quesitin, for σκοπῶμεν ὁν.—πῶς ἀν αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ. "By what means we may not fall into error with regard to them," i. e., by what means we may be free from mistake on these points.—βούλομαι. "I am desirous (that we should)."—ὑποίκειν. "To seize upon."—τοὺς φιλαργυρωτάτους. "The most covetous."—τί δὲ τοὺς κινδυνεύειν μέλλουσα; "But what must we do with regard to those who are about to encounter danger?" i. e., but how must we arrange the soldiers if they are about to brave some perilous enterprise? With τί δὲ supply κρή ποιεῖν.—ἀπα. The Latin nonne.—οὖτοι γοῦν εἴσιν. "For these, indeed, are they." Compare i., 6, 2.—ἀδήλω. "Concealed from notice." The idea is, that they who are eager after praise and distinction can not lie concealed, but are everywhere conspicuous, and may therefore easily be selected.

\[ \Phi 11. \]

τάττειν. "To arrange your troops."—δοσι καὶ διως. "For what object, and in what way." Compare the explanation of Kühner: "δοσι, quae, significat consilium, ad quod singulis ordinibus utendum sit: δος ρατιονem, quae singulis ordinibus utendum sit ad consilium exsequendum."—τῶν ταγμάτων. "Of your divisions."—πρὸς ἀ οὖτε τάττειν, κ. τ. λ. "Against which it is not fitting either to draw up or lead your troops in one and the same way."—ἐπανερώτα. "Question him anew."—αἰσχυνεῖται. Observe that αἰσχύνεσθαι and αἰδεῖσθαι take an infinitive, when the feelings prevent the person from acting; the participle, when the person has done something which causes them. Compare Kühner, § 685; iii., Obs.—ἐνδέα. "In want of proper information)," i. e., uninstructed. Herbst supplies after ἐνδέα the words τῶν εἰς ἀπατηγίαν.

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CHAPTER II.

\[ \Phi 1. \]

ἐντυλίκτικον ὃ ἐποτε, κ. τ. λ. "Having met, moreover, on one occasion, with a certain person who had been chosen to be a general." Observe that τῷ is here Attic for the indefinite τιν. ὃν ἐνεκεν "On what account." The form τοῦ is here Attic for the interrogative τίνος.—Ομηρον. Compare II., i, 263; ii., 243.—ἀρά γε στὶ. "Is it not, indeed because." The particle γε, added to an inter
NOTES TO BOOK III.—CHAPTER II. 279

Logative particle, belongs to the whole proposition. (Kühner, § 735, 2, Jel.)—ὅπως σώαι τε ἐσονταί αἱ διε. "In what way the sheep shall both be safe." The indicative of the future is construed with ὅπως, when something is to be signified which is contemplated as future, at the time denoted by the principal verb.—καί, ὧν ἐνεκα τρέ- φονται, κ. τ. λ. "And (in what way) that result shall be brought about, for the sake of which they are kept." This whole clause is omitted in several MSS. It is found, on the other hand, in all the MSS. of Stobæus, in five MSS. of Xenophon, and in the Juntine edition, except that in place of τρέφονται we find στρατεύονται.—στρα- τεύονται δέ. "Now they serve." Observe here the explanatory force of δέ.

§ 2, 3.

ἡ τι ὅποτε, κ. τ. λ. "Or why, pray, has he thus lauded Agamemnon, saying (of him)."—ἄμφοτερον, κ. τ. λ. This line occurs in the third book of the Iliad, 179th verse.—ἄρι ὑπς ὅτι, κ. τ. λ. "Is it not because one would be both a puissant warrior, not if he himself alone should contend," &c. Observe that ἄρα has here the force of ὅποτε, as in § 1.—οὐκ εἰ μόνον τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ, κ. τ. λ. "Not if he should merely direct his own life well."—ὁτ' αὐτοῦ εὖ πράττωσι. "May prosper through his means."—στρατεύονται. "Take the field."—ὡς βέλτιστος. "As happy as possible."—πρὸς τοῦτο. "For this very purpose." Compare Kühner, § 638, 111, Jel. Several MSS. and printed editions have πρὸς τοῦτος.

§ 4.

tοῦτο παρασκευάζειν. "To provide this happiness."—καί σῶς ἐπισκοπῶν, κ. τ. λ. And considering, in this point of view, what should be the virtue of a good leader." Observe that τίς εἰη is here for ἡτίς εἰη.—τὰ μὲν ἄλλα περιήρει, κ. τ. λ. "He used to reject all other characteristics, and to leave merely the rendering of those happy whom he may lead." More literally, "he used to take away." We would expect here regularly ὅν ἥγοιτο, since a historic tense (κατέλειπε) precedes. Very often, however, the subjunctive in such a case is employed in place of the optative, in order to impart a certain vigor to the style, and bring the action at once before the eyes. (Kühner, § 797, Jel.)
CHAPTER III

§ 1.

καὶ ἵππαρχεῖν δὲ τινι, κ. τ. λ. "I know, too of his having conversed on one occasion, to the following effect, with a certain person who had been chosen to be a hipparch," i.e., a general of cavalry. At Athens there were two ἵππαρχοι, or generals of cavalry, who had supreme command over the cavalry force of the state, but yet were themselves under the authority of the ten στρατηγοί, or generals of infantry. Xenophon has described the duties of the hipparch in a separate tract, entitled ἵππαρχικός.—οὖ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ πρώτος, κ. τ. λ. "For it is not surely for the sake of riding as first of the horsemen." Observe that τοῦ ἐλαύνειν depends on ἐνεκα understood. So τοῦ γνωσθῆναι a little after. Compare Matthiae, § 496, 1.—πρώτος. Attraction. Compare τῷ φανερῶς εἰλαι, 1, 2, 3.—οἱ ἵπποτοι. "The horse-archers." A species of light cavalry.—γοῦν. "At any rate." Compare notes on 1, 6, 2.—τοῦ γνωσθῆναι γε. "For the sake of being known, at least." Supply ἐνεκα.—οἱ μαυιῶμενοι. Compare the explanation of Weiske: "Furiosi quidem facile in vulgus innotescunt ut a pueris etiam rideantur."

§ 2.

ἄλλῳ ἄρα δτι, κ. τ. λ. "But is it then because you think that you could deliver over to the state the cavalry, after having rendered it more efficient?" Kühner conjectures ἄλλῳ ἄρα, "but perhaps it is," &c., without any interrogation; being guided to this by one of the Parisian MSS., which has ἄν ἄρα. Observe that the particle ἄν in our text, which belongs to παραδοῦναι, is put after βέλτιον to make that word more emphatic. Compare Kühner, § 431, 2.—γενέσθαι. "You might become." Supply ἄν with this verb from the previous clause.—καὶ μᾶλα. Compare ii., 2, 1.—καὶ ἔστι γε, νη Δ' καλόν. "And it is a noble thing, indeed."—ἡ δὲ ἄρχῃ ποι, κ. τ. λ. "But the command to which you have been chosen, extends, unless I am mistaken, to horses as well as riders?" There is here a half-suppressed interrogation, and we have pointed the sentence accordingly. The expression ἐφ' ἦς may be rendered more literally, "for which," since ἐντι here denotes, in fact, the object. (Kühner, § 633 3, Jelf.)—ἔστι γὰρ οὖν. "Yes, for it is really so." Compare Kühner § 737, 2, Jelf.
NOTES TO BOOK III.—CHAPTEK III.

§ 3.

θε δὴ "Come, then."—δπως διανοήσυ. "How do you intend."—καὶ δὲ. Compare i., 4, 3.—τοῦτο μέν, έφη, κ. τ. λ. Here the words ἐμὸν εἶναι are the predicate. Construe, therefore, as follows: τοῦτο ἐγὼν οἵμαι οὐκ ἐμὸν εἶναι. Valckeenaer would change the article before ἐγὼν into γέ. But this is refuted by Schneider, who compares Cyrop., ii., 1, 11. Herod., v., 1.—ήδια. "Separately."

§ 4.

ἐὰν οὖν, έφη ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ. "If, then, said Socrates, some (of your men) exhibit to you their horses so weak in foot, or bad in legs," &c. To each soldier his own horse was given, and each led his own steed out for review; hence the middle voice. Schneider thinks σοί redundant here, and that παρέχεσθαι ἵππον is used of those who ἐκ καταλόγου ἱπποτρόφουσα, i. e., are obliged to support horses for the state at their own expense; a duty usually imposed on the richer class of citizens. But it is hardly probable that the hipparchens would take steeds, if in such bad condition, from these persons. (Lange, ad loc.)—οὕτως ἀτρόφωνς. "So ill-conditioned." P. Victorius thinks the author means such horses as are naturally lean, and always look ill, however well fed.—ςτε μὴ δώνασθαι. Compare notes on ii., 7, 2.—ἀναγώγους. "Unmanageable."—λακτιστάς. "Given to kicking."—τοῦ ἱππικοῦ. "From your cavalry." Supply στρατεύματος.

§ 5, 6.

τι δέ. Compare ii., 6, 4.—εὑρόζ. "Indeed wil. I." Supply ἐπι-χειρόσα.—ἀναβατικώτερος. "More expert in mounting." Compare Hipparch., i., 5.—δεῖ γοῦν. "I certainly ought." Compare ii., 1, 1.—μάλλον. "More readily."—κινδύνευεν. "To risk an engagement."—πότερον ἱπαγαγεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, κ. τ. λ. "Will you direct the enemy to lead their forces against you, upon the sand where you and your men are accustomed to exercise your horses." The Athenian cavalry were usually exercised on level ground covered with sand. Hence such places of exercise were called ἄμμοδρομοι.—τὰς μελέτας τοιείσθαι. "To go through your exercises."—γίνεσθαι. "Show themselves." Compare the remark of Kühner. "Verbum γίγνεσθαι nunquam simpliciter versari significare potest, a, potest significare apparere, in conspectum venire."—βελτιων γοῦν. "It would be better, indeed, (to exercise in such places)."
NOTES TO BOOK III.—CHAPTER III.

§ 7, 8.

τού βάλλειν ως πλείστους, κ. τ. λ. "Will you entertain any concern that your troops, from their steeds, may spear as many (foes) as possible?" Observe that βάλλειν here has the same force as ἦκοντίζειν. Compare the explanation of Kühner: "Ui quam plurimi ad equis jaculentur."—θύγειν τὰς ψυχὰς. "Of whetting the courage."—εἰπερ ἄλκιμωτέροις ποιεῖν. "If you do, indeed, (think) of rendering them more valiant." Supply διανοηθεν, and compare the explanation of Morus: "Si quidem eos fortiores reddere cogilas."—εἰ δὲ μὴ "If I have not hitherto." Supply διανενόημαι.—ὁπως δὲ σου πείθων ταῖ, κ. τ. λ. "But you have taken any thought as to the means by which your cavalry are to be made to obey you."—ἀναθῶν καὶ ἄλκιμων. "Valiant and spirited."

§ 9, 10.

εκεῖνο μὲν δὴπον ολοθα. "You are doubtless aware of this."—βελτίστους. "Most skilful."—ιατρικώτατον. "The best physician."—καὶ μάλα, ἐφι. "Certainly, replied he, and they are very obedient." Supply πείθουτες after μάλα.—μάλιστα εἶδος. "To know best."—βελτίστος ὡν αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ. "Shall clearly appear to be the best among them." Literally, "shall be manifest as being the best." Compare ii., 6, 7.—εἰς τὸ πείθουσαι αὐτῶν ἐμοι. "As regards their obeying me," i. e., to make them obey me.—πολὺ νῦ ΔΣ, ἐφι, βίον, κ. τ. λ. "Far more easily, indeed, than if it were incumbent on you to prove that evil is better and more profitable than good."

§ 11.

λέγετι σοῦ. "Do you mean."—πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις. "In addition to his other duties."—τοῦ λέγειν δύνασθαι. "Of being able to bear range."—σὺ δ' φον, ἐφι, κ. τ. λ. "And did you suppose, said Socrates, that one must needs command cavalry by silence?" Compare i., 6, 15.—νῶμι. "According to the institutions of the state." In this clause Socrates speaks of the training of youth, &c., as appointed and regulated by the institutions of the state; in the next member (εἰ τε ἄλλος καλὸν, κ. τ. λ.), he speaks of those arts which one learns by his own inclination, although usually not classed with the regular instruction of a freeman in a free state. (Wheeler, ad loc. Schäfler, ad loc.)—δι' ὧν γε ζῷν ἐκποιήμεθα. "By which we know how to lead a well-regulated life," i. e., by which we enjoy civilized life. Observe that by ζῷόν is meant here a life well regulated by order, and under the laws and customs established by the state, as opposed to a rude and uncivilized existence.—διὰ λόγου.
Through the medium of speech."—καὶ οἱ τὰ σπουδαίοτατα μακίστα ἱππατόμενοι, κ. τ. λ. "And that they who best know the most important doctrines, most eloquently discourse upon them?"

§ 12.

ὅταν γε χορὸς εἰς κ. τ. λ. "Whenever any one single chorus is formed from this very city; as, for example, the one accustomed to be sent to Delos." The force of χορὸς εἰς is well explained by Lange, namely, one single chorus out of the entire state, and consisting, of course, of the best performers. The Delian chorus here referred to was connected with the celebration of the festival called Θεωρία. Consult notes on iv., 8, 2. The idea intended to be conveyed by the whole clause is as follows: "Although the Athenians excel other people in very many respects, yet in none do they excel so much as in their love of praise. Wherefore, if you desire to render your cavalry troops superior to others, you must honor them with praise and approbation, if they well perform their duty." (Lange, ad loc.)—τοῦτω ἐφάμιλλος. "A match for this."—ἐπινοδία. "An abundance of well-made men." This alludes to the custom of selecting, at the festival of Minerva called Παναθηναία, the handsomest men and youths as δήλλοφόροι, that is, to carry green boughs in procession. (Schneider, ad loc. Schol. ad Aristoph., Vesp., p. 524.)

§ 13, 14.

ἐὐφωνία. "By sweetness of voice," i. e., in singing. The following words, μεγέθει καὶ βραβη, refer to εὐνοδία.—φιλοτιμία. "In ambition." Compare iii., 5, 3: ἀλλὰ μὴν φιλοτιμοῦτατοι, κ. τ. λ.—ὡς πολὺ ἀν καὶ τοῦτῳ, κ. τ. λ. "That the Athenians would far excel other nations in this (kind of force) also." As the preposition ἐν is properly required here before τοῦτῳ, Stephens conjectured πολὺ καὶ τοῦτῳ. Kühner would prefer πολὺ ἀν καὶ ἐν τοῦτῳ. Leunclavius altered it to καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο.—παρασκευή. "By equipments."—ἐίκός γε. "It is likely, indeed."

§ 15.

προτρέπειν. Compare note on προτρέπων, i., 2, 64.—ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία πειράσομαι. "Well, then, by Jove, I will try." Observe the force of ἀλλὰ. Literally, "(I have no objections whatever to such a course), but, by Jove, I will try."
CHAPTER IV.

§ 1.

Nικομαχίδης. Who this person was is not known.—ἐξ ἀρχαρε-σιῶν ἀπιόντα. "Coming away from the election of public officers."

By ἀρχαρεσιῶν are meant the assemblies of the people which were held for the election of those public officers at Athens who were not chosen by lot. Consult Dict. Ant., s. v.—στρατηγοὶ. Of the public officers chosen by these general assemblies of the people, the most important were the strategi, taxiarcli, hipparchi, and phylar-chi. The strategi, or generals, were ten in number, one for each of the ten tribes.—οὐ γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, κ. τ. λ. "(You may well ask this question), for are not the Athenians, O Socrates, just the same as ever;" i. e., just as ungrateful as they have ever shown themselves to be. Compare the explanation of Kühner: "nonne tales secex exhibuerunt, quales in omnibus rebus sese exhibent."—δὲ ἐκ κατα-λόγου στρατεύουμενος, κ. τ. λ. "Who am worn out in serving from the list both as a commander of a company and of a brigade."

The λοχαγὸς was the commander at Athens of one hundred men, so, again, the ταξιαρχὸς at Athens commanded the τάξεις, or quota of infantry furnished by a φυλῆ. The like cavalry officers were called φύλαρχοι. By κατάλογος is here meant the list of those persons who possessed a certain amount of property, and were therefore liable to regular military service. These persons alone were allowed to serve in the regular infantry, while the lower class had not this privilege. The former were called οἱ ἐκ καταλόγου στρατεύουτες, and the latter οἱ ἐξῳ τοῦ καταλόγου.—ὑπογυμνούμενος. "Baring himself," i. e., taking off his robe.

§ 2, 3.

ἀγαθὸν. "An advantage."—εἰ γε. "Since, indeed."—καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἑμποροὶ, κ. τ. λ. "(Certainly not), for even the merchants," &c.—δὲ στρατηγῷ προεῖναι, κ. τ. λ. "Which is a proper characteristic to be added to a general," i. e., a proper characteristic for a general.—κεχορήγηκε. "He has been a choragus." It was customary for the wealthiest Athenians to be called upon in turn by the state, to bear the expenses of a chorus. Consult Dict. Ant., s. v. Choragus.—πάσα τοῖς χοροῖς νεκίνηκε. "He has proved victorious with all his cho- ruses."—μὴ Δλ', ἕφη ὁ Νικομαχίδης, κ. τ. λ. "Yes, indeed," replied icomachides, "but to lead a chorus and an army is in no respect
a similar thing.' More freely, "but there is no analogy between leading a chorus and an army." As regards the expression μὰ Δἶ, compare notes on i., 4, 9.

§ 4, 5.

οὐδὲ ἥδης γε, οὐδὲ χορῶν, κ. τ. λ. "Though being experienced neither in singing nor instruction of choruses, yet became able to find out the best (artists) in these things." It was the duty of the choragus to instruct, by means of the best musical artists, the members of the chorus under his charge. The head instructor of the chorus was termed χοροδιδάσκαλος, and he had numerous subordinate διδάσκαλοι.—τοῦς τάξιντας . . . τοὺς μαχομένους. "Who will marshal (his troops) . . . who will fight." Observe the force of the article with the participle, required to be rendered into our idiom by the relative and indicative.—ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς . . . ἐν τοῖς χοροικίοις. "In the transactions of war . . . in the things appertaining to choruses."—ἐξευρίσκητε τε. This is a conjecture of Valckenaer, in place of the old reading ἐξευρίσκεται. The middle is inadmissible here. Compare Valck. ad Herod., iii., 148.—καὶ τούτων. "In this also," i. e., in war. Observe that τούτων is here put for πολεμικῶν, the singular for the plural.—εἰς τὴν ἔνδυν θηγὸς τῇ πόλει, κ. τ. λ. "For victory in warlike matters, in conjunction with the whole state," i. e., to honor the whole state.—ἐν τῇ φυλῇ. The victory belonged not to the individual, but to his tribe; in the name of the latter the chorus was introduced.

§ 6, 7.

χορηγεῖν τε καλῶς καὶ στρατηγεῖν. "To lead both a chorus and an army skillfully."—δοσον ἄν τις προστατεύῃ. "Over whatsoever one may preside."—ἄν εἰη. "He will, in all likelihood, be." Observe the force of ἄν with the optative.—προστατεύοι. Thus in several Parisian and other MSS., in place of the common reading προστατεύει. The optative is required in consequence of the preceding ἀγαθὸς ἄν εἰη.—μὰ ΔÎ. "By Jove." Compare i., 4, 9.—σον ὑκοῦσα. "To hear from you," i. e., to hear you assert.—οἰκουφὸτοι. "House-managers."—τὰ ἐφαγα. "The doings."—τὰ αὐτά. "Identical."—πάνυ γε. "By all means."

§ 8, 9.

tοῦς ἄρχομένους. "Those under their authority." Literally. "those who are governed."—καὶ μᾶλα. Compare ii., 2, 1.—τὸ προςτάττειν, κ. τ. λ. "The ordering of persons to discharge the several
duties, who are competent (to discharge them).” This is he reading of Stobæus, and is adopted by Bornemann, Dindorf, and Kühner. The old editions have τὸ προστάτειν ἐκάστους ἐπιτηδείους πράττειν —καὶ τοῦτ. “This, likewise, is so.”—ἄμφοτέροις προσήκειν. “Is incumbent on both.”—προσάγεσθαι. “To gain for themselves. —ἀμφοτέροις εἶναι προσήκει. In § 8 the construction is different, ἄμφοτέροις ὅμως προσήκειν. The dative is here the personal object of the verb; the accusative, on the other hand, is to be construed with the infinitive. Compare Kühner, § 674, Jelf.—περὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἔργοισιν. “In their own operations.”

§ 10, 11.

ταύτα μὲν, θύη, πάντα, κ. τ. λ. “All these points, said he, belong equally to both; to fight, however, no longer to both,” i. e., is no longer a common trait.—ἄλλα ἔχθροι γέ τοι, κ. τ. λ. “Both, however, have enemies, at least.”—ἐκεῖνοι παρείς. “Waving that, tell me.” Supply λέγων after παρείς, an ellipse which suits the eager and impatient character of Nicomachides.—ἡ οἰκονομική. “Skill in economy.” Literally, “the art of economy.”—ἐνταῦθα δὴν καὶ πλεῖστον. “Here, doubtless, it will benefit most essentially.” Supply τινά with μαχόμενον.—τὰ συμφέροντα. “The things that concude.”—τὰ φέροντα. “The things that tend.” —νικητικὴν ύσυν. “To be likely to ensure victory.”—οὐχ ἡκιστα δὲ, κ. τ. λ. “And, what is not the least of these things, if he be unprepared, he will avoid joining battle,” i. e., and, above all, if he be unprepared, &c. Herbst, less correctly, makes τοῦτων depend on ἀπαράσκευος, and alters the punctuation accordingly.

§ 12.

μὴ καταφρόνει. After these words οὐν seems to have been omitted, because Socrates finishes his discourse with this paragraph.—τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν. “Those men that are skilled in household management.”—πλήθει μόνον. “Only in amount.”—τῶν κοινῶν “Of those of a public nature.”—τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παραπλήσια ἔχει “While it has all else exactly similar.”—τὰ δὲ μέγιστων, δὲι, κ. τ. λ. “But the most important point is this, that,” &c. Supply τούτῳ ἐστιν after μέγιστον, and consult, on this construction, Matthia, § 432, p. 711.—γίγνεται. “Is managed.”—δὲ ἄλλων μὲν ἄνθρωπον . . . . δὲ ἄλλων δὲ. “By men of one nature . . . . by men of another.”—ἄλλως τοιν ἄνθρωποις. “A different kind of men.”—οἱ οἰκονομικοὶ.
NOTES TO BOOK III.—CHAPTER V. 257


CHAPTER V.

§ 1. 
περικλεῖ. The natural son of the celebrated Pericles. When Pericles had lost his sons Xanthippus and Paralus, born in lawful wedlock, by the pestilence which ravaged Athens, the Athenians, to gratify him, repealed the law which he had himself caused to be passed against spurious children, and allowed him to call this son, by the celebrated Aspasia, after his own name. This younger Pericles was one of the ten generals who succeeded Alcibiades in the administration of affairs, and was put to death, together with his colleagues, by the Athenians after the battle of Arginusæ. Compare i., 1, 18.—τῷ τοῦ πάνν Περικλέους νιῷ. "The son of the celebrated Pericles." The article here gives πάνν the force of an adjective.— οὐ στρατηγήσαντος. "When you are elected general." More literally, "you having become a general." — ωμεῖν. "Better (than it now is)." — βουλομένη ἄν, ἄ λέγεις. "I could wish (that these things were so) which you mention." — οὐ δύναμαι γνῶναι. "I am unable to discover." — βούλεις κπισκοπῶμεν. Compare ii., 1, 1. — διὸν ἡδή τὸ δυνατὸν ἔστων. "Where now the possibility of (effecting this) abides," i. e., by what means there is a possibility of effecting this, under present circumstances.

§ 2. 
oἶδα γάρ. Compare i., 4, 9.—σῶματα ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλά. "Vigorous and beautiful frames." — ἀν εκλεχθῶν. "Could be selected." — σωμὴ ταῦτῃ μοι δοκοῦσι λείπεσθαι. "Not even in this respect do they appear to me to be inferior," i. e., do the Athenians appear. The reference in δοκοῦσι is to οἱ Αθηναίοι, as implied in Αθηνῶν immediately preceding. The dative ταῦτῃ is used adverbially here, so that there is no need of supplying μερίδι, as some do.— θεωροίζονται. "Toward one another." Equivalent here to ἄλληλοις. Compare ii., 6, 20.—Βοιωτῶν μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ, κ. τ. λ. "For many of the Bœotians, being wrongfully treated by the Thebans, are hostilely disposed toward them." The Bœotian cities were often at variance with Thebes, the claims of which to the supremacy they actively resisted.
§ 3.

μιλοσφουστατοι. "If the kindest temper."—ἀπερ. "Which traits."—ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας τε καὶ πατρίδος. "For the sake of both a good name and their native country," i.e., for the purpose of both gaining renown and defending their country.—οὐκ ἔστιν οἷς ὑπάρξῃ. "There are not to any," i.e., no people has. Observe that ἔστιν οἷς is equivalent here to ἐνίοις. This usage of ἔστιν οἷς for ἐνίοις, &c., is so firmly established in the language, that neither the number of the relative has any influence on the verb ἔστι, nor is the tense changed, though the time spoken of be past or future. An imitation of this occurs in Propertius: "Est quibus Elea concurririt palma quadrige: Est quibus in celeres gloria nata pedes" (iii., 9, 17). Compare Kühner, § 811, 5, Jelf. Matthiae, § 482.—ὁ πολλοί ἐπαιρόμενοι. "By which circumstance many being incited." Observe that ὁ here refers to the fact of the glorious achievements performed by their forefathers.

§ 4.

ταύτα μὲν ἥληθ᾽ ἄγεις πάντα. "All these things you say true." The English idiom here agrees with the Greek in employing the adjective with a kind of adverbiai force.—ἡ τε σὺν Τολμίδη τῶν χιλίων, κ. τ. λ. "Both the disaster of the thousand with Tolmides at Lebadea." Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus, was a general of great bravery. During the banishment of Conon, he carried on many expeditions with success. After Conon's death, B.C. 447, he marched, contrary to the advice of Pericles, with an army of volunteers, amounting to a thousand heavy-armed men, including the flower of the Athenian youth, against the Boeotian exiles, and other partisans of the same cause, who had made themselves masters of Chaeronea, Orchomenus, and some other towns in Boeotia. The Athenians were completely defeated, many of them were taken prisoners, and Tolmides himself was among the slain. The battle was fought in the neighborhood of Coronea; but, from the vicinity of the places, it is said sometimes to have been fought at Chaeronea, sometimes at Lebadea. This last-mentioned place was a city of Boeotia, about midway between Haliartus and Chaeronea, and to the west of the Lake Copaís. Compare Thucyd., i., 113.—ἐπὶ Δηλίων. "At Delium." Delium was a city of Boeotia, on the sea-cost, north of the mouth of the Asopus. A battle was fought here, in which Hippocrates, the Athenian general, was slain, B.C. 424.—ἐκ τοῦτων. "By reason of these things," i.e., of the defeats just mentioned.—τρος τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς. "In comparison with the Boeotians." A brief
mode of expression, for πρὸς τὴν τῶν Βοιωτῶν δόξαν. Compare i 2, 56 Kühner, § 781, Jelf.


§ 5, 6.

δοκεὶ δὲ μοι, κ. τ. λ. "And yet the state appears to me to be now more favorably disposed for any worthy governor." Compare the explanation of Kühner: "Erga bonum ducem faciliore, benigniore, magis obsequioso animo affecta esse."—τὸ μὲν γὰρ θύρως, κ. τ. λ. "For self-confidence begets in men carelessness," &c. The force of θύρως here is well expressed by Heinze: "Vertrauen auf seine Kräfte."—προσεκτικότερος. "More attentive," i. e., more on the alert.—τεκμήρια δ' ἄν. Compare ii, 6, 6.—ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν. "From the conduct of those on ship-board." —δῆπτον. "Namely." Equivalent to the Latin scilicet.—εἷστ' ἄν δὲ, κ. τ. λ. "But as long as," &c. Thus in five Parisian MSS., and also in the earlier editions. The common text has δόταν δὲ.—καραδοκοῦντες τὰ προσταχθησόμενα, κ. τ. λ. "Anxiously awaiting the orders about to be given, even as the members of a chorus (waiting for the orders of their leader)." The chorus always kept their eyes fixed on the leader, and followed implicitly his signals and directions. (Schneider, ad loc. Compare Weiske, ad Cyrop., i., 6, 18.)

§ 7, 8.

ἀλλὰ μὴν. Compare i., 1, 10, and i., 2, 63.—μᾶλλον τείθωντο. "They would yield especial obedience."—λέγειν, πῶς ἄν αὐτούς, κ. τ. λ. "To discuss how we might urge them on to be stirred up again with a desire of their ancient valor," &c. Observe that the genitive here is to be referred to the head of longing for or desiring a thing. Compare Matthiae, § 350.—εἶ μὲν ἐδοξολόγησα, κ. τ. λ. "If we wished them to reclaim money which others might have possession of." Observe that εἶχον has here, in our idiom, the force of the Latin haberent. Perhaps, however, Orelli's conjecture is the true one, namely, οἱ πάλαι εἶχον, which would give the tense its ordinary force.—τατηρῶ τε καὶ προσήκοντα. "Both their inheritance and property."—οὕτως. To express more clearly and emphatically any sequence, whether of time or otherwise, on the action of the participle, the adverbs ἐνταῦθα, οὖτω, οὕτω δὲ, ὡς, are joined to the
verb of the sentence. Compare Kühner, § 696, Obs. 6, Jel. Matthiae, § 566, 2.—μετ’ ἥρετης. “By their valor.” Compare Matthiae, § 587, a.—τοῦτο αὖ δεικτόν, κ. τ. λ. “We must show that this attribute again belonged to them most (of any people) from ancient time.” Observe that τοῦτο refers to τὸ μετ’ ἥρετης πρωτεύειν.—καὶ ὡς τοῦτον ἐπιμελοῦμενοι, κ. τ. λ. Observe here the change of construction, the particle ὡς with the finite verb being employed, instead of the writer’s continuing on with the participle. This is done for the sake of variety, and to prevent the too great accumulation of participles in the sentence, the difference otherwise being quite immaterial. Compare Kühner, § 804, 4.

§ 9.

ἐλ τοὺς γε παλαιοτάτους, κ. τ. λ. “If we should remind them, who have themselves heard of it, that their most ancient ancestors, of whom we hear, were the bravest of men.” Zeune well explains ἀκηκοότας here by “cum ipsi audiverint.” Weiske, on the other hand, with much less propriety, translates it by “qui dicti sint,” “qui nomen habuerint,” referring it to proφόνως, not to αὑτοῖς. All that is requisite is to repeat mentally after ἀκηκοότας the words ἀριθμούς γεγονέναι. Compare Kühner, § 896, Jel.

§ 10.

ἄρα λέγεις τὴν τῶν θεών Κρισίν, κ. τ. λ. “Do you mean the trial between the gods, which Cecrops and his assessors in judgment decided from their virtue?” By κρίσιν is here meant the controversy between Neptune and Minerva, as to which of the two should be the patron deity of Athens. The question was decided in favor of Minerva. According to one account, the gods themselves were the judges; according to another, Cecrops and Cranaus. (Compare Apollod., iii., 14, 1.) Xenophon follows here a third account. By the expression ἐλ περὶ Κέρυσσα is meant the whole bench of judges seated with Cecrops, or, in other words, his assessors. We must be careful here not to refer the phrase to Cecrops alone. Such an employment of ἐλ περὶ, to designate merely a single individual, would be characteristic of a writer of the Silver Age. (Kühner, ad loc.)—λέγω γάρ. “Yes, I mean that.” More literally, supplying at the same time the ellipsis, “(You are right), for I mean it.”—Ἐρχόμενος τροφῆν καὶ γένεσιν. The Erechtheus here meant was the earlier one of the two, and was the fourth king of Athens, and the son of Vulcan and Minerva. He was father of Pandion I., and grandfather of the younger Erechtheus, who was the sixth king of Athens.
NOTES TO BOOK III.—CHAPTER V. 291

Apollobodorus (iii., 14, 6) calls the elder Erechtheus by the name of Erichthonius, but, as Heyne thinks, this is merely a kind of cognomen. Some editors, offended by the *hysteron proteron* in τροφήν καὶ γένεσιν, convert the latter substantive into γένεσιν, referring it to the hospitable reception of Ceres by Erechtheus, but then, as Weiske observes, it should have been τὴν τῆς Δήμητρος γένεσιν. Kühner suggests two arguments in defence of Xenophon’s collocation of τροφήν and γένεσιν: one, that he is here expressly imitating the language of Homer; and the other, that τροφήν, the more important of the two, is purposely placed first, to make it more emphatic. Compare Hom., II., ii., 547, seqq.

καὶ τὸν πόλεμον, κ. τ. λ. “And the war that was waged in his time against the inhabitants of the whole adjacent continent.” Thrace is meant, which in early times is said to have extended to the confines of Attica. The war alluded to is that between the Athenians and the Thracians and Eleusinians. Compare Isocrat., Paneg., c. 19. Goller, ad Thucyd., ii., 15.—καὶ τὸν ἑφ’ Ἡρακλειδῶν, κ. τ. λ. The war carried on by the descendants of Hercules against Eurystheus and the Peloponnesians.—καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴσων πολεμηθέντας. With πάντας supply τοὺς πολέμους. The allusion is to the wars waged against the Amazons and Thracians. Compare Herod., ix., 27. Plut., Vit. These., 27.—τῶν καθ’ ἐαντούς ἀνθρώπων ἀριστεύσαντες. “As having been the bravest of the men of their own time.” The expression δῆλοι γεγόνασι ἀριστεύσαντες may be rendered more freely, “were clearly the bravest.”

§ 11.

εἰ δὲ βούλει. “And, if you please, (add this also).” A formula of Attic urbanity, and of transition, often translated simply by “moreover.”—οἱ ἱκείνων μὲν ἀπόγονοι. “Their descendants,” i. e., the Athenians in the age of Miltiades, Themistocles, and Aristides, who warred against the Persians.—τὰ μὲν . . . . τὰ δὲ. “Partly . . . . partly.”—καθ’ ἐαντούς. He omits to mention the faithful Plateans. Compare Corn. Nep., Milt., c. 5: “Hoc in tempore nulla civitas Atheniensibus fuit auxilio prater Plataenses.”—τοὺς κυριεύοντας. The Persians are meant, the extent of whose territory at that time is here defined.—ἀφορμὴν. “Means.” Compare ii., 7, 11.—οἱ δὲ καὶ λέγονται. “And these, as all know, are even said.” The particle δὴ has here the force of “uti constat inter omnes.”—λέγονται γὰρ. Compare note on λέγω γάρ, § 10.
NOTE S TO BOOK III.—CHAPTER V

§ 12, 13.

dieúmeinan ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν "They ever remained in their own land." Supply γῇ. Hence the Athenians prided themselves on being ἀνά τόχθους and γνηγεῖς.—ὑπὲρ δικαίων. "For their just rights."—ἐπετρεπον ἐκεῖνοι. "Submitted the case to them," i. e., to their arbitration.—καὶ δικαίως γε. Compare i., 1, 20.—ἡ πόλις ὅπως ποτ' κ. τ. λ. "How our city ever inclined to the worse," i. e., ever degenerated. Conjunctures which usually stand at the commencement of a clause, are often placed after one or more words, to render these words more emphatic. The same arrangement is common in Latin writers also. Compare Cic., Tusc., ii., 4, 12. Zeune reads, with one of the earlier editions, ei ἡ πόλις ὅπως, but this does not agree with the context, for the wonder of Pericles is, how the state at length declined, as appears from what follows.—διὰ τὸ πολὺ ὑπερενεγκεῖν κ. τ. λ. "By reason of their vast superiority, and their being best having sunk into carelessness, fall behind their antagonists"

§ 14.

dv ἀναλαβόειν. "Might they regain."—οὗδὲν ἀπόκρυφον, κ. τ. λ. "That does not appear to me to be any thing mysterious."—τὰ ἐπι-γενέσια. "The pursuits."—μηδὲν χείρον ἐκεῖνων ἐπιτηδεύοιεν. "They should practice them after no worse fashion than those did."—οὗδὲν ἀν χείρος ἐκεῖνων γενέσθαι. "(It appears unto me) that they would be in no respect inferior to them." Observe here the change of construction, the nominative with the infinitive being employed in ἀπόκρυφον εἶναι, and here the accusative with the same mood.—τοὺς γε γῆν πρωτεύοντας. The Lacedæmonians. Herbst remarks, that Xenophon always prefers the Lacedæmonian form of government to the Athenian.—καὶ τούτως τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντες 'And practicing the same pursuits with these.'

§ 15.

λέγεις, ἐφη, πόρρω ποι, κ. τ. λ. "You mean, said he, that moral excellence is, without doubt, far distant unto our city; for when will the Athenians," &c. Observe here the force of ποι, which is to be construed with πόρρω, not with λέγεις, and compare the remark of Weiske (Pleon. Gr.): "Vim intendendi haec particula (ποι) habet, ujecta v. g. τῷ πόρρῳ. Zosim. ii., 1, πόρρῳ ποι, 'longissime.' sed Xenophon, Mem., iii., 5, 15, item metaphorice." The connection of the sentence is this. Since by adopting the discipline of Lacedæmon, you think you can recall the Athenians to their pristine valor and glory, you seem to hint that at present the Athenians are
far inferior to the Lacedæmonians."—οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἀρχοντακαταφρονεῖν, κ. τ. λ. "Men who begin from their own parents to show contempt for their elders." The infinitive here, in place of the participle, is used to mark an intentional neglect observed by the Athenians toward their elders. (Kühner, § 688, Obs. Jelf.)—ἡ σωμασκήσουσιν. Supply πάτε after ἦ, from the previous clause.—εὑδεξίας. "A good habit of body."

§ 16.

ἀγάλλονται. "Pride themselves."—οὕτως ὀμονοήσουσιν. "Will they be so of one mind," i. e., will they be of one mind, as they are.—ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ συνέργειν, κ. τ. λ. "Instead of co-operating with one another for mutual benefit."—καὶ φθονοῦσιν ἐαυτοῖς μᾶλλον. "And have more envy toward one another."—συνόδοις. "Meetings."—καὶ πλείστας ἥ̄κας δικαίωνται. "And institute very many suits." For this construction of ὄκαζεθαί, consult Kühner, § 601, Jelf.—ἡ συνωφελούντες αὐτοὺς. "Than by helping each other." The participle is used to express the means or manner of an action (Matthiae, § 566, 4.)—τοῖς δὲ κοινοῖς ὠσπερ ἄλλοτριὸς χρωμενοι. "And conducting their public affairs as if belonging to another state."—οὖ. "Also."—καὶ ταῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα, κ. τ. λ. "And rejoice most in the power which they obtain for such contests." Observe that τὰ τοιαύτα refers to the several antecedent clauses.

§ 17, 18.

ἐξ ὧν πολλή μὲν ἀπειρία, κ. τ. λ. "From all which conduct great ignorance and cowardice spring up in our state." By ἀπειρία is meant ignorance of military affairs, the result of want of practice.—ἡ ἡ̄στε φέρειν δύνασθαι. "Than it is able to bear." Literally, "than so as to be able to bear it."—οὕτως ἡ̄γοῦ ἄνηκέστω, κ. τ. λ. "Think that the Athenians are afflicted with such incurable depravity." The verb νοσεῖν is generally construed with an accusative. It is sometimes, however, found with a dative, as here. This verb, moreover, is frequently used in a figurative sense, with respect to the disturbed or unsettled state of cities. Compare Anab., vii., 2, 32.—ὡς εὐτακτοι. "How well disciplined."—εὐτάκτως δέ. "In how orderly a manner, too." Supply ὧς from the previous clause.—τοῖς ἐπιστάταις. "Their masters." These are the instructors in the palaistra, or place of exercise, who taught the youth wrestling, boxing, &c.—οὐδένων καταδεέστερον. "In a way inferior to none." Observe that οὐδένων is equivalent here to οὐδὲ ἄλλων τινῶν.
§ 19, 20.

τὸ τὸ γὰρ τοῦ, κ. τ. λ. “(You are right), said he, fo: this, indeed is even strange, that such persons as these, namely, should obey,” &c. Such persons as actors, sailors, rowers, &c., were generally men of the lower order, or slaves, whereas the ὀπλίται and ἱππεῖς were citizens of the higher class.—προκεκρίθαι. “To be superior.”—ἡ δὲ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή, κ. τ. λ. “But does not, O Pericles, the council of the Areopagus consist of persons who have been most fully approved of?” The council, or, rather, court of the Areopagus, held its sittings on a small rocky eminence to the west of, and not far from the Athenian Acropolis. This eminence was called “Mars’ Hill,” whence the name of the court. The Areopagus was a body of very remote antiquity, and gave judgment in capital cases. Consult Smith, Dict. Ant., s. v.—τῶν δεδεκιμασμένων. The most worthy and religious of the Athenians were admitted as members of this council, and such archons as had discharged their duty with care and fidelity. Hence the high character enjoyed by the court.—νομιμώτερον. “More in accordance with the laws.”—σεμνότερον. “With more dignity.”—δίκας δικώζοντας. “Deciding cases.” Observe the force of the active here. The middle would mean, “instituting or commencing lawsuits.”

§ 21, 22.

καὶ μὴν. “Yet surely.”—οδενί τούτων προείχοναί. “They attend to no one of these things.”—Ἰσως γὰρ. “(True); for perhaps.” Compare iv., 4, 13, seq. Edwards less neatly supplies οὐ δαυμαστόν—οὔδε εἰς. Compare i., 6, 2.—δου τούτων ἀρχεσαί. “As many as take the lead in these matters.”—ἔψε ἐλέ ἐφεστώ. “Over which they preside.”—ἀντωσχεδιάζοναι. “Take office without due preparation.” The verb αὐτωσχεδιάζοναι literally means, “to act off-hand,” &c.—οὐδὲν ἤτον ἔχειν. “Are not the less able,” i. e., although you are a general, like one of them.—ἡρῷος μανθάνειν. Compare note on ἀρχεσαι καταφρονείν, § 15.—καὶ πολλὰ μὲν οἶμαι, κ. τ. λ. “I think, too, that you have received and keep in remembrance many of your father’s principles of warfare.”—συνεννοιχέαιναι. “Have collected.” From αὐμφέρω.

§ 23.

πολλὰ μεριμνάν. “Feel much anxiety.” The verb μεριμνάω is construed in this same way with an accusative in iv., 7, 6. It is construed with περί and a genitive in i., 1, 14.—ὅπως μὴ λάθησα σεαυτόν, κ. τ. λ. “That you may not unconsciously be ignorant of any one
of the things," &c., i. e., lest you may be, &c. Literally, "thath you may not escape your own observation in being ignorant of," &c. The participle of the aorist, not of the present, is usually construed with the aorist λαθεῖν.—αἰσθη. Some take this to be from an obsolete verb αἰσθομαι. Compare Sauppe, ad loc.

§ 24, 25.

Οὐ λανθάνεις με, ὦ Σώκρατες, κ. τ. λ. "You do not escape my observation, O Socrates, that you say all this, not really thinking that I am careful of these things," &c. More freely, "I am well aware, Socrates, that you thus speak, not from a real opinion that I have been diligently careful on these points," &c. Pericles understood the irony of Socrates, by which it was his habit to commend an individual for a virtue he did not possess, in order to induce him to endeavor earnestly to possess it.—ὁμολογῶ μέντοι, κ. τ. λ. The particle μέντοι has here a confirmative force, and answers to the Latin profecto.—ὅτι πρόκειται, κ. τ. λ. Attica was separated from Boeotia by the range of Mount Parnes, which was itself connected with that of Cithaeron.—καθέκοντα. "Stretching down." Referring to the chain's stretching off into Boeotia to meet Cithaeron.—καὶ ὅτι μένη διέξωσεν, κ. τ. λ. "And that, lying in the midst, it is girded by strong mountain-heights." The chief mountains of Attica are Parnes, Brilessus, Hymettus, Laurium (famous for its silver mines). Lycaebettus, and Pentelicus.

§ 26.

οὖ εἶκεν. Jacobs conjectures οὐ κάκεινο.—Μυσοὶ καὶ Πισίδαι. The Mysians were a people of Asia Minor, whose territory lay to the north of Lydia, and west of Bithynia. The Pisidians were also a people of Asia Minor, whose territory was bounded on the west and north by Phrygia, and on the south by Pamphylia.—βασιλέως. Observe that βασιλέως, being put kaτρ ἐξοχήν for the King of Persia, stands like a proper name without the article.—ἐρωτήμα τῶν χωρίων. "Very strong situations."—ἀκούω. This is often, as here, used for ἀκήκοα. Compare iv., 2, 8, and Kühner, § 396, Jelf.

§ 27, 28.

μέχρι τῆς ἐλαφρᾶς ἡλικίας. "Up to the time of active youth." The allusion is to the young Athenians called περίπολοι, "the patrol." between eighteen and twenty years of age, who formed a sort of horse-patrol to guard the frontier. These two years, therefore, were a kind of apprenticeship in arms.—ὡπλισμένους. "If armed."—με
CHAPTER VI.

§ 1.

Γλαῦκων. This Glauco, son of Aristo, was brother of Plato the philosopher. There was another Glauco, father of Charmides, and uncle to Plato. Compare iii., 7, 1.—δι' ἐπεχείρει δημηγορεῖν. "When he was attempting to harangue the populace." —οὗτος εἰκοσὶν ἔτη γεγονός. The young men of Athens, at the age of eighteen, were permitted to exercise the rights of free citizens, and to take office in the management of public affairs. (Compare Schömann, de Comit Athen., p. 76, 106.)—δύτων ἄλλων οἰκείων, κ. τ. λ. "Although he had both other relations and friends." —παύσαι ἐλκυμενόν τε, κ. τ. λ. "To prevent him from both being dragged down from the bema." The bema was a stone platform or hustings in the Athenian place of assembly, ten or eleven feet high, with an ascent of steps Schneider cites, in illustration of the present passage, Plato, Protag., p. 139, c., where it is mentioned, that occasionally wretched orators were dragged from the bema, and driven from the assembly by the τροφότα, a body of men kept to serve as the police of Athens, and deriving their name from the bows (τρόφα) with which they were armed.—Πλάτωνα. Aulus Gellius (N. A., xiv., 13) states, that a spirit of rivalry and opposition existed between Xenophon and Plato, and asserts that hence there is no mention of the name of the latter in the works of the former. Muretus, however, employs the present passage to refute him. (Var. Lect., v., 14.) Cobet and Böckh both consider the whole story of their rivalry to be a mere fabrication.—ἐπανασεν. "Caused him to cease (from this conduct)."

§ 2.

ἐντυχὼν γάρ. The particle γάρ refers to the previous paragraph.—πρῶτον μὲν ἐλς τὸ θελήσαι, κ. τ. λ. "He, in the first place, detained (and led) him into a willingness to listen, by having made such remarks as the following." Compare Anab., vii., 8, 20, where ἐλς τό with the infinitive likewise occurs.—ἡμῖν. "For us." The datius commodi. Compare Kühner, § 599, Jelf.—ἡ Δῖ, ἥν, καλὸν γάρ. "To be sure, replied he, for it is an honorable office." The
particle γὰρ here gives the grounds for the preceding affirmation.—
εἰτερ τι καὶ ἄλλο, κ. τ. λ. The Latins have imitated this idiom: Si
quid aliud in rebus humanis, sc. pulchrum est.—lify τούτο διωπτράζη.
"If you shall have accomplished this object," i. e., to stand at the
head of public affairs as a statesman.—τῶν πατρῶν οἴκουν. "Your
father's family." In four Parisian MSS., and in the early editions,
we have τῶν πατρῶν οἴκουν.—Θεμιστοκλῆς. Compare ii., 6, 13.—
περίθλεπτος. "Admired of all." More literally, "looked at from
on all sides."

§ 3, 4.

ἐμεγαλύνετο. "Began to be proudly elated."—ὡφελητέα σοι ἡ ποι.
ις ἑστιν. Here the object becomes the subject, and the verbal is
referred to it as a passive, in the same gender, number, and case,
like the Latin participle in dūs: "the state must be benefited by
you."—ἐκ τίνος ἥρξει. "With what you will begin."—ὡς ἀν τότε
σκοποῦν. "As if he were then considering." Elliptically put for ὡς
ἀν διασωπήσειεν, εἰ τότε σκοποῖν.—ἄρ' ἔφη. Compare iii., 2, 1.

§ 5.

προσόδων. "Revenues."—εἰκός γοῦν. Compare i., 4, 8.—λέγον
δή. "Tell me, then."—πόσαι τινές εἰσι. "How great per-chance
they are," i. e., their probable amount.—δῆ τι ἐκσηψαί. "That you
have considered them."—εἰ μὲν τινες αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ. "If any of
them may be deficient," i. e., if any of these revenues fall short.
Observe that αὐτῶν depends on τινές, not on ἐνδῶς ἔχουσιν.—εἰ εἶ
παραλειπόνται, κ. τ. λ. "And, if any fail, you may procure an ad-
dition."

§ 6.

tύς γε δαπάνας, κ. τ. λ. "Tell us, at least, the expenses of the
city."—δήλων γὰρ, δῆ καὶ τούτων τύς περιττὰς, κ. τ. λ. "For it is
evident that you intend to remove also the superfluous ones of these,"
i. e., to remove all superfluous expenditure.—οὖδὲ πρὸς ταῦτα πω
κ. τ. λ. "Neither for these have I ever as yet had leisure." Ob-
serve that ταῦτα refers to the whole of the previous sentence. Com-
pare Kühner, § 383, Jelf.—τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἄναβαλομέθα. "We will
defer the making." The article here, which might have been omit-
ted, renders the infinitive more emphatic. Compare Kühner, § 670,
Jelf.

§ 7, 8.

ἀπὸ πολεμίων. "At the expense of her enemies."—νὸΔΑφφadro
γε. "Yes, indeed, most assuredly so." Compare i., 2, 9—ἔττως
N 2
"But if he be weaker, he would very likely lose even the things that are already his," i. e., would lose his all.—τὸν γε βοιλευσόμενον. "The minister, at least, who is about to deliberate."—εάν μὲν ἢ τῆς πόλεως κρείττων ἤ. "If that of his own state be superior." Observe that ἤ refers to δεόμεθα, implied from the previous clause.—ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ πολέμῳ. Compare ii., 3, 5.—τῶν ἑναντίων. For τῆς τῶν ἑναντίων.—ἐυλαβεῖσθαι πειθῶ. "He may persuade it to act with caution."

§ 9, 10.

εἶτα. "And then." For εἶτα ἐδε—οὕτως γε ἀπὸ στόματος. "So readily, at least, by word of mouth," i. e., off hand, by memory.—εἰ γέγραπται σοι, ἔνεγκε. "If it has been written out by you, bring it."—οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, καὶ περὶ πολέμου, κ. τ. λ. "Well, then," said he, "we will suspend our deliberating respecting war in the first place." Certain adjectives with an article, in the accusative feminine singular, are used adverbially, as τῶν πρώτην, τῶν εὐθείαν, &c., where some supply ὁδὸν. (Kühner, § 558, Jels.)—αὐτῶν. "Of the things involved in it."—Ἀλλὰ τοῖς. "But certainly." Compare i., 2, 36.—ὅτι σοι μεμέληκε. Bornemann reads from one MS. ὅτι σοι ὅδη με ἀνέληκε.—ὁπόσαι τε φυλακαὶ ἐπικαιρὸς εἰσὶ. "Both how many fortresses are in favorable positions."—ἐκανόλ. "Sufficient to guard them."—συμβουλεύσειν. Supply οἴδα σε. Observe that the construction changes here, from ὅτι and a future verb, to the infinitive. Compare Kühner, § 804, 4, § 683, 1, Obs. Jels. One MS. has συμβουλεύσεις εἰς, which Dindorf adopts.

§ 11.

