THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH—

Even good Latinists do not hesitate to keep on their shelves the translation of St. Thomas, which the English Dominicans are now issuing to the great comfort of those to whom Latin is not a second tongue. And the far smaller body of philosophers whose Greek is fluent, will not grudge their less favored and much more numerous brethren a really good translation of the works of Aristotle, on which depend the whole of Scholastic Philosophy. Nor will they despise a translation with really adequate notes, such as this carries, of two treatises containing such fundamental portions of Aristotle’s philosophy.

The second is, perhaps, the more interesting to us today, for it deals with “the coming-to-be and the passing-away,” and thus attacks problems, such as that of “becoming,” full of actuality, in spite of our changed ideas to as to the “elements,” and in spite of the centuries which have rolled away since the author of these works discussed the utterances of Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Leukippos. We welcome this translation, and hope it may be followed by other volumes until we have a really complete and scholarly edition of the Stagirite in English.
DE CAELO

BY

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PREFACE

THIS translation was begun many years ago in co-operation with Mr. H. B. Wallis of the Board of Education. Unfortunately he was obliged to turn to other work, but his original draft formed the basis of nearly half my version of the book.

Rather full textual notes are given throughout, the text of Prantl being taken as basis. (A complete table of the passages dealt with will be found in the Index, s. v. Text.) For this purpose I have collated the Vienna MS., J, from a photograph, and the reading of this MS. is noted in each case, either explicitly or by implication.

Mr. Ross's generous conception of an editor's responsibilities has been of the greatest service. He has saved me from many mistakes and has made many useful suggestions for the improvement of the translation. A few of his suggestions will be found recorded in the foot-notes as his; but for the most part he is merged in his translator.

J. L. S.

31st March, 1922.
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The science which has to do with nature clearly concerns itself for the most part with bodies and magnitudes and their properties and movements, but also with the principles of this sort of substance, as many as they may be. For of things constituted by nature some are bodies and magnitudes, some possess body and magnitude, and some are principles of things which possess these. Now a continuum is that which is divisible into parts always capable of subdivision, and a body is that which is every way divisible. A magnitude if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and if three a body. Beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the three dimensions are all that there are, and that which is divisible in three directions is divisible in all. For, as the Pythagoreans say, the world and all that is in it is determined by the number three, since beginning and middle and end give the number of an 'all', and the number they give is the triad. And so, having taken these three from nature as (so to speak) laws of it, we make further use of the number three in the worship of the Gods. Further, we use the terms in practice in this way. Of two things, or men, we say 'both', but not 'all': three is the first number to which the term 'all' has been appropriated. And in this, as we have said, we do but follow the lead which nature gives. Therefore, since 'every' and 'all' and 'complete' do not differ from one another in respect of form, but only, if at all, in their

1 i.e. animate things, such as plants and animals.
2 e.g. matter and form, movement, or, in the case of living things, soul.
3 Viz. beginning, middle, and end.
4 Oaths, for instance, usually appeal to three Gods, as in the Homeric appeal to Zeus, Athene, and Apollo (Prantl).
5 Reading εἴλῃφαμεν with E and Prantl. The other MSS. have φαμεν (FLM) or κατάφαμεν (HJ).
6 Reading εἴπερ ἄρα with FHMJ.
matter and in that to which they are applied, body alone among magnitudes can be complete. For it alone is determined by the three dimensions, that is, an 'all'.

But if it is divisible in three dimensions it is every way divisible, while the other magnitudes are divisible in one dimension or in two alone: for the divisibility and continuity of magnitudes depend upon the number of the dimensions, one sort being continuous in one direction, another in two, another in all. All magnitudes, then, which are divisible are also continuous. Whether we can also say that whatever is continuous is divisible does not yet, on our present grounds, appear. One thing, however, is clear. We cannot pass beyond body to a further kind, as we passed from length to surface, and from surface to body. For if we could, it would cease to be true that body is complete magnitude. We could pass beyond it only in virtue of a defect in it; and that which is complete cannot be defective, since it has being in every respect.

Now bodies which are classed as parts of the whole are each complete according to our formula, since each possesses every dimension. But each is determined relatively to that part which is next to it by contact, for which reason each of them is in a sense many bodies. But the whole of which they are parts must necessarily be complete, and thus, in accordance with the meaning of the word, have being, not in some respects only, but in every respect.

The question as to the nature of the whole, whether it is infinite in size or limited in its total mass, is a matter for

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1 Body alone is so determined, and only what is so determined is a totality (an 'all'). Put a comma, instead of a full stop, after τησαίν. The words τούτο δ' ἐστι πᾶν are difficult to interpret. Prantl makes τούτο predicate, and translates as though we had τὸ πᾶν instead of πᾶν. Simplicius gives no help.

2 To be incomplete or defective is to lack being in some respect.

3 i.e. the elements.

4 The 'parts' or elements are bodies, and therefore complete in the sense just given to the word. They are, however, only parts, and as such limited in their being by the juxtaposition of other parts. This suggests a development of the notion of completeness which will make the term 'complete' applicable only to the unrestricted being of the whole.
subsequent inquiry.\(^1\) We will now speak of those parts of the whole which are specifically distinct.\(^2\) Let us take this as our starting-point. All natural bodies and magnitudes we hold to be, as such, capable of locomotion; for nature, we say, is their principle of movement.\(^3\) But all movement that is in place, all locomotion, as we term it, is either straight or circular or a combination of these two, which are the only simple movements. And the reason of this is that these two, the straight and the circular line, are the only simple magnitudes. Now revolution about the centre is circular motion, while the upward and downward movements are in a straight line, 'upward' meaning motion away from the centre, and 'downward' motion towards it. All simple motion, then, must be motion either away from or towards or about the centre. This seems to be in exact accord with what we said above: \(^4\)\(^5\) as body found its completion in three dimensions, so its movement completes itself in three forms.

Bodies are either simple or compounded of such; and by simple bodies I mean those which possess a principle of movement in their own nature, such as fire and earth with their kinds, and whatever is akin to them.\(^5\) Necessarily, then, movements also will be either simple or in some sort compound—simple in the case of the simple bodies, com-

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\(^1\) See c. vii.
\(^2\) i.e. the elements, which represent the ultimate distinctions of kind among bodies.
\(^3\) Cf. Phys. 192\(^b\) 20.
\(^4\) Reading ἕκαλοµηκαί κατὰ λόγον with all MSS. except E.
\(^5\) Τὰ τοῦτον εἶδον (‘with their kinds’) can hardly mean kinds of fire and earth (e.g. sandy and stony earth, flame and glowing coal), as Simplicius supposes, for there is no variety of movement corresponding to this variety of kind. Rather, as Alexander supposes, the phrase is a generalizing formula (ἀντὶ τοῦ καθόλου πᾶν πῦρ ... καὶ καθόλου πᾶσαν γῆν): fire and its kind, earth and its kind, and other species of the same genus (viz. air and water, and the 'fifth body' of which the stars are made).
simple movement is of a simple body (for if it is movement of a compound it will be in virtue of a prevailing simple element), then there must necessarily be some simple body which revolves naturally and in virtue of its own nature with a circular movement. By constraint, of course, it may be brought to move with the motion of something else different from itself, but it cannot so move naturally, since there is one sort of movement natural to each of the simple bodies. Again, if the unnatural movement is the contrary of the natural and a thing can have no more than one contrary, it will follow that circular movement, being a simple motion, must be unnatural, if it is not natural, to the body moved. If then (1) the body, whose movement is circular, is fire or some other element, its natural motion must be the contrary of the circular motion. But a single thing has a single contrary; and upward and downward motion are the contraries of one another. If, on the other hand, (2) the body moving with this circular motion which is unnatural to it is something different from the elements, there will be some other motion which is natural to it. But this cannot be. For if the natural motion is upward, it will be fire or air, and if downward, water or earth. Further, this circular motion is necessarily primary. For the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, and the circle is a perfect thing. This cannot be said of any straight line: —not of an infinite line; for, if it were perfect, it would have a limit and an end: nor of any finite line; for in every case there is something beyond it, since any finite line can be extended. And so, since the prior movement belongs to the body which is naturally prior, and circular movement is prior to straight, and movement in a straight line belongs to simple bodies—fire moving straight upward and earthy bodies straight downward towards the centre—since this is so, it follows that circular movement also must

1 Reading ἐντωπο with all MSS. except E.
2 Therefore neither of these can be also the contrary of circular motion. Thus there is no simple motion opposed as contrary to the circular.
3 Reading παντὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκτὸς (ἐστὶ is omitted by E alone).
be the movement of some simple body. For the movement of composite bodies is, as we said, determined by that simple body which preponderates in the composition. These premises clearly give the conclusion that there is in nature some bodily substance other than the formations we know, prior to them all and more divine than they. But it may also be proved as follows. We may take it that all movement is either natural or unnatural, and that the movement which is unnatural to one body is natural to another—as, for instance, is the case with the upward and downward movements, which are natural and unnatural to fire and earth respectively. It necessarily follows that circular movement, being unnatural to these bodies, is the natural movement of some other. Further, if, on the one hand, circular movement is natural to something, it must surely be some simple and primary body which is ordained to move with a natural circular motion, as fire is ordained to fly up and earth down. If, on the other hand, the movement of the rotating bodies about the centre is unnatural, it would be remarkable and indeed quite inconceivable that this movement alone should be continuous and eternal, being nevertheless contrary to nature. At any rate the evidence of all other cases goes to show that it is the unnatural which quickest passes away. And so, if, as some say, the body so moved is fire, this movement is just as unnatural to it as downward movement; for any one can see that fire moves in a straight line away from the centre. On all these grounds, therefore, we may infer with confidence that there is something beyond the bodies that are about us on this earth, different and separate from them; and that the superior glory of its nature is proportionate to its distance from this world of ours.

1 From his premises Aristotle is here entitled to conclude, not merely that circular movement is the movement of a simple body, but also that it is the movement of a simple body prior to the other simple bodies. Prantl therefore inserts προτέρου after τινός and appeals to Simplicius's paraphrase for corroboration. Simplicius, however, not only does not corroborate the conjecture but actually points out that this part of the conclusion is suppressed (ὑπερ ὁς συμφές παρῆκε). The insertion of προτέρου does not really make the argument any clearer.

2 Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 111 B.
In consequence of what has been said, in part by way of assumption and in part by way of proof, it is clear that not every body either possesses lightness or heaviness. As a preliminary we must explain in what sense we are using the words 'heavy' and 'light', sufficiently, at least, for our present purpose: we can examine the terms more closely later, when we come to consider their essential nature. Let us then apply the term 'heavy' to that which naturally moves towards the centre, and 'light' to that which moves naturally away from the centre. The heaviest thing will be that which sinks to the bottom of all things that move downward, and the lightest that which rises to the surface of everything that moves upward. Now, necessarily, every-thing which moves either up or down possesses lightness or heaviness or both—but not both relatively to the same thing: for things are heavy and light relatively to one another; air, for instance, is light relatively to water, and water light relatively to earth. The body, then, which moves in a circle cannot possibly possess either heaviness or lightness. For neither naturally nor unnaturally can it move either towards or away from the centre. Movement in a straight line certainly does not belong to it naturally, since one sort of movement is, as we saw, appropriate to each simple body, and so we should be compelled to identify it with one of the bodies which move in this way. Suppose, then, that the movement is unnatural. In that case, if it is the downward movement which is unnatural, the upward movement will be natural; and if it is the upward which is unnatural, the downward will be natural. For we decided that of contrary movements, if the one is unnatural to anything, the other will be natural to it. But since the natural movement of the whole and of its part—of earth, for in-stance, as a whole and of a small clod—have one and the same direction, it results, in the first place, that this body can possess no lightness or heaviness at all (for that would mean that it could move by its own nature either from or

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1 Reading ἰκανῶς ὅς πρὸς (ὅς is omitted by E alone).
2 Below, Bk. IV, cc. i-iv.
3 Reading ἀνέργη ὃθ (ὥ is in F alone).
towards the centre, which, as we know, is impossible); and, secondly, that it cannot possibly move in the way of locomotion by being forced violently aside in an upward or downward direction. For neither naturally nor un-naturally can it move with any other motion but its own, either itself or any part of it, since the reasoning which applies to the whole applies also to the part.

It is equally reasonable to assume that this body will be ungenerated and indestructible and exempt from increase and alteration, since everything that comes to be comes into being from its contrary and in some substrate, and passes away likewise in a substrate by the action of the contrary into the contrary, as we explained in our opening discussions. Now the motions of contraries are contrary. If then this body can have no contrary, because there can be no contrary motion to the circular, nature seems justly to have exempted from contraries the body which was to be un-generated and indestructible. For it is in contraries that generation and decay subsist. Again, that which is subject to increase increases upon contact with a kindred body, which is resolved into its matter. But there is nothing out of which this body can have been generated. And if it is exempt from increase and diminution, the same reasoning leads us to suppose that it is also unalterable. For alteration is movement in respect of quality; and qualitative states and dispositions, such as health and disease, do not come into being without changes of properties. But all natural bodies which change their properties we see to be subject without exception to increase and diminution. This is the case, for instance, with the bodies of animals and

1 *Phys.* I. vii–ix. For the phrase, cf. 311a 12.
2 Omitting καὶ τὸ φθινὸν φθινεῖ (l. 23). These words are omitted by three representative MSS. (EFJ), are not referred to by Simplicius or Themistius, and are an awkward intrusion in the sentence since what follows applies only to increase. For the doctrine, cf. *De Gen. et Corr.* I. v.
3 Increase is effected by generation of one kindred body out of another. This body has no contrary out of which it can be generated. Therefore it cannot increase.
4 Reading ἀφθιτὸν with H (so Prantl). All other MSS. have ἀφθαρτὸν; but the rare ἀφθιτὸν would be easily altered to the commoner word. Simplicius has ἀφθαρτον, but explains that φθιαῖς is a kind of φθορά and so ἀφθαρτὸν may be used for ἀφθιτὸν.
their parts and with vegetable bodies, and similarly also with those of the elements. And so, if the body which moves with a circular motion cannot admit of increase or diminution, it is reasonable to suppose that it is also unalterable.

The reasons why the primary body is eternal and not subject to increase or diminution, but unaging and unalterable and unmodified, will be clear from what has been said to any one who believes in our assumptions. Our theory seems to confirm experience and to be confirmed by it. For all men have some conception of the nature of the gods, and all who believe in the existence of gods at all, whether barbarian or Greek, agree in allotting the highest place to the deity, surely because they suppose that immortal is linked with immortal and regard any other supposition as inconceivable. If then there is, as there certainly is, anything divine, what we have just said about the primary bodily substance was well said. The mere evidence of the senses is enough to convince us of this, at least with human certainty. For in the whole range of time past, so far as our inherited records reach, no change appears to have taken place either in the whole scheme of the outermost heaven or in any of its proper parts. The common name, too, which has been handed down from our distant ancestors even to our own day, seems to show that they conceived of it in the fashion which we have been expressing. The same ideas, one must believe, recur in men's minds not once or twice but again and again. And so, implying that the primary body is something else beyond earth, fire, air, and water, they gave the highest place a name of its own, aither, derived from the fact that it 'runs always' for an eternity of time. Anaxagoras, however, scandalously misuses this name, taking aither as equivalent to fire.

It is also clear from what has been said why the number

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1 Simplicius says he 'has been told' that there are written astronomical records (ἀστροφοιοι τηρήσεις ἀναγράφτουσι) in Egypt for the past 630,000 years and in Babylon for the past 1,440,000 years.
2 i.e. αἰθήρ from δεῖ θεῖν. The derivation was suggested by Plato (Cratylus, 410b).
3 i.e. deriving αἰθήρ from αἴθειν. Cf. Bk. III, 302b 4.
of what we call simple bodies cannot be greater than it is. The motion of a simple body must itself be simple, and we assert that there are only these two simple motions, the circular and the straight, the latter being subdivided into motion away from and motion towards the centre.

4. That there is no other form of motion opposed as contrary to the circular may be proved in various ways. In the first place, there is an obvious tendency to oppose the straight line to the circular. For concave and convex are not only regarded as opposed to one another, but they are also coupled together and treated as a unity in opposition to the straight. And so, if there is a contrary to circular motion, motion in a straight line must be recognized as having the best claim to that name. But the two forms of rectilinear motion are opposed to one another by reason of their places; for up and down is a difference and a contrary opposition in place. Secondly, it may be thought that the same reasoning which holds good of the rectilinear path applies also to the circular, movement from $A$ to $B$ being opposed as contrary to movement from $B$ to $A$. But what is meant is still rectilinear motion. For that is limited to a single path, while the circular paths which pass through the same two points are infinite in number. Even if we are confined to the single semicircle and the opposition is between movement from $C$ to $D$ and from $D$ to $C$ along that semicircle, the case is no better. For the motion is the same as that along the diameter, since we invariably regard the distance between two points as the length of the straight line which joins them. It is no more satisfactory to construct a circle and treat motion along one semicircle as contrary to motion along the other. For example, taking

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1 The point of this elliptical argument seems to be that, while the generally admitted case of contrary opposition (viz. that of upward and downward motion) rests on a contrary opposition of places (viz. above and below), no such ground can be suggested for the opposition of circular to rectilinear motion.

2 FIG. I.

3 FIG. II.
a complete circle, motion from $E$ to $F$ on the semicircle $G$ may be opposed to motion from $F$ to $E$ on the semicircle $H$. But even supposing these are contraries, it in no way follows that the reverse motions on the complete circumference are contraries. Nor again can motion along the circle from $A$ to $B$ be regarded as the contrary of motion from $A$ to $C$: for the motion goes from the same point towards the same point, and contrary motion was distinguished as motion from a contrary to its contrary.

And even if the motion round a circle is the contrary of the reverse motion, one of the two would be ineffective: for both move to the same point, because that which moves in a circle, at whatever point it begins, must necessarily pass through all the contrary places alike. (By contrarieties of place I mean up and down, back and front, and right and left; and the contrary oppositions of movements are determined by those of places.) One of the motions, then, would be ineffective, for if the two motions were of equal strength, there would be no movement either way, and if one of the two were preponderant, the other would be inoperative. So that if both bodies were there, one of them, inasmuch as it would not be moving with its own movement, would be useless, in the sense in which a shoe is useless when it is not worn. But God and nature create nothing that has not its use.

1 Fig. III.

Phys. V. v, 229b 21.

Reading ेर for the ेर of our MSS. after Simplicius, who had both readings before him.

4 Prantl’s alteration of $\gamma\rho$ into $\delta\rho$ is not needed. The $\gamma\rho$ refers back to the remark ‘one of the two would be ineffective’. That remark is therefore repeated in the text.

5 The bearing of this argument is clear if it is remembered that the assertion of the existence of a certain movement necessarily involves for Aristotle the assertion of the existence of a body which naturally exhibits the movement. Similarly the assertion that a movement is inoperative involves the assertion that a body is inoperative.
This being clear, we must go on to consider the questions which remain. First, is there an infinite body, as the majority of the ancient philosophers thought, or is this an impossibility? The decision of this question, either way, is not unimportant, but rather all-important, to our search for the truth.\(^1\) It is this problem which has practically always been the source of the differences of those who have written about nature as a whole. So it has been and so it must be; since the least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold.\(^2\) Admit, for instance, the existence of a minimum magnitude, and you will find that the minimum which you have introduced, small as it is, causes the greatest truths of mathematics to totter. The reason is that a principle is great rather in power than in extent; hence that which was small at the start turns out a giant at the end. Now the conception of the infinite possesses this power of principles, and indeed in the sphere of quantity possesses it in a higher degree than any other conception; so that it is in no way absurd or unreasonable that the assumption that an infinite body exists should be of peculiar moment to our inquiry. The infinite, then, we must now discuss, opening the whole matter from the beginning.

Every body is necessarily to be classed either as simple or as composite;\(^3\) the infinite body, therefore, will be either simple or composite. But it is clear, further, that if the simple bodies are finite, the composite must also be finite, since that which is composed of bodies finite both in number and in magnitude is itself finite in respect of number and magnitude: its quantity is in fact the same as that of the bodies which compose it. What remains for us to consider, then, is whether any of the simple bodies can be infinite in magnitude, or whether this is impossible. Let us try the primary body first, and then go on to consider the others.

The body which moves in a circle must necessarily be finite in every respect, for the following reasons. (1) If the body so moving is infinite, the radii drawn from the centre

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\(^1\) Reading ηήν περι τής with FHMJ. The phrase recurs in this form in Met. 993a 30.

\(^2\) After Plato, Cratylus, 436 D.

\(^3\) The εόριν of all other MSS. is preferable to E's ειναι.
30 will be infinite. But the space between infinite radii is infinite: and by the space between the radii I mean the area outside which no magnitude which is in contact with the two lines can be conceived as falling. This, I say, will be infinite: first, because in the case of finite radii it is always finite; and secondly, because in it one can always go on to a width greater than any given width; thus the reasoning which forces us to believe in infinite number, because there is no maximum, applies also to the space between the radii. Now the infinite cannot be traversed, and if the body is infinite the interval between the radii is necessarily infinite: circular motion therefore is an impossibility. Yet our eyes tell us that the heavens revolve in a circle, and by argument also we have determined that there is something to which circular movement belongs.

(2) Again, if from a finite time a finite time be subtracted, what remains must be finite and have a beginning. And if the time of a journey has a beginning, there must be a beginning also of the movement, and consequently also of the distance traversed. This applies universally. Take a line, \( ACE \), infinite in one direction, \( E \), and another line, \( BB \), infinite in both directions. Let \( ACE \) describe a circle,

\[ \frac{1}{2} \]

'The centre', when not in any way qualified, means the centre of the earth, which is taken by Aristotle to be also the centre of all the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. He cannot here mean the centre of the supposed infinite body, since to that no shape has yet been given.

\[ \frac{2}{2} \]

The last phrase (οὐ μὴ δεῖν ἔστιν ἡξίω λαθεῖν) seems to have been misunderstood by Prantl. A comparison of this passage with others in which what is practically the same phrase occurs (esp. Met. 1021b 12, 1055a 12) shows (a) that οὐ is governed by ἡξίω ('outside which'), and (b) that the phrase is roughly equivalent to τελεῖον. The point here is that by διάστημα he means, not a straight line spanning the interval between the radii, but the whole area enclosed between the two radii and the portion of the circumference which connects their extremities. In l. 30 read, after διάστημα, ὶτε rather than γάρ, which is in E alone.

3 Reading ἐτί with the MSS.; Prantl's ἐπίτι seems to have nothing to recommend it. It will then be necessary to put a full-stop after διάστηματος in l. 3. This sentence gives, of course, a second reason for taking the διάστημα to be infinite.

\[ \frac{4}{4} \]

FIG. IV.
revolving upon \( C \) as centre. In its movement it will cut \( BB \) continuously for a certain time. This will be a finite time, since the total time is finite in which the heavens complete their circular orbit, and consequently the time subtracted from it, during which the one line in its motion cuts the other, is also finite. Therefore there will be a point at which \( ACE \) began for the first time to cut \( BB \). This, however, is impossible.\(^1\) The infinite, then, cannot revolve in a circle; nor could the world, if it were infinite.\(^2\)

(3) That the infinite cannot move may also be shown as follows. Let \( A \) be a finite line moving past the finite line, \( B \). Of necessity \( A \) will pass clear of \( B \) and \( B \) of \( A \) at the same moment; for each overlaps the other to precisely the \( \) same extent. Now if the two were both moving, and moving in contrary directions, they would pass clear of one another more rapidly; if one were still and the other moving past it, less rapidly; provided that the speed of the latter were the same in both cases. This, however, is clear: that it is impossible to traverse an infinite line in a finite time. Infinite time, then, would be required. (This we \( 30 \) demonstrated above in the discussion of movement.\(^3\)) And

\(^1\) In this argument the ascertained fact that the revolution of the heavens occupies a limited time is used to prove the finitude of its path and consequently also of the body itself. \( BB \) represents an infinite line drawn within the infinite body and therefore 'traversed' by that body in its revolution. But there can be no point at which the contact of \( ACE \) with \( BB \) either begins or ends, while there is a time within which the revolution is completed. Therefore the revolving body is not infinite. Possibly the centre of the movement of \( ACE \) should be \( A \) (as in \( F \) and Simppl.) rather than \( C \).

\(^2\) Movement of the 'world' (\( \kappa \omega \sigma \mu \omicron \sigma \) is here used for movement of the 'heaven' (\( \sigma \upsilon \rho \alpha \nu \nu \zeta \omicron \sigma \) ). Either \( \kappa \omega \sigma \mu \omicron \) stands for the heavenly body, as in \( \textit{Nic. Eth.} \) 1141\( ^b \) 1, or the movement and the infinity are treated for the moment as attributes of the whole.

\(^3\) Aristotle refers to the \( \textit{Physics} \), here and elsewhere, as continuous with the \( \textit{De Caelo} \). Different parts of the \( \textit{Physics} \) are referred to by different names. Simplicius (p. 226, 19) observes that \( \textit{Phys.} \) I–IV are cited as 'the discussion of principles' (\( \pi \epsilon \iota \ \delta \rho \chi \omicron \omicron \) ) and \( \textit{Phys.} \) V–VIII as 'the discussion of movement' (\( \pi \epsilon \iota \ \kappa \iota \iota \sigma \epsilon \omicron \omicron \) ). In \( \textit{Phys.} \) VIII, 257\( ^a \) 34, Aristotle refers back to an earlier passage as occurring \( \epsilon \nu \ \gamma \nu \theta \omicron \delta \lambda \omicron \nu \ \tau \omega \iota \ \pi \epsilon \iota \ \delta \rho \chi \omicron \omicron \); and Simplicius, commenting on this (\textit{Comm. in Phys.} p. 1233, 30), 'infers' that \( \textit{Phys.} \) I–V are the \( \pi \epsilon \iota \ \delta \rho \chi \omicron \omicron \) and \( \textit{Phys.} \) VI–VIII the \( \pi \epsilon \iota \ \kappa \iota \iota \sigma \epsilon \omicron \omicron \). But his inference is false. The reference is not, as he thought, to \( V \). iv. The principle had been asserted earlier, viz. in \( \textit{III.} \) i. The 'general considerations concerning nature' may therefore be identified with the 'discussion of principles', and the \( \textit{Physics} \) may be divided in the middle, i.e. at the end of Book IV.—The reference in this passage is to \( \textit{Phys.} \) VI. vii.
it makes no difference whether a finite is passing by an
infinite or an infinite by a finite. For when $A$ is passing $B$, then $B$ overlaps $A$, and it makes no difference whether $B$
is moved or unmoved, except that, if both move, they pass
clear of one another more quickly. It is, however, quite
possible that a moving line should in certain cases pass one
which is stationary quicker than it passes one moving in an
opposite direction. One has only to imagine the movement
to be slow where both move and much faster where one is
stationary. To suppose one line stationary, then, makes no
difficulty for our argument, since it is quite possible for $A$ to
pass $B$ at a slower rate when both are moving than when only
one is. If, therefore, the time which the finite moving line
takes to pass the other is infinite, then necessarily the time
occupied by the motion of the infinite past the finite is also
infinite. For the infinite to move at all is thus absolutely
impossible; since the very smallest movement conceivable
must take an infinity of time. Moreover the heavens
certainly revolve, and they complete their circular orbit in
a finite time; so that they pass round the whole extent of
any line within their orbit, such as the finite line $AB$. The
revolving body, therefore, cannot be infinite.

(4) Again, as a line which has a limit cannot be infinite,
or, if it is infinite, is so only in length, so a surface cannot

1 Reading κάνειν παραλλάττει ἐκείνην with FHMJ. The alternative
to παραλλάττει, παρ', rests upon the sole authority of E; for L has
παραλλάττη. Παρ' is intolerable, since it must stand for φέρεται παρά
and thus attributes movement to $B$, of which in the same sentence it is
said that it may be unmoved.

2 The reading is doubtful. It is difficult to attach any other sense
to the possession of πέρας ("limit") than a denial of infinity; in which
case ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐπὶ μῆκος means "or if a finite line is infinite, it is so in
length." The antecedent thus appears to contradict both itself and
the consequent. Simplicius preserves a variant for ἐπὶ μῆκος, ἐπὶ
θάτερα. ("A finite line can only be infinite, if at all, in one direction.")
—Perhaps, however, the text is correct. The sentence may be para-
phrased as follows: A limited line cannot be infinite: lines, in fact,
can only be infinite, if at all, in that respect in which they are un-
limited: but there is nothing in the nature of 'line' to determine the
length of any given line: consequently, it is only in respect to length
that infinity is ever ascribed to lines. (Mr. Ross suggests that ἂ
should be read instead of ἂ in l. 17. 'A line cannot be infinite in that respect
in which it is a limit.' The line is the limit of the plane, i. e. a limit
in respect of breadth. Similarly the plane is the limit in respect of
depth. This correction has support from the translation of Argyropylus
('ex ea parte qua finis est'), and is probably right.)
be infinite in that respect in which it has a limit; or, indeed, if it is completely determinate, in any respect whatever. Whether it be a square or a circle or a sphere, it cannot be infinite, any more than a foot-rule can. There is then no such thing as an infinite sphere or square or circle, and where there is no circle there can be no circular movement, and similarly where there is no infinite at all there can be no infinite movement; and from this it follows that, an infinite circle being itself an impossibility, there can be no circular motion of an infinite body.

(5) Again, take a centre C, an infinite line, AB, another infinite line at right angles to it, E, and a moving radius, CD. CD will never cease contact with E, but the position will always be something like CE, CD cutting E at F. The infinite line, therefore, refuses to complete the circle.

(6) Again, if the heaven is infinite and moves in a circle, we shall have to admit that in a finite time it has traversed the infinite. For suppose the fixed heaven infinite, and that which moves within it equal to it. It results that when the infinite body has completed its revolution, it has traversed an infinite equal to itself in a finite time. But that we know to be impossible.

(7) It can also be shown, conversely, that if the time of revolution is finite, the area traversed must also be finite;

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1 Also, of course, infinite.