νῦν Δῆ, ἐφη ὅ Γλαύκων, κ. τ. λ. "Yes, indeed, replied Glaucon, I, for my part, will advise then to remove all, on account of their being kept in such a way that," &c. After ἐγὼγε, supply συμβουλεύσεω ἄφωρεῖν, and observe that αὐτῶς φυλάττεσθαι is the same as φυλακαὶς φυλάττεσθαι.—ὡς τε κλέπτεσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "That the things which are in it are stolen from the country." We have given the conjecture of Valckenaer, supported by three MSS., for the common reading ὡς καὶ ἀπετεθαί. Zeune, with some early editions, reads ὡς τε καὶ βλαπτέσθαι.—τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας. For τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ (ὅτα) ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς χώρας. Compare Kühner, § 647, Jels.—καὶ ἀρπάζειν. "To plunder also." This is opposed to κλέπτεσθαι. Not only to be stolen, but even to be openly pillaged.—αὐτῶς. "In person."—οὐκοῦν, ἐφη, καὶ περὶ τούτων, κ. τ. λ. "Shall we therefore, said he, delay then about these things also, when we may no longer be indulging in
mere conjectures, but may now have known for certain?” i. e., when we no longer rest on guesses, but have a certain knowledge

§ 12.

eίς γε μὴν, ἐφη, τάργυρια, κ. τ. λ. “I know very well, said he, that you have not gone unto the silver mines.” These mines were at Laurium, near the promontory of Sunium. Compare ii., 5, 2.

12. Observe the strong affirmatory power of μὴν.—αὐτόθεν “From that same quarter.”—οὗ γάρ οὖν ἐλήλυθα, ἐφη. “(You are right), said he, for I have not indeed gone.” The particle οὖν, added to γάρ, marks the truth of the assertion. (Kühner, § 737, 2, Jelf.)

§ 13.

καὶ πόσον χρόνον, κ. τ. λ. “Both for how long a time the corn produced from our territory is sufficient to support the city.”—προσδέται. Supply ἡ τόλις. The subject of one sentence is often supplied from the object of a preceding proposition. (Kühner, § 893, a., Jelf.) One MS. has προσδέται. Compare i., 6, 10.—τούτο γε ἐνδής “In want as respects this in particular.” Observe here the construction of ἐνδής with the accusative, and consult on this usage the remarks of Kühner, ad Cic., Tusc., v., 28, 81. One MS. has τούτον γε, which some editors have received.—ἄλλα ἐιδὼς, ἔχρις. “But that, from accurate knowledge, you may be able.”—εἰς ἐνδήσει. “If it will be incumbent (on me),” i. e., if I shall have to.

§ 14.

ἄλλα μέντοι. “Yet assuredly.”—ἄν προσδέται. “Which it requires.” The common text has προσδέται.—ἐκ πλειώνων ἡ μνάριν οἰκίων. Boeckh (Publ. Econ. of Athens, i., p. 43) shows that Athens with the harbor Piræus, had inhabitants to the number of one hundred and eighty thousand, i. e., including males and females, bond and free. In the region of the silver mines there were twenty thousand persons, and throughout the country region about three hundred thou-
sand, so that the whole number of the Attic population would be about half a million.—οἰκίων. By οἶκαι are here meant "houses;" by οἶκων in the next sentence or clause, "households" or "families."—τῶν τῶν θείων. "That of your uncle, for instance." The individual here referred to was Charmides. Compare iii., 7, 1.—dieutai de. "For he stands in need of help."—καὶ πλείοσιν ἐπιχειρήσεις "You will even attempt to do so for more."—ἐν τάλαντοι. The weight of course is here meant, not a sum of money. The talents of weight most in use were the Euboic or Attic talent (here meant), equal to almost fifty-seven pounds, and the Ἀθηναῖος, equal to about eighty-two and one quarter pounds.

§ 15, 16.
πειθεσθαι μοι. "To follow my advice."—μετὰ τῶν θείων. "Including your uncle."—δυνάσθαι ποιήσαι πειθεσθαι. Here are three connected infinitives, without any other word intervening; a circumstance not uncommon in Greek authors. Compare iv., 6, 6. Cyp. i., 3, 13. Matthis, § 545, Obs.—πυλάττων. "Take care." Observe the force of the middle.—τῶν εὐδοκείν. "Of reputation."—σφαλέρον. "Slippery."—ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, κ. τ. λ. "Think, too, of the rest of men, as many as you know to be such as appear," &c. For the genitive after ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, consult Matthis, § 349.

§ 17, 18.
ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν εἰδότων, κ. τ. λ. "Then think, too, of those who know what they both say and do," i. e., who know the subjects on which they speak, &c.—ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα ἐπισταμένοις ὄντας. "To be of the number of those who have most knowledge."—πειρῶ κατ-εργάσασθαι, κ. τ. λ. "Endeavor to bring about as much as possible the actually knowing those things which you wish to perform," i. e., endeavor really to become most skilled in what you wish to attempt.—διενέγκας. "Having surpassed."—τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν. Compare i., 6, 15.

CHAPTER VII.

§ 1.
Χαρμίδην. Charmides was the son of the elder Glauco, and uncle to Glauco the younger. He was uncle also, by the mother's side, to P•atro, who introduces him, in the dialogue which bears his name, as a very young man at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. He was a great favorite with Socrates. In B.C 404,
he was one of the ten who were appointed, over and above the thirty tyrants, to the special government of the Piræus, and he was slain fighting against Thrasybulus at the battle of Munychia in the same year.—ἀξιόλογον. "Worthy of estimation."—προσιέναι τῷ δήμῳ. "To appear before the people," i. e., to speak in public.—τοὺς στεφανιτας ἀγώνας νικάων. "To conquer in the games where crowns are given as prizes," i. e., in the greater games. The four great games are particularly meant. The Grecian games were divided into two classes, the στεφανιται and the δηματικι. In the latter, rewards or prizes other than crowns were proposed.—ἀγώνας νικάων. Verbs signifying to fight, contend, conquer, &c., take an accusative of the way, contest, or victory, or of that wherein it consists. Compare Kühner, § 564, Jelf.—δήλον, δηλι, ἐφη. A similar collocation of words occurs at iv., 2, 14; iv., 4, 23. The more usual arrangement is δηλιον, ἐφη, δηλι—μαλακῶν τε καὶ δειλόν. Supply ενει νομίζω.

§ 2, 3.

δόκοις ὁ. "Should hesitate thereupon."—δυνατόν ὄντα. "Though fully capable."—καὶ ταύτα, ὃν ἀνάγκη, κ. τ. λ. "And that, too, of those things in which it is necessary for you to take part, especially as being a citizen." The full form of expression would be, καὶ ταύτα, ἐπιμελείσθαι τούτων, ὃν, κ. τ. λ.—τὴν ἐμὴν ὄνυμαν. "My ability."—ταύτα μον καταγεινωσκει. "Do you thus condemn me."—ἐν αἷς σύνει τοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττονσι. "In which you associate with those who do manage the affairs of the state."

§ 4.

идια τε διαλέγεσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "Both to discuss matters in private, and to exhibit one's powers before the people at la, τε," i. e., when met in full assembly.—Ἀριθμεῖν. "To count."—οἴδεν ἔττον. "No less accurately."—κατὰ μόνας. "In private." The same as κατ' ἱδιαν. Bos supplies χώρας, but Kühner gives the preference to δινάμεις.—οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ πλῆθει, κ. τ. λ. The demonstrative pronoun is here brought in for the sake of emphasis, so that οἱ κινδαρίζοντει becomes a nominative absolute, or, in other words, an instance of anacoluthon

§ 5, 6.

ἐμφυτά τε ἀνθρώπωις ὄντα. "Are both things naturally implanted in men." With the names of inanimate things the neuter plural is frequently used, without any regard to the gender of the subjects.—καὶ παριστάμενα. "And affect us." The verb παροιτασθαί: is often
used with respect to fear, hope, desire, and other affections of the mind. Compare Haase, ad Rep. Lac., iii., 2, p. 94.—καὶ σὲ γε διδάξ-ων, κ. τ. λ. "And yet, saith he, I am impelled to inform you." Observe that καὶ has here the force of κατόι or καὶ μὴν. Verbs of motion are accompanied regularly by participles future, to express the object of the verb. Compare Matthiae, § 566, 6.—αἰσχύνει. "You are, notwithstanding, ashamed."—τοὺς γυαφεῖς αὐτῶν. "Of the fullers among them."—τοὺς ἐμπόροντες. "The merchants." The λε- πόροι were properly those merchants who embarked and traded personally from port to port; and hence they are here opposed to ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀγορᾷ μεταβαλλόμενος, "those who barter wares in the market-place."—δ ὁ. "In what way."—συνίσταται. "Is composed."

§ 7.

τί δὲ οἶδε διαφέρειν, κ. τ. λ. "In what, then, do you suppose that what you are doing is other than that a man, who is superior to those practiced in the palaestra, yet fears the untrained?" i. e., in what do you suppose that your conduct differs from that of him who, being superior to the practiced athlete, yet fears the untrained? Kühner well expresses here the force of διαφέρειν by aliud esse quam, or praestabilius esse quam. Observe, too, the force of ἀκηταί, as denoting athletes regularly trained in the palaestra, and opposed to the ἑώραται, who are altogether unacquainted with gymnastic training—οὐ γὰρ τοῖς πρωτεύοντι, κ. τ. λ. "For do you not, although easily holding conference with those who are superior officers in the state, some of whom hold you in contempt, and although far superior to those who practise the addressing the people, nevertheless shrink from delivering your sentiments," &c.—καταπεφρονηκόσιν. Compare the explanation of Kühner, as elucidating the force of the perfect here: "Perfectum indicat . . . . contempsisse et adhuc in contentu haberé."

§ 8, 9.

καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἔτεροι, ἐφ. "(Very true), for even the others, said he, (whom you meet in private, do so)."—εἰ ἐκείνους, δταν τοῦτο θουσι, κ. τ. λ. "If, easily putting down those persons whenever they may attempt this, you nevertheless think that you shall not be able in any way to manage these." The particle δὲ often stands thus, especially in Attic writers, after a protasis, or after a participle which has the effect of a protasis. (Matthiae, § 616, 3.)—προσφέρεσθαι τινι signifies, "to conduct one's self toward one," "to treat any one in a particular way;" and hence, "to
CHAPTER VIII.

§ 1.

Aristippus has been already alluded to, i., 2, 6. The genitive here might have been a dative after ἄπεκρίνατο, but it is used for greater emphasis.—εἴλέγχειν τὸν Σωκράτην. "To confute Socrates." The form Σωκράτην is given here in accordance with five MSS., instead of the common reading Σωκράτην.—τὸ πρότερον In book ii., c. 1.—οὐχ ὅπερ οἷς φυλαττόμενοι, κ. τ. λ. "Not in the style of those who are on their guard lest their discourse may in any way be turned against them; but that, being persuaded (of the truth), they, (his followers), might most readily perform their duty." We have retained the common reading πράττολεν. Kühner, following three of the MSS., gives πράττειν. The meaning is this: Socrates did not answer in the method of those who take great precautions to gain the better in argument, caring little whether their reasoning be just or false; but he replied in the manner of those who, free from all vain sophistry, seek truth alone, being imbued with the idea that what ought to be done, they should do. (Kühner: ad loc. Wheeler, ad loc.)

§ 2.

ο μὲν γάρ. Aristippus is meant.—εἰ εἰποῦ. "In case he should mention," i. e., in reply.—ὁλοῦ. "As, for example." In what follows after ὁλοῦ we have a species of attraction, for ὁλοῦ ἡ σκιόν . . . . ἡ ψυχεα . . . . ἡ ῥώμη . . . . ἡ τὸμα λατιν.—οὕτι, ἐὰν τι ἐνοχλῇ ἡμᾶς, κ. τ. λ. "That, in case any argument disconcert us, we stand in need of that which will cause our difficulty to cease," i. e., of that which will free us from our difficulty. Socrates, as Kühner remarks, answered Aristippus as he thought it best and most prudent to answer him, namely, by denying any thing to be absolutely good, and asserting good only to exist in reference to some other object: and in this mode of answer was included therefore an antidote (τὸ παύσον.
against Aristippus, who sought ἐνοχλοῦν τὸν Σωκρᾶτην ὅγα a captious interrogation.—ποιεῖν. Observe that ποιεῖν is here equivalent in fact to ἀποκρίνεσθαι, the verb ποιῶ, like the Latin facio, being frequently made to supply the place of a verb that has proceeded, by means of a general reference to it.

§ 3.

εἰ τι oldt πυρέτῳ ἄγαθον. “Whether I know any thing good for a fever.” Observe the peculiar construction of ἄγαθος with the genitive, and consult Kuhner, § 100, Jelf. — ἅλλα μὴν. “Well, then.”—δ μηδένος ἄγαθον εἰσίν. “Which is good for no one thing.”

The Socratic doctrine, as here laid down by Xenophon, is this, that nothing is good or useful of itself, but only with reference to something else.—οὐτε δέομαι. “Nor do I want (to know it).” Supply ἴδεναι.

§ 4.

ὡς ὀλὸν τε μὲν ὄν, κ. τ. ἃ. “Nay, said he, some are as dissimilar as possible.” Observe that μὲν ὄν here has somewhat the force of the Latin immo.—τῷ καλῷ πρὸς δρόμουν. “To one who is beautifully formed for running.”—καλὸς πρὸς πάλην. This reading Ernesti introduced, in place of the common one καὶ ἄλλος πρὸς πάλην.—καλὴ πρὸς τὸ προβάλεσθαι. “Handsomely formed for flinging in front of one’s self,” i.e., for defence in front.—ὡς εἰνὶ ἀνομοιοτάτη. “As dissimilar as possible.”

§ 5.

οὐδὲν διαφέροντως, εἰς, κ. τ. ἃ. “You answer me, said the other in no respect differently than when,” &c., i.e., you give an answer now no way different from your previous one when I asked you, &c.—ἄλλο μὴν ἄγαθον, ἄλλο δὲ καλὸν εἶναι. “That the good is one thing, indeed, and the beautiful another.” More literally, “that one thing indeed is good, and another thing is beautiful.”—ὅτι πρὸς ταύτα πάντα, κ. τ. ἃ. “That all things are both beautiful and good, with reference to the same things,” i.e., that with reference to the same things, all that is beautiful is also good.—ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄγαθον. Compare ii., 3, 6.—τὸ αὐτὸ τε καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ. “In both the same way, and with reference to the same objects.”—πρὸς ταύτα δὲ καὶ τάλλα πάντα, κ. τ. ἃ. “And all the other things which men use are considered both beautiful and good with reference to those same things, with reference to which they may be useful,” i.e., are considered beautiful and good with reference to their utility.
NOTES TO BOOK III.—CHAPTER VIII.

§ 6, 7.
κόφυνος κοπροφόρος. "A dung basket."—νῇ Δία. Compare i., 2, 9—ἐὼν πρός τα ἐκαυτών ἑργα, κ. τ. λ. "If the former be beautifully formed, and the latter badly, for their respective uses."—λέγεις συ, ἐφι, κ. τ. λ. "Do you mean, said he, that the same abstract things are beautiful and yet hideous?"—καὶ νῇ Δὶ ἐγώ', ἐφι, κ. τ. λ. "(Yes,) and indeed I, for my part, replied he, (say) that they are both good and evil."—τό τε λημυὸ ἁγαθόν, πυρετὸ κακόν ἑστί. For instance, food. So, again, τὸ πυρετὸ ἁγαθόν is abstinence.—πρὸς ὧν εὐ ἐχῃ. "With reference to those things for which they may be good and proper."

§ 8.
καὶ οἰκίας δὲ λεγον, κ. τ. λ. "And again, when he said that the same houses were both beautiful and useful," i. e., that those which were beautiful were also useful.—οἶας χρὴ οἰκοδομεῖσαι. "What kind of houses we ought to build."—ἄμα γε τὸν μέλλοντα, κ. τ. λ. "Ought not a man, who intends to have a house such as he ought (to have), to plan it in such a way that it shall be," &c.

§ 9.
tοῦτον δὲ ὁμολογομένου. "And this being admitted (by his hearers)"—ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμφαίειν. "And when they used to assent to this also." The optative sometimes represents an action as of frequent recurrence. Hence Kühner supposes that Socrates often discoursed with his friends on the proper method of constructing house. Compare i., 2, 57.—εἰς τὰς παστύδας. "Into the piazzas." The παστύς was a kind of colonnade or piazza, somewhat resembling the Homeric ἀλώνεα, or porch in front of the house.—ὑπὲρ ἵμων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν στεγῶν. "Over our heads and above the roof."—μὴ ἀποκλείσηται. "May not be shut out."—μὴ ἐμπιπτῶσιν. "May not blow upon it strongly."

§ 10.
ὡς δὲ συνελόντει εἰπεῖν. "But to speak briefly." With συνελόντει supply λόγῳ. The verb συναιρέω means literally, in this construction, to bring matters into a small or brief compass. Observe, moreover, that the infinitive is put after particles, especially after ὡς and ὅς, for the simple ut with the subjunctive in Latin, or the English "to." (Matthius, § 545.)—αὐτός. "The owner himself," i. e., the owner and occupier of the house. Compare Hermann, ad Vig. p. 733.—καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἁσφαλέστατα τιθοῖτε. "And might most safely
store up his property." Bornemann reads τιθοίτο, and so Matthei (§ 213, 3), remarking that the optative present passive and 2d aor. mid. of τιθημι and ἵμι, in Attic, have frequently the form of the optative of a baryton verb, in which case the accent is drawn back, as in the imperative. The testimony, however, of the ancient grammarians is for the most part opposed to this. Compare Göttling, Greek Accent, p. 24, Eng. transl. — γραφαὶ δὲ καὶ ποικίλιαι, κ. τ. λ. "But paintings and decorations (on the walls) deprive one of more pleasurable feelings than they afford." The portion of the building reserved for these was wholly excluded from the rays of the sun, and therefore cold and cheerless in winter. By ποικίλαι appear to be meant frescoes, and in this sense Hermann also here understands them, remarking, "ποικίλιας intelligenda esse censeo ornamenta parietibus illita, quae ποικιλματα dicta in Εconom., ix., 2."

ναοίς γε μὲν καὶ βωμοῖς, κ. τ. λ. "For temples and altars, however, he said the most becoming place was that which, being most open to the view, might be most free from the tread of men." Altars and temples, but more particularly the latter, were usually surrounded by a circuit wall (περιβόλωμ), the area included within which was usually thickly planted with trees and shrubs. Socrates disapproves of this arrangement, since he wished the place to be fully exposed to view, as if the worshippers could thus fancy that they saw the deity before them, and could address him as if present. (Kühner, ad loc. Wheeler, ad loc.)—ηδὸ μὲν γὰρ ιδόντας, κ. τ. λ. "For that it was pleasant to pray the moment one beheld it, and pleasant, too, to approach it in perfect purity." Observe the force of the aorist in denoting an instantaneous action; and, with regard to the latter clause, compare the explanation of Schütz: "Si via, quae ad templum ducat, parum frequens sit, facilius adituri ab omni piaculo purae se servare possint."

CHAPTER IX.

§ 1, 2.

ἡ ἄνδρια πότερον, κ. τ. λ. "Whether courage was acquired by education or endowed by nature." More literally, "was a thing to be taught or natural." The substantive is placed before πότερον to make it more emphatic. Compare ii., 7, 8.—φεταί. "Is formed by nature."—πορε τὰ δείνα. "To encounter dangers."—ἐθετ. "Institutions," i. e., national usages.—τολμη. "In daring."—πᾶσαν φύσιν μαθήσει, κ. τ. λ. "That every nature is increased with regard to courage by instruction and training." The same sentiment oc-
curs in ii., 6, 39.— ἀσπίδας καὶ δόρατα. The ordinary mode of Grecian arming is meant, and the Lacedaemonians are named as forming the truest type of Grecian bravery.—οὗτ’ ἄν . . . τάθλεοιν ἄν Heindenburg conjectured οὗτ’ αὐ. But the particle ἄν is often repeated in the same proposition, for greater emphasis. Compare L, 4, 14.— ἐν πέλταις καὶ ἐκονίοις. “Equipped with bucklers and javelins.” The usual Thracian mode of arming. Observe here the force of ἄν. The leading idea is that of being in, being inclosed within, and hence being arrayed in.— ἐν τοῖς. “Armed with bows.” The Scythians were expert archers, the bow being their national weapon.

§ 3.

επὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. “In all other instances.” The preposition επὶ is thus used with a genitive after verbs signifying “to understand, see, judge, say, show,” &c. (Kühner, § 633, 1.)— καὶ ἔπιμελεία πολὺ ἐπιδιόντας. “And improving much by careful practice.”— τῶν εὐφροσύνων “The more talented.”— ἀξιόλογον “Worthy of mention.”

§ 4.

σοφίαν καὶ σωφροσύνην. “Wisdom and temperance.” By σοφίαν is here meant the knowledge of virtue. In iv., 6, 7, he defines it as being identical with ἐπιστήμην. By σωφροσύνην, again, is meant virtuous conduct in general. The one of these always follows the other, and both ought to be united in the same individual. According to the opinion of Socrates, therefore, no one can be σοφός; that is, acquainted with all that is right and good, without being at the same time σωφρων.— ἄλλα τὸν τὰ μὲν καλά, κ. τ. λ. “But he judged that the man who knew the things that were beautiful and good, (and also knew how) to practise them (both), and the man who knew the things that were disgraceful, (and also knew how to guard against them, was both wise and temperate.” We have adopted here, with Kühner, the explanation of Lange, who regards the participles γεγυνώσκοντα and εἰδότα as each, in effect, placed twice, that is, the expression in the text is the same as τὸν τὰ μὲν καλά τε καὶ ἄγαθα γεγυνώσκοντα καὶ γεγυνώσκοντα χρησαίναι ἄντοις, καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα καὶ εἰδότα εὐλαβείσθωι. The regular form of expression would have been as follows: ἄλλα τὸ τὰ μὲν καλά τε καὶ ἄγαθα γεγυνώσκειν καὶ χρησαίναι ἄντοις, καὶ τὸ τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδέναι καὶ εὐλαβείσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σωφρονὸν ἑκρίνει. The explanation here given will save the necessity of any alteration of the text, as is rashly done
by several editors.—οὐδὲν γε μᾶλλον, κ. τ. λ. "That they were no more so than both the unwise and intemperate." We have given ἀκρατεῖς, the reading of four MSS., in place of the common reading ἄμαθεῖς.—ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων. "From every thing possible," i. e., by all possible means.

§ 5.

ἐφι δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, κ. τ. λ. The train of reasoning of the whole passage is as follows: Justice and every other virtue is wisdom; but all just and virtuous things are also beautiful and good, he who knows all that is beautiful and good (i. e., sapiens, sapient), will prefer nothing else to these; and so (οὖν) the wise man will do all that is beautiful and good.—οὖν τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους ὑνασθαί πρᾶττειν, κ. τ. λ. "Nor would they who were not acquainted with them be able to effect them, nay, would actually commit error if they attempt them." Observe that ἄν continues its force throughout the whole of this clause.—δὴλον εἶναι ὅτι . . . σοφία ἐστι. For ἐτει σοφία ἐτη. Compare i., 1, 13.—δικαιοσύνη. The names of virtues and vices are often used without an article. The article which immediately follows is added on account of the adjective ἄλλη. It is omitted in one Paris MS.

§ 6.

μανθαν γε μὴν. Compare i., 4, 5.—τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην. "Ignorance in the abstract."—καὶ μὴ ὁ ὀλίγος, κ. τ. λ. "To imagine as well as actually believe that one knows, not what he knows, (but what he really does not know)," &c. When a negative is prefixed to an article or a relative, a conjunction or preposition, it may not be separated therefrom, for it is attached to it for the purpose of making or suggesting an antithetical clause to be supplied in the mind; thus, the full expression here would be, μὴ ὁ ὀλίγος, ἀλλ' ὁ μὴ ὁλίγος. "Not what he knows, but what he does not know," i. e., simply, "what he does not really know."—τοὺς μὲν τοὺ πολλοὺς, κ. τ. λ. "He said that the multitude indeed do not say that those are mad who err in those matters of which the many are ignorant, but call," &c.—οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ γιγνώσκοντο. The attraction of the relative is here owing to the omission of the demonstrative pronoun.

§ 7.

μέγας οὖτως οίηται εἶναι. "Think himself to be so tall." Observe the construction of the nominative with the infinitive; and moreover, the emphatic position of οὖτως, literally, "tall to such a degree."
§ 8.

δ τε εἰη. "What kind of a thing it might be." The relative pronoun is put in the neuter when it refers to a thing generally, whether masculine or feminine. The expression δ τε εἰη is regular, like the Latin "quid sit invidia," which refers to the determination of the class of objects to which any thing belongs; whereas, on the contrary, in δετι εἰη, "qualis sit invidia," the class is considered as determined, and the question only is put, what other qualities besides the thing has. Compare Matthiae, § 439. Kühner, § 820, 1, Jelf.—οὔτε μέντοι. Observe that μέντοι is here equivalent to δέ, and compare ii., 3, 5; iv., 4, 7.—θην μεγαληνην. "That which arises."—μόνον φθονείν. "That those alone felt envy."—θαυμαξόντων... el. Compare i., 1, 13.—φιλῶν τινα. "Having a friendly feeling toward any person."—οὕτως ἐχουσίν. "Are so disposed in feeling."—κακῶς μὲν πράττοντας. Compare i., 6, 8.—εὐνοχοῦντων. Genitive absolute.—τούτο δὲ φρονίμῳ μὲν ἠνδρί, κ. τ. λ. "That this, however, could not happen to a wise man," i. e., that this feeling could not arise in the breast of the wise man.

§ 9.

σχολήν. "Idleness."—τί εἰη. For δ τε εἰη. Compare notes on previous section.—ποιοῦντας μὲν τι ὅλως ἀπαύντας, κ. τ. λ. "He said that he found all men, upon the whole, doing something, yet still the most of them idle."—ποιεῖν τι. "Attempted to do something."—σχολίζειν. "Were in reality idle."—λέναι πρίζοντας. "To go and do. —απὸ μέντοι τῶν βελτιώνων, κ. τ. λ. "That no one, however, had leisure to pass from the things that were better to those that were worse," i. e., to leave a good occupation for a bad one. The verb σχολίζειν is often construed with a simple infinitive.—τοῦτον, ἄσχολας αὐτῷ ὀδησ, κ. τ. λ. "He said that this one really acted badly in this, because he had no leisure," i. e., that he, there being employment for him, &c.

§ 10, 1.

βασιλεῖς. Compare ii., 2, 14.—ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων. "By the common people." Compare ι. 1 14.—τοὺς κλήρῳ λαχόντας. "Those..."
chosen by lot."—διότε...ομολογήσετε. Compare i., 2, 57.—επι-
δείκνυεν ἐν τε νηλ, κ. τ. λ. "He used to show that, in a ship, the
one who understood matters was the actual commander." Rweis-
ke would add κοιτερναν, but without necessity, for ὁ ἐπιστάμενος is fre-
quently, as here, used absolutely.—οἷς ὑπάρχει τι ἐπιμελείας δεῖμε-
νον. "Who have any office requiring care."—ἀν μὲν αὐτῷ ἡγώνται,
κ. τ. λ. "If they think that they are acquainted with it, take care
of it themselves; but if they do not think that they understand it,"
&c.—ἐν δὲ ταλασία. "In wool spinning, moreover."

§ 12, 13.
μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὀρθῶς λέγοντι. "Not to yield obedience to up-
right advisers."—καὶ πῶς ἂν, ἑφρ, κ. τ. λ. "And how is it pos-
sible that he should not obey, especially since there is a sure penalty
impending if one obey not," &c. Ἰαλ implies wonder at the begin-
ning of a question, in which the inquirer takes up what has been
said, and turns it into an argumentum ad absurdum. Compare iii.,
13, 6; i. v., 4, 10.—τὸν ἐδ φρονούντα. "A prudent monitor."—τὸν δὲ
ἀποκτείναντα. κ. τ. λ. "What, said he, do you think that the man
who slays the best of his allies," &c. Ernesti, Dindorf, and Bor-
немann read ἀποκτείναντα from Stobæus and one Paris MS. Sauppe
explains this aorist as implying an unsuccessful attempt; but Küh-
ner and Jelf reject this signification of the tense. (Kühner, § 403,
Obs. Jelf.) We have adopted, therefore, the ordinary reading, name-
ly, the present participle, as implying a frequency of action, "he
who slays," "who is in the habit of slaying."—ἡ, ὡς ἐνυχε, ζημιο-
σθαι. "Or is punished lightly." Literally, "is punished as it hap-
sens," i. e., in any ordinary way.—οὕτω. "By such conduct"
This refers to ταύτα ποιοῦντα.

§ 14.
ἐπετήδευμα. "Object of study."—ἐὗπραξιαν. "Virtuous conduct."
—πᾶν μὲν οὖν τοῦναντίου, κ. τ. λ. "I, for my part, said he, think
fortune and action altogether opposed to one another," i. e., diamet-
rically opposite. Socrates now proceeds to set his inquirer right
For when Socrates answered εὗπραξιαν, the other took this term it
its ordinary sense of "prosperity," or "success in life," and im-
mediately asked him whether "good fortune," or accidental pros-
perity, was an object of study. The philosopher now proceeds to
lay down clearly the distinction between the two terms.—τὸ μὲν γὰρ
ὑπ’ ἵπτοντα, κ. τ. λ. "For I think that a person's meeting casually
with any one of the things that are needed, without seeking for the
same, is good fortune: while, on the other hand, I consider one's succeeding after having learned and practiced any thing, to be good conduct; and they who aim at this appear to me to do well."

§ 15.

touς τὰ γεωργικὰ εὖ πράττοντας. “Who, (understanding them), practice rightly the things appertaining to agriculture.”—τὸν δὲ μηδὲν εὖ πράττοντα, κ. τ. λ. “While, on the other hand, he said that the man who did nothing zealously (and understandably) was neither useful for any thing, nor loved of the gods.” The student will not fail to perceive the mode in which Socrates plays upon the meaning of εὖ πράττειν.

CHAPTER X.

§ 1.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, κ. τ. λ. “But besides this, indeed, if he at any time entered into conversation with any one of those who were acquainted with the arts,” i. e., with any artist. Observe here the peculiar force of ἐχω, “to hold any thing as one’s own,” “to be possessed of or familiar with a thing.”—ἐγγείασάς εὐεκά. “For the sake of gain.”—καὶ τούτοις. “To these also.” This pleonastic καὶ is added here in consequence of ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ above.—εἰκελθῶν μὲν The particle μὲν refers to δὲ in § 6.—Παρράσιον. Parrhasius was one of the most celebrated of the Greek painters, and a native of Ephesus. He practiced his art, however, chiefly at Athens. His peculiar merit consisted, according to Pliny, in accuracy of drawing, truth of proportion, and power of expression. Judging from the tenor of the present conversation, he appears to have been quite a young man when it took place. He did not, in fact, attain to his highest celebrity until after the death of Socrates.—γραφική ἐστιν ἡ ἐκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων; “Is painting the representation of visible objects?” Observe that the predicate has here the article, while the subject is without it. The subject stands thus as a general notion, while the predicate with the article expresses something definite. There is no need, therefore, of our reading, with some editors ἡ γραφικὴ ἐστιν ἐκασία.—γοῦν. “At least, however.”—διὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ὑπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεῖσθε. “Representing by means of your colors, you closely imitate.” Observe the force ἐκ τῆς καμάντισσας.

§ 2, 3.

ἐφιμέλευσες. “In depicting, i. e. when you depict.—τὴν ἄνθρῳ
“With any one man.”—διά τὰ σωμάτα κυλὰ ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι. “You make your bodies to appear beautiful in all their parts.” Compare the explanation of Kühner: “Corpora in omnibus suis partibus.”—ποιούμεν γὰρ ἕφη, οὖν· ὠς. “(You are right), for we do so, replied he.” Observe the elliptical employment of γὰρ.—τὸ πιθανῶτατον τε καὶ ἢδιστον... τὸς ψυχῆς ἢδος. “That character of soul which is most persuasive as well as pleasing.”—πῶς γὰρ. “(Certainly not), for how.”—μὴτε ὅν ὑπεπαινά, κ. τ. λ. “Nor any one of the characteristics which you just mentioned.” The allusion is to τὰ κοίλα, ψηλά, &c., mentioned in § 1. Observe that ὅν is by attraction for ὅ.

§ 4.

ἀρ’ οὖν, ἕφη, γίγνεται, κ. τ. λ. “Is not then, said he, both the looking in a friendly and in a hostile manner at certain persons accustomed to arise in a man?” i. e., is it not sometimes seen that a man looks on others with a friendly or a hostile look?—τοῦτό γε. Thus in some MSS., in place of the common reading τὸ γε.—καὶ υάλα. “Undoubtedly.”—ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄγαθοῖς. “At the prosperity.”—ὁμοίως ἔχειν τὰ πρόσωπα. “To wear the same expression of countenance.” More literally, “to have their countenances in the same way.” The position of ὁμοίως here is intended to render it emphatic. The Greeks, in order to call attention to a word whereon an emphasis is to be laid, sometimes place it, as in the present instance, immediately before some word or words on which no stress is to be laid. (Kühner, § 904, 5, Jelf.)

§ 5.

ἄλλα μὴν καλ. Compare § 1.—τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ ἐλευθέριον “Both what is exalted and liberal,” i. e., elevation and liberality of spirit.—καὶ τὸ σωφρονητικόν τε καὶ φρόνιμον. “And both what is temperate and prudent,” i. e., temperance and prudence of character.—καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπων, κ. τ. λ. “Display themselves clearly by both the countenance and the gestures of men both standing and in motion.” With διαφαίνει supply εἶναί, and observe the employment here of the active with the reflexive pronoun, as more emphatic than the middle would have been.—πότερον οὖν, ἕφη, νομίζεις, κ. τ. λ. “Whether then, said he, do you suppose that men look with more pleasure upon (those paintings) by which fair, and virtuous, and loveable dispositions appear to the view, or those by which,” &c. Schneider thinks that Socrates desired to persuade Parrhasius to imitate the fair and good rather than the vicious and hateful.
NOTES TO BOOK III.—CHAPTER X. 313

6. πρὸς δὲ. The apodosis to εἰσελθὼν μὲν in § 1.—Κλείτωνα. Who this Clito was is not known. Coray would read Κλέωνα, from Pliny, H. N., xxxiv., 9, 27. The Cleon of whom Pliny speaks was a sculptor of Sicyon, and excelled in portrait statues.—ἀλλοίοις. "Statues of various forms," i. e., in various positions. Supply ἀν ὀφιάντας. We have placed a comma after ποιεῖτο, which makes a neater arrangement than the ordinary one. For ἀλλοίοις Orelli conjectures λαῖνοις, Heindorf καλλίους ἢ οἱ ἀλλοί, and Dindorf καλοὶ ἀν.—μᾶλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὕψους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, κ. τ. λ. "Most of all leads captive, by the sight of it, the minds of men, namely, the look of life." Literally, "that it (the statue) appears animated."

7. ἀπορῶν. "Being at a loss."—ἄρ' ἐφ. Compare iii., 2, 1.—τοὺς τῶν ζώντων, κ. τ. λ. "By assimilating your work to the forms of living creatures," i. e., by moulding and fashioning your work according to the pattern which these present.—ζωτικοτέρους. "More life-like."—οὐκοῦν τὰ τε ὑπὸ τῶν σχημάτων, κ. τ. λ. "Do you not then, said he, by assimilating (to the reality) both those parts in your statues which by reason of the particular gestures are drawn down and those that are drawn upward, both those that are compressed and those that are drawn apart, both those that are in a state of tension and those that are relaxed," &c.—πιθανώτερα "More natural."

8. τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰ πάθη, κ. τ. λ. "Still farther, does not the imitating also of the affections of bodies, when doing any thing, produce a certain feeling of pleasure for the spectators?"—ἀπειλητικά. "As threatening."—ἀπεικοστέον. The reference is now to representing, not assimilating.—τὸν δὲ νευκηκότων, κ. τ. λ. "And should not the countenance of exulting victors be imitated?"—τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, κ. τ. λ. "To represent in his statue the workings of the soul."

9, 10. Πιστίαν. Sturz thinks this Pistias identical with the person called Πιστῶν in Athenaeus, iv., 20.—ἐὖ εἰργαζόμενος. "Skillfully made." Several deponents have in the perfect both an active and passive signification. Compare Matthiae, § 495, d.—νὴ τὴν Ἡραν. Compare i. 5, 5.—τῷ τὰ ἴδια σκέπτετο, κ. τ. λ. "In this, that the hero
let covers those parts of man which require covering." &c.—οὕτε ἵππον ὰεύθυμφρον ὀὕτε πολυτελεστέρους, κ. τ. λ. "Though you make them neither stronger nor of more precious material than the rest." Compare Kühner: "neque e pretiosiore materia, ut auro, et variegatos." Observe that τῶν ἄλλων is for ἣ οἱ ἄλλοι, by the operation of what grammarians term the "comparatio compendiaria," or shorter form of comparison. (Kühner, § 781, d., Jelf.)—εὐρυθροτέρους. "Better proportioned." The πρῶτος τοῦ ὰφρακος is that concinnity and harmony with which all the parts are exactly suited to each other. In other words, it is "proportion."—μέτρῳ ἡ σταθμφ. "By measure or by weight," i. e., proving it to the purchaser by measure or by weight.—οὐ γὰρ δὴ Ιουν, κ. τ. λ. "For certainly I do not think that you make them all of the same size at least," &c.—ποιῶ. "I make (them to fit)." Supply ἀρμόστοντας.

§ 11, 12.

πως οὖν, ἥψι, τῷ ἀρρύθυμῳ σώματι, κ. τ. λ. "How then, said he, do you make that corslet well proportioned, which fits an ill-proportioned body."—ἀστερ καὶ ἀρμόστοντα. "Just as I make them to fit." Supply ποιῶ.—τοῦ εὐρυθρούν οὐ καθ’ εαυτό λέγειν, κ. τ. λ. "To mean proportion, not by itself, but with reference to the wearer," i. e., not independently considered, but, &c.—ἀστερ ἄν εἰ φαίης. "As if you were to say." For ἀστερ ἄν φαίης, εἰ φαίης. The particle ἄν is sometimes found without a verb, when it can be easily supplied from the context, particularly in the phrase ἀστερ ἄν εἰ, "as if." Compare Kühner, § 430, 1, Jelf.—τῷ σῷ λόγῳ. "From what you say," i. e., according to the principle which you lay down.

§ 13.

τῷ ἀρμόστειν πρόσεατι. "Is attached to this fitness."—εἰ τέ ἕξεις "If you know any."—τῶν αὐτῶν σταθμὸν ἔχοντες. "Although they have the same weight."—ἡ ὅλοι ἐκ τῶν ὄμων κρεμάμενοι. "Either hanging entirely from the shoulders."—δύσφορω καὶ χαλπειώ. "Difficult to wear, and annoying."—διεἰλημένοι τῷ βάρος, κ. τ. λ. "Being distributed as to their weight, (borne) partly by the collar bone χολιματικό and the shoulder blade." The preposition υπό is here employed because ϕερόμενον is to be supplied by the mind.—ὁλίγον δεῖν οὐ ϕορήματι, κ. τ. λ. "Almost resemble, not a burden, but a (natural) appendage." Observe that ὀλίγον δεῖν is elliptical for ὧς ὀλίγον δεῖν, and has an adverbial force, arising from its parenthetical nature. (Kühner, § 864, 1, Jelf.)
CHAPTER XI.

§ 14, 15.

αυτό, δέ διπερ. "The very thing, on account of which."—μάλλον "In preference."—διὰ ταύτα. "On these accounts," i. e., because they are variegated and gilded.—τόν σώματος μη μένοντος. "Since the body does not remain in the same position."—τοτε μέν . . . τοτε δέ. "At one time . . . at another." Reiz, ad Vig., p. 445, thinks that toto should always be used in this formula. Compare Borne mann, ad Conviv., viii., 5.—πῶς ἄν άκριβείς θάρακες ἄρμόπτοιεν; "How could accurately made corselets fit?" i. e., corselets accurately fitted to the body.—οἴδαμος. "They by no means do." Supply ἄρμόπτονυσ.—τοὺς ἄκριβείς. "Those exactly made." Compare Küh ner: "loricæ corpori accurate adaptatae."—τοὺς μὴ λυποῦντας ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ. "Those that do not hurt in the wearing."—αὐτὸς τοὺς λέγεις. "You mention yourself the very thing."—ἄποδέχεσθαι. "You comprehend my meaning."

CHAPTER XI.

§ 1.

γόμος ἦν Ἐθοδότη. So in Herodotus, iii., 85, τῷ γόμοι ἦν Οἰδώρος.—μνησθέντος αὐτῆς. "Having made mention of her."—κρείττων λόγου. "Beyond expression," i. e., beyond language to express. —ἄπεικασομένως. "To take her likeness." The middle shows that her likeness was taken for their own benefit, that they might acquire a more perfect knowledge of beauty.—ἰτέων ἄν εἰη θεασομένους. "We must go, I think, to see her." Observe here the force of the optative, as indicating the opinion of Socrates. Observe, moreover, the accusative θεασομένους. The accusative is common with verbs in τέων. The circumstance that a verbal in τέων is equivalent to δεῖ with an infinitive, explains this construction. Compare Seager, ad Vig., vi., 1, 12: Matthiae, § 447, 4.—οβ γὰρ ἐγκαυνόντα γε, κ. τ. λ. "For it is not possible for men, by having merely heard (of it), to become acquainted clearly with that which surpasses language."—καὶ διηγησάμενος, κ. τ. λ. "Thereupon, he that had made mention of her said, 'Follow me instantly.'" Literally, "you could not anticipate (my wishes) in following me," i. e., you could not be too quick in following. Compare ii., 3, 11.

§ 2, 3.

καταλαβόντες παρεστηκοῦν. "Having found her standing."—παν-σαμένων. Supply γράφαντος. Equivalent to ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ζωγράφος ἐπαύ-σατο γράφας.—Ἐθοδότη χάρειν ἔχειν. "To feel gratitude toward
Theodota," i. e., to thank her.—ἀρ' el μέν. Compare iii., 2, 1.—ἐπίδειξις. "The display."—ταύτην ἐκτέων. "Must this woman feel." Observe, again, the accusative with the verbal in τέων.—ἡμᾶς. Supply ἐκτέων.—οἱκοῦν. "Accordingly."—ὁφελήσεται. So in five MSS. Two others, with Stephens's edition, have ὁφελήσει. Dindorf reads ὁφελήσεται with the common text.—ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰκός. "Hence, therefore, it is natural."—θεραπεύειν. "Pay court unto her."—ὑμίν τῆς θέας, κ. τ. λ. "To thank you for this visit." Literally, "for this seeing of me," i. e., for thus coming to see me.

§ 4.

ἐν ἐσθήτι καὶ θεραπεῖν, κ. τ. λ. "In no common vesture and ornament." Herbst refers θεραπεῖν here to an array of attendants, but this idea is expressed by θεραπαίνας τολλάς immediately following. It is better, therefore, with Bornemann, Sauppe, Finkel, and Kühner, to regard the term in question as analogous to the Latin cultus, or ornatus multiebris.—οὐ τῇ τυχοίσῃ. Compare i., 1, 14.—καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας, κ. τ. λ. "And not even these negligently attired."—τοῖς ἄλλοις. "In other respects."—ἄγρος. "A country estate," i. e., a farm.—ἄλλα ἄρα. "Well, then."—ἀλλὰ μή. "But yet have you not."—τάπιτῇδεια. "The necessary supplies," i. e., for living in this way.—οὗτός μοι βίος ἑστι. "He is my means of subsistence."

§ 5, 6.

κρεῖττον διόν τε, κ. τ. λ. For κρεῖττον ἑστι φιλῶν ἀγέλην κεκτή-σθαι ἢ οἰων ἀγέλην, κ. τ. λ.—τῇ τύχῃ ἐπιτρέπεις. "Do you commit the matter to fortune."—ἡ καὶ αὐτή τι μιχανῇ; "Or do you yourself practice any art (to attract him)?"—φάλαγγες. The spider is called φάλαγξ from the long joints of its legs.—δ τι ἄν ἐνταῦθα ἐμπέσῃ. "Whatever may have fallen into these." The adverbs ἐνθα, ἐνθάδε, ἐνταῦθα, are construed with verbs of motion as well as with those signifying rest. Compare Kühner, 9 605, Obs. 5, Jelf.—τραφῇ. "For food."

§ 7, 8.

ἰ τῆρατρον. "A kind of net."—οὖ γὰρ δὴ σύντως, κ. τ. λ. "(Yes), for you ought not truly to suppose that you will thus indeed, without some art, take friends, the most valuable prize of all," i. e., thus, so readily, indeed, without practicing some art for the purpose.—ὁρᾶσθαι. Thus, also, Anab., iv., 5, 24; Cyrop., i., 4, 16. The usual Attic future is ὁρᾶσωμαι.—τὸ μικρὸν ἄξιον. "An article of little value."—νέουνται. "They feed." Referring to the hares.—νυκτ...
"Fit for hunting by night." — ἀποδιαφάσκονταν. "They retire." — εἰς τὴν εὐνὴν. "To their forms." Literally, "to their couch." — ὡστε καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ. κ. τ. λ. "So as by running even to escape out of sight." — ἄλλας αὐτὰ κύνας. The term κύων, like the Latin canis, is used both as masculine and feminine. Hunting dogs are generally used in the feminine. Compare iv., 1, 3; Virg., Æn., vii., 493; Heinsius, ad Oc., Met., iii., 140.—κατὰ πόδας. Compare ii., 6, 9.—αὐτῶν τινες. "Some of them." Referring to the hares. — γεύονταν. "In the direction in which they flee." Supply ὅδε.

§ 9, 10.

τίνι τοιούτῳ. "By what similar method." — κτήσῃ. "You procure (a person)." — δετίς σοι ἠγένον, κ. τ. λ. Join σοι with ἑιρήσει — ἤμβαλγ. "He may drive." — ἐν μὲν ὄψιν, ἐφι, κ. τ. λ. "One, at least, I ween, said he, and very closely embracing (its prize)." — καὶ ὡς ἄν ἣμβλέποισα χαρίζοι. "Both how you might gladden by a glance." — καὶ δότι δεῖ τὸν ἐπιμελόμενον, κ. τ. λ. "And that you should cheerfully receive the zealous suitor, but exclude the self-conceited one." By τρυφῶντα is here meant one puffed up with a vain opinion of himself; such as Thraso, the swaggering captain in Terence. — φρονιστικῶς ἐπισκέψασαι. "Should anxiously visit him." Observe that δεί still extends its government to the infinitive here. — καὶ καλὸν τί πράξαντος. "And when he has met with any success."

§ 11, 12.

καὶ μὴν, ἐφι, πολὺ διαφέρει, κ. τ. λ. "And yet, indeed, said he, the attacking a man in a manner according to his disposition, and in the right way, makes a great difference," i. e., becomes a matter of much importance.— τὸ θηρίον τοῦτο. "This same animal." Observe that θηρίον is here playfully said of a man.— ἀλώσιμον . . . ἐστὶν. Here the construction elegantly changes from the optative with ἄν (ἐλοις ἄν) to the indicative ἐστὶν. This is done to mark certainty.— τί σὺν οὐ σοὶ ἐγένοι. "Why, then, will you not straight way become." The aorist is here employed as an instantaneous future. Compare Kühner, § 403, 2, Jelf; Matthiae, § 106, 2.— ἐτήσις τούτῳ αὐτῆ, κ. τ. λ. "You yourself will seek and devise this." — εἰς ὑμᾶς. "Visit me."

§ 13.

NOTES TO BOOK III.—CHAPTER XII.

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κ. τ. λ. By ήδε πρώγματα, Weiske correctly understands the discussions held by Socrates with his disciples, while τὰ δημώδια is to be regarded as ironical, since Socrates τὰ πολιτικὰ σὲ κρ ἐπραττε.—φίλαι. "Female friends." Said ironically. The allusion is explained immediately after.—φίλτρα τε καὶ ἐπιφδύς. "Both love-charms and incantations."—καὶ ταῦτα. "These arts also."

§ 14.

διὰ τί. "On what account," i. e., influenced by what other reasons.—Ἀπολλόδωρον. Apollodorus was a disciple and constant companion of Socrates, though unable with all his attachment to understand the real worth of his master. A lively picture of the man is given in Plato's Symposium, p. 173, seqq.—τόνδε καὶ Ἀντιαθένην. When demonstrative pronouns are added to proper names, the article is omitted. Antisthenes has been already mentioned, ii., 5, 1.—Κέβητα καὶ Συμμίλαν. Compare i., 2, 48.—ἰγγγον. "Magic wheels." The term ἰγγξ properly denotes a bird called by us the "wryneck." It derived its Greek name from its cry, and its English, as well as Latin one (torquilla), from the never-ceasing motion of its little head. From this peculiarity the ancients believed it to be endowed with magic influence, and therefore used it in incantations to excite love. They bound the bird to a wheel having four spokes, and then rapidly turned the wheel while the charm was being chanted. Hence, as in the present instance, the wheel itself was called by the name of the bird, ἰγγξ.

§ 15.

χρήσον τοῖνυν μοι, ἐη, κ. τ. λ. "Lend me, then, said she, that magic wheel of yours, that I may set it going against yourself first."—ἐλκεσθαι πρός σε. "To be drawn to you."—Ἀλλὰ πορέσομαι. "Well, I will go."—ἐὰν μὴ τις φιλωτέρα, κ. τ. λ. "Unless some one dearer than you be within," i. e., right reason and virtue. Compare in explanation the remark of Ruhnken: "Venuste, ut nihil supra: est enim propria meretricum amatores excludentium formula, ἐνδον ἐτερος."

CHAPTER XII.

§ 1.

Ἐπιγέννην. Epigenes, son of Antiphon, of the demus of Cephisa, a follower of Socrates. He is mentioned by Plato as one of those who were with the philosopher in his last moments. (Plat., Phed.
p. 59.) — τὸ σῶμα κακῶς ἔχουσα. "Weak of frame." — ὃς ἱδιωτικῶς, ἑφή, κ. τ. λ. "How unlike an athlete, said he, you have your frame!" O Epigenes." i. e., how infirm and awkward you are. The ἱδιωταὶ, in a previous passage (iii., 7, 7), were opposed to the ἀσκηταὶ, who are called emphatically ἀθληταὶ, and hence he who neglects bodily exercise is termed ἱδιωτής.—ἱδιωτής μὲν εἰμι. "I am, indeed, unlike an athlete." Observe that μὲν is solitary here; still, however, an apodosis must be supplied by the mind. Thus, "I am not, indeed, one who exercises the body, but, nevertheless, I exercise the mind. Compare Herbst, ad loc.: "Gymnastica quidem ars ad me non pertineat. Opposatum cogita: animo autem excolendo operam do."—οὐδὲν γε μᾶλλον, ἑφη, κ. τ. λ. "You are no less an athlete indeed, replied Socrates, than those who are about to contend at Olympia." Literally, "you are no more, indeed, an ἱδιωτής." The idea is this: You are not a whit less an athlete virtually, than they who are about to contend at the Olympic games; they contend for a prize, or for glory, you should fight for the salvation of your state.—περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. "For life," i. e., where life is risked.—ὅτε Ἀθηναῖοι ὕποτονοι. "Which the Athenians will propose." Ἀγώνα τιβέναι is said properly of the games of Greece. Compare Bornemann: "Cer- tamen instituere præmiis propositis."—ὁταν τύχωσιν. "Whenever they may happen (to propose one)." Supply τιβέναι.

§ 2.

καὶ μὴν. "And yet." Compare ii., 3, 4.—τὴν καχεξίαν. "The evil plight," i. e., the weak condition arising from want of proper exercise.—οὐ ἀντὶ τοῦτο. "For this very same reason," i. e., weakness of body.—ἡτοι δουλείων. "Either, indeed, live as slaves." In Attic, the first ἦ often takes the separative particle τοι, whereby the disjunctive force is increased, and made to seem necessary. (Kühner, § 777, 5, Jelf.)—ἐὰν ὄντω τύχωσιν. These words are omitted in Bessario's version and in the Justinian edition. They are con- demned by Ruhnken.—καὶ ἐκτίσαντες ἐγιοτε, κ. τ. λ. "And having sometimes paid more for their ransom than their actual property." Observe here the peculiar force of ἐκτίνω. ' The verb properly means, "to pay off," "to pay in full," &c.

§ 3.

ἡ καταφρονεῖς τῶν ἐπιτιμῶν, κ. τ. λ. "Or do you think lightly of those penalties that are attendant upon an evil habit of body?" The allusion is to death, disgrace, slavery, poverty, misery, infamy. ' These are all so many penalties attendant upon neglect of bodily
exercise. Some commentators give ἐπιτυμίιον here the meaning merely of incommodorum, "inconveniences," but this wants for e. The reference is literally to an assessment of damages, a penalty imposed.—πολλὰ βάσι καὶ ἡδίω τοῦτων εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. "That those things which he should endure who is careful of the healthful condition of his frame are far lighter and more agreeable than these," i. e., than these same penalties.—τῶν διὰ τὴν εὐεξίαν γεγομένων. "The results arising from a good habit of body," i. e., from good muscular training.

§ 4.