2 FIG. V.

3 The ‘infinite line’ is the infinite radius CD, which is unable to complete the circle owing to its inability to extricate its outer extremity from that of the other infinite, E. The MSS. vary between κύκλων (EL), κύκλω (M), and κύκλον (HFJ: the last, however, has ωι supra-scriptum). In FMJ περίευσιν follows instead of preceding κύκλον (κύκλω M). Perhaps κύκλον περίευσιν should be read with FJ, though either reading will give the sense required.
but the area traversed was equal to itself; therefore, it is itself finite.¹

5 We have now shown that the body which moves in a circle is not endless or infinite, but has its limit.

Further, neither that which moves towards nor that which moves away from the centre can be infinite. For the upward and downward motions are contraries and are therefore motions towards contrary places. But if one of a pair of contraries is determinate, the other must be determinate also. Now the centre is determined; for, from whatever point the body which sinks to the bottom starts its downward motion, it cannot go farther than the centre. The centre, therefore, being determinate, the upper place must also be determinate. But if these two places are determined and finite, the corresponding bodies must also be finite. Further, if up and down are determinate, the intermediate place is also necessarily determinate. For, if it is indeterminate, the movement within it will be infinite²; and that we have already shown to be an impossibility.³ The middle region then is determinate, and consequently any body which either is in it, or might be in it, is determinate. But the bodies which move up and down may be in it, since the one moves naturally away from the centre and the other towards it.

From this alone it is clear that an infinite body is an impossibility; but there is a further point. If there is no such thing as infinite weight, then it follows that none of these bodies can be infinite. For the supposed infinite body would have to be infinite in weight. (The same argument applies to lightness: for as the one supposition involves 'infinite weight, so the infinity of the body which rises to the surface involves infinite lightness.) This is

¹ The preceding six arguments start from the hypothesis of an infinite body and show the difficulties involved in the consequent assumption of an infinite path and in the infinite time needed for its completion. The converse argument starts from known finite time of revolution and argues from that to the finitude of the path traversed and of the body which traverses it.

² Reading εἰς ἕκαστα with FHMJ Simpl.

³ *Phys.* VII. viii.
proved as follows. Assume the weight to be finite, and take an infinite body, $AB$, of the weight $C$. Subtract from the infinite body a finite mass, $BD$, the weight of which shall be $E$. $E$ then is less than $C$, since it is the weight of a lesser mass.\(^1\) Suppose then that the smaller goes into the greater a certain number of times, and take $BF$ bearing the same proportion to $BD$ which the greater weight bears to the smaller. For you may subtract as much as you please from an infinite. If now the masses are proportionate to the weights, and the lesser weight is that of the lesser mass, the greater must be that of the greater. The weights, therefore, of the finite and of the infinite body are equal. Again, if the weight of a greater body is greater than that of a less, the weight of $GB$ will be greater than that of $FB$;\(^1\) and thus the weight of the finite body is greater than that of the infinite. And, further, the weight of unequal masses will be the same, since the infinite and the finite cannot be equal. It does not matter whether the weights are commensurable or not. If (a) they are incommensurable the same reasoning holds. For instance, suppose $E$ multiplied by three is rather more than $C$: the weight of three masses of the full size of $BD$ will be greater than $C$. We thus arrive at the same impossibility as before. Again (b) we may assume weights which are commensurate; for it makes no difference whether we begin with the weight or with the mass. For example, assume the weight $E$ to be commensurate with $C$, and take from the infinite mass a part $BD$ of weight $E$. Then let a mass $BF$ be taken having the same proportion to $BD$ which the two weights have to one another. (For the mass being infinite you may subtract from it as much as you please.) These assumed bodies will be commensurate in mass and in weight alike. Nor again does it make any difference to our demonstration whether the total mass has its weight equally or unequally distributed. For it must always be possible to take from the infinite mass a body of equal

\[\text{FIG. VI.} \]

\[\begin{array}{cccccc}
A & G & F & D & B \\
\hline \\
E & C \\
\end{array}\]
weight to $BD$ by diminishing or increasing the size of the section to the necessary extent.\(^1\)

From what we have said, then, it is clear that the weight of the infinite body cannot be finite. It must then be infinite. We have therefore only to show this to be impossible in order to prove an infinite body impossible. But the impossibility of infinite weight can be shown in the following way. A given weight moves a given distance in a given time; a weight which is as great and more moves the same distance in a less time, the times being in inverse proportion to the weights. For instance, if one weight is twice another, it will take half as long over a given movement. Further, a finite weight traverses any finite distance in a finite time. It necessarily follows from this that infinite weight, if there is such a thing, being, on the one hand, as great and more than as great as the finite,\(^2\) will move accordingly, but being, on the other hand, compelled to move in a time inversely proportionate to its greatness, cannot move at all.\(^3\) The time should be less in proportion as the weight is greater. But there is no proportion between the infinite and the finite: proportion can only hold between a less and a greater finite time. And though you may say that the time of the movement can be continually diminished, yet there is no minimum.\(^4\)

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1. Delete comma after $BD$.
2. There can be no doubt that the comma should follow, not precede, $καὶ$ $ἐτὶ$ (l. 5). The phrase $τοσοῦτον$ $ὅσον$ $τὸ$ $πεπερασμένῳ$ καὶ $ἐτὶ$ is parallel to the $τοσοῦτον$ καὶ $ἐτὶ$ of 273\(^b\) 31. Bonitz (Ind. 291\(^a\) 7) takes καὶ $ἐτὶ$ in this way, but appears to interpret the phrase as indicating the distance moved, which is impossible.—For the use of καὶ $ἐτὶ$ cf. Met. 1021\(^a\) 6.
3. Because, as explained in the following sentences, there is no time for it to move in. The argument is: the infinite may ($μὲν$) be regarded loosely as something exceedingly great, in which case it follows simply that it moves exceedingly fast: so far there is no difficulty: but ($δὲ$) as soon as you begin to specify how great it is and how fast it moves the difficulties become insuperable.
4. ἀλλ' ἄτι ἐν ἀπέραντι is probably an opponent's objection. It is an application of the argument mentioned in 272\(^a\) 1. We talk of number as infinite, $A$. says there, because there is no maximum. Similarly the advocate of infinite weight says, 'At any rate the weight can be increased and the time proportionately diminished ad infinitum'. But the motion of the infinite, to be conceivable, must according to Aristotle occupy a time: and any time, however small, will be a time in which the given movement could be effected by a finite body.
would it help us. For some finite body could have been
down greater than the given finite in the same proportion
which is supposed to hold between the infinite and the
given finite; 1 so that an infinite and a finite weight must
have traversed an equal distance in equal time. But that
is impossible. Again, whatever the time, so long as it is
finite, in which the infinite performs the motion, a finite 15
weight must necessarily move a certain finite distance in
that same time. Infinite weight is therefore impossible,
and the same reasoning applies also to infinite lightness.
Bodies then of infinite weight and of infinite lightness are
equally impossible.

That there is no infinite body may be shown, as we have
shown it, by a detailed consideration of the various cases. 20
But it may also be shown universally, not only by such
reasoning as we advanced in our discussion of principles 2
(though in that passage we have already determined univer-
sally the sense in which the existence of an infinite is to be
asserted or denied), but also suitably to our present purpose
in the following way. That will lead us to a further
question. Even if the total mass is not infinite, it may
yet be great enough to admit a plurality of universes. The
question might possibly be raised whether there is any
obstacle to our believing that there are other universes
composed on the pattern of our own, more than one,
though stopping short of infinity. First, however, let us
treat of the infinite universally.

1 What difficulty there is in this sentence is due to the elliptical
expression and to the tacit inference from a proportion between the
times to a proportion between the bodies. What is known is the ratio
between the imaginary minimum time assigned to the infinite body
and some other finite time. A. speaks of this known ratio as a ratio
between the infinite body and another body. The argument is: take
any other finite body (έτερον): its ratio to the infinite may be deter-
mined by their respective times: but another finite body (άλλο τι
πεπερασμένον) could be found in the same ratio (on the basis of
a comparison of times) to the first. Thus a finite body will cover the
same distance as the infinite body in the same time, which is absurd.—
The comma after λόγοι in I. 11 should be deleted. μείζον belongs to
the predicate both of the relative clause and of the main sentence.
Neither Simplicius nor Alexander (as reported by Simplicius) seems
to have interpreted the words quite correctly.

2 Phys. III. iv–viii (see n. on 272 a 30). Read εἰσημένους with FM.
Every body must necessarily be either finite or infinite, and if infinite, either of similar or of dissimilar parts. If its parts are *dissimilar*, they must represent either a finite or an infinite number of kinds. That the kinds cannot be *infinite* is evident, if our original presuppositions remain unchallenged. For the primary movements being finite in number, the kinds of simple body are necessarily also finite, since the movement of a simple body is simple, and the simple movements are finite, and every natural body must always have its proper motion. Now if the infinite body is to be composed of a *finite* number of kinds, then each of its parts must necessarily be infinite in quantity, that is to say, the water, fire, &c., which compose it. But this is impossible, because, as we have already shown, infinite weight and lightness do not exist. Moreover it would be necessary also that their places should be infinite in extent, so that the movements too of all these bodies would be infinite. But this is not possible, if we are to hold to the truth of our original presuppositions and to the view that neither that which moves downward, nor, by the same reasoning, that which moves upward, can prolong its movement to infinity. For it is true in regard to quality, quantity, and place alike that any process of change is impossible which can have no end. I mean that if it is impossible for a thing to have come to be white, or a cubit long, or in Egypt, it is also impossible for it to be in process of coming to be any of these. It is thus impossible for a thing to be moving to a place at which in its motion it can never by any possibility arrive. Again, suppose the body to exist in dispersion, it may be maintained none the less that the total of all these scattered particles, say, of fire, is infinite. But body we saw to be that which has extension every way. How can there be several dissimilar elements, each infinite? Each would have to be infinitely extended every way.

It is no more conceivable, again, that the infinite should exist as a whole of *similar* parts. For, in the first place,

1 Reading φιλε with FHMJ.
2 'As Anaxagoras seems to have supposed' (Simpl.).
there is no other (straight) movement beyond those mentioned: we must therefore give it one of them. And if so, we shall have to admit either infinite weight or infinite lightness. Nor, secondly, could the body whose movement is circular be infinite, since it is impossible for the infinite to move in a circle. This, indeed, would be as good as saying that the heavens are infinite, which we have shown to be impossible.

Moreover, in general, it is impossible that the infinite should move at all. If it did, it would move either naturally or by constraint: and if by constraint, it possesses also a natural motion, that is to say, there is another place, infinite like itself, to which it will move. But that is impossible.¹

That in general it is impossible for the infinite to be acted upon by the finite or to act upon it may be shown as follows.

(1. The infinite cannot be acted upon by the finite.) Let 275a

A be an infinite, B a finite, C the time of a given movement produced by one in the other. Suppose, then, that A was heated, or impelled, or modified in any way, or caused to undergo any sort of movement whatever, by B in the time C. Let D be less than B; and, assuming that a lesser agent moves a lesser patient in an equal time, call the quantity thus modified by D, E. Then, as D is to B, so is E to some finite quantum. We assume that the alteration of equal by equal takes equal time, and the alteration of less by less or of greater by greater takes the same time, if the quantity of the patient is such as to keep the proportion which obtains between the agents, greater and less. If so, no movement can be caused in the infinite ² by any finite agent in any time whatever. For a less agent will produce that movement in a less patient in an equal time, and the proportionate equivalent of that patient will be a finite

¹ Because an infinite place cannot exclude, or be 'other' than, any finite place. This argument applies to natural as well as unnatural movement: for a body moves naturally in the effort to reach its place. —Read τόπος ἄλλος ἴδιος with EL, confirmed by Simplicius (τόπος ἴδιος ἄλλος, 239, 24).
² Read κινηθῆσθαι with Simplicius and all MSS. except E.
quantity, since no proportion holds between finite and infinite.

(2. The infinite cannot act upon the finite.) Nor, again, can
the infinite produce a movement in the finite in any time
whatever. Let \( A \) be an infinite, \( B \) a finite, \( C \) the time of
action. In the time \( C, D \) will produce that motion in a
patient less than \( B \), say \( F \). Then take \( E \), bearing the same
proportion to \( D \) as the whole \( BF \) bears to \( F \). \( E \) will pro-
duce the motion in \( BF \) in the time \( C \). Thus the finite and
the infinite effect the same alteration in equal times. But
this is impossible; for the assumption is that the greater
effects it in a shorter time. It will be the same with any
time that can be taken, so that there will be no time in which
the infinite can effect this movement. And, as to infinite time,
in that nothing can move another or be moved by it. For
such time has no limit, while the action and reaction have.

(3. There is no interaction between infinites.) Nor can
infinite be acted upon in any way by infinite. Let \( A \) and \( B \)
be infinites, \( CD \) being the time of the action of \( A \) upon \( B \).
Now the whole \( B \) was modified in a certain time, and the
part of this infinite, \( E \), cannot be so modified in the same
time, since we assume that a less quantity makes the move-
ment in a less time. Let \( E \) then, when acted upon by \( A \),
complete the movement in the time \( D \). Then, as \( D \) is to
\( CD \), so is \( E \) to some finite part of \( B \). This part will neces-
sarily be moved by \( A \) in the time \( CD \). For we suppose
that the same agent produces a given effect on a greater
and a smaller mass in longer and shorter times, the times
and masses varying proportionately. There is thus no
finite time in which infinites can move one another. Is
their time then infinite? No, for infinite time has no end,
but the movement communicated has.

If therefore every perceptible body possesses the power
of acting or of being acted upon, or both of these, it is im-
possible that an infinite body should be perceptible. All
bodies, however, that occupy place are perceptible. There
is therefore no infinite body beyond the heaven. Nor again
is there anything of limited extent beyond it. And so

\[1 \text{ Called } BF \text{ a few lines below.}\]
beyond the heaven there is no body at all. For if you suppose it an object of intelligence, it will be in a place—since place is what ‘within’ and ‘beyond’ denote—and therefore an object of perception. But nothing that is not in a place is perceptible.¹

The question may also be examined in the light of more general considerations as follows. The infinite, considered as a whole of similar parts, cannot, on the one hand, move in a circle. For there is no centre of the infinite, and that which moves in a circle moves about the centre. Nor again can the infinite move in a straight line. For there would have to be another place infinite like itself to be the goal of its natural movement and another, equally great, for the goal of its unnatural movement. Moreover, whether its rectilinear movement is natural or constrained, in either case the force which causes its motion will have to be infinite. For infinite force is force of an infinite body, and of an infinite body the force is infinite. So the motive body also will be infinite. (The proof of this is given in our discussion of movement,² where it is shown that no finite thing possesses infinite power, and no infinite thing finite power.) If then that which moves naturally can also move unnaturally, there will be two infinites, one which causes, and another which exhibits the latter motion. Again, what is it that moves the infinite? If it moves itself, it must be animate. But how can it possibly be conceived as an infinite animal? And if there is something else that moves it, there will be two infinites, that which moves and that which is moved, differing in their form and power.³

¹ These sentences are rather disjointed and read more like rough notes than a finished argument. The final remark seems inconsequent. We should expect: ‘but what is not perceptible cannot occupy a place’; so that the hypothesis that the body beyond the heaven is νοστρον contradicts itself. The main point, however, is that all these connected attributes are inapplicable to an object of intelligence like the Platonic ἐθνος.
² Phys. VIII. x.
³ The last argument (from ‘Again, what is it . . .’) is not a mere repetition of the preceding. The preceding sentence shows that an infinite disturbing force is needed to account for any unnatural movement of an infinite body. Finally, it is suggested that even the natural or normal movement of such a body would presuppose an independent infinite force. Again, the foregoing argument applied only to rectilinear
If the whole is not continuous, but exists, as Democritus and Leucippus think, in the form of parts separated by void, there must necessarily be one movement of all the multitude. They are distinguished, we are told, from one another by their figures; but their nature is one, like many pieces of gold separated from one another. But each piece must, as we assert, have the same motion. For a single clod moves to the same place as the whole mass of earth, and a spark to the same place as the whole mass of fire. So that if it be weight that all possess, no body is, strictly speaking, light; and if lightness\textsuperscript{1} be universal, none is heavy. Moreover, whatever possesses weight or lightness will have its place either at one of the extremes or in the middle region. But this is impossible while the world is conceived as infinite. And, generally, that which has no centre or extreme limit, no up or down, gives the bodies no place for their motion; and without that movement is impossible. A thing must move either naturally or unnaturally, and the two movements are determined by the proper and alien places. Again, a place in which a thing rests or to which it moves unnaturally, must be the natural place for some other body, as experience shows. Necessarily, therefore, not everything possesses weight or lightness, but some things do and some do not. From these arguments then it is clear that the body of the universe is not infinite.

We must now proceed to explain why there cannot be more than one heaven—the further question mentioned above.\textsuperscript{2} For it may be thought that we have not proved universally of bodies that none whatever can exist outside movement, since unnatural circular movement has been shown to be impossible; but the last argument would apply equally to circular movement. The remark ‘if it moves itself, it must be animate’ implies that it is incorrect to think of the natural movement of the elements as self-movement. It is only movement uninfluenced by any sublunary body. That self-movement is impossible Aristotle has already shown in \textit{Phys.} VII.

\textsuperscript{1} Prantl misprints \textit{el} for \textit{el}.

\textsuperscript{2} In l. 18 Prantl’s \textit{λέγομεν} seems to be a misprint for \textit{λέγωμεν}.—‘Heaven’ here stands of course for world (\textit{οὐρανὸς = κόσμος}).—The reference is to c. vi (274b 24).
our universe, and that our argument applied only to those of indeterminate extent.

Now all things rest and move naturally and by constraint. A thing moves naturally to a place in which it rests without constraint, and rests naturally in a place to which it moves without constraint. On the other hand, a thing moves by constraint to a place in which it rests by constraint, and rests by constraint in a place to which it moves by constraint. Further, if a given movement is due to constraint, its contrary is natural. If, then, it is by constraint that earth moves from a certain place to the centre here, its movement from here to there will be natural, and if earth from there rests here without constraint, its movement hither will be natural. And the natural movement in each case is one. Further, these worlds, being similar in nature to ours, must all be composed of the same bodies as it. Moreover each of the bodies, fire, I mean, and earth and their intermediates, must have the same power as in our world. For if these names are used equivocally, if the identity of name does not rest upon an identity of form in those elements and ours, then the whole to which they belong can only be called a world by equivocation. Clearly, then, one of the bodies will move naturally away from the centre and another towards the centre, since fire must be identical with fire, earth with earth, and so on, as the fragments of each are identical in this world. That this must be the case is evident from the principles laid down in our discussion of the movements; for these are limited in number, and the distinction of the elements depends upon the distinction of the movements. Therefore, since the movements are the same, the elements must also be the same everywhere. The particles of earth, then, in another world move naturally also to our centre and its fire to our circumference. This, however, is impossible, since, if it were true, earth must, in its own world, move upwards, and fire to the centre; in the same way the earth of our world

1 Reading μία δ’ ἡ with EF²M Alex. The γιφ of the other MSS. and Simpl. is misleading and suggests an argument where there is none. The principle is simply stated for future use.

2 Above, cc. ii–iv.
must move naturally away from the centre when it moves towards the centre of another universe.\(^1\) This follows from the supposed juxtaposition of the worlds. For either we must refuse to admit the identical nature of the simple bodies in the various universes, or, admitting this, we must make the centre and the extremity one as suggested. This being so, it follows that there cannot be more worlds than one.\(^2\)

To postulate a difference of nature in the simple bodies according as they are more or less distant from their proper places is unreasonable. For what difference can it make whether we say that a thing is this distance away or that? One would have to suppose a difference proportionate to the distance and increasing with it, but the form is in fact the same. Moreover, the bodies must have some movement, since the fact that they move is quite evident.\(^3\) Are we to say then that all their movements, even those which are mutually contrary, are due to constraint? No, for a body which has no natural movement at all cannot be moved by constraint. If then the bodies have a natural movement,

\(^1\) In l. 17 the comma which Prantl places after φύσις should be placed instead after μίκτου. It is needed in this place in order to show that the following clause (διὰ τὸ ... ἀλλήλων) is explanatory of the ἀνάγκη of l. 14, not of φέρωσθαι in l. 16.

\(^2\) If there is one centre and one extremity, there is only one heaven or world. (Read τοῦτον δ’ ὅροι, ἀδύνατον κτλ. Prantl’s ἀθάνατον is found only in F and J, and in both it is preceded by τοῦ, which shows that it is an adscript intended to explain the meaning of τοῦτον.)—The argument of the chapter down to this point is a single reductio ad absurdum. Simplicius tries unsuccessfully to interpret it as a series of reductions. The remainder of the chapter reasserts the conclusion here drawn by closing up various pathways of escape. In truth there is only one way of escape, as Aristotle here says, viz. to deny the identity of the fire and earth in the other worlds with that in our own; but the contention takes a variety of forms—(1) ‘distance makes a difference’; (2) ‘they have no movement, or only move by constraint’; (3) ‘the goal of their movement is only the same in kind as that of the corresponding elements here’. These suggestions are refuted in what follows.

\(^3\) Throughout this paragraph when Aristotle speaks of ‘the bodies’ he is thinking of the fire, earth, &c., supposed to constitute another κόσμος. He is not proving over again the proposition that the four elements have each a natural motion, but considering what would be their motion in another world existing beside our own. The empirical evidence of movement here appealed to must be that of the fire and earth of this world; but a thing that did not move would not be a body at all.
the movement of the particular instances of each form must necessarily have for goal a place numerically one, i.e. a particular centre or a particular extremity. If it be suggested that the goal in each case is one in form but numerically more than one, on the analogy of particulars which are many though each undifferentiated in form, we reply that the variety of goal cannot be limited to this portion or that but must extend to all alike. For all are equally undifferentiated in form, but any one is different numerically from any other. What I mean is this: if the portions in this world behave similarly both to one another and to those in another world, then the portion which is taken hence will not behave differently either from the portions in another world or from those in the same world, but similarly to them, since in form no portion differs from another. The result is that we must either abandon our present assumptions or assert that the centre and the extremity are each numerically one. But this being so, the heaven, by the same evidence and the same necessary inferences, must be one only and no more.

A consideration of the other kinds of movement also makes it plain that there is some point to which earth and fire move naturally. For in general that which is moved changes from something into something, the starting-point and the goal being different in form, and always it is a finite change. For instance, to recover health is to change from disease to health, to increase is to change from smallness to greatness. Locomotion must be similar: for it also has its goal and starting-point—and therefore the starting-point and the goal of the natural movement must differ in form—just as the movement of coming to health does not take any direction which chance.

1 Read τῷ ὑμν. τῷ δ' ὁδ. with FLJ Simpl. The meaning is that since none but a 'numerical' difference can be postulated between the portions (e.g. of earth) in this world and those in another, and since a difference of goal can only be justified by a difference in the body, we should have to suppose a distinct goal for every single portion of earth; which is absurd.

2 A full-stop, rather than a comma, is needed after μεταβολή in l. 16. Three principles are laid down and all are illustrated in the case of locomotion. But the instances of health and increase are used only to illustrate the first.
or the wishes of the mover may select. Thus, too, fire and earth move not to infinity but to opposite points; and since the opposition in place is between above and below, these will be the limits of their movement. (Even in circular movement there is a sort of opposition between the ends of the diameter, though the movement as a whole has no contrary: so that here too the movement has in a sense an opposed and finite goal.) There must therefore be some end to locomotion: it cannot continue to infinity.

This conclusion that local movement is not continued to infinity is corroborated by the fact that earth moves more quickly the nearer it is to the centre, and fire the nearer it is to the upper place. But if movement were infinite speed would be infinite also; and if speed then weight and lightness. For as superior speed in downward movement implies superior weight, so infinite increase of weight necessitates infinite increase of speed.

Further, it is not the action of another body that makes one of these bodies move up and the other down; nor is it constraint, like the 'extrusion' of some writers. For in that case the larger the mass of fire or earth the slower would be the upward or downward movement; but the fact

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1 ll. 18-19, the full-stop after ποτ should be deleted, and the words δεί ἄρα ... φέρεσθαι should be marked as a parenthesis. Locomotion, like healing, has a determinate direction, and that involves a difference of form between its two terms.

2 The remarks which follow concerning circular motion are a kind of footnote and would be best marked as a parenthesis.

3 In l. 29 it is tempting to read εἰ δ' εἰς ἀπειρον ἤν for εἰ δ' ἀπειρον ἤν, but no evidence of such a reading survives. The sense of the paragraph is plain. We observe an increase of speed in a falling body as it approaches the earth. The explanation, on our view, is the proximity of the goal. But if there is no goal, the movement, and with it the increase of speed, is capable of continuing to infinity. But infinite speed means infinite weight, which has already (c. vi) been proved impossible. The Greek of the last sentence is puzzling and may be corrupt. Accepting the text of Bekker and Prantl, we must translate as follows: 'as that which by reason of speed is lower than another body would be presumed speedy by reason of weight, so if there were infinite increase of weight there would also be infinite increase of speed.' (The alteration of an accent is required: βαπει for βαπει in l. 32.) The sentence is clumsy, but it gives the required sense. Simplicius seems to have interpreted the passage as above. In l. 31 τρεπον is found in F alone, all the other MSS. giving τερεπον; but τερεπον must be right.

4 The atomists, Leucippus and Democritus.
is the reverse: the greater the mass of fire or earth the quicker always is its movement towards its own place. 5
Again, the speed of the movement would not increase towards the end if it were due to constraint or extrusion; for a constrained movement always diminishes in speed as the source of constraint becomes more distant, and a body moves without constraint to the place whence it was moved by constraint.

A consideration of these points, then, gives adequate assurance of the truth of our contentions. The same could also be shown with the aid of the discussions which fall under First Philosophy, 1 as well as from the nature of the circular movement, which must be eternal both here and in the other worlds. It is plain, too, from the following considerations that the universe must be one.

The bodily elements are three, and therefore the places of the elements will be three also; the place, first, of the body which sinks to the bottom, namely the region about the centre; the place, secondly, of the revolving body, namely the outermost place, and thirdly, the intermediate place, belonging to the intermediate body. Here in this third place will be the body which rises to the surface; since, if not here, it will be elsewhere, and it cannot be elsewhere: for we have two bodies, one weightless, one endowed with weight, and below is the place of the body endowed with weight, since the region about the centre has been given to the heavy body. And its position cannot be unnatural to it, for it would have to be natural to something else, and there is nothing else. It must then occupy the intermediate place. What distinctions there are within the intermediate itself we will explain later on.

We have now said enough to make plain the character and number of the bodily elements, the place of each, and further, in general, how many in number the various places are. 25

9 We must show not only that the heaven is one, 2 but also that more than one heaven is impossible, and, further,

1 i.e. Metaphysics. Cf. Met. Λ. 8.
2 Prantl misprints εσ for ἐσ. For οὐρανός read οὐρανός with M. J, like EHL, omits the word οὐρανός altogether.
that, as exempt from decay and generation, the heaven is eternal. We may begin by raising a difficulty. From one point of view it might seem impossible that the heaven should be one and unique, since in all formations and products whether of nature or of art we can distinguish the shape in itself and the shape in combination with matter.

For instance the form of the sphere is one thing and the gold or bronze sphere another; the shape of the circle again is one thing, the bronze or wooden circle another. For when we state the essential nature of the sphere or circle we do not include in the formula gold or bronze, because they do not belong to the essence, but if we are speaking of the copper or gold sphere we do include them. We still make the distinction even if we cannot conceive or apprehend any other example beside the particular thing. This may, of course, sometimes be the case: it might be, for instance, that only one circle could be found; yet none the less the difference will remain between the being of circle and of this particular circle, the one being form, the other form in matter, i.e. a particular thing. Now since the universe is perceptible it must be regarded as a particular; for everything that is perceptible subsists, as we know, in matter. But if it is a particular, there will be a distinction between the being of 'this universe' and of 'universe' unqualified. There is a difference, then, between 'this universe' and simple 'universe'; the second is form and shape, the first form in combination with matter; and any shape or form has, or may have, more than one particular instance.

On the supposition of Forms such as some assert, this must be the case, and equally on the view that no such entity has a separate existence. For in every case in which the essence is in matter it is a fact of observation that the particulars of like form are several or infinite in number. Hence there either are, or may be, more heavens

1 More correctly: that the heaven should be necessarily one and unique. The argument here set out only attempts to prove the possibility of more than one world, and Aristotle replies by proving the impossibility of more than one. Alexander (cited by Simpl.) points out this defect in the statement.
than one. On these grounds, then, it might be inferred either that there are or that there might be several heavens. We must, however, return and ask how much of this argument is correct and how much not.

Now it is quite right to say that the formula of the shape apart from the matter must be different from that of the shape in the matter, and we may allow this to be true. We are not, however, therefore compelled to assert a plurality of worlds. Such a plurality is in fact impossible if this world contains the entirety of matter, as in fact it does. But perhaps our contention can be made clearer in this way. Suppose 'aquiline' to be curvature in the nose or flesh, and flesh to be the matter of aquiline. Suppose, further, that all flesh came together into a single whole of flesh endowed with this aquiline quality. Then neither would there be, nor could there arise, any other thing that was aquiline. Similarly, suppose flesh and bones to be the matter of man, and suppose a man to be created of all flesh and all bones in indissoluble union. The possibility of another man would be removed. Whatever case you took it would be the same. The general rule is this: a thing whose essence resides in a substratum of matter can never come into being in the absence of all matter. Now the universe is certainly a particular and a material thing: if however it is composed not of a part but of the whole of matter, then though the being of 'universe' and of 'this universe' are still distinct, yet there is no other universe, and no possibility of others being made, because all the matter is already included in this. It remains, then, only to prove that it is composed of all natural perceptible body.

First, however, we must explain what we mean by 'heaven' and in how many senses we use the word, in order to make clearer the object of our inquiry. (a) In one sense, then, we call

1 The ο(sol) before υφαρκα is attributed only to E, and to it 'dubio'. J has it. But the article does not seem to be required here. In corresponding passages in this chapter it is omitted.
2 Read τινός ἐλης. The omission of τινός in E must be a mere slip. All the other MSS., as well as Simpl., have τινός ἐλης, and E is full of small omissions.
'heaven' the substance of the extreme circumference of the whole, or that natural body whose place is at the extreme circumference. We recognize habitually a special right to the name 'heaven' in the extremity or upper region, which we take to be the seat of all that is divine. (b) In another sense, we use this name for the body continuous with the extreme circumference, which contains the moon, the sun, and some of the stars; these we say are 'in the heaven'. (c) In yet another sense we give the name to all body included within the extreme circumference, since we habitually call the whole or totality 'the heaven'. The word, then, is used in three senses.

Now the whole included within the extreme circumference must be composed of all physical and sensible body, because there neither is, nor can come into being, any body outside the heaven. For if there is a natural body outside the extreme circumference it must be either a simple or a composite body, and its position must be either natural or unnatural. But it cannot be any of the simple bodies. For, first, it has been shown that that which moves in a circle cannot change its place. And, secondly, it cannot be that which moves from the centre or that which lies lowest. Naturally they could not be there, since their proper places are elsewhere; and if these are there unnaturally, the exterior place will be natural to some other body, since a place which is unnatural to one body must be natural to another: but we saw that there is no other body besides these. Then it is not possible that any simple body should be outside the heaven. But, if no simple body, neither can any mixed body be there: for the presence of the simple body is involved in the presence of the mixture. Further neither can any body come into that place: for it will do so either naturally or unnaturally, and will be either simple or composite; so that the same argument will apply, since it makes no difference whether the question is 'does A

1 Place a full-stop after φαμεν. In the next line συμεχω should be συμεχης.
2 Read τὸ μὲν γάρ. The μὲν is wanted, and is omitted by E alone. The reference is to cc. ii and iii above.
3 c. ii above.
exist?' or 'could $A$ come to exist?' From our arguments then it is evident not only that there is not, but also that there could never come to be, any bodily mass whatever outside the circumference. The world as a whole, therefore, includes all its appropriate matter, which is, as we saw, natural perceptible body. So that neither are there now, nor have there ever been, nor can there ever be formed more heavens than one, but this heaven of ours is one and unique and complete.

It is therefore evident that there is also no place or void or time outside the heaven. For in every place body can be present; and void is said to be that in which the presence of body, though not actual, is possible; and time is the number of movement. But in the absence of natural body there is no movement, and outside the heaven, as we have shown, body neither exists nor can come to exist. It is clear then that there is neither place, nor void, nor time, outside the heaven. Hence whatever is there, is of such a nature as not to occupy any place, nor does time age it; nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outermost motion; they continue through their entire duration unalterable and unmodified, living the best and most self-sufficient of lives. As a matter of fact, this word 'duration' possessed a divine significance for the ancients, for the fulfilment which includes the period of life of any creature, outside of which no natural development can fall, has been called its duration. On the same principle the fulfilment of the whole heaven, the fulfilment which includes all time and infinity, is 'duration'—a name based upon the fact that it is always—duration immortal and divine. From it derive the being and life which other things, some more or less articulately but others feebly, enjoy. So, too, in its discussions concerning the divine, popular philosophy often propounds the view that whatever is

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1 i.e., $\delta\lambda\nu$ is derived from $\delta\epsilon\iota\\delta\nu$.

2 Aristotle refers apparently under this name to elementary handbooks of philosophy current among his audience. It is usual to identify them with the $\epsilon\zeta\omega\sigma\tau\rho\iota\nu\kappa\iota\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\iota$, as Simpl. does in his commentary on this passage. See Bonitz, Ind. Ar., s.v. 'Αριστοτέλης, 105$\alpha$ 27.
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divine, whatever is primary and supreme, is necessarily unchangeable. This fact confirms what we have said. For there is nothing else stronger than it to move it—since that would mean more divine—and it has no defect and lacks none of its proper excellences. Its unceasing movement, then, is also reasonable, since everything ceases to move when it comes to its proper place, but the body whose path is the circle has one and the same place for starting-point and goal.

Having established these distinctions, we may now proceed to the question whether the heaven is ungenerated or generated, indestructible or destructible. Let us start with a review of the theories of other thinkers; for the proofs of a theory are difficulties for the contrary theory.\(^1\)

Besides, those who have first heard the pleas of our adversaries will be more likely to credit the assertions which we are going to make. We shall be less open to the charge of procuring judgement by default. To give a satisfactory decision as to the truth it is necessary to be rather an arbitrator than a party to the dispute.

That the world was generated all are agreed, but, generation over, some say that it is eternal, others say that it is destructible like any other natural formation.\(^2\) Others again, with Empedocles of Acragas and Heraclitus of Ephesus, believe that there is alternation in the destructive process, which takes now this direction, now that, and continues without end.\(^3\)

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1 Prantl misprints \(\tau\upsilon\ \epsilon\nu\alpha\nu\tau\iota\iota\omega\upsilon\) for \(\tau\omega\ \epsilon\nu\alpha\nu\tau\iota\iota\omega\upsilon\) in l. 6.
2 The former view, according to Alexander (\(a\phi.\) Simpl.), is that of Orpheus (i.e. of Orphic cosmogony), Hesiod, and Plato, while the latter is that of Democritus and his school.
3 Cf. Burnet, E.G.P.\(^3\) p. 157 (§ 77). Heraclitus and Empedocles are agreed in believing in periodic changes in the constitution of our world as a whole. For both, the world exists, as it were, in a succession of lives (below, 280\(^a\) 14); and the view is a kind of compromise between that which regards it as eternal and that which gives it a single life ended by annihilation. The phrase ‘alternation in the destructive process’ is somewhat inaccurate, since the alternation may be described as between generation and destruction (Empedocles’ Love and Strife, Stoic \(\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}k\acute{o}\omicron\omicron\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\sigma\omicron\sigma\iota\upsilon\omega\sigma\iota\) and \(\iota\kappa\acute{\alpha}k\iota\omicron\nu\omega\sigma\iota\omega\sigma\iota\). But it is intelligible. Aristotle is here classing the theory for convenience with those that hold to a destructible world, and the antithesis is between destruction \(\delta\iota\rho\lambda\omega\) and destruction with alternation. Later he explains that this
Now to assert that it was generated and yet is eternal is to assert the impossible; for we cannot reasonably attribute to anything any characteristics but those which observation detects in many or all instances. But in this case the facts point the other way: generated things are seen always to be destroyed. Further, a thing whose present state had no beginning and which could not have been other than it was at any previous moment throughout its entire duration, cannot possibly be changed. For there will have to be some cause of change, and if this had been present earlier it would have made possible another condition of that to which any other condition was impossible. Suppose that the world was formed out of elements which were formerly otherwise conditioned than as they are now. Then (1) if their condition was always so and could not have been otherwise, the world could never have come into being. And (2) if the world did come into being, then, clearly, their condition must have been capable of change and not eternal: after combination therefore they will be dispersed, just as in the past after dispersion they came into combination, and this process either has been, or could have been, indefinitely repeated. But if this is so, the world cannot be indestructible, and it does not matter whether the change of condition has actually occurred or remains a possibility.

Some of those who hold that the world, though indestructible, was yet generated, try to support their case by a parallel which is illusory. They say that in their statements about its generation they are doing what geometricians do when they construct their figures, not implying that the universe really had a beginning, but alternation is not φθορά at all. Burnet in his first edition proposed to excise φθειρώμενον, but the suggestion is now tacitly retracted. In his later editions Burnet wrongly states that what is here in question is the eternity of the first heaven. That has already been proved in c. iii, and the first heaven would not be referred to as ὁ κόσμος.

1 A comma is required after ἀιώνα in l. 22, unless the comma after ἐξείρησις in the preceding line is deleted.

2 The close coordination of εἴ μὲν (in l. 25) with εἴ δὲ (in l. 26) demands a comma, rather than a full-stop, after ἐγένετο.

3 Simpl. refers the following argument to Xenocrates and the Platonists.
for didactic reasons facilitating understanding by exhibiting the object, like the figure, as in course of formation. The two cases, as we said, are not parallel; for, in the construction of the figure, when the various steps are completed the required figure forthwith results; but in these other demonstrations what results is not that which was required.\(^1\) Indeed it cannot be so; for antecedent and consequent, as assumed, are in contradiction. The ordered, it is said,\(^2\) arose out of the unordered; and the same thing cannot be at the same time both ordered and unordered; there must be a process and a lapse of time separating the two states. In the figure, on the other hand, there is no temporal separation.\(^3\) It is clear then that the universe cannot be at once eternal and generated.

To say that the universe alternately combines and dissolves is no more paradoxical than to make it eternal but varying in shape. It is as if one were to think that there was now destruction and now existence when from a child a man is generated, and from a man a child. For it is clear that when the elements come together the result is not a chance system and combination, but the very same as before—especially on the view of those who hold this theory, since they say that the contrary is the cause of each state.\(^4\) So that if the totality of body, which is a continuum, is now in this order or disposition and now in that, and if the combination of the whole is a world or heaven, then it will not be the world that comes into being and is destroyed, but only its dispositions.

If the world is believed to be one, it is impossible to

1 i.e. the geometricians can truly write Ο.Ε.Ε. at the end of their construction, but these cosmogonists cannot. The figure, or world, constructed should be 'the same' (τὸ ἀκριβὸ) as that demanded in the ὑπόθεσις.

2 Cp. Plato, Timaeus 30 A.

3 The construction of the cosmogonist cannot be a mere didactic device like that of the geometrical; for the attributes successively assumed in the construction of the world cannot exist simultaneously as those assumed by the geometrical do.

4 Here Aristotle clearly refers to Empedocles, rather than to Heraclitus. The two causes of Empedocles are Love and Strife (φίλια and νέικος), and since these are two it follows, Aristotle argues, that the world would merely oscillate between two arrangements or dispositions.
BOOK I. 10

suppose that it should be, as a whole, first generated and then destroyed, never to reappear; since before it came into being there was always present the combination prior to it, and that, we hold, could never change if it was never generated. If, on the other hand, the worlds are infinite in number the view is more plausible. But whether this is, or is not, impossible will be clear from what follows. For there are some who think it possible both for the ungenerated to be destroyed and for the generated to persist undestroyed.  

(This is held in the Timaeus, where Plato says that the heaven, though it was generated, will none the less exist to eternity.) So far as the heaven is concerned we have answered this view with arguments appropriate to the nature of the heaven: on the general question we shall attain clearness when we examine the matter universally.

II We must first distinguish the senses in which we use the words ‘ungenerated’ and ‘generated’, ‘destructible’ and ‘indestructible’. These have many meanings, and though

1 In l. 29 Prantl misprints κυί for καί.
2 A colon instead of a full-stop is needed after Τυμαίος. The reference is to Plato, Timaeus 31. Plato is quoted as authority for the indestructible-generated not for the ungenerated-destructible, as the context shows.
3 The general question is the mutual relations of the terms ‘generated’, ‘ungenerated’, ‘destructible’, ‘indestructible’, which have so far been considered only in their application to the heaven. The terms are discussed universally, i.e. apart from any special application, in cc. xi and xii. The combination attributed to Plato is refuted at the end of that discussion (283a1 ff.). Simplicius found the argument of the last paragraph of this chapter (ll. 23 ff.) somewhat obscure. It deals, provisionally and subject to further investigation, with the view that the world is subject both to generation and to destruction in the sense in which the man Socrates is. Simp. is probably right in supposing that under this head Aristotle is thinking of the atomists. Their infinite worlds were successive, if also co-existent. Aristotle here argues that if that out of which the world was formed had the capacity to give birth to a world, then that into which the world is destroyed will have the same capacity. Thus the theory of world-annihilation is dismissed as absurd, while the infinite succession of destructible worlds is left open. But the refutation even of the first of these views, and therefore a fortiori of the second, cannot be regarded as complete until the whole problem of generation and destruction has been examined.
4 It is unfortunate that ‘generated’ and ‘destructible’ are not similar grammatical forms as the Greek γενοτέ & φθοριός are. But from the analysis given by Aristotle it will be seen that in meaning the Greek verbal adjective tends to approximate to the past
it may make no difference to the argument, yet some confusion of mind must result from treating as uniform in its use a word which has several distinct applications. The character which is the ground of the predication will always remain obscure.

The word 'ungenerated' then is used (a) in one sense whenever something now is which formerly was not, no process of becoming or change being involved. Such is the case, according to some, with contact and motion, since there is no process of coming to be in contact or in motion. (b) It is used in another sense, when something which is capable of coming to be, with or without process, does not exist; such a thing is ungenerated in the sense that its generation is not a fact but a possibility. (c) It is also applied where there is general impossibility of any generation such that the thing now is which then was not. And 'impossibility' has two uses: first, where it is untrue to say that the thing can ever come into being, and secondly, where it cannot do so easily, quickly, or well. In the same way the word 'generated' is used, (a) first, where what formerly was not afterwards is, whether a process of becoming was or was not involved, so long as that which then was not, now is; (b) secondly, of anything capable of existing, 'capable' being defined with reference either to truth or to facility; (c) thirdly, of anything to which the passage from not being to being belongs, whether already actual, if its existence is due to a past process of becoming, or not yet actual but only possible. The uses of the words 'destructible' and 'indestructible' are similar. 'Destructible' is applied (a) to that which formerly was and afterwards either is not or might not be, whether a period of being destroyed and changed intervenes or not; and (b) participle, and therefore it is not worth while to insist on 'generable', 'ungenerable' for γενητός, ἀγενήτος.

1 For εἶνξ ηγένεσις read εἶνξ ηγένεσιν. (M has η, but all other MSS. have η.) The correction was suggested by Hayduck (Greiffswald Gymnasium Program, 1871, p. 11).

2 The evidence afforded by Simpl. and the MSS., together with the difficulty of establishing a precise correspondence between this definition of φθαρτόν and the parallel uses of 'ungenerated' (b) and 'generated' (a), might lead one to doubt the soundness of the text at this point; but it is guaranteed by Aristotle's own citation at 281b 27.
sometimes we apply the word to that which a process of destruction may cause not to be; and also (c) in a third sense, to that which is easily destructible, to the ‘easily-destroyed’, so to speak. Of the indestructible the same account holds good. It is either (a) that which now is and now is not, without any process of destruction, like contact, which without being destroyed afterwards is not, though formerly it was; or (b) that which is but might not be, or which will at some time not be, though it now is. For you exist now and so does the contact; yet both are destructible, because a time will come when it will not be true of you that you exist, nor of these things that they are in contact. Thirdly (c) in its most proper use, it is that which is, but is incapable of any destruction such that the thing which now is later ceases to be or might cease to be; or again, that which has not yet been destroyed, but in the future may cease to be. For indestructible is also used of that which is destroyed with difficulty.

1 Aristotle carelessly omits to mention the other and more exact kind of possibility. Cf. ‘ungenerated’ (c) and ‘generated’ (b).

2 The third Ἰ (in l. 29) is not coordinate with the two which precede it (ll. 26, 28), and it would be well to mark this by putting a colon instead of a comma after εἰσιν in l. 28. Simplicius read Ἰ καὶ οὐκ in l. 29, and the addition of καί would be an improvement.

3 Omit the οὐκ inserted by Prantl before ἐνδεχόμενον. The ὅν ἰὲ which Prantl’s note attributes to Simplicius is found only in one inferior MS. and is not printed in Heiberg’s text of the commentary. J also has no word between ἐφθαρμένων and ἐνδεχόμενον, nor had Alexander.

4 Read λέγεται γάρ for λέγεται δέ, and place a colon instead of a full-stop before λέγεται. This alteration is conjectural, but it is preferable to Hayduck’s excision of Ἰ καὶ... εἶναι (ll. 33, 34), and without some alteration the Greek will not give a satisfactory sense. The account given of ‘indestructible’ is closely parallel to that given of ‘ungenerated’ above. Sense (a) of ‘indestructible’ (ll. 26–28) turns on the absence of process, like sense (a) of ‘ungenerated’, even repeating the same instance, touch. In sense (b) (ll. 28–31) ‘indestructible’ covers all that has not been destroyed, as ‘ungenerated’ in sense (b) covers what has not yet come into being: as ‘ungenerated’ includes all possible existents which are now non-existent, so ‘indestructible’ includes all possible non-existents which are now existent. There remains the third and proper sense, viz. potentiality or possibility, subdivided in the case of ‘ungenerated’, according to an ambiguity in the word possible, into (i) strict and final impossibility (τὸ μὴ ἀληθὲς εἶναι εἰσίν), (ii) popular or ‘practical’ impossibility (τὸ μὴ ρᾴδιος μηδὲ ταχὺ ἢ καλῶς). The third sense of ‘indestructible’ is introduced by τὸ δὲ μάλιστα κυρίως in l. 31, and its subdivision is effected by Ἰ καὶ in l. 33. The words before Ἰ καὶ assert the final
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This being so, we must ask what we mean by 'possible' and 'impossible'. For in its most proper use the predicate 'indestructible' is given because it is impossible that the thing should be destroyed, i.e. exist at one time and not at another. And 'ungenerated' also involves impossibility when used for that which cannot be generated, in such fashion that, while formerly it was not, later it is. An instance is a commensurable diagonal. Now when we speak of a power 1 to move 2 or to lift weights, we refer always to the maximum. We speak, for instance, of a power to lift a hundred talents or walk a hundred stades—though a power to effect the maximum is also a power to effect any part of the maximum—since we feel obliged in defining the power to give the limit or maximum. A thing, then, which is capable of a certain amount as maximum must also be capable of that which lies within it. If, for example, a man can lift a hundred talents, he can also lift two, and if he can walk a hundred stades, he can also walk two. But the power is of the maximum, and a thing said, with reference to its maximum, 3 to be incapable of so much is also incapable of any greater amount. It is, for instance, clear that a person who cannot walk a thousand stades will also be unable to walk a thousand and one. This point need not trouble us, for we may take it as settled that what is, in the strict sense, possible is determined by a limiting maximum. Now perhaps the objection might be raised that

removal of the possibility of non-existence, and the following clause relaxes the requirement as popular use demands. Even if the possibility of destruction has not been finally removed, a thing may be called 'indestructible' in this sense if it has not been destroyed. 'For (λέγεται γάρ) what is not easily destroyed is called indestructible.' By calling this the proper sense, whether in its stricter or more popular use, Aristotle must mean that the verbal adjective in -τος should not in precise speech be allowed to approximate, as it often does, to a past participle passive. (Simplicius's interpretation of this passage is quite inadmissible, but he was confused by faulty MSS.)

1 'Power' (δύναμις) must be taken throughout as the noun corresponding to the adjective 'possible' (δυνατόν).
2 The MSS. have κυνηγώναι στάδια ἐκατὼν ('to move a hundred stades'). The translation omits the reference to distance, which seems clearly out of place. The words στάδια ἐκατὼν, which occur more than once in the context, probably got their place in this clause through a copyist's mistake.
3 Prantl misprints ὑπερβολή for ὑπερβολήν.
there is no necessity in this, since he who sees a stade need not see the smaller measures contained in it, while, on the contrary, he who can see a dot or hear a small sound will perceive what is greater. This, however, does not touch our argument. The maximum may be determined either in the power or in its object. The application of this is plain. Superior sight is sight of the smaller body, but superior speed is that of the greater body.

12 Having established these distinctions we can now proceed to the sequel. If there are things capable both of being and of not being, there must be some definite maximum time of their being and not being; a time, I mean, during which continued existence is possible to them and a time during which continued non-existence is possible. And this is true in every category, whether the thing is, for example, 'man', or 'white', or 'three cubits long', or whatever it may be. For if the time is not definite in quantity, but longer than any that can be suggested and shorter than none, then it will be possible for one and the same thing to exist for infinite time and not to exist for another infinity. This, however, is impossible.

Let us take our start from this point. The impossible and the false have not the same significance. One use of 'impossible' and 'possible', and 'false' and 'true', is hypothetical. It is impossible, for instance, on a certain hypothesis that the triangle should have its angles equal to two right angles, and on another the diagonal is commensurable. But there are also things possible and impossible, false and true, absolutely. Now it is one thing to be absolutely false, and another thing to be absolutely impossible. To say that you are standing when you are not standing is to assert a falsehood, but not an impossibility. Similarly

1 i.e. sometimes the maximum is an actual maximum (determined 'in the object', ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος), e.g. in the case of weight-lifting, where the largest weight lifted serves to define the power; sometimes it is an actual minimum, determined as maximum 'in the power' (ἐπὶ τῆς δυνάμεως), e.g. in the case of vision, where the smallest object seen serves to define the capacity. Cf. the distinction between the μέσον τοῦ πράγματος (οὐ κατὰ τὸ πράγμα) and the μέσον πρὸς ἣμας in Eth. Nic. 1106b 26 ff.
to say that a man who is playing the harp, but not singing, is singing, is to say what is false but not impossible. To say, however, that you are at once standing and sitting, or that the diagonal is commensurable, is to say what is not only false but also impossible. Thus it is not the same thing to make a false and to make an impossible hypothesis; and from the impossible hypothesis impossible results follow. A man has, it is true, the capacity at once of sitting and of standing, because when he possesses the one he also possesses the other; but it does not follow that he can at once sit and stand, only that at another time he can do the other also. But if a thing has for infinite time more than one capacity, another time is impossible and the times must coincide. Thus if anything which exists for infinite time is destructible, it will have the capacity of not being. Now if it exists for infinite time let this capacity be actualized; and it will be in actuality at once existent and non-existent. Thus a false conclusion would follow because a false assumption was made, but if what was assumed had not been impossible its consequence would not have been impossible.

Anything then which always exists is absolutely imperishable. It is also ungenerated, since if it was generated it will have the power for some time of not being. For as that which formerly was, but now is not, or is capable at some future time of not being, is destructible, so that which is capable of formerly not having been is generated. But in the case of that which always is, there is no time for such a capacity of not being, whether the supposed time is finite

1 Cf. Anal. Prior. 34\textsuperscript{a} 1 ff. for this distinction. There should be a colon rather than a full-stop after δονατος. The production of like consequences is of course not peculiar to the impossible hypothesis: it applies equally to the false hypothesis. See loc. cit.
2 Read ei δε with FHMJ for ei δη. There is no semblance of inference. Simplicius makes the connexion antithetical.
3 For ἔσται read ἐστω with all MSS. (except E) and Simpl. The μν ἐσευ which follows δοναται in FHMJ must have been a copyist's mistake.
4 The assumption in this case was both false and impossible.
5 The words are taken in their 'most proper' sense, as the qualification 'absolutely' in l. 25 suggests; viz. as conveying a strict and demonstrable possibility or impossibility. See foregoing chapter.
or infinite; for its capacity of being must include the finite
time since it covers infinite time.  

It is therefore impossible that one and the same thing
should be capable of always existing and of always not-
existing.  And 'not always existing', the contradictory, is
also excluded. Thus it is impossible for a thing always to
exist and yet to be destructible. Nor, similarly, can it be
generated. For of two attributes if B cannot be present
without A, the impossibility of A proves the impossibility
of B. What always is, then, since it is incapable of ever
not being, cannot possibly be generated. But since the
contradictory of 'that which is always capable of being' is
'that which is not always capable of being'; while 'that
which is always capable of not being' is the contrary,
whose contradictory in turn is 'that which is not always
capable of not being', it is necessary that the contradictories
of both terms should be predictable of one and the same
thing, and thus that, intermediate between what always is
and what always is not, there should be that to which being
and not-being are both possible; for the contradictory of each
will at times be true of it unless it always exists.
Hence that which not always is not will sometimes be and
sometimes not be; and it is clear that this is true also of
that which cannot always be but sometimes is and therefore
sometimes is not. One thing, then, will have the power
of being and of not being, and will thus be intermediate
between the other two.

Expressed universally our argument is as follows. Let
there be two attributes, A and B, not capable of being present in any one thing together, while either A or C and

1 In l. 29 after μὴ εἶναι a full-stop is required instead of a comma. The construction of the following clauses is difficult. The translation given above proceeds on the hypothesis that no stop is required after δὲν (l. 30) and that δυνάτων, . . . δότε μὴ εἶναι is equivalent to δυνάτων μὴ εἶναι. I cannot find another case of δυνάτων δότε, but similar uses of δότε are fairly common in Aristotle (see Bonitz, Ind. Ar., p. 873a 20). οὔτε ἀπειρον οὔτε πεπερασμένον (sc. χρόνον) is a loose exegesis of οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὧν χρόνῳ, and perhaps should be preceded by a comma.

2 Kai δὲν μὴ εἶναι is the reading of FJ Simpl. Since the omission of δὲν in the other MSS. is easily accounted for, it seems best to accept this. (J at the first attempt omitted the καί.)

3 After ποτε ὅπως a comma, not a colon.
either $B$ or $D$ are capable of being present in everything. Then $C$ and $D$ must be predicated of everything of which neither $A$ nor $B$ is predicated. Let $E$ lie between $A$ and $B$; for that which is neither of two contraries is a mean between them. In $E$ both $C$ and $D$ must be present, for either $A$ or $C$ is present everywhere and therefore in $E$. Since then $A$ is impossible, $C$ must be present, and the same argument holds of $D$.1

Neither that which always is, therefore, nor that which always is not is either generated or destructible. And clearly whatever is generated or destructible is not eternal. If it were, it would be at once capable of always being and capable of not always being, but it has already been shown2 that this is impossible. Surely then whatever is ungenerated and in being must be eternal, and whatever is indestructible and in being must equally be so.3 (I use the words ‘ungenerated’ and ‘indestructible’ in their proper sense, ‘ungenerated’ for that which now is and could not at any previous time have been truly said not to be; ‘indestructible’ for that which now is and cannot at any future time be truly said not to be.4) If, again, the two terms are coincident,5 if the ungenerated is indestructible, and the indestructible ungenerated, then each of them is coincident

1 The four letters $ABCD$ are to be allotted as follows: $A$ is ‘that which is always capable of being’ = ‘what always is’; $B$ is its contrary, ‘that which is always capable of not being’ = ‘what always is not’; $C$ is its contradictory, ‘that which is not always capable of being’; and $D$ is the contradictory of $B$, ‘that which is not always capable of not being’. $C$ and $D$ might also be described by the terms ‘what not always is’ and ‘what not always is not’ respectively.
2 281b 18 ff.
3 The question-mark should come at the end of the line after $BY$ $\delta$é, preceded by a comma at $\epsilon$φαον.
4 i.e. each term has its third sense as defined in chapter xi (280b) 11, 31.
5 The term ‘coincidence’ is used in this passage to express the mutual involution (called by later writers ἀντανακλονθή) of predicates. This mutual involution is here described by Aristotle in terms which mean that the two terms ‘follow’ or ‘accompany’ one another. But later on (e.g. in 282b 10, 27, 32) he frequently says simply that one predicate ‘follows’ another when he means that the two terms are mutually involved. To avoid confusion I have expressed the relation in terms of coincidence throughout.—The $\uptheta$ following the parenthesis introduces an alternative proof to the same effect as that which preceded the parenthesis.
with 'eternal'; anything ungenerated is eternal and anything
indestructible is eternal. This is clear too from the definition
of the terms. Whatever is destructible must be
generated; for it is either ungenerated or generated, but, if
ungenerated, it is by hypothesis\(^1\) indestructible. Whatever,
further, is generated must be destructible. For it is either
destructible or indestructible, but, if indestructible, it is by 5
hypothesis\(^1\) ungenerated.

If, however, 'indestructible' and 'ungenerated' are not
coincident, there is no necessity that either the ungenerated
or the indestructible should be eternal. But they must be
coincident, for the following reasons. The terms 'generated'
and 'destructible' are coincident; this is obvious
from our former remarks, since between what always is and 10
what always is not there is an intermediate which is neither,
and that intermediate is the generated and destructible.
For whatever is either of these is capable both of being and
of not being for a definite time: in either case, I mean,
there is a certain period of time during which the thing is
and another during which it is not. Anything therefore
which is generated or destructible must be intermediate. 15
Now let \(A\) be that which always is and \(B\) that which
always is not, \(C\) the generated, and \(D\) the destructible.
Then \(C\) must be intermediate between \(A\) and \(B\). For in
their case there is no time in the direction of either limit,\(^2\)
in which either \(A\) is not or \(B\) is. But for the generated

\(^1\) 281\(^b\) 25 ff. But Aristotle proceeds to give a proof of the mutual
involution of these terms. If the destructible is generated and the
generated is destructible, it follows that the ungenerated is eternal
and the indestructible is eternal, and this is the thesis set out for proof
in 282\(^a\) 25. But the proof here given of the antecedent depends on the
assumption that 'ungenerated' and 'indestructible' are coincident,
which assumption is now proved. Aristotle's procedure, however, is
needlessly complicated. Having proved the coincidence of 'generated'
and 'destructible' by assuming the coincidence of 'ungenerated' and
'indestructible', he now proves the coincidence of the latter by proving (on other lines) the coincidence of the former.

\(^2\) i.e., in effect, 'neither in the past nor in the future'. But time, of
course, has no limit. The notion of limit is transferred to the in-
destructible-ungenerated from the destructible-generated. The being
of the latter class is necessarily limited in both directions, by birth on
one side and death on the other, and the same terms limit its not-
being. These two limits of finite existence are used to describe the
two directions of infinite existence.
there must be such a time either actually or potentially, though not for $A$ and $B$ in either way. $C$ then will be, and also not be, for a limited length of time, and this is true also of $D$, the destructible. Therefore each is both generated and destructible. Therefore 'generated' and 'destructible' are coincident. Now let $E$ stand for the ungenerated, $F$ for the generated, $G$ for the indestructible, and $H$ for the destructible. As for $F$ and $H$, it has been shown that they are coincident. But when terms stand to one another as these do, $F$ and $H$ coincident, $E$ and $F$ never predicated of the same thing but one or other of everything, and $G$ and $H$ likewise, then $E$ and $G$ must needs be coincident. For suppose that $E$ is not coincident with $G$, then $F$ will be, since either $E$ or $F$ is predicable of everything. But of that of which $F$ is predicated $H$ will be predicable also. $H$ will then be coincident with $G$, but this we saw to be impossible. And the same argument shows that $G$ is coincident with $E$.

Now the relation of the ungenerated ($E$) to the generated ($F$) is the same as that of the indestructible ($G$) to the destructible ($H$). To say then that there is no reason why anything should not be generated and yet indestructible or ungenerated and yet destroyed, to imagine that in the one case generation and in the other case destruction occurs once for all, is to destroy part of the data. For (1) everything is capable of acting or being acted upon, of being or not being, either for an infinite, or for a definitely limited space of time; and the infinite time is only a possible alternative because it is after a fashion defined, as a length of time which cannot be exceeded. But infinity in one direction is neither infinite nor finite. (2) Further, why, after always existing, was the thing destroyed, why, after an infinity of not being, was it generated, at one moment rather than another? If every moment is alike and the moments are infinite in number, it is clear that a generated or destructible thing existed for an infinite time. It has

1 Aristotle now proceeds to apply his results to the refutation of the view attributed in 280a 30 to Plato's Timaeus. He there promised to give a clearer demonstration of its absurdity when the terms 'generated', 'ungenerated', &c. should be investigated on their own account and apart from the special case of the heaven.
therefore for an infinite time the capacity of not being (since the capacity of being and the capacity of not being will be present together), if destructible, in the time before destruction, if generated, in the time after generation. If then we assume the two capacities to be actualized, opposites will be present together. Further, this second capacity will be present like the first at every moment, so that the thing will have for an infinite time the capacity both of being and of not being; but this has been shown to be impossible. (4) Again, if the capacity is present prior to the activity, it will be present for all time, even while the thing was as yet ungenerated and non-existent, throughout the infinite time in which it was capable of being generated. At the time, then, when it was not, at that same time it had the capacity of being, both of being then and of being thereafter, and therefore for an infinity of time.