καὶ μὴν πάντα γε τῶν πράξεων, κ. τ. λ. "And yet all things happen unto those who have their bodies in good condition directly other wise than to those who have them in evil condition," i. e., the results to those of an ill condition of frame are directly the reverse of those which befall a good condition. Words signifying difference are regularly construed with a genitive; but the adjective εὐνάρτος, instead of this genitive, sometimes has the particle ἕ after it. Compare iv., 5, 8.—καὶ διὰ τἀῦτα τὸν τε λοιπὸν βιόν, κ. τ. λ. "And, in consequence of all this, they live the rest of their lives more agreeably and honorably, and leave behind to their children fairer means for the support of existence." Compare ii., 7, 11.

§ 5.

οὐτοί χρή. "We by no means ought."—οὐκ ἄσκει δημοσίᾳ τὰ προς τὸν πόλεμον. "Does not publicly require the practice of warlike exercises." More literally, "does not publicly practice the things appertaining to war." The reference is to the toils and exercises of the atleta, which are also for war. Xenophon here censures the Athenians, with tacit praise of the Lacedaemonians; for though at Athens there were contests of ὀπλομάχων, yet there every citizen was not obliged to practice them as at Lacedaemon.—ἄλλα μηδὲν ἦττον ἑπιμελεῖσθαι. "But to attend to them none the less on this account."—οὐδὲ ἐν ἄλλω οὐδὲν ἀγόνι, κ. τ. λ. "Not even in any other contest, nor in any act whatsoever, will you come off inferior." Observe the construction of οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ, the former being equivalent to the Latin ne quidem, and the latter to neque. We must never confound οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ with οὔτε . . . οὔτε, "neither . . . nor." Compare Kühner, § 776, Jelf.—πολὺ διαφέρει, κ. τ. λ. "It makes a wide difference to have the body in as good a condition as possible." For a full enunciation of the thought, supply καὶ ὡς καύστα, "and in as evil a condition as possible." In this formula,
the words which form the contrast are some times omitted. Compare iii., 11, 11.

§ 6, 7.

ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν φί, κ. τ. λ. Here the sentence commences as if τάντε; ἵσασιν were to follow; but it suddenly changes into an interrogation. This is often the case in sentences beginning with ἢστε. Compare Kühner, § 867, 1, Jelf.—ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι. “In the employment of the mind.”—μιγάλα σφάλλονταί. “Fail greatly.”—πολλάκις πολλοίς. Paronomasia, or alliteration, a figure very common in Latin as well as in Greek. (Kühner, § 904, 2, Jelf.)—εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν ἐμπλήττοσοι οὖσώς. “Attack the mental powers with such violence.”—τάς ἐπι- στήμας. “All previous knowledge.”—εἰκός δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ ἑναν τία, κ. τ. λ. “Nay, it is far more likely for a good constitution even to be useful to obtain results directly contrary to those which arise from a bad constitution.” The position of καὶ here has given rise to some difficulty. The order of construction which we have adopted appears the most natural one.

§ 8.

tὸ διὰ τὴν ἀμέλειαν γηρᾶσαι. “This circumstance, that a person should grow old through omission of proper exercise.” An older Attic form is γηρᾶναι, as cited by the Atticists. (Thom. Mag., p. 78, ed. Ritsch.) Supply τινά with γηρᾶσαι.—πρὶν ἰδεῖν ἐαυτόν, κ. τ. λ. The same idiom sometimes occurs also in Latin; as in Cicero, “Nosti Marcellum, quam tardus sit,” for “nisti quam tardus sit Marcellus.”—ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ἀμελοῦντα. “These things it is not possible for one to see who neglects them.” Compare i., 1 9.—οὖ γὰρ ἔθελει, κ. τ. λ. “For they are not accustomed to come of their own accord,” i. e., without practice.

CHAPTER XIII.

§ 1, 2.

προσειπὼν τινα χαλρεῖν. “Having saluted a person.” More literally, “having bid a certain person hail.” This formula occurs a second time in Xenophon, Hist. Gr., iv., 1, 3, where the person is in the dative.—γελοῖον, ἐφι, τὸ, κ. τ. λ. Many editions omit the article—τὸ σῶμα κάκιον ἔχοντι. “Having his person deformed.” Literally “having his person worse (than ordinary).”—ἀγροικοτέρως διακεμέ- νῷ. “Rather churlishly disposed.”—ἀγδός. “Without any relish (for his food).”—Ἀκουμενός. Acumenus was a celebrated physician,
the friend of Socrates. He was a native of Athens. Many read ἀνιόμενος as a participle, denoting a physician of such a name to have ever existed. But consult Plat., Phæd., 277, a.—παθασαθαί ἔσθιντα. "To stop eating (while you still have an appetite)," i. e., before satiety supervenes.

§ 3.

παρ’ ἐαυτῷ. "With him," i. e., at his house, at home.—ἀλλὰ φυ-χρόνι, ἐοι, κ. τ. λ. "But, replied he, it is cold for the purpose of bathing," i. e., it is too cold for bathing. Sometimes a positive with ἐστε and an infinitive is used for the comparative with ἤ ὡτε (Matthiae, § 448, b.)—ὡς ἥδεως. "With what pleasure." Equivalent to ὅτι οὕτως ἥδεως.—ἐν Ἀσκληπιοῦ. "In the temple of Ἀσκληπιοῦ." Supply νεφ. The temple of Ἀσκληπιοῦ here referred to was in Athens, on the road from the theatre to the Acropolis. There was a warm spring here, connected, of course, with healing purposes. The great temple of Ἀσκληπιοῦ was at Epidaurus, in Arcadia.—ἐν Ἀμφιαράου. Pausanius states (i., 34, 2) that Amphiaraus had a temple in the Acropolis; but he also speaks of another temple of the same at Orōpus, in Bœotia, near a spring possessing healing properties, and it is more than probable that the latter is here meant.

—ὅτι κινδυνεύεις, κ. τ. λ. "That you are, very likely, harder to please," &c. Observe the force of κινδυνεύω. The verb properly means "to run a risk," and then, as the running a risk implies a probable chance of success, it is used, as in the present case, to express that which seems likely, though uncertain.

§ 4.

tον ἄκόλουθον. "His attendant." The term ἄκόλουθος answers to the Latin pedissequus, and denotes properly a young slave, whose duty it was to attend upon his master, and accompany him in public; a page or follower.—ὑψοφάγίστατος. "A perfect glutton." Adjectives in ης, gen. ov, of the first declension, add the compound suffix ὁ-τερος, ὁ-τατος, to their root. The adjective ὑψοφάγος, and some others in ος, irregularly drop the ος, and follow the same mode of comparing. (Kühner, § 33, 2, b., Jel.)—βλασκίστατος. Thu Schneider, from Athenæus viii., p. 277, and Eustathius, p. 867. All the MSS. and previous editions have βλασκώτατος. Buttmann wishes to read here βλασκικώτατος, from βλασκικός. (G. G., § 66, ed Rob.)—πότερος. "Which of the two."
§ 5.

The route to Olympia," i. e., a journey to that quarter. This spot was in Elis, on the banks of the Alpheus, and here the celebrated Olympic games were held. It was not a city, but a sacred spot or district.—την πορείαν. "This journey."—οίκοι. "At home," i. e., at Athens.—περιπατήσας δειπνήσεις. Two MSS. have the conjunction καὶ before περιπατήσας. Hotitius inserts ἓξ after it. Compare, however, the note on ὅμοιας . . . γενό-μενος, i. 1, 18.—εἰ ἔκτεινας τοὺς περιπάτους, κ. τ. λ. "If you should extend in continuous length those several walks which you take in five or six days." The idea is this: If you were to continue in one unbroken length the different walks which you daily take, so as to make up one long walk out of numerous short ones, you might arrive even at Olympia without yet walking more than you usually do at home.—προεξορμάν ἡμέρα μιᾷ. "To set out earlier by one day." With comparatives and analogous words, the noun which expresses the difference or excess is put in the dative. So μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ πλείονας in the next sentence.—περαιτέρω τοῦ μετρίου μηκύνειν τὰς ἁδόνας. "To lengthen your day's journeys beyond a moderate ex- tent."—τὸ δὲ μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ πλείονας πορευθῆναι. "Whereas, the having gone more by a day," i. e., the taking one day more to make it.

§ 6.

ὡς παρετάθη. "That he was wearied out." The verb παρατέλνω properly means "to stretch out," "to protract," and hence "to wear out," "to exhaust," &c.—ἄλλα τὸ ἱμάτιον. "But (merely) my cloak." Ernesti would add μόνου at once to the text, and it is actually expressed in the Latin version of Bessario. Weiske con-jectures ἄλλα ἃ τὸ ἱμάτιον, and probably this is the true reading.—τὰ στρώματα. "The bedding."—καὶ πῶς ὅψ, ἐφή, ἀπήλλαξεν εἰ τῆς ἁδοῦ; "And how, pray, said he, did he get over the journey?"—πῶς ἄν οἰει διατεθήναι; "How do you think you would have been affect-ed," i. e., would have fared.—μᾶλλον δὲ οὖν ἐν ἡγουμένην κομίσαι. "Or, rather, I would not have been able to carry it at all."—ἡσκη-μένου. "Trained in all exercises."

CHAPTER XIV.

§ 1.

ὅποτε. "Whenever." This meaning arises from the union of ὅποτε with the optative φέροιεν, showing that the circumstance here mentioned was not a single instance, but of frequent recurrence.—
NOTES TO BOOK III.—CHAPTER XIV.

Πών εὑνιόντων ἐπὶ δείπνον. "Of those who came together unto, feast of contribution." The reference is to a feast where each guest brought his own provisions with him; and, as the provisions were brought in baskets, such an entertainment was sometimes called a δείπνον ἀπὸ σπυρίδος. The object of Socrates was to prevent an unpleasant rivalry in the quality or quantity of the contributed viands. In order to effect this, he directed the attendant either to place the small portions on table, in common for all, or else to distribute to each guest his share of the same. Observe that the reference is to such entertainments taking place at the house of Socrates, and hence the contro which he assumed in regulating the same.

φέροντες. The verbs φέρειν and πορίζειν are often used where one would rather expect the middle, the speaker not regarding the action in its reflexive relation to the subject. In the next sentence we have φέροντες, and, a little after, φερομένων. (Compare Kähner, § 363, 3, Jel.)—τὸν παῖδα. "His slave." Compare the analogous usage of puer in Latin.—τὸ μικρὸν ἡ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν, κ. τ. λ. "Either to place each small contribution on table for the use of all, or else to distribute his share of the same unto each."—ὑγιόνοντο τὸ τε μή. κ. τ. λ. "Were ashamed not to partake of that which was placed for general use, and not, in return, to place on table their own stock." More literally, "were ashamed as regarded the not partaking of," &c. The infinitive with the article is often put for the infinitive alone, because the infinitive is considered as the subject or object of the main action. (Matthew, § 543, Obs. 2.)—καὶ ιπτει οὐδέν πλέον εἴγον. "And since they partook of no more."—πολλοῦ δειπνοῦντες "Purchasing delicacies at great cost."

§ 2.

τὸν μὲν σίτου πεταυμένον. "To have abstained from the bread."—τὸ δύον αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό. "The meat itself alone." Literally, "the meat itself, by itself."—λόγου δυντος περὶ δυνάμεων, κ. τ. λ. "A conversation arising about names for things, for what particular act, namely, each might be (a proper appellation)."—ἐπὶ ποιῶ ποτὲ ἐργά, κ. τ. λ. "For what particular act a man is called carnivorous."—ἐπὶ τῷ σίτῳ. "With their bread."—ὅταν παρῇ. "Whenever it be present," i. e., whenever bread be laid be 'ore them.—ἐπὶ γε τοῦτῳ. "On this account, at least."—ὀὗ γὰρ εὖν. "By no means." Compare iii., 6, 12.
NOTES TO BOOK III.—CHAPTER XIV.

§ 3, 4.

τὸ ὄψων αὐτό. "The means alone." That is αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, as in § 2. The common text has ἵπτο. Stephens conjectured αὐτοῦ.—μὴ ἄσκησεσθος, ἀλλ' ἡδονὴς ἑνικα. "Not for training, but the mere gratification of the appetite." The term ἄσκησεσθος has reference properly to athletes, who were accustomed to eat an enormous quantity of flesh, in order to strengthen their muscular powers.—σχολὴ. "Scarcely."—τοίς θεοῖς ἐυχονταί. Compare iv., 24.—εἰκότως ἄν οὕτως, κ. τ. λ. "This one should naturally pray for abundance of flesh," i. e., to consume.—προσέλαβεν. "Took in addition."——οἱ πλησίον. "You who are near." Supply ὑμεῖς. The pronoun is expressed in the Hist. Gr., ii., 3, 54, and Cyrop., vi., 2, 4.—τῷ σῖτῳ ὄψω, ἡ τῷ ὄψῳ σῖτῳ. "His bread as meat, or his meat as bread." Compare i., 3, 5.

§ 5.

ἐπὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ψωμῷ. "Tasting many dishes with one piece of bread." Literally, "on one piece of bread."—πολυτελεστέρα ὄψωτια, κ. τ. λ. "Any cookery more extravagant, or one that in a greater degree spoils the viands, than that which he practices who," &c. For ἢ μάλλον, a correction of Castalio, many editions have ἢ μᾶλλον.—πλείω μὲν γε, κ. τ. λ. "Since he mixes many more things than the cooks do," &c. Two MSS. have πλείω μέντοι.—ὅ δὲ ἔκεινοι μὴ συμπληγνύοντοι, κ. τ. λ. "While he who (thus) mixes together condiments which they do not mix, as being unsuitable, errs, if indeed they act rightly, and destroys their art."

§ 6.

παρασκευάζεσθαι μὲν ὄψωτιακός, κ. τ. λ. "To provide one's self with cooks that are perfectly acquainted with their art, and yet that he himself, though claiming no knowledge of this same profession, should alter the dishes prepared by them." Literally, "the things done by them."—καὶ ἄλλο δέ τι προσχινεται, κ. τ. λ. "And something else besides accrues unto the man who is accustomed," &c., i. e., an additional evil befalls him.—μειονεκτεῖν. "To be stinted."—ποθὸν τὸ σύννθες. "Missing what he was accustomed to."—τὸν ἑνα ψωμὸν ἐνι ὄψῳ προσέπομεν. "To accompany single morsels of bread with single morsels of meat." The article here imparts a distributive force.—ὅτε μὴ παρεῖ σολλά, κ. τ. λ. "Would be able to use with pleasure a single kind of meat, whenever variety might not be present."
§ 7.

ὡς τὸ εὖχεισθαι, κ. τ. λ. "That the verb εὖχεισθαι, in the language of the Athenians, meant 'to eat.'" Observe here the peculiarity of καλέω.—τὸ δὲ εὖ προσκείσθαι. "And that the word εὖ was added, that we may eat those things which," &c., i. e., in order to express the fancy for what would disorder neither body nor mind, and might be easily procurable. Observe here the force of εἰ, and compare the explanation of Kühner: "Præpositio εἰ significat conditionem vel consilium: illud εὖ adhærece ita, ut ea comedamus, quæ," &c.—ἀπε ταλ τὸ εὖχεισθαι, κ. τ. λ. "So that he referred the term εὖχεισθαι to those who lived moderately."
BOOK IV

CHAPTER I.

§ 1.

καὶ εἰ μετριῶς αἰσθανομένῳ. "Even if moderately intelligent," i. e., even if only of moderate understanding. Observe the difference between εἰ καὶ and καὶ εἰ. The former means "although," and καὶ belongs to the sentence, and allows something which does or will really exist, or has existed; the latter means "even if," and here καὶ belongs to εἰ, and not to the sentence, and allows a supposed case which does not or will not exist, or has not existed. Compare Kühner, § 861, Jelf.—τοῦ Σωκράτους ἰνεόναι. "Than in timacy with Socrates."—διπουοῦν. "Any where whatsoever." Observe that διπουοῦν, ὀτιεοῦν, &c., like the Latin ubicumque, quicumque, &c., take either a repetition of the verb of the clause, or require εἶναι to be supplied.—τὸ ἐκεῖνον μεμνῆσθαι. "The recollection of him," i. e., the recalling him to one's recollection.—καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ἐκεῖνον. "And who embraced his tenets." Compare the explanation of Kühner: "Quis ejus disciplinam sequabantur. 'Αποδέχεται στίς τίνα vel ti est probare aliquem (alicujus sententiam) vel aliquid'—σπουδάζων. "In serious mood."

§ 2.

ἐφι μὲν ἄν. "He would say," i. e., he was accustomed to say. Compare i., 1, 16.—τὰ σώματα πρὸς ὅραν εὐ πεφυκότων. "Well endowed by nature in their persons for beauty." More freely, "with beauty."—ἐκεκυκαίρετο δὲ, κ. τ. λ. "He conjectured, also, excellent dispositions," i. e., what dispositions were excellent.—οἷς τροπέχουσιν. "Those things unto which they applied themselves."—μαθημάτων πάντων. "All those branches of learning."—ἐστίν. "One has it in his power."—οἶκείν. "To regulate."—εὖ χρῆσθαι. "Manage well."—παίδευθετας. "If instructed."

§ 3.

ὁ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον, κ. τ. λ. "He did not make advances in the same way, however, unto all." The particle δὲ, in place of being the second word in the clause, is here placed after αὐτῶν, be
cause this word is opposed to the different other arts which Socrates employed. Οὐ and ἄλλα are opposed to each other.—μαθήσεως δὲ κατὰφρονοῦντας. "But slighting instruction." Verbs signifying "to care for," "think much of," or their contraries, are construed with a genitive of the person or thing cared for, or disregarded, &c., and an accusative of the cause of care, disregard, &c. (Kühner, 496, 551, Jell.) —ἐπιθεκακίων. "Instancing." —εὐφυεστάτων. "Best in breed."—σφοδροίς. "Mettlesome."—ἐν νέων. "When young."—ἀδύμαστα. "Not broken in."—ἀνκοβοκτοτάτων. "Very difficult to hold in."—τῶν εὐφυεστάτων. "That are of the best blood."—καλῶς ἄχθειας. "Well trained." The term ἄχθειας is peculiarly used of hounds. The word "untrained," ἀναγώγους, here applied to hounds, is applied above to horses, iii., 3, 4.—μανιώδεις. "Rabid."

§ 4.
εὐφυεστάτων "Of the noblest natures."—ταῖς ψυχαῖς. The part of any thing affected by the operation of the verb is put in the accusative, but instead of this accusative the dative is sometimes used, as here. (Compare Matthiae, 424, Obs. 1.)—μεγαλείους καὶ σφοδρούς. "High souled and energetic."—κακὰ ἐργάζονται. Some read κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι.

§ 5.
τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ πλοῦτῳ μέγα φρονοῦντας. "Those, however, who thought highly of themselves in consequence of riches."—ἐφρένον, λέγων. "He admonished by saying."—ἐι τις ολεταί. Observe the employment of the indicative here in the oratio obliqua, the object being brought before the mind not as a mere conception, but as something certain, in order to render the narrative more animated—διαγνώσεσθαι. "He will distinguish between."—εἰ πράττειν. "That he is acting rightly."

CHAPTER II.

§ 1.
Ἄς ποοζεφέρετο. "How he assailed."—καὶ μέγα φρονοῦσιν ἐπὶ σοφία. "And who prided themselves greatly upon their wisdom." Observe that the verb φρονεῖν with ἐπὶ and a dative is usually accompanied by the adverb μέγα.—Εὐθυόδημον. Compare i., 2, 29. A different person of this name is mentioned in iv., 3, 2.—γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον. "Had collected numerous extracts." Kühner
NOTES TO BOOK IV.—CHAPTER II. 326

correctly maintains, that γράμματα has here the force of στραγγάμματα, or συγγεγραμμένα, "praecepta et exempla et scriptoribus excerpta."—συνειλεγμένον. Perfect passive participle in a middle sense, or, rather, the perfect middle participle at once.—ἐπὶ σοφία. "In wisdom." Literally, "for wisdom."—διὰ νέοτητα. Compare iii., 6, 1.—καθήζοντα εἰς ἡμιοποιεῖν τι, κ. τ. λ. "Accustomed to go into the shop of a bridle maker, one of those near the market-place, and sit down therein." The preposition εἰς has here the force of a verb of motion.

§ 2.

diὰ συνουσίαν τινός τῶν σοφῶν. "In consequence of intimacy with any one of the Sophists."—πρὸς ἐκείνον ἀποθλέπειν. "Looked to him." The English idiom is the same: "to look to a person," i. e., to expect some help or assistance from him.—στονδαίον ἀνδρός. "Of an able minister."—κινεῖν. "To arouse," i. e., to induce him to speak. Compare Kühner, "ad loquendum excitare," and also Heindorf and Stallbaum, ad Plat., Lysid., p. 223, A. Valckenaeer, less correctly, renders it by the Latin pungere, i. e., to nettle or provoke.—τὰς μὲν ὀλίγον ὀξιὰς τέχνας, κ. τ. λ. "That men could not become able even in arts of little importance without fit instructors." The expression στονδαίος τὴν τέχνην is the same as δεινός τὴν τέχνην.—ἀπὸ ταυτομάτων. "Spontaneously." The same, in fact, as φόσει.

§ 3.

φυλαττόμενον, μη δόξη, κ. τ. λ. "Anxious lest he appear to admire Socrates for wisdom."—Εὐθύδημος οὔτος. "This Euthydemus here." Proper names, when accompanied by the demonstratives οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος, δέ, and αὐτός, are without the article. (Kühner, § 453, Jelf.)—ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενόμενος. "On having reached the proper age," i. e., the age of manhood. The term ἡλικία properly denotes the age of man from his eighteenth year to his fiftieth.—τῆς πόλεως λόγον περί τινος προτιθέσθης. "The state giving him permission to speak about any matter." The expression λόγον προτιθέναι is in Latin copiam dicendi facere. (D'Orville, ad Charit., p. 111.) After the Athenian people had been convened in assembly, a herald gave liberty to address the people upon a proposed subject by the usual formula τὸς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται; ἐξ ὧν ἐπιτηδεύει. "From the conduct he now pursues." Attraction for ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδεύει.—καλὸν προωίμοιν τῶν δημηγορίων παρεκκενάσασθαι, κ. τ. λ. "To have concocted an admirable preamble for his public orations, from an anxiety not to appear to learn any thing from any one." Observe that του is Attic for τινός.—προωίμωνεται. "He will form the exordium."
4. *Σκούσαν. "Although I heard."—οὐδ' ἐπεμελήθην, κ. τ. λ. "No one was ever so icitious of any one of those who were acquainted with these matters becoming an instructor unto me."—τάναντια. Supply ἐποιεῖσα.—διασπετέλεκα φέυγων. "I have always avoided." Compare i., 2, 28; iii., 1, 4.—τὸ δόζαν. "The very appearance of it."—ἀν ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου ἐπὶ μοι. "May occur to me spontaneously."

5. ἀρμόσεις δ' ἀν, κ. τ. λ. "It might suit, also, those to form their preamble in this way, who wish to obtain a medical appointment from the state." Compare Kühner: "publici medici munus accipere." Weiske supposes that qualified physicians were appointed by the people in assembly. These were of two classes: the free, who attended to the free; and the slaves, who cured the slaves. They received their salary from the public treasury.—ἐπιτήδειον. "Advantageous." Ernesti thinks ἐπιτήδειον and εὐτεύνεον spurious, since they are not noticed in the translation of Bessario.—τὸν ἱατρῷν. "Of the physicians of the day." Observe the force of the article.—τὸ δόζαν μεμαθηκέναι. "The very appearing to have learned."—ἐν ύμῖν ἀποκινούντειν. "By trying experiments upon you." Literally, "among you," i. e., in your case. Schneider aptly compares Pliny, H. N., xxix., 1, "Discut (medici) periculis nostris, et experimenta vel mortes agunt."—τὸ προομίῳ. "At this form of preamble."

6. φανερὸς ὢν. Compare i., 2, 16.—σφροσύνης δόζαν περιβάλλεσθαι. "To invest himself with a reputation for modesty." Compare Schneider: "Tacendo assumere et consequi laudem modestia." Kühner is guilty of a singular oversight here. "Since Euthydemus," he remarks, "is said, in § 3, to have departed, what is now related must be supposed to have happened on a subsequent occasion." Not so, however, by any means. In § 3, Euthydemus is said to have been in the act of departing when Socrates commenced his attack, and he is now represented as having been induced to remain by what he heard fall from the lips of the philosopher.—θαυμάστων γάρ, κ. τ. λ. "It is strange, then, why in the world they who wish," &c. The particle γάρ here serves to draw a conclusion. Socrates forms an inference from the previous conduct of Euthydemus; and hence, for a literal translation of γάρ ("for"), we may supply the ellipsis as follows, with Herbst: οὐκ ὄρθως ποιεῖς φιλαπτόμενον αὐτός τι φθέγγεσθαι.—ἄλλο τι ἱκανοὶ. Compare i., 2, 46.—ὡς συνεχέστατα. "As
cossantly as possible." Ernesti and Weiske explain this by "statim a consilio capto, nullo intervallo facto."—καθ' ἑαυτοὺς. "By themselves," i. e., unassisted.—παρὰ τοῖς ἄριστοις, κ. τ. λ. "With those who seem to be most skilled." Here ἄριστοις is attracted into the case of τοῖς.—ἐνεκα τοῦ μιθέων, κ. τ. λ. "So as not to do any thing without their judgment."—ὡς οὐκ ἄν ἄλλως, κ. τ. λ. "Thinking that they could not otherwise become worthy of notice." Equivalent to νομίζοντες ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ἄλλως ἄξιόλογοι γένοιτο. Compare ii., 2, 13.—ἀυτόματοι. "By uninstructed talent." Literally, "of themselves."

§ 7.
καὶ τοι γε τοσοῦτο, κ. τ. λ. "And yet, these latter affairs are so much more difficult in execution than the others, by how much, although more busy themselves about them, they, who accomplish them, are fewer in number," i. e., in proportion to the comparative unworness of those who succeed.

§ 8.
ἀκούοντος Εὐθυδήμου. "While Euthydemus heard him without attention," i. e., merely heard, but did not seem to pay any attention to him. To this is opposed προθυμότερον ἀκούοντα which presently follows.—προθυμότερος λόγους ἔλεγε. "Used to make such remarks as these." Observe the force of the imperfect. Kühner's observation, referred to under § 6, applies more correctly here, since the allusion now is to several conversations subsequent to the main one so fully detailed.—ἐτοιμότερον ύπομένοντα. "Remaining more readily,"—εἰπέ μοι, ὧ Εὐθύδημε, τῷ ὄντι, κ. τ. λ. "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you really, as I hear, collected," &c. The common text has συνήξας, for which we have given συνήξας with Zeune, Kühner, and others, as suggested by Valckenaer.—τῶν λεγομένων σοφῶν γεγονέναι. Attraction. Compare i., 2, 3.—νὴ τὸν Δλα. Compare i., 2, 9

§ 9.
νὴ τὴν Ἡραν. Compare i., 5, 5.—ἄγαμαί γε σοῦ. "I do admire you, indeed." The verb ἄγαμαι is construed with an accusative of the person, and a genitive of the thing which is the cause of the wonder; or with a genitive of the person and a genitive of a participle, as ἄγαμαι σε τῆς ἄνδρειας, ἄγαμαι σοῦ λέγοντος. The place of the participle, however, is often supplied, as in the present instance, by an explanatory clause, with δτε, διτι, δπως, &c. Compare Kühner, § 495, Obs. Jelſ.—προεῖλον μὰ ἤλον. Compare ii., 1, 2
—δρθως μετεναι την σοφιαν. "To be seeking after wisdom in the right way."

§ 10.

τί δὲ δή; "But in what particular art, pray?"—διεσώπησεν. Compare iii., 6, 4.—νάρα μὴ λατρός; "Do you wish, then, to become a physician?" Supply βνύλει γενέσθαι. The difference between ἄρα ὀν and ἄρα μὴ is this, that ἄρ' ὀν, nonne, requires an affirmative answer, but ἄρα μὴ, non, a negative, as ἄρα does alone; but still μὴ imparts some degree of doubt to the question, and that for the purpose sometimes of irony. Compare Kühner, § 873, Jelf.—συγγράμματα. "Writings."—γνωμονικών γὰρ ἄνθρως, κ. τ. λ. "Since there is need of a well-informed person for this also," i. e., a person of judgment, whose mind has been matured by much reading and reflection. Observe that τοῦτο is here the accusative of the object.—Θεόλωρος. Theodorus was a philosopher and native of Cyrene, and a celebrated geometrician. According to Maximus Tyrius (Diss., 22), he was the preceptor of Socrates. Compare iv., 7, 3.—ἄστρολόγος. "An astronomer." This was the original meaning of the word. Subsequently it was used to signify an astrologer. So ἄστρολογία, "astronomy," though ἄστρωνομία was also in use. The case is similar in Latin with astrologia and astronomia.—βασιλείας. "A Rhapsodist." The Rhapsodists were persons who recited, in public, portions of epic poems, especially those of Homer. They at first were held in great esteem; but in the time of Socrates the order had fallen into disrepute.—τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ ἁρμοδιότατα. "Know his verses accurately."—αὐτοὺς δὲ πάν ἡλιθίων ὄντας. The same contempt for the Rhapsodists was entertained by Plato, as appears from the dialogue entitled Ion, § 1, seqq. Compare Stallbaum, ad loc.

§ 11.

οὐ δήπον ἐφίεσαι. "You surely do not desire." Observe that οὐ δήπον are here employed ironically. These particles are generally used in Attic writers to express a question to which a denial is confidently expected. (Compare ii., 3, 1.) Socrates, however, in putting the question, knew well that it would be answered in the affirmative.—ἐστὶ γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὐτην. "For this is the art of kings." Supply ἡ τέχνη from what precedes.—ἄγαθον ταῦτα. "Good at these things." Adjectives expressing quality, such as ἄγαθος, καλὸς, κακός, σοφὸς, &c., are construed with an accusative of the end or purpose. (Kühner, § 579. 2, Jelf.)—καὶ μία. Compare iii. 3 ο.—καὶ οὐχ όιν τε γε. "And it is not possible, indeed." Valck.
енaei would reject the particle γέ Consult, however, Schaefer. Apparat. Demosth., i., p. 543.

§ 12.
οὗ δὴ τοῦτο κατείργασαι; “Have you, indeed, accomplished this?” 1. e., have you, indeed, acquired this virtue? The allusion is to justice (δικαιοσύνη).—ουδενὸς ἄν ἦττον φανήναι δίκαιος. “That I will appear as just as any other.” More literally, “less just than no one.”—τῶν δικαίων ἐργα. “Any works of the just.”—ἄρ’ οὖν. Compare ii., 7, 5.—ἐχουσιν ἐπιδείξαι. Compare ii., 6, 28.—μή οὖν οὗ δύναμαι. Euthydemus, surprised at the question of Socrates, answers it by another question: “What! am I then unable to explain the works of justice!” When οὑ stands in a sentence introduced by μή, it belongs to some single word, not to the whole sentence. The particle μή, moreover, is distinguished from ὁρᾷ μή only in being less pointed and emphatic.—ἐγώγε τὰ τῆς ἀδικίας. Supply δύναμαι ἐξηγήσασθαι.

§ 13.
βούλει οὖν γράψωμεν. Compare ii., 1, 1. Here Δ stands for δικαιοσύνη, and Λ for ἄδικα.—πρὸς τὸ Δ τεθῶμεν. “We add to Delta,” i. e., we place under it.—εἶ τί σοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, προσδείν τοῦτον, κ. τ. λ. “If you think, said he, that you have any need of these (letters) besides,” i. e., in addition to the means you already possess for explaining these matters. In this discussion, Socrates does not so much wish to strip Euthydemus of his reputation for justice, as of his own self-conceit. When Euthydemus at one moment pronounces the same thing to be just, at another unjust, he clearly shows his ignorance of what he professed to know, and, therefore, that he had not any true or real claim to wisdom.

§ 14.
οὐκοῦν ἐστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις τὸ ψευδεσθαι; “Does falsehood, then, exist among men?” The article, which is wanting in all the MSS and older editions, has been added by Ernesti.—ποτέρωσε. “In which of the two classes.” Literally, “to which of the two sides.”—πρὸς τὴν ἄδικιαν. “Under injustice.”—πρὸς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, κ. τ. λ. “And shall no one of these, in our opinion, belong to justice.” Literally, “lie in addition to justice,” i. e., be placed under it.—ὁδὲν γὰρ ἄν εἶη, ἐφη. “(No), truly, replied he, for that would be intolerable.” The particle γὰρ often occurs in answers, when it must be referred to something not expressed.
§ 15.

ἔξανεραποδίσηται. This verb is often used with respect to cities. Compare Ages., vii., 6. Conviv., iv., 36.—πρὸς τοὺς φίλους. "With reference to friends."—δεια πρὸς τὴν ἀδικία λῃσκαμεν, κ. τ. λ. "Whatever things we have placed under the head of injustice, must we place all (of these), likewise, under the head of justice!" Observe that πρὸς τὴν ἀδικία λῃσκαμεν is an instance of what grammarians term the pregnant construction, for πρὸς τὴν ἀδικία λῃσκαμεν, ὡστε κεισθαι πρὸς αὐτῇ. Prepositions with the dative are sometimes joined to verbs of motion, whither, and with the accusative to verbs of rest. This is called the pregnant construction. In the former case, the speaker regards the state of rest following on the complete motion; in the latter, the motion which precedes and is implied in the state of rest; so that the two parts, which in other languages require two verbs to express them, are in Greek signified by one. Compare Kühner, § 645, Jelf.—ἐθηκαμεν. This form is rare, for the Attic usually write ἔθεμεν. The aorist in ἐὰν occurs in good authors almost exclusively in the singular and third person plural. In the rest of the persons the second aorist is more used, which, again, hardly ever occurs in the singular. Compare Matthiae, § 210, 211.

§ 16.

Βοσλει οὖν, ἡφη, κ. τ. λ. "Do you wish, then, said he, that, having placed these things thus, we again proceed to define, namely, that it is just," &c.—ἀλλὰ δειν πρὸς γε τοῦτον, κ. τ. λ. "But that, with reference to the latter, a general must act without the smallest guile." The subject here is στρατηγῶν, which is to be supplied from the preceding section.

§ 17.

ἄθυμως ἔχειν. "Disheartened." Compare ii., 6, 18.—ψευσάμενος φήσῃ. Compare ii., 6, 33.—πανέκ τὰς ἄθυμιας τοῦ στρατηγάτας "Shall cause the despondent feelings of his army to cease." Sto bæus has, with one MS., τὴν ἀθυμίας τοῦ στρατηγάτας.—ποτέρως θῇ σομικεῖον; "Under which head are we to place this act of deceit?"—πρὸς τὴν ἀκαίριον. "That we must assign it to justice." Supply θετέον εἶναι ἡμῖν.—δεδομένων φαρμακείας, κ. τ. λ. "Requiring medicine, and yet not liking a particular drug."—ὡς σίτιον τὸ φάρμακον δὴ. "Shall give him the drug in question as if it were an article of food." Commentators compare with this the fine lines in Lucretius, i., 935, seqq. : "Sed veluti pueris chœinthia tecta medentes," &c.—κοι. "Under which head."—ἐλε τὸ αὐτὸ. "Under the same"
NOTES TO BOOK IV.—CHAPTER II.

μὴ διαχρῆσθαι ἑαυτόν. "Lest he destroy himself." The verb διαχρῆσθαι is used in this sense by a euphemism, and governs an accusative.—κλεψῃ ἥ ἀρταση. Compare iii., 6, 11.

§ 18.

λέγεις, ἢφη, σύ, κ. τ. λ. "Do you mean, saic. he, that not even toward our friends ought we on all occasions to act without gui e?"—μετατίθημαι. "I retract."—ἡ μὴ ὀρθῶς τιθέναι. "Than to lay down a wrong position."

§ 19.

τῶν δὲ δῆ, κ. τ. λ. In this and the following section, Socrates does not express his own sentiments, for what in those passages he asserts is opposed to his own doctrines as stated elsewhere (e. g., iii., 4, 4, seqq.; iv., 6, 6), respecting the nature of justice and other virtues. He here assumes the character of a Sophist in order more fully to convict Euthydemus of frivolity and self-conceit; for he who knowingly does injury to a friend, if we look to the point of knowledge, is more just, has a greater knowledge of justice, than he who does wrong unwittingly; but if we look to the act of injury, he is more unjust than the other. But he alone is to be called just, who, knowing what is just, also executes it, not he who only has the knowledge without the execution. And so he who designedly, and of set purpose, writes ungrammatically, if we consider the point of knowledge merely, is a better grammarian than he who writes or reads ungrammatically without knowing that he does so, but not so if we regard the act alone. (Kühner, ad loc. Wheeler, ad loc.)

ἐπὶ βλάδη. "To injure them." The preposition ἐπὶ, with a dative, sometimes expresses the object or aim of an action. So ὅν ἐπὶ κακῷ, in Thucydides, v., 45, "not with any view to injury." Compare Kühner, § 634, Jelf:—ὁ ἐκών, ἥ ὁ ἀκών. "He who commits the wrong intentionally, or he who does it unwittingly."—πιστεύω ὅτι ἁπατηθήσομαι. "Put confidence in the answers which I give." Attraction for ᾧ—εἰρήσω μοι. "Let it be said by me," i. e., let me here admit.

§ 20.

NOTES TO BOOK IV.—CHAPTER II.

πως γὰρ οὖ. Affirmatively: "(Yes), for how could it be otherwise?" (Matthiae, § 610, 6.)—τὰ δίκαια δὲ τὸτερον. For the situation of πῶτερον, compare note on ii., 7, 8; iii., 9, 1.—φαίνομαι. "I appear to say so." Supply τοῦτο λέγων. Observe that φαίνομαι is opposed to the following δοκῶ.—δοκῶ δὲ μοι καὶ τοῦτα, κ. τ. λ. "But I think I say so without knowing why."

§ 21.

τι δὲ δή; "What then, pray?"—φράζων. "When describing." With regard to φράζων . . . φράζῃ, observe, that by a peculiar Greek idiom, there is attached to the verb of the sentence a participle of the same root and of similar meaning. This is exactly analogous to the constructions μᾶχην μάχεσθαι, &c. Compare Kühner, § 705, 3, Jelf.—λογισμὸν ἀποφαινόμενον τὸν αὐτὸν. "When stating the result of the same calculation," i. e., when rendering the same account.—δήλος νη Δι' εἶναι. Supply δοκεῖ; and on the construction of the whole clause, compare iii., 5, 24.

§ 22.

ἀνδραποδώδεις. Compare i., 1, 16.—ἀρ' οὖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ χαλκεύειν, κ. τ. λ. "Pray, then, do they obtain this name on account of their ignorance of working at smith's work?"—τοῦ τεκταίνεσθαι. "Of carpentry."—τοῦ σκυτεύειν. "Of shoe making."—οὐδὲ δι' ἐν τούτων. Since the former interrogation has been denied (οὐδὲ διὰ τυχην), Kühner supposes Euthydemus somewhat irritated at the captious interrogatories of Socrates, and that he answers here pettishly.—ἀλλὰ καὶ τούναντίον. That is, διὰ τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων σοφίαν τοῦ ὅνωματος τοῦτον τυχάνουσιν.

§ 23.

φεύγειν, ὅπως μὴ, κ. τ. λ. "To avoid being low-minded." Literally, "slavish," i. e., in spirit.—πάνυ ὑμὴν πιθοσφείν πιθοσφιᾶν. "I altogether thought that I was seeking out a philosophic system," i. e., pursuing a line of study. Compare the explanation of Kühner: "Sane philosophie est, diligenter meditando aliquot repereire." It is used by Isocrates in the signification of "to study," "to investigate by study." The proper meaning of the verb is, "to love knowledge," "to seek to become wise," "to seek after knowledge for its own sake."—δι' ἥς ἄν, κ. τ. λ. Construe ἄν with παιδεύθηναι, and consult Kühner, § 429, Jelf.—παιδεύθηναι τὰ τροχῆκοντα. Verbs which have two accusatives in the active, retain one of these cases in the passive—καλοκαγαθίας δρεγομένη. Compare i., 2, 15.—πῶς οἴει με
κ. Τ. ι. "How much do you think I am dejected," i. e., can you imagine the despair I am in.—διὰ μὲν τὸ προπετονημένα, κ. Τ. ι. "After all my previous labor, not even able to answer that which is asked me concerning the things which I ought most of all to know." Literally, "on account of the things previously labored upon." Observe in ὑπέρ ὧν the attraction for ἀ, and also that περὶ is more usual in this construction.

§ 24.

Δελφοὺς. Delphi was situate on the southern side of Mount Parnassus, in Phocis, and was famed for its oracle of Apollo. The more ancient name was Pytho.—ἠδή πώτερ "Ever as yet."—κατέμαθες οὖν πρὸς τῷ ναῷ, κ. Τ. ι. "Did you observe, then, that sentence, ΚΝΩ ᾿ΗΥΣΕΙΡ, written somewhere upon the temple (wall)?" Observe here the force of the article τό, equivalent, as Sturz remarks, to dictum illud. This is said to have been the saying of Chilo. Others, however, ascribe it to Thales. Socrates often recommended it to his followers, for which he is ridiculed by Aristophanes. Compare Süvern, ad Aristoph., Nub., p. 6.—οἶδέν σοι τοῦ γράμματος ἐμέλησεν. The impersonal μελεί, curae est, is construed with a dative of the person and a genitive of the thing. (Kleiner, § 496, Jelf.)—σαυτὸν ἑπισκοπεῖν, ὅτις εἶν. Thus sometimes in Latin, as in Cicero, "Nosti Marcellum, quam tardus sit."—τούτῳ γε. "This, at least," i. e., my own self.—σχολὴ γὰρ ὃν ἄλλο τι ἴδεις "For I could scarcely have known any thing else."

§ 25.

ἐπερ οἱ τοὺς ἱπποὺς . . . ὡς ἔχει. These words form a parenthesis.—γιγνώσκειν. "That they know (the animal)."—πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἱπποῦ χρείαν. "As regards the proper use of the steed," i. e., the proper services required of him.—πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν "With reference to human uses."

§ 26.

§ 27. 

ντ ὅλε μη εἰδότες. Supply ἵναντοις, or τὴν ἵναντων δόναιν—πρὸς τε τοῖς ἀλλοίς, κ. τ. λ. "Are similarly affected as regards both the rest of men," &c. Inasmuch as they do not know themselves, they are equally ignorant of other men, and of all human affairs.—οὕτω οἷς χρῶνται. "Nor those with whom they have dealings."—τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἀποτυχάκωναι, κ. τ. λ. "They both fail of obtaining the things that are good, and fall into those that are evil."

§ 28. 

ἐπιτυχάκωντες ὧν πράττοντων. "Succeeding in the things which they do." Observe that ὧν is by attraction for ἅ.—καὶ οἱ τε ὁμοίως τοῦτοις, κ. τ. λ. "And they who are like to them gladly make use of their assistance," i. e., men of similar prudence; men who resemble them in character and conduct.—ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν βουλεύονται "To counsel for them."—καὶ προστασθαί τε ἵνα τῶν τοῦτων. "Lest to place these before themselves." We have here, as Kühner remarks, a species of anacoluthon. The more regular form of expression would have been, καὶ προστασθαί τε βουλονται ἵνα τῶν τοῦτων καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας . . . ἔχοναι.

§ 29. 

κακῶς δὲ οἰρούμενοι. "And making an unfortunate choice," i. e., in consequence of not knowing their own abilities. Weiske takes it passively: "Infeliciter ad aliquod negotium vel munus delecti."—ζημιοῦντας τε καὶ κολάζονται. "Are both fined and punished." Compare Kühner: "Muletantur et castigantur."—ὑδροβοῖται. "Incur disrepute."—τῶν πόλεων δτα. In order to give greater force to the opposition, the genitive is thus placed before the conjunction. So sometimes in Latin, as in Cicero, Divin., i., 40: "Deus ut haberetur," &c.

§ 30. 

ὡς πάνυ μοι δοκοῦν. Here δοκοῦν is an accusative after ἵσθι, equivalent to ἵσθι δοκεῖν μοι. In place of this construction the genitive absolute is more frequently employed. The common text has δοκεῖν. —περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέων. Compare ii., 3, 10.—πρὸς σὲ ἀποσχέπω, κ. τ. λ. "I look to you (for aid), if haply you might feel inclined to explain it unto me." The optative with εἰ is used with respect to present actions, when the doubtfulness of the result is to be strongly marked; and sometimes, as in the present instance, ὧν is added, for the purpose of making that doubtfulness still stronger Compare Matthia, § 526
31. "You fully know, I suppose."—ει γαρ κυδε' ταυτα ολδα, κ. τ. λ. "For if I did not even know these, I would be more worthless even than a slave." Literally, "than slaves." The particle ει is used with the indicative, and, in the apodosis, the optative with αυ, when the condition contains a determinately expressed case, and the apodosis refers to a circumstance which is merely possible or probable. (Matthiae, § 524, Obs. 2, 1.)—αυτο το υγιαινειν. "The very circumstance of being in health."—επειτα τα αιτια έκαστέρου αυτων, κ. τ. λ. "In the next place, as regards the causes of each of them, namely, both drink and food, (I regard) those which conduce to health as blessings," &c. Supply νομίζω from the previous clause, and observe that ποτα and βρωτα are more literally "drinkables" and "eatables."

32. και το υγιαινειν και το νοσείν. "Both health and sickness." Taken substantively.—πότε δ' αυ, επη, κ. τ. λ. The inquiry of Euthydemus.—στρατείας τε αισχράς, κ. τ. λ. "Some having, by reason of strong health, taken part either in a disgraceful expedition by land, or some injurious movement by sea," &c.—οι δε δι' άσθενειαν άπολειψθεντες, σωθώσαν. "While others, having been left behind on account of feeble health, may have been saved." Some prefer, rendering άπολειψθεντες here more freely, "having missed (the expedition, or movement by sea)."—μάλλον άγαθα ή κακά. "Any more blessings than evils."—ούδεν, μα δία, ϕαινεται, κ. τ. λ. "Not any more, indeed, it is evident, according to this mode of arguing, at least."

33. άλλη ή γε τοι σοφία. "But wisdom, at least, indeed."—τι δαί: τόν Δαίδαλον, κ. τ. λ. This passage is remarkable for its Socratic irony. Below, iv., 5, 6, where the philosopher utters his real sentiments, he calls σοφίαν, i. e., intelligence and wisdom, the summum bonum; and above, iii., 9, 5, he clearly states all virtue to be σοφία.—τόν Δαίδαλον. "The celebrated Dædalus." The article here is emphatic.—δει ληφθείς υπ' Μίνω, κ. τ. λ. "How that, having been seized by Minos, on account of his wisdom, he was compelled to be a slave to that prince." Dædalus, according to the legend, was an Athenian, but having killed, through envy, his sister's son Perdix, he fled to Crete, where his skill obtained for him the friendship and protection of Minos. This Socrates ironically calls ληφθείς.
υπὸ Μίνω, κ. τ. λ.—μετὰ τοῦ νιῶ. An allusion to the fabled flight of Δαέδαλος, along with his son Icarus, from the island of Crete, after the affair of Πασιφαέ.—τὸν τε παίδα ἅπωλεσε. In the Icarian Sea, as it was afterward called.—εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους. Δαέδαλος fled to Sicily after the loss of his son, where he was protected by Κοκάλος, king of the Σικυώνιοι, and where he executed for the monarch many great works of art. This Socrates ironically calls a second enslaving.—τὰ δὲ Παλαμίδου, κ. τ. λ. Palamedes exposed the pretended madness of Οὐλίσσες, and thus incurred his hatred. Ulysses accused him of treason, and succeeded by his artifices in having him stoned to death. Herbst aptly compares Philostratus (Heroic., p. 707): Παλαμίδου δὲ οὐδέν ἡ σοφία ὤνησε τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἀποδινεῖν διαλθέντα. —ὑμνοῦσιν. "Celebrate in song."—Ως. "How that?"—ἀναρπάστησαν πρὸς βασιλέα γεγονέναι. "To have been carried off to the great king." The King of Persia is meant, and the reference being a well-known one, the article is, as usual, omitted.

§ 34.
κινδυνεύειν. "Appears." Compare ii., 3, 17; iii., 13, 3.—ἐγέ μή τις αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ. "(Yes), if at least one do not seek to compose it, said he, O Εὐθυδέμος, of questionable goods," i. e., if he do not consider any questionable good as one of its ingredients.—τέ δ’ ἄν, ἔφη, κ. τ. λ. "But what one, said he, of the things tending to happiness, could be questionable in its nature?" i. e., could be a questionable good.—ἐγέ μή προσθήσομεν αὐτῷ. "Unless, indeed, we shall attach to it (as its elements)."

§ 35, 36.
νή Δι’, ἔφη, προσθήσομεν ἤρα. "Ay, indeed, said Socrates, we will then be adding those things."—πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπά. Compare i., 2, 24.—μείζοναν ἔργοις ἐπιχειροῦντος. "Undertaking works too great for them."—διαθουπτόμενοι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμουόμενοι. "Being ener-vated and plotted against."—Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, εἰγὲ μηδὲ, κ. τ. λ. "Why in very truth, replied Euthydemos, if I do not speak rightly even in praising happiness, I confess that I do not even know what I ought to pray for from the gods." Literally, "with reference to the gods." Compare i., 2, 10.—αἰτί ξακεψαί. "You have never even examined."—τι ἐστι. "What kind of a thing it is." Compare i., 2, 13.—πάντι ἐπὶ θησον. "Assuredly, if I mistake not, (I know this)."

§ 37.
eιδέναι. "For one to know." Supply τινά.—μή εἰδότα δήμον. "If he know not the people themselves." Literally, "the demus."
Among the Greek democratical states, especially at Athens, the term δῆμος was used to indicate the commons, 'he people, the privileged order of citizens, &c.—πολίους. "What sort of persons."—
eis à δει τελείν. 'To expend on those things on which they ought (to expend their means)," i. e., on the necessaries of life. Sauppe understands this differently. He refers τελείν to those citizens who, being enrolled in a particular class, pay the public taxes assessed upon that class: now, since these are said τελείν εἰς τάξιν τινά, he takes the present passage to mean the same as if it were written τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας τελείν εἰς τάξιν εἰς à δεῖ. We have adopted the same mode of resolving the passage, but with what we conceive to be a far more natural explanation.

§ 38.

καὶ περιποιοῦνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν. "They even make savings from them."—καὶ νῦν Δλ', ἕφη, κ. τ. λ. We have adopted in this sentence the punctuation of Weiske. The passage stood thus in the old editions: Καὶ νῦν Δλ', ἕφη Εὐθύδημος: ὡρθῶς γὰρ μὲ ἀναμμυνήσκεις οἶδα γάρ, κ. τ. λ. The second γάρ, in our reading, explains the parenthesis. The more natural arrangement, as Kühner remarks, would have been as follows: Καὶ νῦν Δλ', ἕφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οἶδα (ὁρθῶς γὰρ μὲ ἀναμμυνήσκεις) καὶ τυράννους, κ. τ. λ.—οἱ ἀπορώτατοι. "They who are completely destitute."

§ 39

tοὺς μὲν τυράννους εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἔσωσμεν. "We will have to class these tyrants among the demus."—ὁίκουμικόι. "Good managers."—ἀναγκάζει μὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν, κ. τ. λ. "My own stupidity, doubtless, forces me to concede even this." The position of δηλον ὅτι here is somewhat unusual. It would come in more naturally after ἀναγκάζει μὲ. Leunclavius considers it a mere expletive here, but this is going altogether too far.—κινδύνεως γὰρ ἀπλῶς, κ. τ. λ. "For I appear to know nothing at all." Literally, "simply nothing." Equivalent to the Latin "omnino nihil."

§ 40.

tῶν οὖτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους. "Of those who were reduced to this state by Socrates."—βλακωτέρους. "More foolish (than ever)." In relation to this form, compare notes on iii., 13, 4. —ὑπέλαβον. "Concluded."—ἄλλως εἰ μὴ. So in Latin, non aliter nisi, for non aliter quam si, in Cic., Ep. ad Fam., viii., 14; xii., 14; Liv., xliv., 11.—ἐνια δὲ καὶ έμμεῖτο, κ. τ. λ. "He imitated also, some
of his pursuits.’ Literally, ‘some of the things which he pursued.’ Observe the attraction in ὄν for ἀ.—διετάραττεν. ‘Confounded him.’—ἐξηγεῖτο. ‘Explained to him.’

CHAPTER III.

§ 1.

τὸ ἄλλο ὄνομα λεκτικοῦς, κ. τ. λ. ‘Socrates, then, was not urgent that those who associated with him should rapidly become able in speech, or in action, or of inventive skill.’ More literally, ‘did not hasten onward this circumstance, that those who associated with him should become,’ &c. How Socrates taught his pupils to be πράκτικοί will be related in chapter v.; how to be διαλεκτικοί in chapter vi.; and how to be μηχανικοί, in chapter vii.—σωφροσύνην. ‘A spirit of self-control.’—τούς ταύτα δυναμένους. ‘That those who were powerful in these qualities,’ i. e., in speaking, acting, &c.

§ 2.

περὶ θεοῦ σώφρονας. ‘Sound in their notions respecting the gods.’—ἄλλοι μὲν ὄνομαλτῷ, κ. τ. λ. ‘Others, then, who were present with him when conversing on this topic with other persons, related (his words unto me).’ Heindorf conjectured δηγοίντα, i. e., narrent; Herbst, διηγοίντα. We have followed the common text, and have given the explanation of Bornemann, as approved of by Kühner.

§ 3.

ἐδή ποτέ σοι ἐπιλθέν. ‘Did it ever hitherto occur to you.’ Compare iv., 2, 4.—κατεσκεύασα. ‘Have provided.’—καὶ δὲς. Compare i., 4, 2.—ἡμῖν παρέχουσιν. ‘Afford us.’—ὅ γε εἰ μὴ εἴχομεν. ‘And if we had not this, at least.’—ἐνεκά γε τῶν ἡμετέρων ὀφθαλμῶν. ‘As far, at least, as our eyes are concerned.’—ἄλλα μὴν καὶ. ‘But, moreover.’—κάλλιστον ἀναπαυτήριον. ‘A most excellent time for taking repose.’ According to the analogy of the language, ἀναπαυτήριον should properly signify ‘a place for taking repose.’ Some read ἀναπαυστήριον, with regard to which form, consult the remarks of Lobeck, ad Soph., Aj., 704, p. 321.

§ 4.

φωτεινὸς ὄν. ‘Being luminous,’ i. e., light-imparting.—τὰς τε ἑρας τῆς ἡμέρας. ‘Both the divisions of the day,’ i. e., ὁμορροῦν ὑπερηφανίαν. ἐξῆλθεν, ἐσπέραν, or ‘dawn, midday, afternoon, even
.ng.” In the time of Xenophon ὧρα did not signify an hour, or the twenty-fourth equal part of a day and night. It appears to have been first used in this latter sense by the astronomer Hipparchus, about 140 B.C. Compare. Ideler, Chronol., i., p. 239.—διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὴ εἶναι, ἀσαφεστέρα ἔστιν. “In consequence of its being gloomy, is less distinct.” Observe here the nominative with the infinitive by attraction, and consult Kühner, § 672, 2, Jell.—ὕσταρα ἄνεφηναν. “They cause the stars to shine forth.” Observe here the employment of the aorist to denote what is customary, or wont to happen. τὰς ὧρας τῆς νυκτὸς. The Greeks divided the night into three watches, the Romans into four.

§ 5.

ταῦταν ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναδιδόναι. “Their raising this for us from out of the earth.” With ἀναδιδόναι supply αὐτοῦς, i. e., τοὺς θεοὺς.—ῳρα. “Seasons.”—οἱ εὐφρανύμεθα. “By which we experience delight.” More literally, “by which we gladden ourselves.” Observe the force of the middle.—πᾶν, ἐφί, καὶ ταῦτα φιλάνθρωπα. “These things, also, said he, are indicative of a very strong love for man.” Observe that ταῦτα is here in the plural, because the reference is not to the preceding τό, but to the various blessings that are enumerated.

§ 6.

οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξιον, κ. τ. λ. “A thing of so much value as both to produce, and, in conjunction with the earth and the seasons, to bring to maturity,” &c.—συντρέφειν. “To help to nurture.”—πᾶσι τοῖς τρέφονσιν ἡμᾶς. “With all our nutriment.”—εὐκατεργαστέρα. “More easy of digestion.”—πρωνοητικόν. “Is a mark of divine foresight,” i. e., of a kind Providence.

§ 7.

τὸ πῦρ. “The element of fire.” Observe the article. It is omitted in one MS., whence Bornemann has very rashly inclosed it in brackets.—ἐπίκουρον μὲν ψύχονς. “An aid against cold.”—ςυνεργόν. “A co-worker.”—κατασκευάζονται. “Supply themselves with.” Observe the middle.—ὡς γὰρ συνελώτει εἰπεῖν. Compare iii., 8, 10.—ὑπερβαλλεῖ φιλανθρωπία. “Surpasses all the former in evincing love for man.”

§ 8.

τὸ δὲ καὶ ἄερα ἡμῖν, κ. τ. λ. “And, again, their having so abundantly diffused the air every where around us.” Literally, “for os”
This whole passage, down to ἄνέκφραστον inclusive, is preserved only in one MS., that of Meermann. It is suspected by most critics of being spurious. The following reasons have been advanced for this opinion. 1. The use of the adverb ὑφόνως, where we would expect ὑφόνον. 2. The suspicious form of the aorist διαχύσατ. 3. The affected form of the expression πρόμαχον ζωής, which does not suit the simple style of Xenophon. 4. The words ἀλλὰ καὶ πελάγη περάν but ill agree with the preceding sentences. 5. The form ἀλλαγόθι is met with in no other passage. In many MSS., moreover, there is an hiatus between τὸ δὲ καὶ ἄερα and τὸ δὲ τὸν ἥλιον, and it has been supposed that some scribe attempted to fill up the vacuum with the present passage.—πρόμαχον καὶ σύντροφον. “A defense and support.”—ἀλλὰ καὶ πελάγη περάν δὲ αὐτοῦ. “But that we even cross over seas by means of it,” i. e., by the action of the air on the canvas of the sails.—καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἄλλους, κ. τ. λ. “And that some men in one quarter and in one land, and other men in another quarter and in a different land, by sending to each other, procure for themselves what they require, how is not this beyond all calculation? It is unutterably so.”

ἐπειδὰν τράπηται. “Whenever he turns.” Observe the force of the middle. The allusion is to the apparent motion of the sun after the shortest day, or the winter solstice.—προσέρχεται. “Approaches toward us.”—ὅν καὶρὸς διελήλυθεν. “Whose season (for ripening) has gone by.”—μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος θερμαίνων. * “By imparting unto us more of his heat than is needful.”—καὶ δὴν αὖ πάλιν ἄπισθὲν γεννηται ἐνθα, κ. τ. λ. “And when, in the course of his departure, he may have come back again (to that quarter of the heavens) where,” &c. Supply ἐνταῦθα before ἐνθα. The order αὖ πάλιν is very rare, πάλιν αὖ, which occurs immediately after, is much more usual. Compare Schaefer, Melet. Crit., p. 39.—εἰ ἀπεισιν. “If he shall depart.” Observe the employment of the present ἀπεισιν, according to Attic usage, in a future sense.—καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀναστρέφοντα, κ. τ. λ. “And keeps revolving in that part of the heavens, by being in which he might benefit us most.”—παντάπασιν θοικεῖν. “Altogether resemble.”

§ 9.

εἰ ἐξαπίνης γίγνοιτο. “If either should come upon us suddenly.”—κατὰ μικρόν. “Gradually.”—ὡς τε λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς, κ. τ. λ. “That we escape our own observation while we are coming toward, and getting placed in, either most powerful extreme.” More freely, “that we are imperceptibly placed in either extreme.” Observe
the construction of εἰς with καθισταμένονς, the preposition to be rendered by a verb of motion.—εἰ άρα τί ετέτι, κ. τ. λ. “Whether the gods, perchance, have any other employment than,” &c. With ἔργον supply ἄλλο. The particle ἦ stands sometimes after an interrogative, τίς, τί, without ἄλλος. So in indirect questions we sometimes find τί instead of ἄλλο τί. Compare Kühne*, § 779, Obs. 1, Ι2f—τούτων. The benefits mentioned above.

§ 10.

οὖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτ’, κ. τ. λ. “(Let it occasion no embarrassment), for is not this also manifest, said Socrates.” Observe the elliptical employment of γὰρ.—ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκα. “For the sake of men.” The same sentiment is expressed by Cicero, N. D., ii., 62.—αλγῶν τε καὶ διών, κ. τ. λ. “Reaps so many advantages from goats and sheep, &c., as men do?”—ἐγοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, κ. τ. λ. “For to me, indeed, it appears (that they reap) more advantages (from these) than from the productions of the earth.” Zeune supplies ἦ after πλεῖω, but when a comparative is followed by a genitive, depending on some other word, this particle is often omitted. The genitive τῶν φυτῶν depends on ἀπολαύειν.—πρέφονται γονὶ καὶ χρηματίζονται, κ. τ. λ. “At least, however, they nourish and enrich themselves no less from these,” i.e., from animals.—πολὺ δὲ γενός ἀνθρώπων. “And a numerous race of men.” The allusion is to the Scythians, who led a nomadic life.—ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων. “Obtained from herds.”—τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ζώων. “The useful ones of animals.” When a substantive is joined with an adjective or pronoun, where both should be in the same case, the Greeks often, for greater emphasis, consider the substantive as the whole and the adjective as the part, and put the former in the genitive.—ὅτι ἄν βούλωνται. “For whatever purpose they may please.” The verb χρησθαι, which properly signifies “to employ as a means or instrument,” is construed with a dative of the person or thing employed, and an accusative of the use, purpose, or end

§ 11.

προσθείναι. “Their adding.” Here again the aorist has reference to what is habitual or customary.—αἰσθησίς. “Senses.”—τὸ δὲ καὶ λογισμὸν ἥμιν ἐμφύτευκα. “And their implanting, also, in us a faculty of reason.”—πέρι ὦν αἰσθανόμεθα, κ. τ. λ. “Both reasoning respecting sensible objects, and holding these reasonings in memory.” Observe that πέρι ὦν is for πέρι τῶν ὦν.—διπ ξκαστα σχμαφέρει. “In what way each is beneficial,” i.e., how far each may be beneficial.—ἐρμηνείαν. “Speech.”—δὲ ἦς πάντων τῶν ἁγαθῶν, κ.
r. 2. "Giving instruction, by means of which we both impart all blessings unto one another, and share these in common."—νόμοι τιθεμένα. Compare iv., 4, 19.—πολιτευόμεθα. "Enjoy constitutional government."—πολλήν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι. "To take, in their goodness, great care." Observe the force of the middle, literally, "to make for themselves," i. e., in their own spontaneous goodness Stronger, therefore, than the simple ἐπιμελεῖσθαι would have been.

§ 12.

ci ὑδύνατομεν, κ. τ. λ. "Since we are unable to foresee what things will be advantageous with regard to the future. The proposition ὑπέρ has here somewhat of the force of the Latin de, with the accessory idea of an intention to regulate or arrange. Hence the explanation which Matthiae here gives to ὑπέρ τῶν μελλόντων, name γίγνοιτα, "ad res futuras bene constituendas." Observe that ei has here, with the indicative, the force of lteί, and compare i., 5, 1. Schneider, Schütz, and Diendorf read γίγνοιτα, a mere conjecture of Reiske's.—τοῖς πυθανομένοις. "Unto those who inquire of them."—γίγνοιτο. Three Paris MSS. have γίγνοιτα, but the plural is right, because several distinct events are referred to. Compare Kühner, § 385, b., Jelf.—σοὶ δ', ἕφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, κ. τ. λ. Consult on this passage, page xxviii. of the Prolegomena.

§ 13.

ὅτι δὲ γε ἄληθῆ λέγω, κ. τ. λ. "And that I speak the truth (in saying that the gods assist us in uncertain circumstances), you also will discover," &c. From this passage it would appear that Socrates did not consider that the δαίμόνιον was given specially to himself alone, as a peculiar gift, but was common to him with other men. Compare i., 1, 19: Σωκράτης δὲ πώς μὲν ἡγεῖτο, κ. τ. λ., and Prolegomena, l. c.—τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν. Compare ii., 1, 19.—οὕτως ὑποδεικνύοντως. "Thus secretly manifest themselves unto us." Observe the force of ὑπό. The idea is, that we are not to look, in divination, for the very forms of the gods, but that they merely give us on those occasions some secret manifestations of their will."—οἱ τε γὰρ ἄλλοι, κ. τ. λ. "For both the other gods." Supply θεοί, which is omitted because αὐτοὶ ol θεοί went before Socrates, Plato, and Cicero, besides believing in one supreme God, supposed that there were several other inferior, but immortal gods, whom the great God employed in the administration of the universe—οὐδέν τούτων. The idea is, that they do not present themselves to our view in giving any of the good things which they bestow —.
καὶ ὁ τῶν διὸν κόσμον, κ. τ. λ. "And he who both disposes and maintains the whole universe," i. e., the universe as a whole. The reference is to the one great Being who reigns supreme over all things. The very name of the universe, κόσμος, denotes the order, harmony, and beauty that pervade it. A similar meaning is embraced by the Latin mundus. Compare Pliny, H. N., ii., 4: "Quem κόσμον Graeci nomine ornamenti appellavere, eum nos a perfecta absolutaque elegantia mundum."—ἐν ὧν πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι. Explanatory, in effect, of the term κόσμος.—καὶ ἂεὶ μὲν χρομένους, κ. τ. λ. "And who always exhibits (this universe) unto those who avail themselves (of its blessings), as uninfluenced by decay, and by disease, and by age, and obeying him," &c. We have adopted ἄγνήρατον, the correction of Stephens, and which has been followed by most subsequent editors. The common text has ἄγνήρατα, making the reference to be τὸ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, but this is inferior in every point of view, though adopted by Kühner.—οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα. k. τ. λ. "This being is (mentally) seen by his performance of the most stupendous works, but is unseen by our bodily eyes while administering the affairs of earth." The idea intended to be conveyed is simply this, that the Deity can only be seen in his works. We have given τάδε here what appears to be its most natural meaning. Kühner refers it to τὰ μέγιστα, but Xenophon would then have used ταῦτα.

§ 14.

ἄκριβως. "Steadfastly."—ἀναιδῶς. "Boldly." A metaphor taken from the staring gaze of effrontery.—τὴν δὲν ἄφαρεταί. "He deprives him of sight." The verb ἄφαρεταί and some others, signifying "to take away," are construed with two accusatives, one of the thing taken, and another of the person deprived. The latter is sometimes, as in the present instance, omitted. (Matthiae, § 418.) τοὺς ὑπηρετάς. "The ministers." A figurative form of expression for thunder, winds, &c. Ernesti remarks, that similarly in the Scriptures, thunder and tempests are called the ministers of God.—κεραυνὸς. Observe that κεραυνὸς and ἄνεμος are often found without the article, as being things familiar and well known. Compare Kühner, § 447, 448, Jelf.—οἷς ἄν ἐντύχῃ. "With whatsoever it may have come into contact," i. e., whatever it strikes.—προσένυμον "As they approach."—ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ. Compare i., 1, 6.—ἡ, εἴπερ. Thus in four MSS. The common text omits ἡ.—τὸν θείου μετέχει. "Partakes of the divine essence."—ἡ χρῆ κατανοοῦντα. Here the conclusive and connecting particle is elegantly omitted by asynde-
CHAPTER IV.—CHAPTER III.

The word μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἰδρῶν. "Not to despise invisible things."

-ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων. "From their results."

§ 15.

ὅτι μὲν εἶδε μικρόν, κ. τ. λ. "That I will not neglect the deities even in a slight degree." Verbs which express the notion of caring for, thinking much of, or their contraries, and which necessarily imply an antecedent notion of the cause, person, or thing whence the case arises, are construed with a genitive. (Kühner, § 496, Jelf.)—ικεῖνο δὲ ἀθετῶ. Many neuter verbs, which express an emotion, not having any direct object, are followed by an accusative of the thing which causes the emotion. Thus, in the following section, μὴ τοῦτο ἀδέημει. So, also, in Latin, "Id dolumus" (Cic., Brut., 1); "Id lacrymat virgo" (Ter., Eun., v., 1, 13).—οὐδὲ ἀν εἰς. Compare i., 6, 2; iv., 2, 22.—άδικας διόνυσον ἀμείβεσθαι. The verb ἀμείβεσθαι, in the signification of "to remunerate," is construed with an accusative of the person or thing remunerated, and with a dative of the means of remuneration. (Matthiae, § 411, 5.)

§ 16.

ὁράς γάρ. The verb ὁράω refers here to mental vision, and has, therefore, a force very like that of "to know."—νόμῳ πόλεως. "In accordance with the ritual of the state." Compare the explanation of Cicero, De Leg., ii., 16: "In lege est, ut de ritibus patriis colantur optimi: de quo cum consulent Athenienses Apollinem Pythium, quas potissimum religiones tenerent, oraculum editum est, eas, qua essent in more majorum."—κατὰ δύναμιν. "According to one's means."—λειτός θεός ἄφεσκεσθαι. For the construction of ἄφεσκεσθαι, consult Matthiae, § 398, 412, and Carmichael's Greek verbs, p. 41. Xenophor here follows the construction of Homer, Od., viii., 396.

§ 17, 18.

τῆς μὲν δυνάμεως· μηδὲν ὑφίσκεσθαι. "That we abate no portion of our means."—πανέμορφος ὅπως ἐστί. Compare i., 1, 2; iv., 1, 2.—μηδὲν ἐλείποντα τιμᾶν. "Failing in no respect to honor." Observe that ἐλείποντα is here construed with an infinitive. The more usual construction, however, of this verb is with a participle.—οὖ γὰρ παρ᾿ ἄλλων, κ. τ. λ. The order is, οὖ γὰρ ἀν τες σωφρονίσῃ, ἐπίζων (i. e., εἰ ἐπίζοι) μείζων παρ᾿ ἄλλων, κ. τ. λ.—οὖδ᾿ ἀν ἄλλως μᾶλλον. Supply τοφρονίσῃ.—καὶ αὐτὸς ποιῶν. "And by personally acting in this way."—παρεσκεύαζεν. "He rendered." This verb occurs again, 414, in this same sense of "to render, effect, make."
CHAPTER IV.

§ 1.

οὐκ ἀπεκρύπτετο. "He was not accustomed to conceal," π. 1. he never concealed.—ἴδια τε πᾶσι, κ. τ. λ. "By both conducting himself toward all, in his private capacity, in accordance with the law and usefully," &c. By ψελλήμεις is meant the being kind, and benevolent, and useful to his fellow-citizens. Schneider, in his first edition, thought this word either corrupt or misplaced.—ἀρχούσι τε The particle τε corresponds with καὶ in § 2, καὶ ὅτε, κ. τ. λ. The sentence should have strictly run thus: ἰδία τε . . . χρώμενος, καὶ κοινὴ ἀρχούσι τε . . . πειθόμενος . . . καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπιστά της γενόμενος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψας τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφίσασθαι. The construction, however, is purposely changed from the participle to the finite verb for the sake of greater emphasis. Compare ii., 1, 30.—ὅτε διάδηλος εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. "So that it was very evident that in comparison with the rest of men he was eminently obedient to discipline."

§ 2, 3.

ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις. Compare i., 1, 18.—ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς νόμοις, κ. τ. λ. "But in his adherence to the laws, he opposed such violence of impulse on the part of the populace as I think that no other individual could have withstood."—προεταττόν αὐτῷ τι. "Enjoined on him any order."—μὴ διαλέγεσθαι. Compare i., 2, 35.—προεταττόν. Observe the employment here of the aorist participle, whereas, in the previous clause, ἀπαγορεύοντων was employed. The distinction appears to be this, that the latter denotes a reiteration of the interdict, whereas the aorist participle implies a single command.—ἀγαγείν τινα ἐπὶ δανύτῳ. "To bring (unto them) a certain individual for the purpose of being put to death." The individual referred to was Leon, a native of Salamis, and citizen of Athens. He had gone to Salamis from Athens as a voluntary exile, to avoid being put to death by the thirty tyrants. Socrates, with four others, was ordered to bring him from Salamis; but he would not execute the command, which was, however, carried into effect by the remaining four. From the speech of Theramenes in Xenophon (Hist Gr., ii., 3, 39) we learn that Leon was a man of worth and respectability, and chargeable with no crime; and Andocides (De Myst., § 94) tells us that he was condemned without a trial.—διὰ τοῦ προεταττεσθαι. "Because the order was imposed"
καὶ ὅτε τὴν ὑπὸ Μελῆτον, κ.τ.λ. "And when he was defendant in the accusation brought by Meletus." Concerning the accusers of Socrates, consult Wiggers' Life of Socrates, p. 406 of this volume. The verb ἑφύγω is frequently employed as an Attic law-term, "to be accused, or prosecuted at law;" hence ὁ φυγόν, "the accused," "the defendant," opposed to ὁ διώκων, "the accuser," "the prosecutor." Hence, too, ἑφύγειν γραφήν or δίκην means "to be put on one's trial for something," the crime being usually added in the genitive, and the accuser being expressed by the same case with ὑπό.—πρὸς χάριν. "In order to gain their favor." There was a regular law at Athens, forbidding defendants having recourse to prayers, entreaties, or any other means for exciting the compassion of their judges. Compare Pollux, viii., 117. Hence the addition of the words παρὰ τοὺς νόμους after δείσδαι.—τῶν εἰσοδών. Supply πονείσδαι.—ἀλλὰ ῥαδίως ἄν ἀφεθείς. "But, although he would easily have been acquitted." Equivalent to δὲ ῥαδίως ἄν ἀφεθήν, εἰ, κ.τ.λ. Observe the employment of ἄν with the participle, and consult Mat- tis, § 598, b.—ἐμένον. "Abiding by."

§ 5.

'Ἰππίαν τὸν Ἡλείων. "Hippias the Elean." Hippias, a native of Elis, was one of the most celebrated Sophists of the age. His vanity and boastful arrogance are well described in two of the dialogues of Plato (the 'Ἰππίας μείζων and the 'Ἰππίας ἐλάττων, Hippias major and Hippias minor). It can not be denied, however, that he was a man of very extensive knowledge. To a certain extent, too, he had a practical skill in the ordinary arts of life; for he used to boast of wearing on his body nothing that he had not made with his own hands, such as his seal-ring, his cloak, and shoes.—διὰ χρόνου. "After an interval of time." Hippias, as the succeeding passages prove, had then arrived for the second time at Athens. His powers of oratory had caused him to be employed on various embassies, and in this occupation he had arrived at Athens.—παρεγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει λέγοντι. "Was by when Socrates remarked."—ὅς θαυ- μαστῶν εἰς τό. Construe τό with μὴ ἀπορεῖν, and compare also i., 6, 15. The optative indicates the opinion of Socrates.—σκυτέα διδάσ- ασολ τινα. "To have any person instructed as a shoemaker." The middle voice of διδάσκω may be employed two ways, as signifying either "to have a person instructed for one's self by another," or "to instruct a person one's self, for one's self." It may therefore be said either of a father who sends his son to a teacher for instruc-
n, or of a father who instructs his own son.—\( \delta \ldots \mu \nu \upsilon \pi o \rho e i n \)
"That he should not be at a loss."—\( \tau \omicron \upsilon \tau o \nu \tau \chi o i \). "He might ob-
tain this object"—\( \phi a \varsigma \delta \varepsilon \tau \iota \nu e s \), \( \kappa . \tau . \lambda \). "Some also say, that for
him who wishes to make both a horse and an ox fit for use, all places are full of those who will teach this." This sentence, though found
in all the MSS., and editions prior to that of Schütz, is condemned
as spurious by Ruhnken and Valckenaeer.—\( \delta i k a i o u s \). This epithet
is here purposely employed by Socrates, with reference to the dis-
cussion on which he is about entering, namely, justice, or \( \tau \omicron \delta i k a i o u s \),
and he plays upon the double meaning of the term, what is just be-
ing also suitable and fitting in its nature.

\( \delta \), 7.

\( \varepsilon \tau i \gamma \dot r o \sigma \nu \), \( \kappa . \tau . \lambda \). "(How is all this), for are you still uttering
those very same things, O Socrates," &c.—\( \delta \delta \varepsilon \gamma \tau o \tau o \omicron \delta e i n \delta t e r o n \).
"(I am), and what is stranger than this."—\( \delta i \delta \nu \tau o \ \pi o \lambda u m a \beta \nu s \ e i n a i \). Compare i., 6, 15.—\( \acute {u} \mu e l e i \). "Undoubtedly."* Compare i., 4, 7.—
\( \pi e r i \ \omicron \nu \nu \ \epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau a s a i \). "Regarding matters of which you have scien-
tific knowledge." For \( \pi e r i \tau \omicron \nu \nu \ \epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau a s a i \) —\( \xi o l o n \). Compare ii., 1
4.—\( \pi \omicron \sigma a \kappa a i \pi o \iota \a \Sigma \omega k r \acute {a} \tau o n \nu s \ \epsilon \sigma t i n \). "How many, and what sort of
letters, make up the name \( \Sigma \omicron c r a t e s \) ?" Literally, "belong to Soc-
rates."—\( \acute {a} \delta l l a \ \mu e n \ \pi o \rho \tau o \tau e r o n \), \( \kappa . \tau . \lambda \). "Do you try to mention one
class of letters at first, and another class now."—\( \hat {\eta} \ \pi e r i \ \acute {o} \rho \iota \beta h \mu o \nu \), \( \kappa . \tau . \lambda \). This is not opposed to the previous instance, but merely
another one of the same kind.—\( \epsilon i \ \tau \omicron \ \delta i c \ \tau e n t e \), \( \kappa . \tau . \lambda \). "Whether
twice five makes ten."—\( \omicron \delta p e r \ \sigma \nu \), \( \kappa a i \ \epsilon \gamma \acute {o} \nu \). The full form of expres-
sion would be, \( \omicron \delta p e r \ \sigma \nu \), \( \sigma \omicron \tau o \kappa a i \ \epsilon \gamma \acute {o} \nu \).—\( \pi \acute {a} n n \ \delta j m a i \ \nu \nu \ \epsilon \chi e i n \ \epsilon l \tau e n \). "I am fully convinced that I have it
now in my power to mention things," &c.

\( \delta \), 8.

\( \nu \hat {\eta} \ \tau \acute {n} \ \hat {\eta} \Sigma \rho a v \). Compare i., 5, 5.—\( \mu \epsilon g a \ \lambda \acute {e} g e i s \), \( \kappa . \tau . \lambda \). "You tell
of your having discovered an important advantage." Ironically.—
\( \pi a \upsilon o s n t a \ \delta i k h a \ \psi \acute {h} \pi \zeta \omicron \delta e n o i \). "Will cease giving contradictory
votes."—\( \kappa a i \ \acute {a} \nu t e d i k o \omicron \upsilon t e s \ k a i \ \sigma \tau a s i \acute {a} \zeta o n t e s \). "And to be parties in
suits at law, and to be distracted by factions."—\( \delta i a f e r \acute {o} a m e n a i \ \pi e r i \tau \omicron \ \delta i k a i o \nu \), \( \kappa a i \ \pi o \lambda \mu o \acute {o} s a i \). "To be at strife respecting their just
rights, and to go to war (for the same)."—\( \delta j k \ \omega i k \ \delta j m o \ \upsilon \ \omicron \ \acute {a} \pi o \lambda e i f \-
\beta \iota \epsilon \iota \nu \nu \sigma o u \). "Do not know how I could let you go." The verb \( \acute {a} \pi o-
\lambda e i p e s o s a i \) often signifies "to depart from," "part with," "leave," &c., and is construed with a genitive.
NOTES TO BOOK IV.—CHAPTER IV.

§ 9.
πρὶν γ’ ἄν αὐτός ἀποφήνη. "Until, at least, you yourself shall declare."—ἀρκεῖ γάρ, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελάς. "For it is quite enough that you decide others." Schneider supplies at the end of this sentence after οὕδενός the following, ἔμοι δὲ σὺ καταγελάσεις, ὦσπερ τῶν ἄλλων, i. e., but you shall not have an opportunity of laughing at me, as at the rest. On the usual mode of disputation adopted by Socrates, consult Prolegomena.—ὑπέχειν ὁγον. "To submit a statement."—γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι. "To declare your own opinion." Observe the force of the middle.

§ 10.
οὕδεν. "In no respect."—καὶ ποῖος δὴ σου, κ. τ. λ. "And what, pray, said Hippias, is this definition of yours?" i. e., your definition of justice (τὰ δίκαια).—ἀξιοτέκμαρτότερον. "A stronger proof." The epithet ἀξιοτέκμαρτος properly means "worthy to be brought in proof," "credible."—οὕδ' ἄν εἰς. Compare i., 6, 2.

§ 11.
ἔθησαι οὖν πάποτέ μου; "Have you, then, ever as yet perceived me?" A participle is put after a verb when the object of that verb is to be expressed, and, if the participle refer to the same person or thing as the object, it is put in the same case. Verbs of sense, "to hear, see," &c., as also "to perceive, discern," &c., are thus followed by a participle.—εἰς στάσιν ἐμβαλλόντος. "Involving in sedition."—τὸ δὲ τῶν ὑδίκων ἀπέχεσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "And do you not consider the refraining from injustice to be justice?"—διαφέγγειν τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι γνώμην. "To avoid the declaring of your own opinion."—ταύτα λέγεις. "You call thus."

§ 12.
τὸ μὴ δέλειν ὑδίκειν, κ. τ. λ. "That the being unwilling to commit injustice was a sufficient proof of justice."—ἐὰν τόδε. "Whether the following."—τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι. "That what is conformable to law is just."—ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεις, κ. τ. λ. "Do you, then, assert, Socrates, that both what is legal and what is just are the same thing," i. e., are identical in their natures.

§ 13.
οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνομαι σου, κ. τ. λ. "(You talk very strangely), for I do not understand you what you call legal, namely, or what just," i. e., what you mean by legal, or what by just. Observe the ellipti
val force of γάρ. Stobæus reads οὐκ ἄρα, and is followed by Weiske in his German version.—δποίον. For ποίον.—γιγνώσκετι. Compare the remark of Kühner: "γιγνώσκειν non solum est 'cognoscere,' sed etiam 'nosse,'" l. e. actio cognosciendi & præterito tempore pertingit ad præsens."—α ὦτ πολιτίαι ἐφη συνθέμενοι, κ. τ. λ. "What the citizens, replied he, having compiled, have written out, as to what things one ought to do, and from what things to refrain?" Legislators, and those who make laws for others, are said θείαι νόμοι, but the people who receive and sanction them, or enact them for themselves, are said θέσαι νόμοι.—νόμοις μὲν ἄν εἶπ, κ. τ. λ. "He would be lawful in deportment who should live as a citizen in accordance with these." The verb πολιτεύεσθαι properly signifies to be a free citizen," and then "to live as such in a state," &c.

§ 14.

νόμοις δ’, ἐφι, δ Σώκρατες, κ. τ. λ. "But how, Socrates, could one consider laws, or obedience unto them, a matter of importance, since oftentimes the persons themselves who enacted reject and alter them?" Stephens reads αὐτοὺς ὦτ θέμενοι, but ὦτ γε has just preceded.—καὶ γὰρ πόλεμον, κ. τ. λ. "(You do not view the matter rightly), said Socrates, for states often, after having even undertaken war," &c. More freely, "Well, said Socrates, so do states which commence war, frequently make peace again." —διάφορον ὦν τι ολει πολείων, κ. τ. λ. "Do you think that you do any thing different, when censuring those who are obedient to the laws, on the ground that these laws might be annulled, than if you should reproach those who are well disciplined in wars, because peace might possibly be made?" i. e., what difference is there between your censuring, &c., and your reproaching, &c. As regards the construction διάφορον . . . ὦ, compare iii., 7, 7.—τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις. Thus in Stobæus and five MSS., and it is confirmed by the translation of Bessario. The common editions have τοὺς πολεμίους.

§ 15.

Λυκοδρωγον. Lycurgus, the celebrated Spartan lawgiver.—καταμεμάθηκας. "Have you ever observed."—δτι οὐδὲν ἄν διάφορον, κ. τ. λ. "That he would have rendered Sparta in no respect different from the other states of Greece, if he had not effected in it the greatest obedience to the laws."—τὸ πείθεσθαι. So, immediately after, τοῦ τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι.—αὐτώτατον τοῦ τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι. "Most influential in bringing about obedience to the laws."—α ὦ ὄ διαγελ. "Goes on most happily."
\( \phi \) 16.

*\omousia.* "Unanimity." The reasoning is this: Concord, which is acknowledged to be the greatest preservative of a state, consists in nothing else but the observance of the laws.—αἵ τε γεροντικαί καὶ οἱ ἄριστοι ἄνδρες, κ. τ. λ. "Both the councils of elders and the leading men exhort their fellow-citizens to harmony." The word *γε- ροντικαί* is properly a Spartan term, but is characteristic generally of Doric states. It was an aristocratic element in the constitutions of these states, just as the βουλή was a democratic element in most Ionian constitutions.—*νόμος κεῖται.* "A law is in force."—ολμαί δ' ἐγὼ ταύτα γίγνεσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "And yet I think that all this is done, not that the citizens may (all) pick out (and adjudge the victory to) the same band of singers and dancers," *i. e.*, may pick them out, from the others that are competing for the same prize. Observe the zeugma in κρινόσων, or the double signification to be assigned to the verb, of both selecting and approving. *(Kühner, ad loc.*)—τοῖς αὐτοῖς ποιητάς. "The same poets," *i. e.*, the same scenic poets, at the dramatic contests, sacred to Bacchus.—τούτοις γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔμμενώντως. "For while the citizens persevere in this course," *i. e.*, in preserving unanimity.—οὔτ', οὐκός. Supply ἄν from the foregoing clause.

\( \phi \) 17.

*ἰδία δὲ.* "And in a private capacity," *i. e.*, and with respect to private individuals.—πῶς δ' ἄν ἢττον ἢττότο, κ. τ. λ. "And how could he less frequently be defeated in courts of law, or how could he more frequently gain a suit?" Many of the forensic terms of the ancients were borrowed, like our own, from the language of real encounters in the field.—τινὶ δ' ἄν τις μᾶλλον πιστεύει, κ. τ. λ. "And with whom would one believe that he could more safely deposit," *&c.* Construe τινὶ with παρακαταθέσθαι.—τῶν ὁκαίων τί- χοιν. "Obtain justice."—τινὶ δ' ἄν μᾶλλον πολέμιοι, κ. τ. λ. "In whom, too, would the enemy repose greater confidence as regarded either truces," *&c.* Observe here the construction of πιστεύω with the accusative and dative. The phrase πιστεύειν ἄνοχάς follows in some respects the analogy of πιστεύειν πίστιν. A more marked instance, however, of the accusative with πιστεύω, occurs in the case of πιστεύειν ἢ ἡγεμονίαν, κ. τ. λ., where the verb must be rendered by "to intrust" or "confide."—*θιδιοεῖν. "Would men wish?"—φρασαρχίαν. "The command of a fortress." Compare Schneider: *praefectura praesidiorum.*—χῶρων κομίσθαι. "That he will meet with gratitude." More literally, "will bear off gratitude for him.
-ell.'—τῷ δ' ἄν τις βούλευτο, κ. τ. λ. Observe that τῷ is here for ἵνα.—ἡ ὁ ἄν μάλιστα, κ. τ. λ. "Than against him unto whom he would most prefer to be a friend," &c.—καὶ ὁ πλείστοι . . . βούλευτο. Supply ἄν from the preceding clause.

§ 18, 19.

ἐπιδείκνυμι. "Strive to show."—οἷς εἰρήκας. Attraction for τοὺς ἀ εἰρήκας.—ἀγράφους δέ τινας οἴσθα, κ. τ. λ.* "But do you know, Hippias, said Socrates, that there are certain unwritten laws?"—τοὺς γε ἐν πάση, κ. τ. λ. "(You mean) those, said he, which have the force of laws in every land, regarding the same points." Supply λέγεις with τοὺς.—ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτοῦς ἔθεντο. Observe the employment here of the middle. Men enact laws for themselves. Farther on we have θεοὺς νόμους θείναι, because the gods enact laws for others, that is, for men.—καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, οἷς γε οὐτε, κ. τ. λ. "And how could they, since they would neither be able all to come together, nor are of the same language?"—θεοὺς σέβειν. The active σέβω is rare in prose. Stobæus has ἐνσέβειν, which Valckenaer says should be ειν σέβειν. Schneider would insert the article τῷ before θεοὺς, which Bornemann and Kühner think unnecessary.

§ 20, 21.

τι δή. "Why, pray?"—καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα πολλά, κ. τ. λ. "(You speak incorrectly), said Socrates, for they break the laws in many other points also." Supply οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεις, with Kühner. Some make ἄλλα πολλά the direct accusative after παρανομοῦν, but it is rather the accusative expressing the manner, and usually explained by the words "with regard to," "with respect to." So πάντα, "in every respect;" πάντα τρόπων, "in every way."—ἄλλα οὖν. "But, nevertheless."—δικήν γε τοι διδάσκαιν. "Suffer punishment, at least, as you know." Observe the force of τοι.—κειμένοις. "Laid down by," i. e., enacted by. The phrase οἱ νόμοι οἱ κειμένοι, however, when independent of any other words, signifies "the established laws."—οἱ μὲν λαθώνωντες, κ. τ. λ. "Some by escaping notice, others by open violence."

§ 22.

οὐ πανταχοῦ νόμιμον ἐστι; "Is it not every where a virtual law?"—διάκειν. "'To seek after,' i. e., to seek their aid, to court them.—ἡ οὖχ οἱ μὲν εὑροίνυτες, κ. τ. λ. "Or are not they, who benefit those that make use of their services, valuable friends?"—θεοῖ ταῦτα πάντως ἔνικε. "All these things are godlike," i. e., suit the
characters of gods rather than those of human beings.—βελτίωνος ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον, κ. τ. λ. "Appears to me to be indicative of a far better legislator than accords with the character of a human being," i.e., than any human being. The words ἢ κατά, with an accusative, are sometimes used to express similitude or comparison. The Latin pro is used in the same manner, "quam pro sorte humana," i.e., than may be expected from the ordinary lot of human nature.

§ 23.

τούς θεοὺς τὰ δίκαια νομοθετεῖν, κ. τ. λ. "That the gods enact by these laws justice, or what is different from justice." Observe that ἀλλος, expressing difference, is construed with a genitive. So alius, in Latin, with the ablative.—καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄρα, κ. τ. λ. "And therefore, Hippias, it pleases the gods, that what is just and what is legal should be regarded as the same thing." Lange lays down the following as the connexion of the argument. "The gods give just laws; whatever is in accordance with these laws is νόμιμον; therefore, every act, which is νόμιμον in the divine laws, is δίκαιον; therefore, also, in this definition the gods agree with men or with me." For above, § 12, Socrates had said, that, even in human laws, νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι, and rightly too, if human laws were understood to be, such as they ought in fact to be, namely, wholly in accordance with natural or divine laws. (Kühner, ad loc. Wheeler, ad loc.)

CHAPTER V.

§ 1.

πρακτικωτέρους. "More fit for the business of life." Compare iv., 3, 1.—νομίζων γὰρ, κ. τ. λ. "For, considering it to be an advantage that self-control exist in him who is likely to perform any thing excellent." The order is, νομίζων γὰρ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἐγκράτειαν ὑπάρχειν τῷ μέλλοντι, κ. τ. λ.—διαλεγόμενος. "By his conversations."

§ 2.

ὥσι μὲν οὖν, κ. τ. λ. "He always, therefore, continued both to be mindful himself of the things that were conducive to virtue, and to remind all his followers of them." As the verb διατελεῖν implies continuance, the particle ὥσι seems to be somewhat redundant here.—μεγάλειον "Noble."
NOTES TO BOOK IV.—CHAPTER V.

§ 3.

ἄρχεται. Compare ii., 1, 10.—ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν· By the pleasures enjoyed through the agency of the body.” Compare i., 4, 5.—ἰσος γὰρ ἐξελεύθερον, κ. τ. λ. “(Right), for perhaps the doing of the best things appears to you to be freedom,” i. e., perhaps you consider liberty to consist in doing what is best.—εἰτὰ τὸ ἔχειν, κ. τ. λ. “And, in the next place, you consider the having those that will prevent,” &c.

§ 4.


§ 5, 6.

ποῖους δὲ τινὰς δεσπότας. “And what kind of masters.”—παρατοίς κακίστοις δεσπόταις. “With the worst masters.”—τὴν κακίστην δουλεῖαν. So in Latin, “pessimum servitutem serviunt.” Compare i., 5, 5. Cic., Mur., c. 29. Plaut., Mil. Gl., ii., 1, 17.—οὐφίαν δὲ τὸ μέγιστον, κ. τ. λ. “Does not, moreover, intemperance appear to you to shut out from men wisdom, the greatest good, and plunge them into the very opposite (extreme)?”—ὡς οὐ δοκεῖ σοι προσέχειν, κ. τ. λ. The order is, ὡς οὐ (ἡ ἀκρασία) δοκεῖ σοι καλέειν προσέχειν, κ. τ. λ. With προσέχειν supply τὸν νοῦν, and compare iv., 2, 24. Matthiae, § 496.—ἀφέλκουσα ἐπὶ τὰ ὑδέα. “By drawing men away to pleasure.”—καὶ τολλάκις αἰσθανομένονς, κ. τ. λ. “And oftentimes having struck with perturbation those who do know how to distinguish between good and evil things,” &c. Observe that αἰσθάνεσθαι has here, as Sturz remarks, the force of dījudicāre. (Lex Xen., vol. i., p. 86, § 3.) As regards the peculiar force of ἐκπλήξασα, compare the remarks of Kühner: “ἐκπλήξτειν omnino est aliquem vehementer movere et percellere, ut quasi extra se rapiatur”

§ 7.

σωφροσύνης δὲ, ὧν Εὐθυδόμημε, κ. τ. λ. “And with whom, Euthydemos, would we say that temperance has less to do than with the intemperate man?” On this construction of προσέχειν, with the dative of the person and the genitive of the thing, compare Kühner, § 509, 1, Jelf.—αὐτὰ γὰρ ὅπου σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκρασίας (the subject) ἐστίν αὐτὰ
NOTES TO BOOK IV.—CHAPTER V.

τὰ ἐναντία (the predicate).—ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ ἐναντία. "Are the very opposite (to one another)." Consult Kühner, § 656, Obs. Jelf, where the present passage is cited.—κωλυτικάπερον εἶναι. "Is more calculated to impede."—τοῦ δὲ αὑτὸ τῶν ὄψεωντων, κ. τ. λ. "And do you think that there is any greater evil for men than that which makes him prefer the things that injure to those that are useful," &c.—καὶ τοῖς σωφρονοῦσι, κ. τ. λ. "And that compels him to do the things directly opposite to those which they who practice self-control do?" Observe the brachiology or conciseness of expression in τοῖς σωφρονοῦσι. The plain form of expression would be τοῖς ἄ οι σωφρονοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.

§ 8.

οὐκ οὖν τῶν ἐγκράτειαν, κ. τ. λ. "Is it not natural, then, for temperance to be a cause unto men of the things opposite to those which intemperance produces?" Compare the explanation of Weiske: "Nonne igitur consentaneum est, continentiam efficiere contraria ipsis, quam incontinentia efficit?"—τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ αἰτίων ἄριστον εἶναι. "That the cause of these opposites be the best." We have here followed Heindenburg's emendation. The common text has ὅ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ αἰτίων. Ernesti reads with Castalio, τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων αἰτίων—ἀριστον ἡ ἐγκράτεια. Compare ii., 3, 1.

§ 9.

ἐφ' ἀπέρ μόνα. "To which only," i. e., to pleasures, and pleasures only.—αὐτῇ. Referring to ἀκρασία, which is opposed to ἐγκράτεια. —ἡδονή ποιεῖ. "Causes us to have pleasures."—πῶς, ἐφ' ἡ ὕπερ, κ. τ. λ. "How so? said he: why, because intemperance," &c. Observe here the peculiar force of ὑπερ.—ὄτ' ὧν μένων ἔστιν. "By means of which (deprivations) alone, it is possible." Observe the employment of the emphatic ἔστιν, in the sense of ἔξεστιν.—ἀναπάύσασθαι τε καὶ κοιμηθῆναι. "Both to cease from toil and indulge in sleep."—καὶ περιμέναντας καὶ ἀνασχομένως. "Both waiting and holding out."—κωλύει τοῖς ἄναγκαιοτάτοις, κ. τ. λ. "Prevents our having any enjoyment worth mentioning in pleasures that are both most necessary and most habitual," i. e., pleasures which are necessary, as being natural, and constantly recurring, as the desire of food, drink, sleep, &c.—ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. "In the case of things that have been stated."

§ 10.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦ μαθεῖν τι, κ. τ. λ. "Nay, moreover, the temperate, by carrying them out into practice, enjoy (the greatest advantages
and pleasures from) the learning something,” &c. With ὑπολαύονσι supply, from what immediately precedes, ὀφελείας καὶ ἡδονὰς μεγά-
tας. (Kühner, ad loc.)—πράττοντες αὐτά. The reference in αὐτά is to μαθεῖν τὰ καλόν, κ. τ. λ.—καὶ ἔχοντος κρατῆσειν. “And might conquer his enemies.” Observe that κρατεῖν, “to be superior to,” or “to govern,” has the genitive, from the relative notion of κράτος, “power;” but when it means “to conquer,” it takes the accusative, from the positive notion κράτος, “strength.” (Kühner, § 518, Obs 1, Jelf.)—συντρίβωντα. The reference in αὐτὰ is to ἀγαθόν, K. T. Ἐπί τῶν σπουδῶν εἰν, κ. τ. λ. “Being wholly influenced by the craving desire for immediate pleasures.” Literally, “the nearest pleasures,” i. e. nearest at hand and easily attainable.

§ 11.

ἐττοῦν τῶν διὰ τοῦ σῶματος ἡδονῶν. Compare i., 5, 1.—τί γὰρ διὰ φέρει. The verb διαφέρειν is construed with τίνι, τί, or εἰς τί. In prose writers, the particular point in which one thing surpasses another is generally in the instrumental dative, as in Herod., i., 1 In poetry, it stands also in the accusative. The accusative, however, is also employed by the purer Attic writers, such as Plato, Xenophon, Demosthenes, &c.—μὴ σκοπεῖ. “Does not aim at.”—καὶ ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ, κ. τ. λ. “And by separating them both by word and act into classes,” &c.

§ 12.

καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατῶτάτοις. “And most able to discuss”—ἐφὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, κ. τ. λ. “For he said that the term ‘to discuss’ was so named from men’s coming together and deliberating in common, separating objects into classes.”—ἀριστοὺς τε, κ. τ. λ. “Most excellent as well as most fit to command, and most able in argument.” The words καὶ διαλεκτικῶτάτοις are bracketed by Herbst and Bornemann, but defended by Lange and Sauppe. Compare the explanation of Kühner: “Διαλέγεσθαι est cum altero disputando bona a malis, vera a falsis discernere.”

CHAPTER VI.

§ 1.

ὡς δέ. “But by what means.”—τί ἐκαστὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων. “What was the nature of every thing individually.”—αὐτῶν τε σφαλλεσθαι, κ. τ. λ “That they both erred themselves and caused others to
err." Observe the difference between the active and middle voices — οὐδέποτ' ἑληγε. The common text has οὐδέπωποτ' ἑληγε, which has been retained by Bornemann.— ἕως ἔορτετο. "As he defined them." Literally, "in the way in which he defined them."— τὸν ἄργον αὖ εἰν. "Would be a tedious task." — τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως. "The method of his investigation."

§ 2, 3.


§ 4.

τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμημα. "The conduct that is legitimate toward the gods," i. e., enjoined by the laws and usages of the state. — νομίμως. "Legitimately." — οὖθως ἀν ἡμῖν εὐσεβῆς ἀριστερος εἰη. "Would, in our opinion, be correctly defined to be a pious man." Observe that ἡμῖν is here, as Kühner remarks, equivalent to "noster judicio."

§ 5.

ἀνθρωπος χρῆσθω. "To conduct one's self toward men."— καθ' ᾧ δεὶ πως, κ. τ. λ. "In accordance with which, men ought, in a certain manner, to conduct themselves toward one another." In rendering πως, we have adopted the explanation of Kühner: "πως explicamus per certo quodam modo, idque ad varias vitae humanae conditions referimus." Five Paris MSS. have καθ' αἱ δεὶ τρὶς ἄλληλοις, whence Bornemann would read προκαλλῆλοις as one word, of which Schneider, in his Addenda et corrigenda to Xen., de Re Eq., iv, 3, p. 474, thinks he has discovered traces. Or else Bornemann would refer πως to ἀν ἄν τρόπον in the signification of ratione nescio quin.— δίκαια οὕτω ποιοῦσι. As regards the emphatic employment of οὔτωι here, consult ii., 1, 19.

§ 6.

dίκαια δὲ οἴσθα, κ. τ. λ. "And do you know, said he, what kind of acts are called just?"— οὐκοῦν οἴ γε τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦντες, κ. τ. λ. Weiske and Schneider reject these words, down to ὣφα, as prepositional. They can not, however, be omitted, for two reasons: first because they appear in all the MSS. and early editions; and sec
oudly, because they constitute the middle term of a syllogism. The reasoning of Socrates is this: They who act lawfully toward men do just things; they who do just things are just; therefore, they who act lawfully toward men are just. Again, They who know just things must needs do just things (iii., 9, 4); they who do just things are just; therefore, they who know just things are just. In both cases, They who do just things are just, constitutes the middle term of the syllogism. (Kühner, ad loc.)—οἱ οἱ τινες οἱ ωσαίν. Compare iii., 6, 15.—ολὸς. This form, which is supported by all the MSS. and early editions, is Ionic, and occurs in Homer, Od., i., 337, on which consult Nitzsch, and also Lehrs, Quest. Epic., p. 275.—δρῶς ἥν ποτε, κ. τ. λ. "Would we, then, at length, be right in our definition, if we were to define?" &c. Herbst thinks that the interrogation is rendered more emphatic by the addition of the particle ποτέ; but in the absence of an interrogative pronoun, as τίς, δετις, the particle ποτέ has not this force. It is used here, as Bornemann properly explains it, in the signification of tandem aliquando. Weiske and Schneider would expunge it.

§ 7.

σοφὸν δέ. Compare iii., 9, 4.—ὡς οὖν οἱ σοφοὶ ἐπιστήμης σοφοὶ εἶλαι; "Are the wise, then, wise by knowledge?"—ἄλλο δέ τι σοφὰν οἰεί εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. "Do you think, therefore, that wisdom is nught else than that by virtue of which men are wise?" The meaning of this passage is rightly given by Leunclavius: "Num vero putas quiddam aliud esse sapientiam, quam quo homines sapientes sunt?" Some supply οἱ σοφοί, but τίνι . . . ἄλλῳ τις ἥν εἶ οὐ λογίζοσθαι ἔχειστιν had preceded. Hence the change from singular to plural. Compare i., 2, 62.—πολλοστόν μέρος. "A very small part." For the sentiment expressed, compare iii., 8, 2, seqq.—πάντα σοφάν. "Wise on every subject."

§ 8, 9.

οὖτω . . . τῶς. "In this way . . . in what way?"—καλὸν μᾶλα. "Very much so."—τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἔχωμεν ἥν, κ. τ. λ. "But could we speak of the beautiful in any other way, or, supposing such a case, do you call beautiful either a body, or utensil, or any thing else whatsoever, which you know to be beautiful for all purposes?" We have here a passage that has occasioned great difference of opinion among commentators, and has given rise to several emendations of the text. We have retained the common reading, and adopted the explanation of Lange. The difficulty is occasioned by the words ἥ, εἶ οὕτω, ὅνομαξείς. Lange explains as follows: "Num possimus
pulchrum alter deinire (intellige ac antecedens ἄγαθον, et vide in i., 8, ubi demonstratum est, καλὸν, ἄγαθον et χρήσιμον idem esse), an pulchrum vocas, si quid pulchrum est (εἰ ἔστιν), vel corus, vel tas, vel aiiud quid, quod ad quamcunque rem (πρὸς πάντα) pulchrum est? His respondet Euthydemus, μὰ Δέ σεκ ἐγώγ, τετε ἐχομι ἄλλως πως εἰπεῖν, equidem aliter deinire ἄγεινο."—καλὸν πρὸς ἄλλο τι. "Beautiful with regard to any thing else."—οὔδε πρὸς ἕν. Compare i., 6, 2

§ 10.

τῶν καλῶν είναι. "To be one of the things that are beautiful." More freely, "to be numbered among the beautiful."—κάλλιστον. "A very beautiful thing."—οῦ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάχιστα. "For not the least important matters."—τὸ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτά. "The being ignorant of their real nature."—τί εστίν. "What each one of them really is."—νὴ Δέ. This affirms the negation, οὐκ ἀνδρείοι εἰσι. Compare ii., 7, 4 ; iv., 2, 8.—τὶ δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ μὴ δεινὰ δεδοκίτες; "What, then, of those who even fear things not terrible in their nature?"—ἡττον Supply ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν.