It is clear also on other grounds that it is impossible that the destructible should not at some time be destroyed. For otherwise it will always be at once destructible and in actuality indestructible, so that it will be at the same time

1 The words ἡμα γὰρ . . . καὶ εἶναι are plainly parenthetical, since the τὸ μὲν, τὸ δὲ which follow explain the clause which precedes them. They should be enclosed in brackets and the colon after χρόνον deleted. Read ἀ δύναται. Prantl's note is incorrect. The facts are as follows: ἀ δύναται FM Simpl., ἀ δύναται EL, ἀδύνατα HJ. Bekker prints the last, though attested by only one of his MSS.

2 The third argument is distinct from the second in that the second arrives at an absurdum by actualizing the capacity, while the third points out that the co-presence of two such capacities has already been admitted to be impossible. Cf. 282a 5, 'that which is always capable of being' is the contrary of 'that which is always capable of not being'. Alexander seems to have maintained that our third argument was not a distinct argument at all; but the short account of his view given by Simpl. is not convincing.

1 A colon is required after ὑπερετ. Aristotle is proving that the capacity was present for infinite time, which in argument (3) he assumed as evident without proof.

Prantl's note as to the reading in i. 26 is inaccurate. The words καὶ ἀφθαρτον (not καὶ φθαρτον) were lacking in the MSS. used both by Alexander and by Simpl.; and they interpreted the sentence without those words to mean—'it will be at once eternal and in actuality destructible'; but 'in actuality destructible' means 'destroyed', and therefore the assertion is not justified by the context. Alex, however, suggested the insertion of the words καὶ ἀφθαρτον, and Simpl. says he 'has come across' a manuscript in which the words are found. καὶ ἀφθαρτον seems to have been added to E upon revision, but all our other MSS. have the words, and it is best to retain them in the text.
capable of always existing and of not always existing. Thus the destructible is at some time actually destroyed. The generable, similarly, has been generated, for it is capable of having been generated and thus also of not always existing.¹

We may also see in the following way how impossible it is either for a thing which is generated to be thenceforward indestructible, or for a thing which is ungenerated and has always hitherto existed to be destroyed. Nothing that is by chance can be indestructible or ungenerated, since the products of chance and fortune are opposed to what is, or comes to be, always or usually, while anything which exists for a time infinite either absolutely or in one direction, is in existence either always or usually. That which is by chance, then, is by nature such as to exist at one time and not at another. But in things of that character the contradictory states proceed from one and the same capacity, the matter of the thing being the cause equally of its existence and of its non-existence. Hence contradictories would be present together in actuality.²

¹ The end of this paragraph from καὶ εἰ γενητὸν seems to be a short statement of the parallel argument with regard to generation. If this is so we require a full-stop instead of a comma after φθαρτόν. τὸ φθαρτόν can hardly be the subject of γένοιν, as Prantl’s stopping suggests. The last words, καὶ μὴ ἄπα ἄρα εἶναι, are unsatisfactory, since, though they draw a true consequence, it is one more directly appropriate to φθορά than to γένοιν. It is tempting to read καὶ μὴ ἄπα μὴ ἄρα μὴ εἶναι. We should then have the relevant consequence and a more precise parallelism between the two arguments.—The point of the paragraph as a whole is to remove the possibility of an escape, by means of a doctrine of unrealized possibilities, from the conclusion already drawn that what is generated is also destructible. (Simpl. appositely quotes Timaeus 41 A, B, where the permanence of the world-order depends on the will and promise of the Demiurge.) Aristotle always maintains that an unrealized possibility in this sense is inconceivable.

² For Prantl’s καὶ ἄμα read ἄμα. The καί is omitted by FMJ Simpl.—The notions of ‘chance’ (τὸ αὐτόματον) and ‘fortune’ (τυχή) are fully discussed in Phys. II. iv–vi, the exclusion of the ‘necessary’ and the ‘usual’ (283b 32) being explained in II. v. It is there plainly implied that chance had actually been suggested by earlier writers as the generative cause of the world (196a 33, 198a 10). The reason why they had recourse to this notion would be that chance means a cause quite external to the nature of the thing considered; and thus the chance generation or destruction of the world would not involve the consequence that in general and as such the world was either generated or destructible. Aristotle’s reply to the suggestion is simply that chance necessarily implies ‘intermittent being, so that a chance-
Further, it cannot truly be said of a thing now that it exists last year, nor could it be said last year that it exists now.\(^1\) It is therefore impossible for what once did not exist later to be eternal. For in its later state it will possess the capacity of not existing, only\(^2\) not of not existing at a time when it exists—since then it exists in actuality—but of not existing last year or in the past. Now suppose it to be in actuality what it is capable of being. It will then be true to say now that it does not exist last year. But this is impossible. No capacity relates to being in the past, but always to being in the present or future. It is the same with the notion of an eternity of existence followed later by non-existence. In the later state the capacity will be\(^3\) present for that which is not there in actuality.\(^3\) Actualize, then, the capacity. It will be true to say now that this exists last year or in the past generally.

Considerations also not general like these but proper to the subject show it to be impossible that what was formerly eternal should later be destroyed or that what formerly was not should later be eternal. Whatever is destructible or generated is always alterable. Now alteration is due to contraries, and the things which compose the natural body are the very same that destroy it.\(^4\)

eternal is a contradiction in terms. (‘Fortune’ is a name for chance within the sphere of conduct; and anything which can be caused by chance could also, according to Aristotle, be caused either by intelligence, as in the case of conduct, or by nature, as here. See Phys. I. c.)

\(^1\) For ἐστὶ, ἐστὶν read ἐστο, ἐστον.—The concluding argument is introduced very abruptly, by a formula which shows that in Aristotle’s mind the suggestion here criticized is only another form of the appeal to chance just dealt with. The suggestion is that a capacity may be limited in respect of time of fulfilment. Aristotle refutes it by assuming that its authors admit (a) that the possession of the capacity is not limited in time, and (b) that any capacity may be actualized.

\(^2\) Before παύω a comma is required instead of Prantl’s full-stop.

\(^3\) οὐ must be taken to stand for ἐκεῖνου ἃ, as in Simpl.’s paraphrase.—The meaning is that after the thing has ceased to be it still retains its capacity of existing at any time previous to that event.

\(^4\) A comma is required after εὐνύσιος and, for συνισταται, συνισταται.
BOOK II

283b 26 That the heaven as a whole neither came into being nor admits of destruction, as some assert, but is one and eternal, with no end or beginning of its total duration, containing and embracing in itself the infinity of time, we may convince ourselves not only by the arguments already set forth but also by a consideration of the views of those who differ from us in providing for its generation. If our view is a possible one, and the manner of generation which they assert is impossible, this fact will have great weight in convincing us of the immortality and eternity of the world. Hence it is well to persuade oneself of the truth of the ancient and truly traditional theories, that there is some immortal and divine thing which possesses movement, but movement such as has no limit and is rather itself the limit of all other movement. A limit is a thing which contains; and this motion, being perfect, contains those imperfect motions which have a limit and a goal, having itself no beginning or end, but unceasing through the infinity of time, and of other movements, to some the cause of their beginning, to others offering the goal. The ancients gave to the Gods the heaven or upper place, as being alone immortal; and our present argument testifies that it is indestructible and ungenerated. Further, it is unaffected by any mortal discomfort, and, in addition, effortless; for it needs no constraining necessity to keep it to its path, and prevent it from moving with some other movement more natural to itself. Such a constrained movement would necessarily involve effort—the more so, the more eternal it were—and would be inconsistent with perfection. Hence we must not believe the old tale which says that the world needs some Atlas to keep it safe—a tale composed, it would seem, by men who, like later thinkers, conceived of all the

1 Omit ἡ κυκλοφορία. The words are found only in L, and though harmless are quite superfluous. There is no reference to κυκλοφορία in Simpl.'s paraphrase.
upper bodies as earthy and endowed with weight, and therefore supported it in their fabulous way upon animate necessity. We must no more believe than follow Empedocles when he says that the world, by being whirled round, received a movement quick enough to overpower its own downward tendency, and thus has been kept from destruction all this time. Nor, again, is it conceivable that it should persist eternally by the necessitation of a soul. For a soul could not live in such conditions painlessly or happily, since the movement involves constraint, being imposed on the first body, whose natural motion is different, and imposed continuously. It must therefore be uneasy and devoid of all rational satisfaction; for it could not even, like the soul of mortal animals, take recreation in the bodily relaxation of sleep. An Ixion's lot must needs possess it, without end or respite. If then, as we said, the view already stated of the first motion is a possible one, it is not only more appropriate so to conceive of its eternity, but also on this hypothesis alone are we able to advance a theory consistent with popular divinations of the divine nature. But of this enough for the present.

2 Since there are some who say that there is a right and a left in the heaven, with those who are known as Pythagoreans—to whom indeed the view really belongs—we must consider whether, if we are to apply these principles to the body of the universe, we should follow their statement of the matter or find a better way. At the start we may say:

1 The cosmic motions must not be regarded as imposed upon the body of the cosmos by a world-soul as the human soul imposes movement on the human body. Such a notion necessarily implies constraint on the part of the body and effort on the part of the soul, and therefore the movement could not be eternal. Aristotle has in mind, no doubt, the world-soul of the Timaeus.

2 Read είπερ κινει φέρεσθαι περικύκτος . . . άλλος και κινεί σωμαχώς, with all MSS. except E. Simpl.'s paraphrase supports this reading.—The remarks which follow as to the absence of 'rational satisfaction' recall verbally Plato, Timaeus 36 E θείαν ἀρχήν ἤρεστο [ἡ ψυχή—the world-soul] ἀπαίτητον καὶ ἐμφρονέως βίον πρὸς τὸν συμπαντήν χρόνον.

3 By 'divination' (μανεία) Aristotle means, not any religious practice of prophecy or the like, but simply the inspired guesses of common sense—τὴν κοινὴν ταύτην ἐποιεῖν ἢν ἑξομέν πέρι τῆς ἀπονίας καὶ μακαρίοτητος τοῦ θείου (Simpl.).
that, if right and left are applicable, there are prior principles which must first be applied. These principles have been analysed in the discussion of the movements of animals, for the reason that they are proper to animal nature. For in some animals we find all such distinctions of parts as this of right and left clearly present, and in others some; but in plants we find only above and below. Now if we are to apply to the heaven such a distinction of parts, we must expect, as we have said, to find in it also that distinction which in animals is found first of them all. The distinctions are three, namely, above and below, front and its opposite, right and left—all these three oppositions we expect to find in the perfect body—and each may be called a principle. Above is the principle of length, right of breadth, front of depth. Or again we may connect them with the various movements, taking principle to mean that part, in a thing capable of movement, from which movement first begins. Growth starts from above, locomotion from the right, sense-movement from in front (for front is simply the part to which the senses are directed). Hence we must not look for above and below, right and left, front and back, in every kind of body, but only in those which, being animate, have a principle of movement within themselves. For in no inanimate thing do we observe a part from which movement originates. Some do not move at all, some move, but not indifferently in any direction; fire, for example, only upward, and earth only to the centre. It is true that we speak of above and below, right and left, in these bodies relatively to ourselves. The reference may be to our own right hands, as with the diviner, or to some similarity to our own members, such as the parts of a statue possess; or we may take the contrary spatial order, calling right that which is to our left, and left that which is to our right. We observe, however, in the things

1 De Incessu Anim., cc. iv, v.
2 Prantl misprints γάν for γάρ.
3 Bekker and Prantl are probably right in regarding the words which follow δεξιάν (viz. καί . . . ἐπιπροσθεν) as spurious, though they are found in all MSS. except E. There is no trace of them in Simpl. or Them.
themselves none of these distinctions; indeed if they are turned round we proceed to speak of the opposite parts as right and left, above and below, front and back. Hence it is remarkable that the Pythagoreans should have spoken of these two principles, right and left, only, to the exclusion of the other four, which have as good a title as they. There is no less difference between above and below or front and back in animals generally than between right and left.

The difference is sometimes only one of function, sometimes also one of shape; and while the distinction of above and below is characteristic of all animate things, whether plants or animals, that of right and left is not found in plants. Further, inasmuch as length is prior to breadth, if above is the principle of length, right of breadth, and if the principle of that which is prior is itself prior, then above will be prior to right, or let us say, since 'prior' is ambiguous, prior in order of generation. If, in addition, above is the region from which movement originates, right the region in which it starts, front the region to which it is directed, then on this ground too above has a certain original character as compared with the other forms of position. On these two grounds, then, they may fairly be criticized, first, for omitting the more fundamental principles, and secondly, for thinking that the two they mentioned were attributable equally to everything.

Since we have already determined that functions of this kind belong to things which possess a principle of movement, and that the heaven is animate and possesses a principle of movement, clearly the heaven must also exhibit

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1 The right and left hands, for instance, differ in function but not in shape. It is implied that the difference of function underlies all the oppositions and determines the differences of shape where these occur. The differences of function are summarized above, 284b 25-30.

2 For the four main kinds of 'priority', see Cat. ch. xii (14a 26 ff.). Additional distinctions are made in Met. Δ, ch. xi.

3 i.e. to animals. This is laid down at the beginning of the present chapter, 283b 13, where reference is made to the De Incessu Animalium. Cf. also Phys. VIII. 4, 254b 7.

4 Bk. I, 279a 28, where it is stated to be the source of all life and movement. The term 'animate' (animate) has not hitherto been applied to it. The notion that the stars are 'inanimate' is rejected below, 292a 20.
above and below, right and left. We need not be troubled by the question, arising from the spherical shape of the world, how there can be a distinction of right and left within it, all parts being alike and all for ever in motion. We must think of the world as of something in which right differs from left in shape as well as in other respects, which subsequently is included in a sphere. The difference of function will persist, but will appear not to by reason of the regularity of shape. In the same fashion must we conceive of the beginning of its movement. For even if it never began to move, yet it must possess a principle from which it would have begun to move if it had begun, and from which it would begin again if it came to a stand. Now by its length I mean the interval between its poles, one pole being above and the other below; for two hemispheres are specially distinguished from all others by the immobility of the poles. Further, by 'transverse' in the universe we commonly mean, not above and below, but a direction crossing the line of the poles, which, by implication, is length: for transverse motion is motion crossing motion up and down. Of the poles, that which we see above us is the lower region, and that which we do not see is the upper. For right in anything is, as we say, the region in which locomotion originates, and the rotation of the heaven originates in the region from which the stars rise. So this will be the right, and the region where they set the left. If then they begin from the right and move round to the right, the upper must be the unseen pole. For if it is the pole we see, the movement will be leftward, which we deny to be the fact. Clearly then the invisible pole is above. And those who live in the other hemisphere are above and to the right, while we are below and to the left. This is just the opposite of the view of the Pythagoreans, who make us above and on the right side and those in the other hemisphere below and on the left side; the fact

1 The unmoving poles mark out one among the infinite possible bisections of the sphere as natural and intelligible. We thus arrive, as explained in what follows, at an 'upper' and a 'lower' hemisphere.
being the exact opposite.\(^1\) Relatively, however, to the secondary revolution, I mean that of the planets, we are above and on the right and they are below and on the left.\(^3\) For the principle of their movement has the reverse position, since the movement itself is the contrary of the other: hence it follows that we are at its beginning and they at its end. Here we may end our discussion of the distinctions of parts created by the three dimensions and of the consequent differences of position.

3 Since circular motion is not the contrary of the reverse circular motion, we must consider why there is more than one motion, though we have to pursue our inquiries at a distance—a distance created not so much by our spatial position as by the fact that our senses enable us to perceive very few of the attributes of the heavenly bodies. But let

\(^1\) Heath (Aristarchus, pp. 231-2) summarizes the argument as follows: "'Right' is the place from which motion in space starts; and the motion of the heaven starts from the side where the stars rise, i.e. the east; therefore the east is "right" and the west "left". If now (1) you suppose yourself to be lying along the world's axis with your head towards the north pole, your feet towards the south pole, and your right hand towards the east, then clearly the apparent motion of the stars from east to west is over your back from your right side towards your left; this motion, Aristotle maintains, cannot be called motion "to the right", and therefore our hypothesis does not fit the assumption from which we start, namely that the daily rotation "begins from the right and is carried round towards the right (ἐνὶ τὰ δεξία)". We must therefore alter the hypothesis and suppose (2) that you are lying with your head towards the south pole and your feet towards the north pole. If then your right hand is to the east, the daily motion begins at your right hand and proceeds over the front of your body from your right hand to your left.' Heath points out that to us this still gives a wrong result: the motion across your front will still be from right to left; but he accepts Simpl.'s explanation that movement to the front is regarded as rightward and motion to the back as leftward—\(\gamma \alpha \rho \ \epsilon \pi υ \ \delta ε\chi \alpha \pi \alpha ρ\) \(\epsilon\iota \sigma \ \tau \nu \ \epsilon \mu \rho \rho ρα \theta \varepsilon \nu \ \epsilon \sigma \tau\). If this is true, Heath's account is satisfactory. It is curious that the notion of rightward movement also gives trouble in the cosmology of Plato. Heath has an entirely different solution of that difficulty, in which the ordinary sense of 'to the right' is preserved (pp. 160-3). In view of the solution of the present passage quoted above, perhaps there is something after all to be said for the assertion of Proclus (In Timaeum 220 E), quoted by Heath only to be dismissed, that \(\epsilon \pi \iota \ \delta \epsilon χ\alpha ω\) does not mean \(\epsilon\iota \ \tau \nu \ \delta \epsilon χιον\) but is confined to circular motion and means 'the direction of a movement imparted by the right hand' (\(\epsilon\phi \ \acute{\alpha} \ \tau \nu \ \delta \epsilon χιον \ \kappa \nu \alpha\iota\)). The discrimination of right and left in circular motions is peculiarly difficult and ambiguous, as every child knows; and some such use of \(\epsilon \pi \iota \ \delta \epsilon χ\alpha ω\) may have been the Greek solution of the terminological problem.
DE CAELO

not that deter us. The reason must be sought in the following facts. Everything which has a function exists for its function. The activity of God is immortality, i.e. eternal life. Therefore the movement of that which is divine must be eternal. But such is the heaven, viz. a divine body, and for that reason to it is given the circular body whose nature it is to move always in a circle. Why, then, is not the whole body of the heaven of the same character as that part? Because there must be something at rest at the centre of the revolving body; and of that body no part can be at rest, either elsewhere or at the centre. It could do so only if the body’s natural movement were towards the centre. But the circular movement is natural, since otherwise it could not be eternal: for nothing unnatural is eternal. The unnatural is sub-quent to the natural, being a derangement of the natural which occurs in the course of its generation.

Earth then has to exist; for it is earth which is at rest at the centre. (At present we may take this for granted: it shall be explained later.) But if earth must exist, so must fire. For, if one of a pair of contraries naturally exists, the other, if it is really contrary, exists also naturally. In some form it must be present, since the matter of contraries is the same. Also, the positive is prior to its privation (warm, for instance, to cold), and rest and heaviness stand for the priva-

1. The argument is clear. ‘God’ or ‘divine’ means ‘eternal’. All body has motion. Therefore the notion of a divine body necessarily involves the notion of an eternal movement.—Simpl. says wrongly that θεός here stands for θείον σώμα.

2. The nature of the circular motion, and the reasons why it alone is compatible with immutability and the other divine attributes, have been explained in Bk. I, chaps. iii and iv.—The adjective ‘circular’ (ἐγκυκλιος) here and in several other passages of this book is transferred from the motion to the body endowed with it.

3. The body which is at the centre cannot be of the same nature, and endowed with the same motion, as that which is at the extremity; for the actual position and movement of one or the other would in that case be unnatural. There must therefore be a body whose natural position is at the centre and whose natural movement is towards the centre.

4. All change involves ‘derangement’ (ἐκτάσις), Phys. 222b16: cf. Phys. 241b2. ἐκτάσις is opposed to τελείωσις (‘fulfilment’, or movement of a thing towards its ideal nature), Phys. 246a17, b2, 247a3.

5. See ch. xiv.
tion of lightness and movement. But further, if fire and earth exist, the intermediate bodies\(^1\) must exist also: for each element stands in a contrary relation to every other.\(^3\) (This, again, we will here take for granted and try later to explain.\(^2\)) With these four elements generation clearly is involved, since none of them can be eternal: for contraries interact with one another and destroy one another. Further, it is inconceivable that a movable body should be eternal, if its movement cannot be regarded as naturally eternal: and these bodies we know to possess movement.\(^3\) Thus we see that generation is necessarily involved. But if so, there must be at least one other circular motion: for a single movement of the whole heaven would necessitate an identical relation of the elements of bodies to one another.\(^4\) This matter also shall be cleared up in what follows: but for the present so much is clear, that the reason why there is more than one circular body is the necessity of generation, which follows on the presence of fire, which, with that of the other bodies, follows on that of earth; and earth is required because eternal movement in one body necessitates eternal rest in another.

4 The shape of the heaven is of necessity spherical; for that is the shape most appropriate to its substance and also by nature primary.

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1 viz. air and water.
2 See De Gen. et Corr. II. iii, iv.
3 Retaining the MSS. reading, which is confirmed by Simpl. and Them., τούτων δ' ἐστι κίνησις. If these words are taken to mean ταῦτα δ' ἐστι κινητά, the argument, though summarily stated, is complete and Prantl's conjecture is unnecessary. If it is granted that the sublunary elements move, generation is admitted, unless it can be shown that their movement is such as to be naturally eternal. But it has already been shown (Phys. 261a 31 ff.) that the rectilinear movements must be intermittent.
4 A. is proving the necessity of the secondary revolution, i.e. that of the planets. If, he argues, there were only the movement of the fixed stars, and sun and moon were set in it and carried along with it, the varieties of summer and winter and the other seasons would disappear and the daily interchange would not follow its accustomed course. For if the sun were set in Cancer, we should have perpetual summer, and if it were set in Capricorn, perpetual winter: there would be no generation or destruction, not even the varied phases of the moon.\(^5\) (Simpl.). The further discussion promised here is to be found in De Gen. et Corr. II. x.
First, let us consider generally which shape is primary among planes and solids alike. Every plane figure must be either rectilinear or curvilinear. Now the rectilinear is bounded by more than one line, the curvilinear by one only. But since in any kind the one is naturally prior to the many and the simple to the complex, the circle will be the first of plane figures. Again, if by complete, as previously defined, we mean a thing outside which no part of itself can be found, and if addition is always possible to the straight line but never to the circular, clearly the line which embraces the circle is complete. If then the complete is prior to the incomplete, it follows on this ground also that the circle is primary among figures. And the sphere holds the same position among solids. For it alone is embraced by a single surface, while rectilinear solids have several. The sphere is among solids what the circle is among plane figures. Further, those who divide bodies into planes and generate them out of planes seem to bear witness to the truth of this. Alone among solids they leave the sphere undivided, as not possessing more than one surface: for the division into surfaces is not just dividing a whole by cutting it into its parts, but division of another fashion into parts different in form. It is clear, then, that the sphere is first of solid figures.

If, again, one orders figures according to their numbers, it is most natural to arrange them in this way. The circle corresponds to the number one, the triangle, being the sum of two right angles, to the number two. But if one is assigned to the triangle, the circle will not be a figure at all.

1 *Phys.* III. 207a 8. For the terms of the definition cf. *sup.* 271b 31. This notion of 'perfect' (or 'complete') is presupposed in the opening chapter of this treatise.—In l. 19 read τῶν αὐτῶν: the τῶν is omitted only in Ε and Φ.

2 Cf. *Phys.* VI. 1 and *inf.* Bk. III, ch. i for further criticisms of these theories. The theory criticized is that expressed by Timaeus the Pythagorean in Plato's dialogue of that name. (So Simpl. on 298b 33.)

3 Prantl's μῶν is a misprint for μίαν.

4 Both sphere and circle can of course be divided into parts, but they cannot be geometrically analysed into constituents not themselves spherical or circular. The geometrical analysis requires that the constituent or 'part' shall be different in form from the whole.
Now the first figure belongs to the first body, and the first body is that at the farthest circumference. It follows that the body which revolves with a circular movement must be spherical. The same then will be true of the body continuous with it: for that which is continuous with the spherical is spherical. The same again holds of the bodies between these and the centre. Bodies which are bounded by the spherical and in contact with it must be, as wholes, spherical; and the bodies below the sphere of the planets are contiguous with the sphere above them. The sphere then will be spherical throughout; for every body within it is contiguous and continuous with spheres.

Again, since the whole revolves, palpably and by assumption, in a circle, and since it has been shown that outside the farthest circumference there is neither void nor place, from these grounds also it will follow necessarily that the heaven is spherical. For if it is to be rectilinear in shape, it will follow that there is place and body and void without it. For a rectilinear figure as it revolves never continues in the same room, but where formerly was body, is now none, and where now is none, body will be in a moment because of the projection at the corners. Similarly, if the world had some other figure with unequal radii, if, for instance, it were lentiform, or oviform, in every case we should have to admit space and void outside the moving body, because the whole body would not always occupy the same room.

Again, if the motion of the heaven is the measure of all movements whatever in virtue of being alone continuous and regular and eternal, and if, in each kind, the measure is the minimum, and the minimum movement is the swiftest, then, clearly, the movement of the heaven must be the swiftest of all movements. Now of lines which return upon themselves the line which bounds the circle is the shortest;

1 This depends, as Simpl. observes, after Alexander, on the position of the axis of revolution. In the case of a perfect sphere alone the position of the axis is immaterial.

2 Reading ἄφ' εαυροῦ ἐφ' εαυρό, with Simpl. and the consensus of the MSS. The τό and τό in Prantl's text are conjectural insertions. J has ἄφ' αυροῦ ἐφ' αιρό.
and that movement is the swiftest which follows the shortest line.\(^1\) Therefore, if the heaven moves in a circle and moves more swiftly than anything else, it must necessarily be spherical.

Corroborative evidence may be drawn from the bodies whose position is about the centre. If earth is enclosed by water, water by air, air by fire, and these similarly by the upper bodies—which while not continuous are yet contiguous with them\(^2\)—and if the surface of water is spherical, and that which is continuous with or embraces the spherical must itself be spherical, then on these grounds also it is clear that the heavens are spherical. But the surface of water is seen to be spherical if we take as our starting-point the fact that water naturally tends to collect in a hollow place—‘hollow’ meaning ‘nearer the centre’. Draw from the centre the lines \(AB, AC\), and let their extremities be joined by the straight line \(BC\). The line \(AD\), drawn to the base of the triangle, will be shorter than either of the radii.\(^3\) Therefore the place in which it terminates will be a hollow place. The water then will collect there until equality is established, that is until the line \(AE\) is equal to the two radii. Thus water forces its way to the ends of the radii, and there only will it rest: but the line which connects the extremities of the radii is circular: therefore the surface of the water \(BEC\) is spherical.

It is plain from the foregoing that the universe is spherical. It is plain, further, that it is turned (so to speak) with a finish which no manufactured thing nor anything

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1. This is true if equality of effort (\(\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \delta\nu\nu\alpha\mu\epsilon\omega\sigma\ Simpl.) is postulated. In a word, the underlying notion is rather the comparative economy than the comparative swiftness of movements.—For the origin of this argument Simpl. refers to Tim. 33 B.

2. 'Continuous', 'contiguous', and the related terms are defined in Phys. V. iii. If these bodies were continuous with the heavenly body they would have to move with the same motion as it.
else within the range of our observation can even approach. For the matter of which these are composed does not admit of anything like the same regularity and finish as the substance of the enveloping body; since with each step away from earth the matter manifestly becomes finer in the same proportion as water is finer than earth.

5  Now there are two ways of moving along a circle, from $A$ to $B$ or from $A$ to $C$, and we have already explained that these movements are not contrary to one another. But nothing which concerns the eternal can be a matter of chance or spontaneity, and the heaven and its circular motion are eternal. We must therefore ask why this motion takes one direction and not the other. Either this is itself an ultimate fact or there is an ultimate fact behind it. It may seem evidence of excessive folly or excessive zeal to try to provide an explanation of some things, or of every-thing, admitting no exception. The criticism, however, is not always just: one should first consider what reason there is for speaking, and also what kind of certainty is looked for, whether human merely or of a more cogent kind. When any one shall succeed in finding proofs of greater precision, gratitude will be due to him for the discovery, but at present we must be content with a probable solution. If nature always follows the best course possible, and, just as upward movement is the superior form of rectilinear movement, since the upper region is more divine than the lower, so forward movement is superior to backward, then front and back exhibits, like right and left, as we said before and

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1 Bekker and Prantl prefer L's καρτερικώτερον to the καρτερώτερον of all other MSS. It is difficult to imagine why. There is good Platonic parallel for the use of καρτέρος in this connexion (Phaedo 77 a, Theaet. 169 b).

2 I. iv.

3 A similar caution is repeated at the beginning of ch. xii, 291 b 25. For this use of φαυλήμενον cf. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 809 b 24.

4 Reading, with Prantl, είχεν δή είπερ, and accepting his punctuation.
as the difficulty just stated itself suggests, the distinction of prior and posterior, which provides a reason and so solves our difficulty. Supposing that nature is ordered in the best way possible, this may stand as the reason of the fact mentioned. For it is best to move with a movement simple and unceasing, and, further, in the superior of two possible directions.

We have next to show that the movement of the heaven is regular and not irregular. This applies only to the first heaven and the first movement; for the lower spheres exhibit a composition of several movements into one. If the movement is uneven, clearly there will be acceleration, maximum speed, and retardation, since these appear in all irregular motions. The maximum may occur either at the starting-point or at the goal or between the two; and we expect natural motion to reach its maximum at the goal, unnatural motion at the starting-point, and missiles midway between the two.1 But circular movement, having no be-

The passage as punctuated by Bekker is untranslatable. The apodosis undoubtedly begins at the word ἔχει. EL give ἔχει δὲ εἰπερ; the remaining MSS. ἔχει ἐπερ. The existence of a 'front' and 'back' in the world was asserted in ch. ii. The priority of 'up', 'right', and 'front' over 'down', 'left', and 'back' is assumed in the same chapter, 284b24.—The gist of the present rather involved and hesitating statement is that the only way to account for the direction of the heavenly movements is by means of these oppositions and the priority commonly attributed in each to one term over the other.