§ 11.

αὐτοῖς καλῶς χρήσθαι. "To manage them well."—τοῖς οἷοις χρη-σθαι. "Those accustomed to manage these things badly." More literally, "those (who are) such as to manage," &c. Compare Matthie, § 479, a.—οὐ δήπον γέ. "Doubtless not."—οἱ ἄρα εἰδότες Compare ii., 1, 19.—οἱ μὴ διημαρτηκότες, κ. τ. λ. "Do they who fail not in their attempts manage such things as these badly?"

§ 12.

Βασιλείαν καὶ τυραννίδα. "Monarchy and tyranny."—ἀρχαῖ "Species of command."—τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων, κ. τ. λ. "For he considered monarchy to be the command over men both with their free consent, and according to the laws of the several free states." Thus, in the opinion of Socrates, Athens, under the rule of Aristides and Themistocles, was a kingdom, since these statesmen were invested with full authority, and yet held rule by the consent of their fellow-citizens, and in accordance with the laws. On the other hand, in the time of Pericles or Alcibiades, Athens was under a tyr-annay.—ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελούτων, κ. τ. λ. "The magistrates are appointed from among those who comply with the injunctions of the laws." More literally, "who perform the things enjoined by law." Xenophon or Socrates had Sparta probably in view when giving this definition.—ὁπού δὲ ἐκ τιμημάτων, πλουτοκρατεῖν "But
where (they are appointed) according to property, a plutocracy." Some render this "a timocracy," but this is less definite. By τιμημα is here meant the nominal value at which a citizen's property was rated for the purpose of taxation; hence the secondary meaning of property generally.—ἐκ τῶν. "From all the people," i.e., from the whole body of citizens.

§ 13.

περὶ τοῦ. "Respecting any thing," i.e., any statement of his. Observe that τοῦ is neuter here, as the Latin translators understood it, "aliaquae in re." Kühner, however, inclines to make it masculine from what follows —σαφές. "Definite."—ἀποδείξεως. "Proof."—ήτω σοφότερον φάσκων, κ. τ. λ. "Asserting that some person, whom he mentioned, was either wiser," &c., i.e., than some other person whom Socrates had mentioned; so that, to complete the sentence, we may mentally supply after λέγοι the words ἢ δὲν ὁ Σωκράτης λέγοι.—ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἑπανῆγεν ἀν, κ. τ. λ. "He would carry back the whole statement to first principles." Thus, if the question were, which of two persons was the better citizen, he would, first of all, inquire what ought to be the conduct of a good citizen.

§ 14.

φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. "I do certainly say so."—ἐπεσκεψάμεθα. The aorist as an instantaneous future. Compare iii., 11, 15.—οὐκοιν ἐν ἑν χρημάτων, κ. τ. λ. "Accordingly, as far as the regulation of the public finances is concerned, will he not be superior to others who renders the state more affluent?"—ὁ καθυπερτέραν τῶν ἀντιπάλων. "Who makes it more victorious than that of its foes." Observe here the brachiology, or, to speak still more technically, the employment of the comparatio compendiaria, τῶν ἀντιπάλων being put for τῆς τῶν ἀντιπάλων.—ὅς ἄν παρασκευάζῃ. "Who shall make." καὶ ἐμπνεῶν. "And inspires."—οὕτω δὲ τῶν λόγων ἑπαναγορέων. "And the arguments being brought back in this way (to first principles)." Supply ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.—καὶ τοῖς ἀντιλέγοσιν αὐτῷ "Even to the persons themselves who opposed him."

§ 15.

ὁπότε δὲ αὐτὸς τι, κ. τ. λ. "And whenever he himself, in the course of an argument, went through any topic, he commenced by statements most universally acknowledged." More literally, "he began to proceed," &c. Observe the idea of repetition expressed by the optative, and compare i., 2, 57.—τὴν ἀσφάλειαν λόγον. "The
stability of reasoning," i. e., the surest mode of reasoning.—δὲ ἑσπραχ "Whenever he discoursed." The optative again marking repetition—διμολογοῦντας. "Of the same opinion with himself."—τῷ Ὄδυσσει ἀναθείματα. κ. τ. λ. "Assigned to Ulysses the character of a cautious orator, since he was able to conduct his arguments (to the desired end) by means of those things that appear right unto men," i. e., to shape his discourses so as to prove effectual, by adducing points well acknowledged among men. Compare Hom., Od., viii., 171, and Dion. Hal., Art. Rhet., xi., 8.—ἰκανοῦ αὐτῶν ἄντα. We would expect here ὡς ἰκανῷ δντι, since τῷ Ὄδυσσει precedes; but an absolute case is often put, where the participle agreeing in case with the noun going before ought naturally to have followed. (Kühner, ad loc.)—διὰ τῶν δοκοῦντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. The same, in effect, as διὰ τῷ μάλιστα διμολογομένων just preceding.

CHAPTER VII.

§ 1.

ἐναντόν γνώμην ἀπεφαίνετο. Observe the employment of the reflexive pronoun with the middle voice to add strength to the meaning.—αὐτάρκεις ἐν ταῖς προσηκούσαις πράξεσιν. "Of sufficient ability in themselves for the actions that properly belonged to them," i. e., for discharging the duties of their respective situations. Not needing, therefore, in such cases, the assistance of others.—αὐτοῖς έίναι ἐπιμελεῖτο. This construction of ἐπιμελεῖσθαι with the accusative and infinitive is of rare occurrence. The more common usage is to have this verb take a genitive of the object of care or concern.—πάντως μὲν γὰρ ᾗν, κ. τ. λ. "For of all men whom," &c. We have here the masculine, not the neuter.—ὑμελεῖν αὐτῷ εἴδειν. The personal μέλει is construed usually with a dative of the subject, and a genitive of the object of care. It is construed with an infinitive in Thucydides, i., 5, as in the present passage. This construction is also found in Latin: "Erit mihi cura explorare provincie voluntatem." (Plin., Epist., vii., 10.)—ὅτι μὲν αὐτοῦ εἶδει. The optative here expresses an indefinite frequency of action. Compare iii., 1, 1.—ἡγεῖ αὐτούς. "He used to bring them."

§ 2.

ἐδίδασκε δὲ, κ. τ. λ. "He used to teach, also, to what degree a well-educated man should be acquainted with each branch of scientific knowledge." As regards the force of πράγματος here, compare the explanation of Schneider: "Negotii ex doctrina et scientia pendere."
his."—αὐτίκα. "For instance."—γῆν μέτρῳ ὅρθως, κ. τ. λ. "Either to receive, or to give, or to apportion land, or to assign labor, correctly according to measurement." The expression ἐργον ὑποθείξαι has reference to the marking out of ground for tillage. Compare Sturz: "Mensuram assignare operis, quantum in agro sit labandum."—τούτο. "This much."—τῇ μετρήσει. "To the principles of measurement."—καὶ ὑς μετρεῖται, κ. τ. λ. "And succeeded in understanding how it is measured." The verb ἀπέλαναι is here employed like the Latin discedere, and is a metaphor borrowed from an army's coming off or leaving the field victorious.

§ 3.

τὸ μέχρι τῶν ὄσιζωντων, κ. τ. λ. "The learning geometry up to diagrams difficult to be used."—αὐτῶν. "In such things themselves." Socrates had been instructed in geometry by Theodorus of Cyrene, already mentioned at iv., 2, 10.—ταῦτα. "That such minute studies as these."—κατατρίβειν. "To wear away."

§ 4.

ἀστρολογίας. Compare iv., 2, 10.—καὶ ταῦτης μέντοι μέχρι, κ. τ. λ. "And yet, (to be acquainted) with this, indeed, only so far as to be able to know the time of the night, and the particular division of the month and year." For the meaning of ὥρα, consult notes on iv., 3, 4.—πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχειν τεκμηρίως, κ. τ. λ. "With reference to these. to be able to make use of certain fixed indications, distinguishing (by means of them) the divisions of the periods that have been mentioned."—παρὰ τε τῶν νυκτοθηρῶν. "Both from those who hunt by night." From Oppian (Halicarn., iv., 640) we learn that fishermen often pursued their vocation by night. Hunting, also, was practiced by night as well as by day. Compare Horat., Od., i., 1, 25; Cic. Tusc., ii., 17, 40. Schneider, without any necessity, reads νυκτοθηρῶν, "watchers by night," referring to Æschylus, Agam., 4, seqq.

§ 5.

τὸ δὲ μέχρι τοῦτον, κ. τ. λ. "But as to learning astronomy so minutely as to know both the bodies that are not in the same periphery with the sphere," &c. Literally, "but as to learning astronomy as far as this, as far, (namely), as the knowing," &c. With regard to the expression τὰ μῆ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορᾷ, compare the explanation of Edwards: "Quae non communem codemque eali motu circumacta proprio sibi motu feruntur."—ὑποθείξαις ἀστέρας. "The unsettled stars." The comets are meant. Diogenes Apolloniates had laid it down, ἀστέρας εἶναι τοὺς κομήτας, according to Plutarch.
de Plac. Phil., iii., 2, and some of the Pythagoreans had an idea of their periodic return; διὰ τινὸς ὀφθαλμούν χρόνον περιοδικῶς ἐναέλιεω. (Plut., i. c. Compare Ukert, Geogr. Gr. et Rom., vol. i., pt. 2, p. 94.)—τὰς περιοδὰς τοὺς ἐναέλιεως. "The periods of their orbits," i. e., the period of time occupied in making their circuits, not the mere orbits or paths themselves.—ἰσχυρως ἀπέτρεπεν. "He used strongly to dissuade (from all these)."—οὕδε τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἤν. "He was not unacquainted even with these, indeed." Archelaus, a follower of Anaxagoras, had been the instructor of Socrates in astronomy. Compare Cicero, Acad., i., 15.

§ 6.

τῶν σερανίων. Compare i., 1, 11.—φροντιστήν. "A subtle speculator."—χαρίζεωθαι ἄν. "Would gratify."—κινδυνεύσαι δ᾽ ἄν ὕπη, κ. τ. λ. "He said, moreover, that the one who scrutinized these things would run a risk even of becoming mad."—'Αναξάγορας. Anaxagoras, a native of Clazomenae in Ionia, was born about B.C. 499. He was one of the leading philosophers of the Ionic school, and the preceptor of Pericles and Euripides. His peculiar doctrines exposed him to the charge of impiety, and being sentenced to pay a fine and quit Athens, he retired to Lampsacus, where he died in the seventy-second year of his age. The term παρεφρόνησεν, here applied to him, refers merely to the visionary nature of many of his speculations, and not to any actual loss of reason.—ὁ μεγίστων φρονήσας, κ. τ. λ. "Who prided himself very greatly on his explaining the plans of the gods," i. e., on unfolding by the powers of reason the secret causes that called into being, as well as the laws that govern the universe.

§ 7.

ἐκεῖνος γάρ. Anaxagoras is meant.—τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον. Anaxagoras maintained that the sun was a red-hot mass of metal, larger than the Peloponnesus. (Diog. Laert., ii., 8.)—καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἥλιου, κ. τ. λ. "And that men, when shone upon by the sun, have their complexions of a darker hue."—ἐδρομαῖνόμενα. "If heated."—λίθον διάπυρον. Diogenes Laertius says that Anaxagoras made the sun to be μῦθρον διάπυρον, but Socrates here chooses, not very fairly, to understand the words in question as meaning a "red-hot stone."—ἀντέχει "Lasts."

§ 8.

λοιγισμοῦς. "Accounts," i. e., by which we calculate income and expenditure. Ernesti and Weiske understand the term to mean
here Arithmetic, but this word implies a much wider range of knowledge. The difference between λογιστικὴ and ἀριθμητικὴ is stated by Plato, Gorg., p. 451, c.—καὶ τὸν πον ὤ μετὰ πραγματείαν. "Idle investigations," i.e., minute and excessive care.—μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὄφελίμου, k. t. λ. "But he himself both studied and investigated along with his followers all things (connected with these) as far as what was practically useful"

§ 9.

detach. "As many things as it was possible." Compare i., 2, 23. —καὶ ἐαυτῷ ἐκαστὸν προσέχοντα, k. t. λ. "And by each attending to himself throughout his whole life, as to what food, &c., might prove beneficial unto him."—πόμα. Porson (ad Eurip., Hec., 392) asserts that the form πόμα was unknown to the Attics, because there are many passages in which the metre requires πόμα, none where it requires πόμα. But πόμα, notwithstanding this critical dictum, appears to have been used in prose. Compare Lobeck, ad Phryn. p. 456, and Kühner and Bornemann, on the present passage.—τοῦ γὰρ οὕτω προσέχοντος, k. t. λ. "For he said that if a person thus attended to himself, it was a difficult matter to find a physician," &c. Observe here the employment of τοῦ οὕτω προσέχοντος, as equivalent to εἰ τις οὕτω προσέχοι.

§ 10.

εἰ δὲ τις μᾶλλον, k. t. λ. "If, however, any might wish to obtain greater benefits than those depending upon human wisdom."—πεινὶ τῶν πραγμάτων. "Concerning the affairs of this life." Observe the force of the article.—ἐρημο. "Devoid."

CHAPTER VIII.

§ 1.

δὲφάσκοντος οὕτου, k. t. λ. "Because, although he asserted, &c., death nevertheless was adjudged against him by his judges."—ψευδόμενον. On the supposition that if he had really had an internal monitor, that monitor would have given him timely warning of his danger, so that he might have escaped it.—δὲ οὕτως ἡ δῆ τοῖς, k. t. λ. "That he was already at that time, so far advanced in years." Literally, "in his age." Socrates was seventy years old at the period of his death. (Diog. Laert., ii., 44.)—οὐκ ὑν πολλῷ ὑστερον, k. t. λ. "He would have ended his existence not long after." The negative οὐκ does not belong here to the entire proposition, but
NOTES TO BOOK IV.—CHAPTER VIII.

to τολλό ἑσπερον.—τὸ ἀγθεινότατον τοῦ βίου. "The most burden some period of life."—τὴν διάνοιαν μειοῦνται. "Become enfeeble in intellect." Literally, "become worse or weaker."—τὴν τε δική ελπίδον. "By having both pleaded his cause."

§ 2.

τῶν μνημονευμένων ἀνθρώπων. "Of men that are held in memory."—μετὰ τὴν κραίνει τριάκοντα ἡμέρας βίοναί. In relation to this subject, and the Delian festival, consult Wiggers' Life of Socrates, page 437 of this volume.—διὰ τὸ Ἡλία μὲν εἶναι. "Because the Delian festival took place." With Ηλία supply ἑρᾶ.—τὸν δὲ νόμον. Supply διὰ τὸ from the preceding clause, so that the full form of expression will be διὰ τε τὸ τῶν νόμον κάν.—ἡ θεωρία. "The sacred embassy." The persons employed in the deputation to Delos were called θεωροί, and their office, &c., θεωρία. The ship in which they went and returned was termed θεωρίς.—τῶν ἐπροσθεν. Supply χρόνον. This is the reading of Weiske and Schneider, adopted by Kühner and others. It is from a correction of Brodæus. The common text has καὶ τῶν.—ἐπὶ τῷ εὐθύμως τε, κ. τ. λ. "For the cheerfulness and tranquillity of his life."

§ 3.

καὶ πῶς ἄν τις, κ. τ. λ. Many critics think that from the third to the eleventh section has been inserted by some transcriber, in a patched up way, from the Apology or Defence. Weiske, however, regards the whole as genuine, and is of opinion that Xenophon employs a sorites to prove that the death of Socrates was θεοφιλής. In his view, the premises are, 1. The death of Socrates was glorious. 2. His death was also happy: 3. His death was θεοφιλής, since the gods give a happy death only to those whom they love.—ἐυδαιμονεστερος. Thus Castalio, from a correction by Brodæus, in place of εὐδαιμονεστατος, which is found in four MSS., and in the early editions. Bornemann prefers the superlative, referring to Hermann, ad Eurip., Med., 67.—δεοφιλεστερος. "More acceptable to heaven"

§ 4.

Ἐρμογένους. Compare ii., 10, 3. Xenophon was not at Athens when Socrates was condemned and put to death. He had gone in the previous year into Asia, to join the army of Cyrus. Compare Apol., c. 2, seqq.—ἡ δὲ Μελήτου γεγοαμένον αὐτὸν τὴν γραφήν. "That, when Meletus had now brought his accusation against him." Observe that γράφεσθαι γραφήν, "to impiē: h or accuse," is followed by
an accusative of the person accused. To the accusative of the suit, a genitive of the difference charged in the accusation is sometimes added. (Kühner, § 583, 40, Jelf.)—οὐ τι ἢπολογήσεται. "What defence he shall make."—οὐ γὰρ ὅσκω σοι; "(You talk strangely), for do I not appear to you?"—ὅπως. Used for πῶς.—ὅτα διωγεγένηται there the direct narrative changes to the indirect. Compare Kühner, § 890, Jelf.—πράττων δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, κ. τ. λ. For this option position of clauses, called chiasmus, consult Kühner, § 904, 3, Jelf.—ἡνπερ. Attraction.—καλλίστην μελέτην ἢπολογίας. "The best mode of practicing for a defence," i.e., the best preparation for one

§ 5.

οὕτως δὲ . . . εἰπεῖν. Supply ἔφη.—λόγῳ παρασθέντες. "Led away by their language," i.e., offended by it. We have given here, with Kühner and others, παρασθέντες, the reading of one MS., for the common reading ἀλλθεσθέντες. Another MS. has ἀλλθέντες.—ἡδή ὦν ἐπιχειροῦντος. Compare iii., 8, 1.

§ 6.

ὑπί μέχρι μὲν τοῦτο τοῦ χρόνου, κ. τ. λ. "That I would not concede to any man that he has lived either better or more pleasantly than I have up to the present time."—τοὺς μάλιστα αἰσθανομένους. "Who are most clearly convinced."

§ 7.

ἀ εγὼ μέχρι τοῦτο τοῦ χρόνου, κ. τ. λ. "And these results I have, up to the present time, perceived to accrue unto myself."—παραθέωρόν. "Comparing."—οὕτω διατετέλεκα γυγνώσκων. "I have constantly thus judged."—οὕτως ἔχοντες περί ἵμοι διατελοῦσιν. "Continue to entertain a similar opinion regarding me."—οὐ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἵμε. "Not merely through affection for me."—ἀν οἴονται, κ. τ. λ. Construe ἀν with γίγνεσθαι.

§ 8.

ἴσως άναγκαῖον ἐσται, κ. τ. λ. "Perhaps it will be necessary for me to sustain the burden of old age." More literally, "to go through with the things appertaining to old age." Compare Sturz: "incomoda senectutis sustinere."—ἡττον. "More feebly."—χείρον. "With less energy."—ἀποδάνειν. "To become." The same with the Latin evadere.—βελτίων. "Superior."—ἀλλὰ μὴν ταῦτά γε, κ. τ. λ. "Why in very truth, unto me, if not conscious of all this, at least, life would not be worth living." More literally, "life would not he

§ 9.


§ 10.

τρῶ δ᾿ ἔγωγε, κ. τ. λ. “I, for my part, also see that the estimation of men, who have gone before, that is left behind among posterity, is not similar in its character as regards both those who have injured and those who have been injured.”—ἐπιμελείας τεύχομαι. “Shall meet with regard.” Compare Sturz: “ἐπιμέλεια, gloria, laus post mortem.”—καί ἔαν. “Even if.”—μαρτυρήσεσθαι μοι. “Will bear testimony unto me.” Compare i., 1, 8

§ 11.

Σωκράτην γιγνωσκόντων, οἶος ἦν. The usual idiom for γιγνωσκοῖ των οἶος Σωκράτης ἦν.—πάντων μᾶλλον. Compare iv., 5, 1.—εὐσεβής μὲν, κ. τ. λ. These words, down to καὶ καλοκάγαθαν, form a paren- thesis.—οἶτε μηδέν. Compare ii., 7, 2.—ἡς γνώμης. “The con- currence.”—τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ. “Those who enjoyed his so- ciety.”—τὸ ἴδιον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίωνος. Compare iv., 5, 6.—κρίνων. “In judging of.”—προσέκοψαί. Thus in four MSS., and in the early editions, for the common reading προσέθαμε.—ικανὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλως δοκιμάσας τε, κ. τ. λ. “Able, also, both to prove the character of others, and to convict those who were in error.”—οἶος ἂν εἶη ὑριστός τε ἄνηρ, κ. τ. λ. “As a most excellent and most happy man would be.”—τῷ. For τινὶ.—παραβάλλων τὸ ἄλλων ἡθος, κ. τ. λ. “Let him compare with these things the moral characters of others, and then form his opinion.” Observe that οἷος is here equivalent to the Lat.:n “hoc fā to.”
LIFE OF Socrates.
Life of Socrates.

Chapter I.

Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor of considerable merit, and of Phænarete, a midwife, who is called by Socrates, in the Theaetetus of Plato, a very noble-minded woman. He was born at Athens on the 5th of the month of Thargelion, about the middle of April or May, in the year 469 B.C. (Ol. 77, 4), and belonged to the tribe of Antiochis, and the deme of Alopece. His features, and indeed his appearance altogether, were anything but handsome, and seemed well adapted for the ironical character which he maintained. Alcibiades, in Plato's Symposium,² compares him to the Sileni, and to Marsyas the Satyr: "And I may also compare Socrates to the Satyr Marsyas. As for thy appearance, thou canst not deny it thyself, Socrates; to what other things thou art like, thou shalt quickly hear. Thou art a scoffer, art thou not? If thou dost not willingly own it, I will bring forward witnesses." One of the principal passages of the ancients which bear on this point is in Xenophon's Symposium,³ in which Socrates engages in a playful dispute with Critobulus as to which of them is the handsomer. Socrates there tries to prove that his prominent eyes, his depressed nose, and his large mouth must, on account of their great usefulness, be the handsomer. Several other particulars, which, however, may be exaggerated, for the purpose of indicating the ugliness of Socrates, are mentioned in the same Symposium.⁴

Notwithstanding the limited means of his father,⁵ Socrates was educated according to the manner of the times. Music in the Greek sense of the word, i.e., music, and poetry, and gymnastic exercises, formed the principal part of the education of an Athenian youth, and in these Socrates was instructed.⁶ In addition to which, he

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1. [More probably in B.C. 468. See Clinton's "Fasti Hellenici," vol. ii., Introduction, p. xx.—Transl.] 2. Page 215, ed. Steph. 3. V., § 5. 4. "Ἡ τοῖς γελαίτε, συνα δύναμιν, τὸν γαστέρα μετριωτέραν βοιλομαί ποιῆσαι αὐτήν;" 5. That his father was by no means a wealthy man, is evident from the fact that Socrates, though very economical, was always poor. 6. Plat., Crito, c. xii.
received instruction in the art of his father; and if we may credit the report of Pausanias, who says that the three Graces made by Socrates had found a place on the walls of the Acropolis of Athens, close behind the Minerva of Phidias, he must have made considerable progress in the art. ¹

Crito, a wealthy Athenian, who subsequently became an intimate friend and disciple of our philosopher, having discovered the eminent talents of Socrates, induced him to give up the profession of his father. ² Various anecdotes preserved in Plutarch and Porphyry rest on too feeble historical evidence to throw any light on the history of Socrates. To this class belongs probably the following story in Porphyry, ³ who, being attached to the new Platonic system which formed such a contrast to the sobriety of the Attic sage, was an adversary of the latter. Socrates, we are told by him, was in his youth compelled by his father to follow the art of a sculptor against his inclination, was very disobedient, and often withdrew himself from the paternal roof. In the same manner, Plutarch, ⁴ among other things, relates, that the father of Socrates had been warned not to compel his son to follow any particular pursuit, as he had a guardian spirit who would lead him in the right way.

Thus Crito was the first who raised Socrates into a higher sphere. Whether he had before this time enjoyed the instructions of Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras, can not be decided by historical evidence, although it is asserted by Porphyry that he was a disciple of Archelaus as early as his seventeenth year. The first study that engaged the attention of Socrates, and to which he applied with

¹ Paus., i., 22, and ix., 35. Compare Diog., ii., § 19, and the scholiast to the Clouds of Aristoph., p. 170. Timon, therefore, in Diogenes, calls him, with a touch of contempt, μὴ δεξάμενος.

² Diog., ii., 20. "Demetrius of Byzantium says that Crito, attracted by the charms of his mind, withdrew him from the workshop and instructed him."—Suda, tomo. ii., under Crito, p. 34. I do not think that there is any reason for disbelieving this account. Meiners, indeed (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, &c., vol. ii., p. 354), considers this to be a mere calumny of Aristoxenus; but it is Demetrius, and not Aristoxenus, who is mentioned by Diogenes as his authority.

³ His charges against Socrates he derived from Aristoxenus, a disciple of Aristotle. Aristoxenus himself could not deny that Socrates had been obedient to the laws, and had always been just, yet he accuses our philosopher of being guilty of violent anger and shameful dissoluteness. The most unobjectionable evidence of the most credible contemporaries sufficiently refutes such calumnies. A detailed examination and refutation of the charges of Aristoxenus will be found in Luzac's Lect. Att., edited by Sluiter, Leyden, 1809, p. 27, fol. But why Aristoxenus brought these charges against Socrates, will be seen from our subsequent description of the character of the latter.

great zeal, was that of Physics. "When I was young," says he in Plato's Phædo,¹ "I had an astonishing longing for that kind of knowledge which they call Physics." He sought after wisdom where his fellow-citizens sought it—in the schools of the vaunting Sophists, and of the most celebrated philosophers of his age, as well as in the writings and songs of former sages. Parmenides, Zeno, Anaxagoras, and Archelaus among the philosophers, Euenus of Paros, Prodicus, and others among the Sophists, are recorded as his teachers.²

Assisted by these masters, he made considerable progress in Mathematics, Physics, and Astronomy, the value of which he afterward confined to very narrow limits.³ Some of his opinions in Natural Philosophy, which Aristophanes distorts to suit his purpose, must perhaps be referred to this early period of his life. In the instance in which the comic poet⁴ makes him say that the sky is a furnace, and men the coals in it, the real assertion probably was, that the sky was a vault covering the earth—quite in accordance with the spirit of the cosmological systems of the time; and that he had studied the cosmological system of Anaxagoras with particular attention, is evident, for he himself⁵ tells us that he hoped to find in it information concerning the origin of things. As Socrates himself gives us in this passage an explanation of the reasons which afterward induced him to think so little of this system, he shall speak for himself. "I once heard a person reading in a book which he said was written by Anaxagoras, and saying that reason arrang-

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1. Page 96, A.
2. Zeno of Elea, about the year 460 B.C., at the age of about forty, undertook, with his teacher Parmenides, a journey to Athens, for the purpose of meeting Socrates. Whether Socrates ever heard Anaxagoras himself or only studied his writings, can not be asserted with historical certainty. That he heard Archelaus is attested by Cicero, Tuscul., v., 10. Euenus of Paros instructed Socrates in poetry. Compare Fischer's remark on the fifth chapter of Plato's Apology. He had also read the writings of Heraclitus. "What I did understand was excellent; I believe, also, that to be excellent which I did not understand."—Diog. Laert., ii., 22. Plato, Cratylus, p. 402, A., seqq. Prodicus taught him the art of speaking.—Plat., Meno, p. 96, D. Æschines, iii., C.: kal ταύτα δὲ τὰ λέγω Προδίκου εὐτί τοῦ σοφοῦ ἀπηχύματα (reminiscences). A long register of teachers of Socrates, which, however, must not be taken strictly, occurs in Maxim. Tyr., Dis., xxxi. [It would appear, however, from a statement in Xenophon's Symposium, that Socrates never received any direct instruction in philosophy, since Socrates is introduced as saying to Caliax, who was a great friend and patron of the Sophists, ἄκα οὐ ἐπισκόπτεις ἡμᾶς καταφρονῶν, ότι οὐ μὲν Πρωταγόρα τε χολὸν ὄργον ἀδέτως ἔπι σοφίᾳ καὶ Γαργάρι καὶ Προδίκῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πελλοῖς, ἡμᾶς δ' ὁρᾶς αὐτομονῦσι τινας τῆς φιλοσοφίας δυνατὰς Symp., i., 5.—Ta.] 3. Xenoph., Mem., iv., 7.
4. Cl. A. 94. 4. Cl. A. 94.
ed all things, and was the cause of them. With this cause I was much delighted, and in some manner it appeared to me quite correct that reason should be the cause of all things. If it be true, I thought, that reason arranges all things, it arranges and places every thing in the place where it is best. Now if any body wanted to find the cause by which every thing arises, perishes, or exists, he must find the manner in which a thing exists, suffers, or acts best. For this reason, I thought only that investigation, the object of which is the most excellent and the best, to be adapted for man both for himself as well as other things; and he, who succeeded in this, must at the same time know that which is bad, for both are objects of the same science. Reflecting upon this subject, I was delighted, as I thought I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher after my own heart, who could open my eyes to the causes of things. Now he will first tell thee, I thought, whether the earth is flat or round; and after he has done this, he will also show thee the cause and the necessity of it, and whichever is the better, he will prove that this quality is the better one for the earth. If he tell thee the earth is in the centre, he will, at the same time, show thee that it is better for it to be in the centre. I was willing, if he would show me this, not to suppose any other kind of causes, and hoped soon to receive information about the sun, the moon, and other stars, pointing out the mutual relation of their rapidity, their rotation and other changes, and how it was better that each should act as it acts, and suffer as it suffers; for as he said that they were arranged by reason, I did not think that he would assign any other cause to things than that their actual qualities were the best. As he assigned to all things their causes, and ascertained them in all things in the same manner, I thought he would represent that which is the best for earth, as the good common to all. I would not have given up my hopes for any thing; with great avidity I took up his books, and read them as soon as I found it possible, in order that I might quickly learn the good and the bad. But, my friend,¹ I was soon disappointed in this hope; for in the progress of my reading, I discovered that the man no longer applied his principle of reason, and mentioned no causes by which to classify things; but declared air, ether, water, and many other strange things to be causes. This appeared to me just as absurd as if somebody should say, Socrates does every thing which he does with reason; and afterward endeavoring to point out the motive of every single action, he should

¹ He is speaking to Cebes.
way, in the first place, that I am now sitting here because my body
is composed of bones and of sinews, &c. I should have liked very
much to have obtained some instruction, from whomsoever it might
have proceeded, concerning the nature of this cause. But as I did
not succeed, and as I was unable to find it out by myself, or to
learn it from any one else, I set out on a second voyage in search
of the cause." The rest are Plato's own thoughts.

Besides this, Socrates was greatly attracted by the intercourse
of women of talent, and courted their society for the higher culti-
vation of his own mind and heart. He, like that powerful dema-
gogue on whom his contemporaries bestowed the highest admira-
tion for the power of his eloquence, was instructed in the art of
speaking by Aspasia; and DIOTIMA OF MANTINEA TAUGHT HIM LOVE;
by which, as FR. SCHLEGEL justly observes, we must not understand
transient pleasures, but the pure kindness of an accomplished mind;
a circumstance which is of importance in forming a proper estimate
of many peculiarities in the doctrine and method of Socrates.

CHAPTER II.

SOCRATES, however, was unable to obtain any satisfactory knowl-
edge from the philosophers and teachers of his time. Dissatisfied
with the pretended wisdom of the Cosmologists and Sophists, he

1. Νευρα with Plato does not mean nerves, which signification it only received
through Galen.

2. Plat., Menex., p. 235, E. She is also said to have written a poem to Socrates.
Athen., v., p. 219.

[It is doubtful whether any historical weight can be attached to the passage in
the Menexenus. The whole may probably be looked upon as a fiction, although
it can hardly be supposed, according to Ast, that Plato meant to deride PERICLES
and ASPASIA. Plato's real object appears to be to ridicule those demagogues who
think themselves equal to Pericles, although they can not compose a speech for
themselves, and are obliged to learn by heart such as have been composed for
them by others. All the other passages of the ancients, in which Socrates is said
to have learned the art of speaking from Aspasia, are probably taken from this
passage of the Menexenus, and therefore prove nothing. Reiske, on Xenophon's
Memorabilia, ii., 6, § 36, likewise considers the statement in the Menexenus to be
made ironically; in which opinion he is supported by Stallbaum and Loers, the
late editor of the Menexenus. As for the influence DIOTIMA is said to have had
over Socrates, it seems just as uncertain. It is only mentioned by Plato, and those
who copied from him, and is probably of the same nature as the story about
Aspasia.—T.x.]

3. Plat., Symposium, p. 201, D. That DIOTIMA is not to be ranked among the
sages has been shown by Fr. Schlegel, Griechen und Römer.

4. Griechen und Römer, p. 254
entirely abandoned all speculative subjects, 1 and devoted his attention to human affairs, according to his own expression 2 i.e., to researches in practical philosophy. He therefore, in Plato, calls his wisdom a human wisdom. 3 Socrates, according to Cicero's expression, 4 called philosophy down from heaven to the earth, i.e., he gave it a practical tendency, whereas before it had taken a direction completely speculative. Previous to Socrates, philosophers were for the most part occupied in cosmological researches: morals were entirely uncultivated; and although the Pythagorean institution, a moral and politico-religious order, had devoted very great care to morals, yet its doctrines had already fallen very much into oblivion; and besides, as an order, it had a direct influence only on its own members. But the greatest shock that morality had received came from the Sophists, a class of men who flourished shortly before and at the time of Socrates, and who boasted of being in the possession of every kind of knowledge, but were, however, not concerned about truth, but merely about the appearance of it; who, by their eloquence, knew how to give to a bad cause the appearance of a good one, 5 and from a love of money gave instruction to every one in this art. 6 These men, descendants of the Eleatic school, exert-

1. Diog., ii, 21. "When he saw that the science of physics (φυσικὴ σεωρία) was not adapted for us, he began to philosophize on moral subjects in the workshops and in the markets, and said he was seeking

"Ορτί τοι ἐν μεγαλορει κακόν τε ἄγαδον τε τέφυκτων." The latter is a verse of Homer (Od., iv, 392), which, as we are told by Sextus Empiricus contra Mathematic., vii, 21, Socrates was constantly in the habit of quoting.

2. 'Ανθρωπεία, res humane, are here opposed to δαμανοίοι, rebus divinis (Xen. Mem., Mem., iv, 1, 12 and 16), which he also calls οὐράνια (Mem., iv, 7, 6). 'Ανθρωπεία are things which directly relate to man as such, as questions on the destination of man, his duties, hopes, and, in short, all moral subjects; δαμανοί, res divinae, are of a speculative nature, and comprehend either physical or metaphysical questions, and have no direct relation to man as such. This distinction must be well borne in mind, as otherwise many assertions of Socrates might appear very paradoxical. Cicero, Acad., i, 15: "ut—coelestia vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene (morally) viven dum conferre."

3. 'Ανθρωπείναι σοφία comprehends either the wisdom of which men are in the possession, or the wisdom relating to human affairs, such as the destination, duties, relations, &c., of man. In the former sense it is used in Plat., Apol., c. v., where Socrates says, "It appears that the god means to say by the oracle that human wisdom is of little or no value at all." In the latter sense Socrates ascribes human wisdom to himself.


5. τὸν ἤπτευ λάγον κρείττω τοιείν.

6. It is well known that the word σοφιστής at first had an honorable meaning

"Ορτί τοι ἐν μεγαλορει κακόν τε ἄγαδον τε τέφυκτων." The latter is a verse of Homer (Od., iv, 392), which, as we are told by Sextus Empiricus contra Mathematic., vii, 21, Socrates was constantly in the habit of quoting.

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"Ορτί τοι ἐν μεγαλορει κακόν τε ἄγαδον τε τέφυκτων." The latter is a verse of Homer (Od., iv, 392), which, as we are told by Sextus Empiricus contra Mathematic., vii, 21, Socrates was constantly in the habit of quoting.
ed their utmost power to shake the foundations of knowledge, to unsettle the ideas of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, to confound the moral power of judgment by dialectical illusions, and to declare a thing to be right at one time, and wrong at another, as their interest dictated. Instead of being teachers of wisdom, they were mere dialectic quibblers, who made no man wiser or better, and who, by the spirit of quibbling which they diffused among their disciples by such questions as whether virtue could be taught, &c., paralyzed the power of the moral feelings. Socrates discovered the irretrievable injuries inflicted by these people on intellectual advancement and morality, and witnessed the distressing results of it among his contemporaries. Filled with vain pride, the disciples of the Sophists returned from their schools persuading themselves they had discovered the most recondite truths; they thought themselves unequaled in the art of disputing, and were constantly seeking opportunities of displaying their subtleties. Thus they wandered far from the only path of true wisdom, the knowledge of themselves. But the instructions of the Sophists were still more inju-

and was synonymous with σοφός, a sage, a scholar in its widest sense—for even artists were comprehended in it. Protagoras was the first who adopted the name of σοφιστής to distinguish more decidedly one who makes others wise, especially one who taught eloquence, the art of governing, politics, or, in short, any kind of practical knowledge. From that time the word sophist acquired that odious meaning which it retains in the present day. Afterward, in the times of the Roman emperors, the name of Sophist again became an honorable appellation, and was applied to those rhetoricians who had established schools of rhetoric, in which they treated on any chosen subject for the sake of exercise. Libanius, for instance, belonged to this class of Sophists. Though the latter class, in a certain point of view, differed from the former, yet covetousness was common to both. Themistius, because he received no money, protested against his being called a Sophist (Orat., 23). The description of a Greek Sophist of the time of Socrates is taken from the Protagoras of Plato. In reading, however, the writings of the philosophers of the Socratic school, it must not be forgotten that they had imbibed from their master a profound hatred of the Sophists, and may consequently have now and then been rather too severe in their remarks upon them. With the description given above all Greek writers agree, and the Sophists themselves, by their own actions, sufficiently characterize themselves as such. Specusippus, Defin. ad calcem Opp. Platonis: Σοφιστής νίων πλουσίων ἐνδέξαν ἐμμοσθή ἔπρεπής. Arist., de Sophist. Elench., i, 11. Xenoph., Mem., i, 6, 13: Καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ἡμῶν τοῖς μὲν ἀρχηγοῖς τῷ βασιλείῳ πολιτώτας, σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσι.—Isocrat. in Helen. Encom., ii, 116 and 117. Later writers, as Philostratus, do not draw any precise distinction between Sophists, philosophers, and orators. Philostratus twice mentions Carneades among the Sophists. Moreover, not only Socrates, but Anaxagoras, are called Sophists by Libanius (Apolog. Socr., p. 54 and 55, edit. Reiske), perhaps in order to raise thereby his own dignity. Compare Carus's graphic description of the Sophists in his Ideen zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 493 seqq.
rious, since, by their defending what was wrong, those moral principles, which are the supports of public peace and happiness, were artificially undermined. Socrates, therefore, firmly resolved to devote his life to the moral improvement of his fellow-citizens, and at the age of about thirty he made it his sacred duty to counteract the Sophists, who perplexed good sense, corrupted public morality, and brought down upon philosophy the reputation of being the art of disputing, nay, of being dangerous and injurious. He endeavored to exhibit them in their naked deformity, and thus directly as well as indirectly, by the doctrines and example of solid virtue, to contribute as much as lay in his power to the moral improvement of mankind.

This noble resolution he faithfully maintained throughout his life, until in his seventieth year he met his higher destination in the manner so generally known. Moreover, Socrates, during his pursuit of the high objects of his existence, followed a course in which he sought within himself what other philosophers had been accustomed to seek without, and thus directed attention to the operations of the mind. The cause of his pursuing this mode of thought not only arose from his practical mode of thinking, and from the high

1. I say about thirty. It is, indeed, generally believed that the public teaching of Socrates commenced precisely at his thirtieth year. But I do not believe that any passage of the ancients can be pointed out in support of this belief. However, that Socrates, even when a young man, had chosen the office of a general teacher, has been proved with great sagacity from several historical facts by Meiners, in his Geschicchte der Wissenschaften, &c., ii., p. 353.

(Ritter, however, remarks, in his History of Ancient Philosophy (vol. ii., p. 20, Engl. trans.), that "from the constitution of the mind of Socrates, which, proceeding through many attempts in the discovery of truth, could only, at a late period, have attained to certainty, it is not improbable that he had arrived at a ripe age before he began to incite others to the study of philosophy. In the more detailed accounts, he is almost without exception depicted as an old man. There are other reasons, also, which scarcely admit of a supposition that he devoted himself suddenly and wilfully once to this vocation; for though it be true that his observation of man, with a view to the science of humanity, has been referred to an oracle for its occasion, even the oracle itself implies his having previously pursued philosophical studies in common with Cherephon; and it is quite consistent with the nature of the case to suppose that a sense of his peculiar fitness for the education of youth gradually opened upon his mind, as he observed the improvement and instruction which others derived from his society." In a note on this passage, Ritter observes, "The assumption of Wiggers that Socrates commenced teaching in his thirtieth year is wholly unfounded. That of Delbrück (Socrates, § 34), that he had openly philosophized five or six years before he was brought upon the stage by Aristophanes (B.C. 423), which would make him about forty at his first appearance as a teacher, is not improbable, although the anecdote of Eucleides (Gell, Nect. Att., vi, 10) is apparently inconsistent with it."—Tr.)
cultivation of the reasoning powers attained by the exertions of previous thinkers, but also from external circumstances. The inscription on the temple of Delphi, "Know thyself," and the celebrated declaration of the Delphic god, "Sophocles is wise, Euripides is wiser, but the wisest of all men is Socrates," may have greatly contributed to direct the attention of Socrates to the internal operations of his mind.

The above inscription on the temple of Delphi must have made a very peculiar impression upon him, for he certainly was the first to whom it became a truth of great moral importance. The inscription itself is well known, and needs no further explanation. But, as regards the declaration of the Delphic oracle, it is not so easily to be accounted for.

Socrates relates the whole event in the Apology of Plato, where he says that an intimate friend of his, of the name of Chaerephon, ventured to ask the Delphic oracle if there was any one wiser than he (Socrates), and that the Pythia replied that there was none wiser.

It is indeed surprising that Chaerephon, a friend and disciple of our philosopher, who, besides, is described both by him and by Plato in the Charmides as a violent and passionate man, should have received this answer to his question. Plessing, therefore, ventures the bold conjecture that Socrates himself had contributed to this imposition, in order thereby to gain authority, and to prepare his plan for changing the form of government in Athens; for this was, according to him, the end for which Socrates was constantly and deliberately striving. This hypothesis, however, is too derogatory to the character of Socrates to be admitted without further reasons. The passionate nature of Chaerephon renders it more probable that he was guilty of an untimely and extravagant zeal to raise the fame of his master; but, on the other hand, it is also possible that Socrates, even at that time, had acquired so great a reputation, that his favor was no longer a matter of indifference to the crafty Pythia.

This declaration of the god of Delphi, together with the application which Socrates made of it, is unquestionably the most important fact in the history of his life, as it gives us a clew to his whole subsequent conduct and mode of thinking. From this time Socrates considered himself as a messenger peculiarly favored by the Deity, standing under its immediate guidance, and sent to the Athe

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1. Σοφός Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δὲ Εὐριπίδης, ανέρων δὲ πάνων Σωκράτης σοφῶτα Ῥογ.—Suidas, see σοφός.
2. C. v.
3. P. 153, f.
4. In his Osiris und Sokrates, p. 185, seqq.
nians, as he expresses himself in the Apology of Plato, to instruct and improve them. 1 "But that I was sent," says he, 2 "as a divine messenger to the state, you may see from what I will tell you. Assuredly it is not a human feature in me that I have neglected all my own interests, and for a great number of years have not concerned myself about my domestic affairs, and am only anxious for your welfare, going to every one of you and admonishing you, like a father or elder brother, to follow the path of virtue." 3 The same oracle had, perhaps, some influence on his belief in a daemon, which restrained him in doubtful cases; of the existence of which, he himself, as well as his friends, were firmly convinced, and whose nature we shall now proceed to examine more closely.

CHAPTER III.

The daemon of Socrates has at all times caused great trouble to the commentators, at which we can not be astonished, since even the friends and disciples of Socrates were ignorant of its real nature. Timarchus, having consulted the oracle of Trophonius about it, received no satisfactory answer. Simmias asked Socrates about the nature of his daemon, but received no answer at all, perhaps

1. [Delbrück, in his Sokrates, laments that there should be many even among the admirers of Socrates in the present day, who, like some of his contemporaries and his judges, take the oracle for a fiction, and his appeal to it for irony. With as much reason, Mr. D. thinks, might Thomas à Kempis, or Pascal, or Fenelon, be suspected of an affectation of humility when they confirm their convictions on sacred subjects by quotations from the Bible. Like them, Socrates was, in the best sense of the word, a Mystic; and the answers of the Delphic oracle exercised an influence on the weal and woe of Greece, similar to that which the Bible exerts on the destinies and proceedings of Christendom. But Mr. Thirlwall remarks, in the sixth number of the "Philological Museum" (p. 587), from which the preceding quotations from Delbrück's work have been taken, "that it may be readily conceived, and seems to be confirmed by several authentic accounts, that Socrates really considered himself as fulfilling a divine mission by his life and labours; but that this idea was first suggested to him by the Delphic oracle is, to say the least, extremely improbable, though such an accidental occurrence (for who but a sincere pagan can believe it to have been more?) may have contributed to confirm the impression, and may have given it a definite form in his mind. But surely his character and pursuits had been already fixed, before Chærephon could have ventured to inquire whether any man better deserved the title of wise. No additional dignity is imparted to his self-devotion by considering it as the effect of such a casual inspiration. It was the spontaneous, necessary result of his moral and intellectual constitution, and needed not to be connected with the eternal order of Providence by a tie so frail as a perishable superstition."—Ta.]

because Socrates himself thought it something quite incomprehensible. From that time he did not propose any other question on this subject. The explanations of the more ancient commentators are almost all of a supernatural kind. The greater number of the ecclesiastical fathers declared it to be the devil; Andrew Dacier, to be a guardian angel. It has also been attempted to explain this mental phenomenon in a natural way; and can it be wondered at if the results were mere absurdities? Such an hypothesis is preserved by Plutarch in his essay on the daemon of Socrates, in which it is said to have been a mere divination from sneezing; an hypothesis which even in modern times has found an advocate in M. Morin. Socrates himself certainly did not understand by it a mere prudence acquired by experience, as has been asserted by others, for the very name of daemon, which, according to the definition of Aristotle, means either the Deity itself, or a work of the Deity, suggests to us something beyond the sphere of common experience. To suppose, with Plessing, that the daemon of Socrates was a fiction, which would enable him, by the high opinion he would thereby acquire, to realize his plan of changing the form of government in Athens, is an hypothesis which rests on too arbitrary grounds, and is too contrary to the veracious character of Socrates ever to be adopted by any intelligent scholar.

But, notwithstanding these opposite modes of explanation, it may not be so very difficult to arrive at a just view of the genius of Socrates by an historico-psychological mode of inquiry. It was, perhaps, nothing more than a strong presentiment, which, being directed by an accurate knowledge of things, led him to form his conclusions from cause to effect by analogy, without his being perfectly conscious of the process. Such an exalted feeling of presentiment is often found in persons of a lively imagination and refined organization; and that Socrates belonged to this class will be seen hereafter. But Socrates himself actually considered it as an inward divine voice that restrained him from engaging in unpropitious un-

1. Plutarch, De Daemonio Socratis, p. 583. Carus observes very much to the point (Geschichte der Psychologie, p. 236), "There are many things of which Socrates would not form any clear idea, such as dreams; others of which he could not, such as his daemon."

2. Tertullian, De Anima, 1. Aitut Daemonium illi puero adnudisse, pessimum re vera pedagogum.

3. In the preface to his French translation of some dialogues of Plato.


dertakings. This hypothesis seems to be fully confirmed, not only by the universal belief of ancient Greece and Rome in guardian spirits, who attended men from their birth, but also by the manner in which Socrates himself speaks of this daemon, and by the examples which are recorded of its influence. The principal passages which refer to this daemon are in the Theages¹ and Apology² of Plato, and in the Memorabilia of Xenophon.³ Plato and Xenophon seem to contradict each other on this point; for Plato states that the daemon only used to restrain him, but Xenophon represents the genius as disclosing to him the future in general, what should not be done as well as what should be done. But both statements, though apparently contradictory, can, as Charpentier⁴ and Tenne mann⁵ observe, be very well reconciled; for Plato only expresses himself more decidedly in saying that the voice had only restrained, and never impelled him. Actions from which he was not restrained were lawful to him, and unattended with danger. In the Apology of Plato,⁶ he concludes, from the silence of the voice during the latter period of his life, that whatever then happened to him was for his good. But Xenophon does not draw a precise distinction between that which the voice directly commanded, and that which Socrates concluded from its silence.⁷

Our view of the nature of the daemon of Socrates is thus confirmed by the manner in which he himself is represented as expressing himself upon it, by both Xenophon and Plato. But the probability is still more increased by the examples which Socrates gives as the

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1. In the Theages be says: "Εστι γάρ τι ζειμα μοίρα παρεγγείλων ήμιν ἑκ παῖδός ἀφίλμενον δαιμόνιον. Εστι δὲ τότο φωνή, ἢ δὲν γίνεται, ἢ μὴ σημαίνει. ἢ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τοῦτον ἀποφημή, προσβείτε ἐκ οὐδέποτε, p. 123, D. Compare Cicero, De Divinat., i., 54. Ast indeed (in the Journ. Philol. by Hauff, Stuttgart, 1803, p. 280) asserts that the Theages is spurious; but—even if we could admit this—we must yet confess that, considering the agreement with the other passages of Plato, Platonic thoughts, at least, constitute its basis.

2. In the Apology be speaks almost in the same manner: 'Εμοι δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἑκ παιός ἀφίλμεν, φωνὴ τις γιγνομένη, ἢ δὲν γίνεται, ἢ ἂν ἀποφημή με τοῦτο, ἢ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προσβείτε ἐκ οὐδέποτε, c. xix. Compare Plat., Phadr., p. 242, B.

3. Σωκράτης, εἰπε Χειροφόνων, ὅσπερ ξυγνοσκε, οὕτως ἔλεγε. τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ, ζημη, σημαίνει. καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ζυνθίων προσγύμνησαν, τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ἢ τὸ δαιμόνιον προσημαλνόντος. Καὶ τοῖς μὲν παιομένως αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ παιομένως μετέμειλε.—Memorab., i., 1, 4.

4. La Vie de Socrate, p. 104.


6. C. xxxi.

7. [Mr. Thirlwall, in the "Philological Museum," No. vi, p. 583, also remarks, "that there is really no inconsistency between the passage in Xenophon and the assertion in the Apology and in the Phædrus; for it is evident that a sign which only forbade might, by its absence, show what was permitted, and thus a positive kind of guidance might not improperly be ascribed to it."—Tr.]
trials of the suggestions of the daemon. The genius advised him not to take any part in public affairs, and at first did not allow him to enter into any intimate connections with Alcibiades. Socrates, on his flight after the defeat of Delium, was warned by his genius, and, in consequence of it, would not take the same way as the others. He also dissuaded his friends from undertaking apparently indifferent actions—Charmides, from visiting the Nemean games; Timarchus, from retiring from the repast—and he also opposed the expedition to Sicily. All this he could have known, without revelation, in some measure by an accurate knowledge of circumstances, to which, in most cases, every-day experience would lead him; and many things, on the other hand, must be attributed to chance. It is not likely that the voice of which Socrates speaks should have been a mere figurative expression: he was, indeed, convinced of its reality, which is sufficiently accounted for by his mental organization. This conviction of Socrates was moreover facilitated by the belief of the ancients in the direct influence of the Deity on man, and in guardian spirits who accompanied man from his birth; and more especially by his own belief in the close connection between the human race and the Deity, as well as by his ignorance of mental philosophy.

1. Τοῦτὸ δὲν τοίδι μου ἐννοεῖται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. Apol., c. xix. He himself adds the reason immediately afterward: "Because an honest man who zealously resists the multitude and prevents unlawful actions, must by necessity become a victim to his honesty."

2. Alcibiades, 1, p. 103. E. Here, too, he adds the reason, because, he said, Alcibiades in his youth would not have listened to his instructions with proper attention, and he therefore should have spoken in vain.

3. Cicero, De Divinat., i., 54. Idem Socrates, cum apud Delium male pugnatum esset, Lachete praetore, fugeretque cum ipso Lachete, ut ventum est in trivium, eadem, qua ceteri, fugere nolabant. Quibus querentibus, cur non eadem via pergeret, deterreri se a deo dixit, tum quidem ii, qui alia via fugerant, in hostium equitatum inciidentur. This event is more minutely related by the author of the Socratic Letters, p. 6 and 7.