1 It appears from Meteorologica I. iv, 341b—342a that meteors and shooting stars come under the notion of 'missiles' or 'things thrown'. Their motion is compared to that of the stone of a fruit when it is made to fly through the air by being squeezed out from between the fingers. Ordinary throwing, e.g. of a stone or javelin, would of course also be included.—Simpl. and, by his report, Alexander are much puzzled by the statement in the text. Simpl. makes the wild suggestion that A. here regards animal movements as 'missile' motion, in that they are neither upward nor downward but horizontal. Alex. suggests that 'missile' movements may be said to have their maximum between goal and starting-point, because every earthly body has its goal either up or down, and the whole of the 'missile' movement, from beginning to end, takes place in the middle region. Alex. is probably right. It is to be remembered that all movement is either natural or unnatural, and that 'missile' movement can only be distinguished in principle as a mixture of the two; further that the body thrown must be composed of one or more of the four elementary bodies. 'Throwing' is thought of as a forced horizontal motion put upon one of these bodies, each of which has a 'goal', down (or up), and a 'starting-point', up (or down). In such a motion the maximum
gining or limit or middle in the direct sense of the words, has neither whence nor whither nor middle: for in time it is eternal, and in length it returns upon itself without a break. If then its movement has no maximum, it can have no irregularity, since irregularity is produced by retardation and acceleration. Further, since everything that is moved is moved by something, the cause of the irregularity of movement must lie either in the mover or in the moved or in both. For if the mover moved not always with the same force, or if the moved were altered and did not remain the same, or if both were to change, the result might well be an irregular movement in the moved. But none of these possibilities can be conceived as actual in the case of the heavens. As to that which is moved, we have shown that it is primary and simple and ungenerated and indestructible and generally unchanging; and the mover has an even better right to these attributes. It is the primary that moves the primary, the simple the simple, the indestructible and ungenerated that which is indestructible and ungenerated. Since then that which is moved, being a body, is nevertheless unchanging, how should the mover, which is incorporeal, be changed?

It follows then, further, that the motion cannot be irregular. For if irregularity occurs, there must be change either in the movement as a whole, from fast to slow and slow to fast, or in its parts. That there is no irregularity in the parts is obvious, since, if there were, some divergence of the stars would have taken place before now in the infinity of time, as one moved slower and another faster; but no alteration of their intervals is ever observed. Nor again is a change in the movement as a whole admissible. Retardation is always due to incapacity, and incapacity is unnatural. The incapacities of animals, age, decay, and the like, are all unnatural, due, it seems, to the fact that the cannot be said to be attained at either terminus, since neither terminus is involved, but only 'between the two'. This means that in the case of natural motion 'goal' must be taken to be the natural place of the body, which is also the 'starting-point' of unnatural motion in the same body. In 'throwing', therefore, there is neither starting-point nor goal, but all is in the intermediate region.

1 For γεγονεὶ read ἐγεγονεὶ with FHLMJ.
whole animal complex is made up of materials which differ in respect of their proper places, and no single part occupies its own place. If therefore that which is primary contains nothing unnatural, being simple and unmixed and in its proper place and having no contrary, then it has no place for incapacity, nor, consequently, for retardation or (since acceleration involves retardation) for acceleration. Again, it is inconceivable that the mover should first show incapacity for an infinite time, and capacity afterwards for another infinity. For clearly nothing which, like incapacity, is unnatural ever continues for an infinity of time; nor does the unnatural endure as long as the natural, or any form of incapacity as long as the capacity. But if the movement is retarded it must necessarily be retarded for an infinite time. Equally impossible is perpetual acceleration or perpetual retardation. For such movement would be infinite and indefinite, but every movement, in our view, proceeds from one point to another and is definite in character. Again, suppose one assumes a minimum time in less than which the heaven could not complete its movement. For, as a given walk or a given exercise on the harp cannot take any and every time, but every performance has its definite minimum time which is unsurpassable, so, one might suppose, the movement of the heaven could not be completed in any and every time. But in that case perpetual acceleration is impossible (and, equally, perpetual retardation: for the argument holds of both and each),

1 Reading όνδ' ἀλῶς, with all MSS. except E, which Prantl follows in reading οὐδ' ἀλῶς.—The effect of ἀλῶς is to make the unnatural one species or department within the general notion of incapacity. ἀλῶς has much more varied uses and enables one to avoid this implication.

2 i.e. equality of duration must be supposed between the incapacity (retardation) and the preceding capacity, as assumed in the foregoing argument, in which infinity (sc. in one direction) is attributed to each. For if the speed of movement has been everlastingly increasing, and now begins to decrease, it is impossible to suppose anything else but that it will decrease everlastingly.

3 viz. in respect of its speed. The hypothesis now considered is retardation or acceleration not balanced by its opposite but having neither beginning nor end, i.e. infinite in both directions.

4 Prantl's stopping needs correction. The words εὐ δὲ μη...θάτερον should be enclosed within brackets.
if we may take acceleration to proceed by identical or increasing additions of speed and for an infinite time. The remaining alternative is to say that the movement exhibits an alternation of slower and faster: but this is a mere fiction and quite inconceivable. Further, irregularity of this kind would be particularly unlikely to pass unobserved, since contrast makes observation easy.

That there is one heaven, then, only, and that it is ungenerated and eternal, and further that its movement is regular, has now been sufficiently explained.

7 We have next to speak of the stars, as they are called, of their composition, shape, and movements. It would be most natural and consequent upon what has been said that each of the stars should be composed of that substance in which their path lies, since, as we said, there is an element whose natural movement is circular. In so saying we are only following the same line of thought as those who say that the stars are fiery because they believe the upper body to be fire, the presumption being that a thing is composed of the same stuff as that in which it is situated. The warmth and light which proceed from them are caused by the friction set up in the air by their motion. Movement tends to create fire in wood, stone, and iron; and with even more reason should it have that effect on air, a substance which is closer to fire than these. An example is that of missiles, which as they move are themselves fired so strongly that leaden balls are melted; and if they are fired the surrounding air must be similarly affected. Now while the missiles are heated by reason of their motion in air, which is turned into fire by the agitation produced by their movement, the upper bodies are carried on a moving sphere, so that, though they are not themselves fired, yet the air underneath the sphere of the revolving body is necessarily heated by its

1 i.e. of the same substance as the spheres to which their motion is due.
2 A colon is required after the word ἀνὴρ in l. 23.
3 πληγή seems to stand here for the continuous beating of the missile upon the air rather than for a single blow. Cf. Simpl. 439. 25 ἐπὶ τὴν ... πληγής καὶ παρατρίψεως. The same use recurs below, 291a 17.
motion, and particularly in that part where the sun is attached to it. Hence warmth increases as the sun gets nearer or higher or overhead. Of the fact, then, that the stars are neither fiery nor move in fire, enough has been said.

Since changes evidently occur not only in the position of the stars but also in that of the whole heaven, there are three possibilities. Either (1) both are at rest, or (2) both are in motion, or (3) the one is at rest and the other in motion.

(1) That both should be at rest is impossible; for, if the earth is at rest, the hypothesis does not account for the observations; and we take it as granted that the earth is at rest. It remains either that both are moved, or that the one is moved and the other at rest.

(2) On the view, first, that both are in motion, we have the absurdity that the stars and the circles move with the same speed, i.e. that the pace of every star is that of the circle in which it moves. For star and circle are seen to come back to the same place at the same moment; from which it follows that the star has traversed the circle and the circle has completed its own movement, i.e. traversed its own circumference, at one and the same moment. But it is difficult to conceive that the pace of each star should be exactly proportioned to the size of its circle. That the pace of each circle should be proportionate to its size is not absurd but inevitable: but that the same should be true of the movement of the stars contained in the circles is quite absurd.

1 The stars are not themselves ignited because the substance of which they are composed cannot be transmuted into any other as fire, air, and the other sublunary substances can. It is, however, legitimate to object to the above account that fire, not air, is the substance in contact with the spheres, and that only with the innermost. How, then, is air ignited by the movement of the spheres? Alex. and Simpl. agree that 'air' must in some sense include fire (or ἄνεκκαυμα, the 'fuel of fire' which occupies the outer place); but that, even if true, will not solve the difficulties. The view here advanced is nowhere fully worked out; but some further suggestions are made in Meteor. I, iii and iv. Cf. Heath, Aristarchus, pp. 241–2. It seems certain that what Aristotle meant was that the 'fire' which is in contact with the spheres is ignited and agitated by their motion and the air beneath by it (341a 2–3 and 30–31).
incredible. For if, on the one hand, we suppose that the star which moves on the greater circle is necessarily swifter, clearly we also admit that if stars shifted their position so as to exchange circles, the slower would become swifter and the swifter slower. But this would show that their movement was not their own, but due to the circles. If, on the other hand, the arrangement was a chance combination, the coincidence in every case of a greater circle with a swifter movement of the star contained in it is too much to believe. In one or two cases it might not inconceivably fall out so, but to imagine it in every case alike is a mere fiction. Besides, chance has no place in that which is natural, and what happens everywhere and in every case is no matter of chance.

(3) The same absurdity is equally plain if it is supposed that the circles stand still and that it is the stars themselves which move. For it will follow that the outer stars are the swifter, and that the pace of the stars corresponds to the size of their circles.

Since, then, we cannot reasonably suppose either that both are in motion or that the star alone moves, the remaining alternative is that the circles should move, while the stars are at rest and move with the circles to which they are attached. Only on this supposition are we involved in no absurd consequence. For, in the first place, the quicker movement of the larger circle is natural when all the circles are attached to the same centre. Whenever bodies are moving with their proper motion, the larger moves quicker. It is the same here with the revolving bodies: for the arc intercepted by two radii will be larger in the larger circle, and hence it is not surprising that the revolution of the larger circle should take the same time as that of the smaller. And secondly, the fact that the heavens do not break in pieces follows not only from this

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1 Bekker and Prantl read ταυτά instead of τά αὐτά, which is the reading of all MSS. and of Simpl. The alteration is unnecessary. The difficulty is the same as that pointed out in the preceding argument—an unaccountable correspondence between the size of the circle and the speed of the star's movement.
but also from the proof already given\(^1\) of the continuity of the whole.

Again, since the stars are spherical, as our opponents assert and we may consistently admit, inasmuch as we construct them out of the spherical body, and since the spherical body has two movements proper to itself, namely rolling and spinning,\(^2\) it follows that if the stars have a movement of their own, it will be one of these. But neither is observed. (1) Suppose them to \textit{spin}. They would then stay where they were, and not change their place, as, by observation and general consent, they do. Further, one would expect them all to exhibit the same movement: but the only star which appears to possess this movement is the sun, at sunrise or sunset, and this appearance is due not to the sun itself but to the distance from which we observe it. The visual ray being excessively prolonged becomes weak and wavering.\(^3\) The same reason probably accounts for the apparent twinkling of the fixed stars and the absence of twinkling in the planets. The planets are near, so that the visual ray reaches them in its full vigour, but when it comes to the fixed stars it is quivering because of the distance and its excessive extension; and its tremor produces an appearance of movement in the star: for it makes no difference whether movement is set up in the ray or in the object of vision.

(2) On the other hand, it is also clear that the stars do not \textit{roll}. For rolling involves rotation: but the ‘face’,

\(^1\) Cf. c. iv. But there is no attempt to prove continuity in the \textit{De Caeo}.

\(^2\) By ‘spinning’ is meant rotation on a stationary axis, by ‘rolling’ a forward movement in which a body turns completely round in a distance equal to its own circumference. See Heath, \textit{Aristarchus}, pp. 233-5.

\(^3\) The term \(δψύς\) (= visual ray) belongs to pre-Aristotelian psychology. Cf. Plato, \textit{Meno}, 76 c-d. Aristotle’s use of it here and elsewhere (e.g. \textit{Meteor.} III. iv, 373b2) seems to commit him ‘to the view that the eye sees by rays issuing from a native fire within it’ (Beare, \textit{Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition}, p. 66, n. 1). But his own argument, when dealing with vision, is to the contrary effect. ‘In seeing we take something in, not give something out’ (\textit{Toph.} 105b6); and the process is ‘from object to eye, not conversely’ (Beare, p. 86). Aristotle must be supposed here to be adopting popular or Platonic terminology.
as it is called, of the moon is always seen. Therefore, since any movement of their own which the stars possessed would presumably be one proper to themselves, and no such movement is observed in them, clearly they have no movement of their own.

There is, further, the absurdity that nature has bestowed upon them no organ appropriate to such movement. For nature leaves nothing to chance, and would not, while caring for animals, overlook things so precious. Indeed, nature seems deliberately to have stripped them of everything which makes self-originated progression possible, and to have removed them as far as possible from things which have organs of movement. This is just why it seems proper that the whole heaven and every star should be spherical. For while of all shapes the sphere is the most convenient for movement in one place, making possible, as it does, the swiftest and most self-contained motion, for forward movement it is the most unsuitable, least of all resembling shapes which are selfmoved, in that it has no dependent or projecting part, as a rectilinear figure has, and is in fact as far as possible removed in shape from ambulatory bodies. Since, therefore, the heavens have to move in one place, and the stars are not required to move themselves forward, it is natural that both should be spherical— a shape which best suits the movement of the one and the immobility of the other.

9 From all this it is clear that the theory that the movement of the stars produces a harmony, i.e. that the sounds they make are concordant, in spite of the grace and originality with which it has been stated, is nevertheless untrue. Some thinkers suppose that the motion of bodies

1 It has been objected to Aristotle that if the moon always shows the same side to us it is thereby proved that it does rotate upon its axis. But such rotation (incidental, in Aristotle's view, to the movement of the sphere) is quite different from the rotation involved in 'rolling', which Aristotle is here concerned to deny. See Heath, P. 235.

2 The doctrine of the 'harmony of the spheres' is no doubt, as Simpl. says, Pythagorean. The most famous statement of the doctrine is in Plato's Republic (Myth of Er, 617B), and the ratios given to the planets in Timaeus, 35B, seem to have a musical significance. For a discussion of the doctrine see Heath, Aristarchus, pp. 105-15.
of that size must produce a noise, since on our earth the motion of bodies far inferior in size and in speed of movement has that effect. Also, when the sun and the moon, they say, and all the stars, so great in number and in size, are moving with so rapid a motion, how should they not produce a sound immensely great? Starting from this argument and from the observation that their speeds, as measured by their distances, are in the same ratios as musical concordances, they assert that the sound given forth by the circular movement of the stars is a harmony. Since, however, it appears unaccountable that we should not hear this music, they explain this by saying that the sound is in our ears from the very moment of birth and is thus indistinguishable from its contrary silence, since sound and silence are discriminated by mutual contrast. What happens to men, then, is just what happens to coppersmiths, who are so accustomed to the noise of the smithy that it makes no difference to them. But, as we said before, melodious and poetical as the theory is, it cannot be a true account of the facts. There is not only the absurdity of our hearing nothing, the ground of which they try to remove, but also the fact that no effect other than sensitive is produced upon us. Excessive noises, we know, shatter the solid bodies even of inanimate things: the noise of thunder, for instance, splits rocks and the strongest of bodies. But if the moving bodies are so great, and the sound which penetrates to us is proportionate to their size, that sound must needs reach us in an intensity many times that of thunder, and the force of its action must be immense. Indeed the reason why we do not hear, and show in our bodies none of the effects of violent force, is easily given: it is that there is no noise. But not only is the explanation evident; it is also a corroboration of the truth of the views we have advanced. For the very difficulty which made the Pythagoreans say that the motion of the stars produces a concord corroborates our view. Bodies which are themselves in motion, produce noise and friction: but those which are attached or fixed to a moving body, as the parts to a ship, can no more create noise, than a ship on a river
moving with the stream. Yet by the same argument one might say it was absurd that on a large vessel the motion of mast and poop should not make a great noise, and the like might be said of the movement of the vessel itself. But sound is caused when a moving body is enclosed in an unmoved body, and cannot be caused by one enclosed in, and continuous with, a moving body which creates no friction. We may say, then, in this matter that if the heavenly bodies moved in a generally diffused mass of air or fire, as every one supposes, their motion would necessarily cause a noise of tremendous strength and such a noise would necessarily reach and shatter us. Since, therefore, this effect is evidently not produced, it follows that none of them can move with the motion either of animate nature or of constraint. If it is as though nature had foreseen the result, that if their motion were other than it is, nothing on this earth could maintain its character.

That the stars are spherical and are not self-moved, has now been explained.

With their order—I mean the position of each, as involving the priority of some and the posteriority of others, and their respective distances from the extremity—with this astronomy may be left to deal, since the astronomical discussion is adequate. This discussion shows that the movements of the several stars depend, as regards the varieties of speed which they exhibit, on the distance

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1 Prantl misprints diakvalew for diakvalew.
2 If the stars moved in a non-moving medium either with a self-originated motion, like that of an animal, or with a motion imposed on them by external force, like that of a stone thrown, a great and destructive noise would result. There is no such noise or destruction. Therefore they do not so move. The Pythagorean doctrine is thus used to corroborate a conclusion already reached. It might be objected that Aristotle has already postulated friction with another substance to account for the brightness of the stars, and that this friction might well be expected to be accompanied with noise as in the case of missiles on the earth.
3 The tone of this reference to 'astronomy', as well as the present tense in the verb λέγειν, suggest that Aristotle is not here referring to other works of his own but to contemporary works on astronomy, current in the school, by other writers. These sentences also clearly imply that 'astronomy' is more empirical in its methods than the De Caelo. Cf. infra, 291b21.—In l. 29 Prantl's δ is a misprint for δν.
of each from the extremity. It is established that the outermost revolution of the heavens is a simple movement and the swiftest of all, and that the movement of all other bodies is composite and relatively slow, for the reason that each is moving on its own circle with the reverse motion to that of the heavens. This at once leads us to expect that the body which is nearest to that first simple revolution should take the longest time to complete its circle, and that which is farthest from it the shortest, the others taking a longer time the nearer they are and a shorter time the farther away they are. For it is the nearest body which is most strongly influenced, and the most remote, by reason of its distance, which is least affected, the influence on the intermediate bodies varying, as the mathematicians show, with their distance.¹

With regard to the shape of each star, the most reasonable view is that they are spherical. It has been shown² that it is not in their nature to move themselves, and, since nature is no wanton or random creator, clearly she will have given things which possess no movement a shape particularly unadapted to movement. Such a shape is the sphere, since it possesses no instrument of movement. Clearly then their mass will have the form of a sphere.³ Again, what

¹ In regard to 'order' Aristotle only seeks to explain one point which might present a difficulty. It would be natural to expect the moon, which is the nearest planet to the earth, to have the slowest motion; but in fact it is the swiftest of the planets. His answer is that the movement of the planets, being the reverse of that of the outer heaven, is hampered by proximity to it; and the planet nearest to the earth is least influenced and therefore moves swiftest. Simpl. raises the objection: is not the planetary motion then in some degree constrained or unnatural? He quotes with approval from Alex. the reply: 'No: for the planetary sphere is not unwilling. This accords with its purpose and desire. It may be necessity, but it is also good, and recognized as such.' Simpl. is not altogether satisfied by this solution.

² Ch. viii.

³ Simpl. notes a circle in Aristotle's argument, since he has already used the spherical shape of the stars to prove that they have no independent motion (c. viii). (The same charge is brought against Aristotle by Dreyer, Planetary Systems, p. 111.) He is not satisfied with Alex.'s rejoinder that neither of these arguments stands alone. The true answer is that the argument of c. viii is explicitly based, in respect of the spherical shape of the stars, on a premise borrowed from the opposition: see 290ᵃ 7. Aristotle's own proof of the matter precedes it. This argument is therefore in order.
holds of one holds of all, and the evidence of our eyes shows us that the moon is spherical. For how else should the moon as it waxes and wanes show for the most part a crescent-shaped or gibbous figure, and only at one moment a half-moon? And astronomical arguments\textsuperscript{1} give further confirmation; for no other hypothesis accounts for the crescent shape of the sun's eclipses. One, then, of the heavenly bodies being spherical, clearly the rest will be spherical also.

There are two difficulties, which may very reasonably here be raised, of which we must now attempt to state the probable solution:\textsuperscript{2} for we regard the zeal of one whose thirst after philosophy leads him to accept even slight indications where it is very difficult to see one's way, as a proof rather of modesty than of over-confidence.

Of many such problems one of the strangest is the problem why we find the greatest number of movements in the intermediate bodies, and not, rather, in each successive body a variety of movement proportionate to its distance from the primary motion. For we should expect, since the primary body shows one motion only, that the body which is nearest to it should move with the fewest movements, say two, and the one next after that with three, or some similar arrangement. But the opposite is the case. The movements of the sun and moon are fewer than those of some of the planets. Yet these planets are farther from the centre and thus nearer to the primary body than they, as observation has itself revealed. For we have seen the moon, half-full, pass beneath the planet Mars, which vanished on its shadow side and came forth by the bright and shining part.\textsuperscript{3} Similar accounts of other stars are

\textsuperscript{1} See note on 291\textsuperscript{a} 32.
\textsuperscript{2} See note on 288\textsuperscript{a} 2.
\textsuperscript{3} Brandis (Berlin Aristotle, vol. IV, 497\textsuperscript{b} 13) quotes a scholium to the effect that Alexander in his Commentary said it was Mercury, not Mars. Both Simpl. and Them., however, give Mars without question. If it was Mars, a calculation of Kepler's (Astronomia Nova, 1609, p. 323) fixes the date. 'Inveni,' he writes, 'longissima inductione per annos L, ab anno quindecimo ad finem vitae Aristotelis, non potuisse esse alio die, quam in vespera diei IV Aprilis, anno ante CHRISTI vulgarem epocham CCLVII, cum Aristoteles XXI annorum audiret
given by the Egyptians and Babylonians, whose observations have been kept for very many years past, and from whom much of our evidence about particular stars is derived.\textsuperscript{1}

A second difficulty which may with equal justice be raised is this. Why is it that the primary motion includes such a multitude of stars that their whole array seems to defy counting, while of the other stars\textsuperscript{2} each one is separated off, and in no case do we find two or more attached to the same motion?\textsuperscript{3}

On these questions, I say, it is well that we should seek to increase our understanding, though we have but little to go upon, and are placed at so great a distance from the facts in question. Nevertheless there are certain principles on which if we base our consideration we shall not find this difficulty by any means insoluble. We may object that we have been thinking of the stars as mere bodies, and as units with a serial order indeed but entirely inanimate; but should rather conceive them as enjoying life and action. On this view the facts cease to appear surprising. For it is natural that the best-conditioned of all things should have its good without action, that that which is nearest to it should achieve it by little and simple action, and that which is farther removed by a complexity of actions, just as with men's bodies one is in good condition without exercise at all, another after a short walk, while another requires running and wrestling and hard training,\textsuperscript{4} and there are yet

Eudoxum, ut ex Diogene Laërtio constat.\textsuperscript{7} Diogenes' date for Aristotle's birth is in fact Ol. 99, i (384-3 B.C.): Aristotle would therefore be 27 at the date arrived at. The calculation for Mercury does not appear to have been made.

\textsuperscript{1} See note on 270\textsuperscript{b} 14.

\textsuperscript{2} i.e. the planets.

\textsuperscript{3} The term φορά (motion) is transferred from the motion itself to the sphere which imparts the motion.

\textsuperscript{4} There seems to be no parallel for the use of the word κόνις (tr. 'hard training') in connexion with the exercises of the palaestra, though κοινάστρα is used in post-Aristotelian writers for the arena. Simpl. says the term stands for the training of the wrestler, διὰ τὸ ἐν κῶινε γυμνάζεσθαι τα παλαίστρα. Bywater (\textit{J. of Phil.}, xxviii, p. 241) objects that the third term in the phrase should be a distinct form of exercise from running or wrestling, and suggests κοινόστρα. Perhaps it is best to keep the text, though there can be no certainty that it is right.
others who however hard they worked themselves could never secure this good, but only some substitute for it. To succeed often or in many things is difficult. For instance, to throw ten thousand Coan throws with the dice would be impossible, but to throw one or two is comparatively easy.\footnote{1} In action, again, when \( A \) has to be done to get \( B \), \( B \) to get \( C \), and \( C \) to get \( D \), one step or two present little difficulty, but as the series extends the difficulty grows. \footnote{2} We must, then, think of the action of the lower stars as similar to that of animals and plants. For on our earth it is man that has the greatest variety of actions—for there are many goods that man can secure; hence his actions are various and directed to ends beyond them—while the perfectly conditioned has no need of action, since it is itself the end, and action always requires two terms, end and means. The lower animals have less variety of action than man; and plants perhaps have little action and of one kind only.\footnote{3} For either they have but one attainable good (as indeed man has), or, if several, each contributes directly to their ultimate good.\footnote{4} One thing then has and enjoys the

\footnote{1} Prantl's \( \text{Κώους} \) rests on one MS. (H) and was known as an alternative reading to Simpl. Two MSS. (EL) give \( \text{Χίους} \), two others (FM) \( \chiίος \) \( \kappa \omega \omega \). \( J \) has \( \chi\lambdaιος \, \kappa \omega \lambda\omega \), with \( \chi\ios \) \( \kappa \omega \ios \) in the margin. Simpl. thinks the point is the size of the dice (\( \alphaς \, \mu\varphi\alpha\iota\mu\alpha\ι\kappa\lambda\alpha\iota\kappa\nu\) \( \epsilon\nu \, \alpha\mu\varphi\omicron\tau\epsilon\rho\epsilon\alpha\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma \) \( \gamma\nu\omicron\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\epsilon\omicron\nu\) \( \tau\alpha\iota\varsigma \, \nu\eta\sigma\omicron\iota \)). Prantl takes the impossibility to be a succession of good throws or 'sixes', and therefore prefers 'Coan' to 'Chian', which according to Pollux was used for the worst throw. The impossibility is clearly the same whether the worst throw or the best is intended; but, since success is implied by the context, I have followed Prantl. The double reading \( \text{Χίους} \) \( \text{Κώους} \) may however be right.

\footnote{2} Reading \( \pi\rho\alpha\tau\tau\epsilon\iota \), with FHMJ and Bekker, for Prantl's \( \pi\rho\alpha\tau\tau\epsilon\iota \) (EL).

\footnote{3} The long parenthesis (l. 3 \( \pi\nu\lambda\lambda\nu \ \gamma\acute{\iota}p \) to l. 7 \( \epsilon\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha \) in Prantl's text breaks the structure of the sentence and should be removed. The succession of colons which results (for a colon must be marked after \( \pi\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\iota \)s in l. 3) is best broken by placing full-stops after \( \phi\nu\tau\omicron\nu \) (l. 2), \( \epsilon\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha \) (l. 4), \( \epsilon\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha \) (l. 7).

\footnote{4} If there is more than one good, e.g. nutriment and propagation, each is a constituent of the plant's 'good' in the final sense. To be able to accept something merely as a means to something else, i.e. as indirectly good, is a distinctive mark of a higher development. Thus the variety here indicated as characteristic of human action lies not so much in the superior range of human desires (though that also is a fact) as in the variety and complexity of the means by which man effects their satisfaction.
ultimate good, other things attain to it, one immediately by few steps, another by many, while yet another does not even attempt to secure it but is satisfied to reach a point not far removed from that consummation. Thus, taking health as the end, there will be one thing that always possesses health, others that attain it, one by reducing flesh, another by running and thus reducing flesh, another by taking steps to enable himself to run, thus further increasing the number of movements, while another cannot attain health itself, but only running or reduction of flesh, so that one or other of these is for such a being the end. For while it is clearly best for any being to attain the real end, yet, if that cannot be, the nearer it is to the best the better will be its state. It is for this reason that the earth moves not at all and the bodies near to it with few movements. For they do not attain the final end, but only come as near to it as their share in the divine principle permits. But the first heaven finds it immediately with a single movement, and the bodies intermediate between the first and last heavens attain it indeed, but at the cost of a multiplicity of movement.

As to the difficulty that into the one primary motion is crowded a vast multitude of stars, while of the other stars each has been separately given special movements of its own, there is in the first place this reason for regarding the arrangement as a natural one. In thinking of the life

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1 Reading ἐνθύς for ἐγγύς. Cf. l. 20 below. ἐγγύς is in all the MSS., but is quite intolerable in view of the general contrast between attainment and approximation made here and repeated below. The influence of ἐγγύς in the following line may be supposed to have caused its substitution for ἐνθύς here. Simpl. paraphrases τὸ δὲ δὲ ἀλγον κινήσεων ἀφικνεῖται πρὸς τὸ έαυτὸ τέλος, and therefore appears not to have had ἐγγύς in his text. Them., however, has it: 'ad illud prope per pauca accedit.'

2 Place a full-stop after ἐλθεῖν (l. 13), delete bracket, comma after ἰχνανθής (l. 17). 'Running' or 'reduction of flesh' becomes in such a case the 'end', i.e. the content of purpose, as soon as the true end or good is recognized as unattainable.

3 Simpl. finds this sentence difficult. He did not see that Aristotle here, as frequently elsewhere, uses ἄλλα where ἄλλα would be expected. See Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 33b 15.

4 The upshot of the argument seems to be this, that the earth and the bodies nearest to it move simply, or not at all, because they are content with little, and perfection is beyond their reach.
BOOK II. 12

and moving principle of the several heavens one must regard the first as far superior to the others. Such a superiority would be reasonable. For this single first motion has to move many of the divine bodies, while the numerous other motions move only one each, since each single planet moves with a variety of motions. Thus, then, nature makes matters equal and establishes a certain order, giving to the single motion many bodies and to the single body many motions. And there is a second reason why the other motions have each only one body, in that each of them except the last, i.e. that which contains the one star, is really moving many bodies. For this last sphere moves with many others, to which it is fixed, each sphere being actually a body; so that its movement will be a joint product. Each sphere, in fact, has its particular natural motion, to which the general movement is, as it were, added. But the force of any limited body is only adequate to moving a limited body.  

The characteristics of the stars which move with a circular motion, in respect of substance and shape, movement and order, have now been sufficiently explained.

13 It remains to speak of the earth, of its position, of the question whether it is at rest or in motion, and of its shape.

I. As to its position there is some difference of opinion. Most people—all, in fact, who regard the whole heaven as finite—say it lies at the centre. But the Italian philosophers known as Pythagoreans take the contrary view. At the centre, they say, is fire, and the earth is one of the stars, creating night and day by its circular motion about the

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1 The movements of each planet are analysed into the combination of a number of simple spherical motions each contributed by a single sphere. The 'last' sphere or motion means the outermost, viz. that to which the planet is actually attached. The inner spheres have really bodies to move even though they carry no planet: for they have to communicate their motion to the sphere or spheres in which they are included.

2 Prantl seems to find unnecessary difficulty in this sentence. These spheres, says Aristotle, have only a limited force, and they have enough to do to impart their motion to the outer spheres, and through it to the planet: the burden of several planets would be too much for them.
centre. They further construct another earth in opposition
to ours to which they give the name counter-earth. In all
this they are not seeking for theories and causes to account
for observed facts, but rather forcing their observations and
trying to accommodate them to certain theories and
opinions of their own. But there are many others who
would agree that it is wrong to give the earth the central
position, looking for confirmation rather to theory than to
the facts of observation. Their view is that the most
precious place befits the most precious thing: but fire, they
say, is more precious than earth, and the limit than the
intermediate, and the circumference and the centre are
limits. Reasoning on this basis they take the view that it
is not earth that lies at the centre of the sphere, but rather
fire. The Pythagoreans have a further reason. They hold
that the most important part of the world, which is the
centre, should be most strictly guarded, and name it, or
rather the fire which occupies that place, the 'Guard-house
of Zeus', as if the word 'centre' were quite unequivocal,
and the centre of the mathematical figure were always the
same with that of the thing or the natural centre. But it is
better to conceive of the case of the whole heaven as
analogous to that of animals, in which the centre of the
animal and that of the body are different. For this reason
they have no need to be so disturbed about the world, or to
call in a guard for its centre: rather let them look for the
centre in the other sense and tell us what it is like and
where nature has set it. That centre will be something
primary and precious; but to the mere position we should
give the last place rather than the first. For the middle is
what is defined, and what defines it is the limit, and that
which contains or limits is more precious than that which
is limited, seeing that the latter is the matter and the
former the essence of the system.

II. As to the position of the earth, then, this is the view
which some advance, and the views advanced concerning
its rest or motion are similar. For here too there is no
general agreement. All who deny that the earth lies at

1 ρώμα is omitted by FHMJ, but is probably right.
the centre think that it revolves about the centre,\(^1\) and not the earth only but, as we said before, the counter-earth as well. Some of them even consider it possible that there are several bodies so moving, which are invisible to us owing to the interposition of the earth. This, they say, accounts for the fact that eclipses of the moon are more frequent than eclipses of the sun: for in addition to the earth each of these moving bodies can obstruct it. Indeed,\(^2\) as in any case the surface of the earth is not actually a centre but distant from it a full hemisphere, there is no more difficulty, they think, in accounting for the observed facts on their view that we do not dwell at the centre, than on the common view that the earth is in the middle.\(^2\) Even as it is, there is nothing in the observations to suggest that we are removed from the centre by half the diameter of the earth. Others, again, say that the earth, which lies at the centre, is ‘rolled’, and thus in motion, about the axis of the whole heaven. So it stands written in the *Timaeus*.\(^3\)

III. There are similar disputes about the *shape* of the earth. Some think it is spherical, others that it is flat and drum-shaped. For evidence they bring the fact that, as the *294\(^a\)*

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\(^1\) \(\mu\varepsilon\) in l. 18 appears to prove that the comma should be put after \(κ\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\) instead of after \(αυ\tau\eta\nu\), and that \(φα\varepsilon\nu\) governs both infinitives.

\(^2\) Prantl’s insertion of \(\mu\eta\) in the last clause rests on a misunderstanding of the passage. The text is quite sound.—Dreyer (*Planetary Systems*, p. 45) thinks that the supposed movement would seriously affect observations of the sun and the moon.

\(^3\) *Timaeus*, 40 \(b\). For a discussion of this vexed passage see Heath, *Aristarchus*, pp. 174–8. J has \(\epsilon\lambda\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\; κα\iota\; κ\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\) (in 296\(^a\) 26, however, where the same pair of words recur, it has \(\epsilon\lambda\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\; κ.\; κ\), which decreases the probability, not antecedently very great, that the words \(κα\iota\; κ\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\) are an insertion. Unless the idea of movement is contained in the phrase, the quotation would seem to be out of place here. It seems plain that Aristotle considered the word \(\epsilon\lambda\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\) (‘rolled’ in the text) obscure or ambiguous, and added the words \(κα\iota\; κ\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\) to indicate his interpretation of it. Alex. (\(\alpha\rho\nu\\iota\; \text{Simpl.}\)) says that the word used in the *Timaeus* means ‘pressed’ (\(\beta\u03a3\varepsilon\varepsilon\sigma\varepsilon\beta\iota\iota\)), but that it is difficult to contradict Aristotle on a point on which he was so much better informed. Simpl. says that, spelt with the diphthong \(ε\iota\) and a single \(λ\), the word does connote rotation. He points out that Aristotle promised to speak of the earth’s motion and rest; and suggests that, taking \(κα\iota\; κ\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\) to be a later insertion, one might suppose that Aristotle passes in this sentence to the consideration of the view that the earth is at rest. But this will hardly do.
sun rises and sets, the part concealed by the earth shows a straight and not a curved edge, whereas if the earth were spherical the line of section would have to be circular. In this they leave out of account the great distance of the sun from the earth and the great size of the circumference, which, seen from a distance on these apparently small circles appears straight. Such an appearance ought not to make them doubt the circular shape of the earth. But they have another argument. They say that because it is at rest, the earth must necessarily have this shape. For there are many different ways in which the movement or rest of the earth has been conceived.

The difficulty must have occurred to every one. It would indeed be a complacent mind that felt no surprise that, while a little bit of earth, let loose in mid-air, moves and will not stay still, and the more there is of it the faster it moves, the whole earth, free in mid-air, should show no movement at all. Yet here is this great weight of earth, and it is at rest. And again, from beneath one of these moving fragments of earth, before it falls, take away the earth, and it will continue its downward movement with nothing to stop it. The difficulty then, has naturally passed into a commonplace of philosophy; and one may well wonder that the solutions offered are not seen to involve greater absurdities than the problem itself.

By these considerations some have been led to assert that the earth below us is infinite, saying, with Xenophanes of Colophon, that it has 'pushed its roots to infinity',1—in order to save the trouble of seeking for the cause. Hence the sharp rebuke of Empedocles, in the words 'if the deeps of the earth are endless and endless the ample ether—such is the vain tale told by many a tongue, poured from the mouths of those who have seen but little of the whole'.2

1 Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, 11 A 47 (53, 38 ff.), B 28 (63, 8). Ritter and Preller, 103 b. Simpl. cannot find the quotation in the writings of Xenophanes, and doubts whether τὸ κάτω τῆς γῆς means 'the under-parts of the earth' or 'the ether under the earth'. A fragment corroborating the former interpretation survives (no. 28 in Diels). Cf. Burnet, E.G.P. § 60.
Others say the earth rests upon water. This, indeed, is the oldest theory that has been preserved, and is attributed to Thales of Miletus. It was supposed to stay still because it floated like wood and other similar substances, which are so constituted as to rest upon water but not upon air. As if the same account had not to be given of the water which carries the earth as of the earth itself! It is not the nature of water, any more than of earth, to stay in mid-air: it must have something to rest upon. Again, as air is lighter than water, so is water than earth: how then can they think that the naturally lighter substance lies below the heavier? Again, if the earth as a whole is capable of floating upon water, that must obviously be the case with any part of it. But observation shows that this is not the case. Any piece of earth goes to the bottom, the quicker the larger it is. These thinkers seem to push their inquiries some way into the problem, but not so far as they might. It is what we are all inclined to do, to direct our inquiry not by the matter itself, but by the views of our opponents: and even when interrogating oneself one pushes the inquiry only to the point at which one can no longer offer any opposition. Hence a good inquirer will be one who is ready in bringing forward the objections proper to the genus, and that he will be when he has gained an understanding of all the differences.¹

Anaximenes and Anaxagoras and Democritus give the flatness of the earth as the cause of its staying still. Thus, they say, it does not cut, but covers like a lid, the air beneath it. This seems to be the way of flat-shaped bodies: for even the wind can scarcely move them because of their power of resistance. The same immobility, they say, is produced by the flatness of the surface which the earth presents to the air which underlies it; while the air,

¹ The objections must be ‘proper to the kind’ or class to which the subject of investigation belongs, i.e. scientific, not dialectical or sophistical. These thinkers, as Simpl. observes, have failed to investigate the peculiar characteristics of wood and earth in the genus ‘body’, and therefore think that, because wood floats, earth may. For the importance of a study of the ‘differences’ Simpl. refers to Top. I. xviii.
not having room enough to change its place because it is underneath the earth, stays there in a mass, like the water in the case of the water-clock. And they adduce an amount of evidence to prove that air, when cut off and at rest, can bear a considerable weight.

Now, first, if the shape of the earth is not flat, its flatness cannot be the cause of its immobility. But in their own account it is rather the size of the earth than its flatness that causes it to remain at rest. For the reason why the air is so closely confined that it cannot find a passage, and therefore stays where it is, is its great amount: and this amount is great because the body which isolates it, the earth, is very large. This result, then, will follow, even if the earth is spherical, so long as it retains its size. So far as their arguments go, the earth will still be at rest.

In general, our quarrel with those who speak of movement in this way cannot be confined to the parts; it concerns the whole universe. One must decide at the outset whether bodies have a natural movement or not, whether there is no natural but only constrained movement. Seeing, however, that we have already decided this matter to the best of our ability, we are entitled to treat our results as representing fact. Bodies, we say, which have no natural movement, have no constrained movement; and where there is no natural and no constrained movement there will be no movement at all. This is a conclusion, the necessity of which we have already decided, and we have seen further that rest also will be inconceivable, since rest, like

1 Reading ὄσπερ with the MSS. Diels (Vors. 3 25, 32) inserts τὸν before μεταστήρια (l. 19), a conjecture which has some support in L, which has πῶν in that place.—Experiments with the water-clock are frequently mentioned. See esp. Emped. fr. 100 (Diels), Arist. Probl. 914 26, Burnet, E.G.P. Index I s.v. Klepsydra. ‘The water-clock’, says Simpl., ‘is a vessel with a narrow mouth and a flattish base pierced with small holes, what we now call a ἰδραρπαξ. If this vessel is dipped in water while the mouth at the top is kept closed, no water runs in through the holes. The massed air inside resists the water and prevents its ingress, being unable to change its own place. When the mouth at the top is opened the water runs in, the air making way for it.’ The position of the water beneath the water-clock is analogous to that of the air beneath the earth.

2 i.e. to the single element earth or to earth and air.

3 I. ii–iv.
movement, is either natural or constrained. But if there is any natural movement, constraint will not be the sole principle of motion or of rest. If, then, it is by constraint that the earth now keeps its place, the so-called 'whirling' movement by which its parts came together at the centre was also constrained. (The form of causation supposed they all borrow from observations of liquids and of air, in which the larger and heavier bodies always move to the centre of the whirl. This is thought by all those who try to generate the heavens to explain why the earth came together at the centre. They then seek a reason for its staying there; and some say, in the manner explained, that the reason is its size and flatness, others, with Empedocles, that the motion of the heavens, moving about it at a higher speed, prevents movement of the earth, as the water in a cup, when the cup is given a circular motion, though it is often underneath the bronze, is for this same reason prevented from moving with the downward movement which is natural to it. But suppose both the 'whirl' and its flatness (the air beneath being withdrawn) cease to prevent the earth's motion, where will the earth move to then? Its movement to the centre was constrained, and its rest at the centre is due to constraint; but there must be some motion which is natural to it. Will this be upward motion or downward or what? It must have some motion; and if upward and downward motion are alike to it, and the air above the earth does not prevent upward movement, then no more could air below it prevent downward movement. For the same cause must necessarily have the same effect on the same thing.

Further, against Empedocles there is another point which might be made. When the elements were separated off by

1 Simplicius seems to be right in considering the portion included within brackets in the text as a parenthetic note on δινησις, interrupting Aristotle's argument.

2 The sense required is 'withdrawn', as above, but there is no parallel to the use of ἐπελθεῖν in this sense. The MSS. offer no variant, and Simpl. paraphrases ἐκστάντος. In the absence of a better suggestion I should read ὑπεξελθόντος.

3 The suggestion clearly is that, consciously or unconsciously, these thinkers attributed a natural motion downward to the earth, since they gave it a reason for not moving in that direction only.
Hate, what caused the earth to keep its place? Surely the 'whirl' cannot have been then also the cause. It is absurd too not to perceive that, while the whirling movement may have been responsible for the original coming together of the parts of earth at the centre, the question remains, why

\[295^a\] now do all heavy bodies move to the earth. For the whirl surely does not come near us. Why, again, does fire move upward? Not, surely, because of the whirl. But if fire is naturally such as to move in a certain direction, clearly the same may be supposed to hold of earth. Again, it cannot be the whirl which determines the heavy and the light.\[1\]

Rather that movement caused the pre-existent heavy and light things to go to the middle and stay on the surface respectively. Thus, before ever the whirl began, heavy and light existed; and what can have been the ground of their distinction, or the manner and direction of their natural movements? In the infinite chaos there can have been neither above nor below, and it is by these that heavy and light are determined.\[5\]

It is to these causes that most writers pay attention: but there are some, Anaximander, for instance, among the ancients, who say that the earth keeps its place because of its indifference.\[2\] Motion upward and downward and sideways were all, they thought, equally inappropriate to that which is set at the centre and indifferently related to every extreme point; and to move in contrary directions at the same time was impossible: so it must needs remain still. This view is ingenious but not true. The argument would prove that everything, whatever it be, which is put at the

1 Read καὶ τὸ κοὐφον with all MSS. except E.
2 Literally 'likeness'. Kranz, Index to Diels, Vors., s. v. ὀμοιότης, translates 'gleichmässige Lage'. Burnet (who formerly took a different view) now accepts 'indifference' as the equivalent of ὀμοιότης in this passage. (E.G.P.\(^8\) p. 66, n. 1.) Cf. Burnet's note on Plato, Phædo, 109 A 2, where he proposes the translation 'equiformity', and the phrase πρὸς ὀμοιάς γοαίνας below (296\(^b\) 20). From Aristotle's wording it seems probable that he had the Phædo in mind here. The full phrase there is: τὴν ὀμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐαυτῷ πάντη καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ισορροπίαν. It is to be observed that Plato makes ὀμοιότης an attribute of the whole heaven or universe, not of the earth.
3 Prantl's ἐναυρίον is a misprint for ἐναυριόν.
centre, must stay there. Fire, then, will rest at the centre: for the proof turns on no peculiar property of earth. But this does not follow. The observed facts about earth are not only that it remains at the centre, but also that it moves to the centre. The place to which any fragment of earth moves must necessarily be the place to which the whole moves; and in the place to which a thing naturally moves, it will naturally rest. The reason then is not in the fact that the earth is indifferently related to every extreme point: for this would apply to any body, whereas movement to the centre is peculiar to earth. Again it is absurd to look for a reason why the earth remains at the centre and not for a reason why fire remains at the extremity. If the extremity is the natural place of fire, clearly earth must also have a natural place. But suppose that the centre is not its place, and that the reason of its remaining there is this necessity of indifference—on the analogy of the hair which, it is said, however great the tension, will not break under it, if it be evenly distributed, or of the man who, though exceedingly hungry and thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay where he is—even so, it still remains to explain why fire stays at the extremities. It is strange, too, to ask about things staying still but not about their motion,—why, I mean, one thing, if nothing stops it, moves up, and another thing to the centre. Again, their statements are not true. It happens, indeed, to be the case that a thing to which movement this way and that is equally inappropriate is obliged to remain at the centre. But so far as their argument goes, instead of remaining there, it will move, only not as a mass but in fragments. For the argument applies equally to fire. Fire, if set at the centre, should stay there, like earth, since it will be indifferently related to every point on the extremity. Nevertheless it will move, as in fact it always does move when nothing stops it, away from the centre to the extremity. It will not, however, move in a

1 The structure of the sentence would be made clearer if commas were placed after μίαν and after ηκ in l. 33.

2 The principle is in fact true, if it is properly understood, i.e. seen to apply, as explained in what follows, only to indivisible bodies.
mass to a single point on the circumference—the only possible result on the lines of the indifference theory—but rather each corresponding portion of fire to the corresponding part of the extremity, each fourth part, for instance, to a fourth part of the circumference. For since no body is a point, it will have parts. The expansion, when the body increased the place occupied, would be on the same principle as the contraction, in which the place was diminished. Thus, for all the indifference theory shows to the contrary, earth also would have moved in this manner away from the centre, unless the centre had been its natural place.

We have now outlined the views held as to the shape, position, and rest or movement of the earth.

Let us first decide the question whether the earth moves or is at rest. For, as we said, there are some who make it one of the stars, and others who, setting it at the centre, suppose it to be 'rolled' and in motion about the pole as axis. That both views are untenable will be clear if we take as our starting-point the fact that the earth's motion, whether the earth be at the centre or away from it, must needs be a constrained motion. It cannot be the movement of the earth itself. If it were, any portion of it would have this movement; but in fact every part moves in a straight line to the centre. Being, then, constrained and unnatural, the movement could not be eternal. But the order of the universe is eternal. Again, everything that moves with the circular movement, except the first sphere, is observed to be passed, and to move with more than one motion. The earth, then, also, whether it move about the centre or as stationary at it, must necessarily move with two motions. But if this were so, there would have to be passings and turnings of the fixed stars. Yet no such thing is observed. The same stars always rise and set in the same parts of the earth.

1 For ἔλλεισθαι Ι has ἔλλεισθαι. See note on 293b 31.
2 This passage is examined in Heath, *Aristarchus*, pp. 240-1. The necessity for two motions appears to rest only on the analogy of the planets, which are 'passed' or left behind by the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars. The consequence, that there would be variety in
Further, the natural movement of the earth, part and whole alike, is to the centre of the whole—whence the fact that it is now actually situated at the centre—but it might be questioned, since both centres are the same, which centre it is that portions of earth and other heavy things move to. Is this their goal because it is the centre of the earth or because it is the centre of the whole? The goal, surely, must be the centre of the whole. For fire and other light things move to the extremity of the area which contains the centre. It happens, however, that the centre of the earth and of the whole is the same. Thus they do move to the centre of the earth, but accidentally, in virtue of the fact that the earth’s centre lies at the centre of the whole. That the centre of the earth is the goal of their movement is indicated by the fact that heavy bodies moving towards the earth do not move parallel but so as to make equal angles, and thus to a single centre, that of the earth. It is clear, then, that the earth must be at the centre and immovable, not only for the reasons already given, but also because heavy bodies forcibly thrown quite straight upward return to the point from which they started, even if they are thrown to an infinite distance. From these considerations then it is clear that the earth does not move and does not lie elsewhere than at the centre.

From what we have said the explanation of the earth’s immobility is also apparent. If it is the nature of earth, as observation shows, to move from any point to the centre, as

the places of rising and setting of the fixed stars, follows from the assumption of a second motion, if the second is taken to be oblique to the first (Heath, loc. cit.).

1 i.e. at right angles to a tangent: if it fell otherwise than at right angles, the angles on each side of the line of fall would be unequal. Cf. inf. 311b34, where the argument is repeated. The phrase πρὸς ὁμοίας γωνίας, ‘at like angles’, appears to strike Simp., as a rather strange equivalent for πρὸς ἵκον γωνίας, ‘at equal angles’, borrowed, as he says, from those who referred ‘angle’ to the category of quality—ὁμοίας δὲ ἐκάλου τὰς ἵκους γωνίας οἱ τῆν γωνίαν ὑπὸ τὸ ποιὸν ἀνάγοντες (538, 22). Cf. Burnet’s remarks on ὑμωνύτης in Phaedo, 109A2, quoted in part above in note on 295b11.

2 It seems plain that the words κατὰ στάθμην (‘quite straight’) refer to the line of the throw, not, as Simp., supposes, to the line of return. But it is difficult to see what independent test Aristotle had of the straightness of the throw.
of fire contrariwise to move from the centre to the extremity, it is impossible that any portion of earth should move away from the centre except by constraint. For a single thing has a single movement, and a simple thing a simple: contrary movements cannot belong to the same thing, and movement away from the centre is the contrary of movement to it. If then no portion of earth can move away from the centre, obviously still less can the earth as a whole so move. For it is the nature of the whole to move to the point to which the part naturally moves. Since, then, it would require a force greater than itself to move it, it must needs stay at the centre. This view is further supported by the contributions of mathematicians to astronomy, since the observations made as the shapes change by which the order of the stars is determined, are fully accounted for on the hypothesis that the earth lies at the centre. Of the position of the earth and of the manner of its rest or movement, our discussion may here end.

Its shape must necessarily be spherical. For every portion of earth has weight until it reaches the centre, and the jostling of parts greater and smaller would bring about not a waved surface, but rather compression and convergence of part and part until the centre is reached. The process should be conceived by supposing the earth to come into being in the way that some of the natural philosophers describe. Only they attribute the downward movement to constraint, and it is better to keep to the truth and say that the reason of this motion is that a thing which possesses

1 The sense of the sentence is, clearly, 'the phenomena are accounted for on the present hypothesis: why change it?' But the precise relevance of (apparent) changes of shape does not seem clear. Simpl. illustrates by changes which would be necessitated by the hypothesis of a moving earth; but his own paraphrase of Aristotle's words implies that the changes in question are observed changes. The Greek implies (1) that the order of the stars is settled by the apparent shapes or patterns which they make in combination; (2) that the changes of these shapes are accounted for on the hypothesis of a stationary earth.

2 ἀνενοσεῖ is clearly used here of 'convergence', not, as Prantl translates, of 'making way'. So Simpl. paraphrases, ὑποπλάτηται ἡ ἀνενοσέως ἑτερον ἑτέρον.

3 The cosmogony which follows is in principle that of Anaxagoras (Burnet, E.G.P., § 133).
weight is naturally endowed with a centripetal movement. When the mixture, then, was merely potential, the things that were separated off moved similarly from every side towards the centre. Whether the parts which came together at the centre were distributed at the extremities evenly, or in some other way, makes no difference. If, on the one hand, there were a similar movement from each quarter of the extremity to the single centre, it is obvious that the resulting mass would be similar on every side. For if an equal amount is added on every side the extremity of the mass will be everywhere equidistant from its centre, i.e. the figure will be spherical. But neither will it in any way affect the argument if there is not a similar accession of concurrent fragments from every side. For the greater quantity, finding a lesser in front of it, must necessarily drive it on, both having an impulse whose goal is the centre, and the greater weight driving the lesser forward till this goal is reached. In this we have also the solution of a possible difficulty. The earth, it might be argued, is at the centre and spherical in shape: if, then, a weight many times that of the earth were added to one hemisphere, the centre of the earth and of the whole will no longer be coincident. So that either the earth will not stay still at the centre, or if it does, it will be at rest without having its centre at the place to which it is still its nature to move. Such is the difficulty. A short consideration will give us an easy answer, if we first give precision to our postulate that any body endowed with weight, of whatever size, moves towards the centre. Clearly it will not stop when its edge touches the centre. The greater quantity must prevail until the body's centre occupies the centre. For that is the goal of its impulse. Now it makes no difference whether we apply

1 The words 'at the centre' in the first clause seem intrusive at first sight; and logically they are indefensible. 'Either the earth will not stay still at the centre, or, if it does stay still at the centre, it will not have its (new) centre at the centre which is its natural goal!' The words ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου, then, may be an insertion. They are, however, more probably due to the desire for a direct contradictory. The view is μένει ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου: the contradictory is therefore οὐ μένει ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου: and the εἰσπράξει recalls only the μένει. 'Either it does not stay still at the centre or it doesn't stay still at the centre.'
this to a clod or common fragment of earth or to the earth as a whole. The fact indicated does not depend upon 10 degrees of size but applies universally to everything that has the centripetal impulse. Therefore earth in motion, whether in a mass or in fragments, necessarily continues to move until it occupies the centre equally every way, the less being forced to equalize itself by the greater owing to the forward drive of the impulse.  

If the earth was generated, then, it must have been formed in this way, and so clearly its generation was spherical; and if it is ungenerated and has remained so always, its character must be that which the initial generation, if it had occurred, would have given it. But the spherical shape, necessitated by this argument, follows also from the fact that the motions of heavy bodies always make equal angles, 2 and are not parallel. This would be the natural form of movement towards what is naturally spherical. Either then the earth is spherical or it is at least naturally spherical. 3 And it is right to call anything that which nature intends it to be, and which belongs to it, rather than that which it is by constraint and contrary to nature. The evidence of the senses further corroborates this. How else would eclipses of the moon show segments shaped as we see them? As it is, the shapes which the moon itself each month shows are of every kind—straight, gibbous, and concave—but in eclipses the outline is always curved: and, since it is the interposition of the earth that

1 The argument is quite clear if it is understood that 'greater' and 'less' here and in ² 30 and in ² 5 stand for greater and smaller portions of one body, the line of division passing through the centre which is the goal. Suppose the earth so placed in regard to the centre. The larger and heavier division would 'drive the lesser forward', i.e. beyond the centre (² 30); it would 'prevail until the body's centre occupied the centre' (² 5); it would 'force the less to equalize itself', i.e. to move on until the line passing through the central goal divided the body equally. Simpl. fails to see this.—Alex. (ap. Simpl. 543, 15) raises the difficulty that the final movement of the 'less' will be away from the centre, or upward, and hence unnatural. But this is to make a perverse abstraction of part from whole. The desire of earth to reach the centre can never be fully satisfied, since the centre is a geometrical point.

² See note on 296² 20.

³ Allowing for scruples due to the evident inequalities of the earth's surface.
makes the eclipse, the form of this line will be caused by the form of the earth's surface, which is therefore spherical. Again, our observations of the stars make it evident, not only that the earth is circular, but also that it is a circle of no great size. For quite a small change of position to south or north causes a manifest alteration of the horizon. There is much change, I mean, in the stars which are overhead, and the stars seen are different, as one moves northward or southward. Indeed there are some stars seen in Egypt and in the neighbourhood of Cyprus which are not seen in the northerly regions; and stars, which in the north are never beyond the range of observation, in those regions rise and set. All of which goes to show not only that the earth is circular in shape, but also that it is a sphere of no great size: for otherwise the effect of so slight a change of place would not be so quickly apparent. Hence one should not be too sure of the incredibility of the view of those who conceive that there is continuity between the parts about the pillars of Hercules and the parts about India, and that in this way the ocean is one. As further evidence in favour of this they quote the case of elephants, a species occurring in each of these extreme regions, suggesting that the common characteristic of these extremes is explained by their continuity. Also, those mathematicians who try to calculate the size of the earth's circumference arrive at the figure 400,000 stades. This indicates not only that the earth's mass is spherical in shape, but also that as compared with the stars it is not of great size.

1 Simpl. gives, for the benefit of 'those who doubt the wisdom of the ancients', a summary account of the methods by which this result was attained.—This appears to be the oldest recorded estimate of the size of the earth. 400,000 stades = 9,987 geographical miles. Other estimates (in miles) are: Archimedes, 7,495; Eratosthenes and Hipparchus, 6,292; Poseidonius, 5,992 or 4,494; present day, 5,400. (These figures are borrowed from Prantl's note on the passage in his translation, p. 319.)
BOOK III

298a WE have already discussed the first heaven and its parts, the moving stars within it, the matter of which these are composed and their bodily constitution, and we have also shown that they are ungenerated and indestructible. Now things that we call natural are either substances or functions and attributes of substances. As substances I class the simple bodies—fire, earth, and the other terms of the series—and all things composed of them; for example, the heaven as a whole and its parts, animals, again, and plants and their parts. By attributes and functions I mean the movements of these and of all other things in which they have power in themselves to cause movement, and also their alterations and reciprocal transformations. It is obvious, then, that the greater part of the inquiry into nature concerns bodies: for a natural substance is either a body or a thing which cannot come into existence without body and magnitude. This appears plainly from an analysis of the character of natural things; and equally from an inspection of the instances of inquiry into nature. Since, then, we have spoken of the primary element, of its bodily constitution, and of its freedom from destruction and generation, it remains to speak of the other two. In speaking of them we shall be obliged also to inquire into generation and destruction. For if there is generation anywhere, it must be in these elements and things composed of them.

This is indeed the first question we have to ask: is generation a fact or not? Earlier speculation was at variance both with itself and with the views here put forward as to the true answer to this question. Some removed generation and destruction from the world altogether.

1 Aristotle speaks of the four sublunary elements as two, because generically they are two. Two are heavy, two light: two move up and two down. Books III and IV of this treatise deal solely with these elements.
BOOK III. 1

Nothing that is, they said, is generated or destroyed, and our conviction to the contrary is an illusion. So maintained the school of Melissus and Parmenides. But however excellent their theories may otherwise be, anyhow they cannot be held to speak as students of nature. There may be things not subject to generation or any kind of movement, but if so they belong to another and a higher inquiry than the study of nature. They, however, had no idea of any form of being other than the substance of things perceived; and when they saw, what no one previously had seen, that there could be no knowledge or wisdom without some such unchanging entities, they naturally transferred what was true of them to things perceived. Others, perhaps intentionally, maintain precisely the contrary opinion to this. It had been asserted that everything in the world was subject to generation and nothing was ungenerated, but that after being generated some things remained indestructible while the rest were again destroyed. This had been asserted in the first instance by Hesiod and his followers, but afterwards outside his circle by the earliest natural philosophers. 1 But what these thinkers maintained was that all else has been generated and, as they said, 'is flowing away', nothing having any solidity, except one single thing which persists as the basis of all these transformations. So we may interpret the statements of Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others. 2 And some 3 subject all bodies whatever to generation, by means of the composition and separation of planes.