4. This and several other instances are related in the Theages of Plato, p. 129, seqq. Cicero, De Divinat., i., 54, observes that a great number of such instances were recorded by Antipater in his books De Divinatione. Some are also mentioned by Cicero himself.

5. [Schleiermacher, however, argues from a passage in the Memorabilia (i., 1. § 2, 3) of Xenophon, that Socrates himself could never have considered his ἐννοεῖν in the light of a specific supernatural being; for Xenophon there speaks of it as something resembling in kind the ordinary instruments of divination, as birds, voices, omens, sacrifices. See "Philological Museum," No. vi., p. 583. Ritter, in his "History of Ancient Philosophy" (vol. ii., p. 37-39), observes, "We shall not, perhaps, be far wrong if we explain the daemonium of Socrates as nothing more than excitability of feeling, expressing itself as a faculty of prosentiment. It must
It thus appears that the daemon of Socrates merely related to things the consequence of which was uncertain; but, whenever the morality of an action was discussed, Socrates never referred to his daemon. He was perfectly convinced that, in order to know what is right and wrong, reason is the only unerring principle. Among

not, however, be supposed that we seek thereby to screen Socrates from the imputation of superstition; for his opinion of demoniacal intimations was in unison with his veneration, not merely of the Deity, but of the gods. This is apparent from his recommendation of divination as a remedy for the deficiency of our knowledge of the future and of contingent events, his advice to Xenophon that he should consult the Delphic god as to his Asiatic expedition, his disposition to pay attention to dreams, and, lastly, his constant sacrifices, and his command to make all due offerings to the gods of house and state. Now in this superstition there are two points to be distinguished: that which he derived from the common opinion of his nation, and that which was founded on his own experience. In both phases it is equally superstitious, but venial, if not commendable; for, in respect to the former, he who, brought up in the olden creeds and traditions of his country, adheres to them so long as nothing better is offered for his adoption, and so far as they are not opposed to his own reason and enlightenment, is, to our minds, a better and a wiser man than he who lightly or hastily turns into ridicule the objects of public veneration. As to the demoniacal intimations of Socrates, they were, in common with his other superstitions, the good foundation of his belief, that the gods afford assistance to the good, but imperfect endeavors of virtuous men, and prove the scrupulous attention he paid to the emotions and suggestions of his conscience. Among the various thoughts and feelings which successively filled and occupied his mind, he must have noticed much that presented itself involuntarily, and which, habituated, as he was, to reflect upon every subject, and yet unable to derive it from any agency of his own, he referred to a divine source. This is particularly confirmed by the exhortation he gives, in Xenophon, to Eu thydemus, to renounce all idle desire to become acquainted with the forms of the gods, and to rest satisfied with knowing and adoring their works, for then he would acknowledge that it was not idle and without a cause that he himself spoke of demoniacal intimations. By this Socrates evidently gave him to understand that this demoniacal sign would be manifest to every pious soul who would renounce all idle longing for a visible appearance of the Deity. Still, in spite of all this, he cautiously guarded against the danger of that weak and credulous reliance upon the assistance of the Deity which necessarily proves subversive or obstructive of a rational direction of life; for he taught that those who consult the oracles in matters within the compass of human powers, are no less insane than those who maintain the all-sufficiency of human reason."—Ta.]

1. Plutarch, De Genio Socrates, tom. iii., p. 462, says, the demon of Socrates only enlightened him on obscure subjects into which human prudence could not penetrate. But it is surprising that Socrates did not make use of this genius in all doubtful cases. When Xenophon had received letters from his friend Proxenus, persuading him to go into Asia, and to enter into the service of Cyrus the Younger, he communicated them to Socrates, and asked for his advice. Socrates referred him to the oracle of Delphi. See Xenoph. Anab., iii., 1, 5. Cicero, De Die nata, i., 54, says: Xenophon consulti, sequeretur Cyrus, posteaquam exposuit, ous ibi videbantur. Et nostrum quidem, inquit, humenum est consiliu...
all the instances mentioned in the Theages of Plato, there is not one in which the rectitude of an action was decided by the daemon. Hence many authors, such as Buhle, go too far when they extend the influence of the daemon to moral feeling. Respecting things imposed upon us as duties, according to the opinion of Socrates oracles ought not to be consulted.  

But it is interesting to see how this conviction of a genius acted on Socrates, and how, together with the external causes above mentioned, it led him to a careful observation of his own mind. On every occasion he listened to the voice of his genius. Whenever a person desirous of improvement wished to have his instructions, Socrates ascertained whether his genius would not dissuade him, and, whenever he was requested to do something which was not at variance with morality, his genius was consulted. It will be needless to explain how greatly such a disposition must have contributed to turn the inquiries of Socrates from the speculative questions which had engaged previous philosophers, such as the origin and formation of the world, the unity of the first cause and the variety of its operations—in short, from divine to human affairs, in the sense of Socrates.  

CHAPTER IV.

Socrates never established any particular school; he taught wherever chance led him, and wherever he found men to whom he thought he might be useful by his instructions, or—to speak the language of Socrates—wherever his genius did not prevent him: in public walks, in the gymnasium, porticoes, markets, &c.  

In the same sense in which Socrates established no school, he

sed de rebus et obscuris et incerti ad Apollinem censo referendum, ad quae etiam Athenienses publice de majoribus rebus semper retulerunt.


2. Carus, in his Ideen zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 524, aqqq, says: "How much must the belief of being under the immediate influence of a protecting genius have increased his attention to himself, and to what great resolutions and noble self-confidence must it have led him, at that age in which simplicity of heart is still the prevailing characteristic! It is just as remarkable, that he was most strongly attracted to those who had observed in themselves a similar guide."

had no disciples; hence he asserts in the Apology, 1 he had taught none; yet a circle of inquisitive men and youths were soon assembled around him, and, charmed with his conversation and instruction, were attached to him with incredible affection. Such were Plato, Xenophon, Aristippus, Cebes, Simmias, Euclides, and others; and it was, properly speaking, from his school, i.e., from the instructions which he had occasionally given, that all the distinguished Greek philosophers subsequently proceeded. He gave his instructions gratis, a disinterestedness which formed the most striking contrast to the covetousness of the Sophists. 2

Socrates never delivered any complete discourse, but conversed with his hearers in a friendly manner on topics just as they were suggested by the occasion.

His method of teaching, however, had something peculiar to him self, which will be more fully developed in the following remarks. The peculiarity of his method consisted in questions, the nature of which, however, was different, according to the persons with whom he conversed.

Whenever Socrates had to deal with Sophists, who were puffed up with their pretended wisdom, he used that admirable kind of irony which Cicero translates by "dissimulatio"—a translation

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2. Xen., Mem., i, 2, § 6, seqq., and chap. vi.


4. Academ., ii, 5: Socrates de se ipso detrachens in disputatone plus tribuebat lis, quos volebat refellere. Ita quum alid diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatone quam Graeci εἰρωνείαν vocant. Quintil., Inst. Orat., ix, 2, says: Ironia est totius voluntatis fictio apparentis magis, quam confess, ut illinc verba sint verbis diversae, hic sensus sermonis, et joci, et tota interim causa conformatio, tum etiam vita universalam ironiam habere videatur. C. 20: Dum enim vita universalis ironiam habere videatur; qualis est vita Socratis. Nam ideo dicit est εἰρων, ι. e., agens imperitum et admirator aliorum tamquam sapientum. The later academicians understood this irony of Socrates in a wrong way, and therefore represented him as the founder of their skepticism.—Acad., iv, 23. They also endeavored to imitate the form of the Socratic method of disputing.—Tuscul., i, 10. I need hardly remind the reader that we are here only speaking of that kind of irony which is peculiar to Socrates; for on other occasions he often employed that kind of ridicule which we usually call irony, and which was peculiar to the Athenians in general, viz., that contrast between the literal meaning of the
which Quintilian did not approve of—and which is not at all more than the contrast of the half-ridiculing and half-sincere confession of his ignorance with the boastings of those who thought themselves to be wise. In this manner conceited pride was exposed by questions; and the distinguishing characteristic of the ridicule consisted in Socrates pretending that he could not form an opinion in any other manner; and this I conceive to be the principal difference between the Socratic and Platonic irony. That of Socrates, which is described by Xenophon in its purity, i as nothing of Plato's bitterness; its playfulness only instructs, but never enrages. A more minute comparison of the conversation of Socrates with Hippias, as it is described both by Plato and Xenophon, at which the latter was present, may serve to show this difference more strikingly.

This Socratic irony was admirably calculated to place such conceited persons as the Sophists in their true light. If any one entered into a discussion with them, he was so much overwhelmed with a host of philosophical terms and sophisms, that the point in question was entirely lost sight of. Socrates played the part of an attentive hearer, who was sincerely desirous of comprehending their sublime wisdom, and now and then asked a short question which was apparently quite insignificant, and did not at all belong to the point at issue, and which being answered by the Sophists with a smile, he imperceptibly went on, and compelled them, at last, after being perplexed in contradictions, to acknowledge their ignorance. Examples of such conversations are found in all the writings of the disciples of Socrates; but here, too, we must chiefly depend upon Xenophon, the most faithful interpreter of the manner in which Socrates thought and acted. Besides the above-mentioned conversation with Hippias, examples occur in that with Euthydemus, and in other places.

But when Socrates met with disciples desirous of improvement,

expression with the thought conveyed by it, by which a meaning is conveyed to the minds of the hearers totally different from the literal sense of the words. Instances of this irony are to be found in the celebrated dialogue with Theodota, and in the conversation with Pericles the Younger, on whom Socrates bestows much praise for his talents as a general. "I know very well," replies Pericles to Socrates (Memorab., iii., 5, 24), "that thou dost not say this thinking that I am actually striving after this kind of knowledge, but in order to suggest to me that a future general ought to try to acquire all this kind of wisdom."

1. Institut. Orat., ix., 2.
3. Cicero, De Oratore, iii., 16, blames Socrates for having first separated philosophy and eloquence, which, however, in the sense above-described, was highly praiseworthy.
his instructions, again, were not given in a didactic form; but he applied the same method of asking which is called after him the Socratic method, and which owes to Socrates, if not its origin, at least its cultivation and perfection. He himself called this method the τέχνη ματευτηκή (ars obstetricia), and on that account compared himself to his mother Phænarete, who, though not fruitful herself, was yet admirably skilled in bringing to light the children of others. "I am an accoucheur of the mind," says he, in the Theætætes of Plato, "just as my mother is an accoucheur of the body." By this comparison Socrates sufficiently characterizes the nature of his method. It is nothing else but an analytical development of the undigested materials existing in the minds of his hearers, and as such it is applicable only as far as the materials are already in the possession of the pupil, or previously communicated to him by synthesis. As regards the form, we have an example of this Socratic method of asking in the Meno of Plato, where Plato makes Socrates apply his method in order to prove his own (Plato's) doctrine of ideas. Socrates there asks quite an ignorant boy some geometrical questions, to which the boy gives correct answers. From this, Plato draws the conclusion that the boy could not have answered in that manner if his soul had not acquired, in a state previous to its being united to its body, a knowledge of the nature of things; but he seems to have overlooked one important fact, that this knowledge had been previously communicated to the lad by Socrates, in the way of synthesis.

This method of asking, which is usually called the Socratic method in a limited sense of the word, is in its character often similar to irony, but is different in its object and effect. It differs from our catechetical method in as much as it was confined almost exclusively to adult persons, in whom a tolerable share of knowledge might be supposed to exist, so that they not only answered, but also asked, and thus carried on a lively conversation. But what formed its characteristic feature was its aiming at leading men to knowledge by reflecting upon themselves, and not upon external objects. This line of demarkation must not be overlooked, and it would be rashness to introduce the Socratic method into our elementary schools.¹

Socrates applied this method with great skill,² and in modern

² Cicero, De Finib., ii, 1. Socrates percontando atque interrogando elicere so
times he has justly been considered as the supreme master of it. He accommodated himself to the individual dispositions and to the peculiar wants of each of his disciples, and connected his instructions with the most ordinary events of the day. He rather appeared to instruct himself than to pretend to instruct others, rather called forth ideas than communicated them. The questions were clear and concise; however absurd the answers might be, he knew how to make them subserve his purposes. In his conversation he commenced with the most undisputed propositions, which even a person with any sagacity might understand and comprehend. He omitted no intermediate ideas, but went on carefully from one to another. If in his researches Socrates sometimes appears to have entered too much into detail, we must not forget that by the want of precision in Greek expressions this apparent diffuseness was often necessary. He introduced a great degree of clearness into his conversations, which he accomplished both by his placing a thing in a point of view the best suited to the person to whom he spoke, and by viewing it in all its relations, by returning to it in various ways, by accurately dissecting the simple qualities of an idea, until the truth which Socrates intended to teach became evident to his disciples, and, as it were, their own. He knew how to interest those who conversed with him, and who seemed to have no wish to enter into any further discussion with him—as Alcibiades—by describing their own character, and by appealing to their peculiar wishes and hopes.

This is the favorable side of the Socratic method; if, however, we examine it with impartiality, we must acknowledge that his art of asking was not altogether free from sophistry; yet this tinge of it did not constitute him a Sophist, as he never substituted one idea for another, or confounded dissimilar ideas. Neither did Socrates intentionally try to make error victorious over truth—which is an essential feature in a Sophist—but his confounding heterogeneous ideas often arose from a want of precision in the Greek language. This kind of sophistry is found in the dialogues of Plato;

[1] Jebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad hæc quas hi respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. Hence the invention of dialogues is attributed to Socrates.
1. Xenoph., Mem., iv., 6, 15. [Econ., 6, § 2, seqq.
2. As in Xenoph., Mem., i., 2, 57; iv., 6, 3; 4, 13, and 23.
4. [This assertion, if applied to the Greek language in general, will certainly not find many advocates. If, however, the word kalos, which Wiggers especially mentions, is the only instance, few, who are acquainted with the meaning which this word has in all the writings of Plato, will feel disposed to assent to the assertion.
as in the conversation with Thrasymachus, in the first book of the Republic, where the expression ὑμεῖνον ζήν gives rise to a sophistical dispute; and in all the passages in which the word καλὰς is sometimes interpreted by beautiful and sometimes by good. To these passages it might be objected that Plato made Socrates speak sophistically; but the same arguments are also found in Xenophon; and even in the writings of this most faithful disciple of Socrates, we find that he confounds the ideas of the beautiful and useful, which are both implied in the Greek word καλὰς; and also the ideas of virtue and happiness, the bene beatæque vivere of Cicero, which the Greek expressed by the word εὐπραξία. In this manner he attributed to the expressions of those with whom he conversed a meaning which was not intended.

A second peculiarity of the Socratic method of teaching is, that Socrates himself never gives a definition of the subject in dispute, but merely refutes the opinion of the person with whom he converses. Thus he awakened the true philosophical spirit; and by throwing out doubts, stimulated the mind of his hearer to further examination. In the Meno of Plato, Socrates does not, properly speaking, define what virtue is, but only what it is not, and thus merely refutes the definition given by Meno; and the conclusion that it is a δεια προσα is rather ironical: Meno therefore compares Socrates to a cramp-fish, which paralyzes every one that comes in touch with it; for with what justice can we find fault with the Greek language, because some Sophist avails himself of a word which, according to his opinion, has two different meanings, while Plato himself certainly does not attribute two distinct meanings to it? According to Plato, nothing is useful which is not good, and nothing is good which is not at the same time useful. If we wish to account for the sophistries of Socrates, of which there are, indeed, several instances, it should be recollected, that Socrates was in his youth instructed by Sophists, and subsequently came very often in contact with them, and therefore can not have been entirely free from their influence; every man partakes, more or less, of the character of the age in which he lives. On the other hand, Socrates sometimes used the weapons of the Sophists themselves to expose their ignorance — [Ta.]

1. As in the Gorgias, p. 462, D.
2. Xenophon, Mem., iii., 8; iv. 2, 26. The Socratic manner of asking questions is, however, a dangerous instrument in the hands of a Sophist, as it is so very easy to take words in different senses, and thus to oblige the person who answers to make assertions which, but for the application of those sophisms, he would never acknowledge as his own. Protagoras, who perceived this, combined the Socratic method with that of the Sophists.—Diog., ix., 8, 4.
3. I should at least not like to infer with Carus (Geschichte der Psychologie, p 254) from this passage that Socrates had looked at virtuous men as inspired by the deity. Besides, it would be incompatible with the assertion of Socrates that virtue can be taught.

4. P. 83, A.
contact with it.1 This mode of disputing (in utrumque partem disputare) descended to the school of Plato,2 and constituted the academica ratio disputandi,3 though Socrates did not employ it in the sense in which the later academy made use of it. Socrates was far from philosophical skepticism; he was unconcerned about speculation; and the truths of practical philosophy had for him positive evidence.

By this mode of disputing, Socrates acquired a considerable advantage over the Sophists; for, as he did not openly express his own opinion, they could not lay hold of his views, but were obliged to allow him to attack and to refute their dogmatical assertions. "Thou shalt," says Hippias the Sophist to Socrates,4 "not hear my opinion before thou hast explained to me what thou meanest by the just; for it is enough that thou laughest at others in proposing to them questions and refuting them, but thou never givest any account or answer thyself, nor wishest to express thy opinion on any subject."

As Socrates did not deliver any complete discourse, the form of his philosophical lectures can not be spoken of, and, consequently, there are no complicated conclusions, corollaries, &c., which abound in the writings of other philosophers.

A third peculiarity of the Socratic method was the inductive mode of reasoning. "Two things," says Aristotle (Metaph., xiii., 4), "are justly ascribed to Socrates, induction and illustration by general ideas." Cicero5 also mentioned it as something peculiar to Socrates and Aspasia. Instances of such inductions are most numerous in the Memorabilia of Xenophon.6 Thus he tried to prove by induction to Chærecreates, who did not live on the most friendly terms with his brother Chærephon, what he ought to do to gain the affections of his brother;7 to his friend Diodorus that he must support poor Hermogenes;8 to timid Charmides, who had too great a diffidence in his own talents, that he must endeavor to obtain public appointments.9

A fourth and last peculiarity of the Socratic method of teaching was the palpable and lively manner in which he delivered his in-

1. Οὐ γὰρ, he says in the same dialogue (p. 80, C.), εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τοῖς ἀποτελεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν δύναται καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοῖς ἀποτελεῖν
5. De Invent., i., 51, seqq. Topica, 10
6. Όποτὲ δὲ, says Xenophon (Mem., iv., 6, 15), αὐτὸς τι λόγῳ διεξου, διὰ τῶν μὲ λέοντα διαλογισμῶν ἐπερείτο, νομίζων παύσαν τὴν ἀδιάλεκτον εἰσὶν λόγον.
7 Xenoph., Mem., ii., 3, 11, seqq.
8. Ibid., ii., 10.
9. Ibid., iii., 7.
sstractions, leading his hearers from the abstract to the concrete by
similes, allegories, fables, apopthegms, passages from poets, and
sayings of wise men. A peculiar talent of Socrates was the power
he possessed of demonstrating the correctness or incorrectness of
general assertions by applying them to individual cases. It is evi-
dent that a distinctness of conception must have been promoted by
such a popular method of reasoning, especially among a people
thinking as practically as the Greeks. It was also best adapted for
exposing the absurdity of many assertions of the Sophists, who
principally delighted in general propositions. If the Sophists ex-
pressed themselves in dazzling theses and antitheses, Socrates di-
rectly applied them to individual cases taken from common life,
and thus demonstrated in a palpable manner the inapplicability of
their assertions. His similes were taken from the immediate cir-
cle of his hearers a circumstance for which, it is well known, Soc-
rates has often been ridiculed.

A great many passages from the Socratic philosophers might be
quoted in proof of the manner in which he rendered abstract ideas
palpable; but it will be sufficient here to give the classical passage
from the Symposium of Plato, in which Alcibiades, the favorite of
Socrates, gives his opinion on the method of teaching pursued by
Socrates. 1

The ironical character of the method of Socrates was principally
directed against the Sophists, whom he combated very successfully
with this weapon; and, indeed, sharp weapons were necessary to
humble these men, who undeservedly enjoyed so great an authority
among the Greeks. There were, however, among the Sophists
some very superior men, who only wanted the true spirit of philos-
ophy, the love of truth and science, in order to accomplish great
things. We can not, therefore, rank all the Sophists in the same
class, and must carefully distinguish a Protagoras or a Gorgias,
who deserve our sincere respect for their talents, and who were
celebrated as orators, and made the first researches into the nature

1 I. σ. 221. E. Ἐπὶ θάλει τῶν Σωκράτος ἀκούειν λόγων, φανεῖν ἄν πάνι γελοίος
τὸ πρῶτον· τοιαῦτα καὶ ἰσχυρά καὶ ὑβρισμα ἔχοντα περιγράφειν Σατέρον ἄν τινα
ἐθροισμὸν δορᾶν· ἄνους γὰρ κανθάλους λέγει καὶ καλκάς τινάς καὶ σκυτοτόμας καὶ
μυροδέζνας, καὶ ἄλλο διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ταῦτα φαίνεται λέγειν, ὡστε ἀπαιρούτερον καὶ ἀνόητον
ὁ ἰσχυρος πάντα ἄν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσεις· ὁδοὺς ὑπογέονος ὃς ἄν τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν
γεγραμμένος πρῶτον μὲν νῦν ἑκοῦσα ἐνόνομων καὶ ἐθροίσμοις τῶν λόγων, ἔτειτα δεικτέ
τους καὶ πλείστα ἀγάλματα ὑπεβής ἀν αὐτοῖς ἑκοῦσας καὶ ἕν πλεῖστον τεινοντας, μᾶλ
λον ἀν ἄν ἕπι πᾶν δοὺς προσέχει αὐτοῖς τῷ μελοὺς καὶ καύγαρον ἐσεθαι. A great
power in speaking is attributed to him even by his enemies, Aristoxenus and For
phyry. Theodoret. ad Graecos infideles, Serm. iv., p. 56.
of language—from a Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, whom Plato in his Euthydemus, describes as true logomachists. Socrates took the field against these two classes of Sophists, and established moral consciousness, founded on common sense, in opposition to their moral skepticism; and, notwithstanding their sophistical stratagems, often extorted from them the shameful confession of their own ignorance. His disciples, encouraged by his example, carried the irony of their master against the Sophists further than himself. "The sons of the richest people," says Socrates, in Plato's Apology, "who necessarily have the greatest leisure, follow me of their own accord, and are pleased when they hear me refuting these men. Yea, they themselves often follow my example, and undertake to examine others." No wonder that Socrates gained for himself the perfect hatred of these people, and that they left no means untried to effect his ruin. But of this hereafter.

CHAPTER V.

Socrates lived in the simplest manner; and it was from this circumstance that he was enabled to maintain his philosophical independence, notwithstanding his limited means. He despised the luxurious mode of living, which had greatly increased in his time at Athens, as well as all those sensual enjoyments that destroy the health both of body and mind. Yet Socrates did not violate the laws of taste and propriety, but observed a nice distinction, by the neglect of which the Cynics destroyed all that genuine humanity which rendered Socrates so amiable, notwithstanding the austerity of his manners.

But the exertions which Socrates devoted to the improvement of mankind did not prevent him from fulfilling those duties which were incumbent on him as a citizen.

1. C. x.

2. "I think," says Socrates to Critobulus in the Economicus of Xenophon (ii, § 3), "if I could find a reasonable purchaser, I should, perhaps, get five minae for all my property, including my house."

3. Ζητεῖ γονὸν ὀθρός, says Antiphon the Sophist to Socrates (Xenoph., Mem., i, 6, 3), ὡς ὥστ' ἄν ἔτω δουλός ὑπὸ διορίσκων καταστής, οἵτινες τῷ οἴκῳ, καὶ πολλά πλήρεις τὸ παράλληλον, καὶ ἴματος ἱμίφθων ὡς μοῖραν φαντάζομαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅστις ἐρεῖν ὑπὸ καὶ χειμῶνος, ἀναυδητός τε καὶ ἀδίκων διατελεῖς.

4. The statement, in the Symposium of Plato, that Socrates bathed but seldom, is to be understood of warm baths, which Socrates considered as tending to make the body effeminate. The description of philosophers by Aristophanes (Clouds, v, 833) does not involve Socrates.
Socrates deserved well of the state as a father and a husband. Xanthippe, his wife, is sufficiently known to posterity as a woman of violent passions, and her name has even passed into a proverb. In modern times, some scholars, as Heumann and Mendelssohn, have endeavored to defend her, but with little success. That she possessed many good qualities, and, notwithstanding her passionate character, may have had a great deal of goodness of heart, can be easily admitted; but that she was of a very quarrelsome disposition, and made Socrates feel its effects, we may easily believe, without giving credit to the anecdotes recorded by Plutarch, Diogenes, and ΑELian, from the manner in which Antisthenes, and even Socrates himself, in a playful manner, express themselves concerning her. "But," says Antisthenes, "what is the reason, Socrates, that, convinced as thou art of the capacity of the female sex for education, thou dost not educate Xanthippe, for she is the worst woman of all that exist, nay, I believe of all that ever have existed or ever will exist?" "Because," replies he, "I see that those who wish to become best skilled in horsemanship do not select the most obedient, but the most spirited horses; for they believe that after being enabled to bridle these, they will easily know how to manage others. Now, as it was my wish to converse and to live with men, I have married this woman, being firmly convinced that in case I should be able to endure her, I should be able to endure all others." By Xanthippe Socrates had several sons; on the eldest of whom, called Lamprocles, he enjoins, in Xenophon's Memorabilia, obedience to his mother. At his death he left behind him three sons, one of whom was a youth, but the other two were still children.

3. [Ritter remarks (History of Philosophy, ii., p. 33, 34), "Socrates was a perfect Greek in his faults and his virtues; hence he always regarded morals under a political aspect. In such a political view of virtue, the relations of domestic life fall naturally enough far into the back ground; the notorious bad feeling of his wife Xanthippe to her husband and child prevents the supposition of a very happy home; and when we remark the degree to which, in his devotion to philosophy, he neglected his family duties, and the little attention he paid his wife and child, we are justified in ascribing to him, together with his countrymen, little respect for domestic life in comparison with public duties."—T.]
4. ii., 2, 7.
5. Plat., Apolog., c. xxiii. Whether Socrates, as some think, had also been married to Myrto, can not be decided with historical certainty. The contrary opinion, however, is far more probable, as appears from Meiners' examination (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. ii., p. 532). Even Panætius Rhodius in Athenaeus (xiii. i. p., p. 532) was of this opinion, which is also adopted by Bentley in his Dissertat. de Epistolis Socratis, § 13. Luzac, in his discourse De Socrate Cire, p. 1, supposes.
Socrates performed military service in three different battles, of which he gives us an account himself in the Apology of Plato.  

The first time that Socrates performed military service was in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in the thirty-seventh or thirty-eighth year of his age, at the siege of Potidæa, an Athenian colony in Thrace, in the years 431 and 430 B.C. The inhabitants of Potidæa had revolted from the Athenians, to whom they were tributary, and were supported by the Corinthians and other Peloponnesians. In this campaign, Socrates endeavored to harden his body, and to steel himself against the effects of hunger, thirst, and cold. Though Potidæa was besieged during the severest cold of a Thracian winter, Socrates, in his usual clothing, walked barefoot through snow and ice. He distinguished himself so much by his bravery, that the prize was awarded to him, which he, however, gave up to Alcibiades, his favorite follower (whom he himself had saved in this battle, as we are told by the latter in the Symposium of Plato), with the object of encouraging him to deserve from his country such honors in future by his own personal merits. Various anecdotes are preserved respecting this campaign of Socrates, to which, however, we can not attach any importance. Thus we are told by Gellius, Diogenes, and Aelian, that while the plague raged in the Athenian camp, and in Athens itself, Socrates was the only person who escaped the general infection. It is also said that he

that Socrates had had two wives, first Myrto, and after her death Xanthippe. He at the same time combats the opinion of those who think that Socrates had been married to two women at once. He assigns a different meaning to the Athenian law which was passed in the time of Pericles, and according to which, as is commonly supposed, it was lawful to contract a double marriage—a law which the advocates of that opinion usually quote in support of it. The subject is still more minutely discussed by Luzac in the above-mentioned Lectiones Atticae, especially against Mahno's Diatribe de Aristoxeno.

1. C. xvii. Athenæus (Deipnosoph., v., 15), the bitter opponent of philosophers, and more especially of Plato, declares the whole narrative of the military services of Socrates to be a fiction, and observes that philosophers do not always strictly adhere to historical truth. Plato, he says, contradicts himself, since he asserts in the Crito that Socrates had never been out of Athens except once, and that on a visit to the Isthmian games, and yet in the Apology and Symposium he makes Socrates say that he had fought in three battles. But this passage shows how little reliance is to be placed on the remarks of Athenæus, for in the Crito he has overlooked the following words: εἰ μὴ ποι ῥωπάρωσίμενος. We are acquainted with too many instances of the carelessness of ancient grammarians (see Wessel-ling on Diodorus Siculus, vol. i., p. 527, and Huel inson on Xenophon’s Anabasis, p. 301) to have recourse to the hypothesis that these words were omitted in the edition which Athenæus had before him.

2. Diog., ii., § 12. Thucyd. i. 58, seqq
once stood for twenty-four hours on the same spot before the camp, absorbed in deep thought, with his eyes fixed on an object, as if his soul were absent from his body.\(^1\)

In his second campaign we find Socrates at Delium, a town in Boeotia, where the Athenians were defeated by the Boeotians. This battle was fought 424 B.C., when Socrates was at the age of forty-five, in the same year in which the Clouds of Aristophanes were performed. Although the issue was unfavorable to the Athenians, Laches, the Athenian general, whom Socrates afterward accompanied in his flight, declared, that if all the Athenians had fought as bravely as Socrates, the Boeotians would have erected no trophies.\(^3\)

Soon after this battle, Socrates was engaged in military service for the third time at Amphipolis, a city of Thrace or Macedonia, which was a colony of Athens, and a town of great commercial importance. It had been seized by Brasidas, a Lacedaemonian general, 424 B.C.; and the Athenians, with a view to its recovery, sent an army, 422 B.C., under Cleon to Thrace, which did not succeed in its undertaking. In this expedition Socrates was present; but we do not find him engaged afterward in any other military duties, since he was now approaching the fiftieth year of his age.

Socrates was particularly attached to his native city. "I love my countrymen more than thine," he remarks in the Theætetus of Plato to Theodorus, a mathematician of Cyrene, who taught at Athens.\(^4\) This partiality for Athens, which at that time presented a picture of the great world on a small scale, combined with a feeling of independence, were perhaps the principal reasons which determined him not to accept the flattering invitations of Archelaus,

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2. Thucyd., iv., 96.
3. I pass over the ridiculous anecdote of Diogenes (ii., 23), who says that Socrates, when all had taken to flight, retreated step by step, and often turned round to oppose any enemy that might attack him. This circumstance is mentioned by no other ancient writer. It finds a severe censor in Athenæus, who also doubts the fact that Socrates had given up the prize of bravery to Alcibiades at Potidæa, since Alcibiades had taken no part in that war. The latter circumstance, however, is sufficiently established on the authority of Plato (Sympos., p. 219, E.). Simplicius (ad Epictet., c. 31) tells us that the Boeotians had been deterred by the bravery of Socrates from pursuing the fugitives. Thus every thing is exaggerated, and often to a monstrous degree, by later writers.
4. Compare Plato, Apol., xvii. These expressions of Socrates seem to raise a doubt as to the statement of Cicero (Tuscui., v., 37) and Plutarch (De Exilii, vol. viii., p. 371), that Socrates had said he was no Athenian, no Greek, but a citizen of the world. Compare Meiners' Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. ii., p. 361.
Scopas, and Eurylochus. 1. "He smiled upon three tyrants," says Libanius in his apology, 2 "at their presents, their manner of living, and their exquisite pleasures." The riches, and the manner in which the great lived, had no attractions for him; not even the sovereign of Asia was happy, in his opinion. 3 He did not wish to go to a man, he told Archelaus, who could give more than he himself could return; at Athens, he said, four measures of flour were sold for one obolus, the springs yielded plenty of water, and he lived contented with what he possessed. 4

Socrates did not like a country life, for man attracted him more than nature. "Forgive me, my friend," he once said to Phaedrus, 5 who preferred a country life, and who accused Socrates of being almost unacquainted with the neighborhood of Athens, "I am very anxious to learn something, and from fields and trees I can learn nothing; but I can, indeed, from the men in town." Thus we do not read of his being absent from Athens except on the expeditions mentioned above, and on some short journeys, such as to the Isthmian games and to Delphi; and, as some think, on a journey to Samos, with Archelaus his teacher. 6

After Socrates returned to Athens from those expeditions, he was regarded by his countrymen and by the Greeks in general as an eminent teacher and practical philosopher. But his activity as a citizen was exerted in a still different sphere, for in his sixty-fifth year he became a senator. "I have," says he, in the Apology of Plato, "held no state office, men of Athens, with the exception of having been a senator."

In order to understand fully the conduct of Socrates in this office, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the constitution of the Athenian senate. The Athenian senate, usually called ἡ βουλή τῶν πεντακόσιων, consisted of five hundred senators, who were elected from the ten tribes established by Cleisthenes. Every month, viz., every thirty-fifth or thirty-sixth day (for the Athenian year consisted of ten months), one tribe had the presidency, and this tribe was called φυλή πρωτανέωνα, and its members πρωτάνες. Of these fifty prytanes ten had the presidency every seven days, under the name of προέδροι. Each day, one of these ten enjoyed the highest dignity.

with the name of ἵππος. His authority was of the greatest extent: he laid every thing before the assembly of the people, put the question to the vote, examined the votes, and, in fact, conducted the whole business of the assembly. A senator was only elected for one year; and a man could only be epistates once, and only for one day. He who was invested with this office had the keys of the citadel and the treasury of the republic intrusted to his care.

Socrates was epistates on the day when the unjust sentence was to be passed on the unfortunate admirals who had neglected to take up the bodies of the dead after the battle of Arginusae. How did Socrates behave on that occasion? This is an event which shows Socrates to us in such an active, and, indeed, important office, that it is of the greatest importance, in forming a proper estimate of his character, to observe his conduct on this occasion with the greatest attention.

In the battle off the islands of Arginusae (B.C. 404), the Athenians had obtained a complete victory, under the command of ten admirals, among whom Pericles, a natural son of the celebrated statesman of that name, and Diomedon, possessed considerable reputation. To take care of the burial of the dead was regarded by the Athenian laws as a sacred duty, since the shades of the unburied dead, said the Greek superstition, restlessly wander a hundred years on the banks of the Styx. But after the battle there arose a violent storm, which prevented the ten generals from obtaining the bodies of the slain; yet, in order to effect every thing in their power, they left behind them some inferior officers, ταξιάρχαι, to attend to the burial of the dead. Among these taxiararchs we find Thrasybulus, who expelled the thirty tyrants, and Theramenes, who afterward became so well known as one of these tyrants, and was at last executed. But the violent storm opposed insurmountable obstacles to the execution of their orders.

It then became necessary to give to the senate and the people of Athens a full report of what had taken place. Although the admirals might have thrown the whole blame on the taxiararchs, yet, chiefly induced by Pericles and Diomedon, they stated in their report that the storm had prevented them from fulfilling this sacred duty. But Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who had arrived at Athens before the ten admirals, brought such heavy charges against them, that six who had already returned were, at the command of

3. [For a more correct view of this statement, vid. note on Mem. 1, 18, Asl. Ed.]
the senate, thrown into the public prison. They were summoned before the tribunal of the people (the *Heliaea*, Theramenes and Thrasybulus appearing foremost among their accusers, and were accused of high treason. They proved in their defence, by the evidence of their pilots, that the tempest had rendered it absolutely impracticable for them to fulfill their duty; besides which, they had also appointed Thrasybulus and Theramenes as taxiarhs, and therefore, if it were necessary for any body to suffer punishment, it should be inflicted on them. This statement produced its natural effect on the people, and they would probably have been acquitted at once if the question had been put to the vote. But by such an act the design of their enemies would have been frustrated. They therefore managed to adjourn the assembly till another day, alleging that it was too dark to count the show of hands.

In the mean while, the enemies of the admirals set all their engines at work to inflame the people against them. The laments, and the mournful appearance of the kinsmen of the slain, who had been hired by Thrasybulus and Theramenes for this tragic scene, during the festival of the Apaturia,¹ which happened to fall on the day on which the assembly was held, were intended to inflame the minds of the people against the unfortunate admirals. The votes were to be given on the general question whether the admirals had done wrong in not taking up the bodies of those who had been left in the water after the battle; and if they should be condemned by the majority (so the senate ordained), they were to be put to death, and their property to be confiscated.² But to condemn all by one vote was contrary to an ancient law of Cannonus, according to which the vote ought to have been given upon each individual separately. Hence the prytanes, and Socrates at their head, refused to put the illegal question to the votes of the people. Yet, when the latter, enraged against the prytanes, loudly demanded that those who resisted their pleasure should themselves be brought to trial, they yielded to the general clamor with the exception of Socrates, who alone remained unshaken.

Notwithstanding all the threatenings that were used against him,

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¹ The Ἀπατοῦρα were solemnized for three days. The most probable interpretation of the word is to consider it synonymous with δησατοῦρα, as the children came with their fathers to register their names in the phratries. See Welske on Xenoph., *Hist. Gr.*, i, 7, 8.

² Xenoph., *Mem.*, i, 1, 18: *Hist. Gr.*, i, 7, 34: ἦ δὲ τῆς βαυλῆς γνώμη ἦν μεὶς ψῆφῳ κρίναιν. In this same passage the ancient law of Cannonus is mentioned, which enjoined κρίνεσθαι δίχα ἑκαστον. [On the decree of Cannonus, see Appendix II. to the fourth volume of Mr. Tier wall’s *History of Greece.*—Tr.]
he could not be induced to desist from his resolution, but boldly declared he would do nothing which he considered contrary to his duty. In consequence of this refusal, the question could not be put to the vote, and the assembly was therefore adjourned; another epistates and other πρεσβυτοι were chosen, and the enemies of the admirals obtained what they had wished for. The admirals were condemned to death, and the six who were in Athens were executed. 1

This was the only civil office that Socrates ever held; and we can not be surprised, when so many acts of injustice were committed, which he alone could not possibly have prevented, that he entirely withdrew from public business. He mentions this himself as the reason of his living a private man. "Be assured, men of Athens, if in former times I had wished to engage in public affairs, I should have perished long ago, without being either useful to you or myself." 2

Socrates himself lived to see the injurious consequences which the unjust condemnation of those admirals brought down upon Greece, in the mournful issue of the Peloponnesian war. The very year after their condemnation (405 B.C.), the Athenians, for want of abler generals, were entirely defeated by the Lacedæmonians under Lysander; their fleet was destroyed, Athens besieged, and reduced to the necessity of surrendering at discretion to the victors. Lysander, after this, established the government of the Thirty Tyrants, whose memory is branded in history; and Socrates was one among the many who had to struggle with their injustice. Preret, indeed, has endeavored 3 to prove that Socrates supported these hateful oligarchs, and that by this circumstance we must account for his condemnation immediately after their fall. But this assertion is at variance with every thing recorded respecting the history and opinions of Socrates. He was, indeed, favorably disposed toward an aristocratical government, but in the old Attic sense of the word, viz., to a form of government in which the supreme power is lodged in the hands of the best and wisest; but he could never have approved of an oligarchy, and least of all of a des-

1. They were sentenced to death B.C. 404. Luzac, in his Disquisitio de Epistatis et Proedris Atheniensium, p. 114, which is added to his discourse De Socrate Cive, has considered the subject very carefully. The principal passages of the ancients are: Xenoph., Hist. Gr., i., 7, and Æsch., Axiochus, c. 12. Though Æschines may not be author of this dialogue, yet the agreement existing between him and Xenophon proves its authenticity with regard to historical facts.


3 Magazin Encyclopédique, Seconde Année, tom. v., p. 474, seqq.
potic aigai chy like that of the Thirty. Socrates loved his fellow-creatures too well to wish them to be ruled by such oppressors.

There can be no blame attached to Socrates, that Critias, one of the Thirty, had been his disciple, for it could not be in the school of Socrates that he had learned the bad principles on which he acted. He had, as we are told by Xenophon,\(^1\) not sought the instruction of Socrates because he loved him, but, like Alcibiades, in order to learn the _kingly art_—which was the name for politics, or the science of governing men\(^2\)—in the same manner as every young Athenian anxious to distinguish himself in the state sought the instructions of some one of the Sophists, among whom Socrates was ranked. Critias, not finding what he expected, soon afterward abandoned the company of Socrates; and we also know how he afterward behaved toward his former master. Socrates never made use of the language of flattery, but censured on every occasion the wicked rulers of a poor and orphan people. This reached the ears of the Thirty. Critias and Charicles, who were appointed to compose a code of laws, forbade, with the intention of injuring Socrates, any instruction to be given in the art of speaking; a profession, however, in which Socrates had never been engaged. But when he continued to converse with young men, and show them the path of real wisdom, Critias, who, moreover, entertained an old aversion to Socrates for having censured his sensual pleasures with Euthydemos and Charicles, summoned him before their tribunal, and altogether forbade him from conversing with or instructing young men. Socrates, in his usual manner, had used a simile, which gave great offence to the Thirty, who felt its truth. "I should indeed wonder," Socrates had said, "if a cowherd, under whose care the cows grow fewer and thinner, would not own that he was a bad cowherd; but it is still more astonishing to me if a state officer, who diminishes the number of citizens and renders them unhappy, is not ashamed and will not own that he is a bad officer of the state." Charicles added the significant words, "By Jove, now, do not speak of the cowherd! take care that thou dost not thyself diminish the herd by speaking again of them." "Now it was evident," adds Xenophon, "that after the simile of the cows had been reported to them, they were enraged against Socrates.\(^3\)

Thus Socrates, far from supporting the tyrants, was a declared enemy of these base and cruel men, and none of their edicts had the effect of inducing him to abandon that course which he consid-

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2. *Memorab.* 1, 2, 39.  
3. *Ibid.* 1, 2, 29
ered his duty. Entertaining no fear of them, he did not leave Athens, which is duly appreciated by Cicero. The Thirty summoned him, with four others, to the Tholos, the place in which the tyrantes used to take their meals; and commanded him to bring Leon of Salamis to Athens, who had obtained the right of citizenship at Athens, but had chosen a voluntary exile, fearing that the tyrants might execute him, as he was a wealthy and distinguished man. "Then indeed," says Socrates, in Plato's Apology, "I showed by my actions, and not merely by my words, that I did not care (if it be not too coarse an expression) one jot for death; but it was an object of the greatest care to me to do nothing unjust or unholy; for that government, though it was so powerful, did not frighten me into doing any thing unjust; but when we came out of the Tholos, the four went to Salamis and took Leon, but I went away home. And perhaps I should have suffered death on account of this, if the government had not soon been broken up."

In this manner Socrates most effectually refused taking any part in the unjust acts of the Thirty, who were very anxious to gain him over to their interest, as they wished in general to have as many of the citizens as possible accessory to their crimes. When he declared that he would never assist them in any unjust act, Charicles said, "Dost thou indeed wish to be at liberty to say what thou pleasest, and not suffer any thing at all for it?" "I am willing to suffer any calamity," said Socrates, "but I will not do wrong to any one." Charicles was silent, and his associates looked at each other.

According to Diodorus, Socrates undertook the defence of Thermomenes, a man of a very equivocal character. This account has

1. Ad Attic., viii., 2: "Socrates, quum triginta tyranni essent, pedem porta non extulit."

2. Tota mensa diu ob logw, all'tirpw ait enedieijarm, ati eirn Euvatov mun melie, eil muq aypoeikteron qn eitein, ovd' otioyn, k. p. l., c. xx. Ovd' otioyn seems to be an expression which only people of the lower classes made use of; hence the addition of Socrates: eil muq aypoeikteron qn eitein, "quamvis forte radior loqui videar." Libanius, the imitator of the Attic idiom, on this account, adds before ovd' otioyn the softening de eitein.—Apol., p. 8. The courage and intrepidity of Socrates before the Thirty is often mentioned. Seneca, Epist., 28: "Triginta tyranni Socra- tem circumsteterunt, nec potuerunt animum ejus infringere." Diog., ii. 24: "Hv el (Cwkeftou) qnopkratikosq, de elenq qe tov m qeias qois peri Kretiav, k. p. l.


4. Diod. Sic., xiv., 5. Aristotle, Cicero, and Diodorus speak of Thermomenes in the highest terms. Aristotle (in Plutarch, lii., p. 337) and Cicero, who seem to have been prejudiced in his favor by the constancy with which he suffered death declare him to be the best citizen of Athens. Cicero (Tusc., L, 44
been copied by other writers, but is not established on sufficient historical evidence, being mentioned neither by Plato, by Xenophon, nor any other contemporary writer.1

Theramenes was himself one of the Thirty Tyrants. When he was sent on an embassy by his fellow-citizens, who had placed great confidence in him, to enter into negotiations with Lysander, he abused his trust, and was the first who proposed to change the democracy to an oligarchy. He himself named ten of the Thirty, and lived on terms of intimate friendship with Critias, the most cruel of those tyrants. But the characters of these men were too different to allow their friendship to be of long duration. Critias, a man of energetic character, never lost sight of the object which his imagination represented to him as desirable, and at the same time employed every means in his power which might enable him to gain his ends. Theramenes also wished to distinguish himself, but in the choice of his means, though little concerned about morality, he displayed great anxiety for his personal safety. The violent measures of Critias and his colleagues appeared to him too dangerous, and he proposed to elect a number of citizens, who might take a part in the business of the government, and check the cruelties of the Thirty. But the Thirty were little disposed to relinquish the power which they had obtained with difficulty, and had preserved with so much cruelty and bloodshed, and they resolved to rid themselves of one who might prove a powerful enemy to their designs. Critias accordingly accused Theramenes before the council, and Theramenes defended himself in a manner which made a very favorable impression on the council; but Critias, seeing that he could not depend upon the assistance of the council, condemned him to death, with the assistance of his colleagues, without even putting the question to the vote as to his condemnation or acquittal. Theramenes flew to the altar of Vesta, and Socrates, Diodorus says, undertook his defence. Supported by two other citizens, he used every exertion to save him, until Theramenes entreated him to desist from an undertaking which was as dangerous for him

1 Among the writers of a later time, the author of the biographies of the tyrants ascribes the defence of Theramenes to Isocrates, p. 836, F.
as it was useless to himself. Theramenes, after this, drank the poisoned cup with great composure and serenity.

If Socrates actually undertook the defence of Theramenes, it was unuestionably a noble action, as the reason for which the Thirty punished their colleague, and the manner in which it was done, were equally detestable. Plato's silence respecting this occurrence may be accounted for, as in his seventh letter he evidently avoids every opportunity of speaking of Critias, who was his kinsman on his mother's side. But perhaps Plato as well as Xenophon may have considered Theramenes unworthy of the defence of Socrates, and on that account passed over it in silence. However, the works from which Diodorus compiled his history, especially where he does not mention his authorities, are not entitled to so much confidence as to justify us in having recourse to these hypotheses. It seems also contrary to the character of Socrates that he should have been deterred by the representations of Theramenes, that his exertions would be fruitless and dangerous to himself; for Socrates did not easily desist from a resolution once taken up, as he cared little about personal danger, unless he was restrained by his genius.

CHAPTER VI.

We now come to the most interesting period in the life of Socrates—his accusation, defence, condemnation, and execution. We know that all this took place a few years after the abolition of the oligarchy by Thrasybulus, in the year 400, or, according to others, 399 B.C. Anytus, Lycon, and Meletus brought the accusation in a writ (ἀντιμοσεία) before the tribunal of the people, charging him with introducing new divinities and corrupting the young; Anytus on behalf of the demagogues, Lycon on behalf of the orators, and

1. Diogenes, iii. 2.
2. That it was the tribunal of the people, or the court of the Heliastae (Ἠλιασταὶ) or Dicasta (Δίκαστα), by which Socrates was condemned, has been proved by Bougainville in his essay "On the Priests of Athens," in the Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres, and by Meiners in his Gesch. d. Wiss., vol. ii. p. 482, against Meursius, who thought that Socrates had been condemned by the Areopagus. This usual supposition is also advocated by Patter and Stollberg in the remarks on the Apology. But Bougainville's arguments for substituting the Heliastae seem to be convincing. The Heliastae were elected from the whole body of the people, without any regard to the different classes, and received a pay for their services. Their appellation was derived from Ἡλιασταὶ, the name of the place where the Ἡλιασταὶ assembled. Ἡλιασταὶ is another form of ἀλίῃ (an assembly) a word which frequently occurs in Herodotus. It is also connected with ἴσα and ἴσοπαῖ.
Meletus on behalf of the poets. Socrates was sentenced to death. The circumstances of the trial are sufficiently known, and are accurately explained by Tychsen in the Bibliothek für alte Literatur und Kunst. But the real causes of the condemnation of Socrates are not yet accurately ascertained; and for this reason, as well as on account of the light which they must throw on his character, the whole particulars of his trial seem to require careful examination. He is generally considered as a victim of the intrigues and hatred of his enemies, especially of the Sophists; and in modern times, his death has sometimes been represented as a well-deserved punishment for his anti-democratical and revolutionary ideas.

Both these views, however, take only one side of the question, and I am convinced that several causes must be taken together in order to judge impartially and to account satisfactorily for the condemnation of Socrates.

The causes which led to his condemnation appear to be of two kinds, partly direct and partly indirect. I call those indirect causes which led to the accusation of Socrates, and those direct which, independent of the points contained in the accusation, disposed the judges to pronounce the sentence of death.

The indirect causes will easily be seen, as soon as we have obtained a clear insight into the character of the persons who accused him. Meletus, who first laid the charge before the second archon, who bore the title of king, and before whose tribunal all religious affairs were brought, was the most insignificant of all, and perhaps only an instrument in the hands of the two other powerful accusers. He was a young tragic poet, who, however, did not sacrifice to the tragic muse with the best success. His memory as a poet has only been preserved from entire oblivion by the ridicule of Aristophanes. It was because Socrates valued true poetry so highly that he was a great friend of Euripides, and whenever one of his pieces was performed, he went to the theatre; nay, even in his old age, and during the thirty days which elapsed between his condemnation and execution, he composed poems himself; but he could not bear that those who possessed none of the true spirit of poetry should obtrude their poems on public attention. Such persons, therefore, often had to sustain the ridicule of Socrates; and it is, therefore, not to be wondered at, that a vain young man, feeling himself hurt by the remarks of our philosopher, should seize on the first opportunity of

3. Maxim. Tyr., Dissert., 9
5. Ælian, Var. Hist., vi., 13
gratifying his desire for revenge. To this, however, another reason may be added: Meletus had been one of the four who had, at the command of the Thirty, brought Leon of Salamis to Athens. Socrates, having refused obedience to this command, and declared it an act of injustice to which he could not be accessory, must have increased the enmity of Meletus. Libanius, besides, describes him as a venal accuser, who for a drachma would accuse any one, whether he knew him or not. To this report, however, we can not attach any great importance, as we are ignorant of the source from which it was derived.

Lycon was a public orator. We know that, according to a law of Solon, ten persons were elected to this office, whose duty was to advise the people and to maintain public justice. But these orators were very often individuals who entirely neglected their high calling, and merely attended to their own private interests, and persecuted the most honest persons, whenever their personal advantage required it. Can we wonder that the name of an orator should be despised by every honest man? Can we wonder that a man like Socrates, whose whole heart was benevolence toward mankind, should hate these corrupters of morality, and often censure their conduct in the strongest terms, when they hurried the people into the most unjust and revolting actions? On the other hand, what was more natural than that Socrates should render these men his bitterest enemies, who became the more dangerous as they scrupled not to employ any means to get rid of such a troublesome censor of their conduct? 12

Anytus was the most powerful among the accusers of Socrates, whence the latter, in an expressive manner, is called by Horace Anyti reus. Plato, in his seventh letter, ranks him, with Lycon, among the most influential citizens. He had been driven into exile by the Thirty, and from this circumstance alone he would have been an interesting personage to his fellow-citizens, after the restoration of the democratical government. But his influence as a demagogue and a statesman must have been still more increased, since he himself had co-operated with Thrasybulus in expelling the Thirty. He carried on the business of a tanner, whereby he acquired great importance; for, after the changes introduced by Cleisthenes into the Constitution of Solon, every tradesman or artisan

3. Προτροπέως δέ πάντα Δίκων οἱ ἐναγωγές, says Diogenes, ii., 38.
4. Sat., ii. 4. 3.
5 Xenoph., Hist. Gr., ii., 3.
could rise to the highest honors of the state. Socrates often censured the principle that people totally ignorant of the Constitution and of public business should have an influence in the management of state affairs. His examples were often derived from artisans "Thou must," said Critias, in the above-mentioned conversation between himself, Charicles, and Socrates,¹ "no longer speak of shoemakers and other artisans, for I indeed think that they are tired of thy foolish talk, by which their trade has become so notorious." In the Meno of Plato, Socrates expresses a doubt as to whether a son could be taught virtue by his parents, and uses the example of shoemakers and other artisans, who, according to his view, are themselves ignorant of virtue. Hence the multitude were not much disposed in his favor, and Anytus, in the Meno, declares that he would avail himself of the influence which he possessed to make Socrates repent of his expressions. But there were causes still more personal which drew down upon Socrates the hatred of Anytus. The latter had intrusted two of his sons to the instructions of Socrates, with the intention of educating them as orators, which was the principal way to authority and wealth in Athens at that time. In one of these young men Socrates observed superior talents, which might raise him to something better than the profession of his father, and he told him that he must give up the trade of his father and pursue a higher course.² This exceedingly offended the vanity of a man who, as a member of the popular assembly, wished to be thought a very important personage. The account of Libanius³ is therefore, in itself, not very improbable when he says that Anytus, after having accused Socrates, promised him that he would desist from his accusation if the latter would no longer mention tanners, shoemakers, &c., and that Socrates refused the proposal; but we can not place much reliance on this account, since we are ignorant of the source from which Libanius derived it, and know, besides, that he composed his Apology of Socrates merely as an exercise in rhetoric, and was, probably, not much concerned about historical truth.