Discussion of the other views may be postponed. 4 But this last theory which composes every body of planes is, as

1 The reference, according to Simplicius, is to Orphic writings ('the school of Orpheus and Musaeus').
2 e.g. Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes.
3 'The view of Timaeus the Pythagorean, recorded by Plato in the dialogue named after him' (Simpl.). The theory criticized is certainly that advanced in the Timaeus, and is usually attributed to Plato, as by Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. 4 II. i, p. 804, but Aristotle probably has also in mind certain members of the Academy, particularly Xenocrates (ib., pp. 1016 ff.).
4 The promised discussion is not to be found in the De Caelo nor in its sequel, the De Generatione et Corruptione. But Aristotle has already devoted some attention to these views at the beginning of the Physics, and there is also the discussion of Met. A.
the most superficial observation shows, in many respects in plain contradiction with mathematics. It is, however, wrong to remove the foundations of a science unless you can replace them with others more convincing. And, secondly, the same theory which composes solids of planes clearly composes planes of lines and lines of points, so that a part of a line need not be a line. This matter has been already considered in our discussion of movement, where we have shown that an indivisible length is impossible.¹ But with respect to natural bodies there are impossibilities involved in the view which asserts indivisible lines, which we may briefly consider at this point. For the impossible consequences which result from this view in the mathematical sphere will reproduce themselves when it is applied to physical bodies, but there will be difficulties in physics which are not present in mathematics; for mathematics deals with an abstract and physics with a more concrete object. There are many attributes necessarily present in physical bodies which are necessarily excluded by indivisibility; all attributes, in fact, which are divisible.² There can be nothing divisible in an indivisible thing, but the attributes of bodies are all divisible in one of two ways. They are divisible into kinds, as colour is divided into white and black, and they are divisible per accidens when that which has them is divisible. In this latter sense attributes which are simple³ are nevertheless divisible. Attributes of this kind will serve, therefore, to illustrate the impossibility of the view. It is impossible, if two parts of a thing have no weight, that the two together should have weight. But either all perceptible bodies or some, such as earth and water, have weight, as these thinkers would themselves admit. Now if the point has no weight, clearly the lines have not either, and, if they have not, neither have the planes. Therefore no body has weight. It is, further, manifest that their point cannot have

¹ Phys. VI. i.
² The reading διαιρέτων, though preserved only in one rather inferior manuscript, must be preferred on grounds of sense to the διδαιρέτων of the other manuscripts. The silence of Simplicius seems to corroborate the reading διαιρέτων. Possibly the clause is a gloss.
³ i.e. not divisible into kinds.
weight. For while a heavy thing may always be heavier than something and a light thing lighter than something, a thing which is heavier or lighter than something need not be itself heavy or light, just as a large thing is larger than others, but what is larger is not always large. A thing which, judged absolutely, is small may none the less be larger than other things. Whatever, then, is heavy and also heavier than something else, must exceed this by something which is heavy. A heavy thing therefore is always divisible. But it is common ground that a point is indivisible. Again, suppose that what is heavy is a dense body, and what is light rare. Dense differs from rare in containing more matter in the same cubic area. A point, then, if it may be heavy or light, may be dense or rare. But the dense is divisible while a point is indivisible. And if what is heavy must be either hard or soft, an impossible consequence is easy to draw. For a thing is soft if its surface can be pressed in, hard if it cannot; and if it can be pressed in it is divisible.

Moreover, no weight can consist of parts not possessing weight. For how, except by the merest fiction, can they specify the number and character of the parts which will produce weight? And, further, when one weight is greater than another, the difference is a third weight; from which it will follow that every indivisible part possesses weight. For suppose that a body of four points possesses weight. A body composed of more than four points will be superior in weight to it, a thing which has weight. But the difference between weight and weight must be a weight, as the difference between white and whiter is white. Here the difference which makes the superior weight heavier is the single point which remains when the common number, four, is subtracted. A single point, therefore, has weight.

Further, to assume, on the one hand, that the planes can

1 Prantl’s conjecture ἑ τοῦ ὄστρακου is unsatisfactory. The alternatives are (1) to keep the reading of the manuscripts (ἑ τοῦ ὄστρακου), (2) to read τοῦ ὄστρακου, omitting ἑ. In the latter case the sense remains the same but the construction becomes rather easier.

2 Prantl’s conjectural duplication of the words μᾶ ἄρχων τριγύρων, though harmless, is unnecessary.
only be put in linear contact would be ridiculous. For just as there are two ways of putting lines together, namely, end to end and side by side, so there must be two ways of putting planes together. Lines can be put together so that contact is linear by laying one along the other, though not by putting them end to end. But if, similarly, in putting the planes together, superficial contact is allowed as an alternative to linear, that method will give them bodies which are not any element nor composed of elements. Again, if it is the number of planes in a body that makes one heavier than another, as the Timaeus explains, clearly the line and the point will have weight. For the three cases are, as we said before, analogous. But if the reason of differences of weight is not this, but rather the heaviness of earth and the lightness of fire, then some of the planes will be light and others heavy (which involves a similar distinction in the lines and the points); the earth-plane, I mean, will be heavier than the fire-plane. In general, the result is either that there is no magnitude at all, or that all magnitude could be done away with. For a point is to a line as a line is to a plane and as a plane is to a body. Now the various forms in passing into one another will each be resolved into its ultimate constituents. It might happen therefore that nothing existed except points, and that there was no body at all. A further consideration is that if time is similarly constituted, there would be, or might be, a time at which it was done away with. For the indivisible now is like a point in a line. The same consequences follow from composing the heaven of numbers, as some of the Pythagoreans do who make all nature out of numbers. For natural bodies are manifestly endowed with weight and lightness, but an assemblage of units can neither be composed to form a body nor possess weight.

1 i.e. so as to form pyramids, cubes, &c.
2 Grammar requires the readings ἐπιτεθέμενη, προστιθέμενη instead of the ἐπιτεθέμενυ, προστιθεμένυ of all manuscripts but one (M).
3 Because they will not be pyramids or instances of any other recognized figure.
4 Omitting the τά before τῶν ἐπιτεθέων, which got into E by a simple dittography and is found in no other manuscript.
5 Plato, Tim. 56 B.
6 i.e. point : line :: line : plane :: plane : body (as below).
The necessity that each of the simple bodies should have a natural movement may be shown as follows. They manifestly move, and if they have no proper movement they must move by constraint: and the constrained is the same as the unnatural. Now an unnatural movement presupposes a natural movement which it contravenes, and which, however ever many the unnatural movements, is always one. For naturally a thing moves in one way, while its unnatural movements are manifold. The same may be shown from the fact of rest. Rest, also, must either be constrained or natural, constrained in a place to which movement was constrained, natural in a place movement to which was natural. Now manifestly there is a body which is at rest at the centre. If then this rest is natural to it, clearly motion to this place is natural to it. If, on the other hand, its rest is constrained, what is hindering its motion? Something, perhaps, which is at rest: but if so, we shall simply repeat the same argument; and either we shall come to an ultimate something to which rest where it is natural, or we shall have an infinite process, which is impossible. The hindrance to its movement, then, we will suppose, is a moving thing—as Empedocles says that it is the vortex which keeps the earth still: but in that case we ask, where would it have moved to but for the vortex? It could not move infinitely; for to traverse an infinite is impossible, and impossibilities do not happen. So the moving thing must stop somewhere, and there rest not by constraint but naturally. But a natural rest proves a natural movement

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1 This is in verbal contradiction with the doctrine of Book I, which asserts that the unnatural movement is single since it is the contrary of the natural, which is single. But it is not difficult to conceive of all movements of a body divergent from the one natural path as unnatural according to the degree of their divergence, even though, strictly construed, the unnatural path is also one.

2 This question, though relevant to the general problem, is not specially relevant to the hypothesis that the obstacle is in movement. There is therefore something to be said for an interpretation which, like that attributed by Simplicius to Alexander, makes the question refer to the supposed moving obstacle instead of to the earth. But Alexander’s interpretation turns out on examination to create more difficulties than it removes: and there is no great objection, after all, to supposing that Aristotle refutes the second alternative by an argument which refutes both.
Plato, and Yet the oo ao 10 ao 15 25 30 b to a who by the one to of the difficulty have as prime shows if the movement, which the constrained contravenes, and the prime mover must cause motion not by constraint but naturally. If there is no ultimate natural cause of movement and each preceding term in the series is always moved by constraint, we shall have an infinite process. The same difficulty is involved even if it is supposed, as we read in the Timaeus, 1 that before the ordered world was made the elements moved without order. Their movement must have been due either to constraint or to their nature. And if their movement was natural, a moment’s consideration shows that there was already an ordered world. For the prime mover must cause motion in virtue of its own natural movement, 2 and the other bodies, moving without constraint, as they came to rest in their proper places, would fall into the order in which they now stand, the heavy bodies moving towards the centre and the light bodies away from it. But that is the order of their distribution in our world. There is a further question, too, which might be asked. Is it possible or impossible that bodies in unordered movement should combine in some cases into combinations like those of which bodies of nature’s composing are composed, such, I mean, as bones and flesh? Yet this is what Empedocles asserts to have occurred under Love. ‘Many a head,’ says

1 Plato, Tim. 30 a.
2 Taking the reading for which Alexander argued—κυνείν αὐτὸ κυνομεν κατὰ φύσιν. I should put a comma after κυνείν and take κατὰ φ. with κυνομεν. The hypothesis is that the elements have their natural movements; and the dependent clause αὐτὸ κυν. κ. φ. applies this hypothesis to the prime mover, as τὰ κυνομενα υπ’ ἑαυτου applies it to the other bodies. Aristotle shows that, on this hypothesis, the present world-order would exist: the prime mover would be imparting movement to the bodies within it, as it does now, and the four elements would be moving towards or resting in their proper places, as now. If αὐτὸ is read, we have a more disputable description of this κόσμος and less use for the words κυνομεν κατὰ φύσιν. αὐτὸ is said to be the reading of the manuscripts, but neither copyists nor collators are to be trusted with a breathing. J has αὐτὸ (sic).
he, 'came to birth without a neck.'

The answer to the view that there are infinite bodies moving in an infinite is that, if the cause of movement is single, they must move with a single motion, and therefore not without order; and if, on the other hand, the causes are of infinite variety, their motions too must be infinitely varied. For a finite number of causes would produce a kind of order, since absence of order is not proved by diversity of direction in motions: indeed, in the world we know, not all bodies, but only bodies of the same kind, have a common goal of movement. Again, disorderly movement means in reality unnatural movement, since the order proper to perceptible things is their nature. And there is also absurdity and impossibility in the notion that the disorderly movement is infinitely continued. For the nature of things is the nature which most of them possess for most of the time. Thus their view brings them into the contrary position that disorder is natural, and order or system unnatural. But no natural fact can originate in chance. This is a point which Anaxagoras seems to have thoroughly grasped; for he starts his cosmogony from unmoved things. The others, it is true, make things collect together somehow before they try to produce motion and separation. But there is no sense in starting generation from an original state in which bodies are separated and in movement. Hence Empedocles begins after the process ruled by Love: for he could not have constructed the heaven by building it up out of bodies in separation, making them to combine by the power of Love, since our world has its constituent elements in separation, and therefore presupposes a previous state of unity and combination.

These arguments make it plain that every body has its natural movement, which is not constrained or contrary to its nature. We go on to show that there are certain bodies

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1 Emped. fr. 57, l. 1 (Diels, Vors. 245, 20).
2 Reading συμβαίνει, with HMJ, for συμβαίνειν.
3 Putting a comma instead of a full-stop after στοιχείων (l. 19).
4 The proposition to be proved is that some bodies have necessarily this kind of impetus. The introduction of necessity shows that we are dealing with a universal. Below in 301b 16, and again in 301b 30, we
whose necessary impetus is that of weight and lightness. Of necessity, we assert, they must move, and a moved thing which has no natural impetus cannot move either towards or away from the centre. Suppose a body $A$ without weight, and a body $B$ endowed with weight. Suppose the weightless body to move the distance $CD$, while $B$ in the same time moves the distance $CE$, which will be greater since the heavy thing must move further. Let the heavy body then be divided in the proportion $CE:CD$ (for there is no reason why a part of $B$ should not stand in this relation to the whole). Now if the whole moves the whole distance $CE$, the part must in the same time move the distance $CD$. A weightless body, therefore, and one which has weight will move the same distance, which is impossible. And the same argument would fit the case of lightness. Again, a body which is in motion but has neither weight nor lightness, must be moved by constraint, and must continue its constrained movement infinitely. For there will be a force which moves it, and the smaller and lighter a body is the further will a given force move it. Now let $A$, the weightless body, be moved the distance $CE$, and $B$, which has weight, be moved in the same time the distance $CD$. Dividing the heavy body in the proportion $CE:CD$, we subtract from the heavy body a part which will in the same time move the distance $CE$, since the whole moved $CD$: for the relative speeds of the two bodies will be in inverse ratio to their respective sizes. Thus the weightless body will move the same distance as the heavy in the same time. But this is impossible. Hence, since the motion of the weightless body will cover a greater distance than any that is suggested, it will continue infinitely. It is therefore obvious that every body must have a definite weight or are told that every body is either light or heavy. Aristotle's readers would of course understand that the disjunction only applied universally 'beneath the moon'. The more cautious statement in this passage allows for the exception of the heavenly body.

1 Reading προτεϑέντος, which is given by all manuscripts except M and by Simplicius.

2 i.e. not infinite. διωρισμένον is here equivalent to ὑπωρισμένον. A similar tendency is observable in other derivatives of διορίζων, e.g. ἄδιωρίστος. Alexander and Simplicius made great, but not very
lightness. But since 'nature' means a source of movement within the thing itself, while a force is a source of movement in something other than it or in itself quâ other,\(^1\) and since movement is always due either to nature or to constraint, movement which is natural, as downward movement is to a stone, will be merely accelerated by an external force, while an unnatural movement will be due to the force alone.\(^2\) In either case the air is as it were instrumental to the force. For air is both light and heavy, and thus quâ light produces upward motion, being propelled and set in motion by the force, and quâ heavy produces a downward motion. In either case the force transmits the movement to the body by first, as it were, impregnating the air.\(^3\)

That is why a body moved by constraint continues to move when that which gave the impulse ceases to accompany it. Otherwise, i.e. if the air were not endowed with this function, constrained movement would be impossible. And the natural movement of a body may be helped on in the same way. This discussion suffices to show\(^4\) (1) that all bodies are either light or heavy, and (2) how unnatural movement takes place.

From what has been said earlier\(^5\) it is plain that there successful efforts to interpret the word as qualifying 'body': they do not consider the possibility of its qualifying βάρος ἡ κοινότητα. Probably their manuscripts, like FHMJ, had τὸ before διωμισμένον, which would make it difficult or impossible to take διωμισμένον in that way.

\(^1\) Reading ἡ ἡ ἀλλο. It looks as if Simplicius had this reading (see critical note to Heiberg’s edition, p. 595, 22): his interpretation requires it.

\(^2\) Reading χάρτω in l. 20, with all manuscripts except F and with Simplicius. αὐτή in 22 is somewhat vague in reference, but must stand for ἡ δύναμις αὐτή.

\(^3\) ll. 23-5, πέφυκε . . . βαρύς, are grammatically a parenthesis, and should be so printed, with a colon in 23 after βαρύς. For the doctrine cf. Phys. IV. 8 and VIII. 10.

\(^4\) Simplicius and Alexander, with three of our manuscripts (FHM), have ἐν τούτοις for ἐκ τούτων. ἐν τούτοις would go with ἔχοντι rather than with φανερῶν, qualifying the application of the second clause. The qualification, however, cannot be made very precise, and it is best to follow the other three manuscripts.

\(^5\) The γάρ which introduces the next sentence shows that the justification of the statement is to come. The thesis follows from what was 'said earlier', because in Phys. IV. 6-9 the hypothesis of a void was investigated and refuted, and it is here shown that absolute generation, or generation of body out of not-body, requires a void.
cannot be generation either of everything or in an absolute sense of anything. It is impossible that everything should be generated, unless an extra-corporeal void is possible. For, assuming generation, the place which is to be occupied by that which is coming to be, must have been previously occupied by void in which no body was. Now it is quite possible for one body to be generated out of another, air for instance out of fire, but in the absence of any pre-existing mass generation is impossible. That which is potentially a certain kind of body may, it is true, become such in actuality. But if the potential body was not already in actuality some other kind of body, the existence of an extra-corporeal void must be admitted.

10 It remains to say what bodies are subject to generation, and why. Since in every case knowledge depends on what is primary, and the elements are the primary constituents of bodies, we must ask which of such bodies are elements, and why; and after that what is their number and character. The answer will be plain if we first explain what kind of substance an element is. An element, we take it, is a body into which other bodies may be analysed, present in them potentially or in actuality (which of these, is still disputable), and not itself divisible into bodies different in form. That, or something like it, is what all men in every case mean by element. Now if what we have described is an element, clearly there must be such bodies. For flesh and wood and all other similar bodies contain potentially fire and earth, since one sees these elements exuded from them; and, on the other hand, neither in potentiality nor in actuality does fire contain flesh or wood, or it would exude them.

The nature of the heavenly body and the views of Parmenides and Melissus, referred to by Simplicius, are not here in point. 
1 i.e. a void outside bodies, as distinct from the fragments of void which are supposed to be distributed throughout the texture of every body. Simplicius attributes the distinction of two kinds of void to the authors of the theory themselves.
2 Reading in l. 2 τὸ γίνόμενον, εἰ ἐγένετο with Bekker. The manuscripts are confused, and offer many variants.
3 viz. bodies subject to generation. We read τοία τῶν τοιούτων with the manuscripts, taking τῶν τοιούτων as a partitive genitive (after Simplicius).
Similarly, even if there were only one elementary body, it would not contain them. For though it will be either flesh or bone or something else, that does not at once show that it contained these in potentiality: the further question remains, in what manner it becomes them. Now Anaxagoras opposes Empedocles' view of the elements. Empedocles says that fire and earth and the related bodies are elementary bodies of which all things are composed; but this Anaxagoras denies. His elements are the homoeomerous things, viz. flesh, bone, and the like. Earth and fire are mixtures, composed of them and all the other seeds, each consisting of a collection of all the homoeomerous bodies, separately invisible; and that explains why from these two bodies all others are generated. (To him fire and aither are the same thing.) But since every natural body has its proper movement, and movements are either simple or mixed, mixed in mixed bodies and simple in simple, there must obviously be simple bodies; for there are simple movements. It is plain, then, that there are elements, and why.

The next question to consider is whether the elements are finite or infinite in number, and, if finite, what their number is. Let us first show reason for denying that their number is infinite, as some suppose. We begin with the view of Anaxagoras that all the homoeomerous bodies are elements. Any one who adopts this view misapprehends the meaning of element. Observation shows that even mixed bodies are often divisible into homoeomerous parts; examples are flesh, bone, wood, and stone. Since then the composite

1 'Homoeomerous' means 'having parts like one another and like the whole of which they are parts'. Some confusion is here caused by the fact that Aristotle sometimes uses 'homoeomerous' as an attribute of the parts of a homoeomerous whole, i.e. as meaning 'like one another and like the whole of which they are parts'. That is what he means when he says of a body (302b16) that it is 'divisible into homoeomerous parts' or (ib. 25) that it is 'composed of homoeomerous bodies'. The use of the term λεπτομερές (= μικρομερές) is complicated by a similar transference from whole to part (cp. 304b9, note).


3 τούς ... ποιοντας must be construed (by a kind of zeugma) with θηρίουν.
cannot be an element, not every homoeomerous body can be an element; only, as we said before,\(^1\) that which is not divisible into bodies different in form.\(^2\) But even taking ‘element’ as they do, they need not assert an infinity of elements, since the hypothesis of a finite number will give identical results. Indeed even two or three such bodies serve the purpose as well, as Empedocles’ attempt shows. Again, even on their view it turns out that all things are not composed of homoeomerous bodies. They do not pretend that a face is composed of faces, or that any other natural conformation is composed of parts like itself.\(^3\) Obviously then it would be better to assume a finite number of principles. They should, in fact, be as few as possible, consistently with proving what has to be proved. This is the common demand of mathematicians, who always assume as principles things finite either in kind or in number.\(^4\) Again, if body is distinguished from body by the appropriate qualitative difference, and there is a limit to the number of differences (for the difference lies in qualities apprehended by sense, which are in fact finite in number, though this requires proof\(^5\)), then manifestly there is necessarily a limit to the number of elements.

There is, further, another view—that of Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera—the implications of which are also

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\(^1\) Above, 302\(^a\) 18.

\(^2\) ‘Divisible into homoeomerous parts’ = ‘homoeomerous wholes’ (cp. note on ‘homoeomerous’ at 302\(^a\) 31). The argument is therefore as follows: ‘homoeomerous’ includes mixed as well as simple bodies; but any one who understood the meaning of the term ‘element’ would have seen that a mixed body cannot be an element: instead of regarding all homoeomerous bodies as elements, he would have confined the term to such homoeomerous bodies as are simple.—As an argument against Anaxagoras this is ineffective; for he \(a\) denied that flesh, bone, &c., are mixed; \(b\) denied that earth, air, fire, and water—cited by Simplicius as simple and homoeomerous—are simple. Aristotle is content to argue from what he regards as established fact, whether Anaxagoras admits it or not. Anaxagoras would have claimed that the suggested criterion of indivisibility \(\text{καρτ' \ epsilon was satisfied by his \(\text{ομοιωμερην} \), and could therefore plead not guilty to the charge of misapprehending the meaning of 'element'}.\)

\(^3\) All bodies should be either elements or composed of elements. But Anaxagoras, though he makes his elements infinite, is still not able to show that every whole is composed of parts like itself.

\(^4\) Reading τά πεπερασμένα (so J, as well as three of Bekker’s manuscripts).

\(^5\) The proof of the proposition is given in *De Sensu*, 6 (445\(^b\) 20 ff.).
unacceptable. The primary masses, according to them,\textsuperscript{5} are infinite in number and indivisible in mass: one cannot turn into many nor many into one; and all things are generated by their combination and involution. Now this view in a sense makes things out to be numbers or composed of numbers.\textsuperscript{1} The exposition is not clear, but this is its\textsuperscript{10} real meaning. And further, they say that since the atomic bodies differ in shape, and there is an infinity of shapes, there is an infinity of simple bodies. But they have never explained in detail the shapes of the various elements, except so far as to allot the sphere to fire. Air, water,\textsuperscript{15} and the rest they distinguished by the relative size of the atom, assuming that the atomic substance was a sort of master-seed for each and every element. Now, in the first place, they make the mistake already noticed. The principles which they assume are not limited in number, though such limitation would necessitate no other alteration in their theory. Further, if the differences of bodies are not infinite, plainly the elements will not be\textsuperscript{20} an infinity.\textsuperscript{2} Besides, a view which asserts atomic bodies must needs come into conflict with the mathematical sciences, in addition to invalidating many common opinions and apparent data of sense perception. But of these things we have already spoken in our discussion of time and movement.\textsuperscript{3} They are also bound to contradict themselves.\textsuperscript{25} For if the elements are atomic, air, earth, and water cannot be differentiated by the relative sizes of their atoms, since then they could not be generated out of one another. The extrusion of the largest atoms is a process that will in time exhaust the supply; and it is by such a process that they account for the generation of water, air, and earth from one another.\textsuperscript{4} Again, even on their own presuppositions it does\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{1} Because the atom is practically a mathematical unit, out of which bodies are formed by simple addition. \textit{Cp. Met. Z. 13, 1039\textsuperscript{a} 3 ff.}

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Cp. 303\textsuperscript{a} 1.}

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Esp. Phys. VI. 1-2 (231\textsuperscript{a} 18 ff.).}

\textsuperscript{4} Suppose water is being formed out of air; and suppose that the water-atom is larger than the air-atom: what is required on this theory is the extrusion from the air of the larger atoms. Conversely, if air were being formed out of water, the smaller atoms would be extruded from the water. But the supply of large (or small) atoms will soon run out, and air not reducible to water (or water not reducible to air) will be left.
not seem as if the elements would be infinite in number. The atoms differ in figure, and all figures are composed of pyramids, rectilinear in the case of rectilinear figures, while the sphere has eight pyramidal parts. The figures must have their principles, and, whether these are one or two or more, the simple bodies must be the same in number as they. Again, if every element has its proper movement, and a simple body has a simple movement, and the number of simple movements is not infinite, because the simple motions are only two and the number of places is not infinite, on these grounds also we should have to deny that the number of elements is infinite.

Since the number of the elements must be limited, it remains to inquire whether there is more than one element. Some assume one only, which is according to some water, to others air, to others fire, to others again something finer than water and denser than air, an infinite body—so they say—embracing all the heavens.

Now those who decide for a single element, which is either water or air or a body finer than water and denser than air, and proceed to generate other things out of it by use of the attributes density and rarity, all alike fail to observe the fact that they are depriving the element of its priority. Generation out of the elements is, as they say, synthesis, and generation into the elements is analysis,

1 The pyramids are tetrahedrons; and those produced by triple section of a sphere are irregular, having a spherical base.
2 i.e. there must be a limited number of primary figures to which all other figures are reducible.
3 There are only two places to which movement can be directed, viz. the circumference and the centre. By the two simple motions Aristotle probably here means motions towards these two places, motion up and motion down. Circular motion is not possible beneath the moon.
4 Thales and Hippon.
5 Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia.
6 Heracleitus and Hippasus: but see below, 304a18, note.
7 Anaximander. This identification has been rejected by many modern scholars. See Bonitz, Ind. 50a33, Diels, Vors.18, 10 and 416, 1, Burnet, E.G.P.5 § 15. Diels follows Zeller in attributing the view to a certain Idaïos of Himera, whom Aristotle never mentions by name and of whom hardly anything is known. Burnet refers the passage to Anaximander.
so that the body with the finer parts must have priority in the order of nature. But they say that fire is of all bodies the finest. Hence fire will be first in the natural order. And whether the finest body is fire or not makes no difference; anyhow it must be one of the other bodies that is primary and not that which is intermediate.\(^1\) Again, density and rarity, as instruments of generation, are equivalent to fineness and coarseness, since the fine is rare, and coarse in their use means dense. But fineness and coarseness, again, are equivalent to greatness and smallness, since a thing with small parts is fine and a thing with large parts coarse. For that which spreads itself out widely is fine, and a thing composed of small parts is so spread out. In the end, then, they distinguish the various other substances from the element by the greatness and smallness of their parts. This method of distinction makes all judgement relative. There will be no absolute distinction between fire, water, and air, but one and the same body will be relatively to this fire, relatively to something else air.\(^2\) The same difficulty is involved equally in the view which recognizes several elements and distinguishes them by their greatness and smallness. The principle of distinction between bodies being quantity, the various sizes will be in a definite ratio, and whatever bodies are in this ratio to one another must be air, fire, earth, and water respectively. For the ratios of smaller bodies may be repeated among greater bodies.\(^3\)

Those who start from fire as the single element, while avoiding this difficulty, involve themselves in many others. Some of them give fire a particular shape, like those who make it a pyramid, and this on one of two grounds. The reason given may be—more crudely—that the pyramid is the most piercing of figures as fire is of bodies,\(^4\) or—more

\(^1\) i.e. the rarest or finest body is the true element, as being the true starting-point of the process of generation or synthesis; and a body denser than fire and rarer than earth, like air or water, or finer than water and denser than air, like Anaximander’s infinite, will not do.

\(^2\) For the attributes great and small belong to the category of relation (\textit{Cat.} 5\(^b\) 10ff.).

\(^3\) i.e. what is really asserted is a ratio, and ratio is independent of size.

\(^4\) Simplicius observes that the argument is justly called crude, since
ingeniously—the position may be supported by the follow-
ing argument. As all bodies are composed of that which
has the finest parts, so all solid figures are composed of
pyramids: but the finest body is fire, while among figures
the pyramid is primary and has the smallest parts;¹ and
the primary body must have the primary figure: therefore
fire will be a pyramid.² Others, again, express no opinion on
the subject of its figure, but simply regard it as the body
of the finest parts, which in combination will form other
bodies, as the fusing of gold-dust produces solid gold.
Both of these views involve the same difficulties. For (1)
if, on the one hand, they make the primary body an atom,
the view will be open to the objections already advanced
against the atomic theory. And further the theory is incon-
sistent with a regard for the facts of nature. For if all
bodies are quantitatively commensurable, and the relative
size of the various homoeomerous masses and of their
several elements are in the same ratio, so that the total
mass of water,³ for instance, is related to the total mass
of air as the elements of each are to one another, and
so on, and if there is more air than water and, generally,
more of the finer body than of the coarser, obviously the
element of water will be smaller than that of air.⁴ But
the lesser quantity is contained in the greater. Therefore

it involves an undistributed middle: 'fire is piercing', 'the pyramid
is piercing': they attempt to draw an affirmative conclusion in the
second figure.

¹ Reading μικρομεριστατον with FHMJ. The word is used as
equivalent to λεπτομεριστατον, which is the reading of EL and (prob-
ably) of Simplicius.—The pyramid is presumably said to have the
smallest parts because it contains fewer of the primary triangles than
any other regular solid. But the assertion is not thereby justified.
Given a certain size of triangle, the pyramid would be the smallest of
the solids in cubic content; thus the body composed of pyramids
would be the body with the smallest parts. The epithet λεπτομερες,
in short, seems to be transferred from the whole to the part, just as
δρωμομερες was (above, 302a 31, note).

² To whom is this 'more ingenious' version to be attributed?
'Heracleitus made fire the universal element but did not say it was
a pyramid, and the Pythagoreans, who said that fire was composed
of pyramids, did not make it the universal element' (Simpl.).

³ Perhaps οὐον το should be read for οἴον τά.

⁴ The ascertained fact on which this argument is based is that
when (e.g.) water turns into air, the volume of the resultant air is
the air element is divisible. And the same could be shown of fire and of all bodies whose parts are relatively fine. (2) If, on the other hand, the primary body is divisible, then (a) those who give fire a special shape will have to say that a part of fire is not fire, because a pyramid is not composed of pyramids, ¹ and also that not every body is either an element or composed of elements, since a part of fire will be neither fire nor any other element. And (b) those whose ground of distinction is size will have to recognize an element prior to the element, a regress which continues infinitely, since every body is divisible and that which has the smallest parts is the element.² Further, they too will have to say that the same body is relatively to this fire and relatively to that air, to others again water and earth.