After this short sketch of the characters of his accusers, it will be easier to discover the true causes of the accusation of Socrates;

1. Xenoph., Mem., i., 2, 37.
2. Xenoph., Apolog., § 29. Although this Apology in its present form was not written by Xenophon, it appears to express his views; the greater part of it, at least, is a compilation from the Memorabilia.
3. The author of the seventh of the Socratic letters, p. 30, says: Πῶς ἂν οὖν, ἔνοφων, τὴν μιαίαν τοῦ Ἰωσοδίσσου Ἀνέτου γρήγοροι ναι τὸ Ἑράσος αὐτόν:
for at first sight it is surprising that so many other Greek philosophers, though they gave much greater offence to the popular religion, were yet allowed to live at Athens free from persecution, and that such a violent accusation should have been raised against Socrates alone. Epicurus, for instance, died in the seventy-first year of his age, highly lamented by his disciples, without having ever been accused on account of his religious opinions. The causes which led to the accusation of Socrates may be fairly classed under four divisions, which will form the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER VII.

1. Every great man, especially under a democratical government and in a period of moral corruption, excites the envy of others; for it is the fate of the truly great to be envied by those who feel their own comparative inferiority. Even a superficial knowledge of the human heart shows how much we are inclined to envy those we can not equal. Who does not remember the answer which that citizen of Athens gave to Aristides, when the latter asked him why he voted against him! If such a man be distinguished by his talents, others endeavor to degrade him, or, if they do justice to his genius, speak in a derogatory manner of his feelings. But should he be a man distinguished by unusual moral goodness, by rare qualities of heart, and by a high enthusiasm for virtue and morality, he is still more in danger of being misunderstood by his contemporaries; for there are always persons mean enough to suppose, because their own hearts can not comprehend such virtues, that the low objects of vanity and selfishness influence the actions, and the noble, philanthropic views of the man of superior morality, and

1. (The assertion of Wiggers that Greek philosophers, who gave offence to the popular religion, were allowed to live at Athens free from persecution, is contrary to all historical evidence. Although skeptical opinions on religion had for many years previous to the death of Socrates made considerable progress among the upper classes at Athens, it is nevertheless certain that the lower orders were strongly attached to the popular religion, and highly resented any attempts which were made to question its truth. Anaxagoras was compelled to leave Athens, notwithstanding the powerful support of Pericles, on account of his religious opinions; and Diagoras of Melos was proscribed at Athens on account of his impiety, and a reward offered to any one who should either kill him or bring him to justice. Protagoras, also, was accused and condemned to death for having read a work at Athens on the nature of the gods, in which he declared that he was unable to determine whether the gods existed or not. He escaped, however; but the book was publicly burned, and all who possessed copies were ordered to give them up.—Th.)
ready enough to stigmatize the teachers and benefactors of mankind as corruptors of the people and seducers of the young. This must be the case principally in democratical states. The more numerous the relations and combinations in a state, and the more various the conflicts of the parties with each other, the less can a man so tolerated who rises by his superior talents and virtues above the ordinary class of men. In a monarchical state, in which his influence is not so great, and the various conflicts of different powers are not so numerous, he may live, if not more honored, at any rate more peaceably. But the greater the immorality of the citizens in a democratical state, the less likely is a man of great moral excellence to be tolerated. The contrast between him and their own corruption is a sufficient reason to excite against him their hatred and persecution. Socrates was one of those superior beings, who are born not only to enlighten his own age, but mankind in general. Virtue and humanity had descended upon him in their sublime purity, and had excited his unbounded veneration. Could he be otherwise than offensive to the wise and the learned of his age, to the narrow-minded, quibbling Sophists, the selfish demagogues and the conceited poetasters? Hence Socrates himself, in Plato’s Apology mentions the hatred of the multitude as the cause of his fate.

Socrates always lived under a democratical form of government, with the exception of the eight months during which the Thirty possessed the supreme power. In his intercourse, as a teacher of the people, with the orators, Sophists, poets, &c., he frequently offended them, and sometimes injured their interests. He lived moreover, in a corrupt period. Aristophanes, Plato, the author of the Axiochus, and other contemporary writers, describe the Athenian people as inconstant and frivolous, of a cruel disposition, ungrateful to those who deserved well of their country, and jealous of men who were distinguished by their virtue and superior qualities. During the dazzling sway of Pericles, or perhaps, more...
properly speaking, of Aspasia, who had, it is true, done very much to diffuse a taste for the fine arts, vices of every description had gained the ascendancy. During the Peloponnesian war, the neglect of all moral and religious cultivation had kept pace with the decay of external worship; the spirit of the times had taken a sophistical tendency, and selfishness had so evidently become the motive to action, that even Athenian ambassadors unblushingly declared to the Spartans and Melians that it was lawful and right for the better and stronger to oppress and rule over the weak and helpless, asserting that not only all tribes of animals, but whole cities and nations, acted according to this principle. 1 It was a very common opinion that after death the soul ceased to exist; the religious phantoms of a future state were laughed at by an age so full of conceit, that nothing but a conscience disturbed in the last moments of life could excite an apprehension lest those ridiculed phantoms might still not be wholly fictitious. 2 But it is obvious how completely every seed of virtue must have been crushed by the government of such corrupt men as the thirty tyrants. 3

far from beneficial to the Athenians. He was an ambitious man, and by this disposition he was hurried into many acts injurious to his country. The diminution of the power of the Areopagus, to which Solon had wisely assigned an extensive sphere of action, is wholly unpardonable. On the other hand, we should undoubtedly be going too far if we should credit all the assertions of the comic poets, which are partly repeated by Diodorus and Plutarch, and attribute the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war to the intrigues by which Pericles endeavored to escape the necessity of accounting for the treasure of the allies, which he had lavished on magnificent buildings. This opinion, though very generally maintained, and usually adopted in historical manuals, can not be supported by any authentic testimony. Diodorus (xii. p. 503-505) and Plutarch (Pericles, i., p. 647, seqq.) might be mentioned as authorities, but it is evident that they have only copied the comic poets, without being much concerned about historical truth. Besides, their authority is little, compared with that of Thucydides, the impartial adversary of Pericles, who declares the desire to extend the power of Athens, and to humble the Spartans, to have been the true causes of the war (1., 23, 24, 56, and 88, and ii., 1. Compare Wytenbach’s review of the Leciones Anaxoetides of Sluter in the Biblioth. Crit., vol. iii., P. iii., p. 79).

1. Thucyd., i., 76; v., 105.

2. Plat., Phaed., and De Republ., vi. That free-thinking at that time generally prevailed, is evident from the tenth book De Legibus. These principles were chiefly and eagerly adopted by young people, who made such an application of the astronomical hypotheses of Anaxagoras, that they not only denied the divinity of the stars, but, at the same time, hazarded the assertion that the gods, being changed into the dust of the earth, were unconcerned about human affairs.

3. [Those persons, however, who are disposed to join in the common declamations against the vices of the Athenian Constitution, would do well to weigh the following just and eloquent remarks of Niebuhr before they pronounce an opinion. “Evil without end may be spoken of the Athenian Constitution, and with truth,
2. The accusation and trial of Socrates was also, in part, occasion-
ed by the hatred which the Sophists bore toward him, and by the
freedom with which he always expressed his opinions. How re-
but the common-place, stale declamation of its revilers would be in a great meas-
ure silenced, if a man qualified for the task should avail himself of the advanced
state of our insight into the circumstances of Athens, to show how even there the
vital principle instinctively produced forms and institutions by which, notwith-
standing the elements of anarchy contained in the Constitution, the Common
wealth preserved and regulated itself. No people in history has been so much
misunderstood and so unjustly condemned as the Athenians: with very few ex-
ceptions, the old charges of faults and misdeeds are continually repeated. I should
say, God shield us from a constitution like the Athenian! were not the age of such
states irrevocably gone by, and, consequently, all fear of it in our own case. As it
was, it shows an unexampled degree of noble-mindedness in the nation, that the
heated temper of a fluctuating popular assembly, the security afforded to individ-
uals of giving a base vote unobserved, produced so few reprehensible decrees,
and that, on the other hand, the thousands, among whom the common man had
the upper hand, came to resolutions of such self-sacrificing magnanimity and hero-
ism as few men are capable of except in their most exalted mood, even when
they have the honor of renowned ancestors to maintain as well as their own.

"I will not charge those who declaim about the Athenians as an incurably reck-
less people, and their republic as hopelessly lost, in the time of Plato, with willful
injustice, for they know not what they do. But this is a striking instance how
imperfect knowledge leads to injustice and calumnies; and why does not every
one ask his conscience whether he is himself capable of forming a sober judgment
on every case that lies before him? A man of candor will hear the answer, in a
voice like that of the genius of Socrates. Let who will clamor and scoff; for my-
self, should trials be reserved for my old age, and for my children, who will cer-
tainly have evil days to pass through, I pray only for as much self-control, as much
temperance in the midst of temptation, as much courage in the hour of danger, as
much calm perseverance in the consciousness of a glorious resolution, which was
unfortunate in its issue, as was shown by the Athenian people, considered as one
man: we have nothing to do here with the morals of the individuals; but he who
as an individual possesses such virtues, and, withal, is guilty of no worse sins in
proportion than the Athenians, may look forward without uneasiness to his last
hour.

"The ancient rhetoricians were a class of babblers; a school for lies and scan-
dal: they fastened many aspersions on nations and individuals. So we hear it
echoed from one declamation to another, among the examples of Athenian ingrat-
itude, that Paches was driven to save himself by his own dagger from the sentence
of the popular tribunal. How delighted was I last year to find, in a place where
no one will look for such a discovery, that he was condemned for having violated
free women in Mytilene at its capture. The Athenians did not suffer his services
in this expedition, or his merit in averting an alarming danger from them, to screen
him from punishment.

"The fathers and brothers who, in the epigraph of the thousand citizens who
fell as freemen at Cheronaea, attested with joy that they did not repent of their de-
termination, for the issue was in the hands of the gods, the resolution, the glory
of man—who conferred a crown of gold on the orator by whose advice the unfor-
tunate attempt had been made which cost them the lives of their kinsmen, with
volting must it have been to a man of correct habits of thinking, that persons assuming the venerable appellation of the wise should have aimed at confounding the fundamental ideas of right and wrong, of virtue and vice! The Sophists were most dangerous men, not only on account of their theoretical unbelief, which they indiscreetly preached, but also on account of their moral doctrines, which were founded on egotism and selfishness. Disinterested virtue, they declared, was folly, and the civil laws were at variance with the laws of nature; moderation and temperance were enemies to pleasure, and contrary to the precepts of good sense. Socrates too deeply felt the corruption of his age not to oppose its authors in every way, and to express his indignation as loudly as possible. Their dazzling sophistries he opposed with weapons, which must have been very painful to conceited people, who loved any thing better than the truth. Pretending to be a disciple, anxious to learn something, he attentively listened to the wisdom which flowed from the lips of the Sophists; and perhaps praised it exceedingly, while he lamented his own dullness, and, at the same time, will out asking whether they were provoking the resentment of the conqueror—the people who, when Alexander, fresh from the ashes of Thebes, demanded the patriots, refused to give them up, and chose rather to await his appearance before their walls—who, while all who flattered or feared Philip warned them not to irritate him, condemned citizens to death for buying slaves that had fallen into the hands of the Macedonians by the capture of Greek cities which had been hostile to Athens—the people whose needy citizens, though predominant in the assembly, renounced the largess which alone afforded them the luxury of flesh on a few festivals, though on all other days throughout the year they ate nothing but olives, herbs, and onions, with dry bread and salt fish—who made this sacrifice to raise the means of arming for the national honor—this people commands my whole heart and my deepest reverence. And when a great man* turned away from this noble and pliable people, though certainly it did not appear every day in its holiday clothes, and was not free from sins and frailties, he incurred a just punishment in the delusion which led him to attempt to wash a blackamoor white; to convert an incorrigible bad subject like Dionysius, and through his means to place philosophy on the throne in the sink of Syracusan luxury and licentiousness; and in the scarcely less flagrant folly of taking an adventurer so deeply tainted with tyranny as Dion, for a hero and an ideal. A man who could hope for success in this undertaking, and despairs of a people like the Athenians, had certainly gone great lengths in straining at gnats and swallowing camels."—Translated by Mr. Thrilwall in the Philological Museum, No. iii., p. 494-496.—* T."

1. Compare Plato in the Gorgias and De Republic., ii. The beautiful allegory of Prodicus, "Hercules at the Cross-way," which has acquired such celebrity, and perhaps owes its perfection to Xenophon, at least so far as its form is concerned, was only a declamation, and probably belonged to those show-speeches which this Sophist delivered in the cities of Greece.—Philostr., De Vit. Sophist., p. 482, seqq.

* Plato.
admitted the truth of the greater part of their doctrines, and only now and then indulged in a little modest question, which they could not refuse to answer to an industrious disciple, and which appeared to them so insignificant, that it could not contribute in the least to refute their assertions. But he went gradually further, and traced things to their ultimate causes, and thus extorted from them the confession of their ignorance. He perhaps even followed them as he did Euthydemus, until he could engage them, with propriety, in a conversation which would humble their pride. The method of examining and refuting (ἐξετάζειν and ἔλέγχειν, according to the expression of the Socratic philosophers), with which his disciples, animating their teacher, tried every one who gloried in his wisdom, was still more disagreeable to the Sophists. But the indignation of those who had been tested in this manner did not fall on the disciples, but on Socrates himself, as he asserts in the Apology. It can not be denied that the Sophists, who before enjoyed a high degree of estimation, were deprived by Socrates of a considerable portion of their influence in Greece, and especially at Athens; and, in revenge, they did every thing to degrade him in the eyes of his fellow-citizens, and to prove that the real motives of his actions were bad. "He seduces the young, and introduces new gods:" these were the hateful calumnies by which they attempted to injure his reputation with the people, and which were faithfully repeated by Meletus in his accusation—calumnies which must have represented Socrates to the people in a more odious light, as the Constitution of Athens was intimately connected with its religion, and the interest of the one was necessarily involved in that of the other.

But, in general, it was by too freely expressing what he thought that Socrates made enemies and brought on his accusation. He not only combated the fallacies and the perversity of the Sophists, but every kind of vice and folly, and called them by their true names; he attacked every error, and that the more zealously the closer it was connected with morality. Thus not only Sophists, but poets, orators, and demagogues, soothsayers and priests, became his enemies. He despised the comic poets, who delighted the mul-

1. C. x.

2. Xenoph., Mem., i., 2, § 49: Σωκράτης τούς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν εἴδοσεν: a charge which had been brought against Socrates by Aristophanes. Excellent remarks on the ironical manner in which Socrates treated the Sophists, are found in Reinhard's essay, De Methode Socratica, in the first vol. of his Opuscul. Academ. dited by Pôlitz. Lipsias, 1808.
titude at the expense of morality; and bad poets and sophistical orators felt the sting of his irony. The demagogues hated him because he was the opponent of their teachers, the Sophists, from whom many among them had learned the art of deceiving the people. What could, indeed, be more absurd in the eyes of reason, than that persons totally ignorant of the Constitution and public business, such as artisans, tanners, shoemakers, &c., should have an influence on the conduct of public affairs? These he made the objects of his satire, and exposed the absurdity of their pretensions. Socrates had, besides, a prejudice against mechanical arts, which he sometimes expressed too indiscreetly and offensively. Thus he says to Critobulus: "Mechanical arts are despised, and, indeed, it is not with injustice that they are little valued by states; for they are injurious to the bodies of the workmen as well as to the superintendents, since they render it necessary for them to sit, and to remain constantly in-door; and many of them pass all the day near the fire. And whenever the body is languid, the mind loses its energy. Besides, those arts allow us no time to devote to our friends and to the state, so that such people are little useful to their friends, and bad protectors of their country. Nay, in some, principally in warlike states, no citizen is allowed to pursue mechanical arts."

Even the tyranny of the Thirty, as we have seen, did not escape the satire of Socrates. The priests too, as we know from the Euthyphron of Plato, were obliged to hear from his lips the truth that their ideas of divine worship were totally erroneous. It is natural enough that Socrates should have made a number of individuals


2. That poets were allowed to express themselves freely on religious subjects, and that philosophers were deprived of this privilege, may be accounted for in the following way. Poets wrote for the sake of amusement; a little freedom was easily granted to them, provided they made the people laugh; but the words of a philosopher had a more serious tendency. Besides, we know that dramatic representations originated in the festival of Dionysus, which was solemnized as licentiously as the Bacchanalia of the Romans. On the other hand, a distinction must be drawn between political religion, i. e., that which, being intimately connected with the Constitution, was observed in public festivals and ceremonies, and the monstrous mass of fables concerning the origin and history of the gods; for at Athens religious belief was unconnected with public worship. With regard to mythological stories, the Greeks were allowed to express themselves as freely as they liked, provided they did not attack the mysteries, or doubt the existence of the gods. Proofs of this we find not only in the comic writers, but in the most celebrated tragic poets, as *Eschylus* and *Euripides,* and in the history of *Aischylos.* But it is surprising that Xenophon in *Magna Graecia* was allowed to express himself so freely on the state religion, while philosophical opinions much less connected with religion proved so dangerous to Anaxagoras at Athens.
his enemies by these free expressions, and especially by interfering with the interests of the priests, who demanded the greatest submission, as their religious system did not bear a free examination. The analogy of history and daily experience shows this sufficiently, even if we leave out of consideration the facts stated in the accusation.

3. The odious light in which Socrates was represented by Aristophanes, created enemies to the former, and contributed to his accusation. The assertion founded on the report of Ælian,1 that Aristophanes had been bribed by the enemies of Socrates, especially by Meletus and Anytus, to represent him in a ridiculous light, though it was in former times almost generally believed, is certainly destitute of any historical evidence. Meletus was a young man when he accused Socrates (νεος, βαδυγένεως, he is called in the Euthyphron of Plato): how is it possible that twenty-three years2 before that time he should have bribed Aristophanes? On the first representation of the Clouds, Anytus was only fourteen years old, and on good terms with Socrates, as we are told by Plato. With our present accurate knowledge of the nature of the so-called old Attic comedy, we can not even suppose that Aristophanes was a personal enemy of Socrates,3 though he represented him to the Athenian people in the manner we see in the Clouds. The manner in which Socrates lived was a subject too tempting for a comic poet not to have introduced, though he might not have been provoked by any

2. The Clouds were performed 423 B.C., on the festival of Dionysus.
3. The scholiasts, endeavoring to account for the odious light in which Socrates is represented in the Clouds, are of different opinions, some ascribing it to the in viterate hatred of the comic poets against the philosophers, others to personal jealousy, since Socrates had been preferred by King Archelaus to Aristophanes, &c. But all these hypotheses can easily be dispelled with. The comic poet took up any subject which did not appear to be wanting in comical interest, and made it suit his purpose. Besides, Aristophanes was not the only one who brought Socrates on the stage. Eupolis and Amphisias did the same (see Diog. Laert., ii., 18 Schol. ad Nub., 96 and 120); and Socrates shared this fate with all the distinguished men of his age, Pericles, Alcibiades, and Euripides. Thus the Frogs of Aristophanes were a satire upon Euripides, and, to a certain extent, upon Æschylus also. These comedies gave great delight to the multitude, as they considered it an essential part of their democratical liberty to laugh with impunity at the most eminent men of the age; even their demagogues, the adored Pericles and Cleon, were not spared. To attack the People was, properly speaking, not allowed—though Aristophanes made occasional exceptions—for it was sacred; but every individual might be brought on the stage by the comic poet. Xenoph., De Republica Athen., c. 2. The first archon, whose name could not be profaned on the stage, formed the only exception. Compare the schol. on the Clouds, v. 32.
external causes. How many truly comical scenes might be derived from Socrates gazing at one object for twenty-four hours, and from the many anecdotes which were told of him; in addition to which, we must not forget his resemblance to a Silenus, and the many peculiarities in his conduct. 1 On the other hand, however, it would be going too far to assert that the ridiculous representation of Socrates had no influence on his fate. Even a cursory perusal of the Clouds of Aristophanes must convince the reader that every thing is calculated to exhibit Socrates in an odious light, as seducing the young, introducing new gods, and, consequently, as highly injurious to the Commonwealth; and it is surprising to see these charges, twenty-three years afterward, repeated by Meletus. Socrates himself, in the Apology, says that Aristophanes and his party were enemies far more dangerous to him than his accusers, and that Meletus, in reality, had only repeated the charges of the former. 2 Aristophanes has been standing there, on the same spot, thinking about something, from an early hour in the morning. 3 In the evening, when he was still standing there, some of the Ionian soldiers, after supper, took out their carpets, partly to repose on them in the refreshing evening air (for it was a summer night), partly to watch whether Socrates would actually pass the night in that position. And he actually remained standing till daybreak, and then addressed his prayers to the rising sun, and hastened away."—Aul. Gellius, Noct. Att., ii, 1.

1. Plat., Sympos., p. 220, C. "Meditating on some subject, he once stopped somewhere early in the morning (viz., during the expedition against Potidaea), and as he did not succeed in his search, he remained in deep thought, standing on the same spot. When it had become noon-time, he attracted the attention of the people, and one said to another, 'Socrates has been standing there, on the same spot, thinking about something, from an early hour in the morning.' In the evening, when he was still standing there, some of the Ionian soldiers, after supper, took out their carpets, partly to repose on them in the refreshing evening air (for it was a summer night), partly to watch whether Socrates would actually pass the night in that position. And he actually remained standing till daybreak, and then addressed his prayers to the rising sun, and hastened away."

2. τεοδ γρά τολλοι καθ'γαια γεγόναν πρός ομας, σας ήν, και πάλαις πολλά ήσαν δια την και εσθεν αλλοις λειωντες, δεις εγρά καλλον φοθουμα τοις αριστοις, και απειροντες και πατοντες δεικνυον. Αλλ' εκεινοι δεικνυοντει, οι άνεφες, οι ιμαντος τοις πολλοις εκ πατον παραλαμβανοντες δεικνυον τε και κατηγορουν εγον στηλην αλληλικες, έτε ί ας εις ξωκρατησ, ουφος άνθρ, τα τε μετωφρα φρονιστης, και τα του γης απαντα ανεξητηκας και τον ιλην λογον κρειτω ποιαν. 3 ουτοι, οι άνεφες Αθηναιαι, ταυτην φημην κατα-

3 A man who investigates all things above and below the earth (μετεωροφθον τιος) is the expression of Aristophanes) was an Atheist, according to the ideas of the Athenian people, for a natural philosopher and an Atheist were synonyms apppellations. These natural philosophers were also called meteωρολαγχαι. A Sophist is a person who gives to a bad cause the appearance of a good one, by means of eloquence. This proves that Aristophanes did not distinguish Socrates from the Sophists; and, indeed, proofs of this are met with throughout the Clouds. Thus Socrates invokes the Clouds, the protecting deities of the Sophists; Socrates teaches how the λογος δικαιος may be conquered by the λογος άδικος; he makes astronomical researches (to this must be referred his soaring in the air in a basket, v. 184, seqq.); and he receives money for his instructions (v. 98, 29, 113-115, 245, 246), &c. A slight allusion to the sophistry of Socrates we find also in the answer of Ischomachus (in Xenoph., Econ., c. 11, § 27) to the question how Ischomachus was getting on with his lawsuit: "When it is sufficient," he says, "for
towards and his party, it is true, could not directly contribute to the accusation of Socrates, for the times were too distant; but they assisted to prejudice the minds of the people against our philosopher, and to exhibit him not only as an object of ridicule, but as a man dangerous to the Constitution. This was certainly an effect which these calumnies were calculated to produce, and in which they wonderfully succeeded. Meletus would perhaps not have ventured to come forth with an accusation against Socrates, had not a favorite poet of the Athenian people paved the way, and indirectly undertaken his accusation. “Let us go back,” says Socrates, in the Apology, “to the commencement, and the first charge from which the calumny has arisen, relying on which, Meletus has brought the present charge against me.” That the Clouds of Aristophanes did not obtain the prize, but a play of Cratinus, who contested for it with him and Anytus, can not surprise us; nor should it lead us to the conclusion that the Clouds of Aristophanes were unfavorably received by the Athenians. It was not the applause of the people which decided the prize, but judges were especially appointed for that purpose, who were often biased by opposite motives, and who may have been influenced in this instance by circumstances unknown to us.

4. Socrates was not in favor of a democratical form of government.

1 Argum. ii., ad Nubes, edit. Herm, says that Alcibiades and his party had prevented the success of this piece. According to Aelian’s account (Var. Hist. ii., 13), the people were so much pleased with the Clouds of Aristophanes, that they exclaimed, “No one but Aristophanes ought to be rewarded with the prize.” Aristophanes himself considered it the most perfect of his comedies (Nuµb., v. 522, and Vespa, v. 1033). The account of Aelian, however, deserves just as little credit as the anecdote which he relates immediately after it, that Socrates, knowing that he would be the object of bitter satire, was not only present during the performance, but that, having heard that many strangers were present, and were inquiring who Socrates was, he came forth in the midst of the comedy, and remained standing in a place where he could be observed by all, and compared with the copy.

2. [For an account of the Clouds of Aristophanes, see a note at the end of this chapter.—Tr.]
ment: this must also have contributed to his accusation. Socrates, like the sages of antiquity in general, approved of an aristocracy in the original sense of the word, viz., a constitution which intrusted the supreme power to the hands of the best in a moral point of view. Socrates was aware how dangerous it is to intrust the supreme power to the hands of an uneducated populace; his own experience taught him how easy it was for selfish demagogues to gain favor with an inconstant multitude, and to carry plans into execution which were often highly injurious to the whole nation. Hence he frequently spoke in a sarcastic manner of the Athenian Constitution, and satirized their bean-archons. Socrates said to Charmides, an able young man, who, however, was too timid to speak in the public assembly, "Is it the fullers that thou art afraid of, or the shoemakers? the carpenters, or the smiths? the peas-

1. An aristocracy, according to the conceptions of the Athenians before the time of Alexander the Great, was not opposed to democracy, but to oligarchy. In an aristocracy the people always had great influence, but in an oligarchy they were entirely deprived of it. One of the principal passages relating to this point is in the *Menexenus* of Plato, p. 238, C. Plato there represents Socrates as repeating a funeral discourse of Aspasia in honor of those who had died for their country. *Politieia γι̂ρ τροφή άνθρώπων ήτι, σαγη Ασπασία, καλή μην ἄγαθων, ἥ ήτι άναντία κακών. Ός μην ἐν καλῇ πολιτεια ἄνθρωποι οἱ πρόσθεν ἢμους, άναγκαίον ἀνήσυχον, οἷν ἄλλοι κακεύον ἄγαθοι καὶ οἱ νῦν εἰσίν, ὥς οἶδε τυχαῖοιν οὕτως οἱ τετελευτηκότες. 'Η γάρ αὕτῃ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τότε ἦν καὶ νῦν, ἀριστοκρατία, ἐν τῷ νῦν τε πολιτείας καὶ τῷ ἄλλοι κράτους ἐξ ἱκείου ἡ τῇ πολλῇ. Καλεί δὲ δὲ μὲν αὕτην ἐπιμεταξίαν, δὲ ἄλλα, ἦν καιρὸς. Ἰστι δὲ τῇ άλθείᾳ μετε ἀνθρώπους ἀριστοκρατία. Βασίλειος μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι μην εἰσίν· οὗτοι δὲ τούτοι μὲν ἐκ γένους, τούτο δὲ ἰρετός· ἐγκρίτης δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ πολλῇ τῷ πλῆθος, τοῖς ὧν ἄρχει διότι καὶ τῷ κράτῳ τοῖς ἄλλοι διότι διότι διότι εἰσιν, καὶ οὕτω δεώνειν, οὕτω πείνῃ, οὕτω ἀγνώστοι πατέρων ἀπέλλαγατο οὐθεὶς οὐθὲ τοὺς ισαντιοὺς τενιμήτω ὡσπέρ ἐν ἄλλαις πολιτείας, ἄλλα ὧν ὄρος, δὲ ὄρος σοφοὶ ἄγαθοι δὲ τοὺς κρατεῖ κἀκε ἄρχει. Compare with this Xenoph. *Mem.*, iv., 6, § 12: "When ever public offices were held by persons who executed the will of the law, Socrates considered the government to be an aristocracy." More arguments in support of this opinion are given by Luc. *Hist.*, l. c., p. 67.

2. Xenoph. *Mem.*, i., 2, § 3. The archons were elected by beans: white beans were used in voting for a candidate, black ones in voting against him. The names of the candidates for the *bole* were put into one vase, and into another an equal number of beans, fifty of which were white, the remainder black. Simultaneously with the name of a candidate drawn from one vase, a bean was drawn from the other. A white bean accompanying the name made the candidate a senator. Hence the expression *εὐμετατοι ἄρχετοι* for senators. That Socrates was adverse to the democratic Constitution of the Athenians, is also stated by *Elian, Par Hist.*, iii., 17: Συκρατήσιν ἐν τῇ μὴν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ οὐκ ἥρθεστει: τυραννικήν γὰρ καὶ μοναρχικὴν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐπιμεταξίαν ἀνεύσατο. This sentiment was also maintained by his successors. Plato and Xenophon, although differing in their principles and opinions on other subjects, agree with each other on this point.

anis, or the merchants, or the higglers who exchange things in the market, and think of nothing else but how they may sell at the highest price what they have bought at the lowest? for of such people the assembly is composed.” Still more forcible is the account given by Aelian, who appears to have confounded Charmides with the more celebrated Alcibiades: “Thou surely art not afraid of that shoemaker?” When Alcibiades denied this, he said, “But perhaps that crier in the market or the tent-maker?” When Alcibiades answered this also in the negative, “Well, then,” said Socrates, “do not the people of Athens consist of nothing but such persons? and if thou art not afraid of each of them individually, thou canst not be afraid of them when they are assembled.” Even in his Apology he did not conceal his anti-democratical feelings. It is but natural that such assertions of our philosopher should have inflamed those irritable Athenian democrats, according to whose ideas the election of magistrates by lot was the very foundation of their democracy, and that they should have been strongly inclined to accuse a man who held such opinions.

This anti-democratic mode of thinking was not only thought to be discovered in the expressions of Socrates; his having educated the cruel tyrant Critias was alleged as an actual proof of it, although Socrates had not the slightest share in his tyrannical principles. We can not be surprised that in the accusation of Socrates no mention was formally made of Critias and of the Thirty Tyrants in general, of Alcibiades, Hipparchus, and many others of the oligarchical party, who had been more or less intimately connected with Socrates; nor can it be maintained that these connections had no influence on the accusation. The omission of this very important point must be ascribed to the general amnesty which had been proposed by Archinus, and was established after the banishment of the Thirty; and yet Xenophon, the most trustworthy of all the writers who have transmitted to us accounts of Socrates, says that the ridicule at Socrates on the election of magistrates by lot, his having instructed Critias, and quoted passages from the most eminent poets, which bestowed praise on tyranny, were the principal articles in the second charge which accused Socrates of seducing the young.

1. II, 1.
5. Xenophon, clearly seeing that he could not refute the first of these facts namely, the ridicule on the κυαμεται, wisely avoids mentioning it.
The account of Xenophon strongly confirms the supposition that
the connection between Socrates and Critias, whose cruelties were
still well remembered by the democratical party, must have con-
tributed to his accusation, and is indeed very probable, when we
only consider the state of affairs. A passage of Eschines, the or-
ator, might also be adduced to confirm this opinion, but we have
reason to doubt the veracity of Eschines whenever it is his object
to bring charges against his adversary, Demosthenes. This pas-
sage occurs in the speech against Timarchus,1 which Eschines de-
livered before the assembly of the people. "You who have put to
death Socrates, the Sophist, whom you knew to have educated Crit-
ias, one of the Thirty Tyrants who abolished your democracy, will
you allow yourselves to be moved by the private interest of an or-
ator like Demosthenes?" The name of Sophist, which Eschines
must surely have known not to have belonged to Socrates, but
which orators frequently applied to philosophers to express their
contempt of them, and the mention of Critias, are sufficient to
prove the intention of Eschines, who wished by these sentiments
to hurt the feelings of Demosthenes, a disciple of Plato, and a kins-
man of Critias.

[THE CLOUDS OF ARISTOPHANES.

In the clouds of Aristophanes, which was exhibited B.C. 423, Soc-
rates is introduced as the great master of the school of the Sophists.
A plain, simple citizen of Athens, named Strepsiades, engaged in
husbandry, having married into a family of distinction, and having
contracted debts through the extravagance of his wife (v. 49, seq.,
437, seq., ed. Dindorf) and his son's (Pheidippides) fashionable love
of horses, in order to defeat the impending suits of his creditors,
wishes to place his son in a school of philosophy and rhetoric, where
he may learn the arts of oratory, and of turning right into wrong, in
order thereby to repair the ills which he had chiefly brought upon
himself. On the son's refusal, the father applies in person to the
master of the school, who is named Socrates; by him he is solemnly
initiated, instructed, and examined, but, being found too old and
stupid to learn, he is dismissed; upon which, after he has given
his son some samples of the new philosophy, he forces him, much
against his will, into the school: here the young man makes such
great and rapid progress in learning that he is able to teach his father.

1. In the third volume of Reiske's edition of the Oratores Graeci p. 168.
who exults at his brilliant success, the most extraordinary tricks for the attainment of his object; but as he is now himself enlightened, and has raised himself above considerations of right and duty, he denies and scorns in the coarsest manner the relation in which he stands both to his father and mother; he defends his new opinions with the refinements of sophistry, and, retorting upon his father the good lessons he had before received from him, pays him in the same coin. Upon this the father, cured of his error, in wishing to get rid of his embarrassments by dishonesty and sophistical chicanery, returns to take revenge upon the school of that pernicious science and upon its master, who is obliged to receive back all the subtle arguments and high-flown words which he had himself made use of, and the old man levels the establishment to the ground.

From this connected view of the story, we see that it is through out directed against that propensity of the Athenians to controversies and law-suits, which was eminently promoted by their practice of getting into debt; and against the pernicious, sophistical, and wrangling oratory, which was ever at the service of this disposition, in the courts of justice, and particularly in the discussion of all public transactions; and Aristophanes never loses an opportunity of combating these two vices.

Moreover, as the story is set in action by the perverse purpose awakened in Strepsiades, as it comes to an end when he is cured, and as this change arises from the unexpected and extravagant result of the experiment upon Pheidippides, who is to be the instrument of the father's design, the school of sophistry in which the youth is to be formed is clearly the hinge on which the whole action turns; for its influence on Pheidippides decides the success or failure of the views of Strepsiades, and, consequently, the issue of the story of the drama.

This, therefore, is the view which we must take of the relation of the several parts to each other, namely, that the principal character to which the whole refers is not Socrates, who has generally been considered to be so, in consequence of the story lingering so long at his shop, and of his being the sufferer at the conclusion, but Strepsiades himself; whereas Socrates is the intermediate party who is to instruct Pheidippides for the vicious purposes of the father; and this he executes so perfectly, that the old gentleman is at first deceived; but he soon reaps fruits, the nature of which opens his eyes to his own folly, and to the destructive tendency of this system of education.

In "The Clouds" the poet introduces us to the original source
whence, according to his view, the new fangled and pernicious system of education took its rise, namely, the school of sophistical eloquence. He represents the Phrontisterion, or subtilety shop, as its seat and centre of union, this being necessary in a dramatic point of view; and he concentrates in the schoolmaster those essential properties of the school which are to explain his purpose, intertwined as they are with others, which belong to the real Socrates, under whose name and mask he clothed the dramatic personage. This individual centralization was indispensably requisite for the conduct of the drama; and this is the poet's only excuse for representing Socrates within the walls of a school, as the philosopher himself was continually moving about in public, a contradiction which has been considered as a convincing proof that the whole exhibition, as we have it, could not have been intended really for him. Aristophanes lays open to us, with the coloring, indeed, of a caricature, the whole interior sayings and doings of the school; he draws a sketch of the methods and means of instruction peculiar to it; and he shows the extent to which the mischief has already gone, since the λόγος δίκαιος is unable to defend himself; he points out, likewise, what results we are to expect from the school, what immediate calamities threaten not merely the parents themselves, who were blind enough to encourage such a system of education, but the common-weal also; and, finally, what the people ought to do to annihilate the evil at its source.

The Socrates in "The Clouds" must not, therefore, be considered as an individual, or as the copy of an individual; but as the principal personages in Aristophanes are for the most part symbolical, he too must be viewed as symbolical, that is, as the representative of the school and of its principle. And as we see in him a good deal which answers to the individual whose name and mask he bears, and much, too, which is heterogeneal to him, although, by means of certain allusions, and the ingenuity of dramatic combination, these two are amalgamated together, so, also, in the characters of Strepsiades and Pheidippides, many traits which are perfectly apposite to the objects which they are intended to typify, are combined with many which are extravagantly caricatured, and the creatures of poetic fiction. Strepsiades, for example, whose name is explained by his tendency to evil (v. 1455, comp. v. 88), and by the pleasure he takes in distorting right (v. 434), is the representative of the good old time, working out its own destruction by the abandonment of the laborious, frugal peasant's life, by illustrious marriages and female influence, by the extravagant life which his son leads in son-
sequence of it, and by the debts and law-suits which this occasions, all of which open the door to sophistical eloquence; or, if you will, he is the representative of the elder portion of the Athenian people, in this dangerous crisis of their affairs. As in some other characters of the comedies of Aristophanes, which present the people under different aspects, for example, the Demos himself in "The Knights," and Philocleon in "The Wasps," there is always a groundwork of truth and honesty, but which is alloyed with falsehood and led into error, and whose cure and restoration to a healthy and vigorous state, and a right view of things, form the end and aim of the dramas; so, likewise, in "The Clouds," a sickly disposition of the people, the nature and bent of which are portrayed under the character of Strepsiades, in the most lively colors of caricature, is represented as the school in which that personage seeks the means of obtaining the object of his desires, but is cured the moment that the full operation of those means is unexpectedly brought to light.

Pheidippides, on the other hand, is the picture of the new or modern times, in the young men of fashion just coming out into the world, whose struggle with the older generation is pointed out by words of derision and raillery. The fashionable and chevaleresque passion for horses and carriages in the young men of the time was accompanied by λαλω (loquaciousness) and her whole train of vicious propensities; and yet how much better would it be, as Aristophanes implies, to leave the youth to these pursuits, and honorably bear up against the lesser evil of the debts, which had grown out of them, than that, from selfish and dishonest motives, encouragement should be given to what was calculated to poison the youths in their hearts' core, and thereby to bring disorder into all domestic and political relations! In this sense, when Pheidippides expresses his delight and satisfaction with what he had gained from the art of oratory, as it put him in a situation to prove that it was right for a son to correct his father, Strepsiades retorts upon him in these words:

"Ride on and drive away, 'fore Jove! I'd rather keep a coach and four, than be thus beat and mauled."

This, then, is the lesson which Aristophanes would give to his contemporaries in Athens by "The Clouds." If one of the two must have its way, let the young men indulge themselves in their horses and carriages, however it may distress you; but check the influence of these schools, unless you wish to make a scourge for yourself and for the state; exterminate in yourselves that dishonest propensity which entangles you in law-suits, and which by means
of those schools, will make your sons the instruments of your ruin! The younger population he tries to deter from the same fate by a display of the manners of the school, and of the pale faces and enervated limbs which come out of it (v. 102, 504, 1012, 1171).

We can not, therefore, say that the play of "The Clouds" is pointed at any one definite individual; but it reproves one general and dangerous symptom of the times, in the whole habits and life, political and domestic, of the Athenians, developing it in its source, in every thing which fostered it and made it attractive, in the instruments by which it was established, and which gave to it its pernicious efficiency; and thus, while he strictly and logically deduces real effects from real causes, as far as this development is concerned, the personages which bear a part in the action are consequently one and all historical. Hence we can very well understand the striking references in particular characters to certain individuals; and I think it more than probable that such reference is intended, not merely in the personage which bears the name of Socrates, but also in that of Pheidippides, while in the character of Strepsiades the poet only meant to point to the people in general.

The excessive love of horses exhibited in Pheidippides, and the extravagance consequent upon it; the rapid strides, too, which he makes in readiness of speech, in debauchery, and in selfish arrogance, and the relation in which he stands to Socrates, evidently point, without further search, to Alcibiades, in whom we find all these features united, on whom all the young men of the higher classes of his time pinned their faith, and whom they assisted a few years afterward in carrying through his political projects.

In "The Clouds," Aristophanes introduces Alcibiades as a ready orator and a debauchée; as the fruit of that school, from which, as the favorite pupil of Socrates, he seems to have issued; in short, as the type of Pheidippides, although all the traits attributed to the latter are not to be looked for individually in Alcibiades, and although his name does not occur in the course of the drama. Moreover, the supposed lineage of Pheidippides, whose mother (v. 46) was the niece of a Megacles, the frequent mention of that uncle (v. 70, 124, 825), and that of his descent from a celebrated ancient lady of the name of Kostiopa, distinctly point to Alcibiades, whose mother, Deinomacbe, was herself a daughter of Megacles, and from whose family the Alcmeneidae, to which Kostiopa belonged, he had inherited his strong passion for a well-furnished stable. This passion is, in-

the deed, brought forward in the care taken by Pheidippides' mother that the word ἵππος should be introduced somehow or other into his name, as, in truth, it did occur also in ἵππαρτη,¹ the daughter of Hipponicus, and wife of Alcibiades. With all these circumstances to point it out, the part of Pheidippides in the play could not have failed to remind the Athenians of Alcibiades, who, about this time, or somewhat earlier, began to neglect, as Isocrates says,² the contests of the gymasia (and this is an important matter in reference to the play of "The Clouds"), and to devote himself to those equestrian and chariotteering pursuits, to which he was indebted for his victory at the Olympic games. The very name of Pheidippides is not a pure invention of Aristophanes, but forms at once a connecting link between the youth himself and that Pheidippus, son of Thessalus,³ who was one of the ancestors of the Thessalian Aleuadæ, famous for their breed of horses; and, at the same time, by its final syllables, it keeps up the allusion to Alcibiades, who had likewise learned the science of the manège, both in riding and driving, in Thessaly; and the same comparison with the Aleuadæ is implied, which we find also in Satyrus,⁴ who tells us that Alcibiades spent his time in Thessaly, breeding horses, and driving cars, with more fondness for horse-flesh even than the Aleuadæ. An allusion, also, to the well-known infantine τραυλισμός of Alcibiades, or his defect in the articulation of certain letters,⁵ could not fail to fix the attention of the Athenian public to this remarkable personage. If, then, the actor who represented Pheidippides did but imitate slightly this τραυλισμός in appropriate passages, and if he bore in his mask and conduct any resemblance to Alcibiades, there was no further occasion whatever for his name; and we need not have recourse to the supposition that his not being mentioned by name in the play was owing to any fear of Alcibiades, who did not understand such rairillery on the part of the comic poets, since the other characteristics by which he was designated were sufficiently complete and intelligible for comic representation; and the whole was affected with much more freedom and arch roguery than if, in addition to that of Socrates, the name likewise of Alcibiades had crudely destroyed the whole riddle, it being already quite piquant enough for a contemporary audience. The proof of an allusion in "The Clouds" to Alcibiades, and to the youths who shared in his pursuits and disposition,

² L. c. Compare Plut., Alcib., c. 11.
³ Homer, II., ii., 678.
⁴ In Athenæus, xii., c. 9, p. 534–6: Ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ ἐκ ἰππορφών καὶ βελαχῶν ἱππαρτής Ἀλκιβιάδου ἱππικόμερης.
⁵ Plutarch, Alcib., c. 1.
life of Socrates.

is confirmed also by the second argument prefixed to the play, and by the notice it contains that Alcibiades and his party had prevented the first prize being awarded to Aristophanes; from which it is evident, even were the fact not probable in itself, that a tendency hostile to Alcibiades and his friends was perceived even by the ancients in this drama.

It was also about this time that the intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates was at its height, as the flight from Delion took place in the winter of the first year of the 89th Olympiad, that is, in the year in which "The Clouds" was represented; and the share they both had in this engagement, and the assistance which Alcibiades gave to Socrates, were manifest proofs of that intimacy. Alcibiades also, about this time, must have been deeply engaged in public affairs.

But the question arises, Why did Aristophanes, when he gave a name and mask to the master of the school of subtlety, which was so foreign to the real Socrates, select the name and mask of that very individual?

Aristophanes selected Socrates, not only because his whole exterior and his mode of life offered a most appropriate mask for comic representation, but also (and this was his chief reason) because, in these circumstances as well as in many other points, the occupations of Socrates and his mode of instruction bore a great resemblance to those of the natural philosophers and of the Sophists. The poet thus found abundance of subject-matter, which composed a picture suited to his views, namely, to exhibit to the public a master of the school whence the mischief he strove to put down was working its way into the hearts of the Athenian youths. We must also take into our consideration the important fact, that several individuals, such as Euripides, Pericles, Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Critias, who supported the modern system of education, were in close habits of intimacy with Socrates, and in part, too, with the natural philosophers and Sophists; and this helped to give additional relief and light to the portrait of the man who was the centre around which they moved.

It should be recollected that it was not the object of Aristophanes to represent Socrates as he appeared to his confidential pupils, to Xenophon, to Plato, to Phædo, to Cebes, and others, but how he might be represented to the great mass of the Athenian people, that is, how they comprehended and judged him from his outward and visible signs, and how they understood and appreciated the usual extravagances of the comic poets; in short, how it was to be managed, that while his name and his mask, caricatured to the un-
most, were kept together by fundamental affinities, the former might appear sufficiently justified, and be not improperly placed in connection with individuals who were displaying before the eyes of the public the germs which were developed in Alcibiades, and the early results to which they had given birth. But as the people saw Socrates forever and deeply employed, either in meditations, like the natural philosophers, φροντιζειν, or like the Sophists in instructive intercourse with the youth, σοφίζεσθαι, as Pericles called it, and as Socrates was frequently engaged in conversation with those Sophists (besides many palpable points of resemblance, calculated to mislead even those who observed him more closely), it would necessarily follow that they reckoned him one of that community. As Aeschines himself does when he calls him a Sophist; judging, then, as they did, from outward appearances, they placed him in the same category with those of his associates whom they knew to be most engaged on the theatre of public life. Aristophanes himself seems to have had no other notion of Socrates; at least, the whole range of his comedy furnishes us with many characteristic traits perfectly similar to the picture we have of him in "The Clouds." In "The Birds" (v. 1282), the poet expresses by ἐσωκράτων the ideal of a hardy mode of life, and neglect of outward appearances; and in v. 1554 he represents Socrates, who is there called the unwashed (ἄλοντος), as ψυχαγωγός, conductor of souls, maker of images, conjurer-up of spirits, who is obeyed by the shadowy forms of his scholars, among whom Chærephon is particularly designated, the same who is assailed also in "The Clouds," and on various other occasions by the comic poets, as the confidential friend of his youth. And not only in "The Clouds," but in "The Frogs" also, near the end, the Socratic dialogues are ridiculed as solemn twaddle and impertinent nonsense. Although, therefore, the chief purpose of Socrates' appearance in "The Clouds" is on account of Alcibiades, who is principally aimed at in the character of Pheidippides, and though this motive for introducing him necessarily influenced the formation of that character, yet it is evident that the picture of Socrates and his school, as portrayed in "The Clouds," was not created by Aristophanes merely for the purposes of this comedy, but that he had for his ground-work a definite and decided model.—Abridged from Sücurns's Essay on "The Clouds," translated by Mr. W. R. Hamilton.

"There are two points with regard to the conduct of Aristophanes which appear to have been placed by recent investigations be-

1 In Timaret., p. 346, ed. Bekker.
yon^t doubt. It may be considered as certain that he was not anim-
ated by any personal malevolence toward Socrates, but only at-
tacked him as an enemy and corruptor of religion and morals; but,
on the other hand, it is equally well established that he did not
merely borrow the name of Socrates for the representative of the
sophistical school, but designed to point the attention and to excite
the feelings of his audience against the real individual. The only
question which seems to be still open to controversy on this subject
concerns the degree in which Aristophanes was acquainted with the
real character and aims of Socrates, as they are known to us from
the uniform testimony of his intimate friends and disciples. We
find it difficult to adopt the opinion of some modern writers, who
contend that Aristophanes, notwithstanding a perfect knowledge of
the difference between Socrates and the Sophists, might still have
looked upon him as standing so completely on the same ground with
them, that one description was applicable to them and him. It is
ture, as we have already observed, that the poet would have will-
ingly suppressed all reflection and inquiry on many of the subjects
which were discussed both by the Sophists and by Socrates, as a
presumptuous encroachment on the province of authority. But it
seems incredible, that if he had known all that makes Socrates so
admirable and amiable in our eyes, he would have assailed him with
such vehement bitterness, and that he should never have qualified
his satire by a single word indicative of the respect which he must
then have felt to be due at least to his character and his intentions.
But if we suppose, what is in itself much more consistent with the
opinions and pursuits of the comic poet, that he observed the phi-
losopher attentively indeed, but from a distance which permitted no
more than a superficial acquaintance, we are then at no loss to un-
derstand how he might have confounded him with a class of men
with which he had so little in common, and why he singled him out
to represent them. He probably first formed his judgment of Soc-
rates by the society in which he usually saw him. He may have
known that his early studies had been directed by Archelaus, the dis-
ciple of Anaxagoras; that he had both himself received the instruc-
tion of the most eminent Sophists, and had induced others to be-
come their hearers; that Euripides, who had introduced the sophis-
tical spirit into the drama, and Aleibiades, who illustrated it most
completely in his life, were in the number of his most intimate
friends. Socrates, who never willingly stirred beyond the walls of
the city, lived almost wholly in public places, which he seldom en-
ered without forming a circle round him, and opening some discus-
tion connected with the object of his philosophical researches; he readily accepted the invitations of his friends, especially when he expected to meet learned and inquisitive guests, and probably never failed to give a speculative turn to the conversation. Aristophanes himself may have been more than once present, as Plato represents him, on such occasions. But it was universally notorious that whenever Socrates appeared, some subtle disputation was likely to ensue; the method by which he drew out and tried the opinions of others, without directly delivering his own, and even his professions—for he commonly described himself as a seeker who had not yet discovered the truth—might easily be mistaken for the sophistical skepticism which denied the possibility of finding it. Aristophanes might also, either immediately or through hearsay, have become acquainted with expressions and arguments of Socrates apparently contrary to the established religion."—Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. iv., p. 267, 268.—Tr.]

CHAPTER VIII.

These causes sufficiently account for the accusation of Socrates, but why was it delayed till he had reached his seventieth year?

The hatred against Socrates, as an enemy of the democracy, did not dare to display itself previous to the banishment of Alcibiades, the powerful friend of Socrates, who still remained his friend even after he had given up his intimate acquaintance. Besides this, during the Peloponnesian war, the attention of the people was engaged by more important affairs than the accusation of Socrates, and his enemies, who belonged for the most part to the democratical party, had not sufficient influence during the government of the Thirty to attempt any thing against him. On the other hand, the Thirty, in spite of their own corruption, could not deny him their esteem, and they also probably dreaded his friends, whose number was not small and therefore endeavored, but unsuccessfully, to gain him over to their interest, as we have seen in the affair of Leon of Salamis. But there was hardly a moment more favorable to the accusation of a man suspected of anti-democratic sentiments1 than that which the

1. That Socrates was not considered as a friend of the people, according to the notions of the multitude, we also see from the Apology ascribed to Xenophon, in which great pains are taken to represent him as ἰησοῦκος. Compare the Apology of Libanius, p. 17: "Socrates hated democracy, and would have liked to have seen a tyrant at the head of the republic," &c. "He is an enemy of the people, and persuaded his friends to despise democracy. He praised Pisistratus, admired
accusers of Socrates actually chose. After the recovery of democratic liberty, the Athenians, still feeling the consequences of the unfortunate issue of the Peloponnesian war, which their superstition ascribed to the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermes-busts by Alcibiades, and remembering the honors with which the government of the Thirty Tyrants was branded, became more jealous of their Constitution than ever, and more inclined to punish persons against whom such plausible charges could be brought as those against Socrates, the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades.

But the old charge, so often repeated against philosophers, that they introduced new gods and corrupted the young, and which was also employed against Socrates, was not followed by his immediate condemnation. We know from the Apology of Plato that Meletus requested the assistance of the party of Anytus and Lycon, in order to induce the judges to pronounce the preliminary sentence of guilty

Hippias, honored Hipparchus, and called that period the happiest of the Athenians, andc. These are the charges against which Socrates is defended by Libanius.

1. The accusation of impiety was so comprehensive, that the greatest and best men, on whom not a shadow of any other crime could fall, were charged with it. The tribunal before which they were tried was not the same at all times, as the cause might be pleaded before the Areopagus, the Senate, or the Heliaea.

2. C. xxv.

3. A preliminary sentence; for a proper condemnation in matters which were not considered criminal only took place after a counter-estimate had been made by the defendant; and wherever a punishment was stated by the law, it was inflicted according to the law, and not left to the discretion of the judges. We find one irregularity in the trial of Socrates, for which we can only account by supposing that some expressions of Socrates were considered by the judges as personally insulting to themselves. But, although the accuser thought the matter criminal (κίνημα Ἀνδρον, he added, according to Diog.; II. 40), yet it was not treated as such by the judges. The first estimate of the punishment was made by the plaintiff, and this kind of estimating was called τιμῶν; the counter-estimate was made by the defendant, and the terms for it were διτιμῶν, διτιμῶσεται (Plat., Apol., c. xxvi.). Compare Pollux, viii., 150, or ἐκτιμῶσεται (Xenoph., Apol., § 25). The positive decision of the punishment was the privilege of the judges, and to fix the punishment was called προτιμῶν. The calculation of votes which Fischer has made, in a remark on the passage of Plato, is too artificial; a more simple interpretation, which is adopted by Schleiermacher and others, is that the union of the party of Anytus and Lycon was required in order to obtain, in combination with that of Meletus, a fifth part of the votes. The number of the judges in the trial of Socrates is said to have been 554. 281 voted against him, 275 for him. If Socrates had had three votes more in his favor, the numbers would have been equal on both sides, and in this case he would have been acquitted. Tychsen, by correcting Diogenes, endeavours to reconcile him with Plato, for they contradict each other with regard to the number of votes. He accordingly increases the number of judges to 559, of whom 291 condemned, and 278 acquitted him. [For an account of the number of
Had Meletus not been supported by them, he would, as Socrates himself says, have failed in his accusation, and been fined one thousand drachmas; for an accuser who failed in obtaining less than the fifth part of the votes was fined this sum. But, even after the preliminary sentence had been pronounced, it would have been easy for Socrates to have given his trial a turn favorable to himself, if he had chosen to condescend to those practices which other defendants had recourse to in such cases, and which men of the highest character employed. In cases which were not criminal, as stated above, a counter-estimate took place; that is, the defendant was allowed to fix on any punishment for himself which he considered proper. It was left to Socrates to choose between imprisonment for life, exile, or a fine. He might have escaped with a small fine, which his friends had declared themselves willing to collect for him; but he rejected this offer, as well as a speech composed by Lysias in his defence. "My whole life," he said, "forms a defence against the present accusation."

"When Meletus had accused him of a crime against the republic," says Xenophon, "he refused doing the slightest thing contrary to the laws, although others, in opposition to the law, were accustomed to implore the compassion of the judges, and to flatter and entreat them, which frequently procured their acquittal. On the contrary, however easy it might have been for him to have been acquitted by the judges, if he had chosen to act in the usual manner, he preferred death in consonance with the laws, to a life maintained by their violation." Instead of trying to make a favorable impression upon the judges, he pronounced these proud words: "If I must estimate myself according to my desert, I estimate myself as deserving to be maintained in the Prytaneum at the public expense." This was

judges who were present at the trial of Socrates, see note (e) on e. xxv. of the Apology, p. 134—Tr.

1. Meursius, Lect. Att., v, 13. Sometimes banishment was inflicted, as we see from the case of Æschines.

2. Cic., De Orat., i, 54: Erat Athenis, reo damnato, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi pecunia estimatos: et sentenda quum judicibus daretur, interrogabatur reus, quam quasi estimationem commeruisset.

3. In the Crîto of Plato, c. xiv., the laws are introduced speaking thus: "Even during thy trial thou wast at liberty to declare thyself deserving exile, if thou hadst wished to do so, and with the consent of the state thou mightest have done what thou art now undertaking against her will. But thou didst even boast, as if thou wast not thyself alarmed, thou even didst say that thou wouldst prefer death to exile." It was the privilege of every Athenian citizen to avoid the severity of the laws by a voluntary exile. Pollux, viii., 10, 117.

₄ Memorab., iv, 4, § 4.  
₅ Plato, Apolog., c. xxvi.
the highest honor, and was conferred on the Prytanes, i.e., the fifty senators belonging to the presiding tribe, on the conquerors at the Olympic games, on youths whose fathers had died in defence of their country, on foreign ambassadors, &c., and at the end of his speech he ironically adds, "If I had had money, I would have estimated myself at as high a sum as I should have been able to pay, for that would not have injured me; but now I can not do so, for I have nothing, unless you will fine me in such a sum as I can pay. But perhaps I might be able to pay a mina of silver: that shall therefore be my estimate. But Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito, and Critobulus, and Apollodorus, are persuading me to fine myself thirty minae, and they themselves are ready to answer for me: that, therefore, shall be my estimate, and they will be satisfactory guarantees for this sum." Such a proud answer, and the language in general which Socrates used, inflated all the judges against him, and eighty of those who at first had been favorably disposed toward him now voted for his death. The real cause of his condemnation was, therefore, the noble, the pride, the "libera contumacia," as Cicero calls it, which he displayed during his trial. He

1. Apologet., c. xxviii. The account in the Apology ascribed to Xenophon (§ 23), that Socrates did not fine himself, nor allow his friends to do so, because this would have been acknowledging his crimes, may be reconciled with the statement of Plato quoted above; for the estimate mentioned by the latter, as appears from the whole context, is pronounced in quite an ironical tone; it is, in reality, no estimate. Tychæon doubts the authority of Plato, thinking that it was only the intention of Plato to immortalize the offer which he and his friends had made to Socrates. But for this supposition we have no reason whatever. Tychæon, in his account of this affair, follows Diogenes, who differs from Plato inasmuch as he states that the estimate of the thirty minae preceded the proud assertion that he deserved to be maintained in the Prytaneum. But the authority of Plato is surely more important. The source from which Diogenes derived his account is unknown.

2. Cic., De Orat., 1, 54: Socrates in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplici aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum.

3. Cic., Ibid.: Cujus responsa sic judices exarserunt ut capitis hominum incessantium condemnarent.

4. Cic., Tuscul., 1, 24: Socrates nec patronum quaesivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit, sed hibere libera contumacia, a magnitudine aequali ductam, non a superbia. This libera contumacia is expressed by the author of the Apology ascribed to Xenophon by μεγάληνοσία. Diog., 8, 84, also says of him, ἐὰν ἐξαγωγήνων (contumax). We see from the Apology of Plato (see also Xenophon, Apol., § 14) that the judges had taken it very ill of Socrates that he mentioned the declaration of the Delphic god, and that he spoke of a genius by whom he was guided. But they were most bitterly enraged by the manner in which he estimated his punishment. The author of the Xenophon, Apology attributes to Socrates one other expression, which must have excited the indignation of the Atheni
fell, properly speaking, as a voluntary victim. It would, however, be improper to suppose that the proud language which he made use of before his judges proceeded wholly and alone from a consciousness of his own worth. The reason why Socrates did not wish to defend himself, and rather did every thing to dispose the judges for his condemnation, was of a religious nature, as appears from several passages of the Socratic philosophers. He was not restrained by his daemon: this was the reason to which he referred the calmness of his mind and the omission of all that he might have done for his defence. Socrates considered himself as a man destined by the Deity to be a general instructor of the people, and regarded his death as a sacrifice which was demanded by the same Deity. This is undoubtedly an interesting point, but, at the same time, one that has too frequently been overlooked in the life of Socrates.

Respecting the immediate cause of the condemnation of Socrates, we must come to the conclusion that he did not so much fall a victim to the hatred of his enemies as to his religious mode of thinking, combined with a strong feeling of his own worth. The indirect causes of his death were certainly his accusers, who were actuated in a great measure by very ignoble motives; but the conduct of the judges, however unjustifiable, is yet excusable in many respects. Socrates had certainly expressed himself too freely on the Constitution; and he must have appeared to the democratic Athenians to have seduced the young by such an open avowal of his opinions. The second point, however, with which Socrates was charged, that he did not believe in the gods worshipped by the state, and on which even the hypothesis of Anaxagoras concerning the sun and the moon was brought to bear, was perfectly unfounded, and is satisfactorily refuted by Socrates in the Apology, and by Xenophon in the Memorabilia. On the other hand, however, even the

ans. Socrates there tells them that Apollo had expressed himself still more strongly in favor of Lycurgus, the legislator of the Lacedemonians (who were so much detested by the Athenians), and had declared him to be the noblest, justest, and most moral of men. See § 15 and 16.

1. Plat., Apol., c. xvii: "Whatever you may think of my conduct and my instructions, I shall change the one as little as the other, and I will rather obey the commands of the god who sent me as your teacher, than those of men." Xenoph., Memorab., iv, 8, 5: "Dost thou not know," Hermogenes says to Socrates, "that the judges at Athens, when offended by one word, have often condemned innocent men to death, and acquitted many criminals?" "Yes indeed they have; but, by Zeus, dear Hermogenes," he answered, "when I was thinking of my defence before the judges, my genius opposed and warned me." Compare Xenoph., Apol., § 4.
calmest judge could not help being prejudiced against him by his pride. He appeared as a man who was in no way willing to own his errors, and who was, consequently, incapable of improvement. Death is, indeed, a very severe punishment according to our ideas, but it was not so among the Athenians, with whom it was considered equal to perpetual exile, and was inflicted for crimes of a less serious nature.¹

Socrates was thus condemned to drink the poisoned cup. A guarantee was demanded that he might not escape from punishment by flight, and Crito became answerable for him. According to the form then customary, as it is expressed in Plutarch's Life of Antiphon, the sentence must have run thus: "Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, of the tribe of Antiochis and the deme of Alopece, has been condemned to be surrendered to the Eleven." To be surrendered to the Eleven was a euphemism of the Attic language instead of to be condemned to death, since the Athenians wished to avoid the word death, which was considered ominous. The Eleven formed a commission, which consisted of the executioner and ten individuals, named respectively by each of the ten tribes. The superintendence of the prisons was intrusted to them, and they carried into execution the sentence of the courts. After the sentence had been pronounced and made publicly known by the herald, they seized the condemned person, and, after putting him in fetters, accompanied him to his prison. We must suppose that these formalities were likewise observed with regard to Socrates.

After the sentence had been pronounced, Socrates once more addressed the judges who had condemned him, and with great resignation and intrepidity spoke of the evil which they inflicted upon themselves by his punishment; and to those who had voted for his acquittal, he spoke upon subjects which at that moment were of the greatest interest—death and immortality. The last words of this address are particularly beautiful, and have found in Cicero² an enthusiastic admirer. "However, it is time for us to go—for me to die, for you to live; which is the better, is unknown to all except to God."

¹ The Athenian laws in this respect were very much like the English. Xenoph., Mem., 1, 2, 63, says: "If a man proves to be a thief, to have stolen clothsings from a bath, to be a pickpocket, to have broken through a wall, to have enslaved free citizens, or robbed a temple, he is punished with death according to the laws." If the value of the things stolen in a bath exceeded ten drachmas, death was inflicted, as is observed by Hindenburg (on this passage) from Demosthenes in Timocr ² Tuscul., 1, 41.
When Socrates had spoken these words, he went with cheerful-
ness to the prison where death awaited him. "Magnus animo ei
vultu," says Seneca,¹ "carcerem intravit." He consoled his weep-
ing friends who followed him, and gently reproached Apollodorus,
who uttered loud complaints respecting the unjust condemnation
of his master.²

The next day Socrates would have been executed, had not a par-
ticular festival, which was then celebrated at Athens, postponed it
for thirty days. It was the time when the Athenians sent to Delos
a vessel with presents for the oracle of Apollo, as a grateful ac-
knowledgment for the successful expedition of Theseus against the
Minotaur. This great festival was solemnized at Athens every
year, and from the moment when the vessel was adorned with a
garland of laurel for its departure till the moment of its return, no
criminal was allowed to be executed. The festival itself, called
Themis, was a kind of propitiation, during which the city was puri-
fied. The vessel in which the presents were conveyed to Delos
was called Themist. As the vessel had been crowned the day before
the condemnation of Socrates, the whole interval between this and
its return was at the disposal of Socrates to prepare himself for his
death. This interval lasted, as we have said, thirty days.³

Although he was confined in irons, Socrates passed these thirty
days with his usual cheerfulness, in conversation with his friends,
in meditations on his future existence, and on the history of his
past life, as well as in attempts at composing verses. "During
this time also," says Xenophon,⁴ "he lived before the eyes of all his
friends in the same manner as in former days; but now his past

¹ Consol. ad Helviam, c. xiv.
² The author of the so-called Apology of Xenophon perfectly agrees with Plato
on these facts, which are in themselves credible enough. See Plat., Phaedo. The
former, however, adds (§ 29, seqq.), that Socrates said, while Anytus passed by,
"That man is perhaps very proud, as if he had performed something very great
and sublime by having caused my death. Oh, the unhappy man, who does not
seem to know that he is the conqueror who has been active for all futurity in the
best and most useful manner! Homer has ascribed to some, who were near the
end of their life, the power of foreseeing the future. Therefore I will also proph-
ecy. For a short time I had intercourse with the son of Anytus, and he appeared
to me to be of rather a strong mind: I therefore say that he will not long remain
in that servile occupation which his father has chosen for him; but as he has no
honest guide, he will be led away by some evil propensity, and carry his wicked-
ness to a great extent." A malicious prophecy, and contrary to the well-known
character of Socrates.
³ The passages upon which these statements rest may be found in the Crito of
Plato, and in Xenoph., Men., iv., 8, § 2.
⁴ Mem., iv., 8, § 2.
life was most admired on account of his present calmness and cheerfulness of mind." Among the conversations with his friends, two are particularly interesting, which are preserved by Plato in his Crito and Phædo—in the latter not without a considerable addition of Plato's own thoughts. In the Crito he treats of the duties of a citizen. Crito, a wealthy Athenian and powerful friend of Socrates, came to him early one morning, but, finding him asleep, waited till he awoke. When he awoke, Crito discovered to him a plan of escaping from prison, which he had formed in common with his other friends, and informed him that every thing was prepared for his escape, and that an asylum was provided for him in Thessaly. A lively conversation then arose between them, in which Socrates proved to Crito that a citizen is not justified, under any circumstances, in escaping from prison.

On the day of his death, Socrates had a conversation with his friends on the immortality of the soul. The arguments adduced in the Phædo of Plato are for the most part invented by Plato; but the real arguments of Socrates are probably preserved by Xenophon in the Cyropædia, in the dying speech of Cyrus.

The exercises which Socrates made in poetry were versifications of a hymn to Apollo, and of some fables of Æsop. Socrates undertook these on account of an admonition given him in a dream. But the reason for his choosing fables of Æsop was probably that this kind of poetry, which has such a decided moral tendency, particularly agreed with his own inclinations.

The vessel returned from Delos; the Eleven announced to Socrates the hour of his death, and one of their executioners was ready to prepare the poisoned cup, which Socrates was obliged to empty after the sun had set. At a very early hour of the day his friends had assembled around him in great numbers, and Xanthippæ, with her children, was also present. His friends were in the deepest distress, which, according to their different characters, was more or less loudly expressed. Apollodorus wept aloud, and moved all to tears except Socrates. Xanthippæ, the violent and passionate

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1. Pollakèς μοι φοιτέων τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον, ἰδε θαύμα (Phædo, p. 60, Ε., σεπρ.), ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλον ἐν ἄλλη ἄφει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐξέλγον, Ἡ Σάκρατες, ἔφη, μουσική νοεῖ καὶ ἐργάζεται καὶ ἐγώ ἐν γέ τῷ πρόδρομον κρόνῳ, ὑπὲρ ἐπαττῶν, τά τιτόνου παρακληθηνείν, ταῦτα ἄνωτες οἰκεῖαι γι' αὐτοῖς ἀκατάλειπτα, καὶ ἑμοὶ ὁμώς τὸ ἐνύπνιον. ὑπὲρ ἐπαττῶν, τά τιτόνου ἑπικλείειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐχὶ μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἦμοι ἐν τῷ πράττοντι. τούτῳ εἶ ἐπειδὴ ἢ τε δική ἐγώντα ἢ τοῦ Σεῦ διαρκῶς με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδειχε χρῆναι, εἰ δέρα πολλάκις μι προστάται τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταῦτα τὴν ἀνάμνησιν μοι ἀπειθήσασα αὐτῷ. ἄλλα τοιεῖν, ἐ. ὑ. λ.
oman, was inconsolable at the prospect of the death of her hus-
band. Without fortune, without support, without any consolation, she saw herself and her children, of whom two were still at a ten-
der age, left in want and misery. Socrates, probably with the in-
tention of sparing her the distressing sight of her dying husband, requested Crito to send her home.

The executioner entered the prison, and offered the poisoned cup to Socrates: he took and emptied it with the intrepidity of a sage who is conscious of his virtuous life; and even at the moment when he held it in his hand, he spoke, according to Cicero's ex-
pression, in such a manner that he appeared not to die, but to as-
cend into heaven. The lower part of his body had already grown cold; he then uncovered himself (for he had before been covered), and spoke his last words: "Crito," said he, "I owe a cock to Æs-
culapius. Offer one to him as a sacrifice; do not forget it." Soc-
rates alluded in these words to the happiness he should enjoy after being delivered from the chains of his body. Crito asked whether he wished any thing else to be done. To this question Socrates made no reply, and a short time afterward became convulsed. His eyes became dim—and he expired. He died in the year 400, or,

1. Tuscul., i., 29.

2. All this is more circumstantially related in the Phædo of Plato. The above interpretation of the words at the end of the Phædo, "Crito, I owe a cock to Æs-
culapius," &c., which is also adopted by Olympiodorus, appears to be the most suitable. It is well known how many undeserved reproaches have been inflicted upon Socrates for this expression. The ecclesiastical fathers Origen, Eusebius, Chrysostome, and others, pretended to discover in it the real belief of Socrates in polytheism. ["It is extremely difficult to determine the precise relation in which the opinions of Socrates stood to the Greek polytheism. He not only spoke of the gods with reverence, and conformed to the rites of the national worship, but testified his respect for the oracles in a manner which seems to imply that he be-
lieved their pretensions to have some real ground. On the other hand, he ac-
knowledged one Supreme Being as the framcr and preserver of the universe; he used the singular and the plural number indiscriminately concerning the object of his adoration; and when he endeavored to reclaim one of his friends, who scoffed at sacrifices and divination, it was, according to Xenophon, by an argument drawn exclusively from the works of the one Creator."

† Mem., i., 4. If the conversation has been faithfully reported by Xenophon, Aristodemus shifted his ground in the course of the argument. But he suggests no objection to the inference drawn by Socrates from the being and providence of God, as to the propriety of conforming to the rites of the state religion, and Xenophon himself seems not to have been aware that it might be disputed. He thinks that he has sufficiently refuted the indictment which charged Socrates
according to others, 399 B.C., under the archon Laches,1 or Atticocrates.

Imagine that he treated many points, to which the vulgar attached great importance, as matters of indifference, on which it was neither possible nor very desirable to arrive at any certain conclusion: that he was only careful to exclude from his notion of the gods all attributes which were inconsistent with the moral qualities of the Supreme Being; and that, with this restriction, he considered the popular mythology as so harmless, that its language and rites might be innocently adopted. The observation attributed to him in one of Plato's early works* seems to throw great light on the nature and extent of his conformity to the state religion. Being asked whether he believed the Attic legend of Boreas and Orithyia, he replied that he should indeed only be following the example of many ingenious men if he rejected it, and attempted to explain it away;† but that such speculations, however fine, appeared to him to betoken a mind not very happily constituted; for the subjects furnished for them by the marvelous beings of the Greek mythology were endless, and to reduce all such stories to a probable form was a task which required much leisure. This he could not give to it, for he was fully occupied with the study of his own nature. If therefore let those stories alone, and acquiesced in the common belief about them."—Thirlwall’s History of Greece, vol. iv., p. 208, seqq.—Ta.]

1. Diog. li. 55 and 56. Marmor. Oxon., 57. Sachae places his death in OL 95, 1; Fabricius and Hamberger, OL 94, 2. [According to Diogenes, li. 43 (c. xxiii.), the Athenians immediately repented of the death of Socrates, and manifested their sorrow by closing the palestras and gymnasia. They are said to have condemned Meletus* to death, and to have banished the other accusers, and also to have erected a bronze statue of Socrates. It is also said, in the lives of the Ten Orators, that Isocrates appeared in mourning for Socrates the day after his execution.—Ta.]

with disbelieving the existence of the gods acknowledged by the state, when he has proved that he believed in a deity. * Phædrus, p. 229.

† I should say that she had been carried by the north wind over the cliffs, near which she had been playing with Pharmaces.
SCHLEIERMACHER
ON THE
WORTH OF Socrates AS A PHILOSOPHER.
THAT very different and even entirely opposite judgments should be formed by different men, and according to the spirit of different times, on minds of a leading and peculiar order, and that it should be late, if ever, before opinions agree as to their worth, is a phenomenon of every-day occurrence. But it is less natural, indeed it seems almost surprising, that at any one time a judgment should be generally received with regard to any such mind which is in glaring contradiction with itself. Yet, if I am not mistaken, it is actually the case with Socrates, that the portrait usually drawn of him, and the historical importance which is almost unanimously attributed to him, are at irreconcilable variance. With Socrates most writers make a new period to begin in the history of Greek philosophy, which at all events manifestly implies that he breathed a new spirit and character into those intellectual exertions of his countrymen which we comprehend under the name of philosophy, so that they assumed a new form under his hands, or, at least, that he materially widened their range. But if we inquire how the same writers describe Socrates as an individual, we find nothing that can serve as a foundation for the influence they assign to him. We are informed that he did not at all busy himself with the physical investigations which constituted a main part even of Greek philosophy, but rather withheld others from them, and that even with regard to moral inquiries, which were those in which he engaged the deepest, he did not by any means aim at reducing them into a scientific shape, and that he established no fixed principle for this, any more than for any other branch of human knowledge. The base of his intellectual constitution, we are told, was rather religious than speculative; his exertions rather those of a good citizen, directed to the improvement of the people, and especially of the young, than those of a philosopher; in short, he is represented as a virtuoso in the exercise of sound common sense, and of that strict integrity and
mild philanthropy with which it is always associated in an uncorrupted mind; all this, however, tinged with a slight air of enthusiasm. These are, no doubt, excellent qualities; but yet they are not such as fit a man to play a brilliant part in history, but rather, unless where peculiar circumstances intervene, to lead a life of enviable tranquillity, so that it would be necessary to ascribe the general reputation of Socrates, and the almost unexampled homage which has been paid to him, by so many generations, less to himself than to such peculiar circumstances. But least of all are these qualities which could have produced conspicuous and permanent effects on the philosophical exertions of a people already far advanced in intellectual culture. And this is confirmed when we consider what sort of doctrines and opinions are attributed to Socrates in conformity with this view; for, in spite of the pains taken to trick them out with a show of philosophy, it is impossible, after all, to give them any scientific solidity whatever: the farthest point we come to is, that they are thoughts well suited to warm the hearts of men in favor of goodness, but such as a healthy understanding, fully awakened to reflection, can not fail to light upon of itself. What effect, then, can they have wrought on the progress, or the transformation of philosophy! If we would confine ourselves to the well-known statement that Socrates called philosophy down from heaven to earth, that is, to houses and market-places, in other words, that he proposed social life as the object of research in the room of nature, still the influence thus ascribed to him is far from salutary in itself, for philosophy consists not in a partial cultivation either of morals or physics, but in the coexistence and intercommunion of both; and there is, moreover, no historical evidence that he really exerted it. The foundations of ethical philosophy had been laid before the time of Socrates in the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, and after him it only kept its place by the side of sciences, in the philosophical systems of the Greeks. In those of Plato, of Aristotle, and of the Stoics, that is, of all the genuine Socratic schools of any importance, we again meet with physical investigations, and ethics were exclusively cultivated only by those followers of Socrates who themselves never attained to any eminence in philosophy. And if we consider the general tendency of the above-named schools, and review the whole range of their tenets, nothing can be pointed out that could have proceeded from a Socrates, endowed with such qualities of mind and character as the one described to us, unless 't be where their theories have been reduced to a familiar practical application. And even with regard to the elder Socrates we find
more satisfaction in tracing their strictly philosophical speculations to any other source rather than to *this* Socrates; - not only may Aristippus, who was unlike his master in his spirit as well as his doctrines, be more easily derived from Protagoras, with whom he has so much in common, but Euclid, with his dialectic bias, from the Eleatics. And we find ourselves compelled to conclude that the stem of Socrates, as he is at present represented to us, can have produced no other shoot than the Cynical philosophy, and that not the cynism of Antisthenes, which still retains many features which we should rather refer to his earlier master, Gorgias, but the purer form, which exhibits only a peculiar mode of life, not a doctrine, much less a science: that of Diogenes, the *mad Socrates*, as he has been called, though, in truth, the highest epithet due to him is that of *Socrates caricatured*; for his is a copy in which we find nothing but features of such an original: its approximation to the self-contentedness of the deity in the retrenchment of artificial wants, its rejection of mere theoretical knowledge, its unassuming course of going about in the service of the god to expose the follies of mankind. But how foreign all this is to the domain of philosophy, and how little can be there effected with such means, is evident enough.

The only rational course, then, that seems to be left, is to give up one or other of these contradictory assumptions: either let Socrates still stand at the head of the Athenian philosophy, but then let those who place him there undertake to establish a different notion of him from that which has been long prevalent; or let us retain the conception of the wise and amiable man, who was made, not for the school, but wholly for the world; but then let him be transferred from the history of philosophy to that of the general progress of society at Athens, if he can claim any place there. The latter of these expedients is not very far removed from that which has been adopted by Krug; for as in his system Socrates stands at the end of the one period, and not at the beginning of the next, he appears, not as the germ of a new age, but as a product and after growth of an earlier one; he sinks, as an insulated phenomenon, into the same rank with the Sophists, and other late fruits of the period, and loses a great part of his philosophical importance. Only it is but a half measure that this author adopts when he begins his new period with the immediate disciples of Socrates as such, for at its head he places the genuine Socrates, as they are commonly called, and, above all, Xenophon, men of whom he himself says that

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their only merit was that of having propagated and diffused Socratic doctrines, while the doctrines themselves do not appear to him worth making the beginning of a new period. Ast had previously arrived at the same result by a road in some respects opposite. With him Plato is the full bloom of that which he terms the Athenian form of philosophy; and as no plant begins with its bloom, he feels himself constrained to place Socrates at the head of this philosophy, but yet not strictly as a philosopher. He says that the operation of philosophy in Socrates was confined to the exercise of qualities that may belong to any virtuous man, that is to say, it was properly no philosophy at all; and makes the essence of his character to consist in enthusiasm and irony. Now he feels that he can not place a man endowed with no other qualities than these at the head of a new period, and therefore he ranges the Sophists by his side, not, indeed, without some inconsistency, for he himself sees in them the perverse tendency which was to be counteracted by the spirit of the new age; but yet he prefers this to recognizing the germ of a new gradation in Socrates alone, whose highest philosophical worth he makes to consist in his martyrdom, which, however, can not by any means be deemed of equal moment in the sphere of science, as in that of religion or politics. Though in form this course of Ast's is opposite to Krug's, in substance it is the same: its result is likewise to begin a new period of philosophy with Plato; for Ast perceives nothing new or peculiar in the struggle Socrates made against the Sophists, only virtue and the thirst after truth, which had undoubtedly animated all the preceding philosophers; what he represents as characteristic in the Athenian philosophy, is the union of the elements which had been previously separate and opposed to each other; and since he does not, in fact, show the existence of this union in Socrates himself, and distinctly recognizes their separation in his immediate disciples, Plato is, after all, the point at which, according to him, that union begins.

But if we choose really to consider Plato as the true beginner of a new period, not to mention that he is far too perfect for a first beginning, we fall into two difficulties: first, as to his relation to Aristotle. In all that is most peculiar to Plato, Aristotle appears as directly opposite to him as possible; but the main division of philosophy, notwithstanding the wide difference between their modes of treating it, he has in common with Plato, and the Stoics with both; it fits as closely and sits as easily on one as the other, so that one
can scarcely help believing that it was derived from some common origin, which was the root of Plato's philosophy as well as theirs. The second difficulty is to conceive what Plato's relation to Socrates could really have been, if Socrates was not in any way his master in philosophy. If we should suppose that Plato's character was formed by the example of Socrates, and that reverence for his master's virtue, and love of truth, was the tie that bound him, still this merely moral relation is not a sufficient solution of the difficulty. The mode in which Plato introduces Socrates, even in works which contain profound philosophical investigations, must be regarded as the wildest caprice, and would necessarily have appeared merely ridiculous and absurd to all his contemporaries, if he was not in some way or other indebted to him for his philosophical life. Hence we are forced to abide by the conclusion, that if a great pause is to be made in Greek philosophy, to separate the scattered tenets of the earlier schools from the later systems, this must be made with Socrates; but then we must also ascribe to him some element of a more strictly philosophical kind than most writers do, though, as a mere beginning, it needs not to have been carried very far toward maturity. Such a pause as this, however, we can not avoid making: the earlier philosophy, which we designate by the names of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, &c., has evidently a common type, and the later, in which Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno are the conspicuous names, has likewise one of its own, which is very different from the other. Nothing can have been lost between them which could have formed a gradual transition, much less is it possible so to connect any of the later forms with any of the earlier as to regard them as a continuous whole. This being so, nothing remains to be done but to subject the case of Socrates to a new revision, in order to see whether the judges he has met with among posterity have not been as unjust in denying his philosophical worth, and his merits in the cause of philosophy, as his contemporaries were in denying his worth as a citizen, and imputing to him imaginary offences against the Commonwealth. But this would render it necessary to ascertain somewhat more distinctly wherein his philosophical merit consists.

But this new inquiry naturally leads us back, in the first instance, to the old question whether we are to believe Plato or Xenophon in their accounts of what Socrates was; a question, however, which only deserves to be proposed at all, so far as these two authors are really at variance with each other, and which, therefore, only admits of a rational answer, after it has been decided whether such
a variance exists, and where it lies. Plato nowhere professes him-
self the historian of Socrates, with the exception, perhaps, of the
Apology, and of insulated passages, such as the speech of Alcibiades
in the Banquet; for it would certainly have been in bad taste, if
here, where Plato is making contemporaries of Socrates speak of him
in his presence, he had exhibited him in a manner that was not sub-
stantially faithful, though even here many of the details may have
been introduced for the sake of playful exaggeration. On the other
hand, Plato himself does not warrant any one to consider all that he
makes Socrates say in his dialogues, as his real thoughts and lan-
guage; and it would be rendering him but a poor service to con-
fine his merit to that of having given a correct and skillful report of
the doctrines of Socrates. On the contrary, he undoubtedly means
his philosophy to be considered as his own, and not Socrates's.
And, accordingly, every intelligent reader is probably convinced by
his own reflections that none but original thoughts can appear in
such a dress; whereas a work of mere narrative—and such these
dialogues would be, if the whole of the matter belonged to Socrates
would necessarily show a fainter tone of coloring, such as Xenon-
phon's conversations really present. But as, on the one hand, it
would be too much to assert that Socrates actually thought and
knew all that Plato makes him say, so, on the other hand, it would
certainly be too little to say of him that he was nothing more than
the Socrates whom Xenophon represents. Xenophon, it is true, in
the Memorabilia, professes himself a narrator; but, in the first place,
a man of sense can only relate what he understands, and a disciple
of Socrates, who must have been well acquainted with his master's
habit of disclaiming knowledge, would of all men adhere most strict-
ly to this rule. We know, however, and this may be admitted with-
out being harshly pressed, that Xenophon was a statesman, but no
philosopher, and that, besides the purity of his character and the
good sense of his political principles; besides his admirable power
of rousing the intellect and checking presumption, which Xenophon
loved and respected in Socrates, the latter may have possessed
some really philosophical elements which Xenophon was unable to
appropriate to himself, and which he suffered to pass unnoticed;
which, indeed, he can have felt no temptation to exhibit, for fear
of betraying defects such as those which his Socrates was wont to
expose. On the other hand, Xenophon was an apologetic narrator,
and had, no doubt, selected this form for the very purpose that his
readers might not expect him to exhibit Socrates entire, but only
that part of his character which belonged to the sphere of the affec
tions and of social life, and which bore upon the charges brought against him, every thing else he excludes, contenting himself with showing that it can not have been any thing of so dangerous a tendency as was imputed to Socrates. And not only may Socrates, he must have been more, and there must have been more in the background of his speeches than Xenophon represents; for if the contemporaries of Socrates had heard nothing from him but such discourses, how would Plato have marred the effect of his works on his immediate public, which had not forgotten the character of Socrates, if the part which Socrates plays there stood in direct contradiction with the image which his real life left in the reader's mind!

And if we believe Xenophon, and in this respect we can not doubt the accuracy of the contemporary apologist, that Socrates spent the whole of his time in public places, and suppose that he was always engaged in discourses which, though they may have been more beautiful, varied, and dazzling, were still, in substance, the same with these, and moved in the same sphere to which the Memorabilia are confined, one is at a loss to understand how it was that, in the course of so many years, Socrates did not clear the market-place and the work-shops, the walks and the wrestling-schools, by the dread of his presence, and how it is that, in Xenophon's native Flemish style of painting, the weariness of the interlocutors is not still more strongly expressed than we here and there actually find it; and still less should we be able to comprehend why men of such abilities as Critias and Alcibiades, and others formed by nature for speculation, as Plato and Euclid, set so high a value on their intercourse with Socrates, and found satisfaction in it so long. Nor can it be supposed that Socrates held discourses in public, such as Xenophon puts into his mouth, but that he delivered lessons of a different kind elsewhere, and in private; for this, considering the apologetic form of Xenophon's book, to which he rigidly confines himself, he would probably not have passed over in silence. Socrates must have disclosed the philosophical element of his character in the same social circle of which Xenophon gives us specimens. And is not this just the impression which Xenophon's conversations make? philosophical matter, translated into the unphilosophical style of the common understanding, an operation in which the philosophical base is lost; just as some critics have proposed, by way of test for the productions of the loftiest poetry, to resolve them into prose, and evaporate their spirit, which can leave nothing but an extremely sober kind of beauty remaining. And as, after such an experiment, the greatest of poets would scarcely be able exactly to restore
the lost poetry, but yet a reader of moderate capacity soon observes what has been done, and can even point it out in several passages, where the decomposing hand has grown tired of its work, so it is in the other case with the philosophical basis. One finds some parallels with Plato, other fragments are detected in other ways; and the only inference to be drawn from the scarcity of these passages is, that Xenophon understood his business; unless we choose to say, that as Aristotle is supposed to have held his philosophical discourses in the forenoon, and the exoteric in the afternoon (Gellius, N. A., xx., 5), Socrates reversed this order, and in the morning held conversations in the market-place with the artisans, and others who were less familiar with him, which Xenophon found it easier to divest of their philosophical aspect; but that of an evening, in the walks and wrestling-schools, he engaged in those subtler, deeper, and wittier dialogues with his favorites, which it was reserved for Plato to imitate, embellish, and expand, while he connected his own investigations with them.

And thus, to fill up the blank which Xenophon has manifestly left, we are still driven back to the Socrates of Plato, and the shortest way of releasing ourselves from the difficulty would be to find a rule by which we could determine what is the reflex and the property of Socrates in Plato, and what his own invention and addition. Only the problem is not to be solved by a process such as that adopted by Meiners, whose critical talent is of a kind to which this subject in general was not very well suited; for if, in all that Plato has left, we are to select only what is least speculative, least artificial, least poetical, and hence, for so we are taught, least enthusiastic, we shall, indeed, still retain much matter for this more refined and pregnant species of dialogue, to season Xenophon's tediousness, but it will be impossible in this way to discover any properly philosophical basis in the constitution of Socrates; for if we exclude all depth of speculation, nothing is left but results, without the grounds and methodical principles on which they depend, and which, therefore, Socrates can only have possessed instinctively that is, without the aid of philosophy. The only safe method seems to be, to inquire: What may Socrates have been, over and above what Xenophon has described, without, however, contradicting the strokes of character and the practical maxims which Xenophon distinctly delivers as those of Socrates; and what must he have been to give Plato a right and an inducement to exhibit him as he has done in his dialogues? Now the latter branch of this question inevitably leads us back to the historical position from
which we started: that Socrates must have had a strictly philosophical basis in his composition, so far as he is virtually recognized by Plato as the author of his philosophical life, and is, therefore, to be regarded as the first vital movement of Greek philosophy in its more advanced stage; and that he can only be entitled to this place by an element, which, though properly philosophical, was foreign to the preceding period. Here, however, we must, for the present, be content to say that the property which is peculiar to the post-Socratic philosophy, beginning with Plato, and which henceforward is common to all the genuine Socratic schools, is the coexistence and intercommunion of the three branches of knowledge, dialectics, physics, ethics. This distinction separates the two periods very definitely; for before Socrates either these branches were kept entirely apart, or their subjects were blended together without due discrimination, and without any definite proportion: as, for instance, ethics and physics among the Pythagoreans, physics and dialectics among the Eleatics; the Ionians alone, though their tendency was wholly to physics, made occasional excursions, though quite at random, into the region both of dialectics and of ethics. But when some writers refuse Plato himself the honor of having distinguished and combined these sciences, and ascribe this step to Xenocrates, and think that even Aristotle abandoned it again; this, in my opinion, is grounded on a misunderstanding, which, however, it would here lead us too far to explain. Now it is true we can not assert that Socrates was the first who combined the characters of a physical, ethical, and dialectic philosopher in one person, especially as Plato and Xenophon agree in taking physics out of his range; nor can it be positively said that Socrates was at least the author of this distribution of science, though its germ may certainly be found from the Memorabilia. But we may surely inquire whether this phenomenon has not some simpler and more internal cause, and whether this may not be found in Socrates. The following observation will, I conceive, be admitted without much dispute. So long as inquirers are apt to step unwittingly across the boundaries that separate one province of knowledge from another, so long, and in the same degree, does the whole course of their intellectual operations depend on outward circumstances; for it is only a systematic distribution of the whole field that can lead to a regular and connected cultivation of it. In the same way, so long as the several sciences are pursued singly, and their respective votaries contentedly acquiesce in this insulation, so long, and in the same degree, is the specific instinct for the object of each science predom
inan in the whole sphere of intellectual exertion. But as soon as the need of the connection and co-ordinate growth of all the branches of knowledge has become so distinctly felt as to express itself by the form in which they are treated and described, in a manner which can never again be lost, so far as this is the case, it is no longer particular talents and instincts, but the general scientific talent of speculation, that has the ascendancy. In the former of these cases, it must be confessed that the idea of science, as such, is not yet matured, perhaps has not even become the subject of consciousness; for science, as such, can only be conceived as a whole, in which every division is merely subordinate, just as the real world to which it ought to correspond. In the latter case, on the contrary, this idea has become a subject of consciousness; for it can have been only by its force that the particular inclinations which confine each thinker to a certain object, and split science into insulated parts, have been mastered: and this is, unquestionably, a simpler criterion to distinguish the two periods of Greek philosophy. In the earlier period, the idea of science, as such, was not the governing idea, and had not even become a distinct subject of consciousness; and this it is that gives rise to the obscurity which we perceive in all the philosophical productions of that period, through the appearance of caprice which results from the want of consciousness, and through the imperfection of the scientific language, which is gradually forming itself out of the poetical and historical vocabulary. In the second period, on the other hand, the idea of science has become a subject of consciousness. Hence the main business everywhere is to distinguish knowledge from opinion; hence the precision of scientific language; hence the peculiar prominence of dialectics, which have no other object than the idea of science: things which were not comprehended even by the Eleatics in the same way as by the Socratic schools, since the former still make the idea of being their starting-point, rather than that of knowledge.

Now this waking of the idea of science, and its earliest manifestations, must have been, in the first instance, what constituted the philosophical basis in Socrates; and for this reason he is justly regarded as the founder of that later Greek philosophy, which in its whole essential form, together with its several variations, was determined by that idea. This is proved clearly enough by the historical statements in Plato, and this, oo, is what must be supplied in Xenophon's conversations, in order to make them worthy of Socrates, and Socrates of his admirers for if he went about in the
service of the god, to justify the celebrated oracle, it was impossible that the utmost point he reached could have been simply to know that he knew nothing; there was a step beyond this which he must have taken, that of knowing what knowledge was; for by what other means could he have been enabled to declare that which others believed themselves to know, to be no knowledge, than by a more correct conception of knowledge, and by a more correct method founded upon that conception? And every where, when he is explaining the nature of non-science (ἀνεπιστημοσύνη), one sees that he sets out from two tests: one, that science is the same in all true thoughts, and, consequently, must manifest its peculiar form in every such thought; the other, that all science forms one whole; for his proofs always hinge on this assumption: that it is impossible to start from one true thought, and to be entangled in a contradiction with any other, and also that knowledge derived from any one point, and obtained by correct combination, can not contradict that which has been deduced in like manner from any other point; and while he exposed such contradictions in the current conceptions of mankind, he strove to rouse those leading ideas in all who were capable of understanding, or even of divining his meaning. Most of what Xenophon has preserved for us may be referred to this object, and the same endeavor is indicated clearly enough in all that Socrates says of himself in Plato's Apology, and what Alcibiades says of him in his eulogy; so that if we conceive this to have been the central point in the character of Socrates, we may reconcile Plato and Xenophon, and can understand the historical position of Socrates.

When Xenophon says (Mem., iv., 6, 15), that as often as Socrates did not merely refute the errors of others, but attempted to demonstrate something himself, he took his road through propositions which were most generally admitted, we can perfectly understand this mode of proceeding, as the result of the design just described; he wished to find as few hinderances and diversions as possible in his way, that he might illustrate his method clearly and simply; and propositions, if there were such, which all held to be certain, must have appeared to him the most eligible, in order that he might show, in their case, that the conviction with which they were embraced was not knowledge, since this would render men more keenly sensible of the necessity of getting at the foundation of knowledge, and of taking their stand upon it, in order to give a new shape to all human things. Hence, too, we may explain the preponderance of the subjects connected with civil and domestic life in most
of these conversations; for this was the field that supplied the most generally admitted conceptions and propositions, the fate of which interested all men alike. But this mode of proceeding becomes inexplicable if it is supposed that Socrates attached the chief importance to the subject of these conversations. That must have been quite a secondary point. For when the object is to elucidate any subject, it is necessary to pay attention to the less familiar and more disputed views of it, and how meagre most of those discussions in Xenophon are in this respect, is evident enough. From the same point of view we must also consider the controversy of Socrates with the Sophists. So far as it was directed against their maxims, it does not belong to our present question; it is merely the opposition of a good citizen to the corrupters of government and of youth. But, even looking at it from the purely theoretical side, it would be idle to represent this contrast as the germ of a new period of philosophy, if Socrates had only impugned opinions which were the monstrous shapes into which the doctrines of an earlier school had degenerated, without having established any in their stead, which nobody supposes him to have done. But, for the purpose of awakening the true idea of science, the Sophists must have been the most welcome of all disputants to him, since they had reduced their opinions into the most perfect form, and hence were proud of them themselves, and were peculiarly admired by others. If, therefore, he could succeed in exposing their weakness, the value of a principle so triumphantly applied would be rendered most conspicuous.

But, in order to show the imperfections of the current conceptions both in the theories of the Sophists and in common life, if the issue was not to be left to chance, some certain method was requisite; for it was often necessary, in the course of the process, to lay down intermediate notions, which it was necessary to define to the satisfaction of both parties, otherwise all that was done would afterward have looked like a paltry surprise, and the contradiction between the proposition in question and one that was admitted could never be detected without ascertaining what notions might or might not be connected with a given one. Now this method is laid down in the two problems which Plato states in the Phædrus, as the two main elements in the art of dialectics, that is, to first know how correctly to combine multiplicity in unity, and again to divide a complex unity according to its nature into a multiplicity, and next to know what notions may or may not be connected together. It is by this means that Socrates became the real founder of dialec-
ties, which continued to be the soul of all the great edifices reared in later times by Greek philosophy, and by its decided prominence constitutes the chief distinction between the later period and the earlier; so that one can not but commend the historical instance which has assigned so high a station to him. At the same time, this is not meant to deny that Euclid and Plato carried this science, as well as the rest, farther toward maturity; but it is manifest that in its first principles Socrates possessed it as a science, and practiced it as an art, in a manner peculiar to himself: for the construction of all Socratic dialogues, as well of those doubtfully ascribed to Plato, and of those attributed with any degree of probability to other original disciples of Socrates, as of all those reported in the Memorabilia, hinges without any exception on this point. The same inference results from the testimony of Aristotle (Metaph., i., 6; xiii., 4): that what may be justly ascribed to Socrates is that he introduced induction and general definitions; a testimony which bears every mark of impartiality and truth. Hence there is no reason to doubt that Socrates taught this art of framing and connecting notions correctly. Since, however, it is an art, abstract teaching was not sufficient, and, therefore, no doubt Socrates never so taught it: it was an art that required to be witnessed and practiced in the most manifold applications, and one who was not firmly grounded in it, and left the school too early, lost it again, and with it almost all that was to be learned from Socrates, as, indeed, is observed in Plato's dialogues. Now that this exercise and illustration was the main object of conversations held by Socrates even on general moral subjects, is expressly admitted by Xenophon himself, when, under the head—What Socrates did to render his friends more expert in dialectics—he introduces a great many such discourses and inquiries, which so closely resemble the rest, that all might just as well have been put in the same class.

It was with a view, therefore, to become masters in this art, and thereby to keep the faster hold of the idea of science, that men of vigorous and speculative minds formed a circle round Socrates as long as circumstances allowed, those who were able to the end of his life, and in the mean while chose to tread closely in their master's steps, and to refrain for a time from making a systematic application of his art in the different departments of knowledge, for the more elaborate cultivation of all the sciences. But when, after his death, the most eminent among them, first of all at Megara, began a strictly scientific train of speculation, and thus philosophy gradually ripened into the shape which, with slight variations, it
ever after retained among the Greeks: what now took place was not, indeed, what Socrates did, or perhaps could have done, but yet it was undoubtedly his will. To this it may indeed be objected, that Xenophon expressly says (*Mem.*, i., 1, 11), that Socrates in his riper years not only himself gave up all application to natural philosophy, but endeavored to withhold all others from it, and directed them to the consideration of human affairs; and hence many hold those only to be genuine Socratics who did not include physics in their system. But this statement must manifestly be taken in a sense much less general, and quite different from that which is usually given to it. This is clearly evinced by the reasons which Socrates alleges. For how could he have said so generally, that the things which depend on God ought not to be made the subject of inquiry, before those which depend on man have been dispatched, since not only are the latter connected in a variety of ways with the former, but even among things human there must be some of greater moment, others of less, some of nearer, others of more remote concern, and the proposition would lead to the conclusion that before one was brought to its completion, not even the investigation of another ought to be begun. This might have been not unfairly turned by a Sophist against Socrates himself, if he had dragged in a notion apparently less familiar, in order to illustrate another; and certainly this proposition, taken in a general sense, would not only have endangered the conduct of life, but would also have altogether destroyed the Socratic idea of science, that nothing can be known except together with the rest, and along with its relation to all things besides. The real case is simply this. It is clear that Socrates had no peculiar talent for any single science, and least of all for that of physics. Now it is true that a merely metaphysical thinker may feel himself attracted toward all sciences, as was the case with Kant; but then this happens under different circumstances, and a different mental constitution from that of Socrates. He, on the contrary, made no excursions to points remote from this centre, but devoted his whole life to the task of exciting his leading idea as extensively and as vividly as possible in others; his whole aim was, that whatever form man's wishes and hopes might take, according to individual character and accidental circumstances, this foundation might be securely laid before he proceeded further; but, till then, his advice was, not to accumulate fresh masses of opinions; this he, for his part, would permit only so far as it was demanded by the wants of active life, and for this reason he might say, that if those who investigated meteoric phenomena had any hope of producing them at their
pleasure, he should be more ready to admit their researches—language which in any other sense but this would have been absurd. We can not, therefore, conclude from this that Socrates did not wish that physics should be cultivated, any more than we are authorized to suppose that he fancied it possible to form ethics into a science by sufficiently multiplying those fragmentary investigations into which he was drawn in discussing the received opinions on the subject. The same law of progression was involuntarily retained in his school; for Plato, though he descends into all the sciences, still lays the principal stress on the establishment of principles, and expatiates in details only so far as they are necessary, and so much the less as he has to draw them from without: it is Aristotle who first revels in their multiplicity.

This appears to me as much as can be said with certainty of the worth of Socrates as a philosopher. But should any one proceed to ask how far he elaborated the idea of science in his lessons, or in what degree he promoted the discovery of real knowledge in any other province by his controversial discussions and his dialectic essays, there would, perhaps, be little to say on this head, and least of all should I be able to extricate any thing to serve this purpose from the works of Plato taken by themselves; for there, in all that belongs to Plato, there is something of Socrates, and in all that belongs to Socrates, something of Plato. Only, if any one is desirous of describing doctrines peculiar to Socrates, let him not, as many do in histories of philosophy, for the sake of at least filling up some space with Socrates, string together detached moral theses, which, as they arose out of occasional discussions, can never make up a whole; and as to other subjects, let him not lose sight of the above-quoted passage of Aristotle, who confines Socrates's philosophical speculations to principles. The first point, therefore, to examine would be, whether some profound speculative doctrines may not have originally belonged to Socrates, which are generally considered as most foreign to him, for instance, the thought which is unfolded by Plato in his peculiar manner, but is exhibited in the germ by Xenophon himself (Mem., i., 4, 8), and is intimately connected with the great dialectic question as to the agreement between thought and being: that of the general diffusion of intelligence throughout the whole of nature. With this one might connect the assertion of Aristocles (Euseb., Prep., xi., 3), that Socrates began the investigation of the doctrine of ideas. But the testimony of this late Peripatetic is suspicious, and may have had no other foundation than the language of Socrates in the Parmenides.
WORTH OF SOCRATES AS A PHILOSOPHER.

But, whether much or little of this and other doctrines belonged to Socrates himself, the general idea already described can not fail to suggest a more correct mode of conceiving in what light it is that Plato brings forward his master in his works, and in what sense his Socrates is to be termed a real or a fictitious personage. Fictitious, in the proper sense, I hold he is not, and his reality is not a merely mimic one, nor is Socrates in those works merely a convenient person who affords room for much mimic art and much cheerful pleasantry, in order to temper the abstruse investigations with this agreeable addition. It is because the spirit and the method of Socrates are everywhere predominant, and because it is not merely a subordinate point with Plato to adopt the manner of Socrates, but is as truly his highest aim, that Plato has not hesitated to put into his mouth what he believed to be no more than deductions from his fundamental ideas. The only material exceptions we find to this (passing over several more minute which come under the same head with the anachronisms) occur in later works, as the Statesman and the Republic; I mean doctrines of Plato foreign to the real views of Socrates, perhaps, indeed, virtually contradicting them, and which are nevertheless put into his mouth. On this head we must let Plato appeal to the privilege conferred by custom. But, on the whole, we are forced to say, that in giving Socrates a living share in the propagation of that philosophical movement which took its rise from him, Plato has immortalized him in the noblest manner that a disciple can perpetuate the glory of his master; in a manner not only more beautiful, but more just, than he could have done it by a literal narrative.

THE END.