The common error of all views which assume a single element is that they allow only one natural movement, which is the same for every body. For it is a matter of observation that a natural body possesses a principle of movement. If then all bodies are one, all will have one movement. With this motion the greater their quantity the more they will move, just as fire, in proportion as its quantity is greater, moves faster with the upward motion which belongs to it. But the fact is that increase of quantity makes many things move the faster downward. For these reasons, then, as well as from the distinction already established ³ of a plurality of natural movements, it is impossible that there should be only one element. But if the elements are not an infinity and not reducible to one, they must be several and finite in number.

greater than that of the original water. This increase of volume can only be accounted for (since the hypothesis of a void has been refuted) by supposing an increase in the volume of the atom proportionate to the observed increase in the volume of the total mass. But the enlarged atom would be divisible, and therefore no atom.

¹ i.e. a pyramid cannot be divided so that every part is a pyramid.
² If every body is infinitely divisible, it is difficult to give a precise meaning to 'that which has the smallest parts'. Further, the phrase, as used, is somewhat illogical; for the argument would point to the smallest part of any body, rather than the body with the smallest parts, as the element. But the use of leptouμέρες (and μικρομερείς) as an epithet of the part instead of the whole occurs elsewhere (cf. note on 304a 16).
³ Book I, c. ii.
First we must inquire whether the elements are eternal or subject to generation and destruction; for when this question has been answered their number and character will be manifest. In the first place, they cannot be eternal. It is a matter of observation that fire, water, and every simple body undergo a process of analysis, which must either continue infinitely or stop somewhere. (1) Suppose it infinite. Then the time occupied by the process will be infinite, and also that occupied by the reverse process of synthesis. For the processes of analysis and synthesis succeed one another in the various parts. It will follow that there are two infinite times which are mutually exclusive, the time occupied by the synthesis, which is infinite, being preceded by the period of analysis. There are thus two mutually exclusive infinites, which is impossible. (2) Suppose, on the other hand, that the analysis stops somewhere. Then the body at which it stops will be either atomic or, as Empedocles seems to have intended, a divisible body which will yet never be divided. The foregoing arguments show that it cannot be an atom; but neither can it be a divisible body which analysis will never reach. For a smaller body is more easily destroyed than a larger; and a destructive process which succeeds in destroying, that is, in resolving into smaller bodies, a body of some size, cannot reasonably be expected to fail with the smaller body. Now in fire we observe a destruction of two kinds: it is destroyed by its contrary when it is quenched, and by itself when it dies out. But the effect is produced by a greater quantity upon a lesser, and the more quickly the smaller it is. The elements of bodies must therefore be subject to destruction and generation.

Since they are generated, they must be generated either from something incorporeal or from a body, and if from a body, either from one another or from something else. The theory which generates them from something in-

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1 Reading ἄνυγκη δὲ with the MSS.  
2 c. iv.  
3 i.e. it may die out 'of itself'. Aristotle does not develop this, but his point is only the simple one that the smaller the fire is, the sooner, by either process, it is destroyed.
corporeal requires an extra-corporeal void. For everything that comes to be comes to be in something, and that in which the generation takes place must either be incorporeal or possess body; and if it has body, there will be two bodies in the same place at the same time, viz. that which is coming to be and that which was previously there, while if it is incorporeal, there must be an extra-corporeal void. But we have already shown that this is impossible. But, on the other hand, it is equally impossible that the elements should be generated from some kind of body. That would involve a body distinct from the elements and prior to them. But if this body possesses weight or lightness, it will be one of the elements; and if it has no tendency to movement, it will be an immovable or mathematical entity, and therefore not in a place at all. A place in which a thing is at rest is a place in which it might move, either by constraint, i.e. unnaturally, or in the absence of constraint, i.e. naturally. If, then, it is in a place and somewhere, it will be one of the elements; and if it is not in a place, nothing can come from it, since that which comes into being and that out of which it comes must needs be together. The elements therefore cannot be generated from something incorporeal nor from a body which is not an element, and the only remaining alternative is that they are generated from one another.

7 We must, therefore, turn to the question, what is the manner of their generation from one another? Is it as Empedocles and Democritus say, or as those who resolve bodies into planes say, or is there yet another possibility?

1 γεννώμενος is found only in EL, and the other four manuscripts offer no substitute. It was clearly not in Simplicius' text. κεχωρισμένοι, or another word of similar meaning, must be read.

2 The words ἐν τῷ γινομένῳ καί are a conjectural addition suggested by Simplicius (after Alexander). They occur (without the καί) in one of our manuscripts, M, whose original readings are mostly either errors or conjectures. Without these words it is almost impossible to make any sense of the passage; but they are not intrinsically a probable conjecture and are only accepted because a better remedy remains to be suggested.

3 Phys. IV. 8.

4 Placing the comma after ποῦ (l. 29) instead of after τὸ ποῦ (l. 28). To be 'somewhere' is to be 'in a place'.
(1) What the followers of Empedocles do, though without observing it themselves, is to reduce the generation of elements out of one another to an illusion. They make it a process of excretion from a body of what was in it all the time—as though generation required a vessel rather than a material—so that it involves no change of anything. And even if this were accepted, there are other implications equally unsatisfactory. We do not expect a mass of matter to be made heavier by compression. But they will be bound to maintain this, if they say that water is a body present in air and excreted from air, since air becomes heavier when it turns into water. Again, when the mixed body is divided, they can show no reason why one of the constituents must by itself take up more room than the body did: but when water turns into air, the room occupied is increased. The fact is that the finer body takes up more room, as is obvious in any case of transformation. As the liquid is converted into vapour or air the vessel which contains it is often burst because it does not contain room enough. Now, if there is no void at all, and if, as those who take this view say, there is no expansion of bodies, the impossibility of this is manifest: and if there is void and expansion, there is no accounting for the fact that the body which results from division occupies of necessity a greater space. It is inevitable, too, that generation of one out of another should come to a stop, since a finite quantum cannot contain an infinity of finite quanta. When earth produces water something is taken away from the earth, for the process is one of excretion. The same thing happens again when the residue produces water. But this can only go on for ever, if the finite body contains an infinity, which is impossible. Therefore the generation of elements out of one another will not always continue.

1 More accurately, becomes heavy, since air rises and water falls. Lightness is treated here as a low degree of heaviness.
2 The words καθάτερ φαίνοντα to τ. λ. must be taken to refer only to expansion, since Democritus of course believed in a void.
3 In the end the elements will be sorted out, and there will remain several homogeneous masses between which no interchange is possible.
(2) We have now explained that the mutual transformations of the elements cannot take place by means of excretion. The remaining alternative is that they should be generated by changing into one another. And this in one of two ways, either by change of shape, as the same wax takes the shape both of a sphere and of a cube, or, as some assert, by resolution into planes. (a) Generation by change of shape would necessarily involve the assertion of atomic bodies. For if the particles were divisible there would be a part of fire which was not fire and a part of earth which was not earth, for the reason that not every part of a pyramid is a pyramid nor of a cube a cube. But if (b) the process is resolution into planes, the first difficulty is that the elements cannot all be generated out of one another. This they are obliged to assert, and do assert. It is absurd, because it is unreasonable that one element alone should have no part in the transformations, and also contrary to the observed data of sense, according to which all alike change into one another. In fact their explanation of the observations is not consistent with the observations. And the reason is that their ultimate principles are wrongly assumed: they had certain predetermined views, and were resolved to bring everything into line with them. It seems that perceptible things require perceptible principles, eternal things eternal principles, corruptible things corruptible principles; and, in general, every subject matter principles homogeneous with itself. But they, owing to their love for their principles, fall into the attitude of men who undertake the defence of a position in argument. In the confidence that the principles are true they are ready to accept any consequence of their application. As though some principles did not require to be judged from their results, and particularly from their final issue! And that issue, which in the case of productive knowledge is the product, in the knowledge of nature is the unimpeachable evidence of the senses as to each fact.

The result of their view is that earth has the best right to the name element, and is alone indestructible; for that

1 i.e. in the case of art.
which is indissoluble is indestructible and elementary, and earth alone cannot be dissolved into any body but itself. Again, in the case of those elements which do suffer dissolution, the ‘suspension’ of the triangles is unsatisfactory. But this takes place whenever one is dissolved into another, because of the numerical inequality of the triangles which compose them. Further, those who hold these views must needs suppose that generation does not start from a body. For what is generated out of planes cannot be said to have been generated from a body. And they must also assert that not all bodies are divisible, coming thus into conflict with our most accurate sciences, namely the mathematical, which assume that even the intelligible is divisible, while they, in their anxiety to save their hypothesis, cannot even admit this of every perceptible thing. For any one who gives each element a shape of its own, and makes this the ground of distinction between the substances, has to attribute to them indivisibility; since division of a pyramid or a sphere must leave somewhere at least a residue which is not a sphere or a pyramid. Either, then, a part of fire is not fire, so that there is a body prior to the element—for every body is either an element or composed of elements—or not every body is divisible.

In general, the attempt to give a shape to each of the simple bodies is unsound, for the reason, first, that they will not succeed in filling the whole. It is agreed that there are only three plane figures which can fill a space, the triangle, the square, and the hexagon, and only two solids, the pyramid and the cube. But the theory needs more than these because the elements which it recognizes are more in number. Secondly, it is manifest that the simple bodies are often given a shape by the place in which they are included, particularly water and air. In such a case the shape of the element cannot persist; for, if it did, the

1 e.g. the eikosáedrou of water, with its twenty triangles, has to be converted into the ἕξαεδρου of air, with eight triangles. Four of the twenty component triangles of the water-particle will be 'suspended'.

2 Only regular figures are included.
contained mass would not be in continuous contact with the containing body; while, if its shape is changed, it will cease to be water, since the distinctive quality is shape. Clearly, then, their shapes are not fixed. Indeed, nature itself seems to offer corroboration of this theoretical conclusion. Just as in other cases the substratum must be formless and unshapen—for thus the ‘all-receptive’, as we read in the Timaeus, will be best for modelling—so the elements should be conceived as a material for composite things; and that is why they can put off their qualitative distinctions and pass into one another. Further, how can they account for the generation of flesh and bone or any other continuous body? The elements alone cannot produce them because their collocation cannot produce a continuum. Nor can the composition of planes; for this produces the elements themselves, not bodies made up of them. Any one then who insists upon an exact statement of this kind of theory, instead of assenting after a passing glance at it, will see that it removes generation from the world.

Further, the very properties, powers, and motions, to which they paid particular attention in allotting shapes, show the shapes not to be in accord with the bodies. Because fire is mobile and productive of heat and combustion, some made it a sphere, others a pyramid. These shapes, they thought, were the most mobile because they offer the fewest points of contact and are the least stable of any; they were also the most apt to produce warmth and combustion, because the one is angular throughout while the other has the most acute angles, and the angles, they say, produce warmth and combustion. Now, in the first place, with regard to movement both are in error. These may be the figures best adapted to movement; they are

1 Reading αὐτῶν for αὐτοῖς, with LMJ.
2 Plato, Tim. 51 A. At Mr. Ross’s suggestion, I have altered the stopping of the sentence. Delete comma after ἄλλοις (l. 17), and enclose the words μάλαστα γὰρ . . . τὸ πανδεχέσ (ll. 18-19) within brackets.
3 Reading τοῖς τοιούτοις with FHMJ.
4 Prantl’s text (presumably by accident) omits the καὶ before θερμαντικόν.
5 Cf. below, 307a 16.
not, however, well adapted to the movement of fire, which is an upward and rectilinear movement, but rather to that form of circular movement which we call rolling. Earth, again,\textsuperscript{1} they call a cube because it is stable and at rest. But it rests only in its own place, not anywhere; from any other it moves if nothing hinders, and fire and the other bodies do the same. The obvious inference, therefore, is that fire and each several element is in a foreign place a sphere or a pyramid, but in its own a cube. Again, if the possession of angles makes a body produce heat and combustion, every element produces heat, though one may do so more than another. For they all possess angles, the octahedron and dodecahedron as well as the pyramid; and Democritus makes even the sphere a kind of angle, which cuts things because of its mobility.\textsuperscript{2} The difference, then, will be one of degree: and this is plainly false. They must also accept the inference that the mathematical solids produce heat and combustion, since they too possess angles and contain atomic spheres\textsuperscript{3} and pyramids, especially if there are, as they allege, atomic figures.\textsuperscript{4} Anyhow if these functions belong to some of these things and not to others, they should explain the difference, instead of speaking in quite general terms as they do. Again, combustion of a body produces fire, and fire is a sphere or a pyramid. The body, then, is turned into spheres or pyramids. Let us grant that these figures may reasonably be supposed to cut and break up bodies as fire does; still it remains quite inexplicable that a pyramid must needs produce pyramids or a sphere spheres. One might as well postulate that a knife or a saw divides things into knives or saws. It is also ridiculous to think only of division when allotting fire its shape. Fire is generally thought of as combining and connecting rather than as separating.

\textsuperscript{1} Prantl has \textit{εἰςεξερ} for \textit{ἐξερ} by a misprint.
\textsuperscript{2} Though it has a low degree of angularity, it is highly mobile and therefore extremely piercing. But the double \textit{ός} is awkward, and perhaps the tradition is at fault. (J has \textit{τέμνει} \textit{ός} \textit{ἐξίκινθον}, supporting \textit{E} against the other MSS.)
\textsuperscript{3} Prantl's \textit{σφαῖρα} is a misprint for \textit{σφαῖρα}.
\textsuperscript{4} i.e. indivisible units of line, of which the geometrical figures are composed.
For though it separates bodies different in kind, it combines those which are the same; and the combining is essential to it, the functions of connecting and uniting being a mark of fire, while the separating is incidental. For the expulsion of the foreign body is an incident in the compacting of the homogeneous. In choosing the shape, then, they should have thought either of both functions or preferably of the combining function. In addition, since hot and cold are contrary powers, it is impossible to allot any shape to the cold. For the shape given must be the contrary of that given to the hot, but there is no contrariety between figures. That is why they have all left the cold out, though properly either all or none should have their distinguishing figures. Some of them, however, do attempt to explain this power, and they contradict themselves. A body of large particles, they say, is cold because instead of penetrating through the passages it crushes. Clearly, then, that which is hot is that which penetrates these passages, or in other words that which has fine particles. It results that hot and cold are distinguished not by the figure but by the size of the particles. Again, if the pyramids are unequal in size, the large ones will not be fire, and that figure will produce not combustion but its contrary.

From what has been said it is clear that the difference of the elements does not depend upon their shape. Now their most important differences are those of property, function, and power; for every natural body has, we maintain, its own functions, properties, and powers. Our first business, then, will be to speak of these, and that inquiry will enable us to explain the differences of each from each.
BOOK IV

307b We have now to consider the terms 'heavy' and 'light'. We must ask what the bodies so called are, how they are constituted, and what is the reason of their possessing these powers. The consideration of these questions is a proper part of the theory of movement, since we call things heavy and light because they have the power of being moved naturally in a certain way. The activities corresponding to these powers have not been given any name, unless it is thought that 'impetus' is such a name. But because the inquiry into nature is concerned with movement,1 and these things have in themselves some spark (as it were) of movement, all inquirers avail themselves of these powers, though in all but a few cases without exact discrimination.

308a We must then first look at whatever others have said, and formulate the questions which require settlement in the interests of this inquiry, before we go on to state our own view of the matter.

Language recognizes '(a) an absolute, (b) a relative heavy and light. Of two heavy things, such as wood and bronze, we say that the one is relatively light, the other relatively heavy. Our predecessors have not dealt at all with the absolute use of the terms, but only with the relative. I mean, they do not explain what the heavy is or what the light is, but only the relative heaviness and lightness of things possessing weight. This can be made clearer as follows. There are things whose constant nature it is to move away from the centre, while others move constantly towards the centre; and of these movements that which is away from the centre I call upward movement and that which is towards it I call downward movement. (The view, urged by some,2 that there is no up and no down in the heaven, is absurd. There can be, they say, no up and no down, since

1 Read φυσικήν μέν εἶναι (E alone omits μέν).
2 The digression is directed against Plato, Tim. 62e; but the view was held by others besides Timaeus.
the universe is similar every way, and from any point on the earth's surface a man by advancing far enough will come to stand foot to foot with himself. But the extremity of the whole, which we call 'above', is in position above and in nature primary. And since the universe has an extremity and a centre, it must clearly have an up and down. Common usage is thus correct, though inadequate. And the reason of its inadequacy is that men think that the universe is not similar every way. They recognize only the hemisphere which is over us. But if they went on to think of the world as formed on this pattern all round, with a centre identically related to each point on the extremity, they would have to admit that the extremity was above and the centre below.) By absolutely light, then, we mean that which moves upward or to the extremity, and by absolutely heavy that which moves downward or to the centre. By lighter or relatively light we mean that one, of two bodies endowed with weight and equal in bulk, which is exceeded by the other in the speed of its natural downward movement.2

2 Those of our predecessors who have entered upon this inquiry have for the most part spoken of light and heavy things only in the sense in which one of two things both endowed with weight is said to be the lighter. And this treatment they consider a sufficient analysis also of the notions of absolute heaviness and absolute lightness, to which their account does not apply. This, however, will become clearer as we advance. One use of the terms 'lighter' and 'heavier' is that which is set forth in writing in the Timaeus, that the body which is composed of the greater number of identical parts is relatively heavy, while that which is composed of a smaller number is relatively

1 Read ὁλοκερ with FHJM.
2 Accepting Prantl's first correction, ὁ (for ὃ), which seems to be necessary to the sense. His second correction, ἐνεργ (for ἐνεργ), is to be rejected as unnecessary. Bywater (J. of Phil. xxviii, p. 242) suggests ἑαρτενου, keeping ὃ and ἐνεργ; but the phrase, so emended, seems to be descriptive of the heavy rather than of the light.
light. As a larger quantity of lead or of bronze is heavier than a smaller—and this holds good of all homogeneous masses, the superior weight always depending upon a numerical superiority of equal parts—in precisely the same way, they assert, lead is heavier than wood. For all bodies, in spite of the general opinion to the contrary, are composed of identical parts and of a single material. But this analysis says nothing of the absolutely heavy and light. The facts are that fire is always light and moves upward, while earth and all earthly things move downwards or towards the centre. It cannot then be the fewness of the triangles (of which, in their view, all these bodies are composed) which disposes fire to move upward. If it were, the greater the quantity of fire the slower it would move, owing to the increase of weight due to the increased number of triangles. But the palpable fact, on the contrary, is that the greater the quantity, the lighter the mass is and the quicker its upward movement: and, similarly, in the reverse movement from above downward, the small mass will move quicker and the large slower. Further, since to be lighter is to have fewer of these homogeneous parts and to be heavier is to have more, and air, water, and fire are composed of the same triangles, the only difference being in the number of such parts, which must therefore explain any distinction of relatively light and heavy between these bodies, it follows that there must be a certain quantum of air which is heavier than water. But the facts are directly opposed to this. The larger the quantity of air the more readily it moves upward, and any portion of air without exception will rise up out of the water.

So much for one view of the distinction between light and heavy. To others the analysis seems insufficient; and their views on the subject, though they belong to an older generation than ours, have an air of novelty. It is apparent

1 I put a colon in l. 6 after ἐλαστόνων and mark ll. 8−9, ὅμοιος δὲ... ἔστω, as parenthetical. This leaves an asyndeton at ἄντερ in l. 7, but it seems to give the sequence of thought better than the stopping of Bekker and Prantl does.

2 There should be a comma after τριγώνων in l. 15.

3 The atomists, Democritus and Leucippus.
that there are bodies which, when smaller in bulk than others, yet exceed them in weight. It is therefore obviously insufficient to say that bodies of equal weight are composed of an equal number of primary parts: for that would give equality of bulk. Those who maintain that the primary or atomic parts, of which bodies endowed with weight are composed, are planes, cannot so speak without absurdity; but those who regard them as solids are in a better position to assert that of such bodies the larger is the heavier. But since in composite bodies the weight obviously does not correspond in this way to the bulk, the lesser bulk being often superior in weight (as, for instance, if one be wool and the other bronze), there are some who think and say that the cause is to be found elsewhere. The void, they say, which is imprisoned in bodies, lightens them and sometimes makes the larger body the lighter. The reason is that there is more void. And this would also account for the fact that a body composed of a number of solid parts equal to, or even smaller than, that of another is sometimes larger in bulk than it. In short, generally and in every case a body is relatively light when it contains a relatively large amount of void. This is the way they put it themselves, but their account requires an addition. Relative lightness must depend not only on an excess of void, but also on a defect of solid: for if the ratio of solid to void exceeds a certain proportion, the relative lightness will disappear. Thus fire, they say, is the lightest of things just for this reason that it has the most void. But it would follow that a large mass of gold, as containing more void than a small mass of fire, is lighter than it, unless it also contains many times as much solid. The addition is therefore necessary.

Of those who deny the existence of a void some, like Anaxagoras and Empedocles, have not tried to analyse the notions of light and heavy at all; and those who, while still denying the existence of a void, have attempted this, have

1 For, since the planes have no weight, their number cannot affect the weight of a body.
2 Plato, in the Timaeus.
failed to explain why there are bodies which are absolutely heavy and light, or in other words why some move upward and others downward. The fact, again, that the body of greater bulk is sometimes lighter than smaller bodies is one which they have passed over in silence, and what they have said gives no obvious suggestion for reconciling their views with the observed facts.

But those who attribute the lightness of fire to its containing so much void are necessarily involved in practically the same difficulties. For though fire be supposed to contain less solid than any other body, as well as more void, yet there will be a certain quantum of fire in which the amount of solid or plenum is in excess of the solids contained in some small quantity of earth. They may reply that there is an excess of void also. But the question is, how will they discriminate the absolutely heavy? Presumably, either by its excess of solid or by its defect of void. On the former view there could be an amount of earth so small as to contain less solid than a large mass of fire. And similarly, if the distinction rests on the amount of void, there will be a body, lighter than the absolutely light, which nevertheless moves downward as constantly as the other moves upward. But that cannot be so, since the absolutely light is always lighter than bodies which have weight and move downward, while, on the other hand, that which is lighter need not be light, because in common speech we distinguish a lighter and a heavier (viz. water and earth) among bodies endowed with weight. Again, the suggestion of a certain ratio between the void and the solid in a body is no more equal to solving the problem before us. This manner of speaking will issue in a similar impossibility. For any two portions of fire, small or great, will exhibit the same ratio of solid to void; but the upward movement of the greater is quicker than that of the less, just as the downward movement of a mass of gold or lead, or of any other body endowed with weight, is quicker in proportion to its size. This, however, should not be the case if the ratio is the ground of distinction between heavy things and light. There is also an absurdity in attributing
the upward movement of bodies to a void which does not itself move. If, however, it is the nature of a void to move upward and of a plenum to move downward, and therefore each causes a like movement in other things, there was no need to raise the question why composite bodies are some light and some heavy; they had only to explain why these two things are themselves light and heavy respectively, and to give, further, the reason why the plenum and the void are not eternally separated. It is also unreasonable to imagine a place for the void, as if the void were not itself a kind of place. But if the void is to move, it must have a place out of which and into which the change carries it. Also what is the cause of its movement? Not, surely, its voidness: for it is not the void only which is moved, but also the solid.

Similar difficulties are involved in all other methods of distinction, whether they account for the relative lightness and heaviness of bodies by distinctions of size, or proceed on any other principle, so long as they attribute to each the same matter, or even if they recognize more than one matter, so long as that means only a pair of contraries. If there is a single matter, as with those who compose things of triangles, nothing can be absolutely heavy or light: and if there is one matter and its contrary—the void, for instance, and the plenum—no reason can be given for the relative lightness and heaviness of the bodies intermediate between the absolutely light and heavy when compared either with one another or with these themselves. The

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1 Read ἕορς ἐκατέρας. ἐκατέρας is in all MSS. except E, and is implied in Simplicius’ paraphrase.
2 Read αἷτο with FHMJ and the corrector of E. The construction is certainly loose, but the other reading (ἀἷτο) does not give the required sense. To give void a motion is to give it a ‘place’, i.e. a natural place to which it moves. But it is itself nothing but a place where no body is (cf. Phys. IV. 7): and, as Simplicius punningly remarks, ‘it is out of place to give a place a place’ (τοῦ δὲ τῶν τῶν ποιεῖν τῶν ἀτοποτύτων ἔστιν).
3 If movement is natural to both void and solid, the cause of movement must lie in something common to both and not in the peculiar nature of either, i.e. not in voidness or solidity.
4 Aristotle’s argument is that the observed diversity of movement necessarily involves a corresponding diversity of bodies: hence any view which makes the four elements one in substance fails to account
view which bases the distinction upon differences of size is more like a mere fiction than those previously mentioned, but, in that it is able to make distinctions between the four elements, it is in a stronger position for meeting the foregoing difficulties. Since, however, it imagines that these bodies which differ in size are all made of one substance, it implies, equally with the view that there is but one matter, that there is nothing absolutely light and nothing which moves upward (except as being passed by other things or forced up by them); and since a multitude of small atoms are heavier than a few large ones, it will follow that much air or fire is heavier than a little water or earth, which is impossible.

These, then, are the views which have been advanced by others and the terms in which they state them. We may begin our own statement by settling a question which to some has been the main difficulty—the question why some bodies move always and naturally upward and others downward, while others again move both upward and downward. After that we will inquire into light and heavy and the explanation of the various phenomena connected with them. The local movement of each body into its own place must be regarded as similar to what happens in connexion with other forms of generation and change. There for the facts of movement. He here adds that it is not enough to recognize two kinds of substance or two contrary attributes. For there are four bodies to be accounted for. A single pair of opposites may yield an account of fire and earth, but they cannot account also for the ‘intermediate bodies’, water and air. Two pairs of opposites will be required, such as those which he uses himself (warm, cold: dry, moist).—In I. 3 τῶν ἀπλῶν must refer to the things also called τῶν ἀπλῶν βαρέων καὶ κοψφον. Simplicius tells us that Alexander read τῶν ἀπλῶν, but found in some MSS. τῶν ἀπλῶς. ἀπλῶς is tempting, but ἀπλῶν may be allowed to stand: for (a) the absolutely heavy and light are, on the theory criticized, pure solid and pure void respectively: thus τὰ ἀπλῶς are τὰ ἀπλά: (b) all other bodies whatever will be composed of these in combination, and may therefore be opposed to them as composite to simple.

1 Reading τῷ with HMLJ. Simplicius’ paraphrase supports this.

2 i.e. upward movement is either (a) illusory: as all things race downward, some, moving slower, are left behind, and thus appear to move up: or (b) unnatural: due to pressure applied from without by other bodies pushing downward.

3 Prantl misprints γένεται for γίνεται.
are, in fact, three kinds of movement, affecting respectively the size, the form, and the place of a thing, and in each it is observable that change proceeds from a contrary to a contrary or to something intermediate: it is never the change of any chance subject in any chance direction, nor, similarly, is the relation of the mover to its object fortuitous: the thing altered is different from the thing increased, and precisely the same difference holds between that which produces alteration and that which produces increase. In the same manner it must be thought that that which produces local motion and that which is so moved are not fortuitously related. Now, that which produces upward and downward movement is that which produces weight and lightness, and that which is moved is that which is potentially heavy or light, and the movement of each body to its own place is motion towards its own form. (It is best to interpret in this sense the common statement of the older writers that 'like moves to like'. For the words are not in every sense true to fact. If one were to remove the earth to where the moon now is, the various fragments of earth would each move not towards it but to the place in which it now is. In general, when a number of similar and undifferentiated bodies are moved with the same motion this result is necessarily produced, viz. that the place which is the natural goal of the movement of each single part is also that of the whole. But since the place of a thing is the boundary of that which contains it, and the continent of all things that move upward or downward is the extremity and the centre, and this boundary comes to be, in a sense, the form of that which is contained, it is to its like that a body moves when

1 Reading εἰ ὁδὼν εἰς with EL (Simplicius' MSS. had, some εἰ μὲν εἰς, and some εἰ μὲν. J has εἰς ὁδὸν). The apodosis does not begin till 310b 16 τὸ δὲ ἔγραψα, the argument being interrupted by a long note on the meaning of the saying ὃμοιον πρὸς ὃμοιον, which should be marked as a parenthesis.

2 ὀφθ' ἀπὸ ... τὸ πᾶν is explanatory of τοῦτο συμβαίνειν. Grammatically the predicate to be supplied to τὸ πᾶν is πέφυκε φέρεσθαι, though this in the context creates a slight illogicality. Aristotle's point is that a fragment of earth moves to the mass called the earth, not because it loves its like, but per accidens in the effort to reach the centre. It is the effort of numberless such fragments to reach the centre which has formed the mass, not the presence of the mass at the centre which causes the effort.
it moves to its own place. For the successive members of the series 1 are like one another: water, I mean, is like air and air like fire, and between intermediates the relation may be converted, though not between them and the extremes; thus air is like water, but water is like earth. 2 for the relation of each outer body to that which is next within it is that of form to matter. 3) Thus 4 to ask why fire

1 \(\psi \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon\) should be read, with the other MSS. and Simplicius, rather than E's \(\varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon\). Cf. de Gen. et Corr. 331b 4, 26, 34.

2 i.e., though air is like fire, fire is not like air; and though water is like earth, earth is not like water. See next note. Prantl proposes to take \(\mu \varepsilon \sigma \omega \nu \) and \(\delta \kappa \rho \omega \iota \) in l. 13 to mean inner and outer respectively, i.e. to make the former stand for earth and water, the latter for fire and air. His reason is grammatical: \(\mu \varepsilon \sigma \omega \nu\) is in the dative and so are \(\delta \sigma \sigma \iota \) and \(\gamma \gamma\). Thus a construction is provided for \(\mu \varepsilon \sigma \omega \nu\). He omits to observe that \(\tau \omega \iota \delta \delta \) \(\delta \kappa \rho \omega \iota \nu \) of becomes meaningless: which, with the admitted difficulty of taking the terms in this sense, is sufficient reason for rejecting the proposal. It is no doubt due to \(\delta \mu \omicron \omicron \omega \lambda \upsilon\) that \(\mu \varepsilon \sigma \omega \nu\) is in the dative: likeness to a \(\mu \varepsilon \sigma \omega \nu\) is convertible, likeness to an \(\delta \kappa \rho \omega \iota \nu\) not.

3 The connexion is difficult, and may be explained as follows. Aristotle's argument is formally concluded at \(\phi \iota \rho \varepsilon \alpha \theta \mu \) in l. 11 (to its own place'). The 'place' (centre and extremity, as explained) gives form to the body, and the body in reaching its place attains its form, i.e. completes the transition from potentiality to actuality. In a sense, then, if the potential is like the actual, it moves 'to its like'. The \(\gamma \alpha \rho\) in l. 11 forestalls an objection. 'There remain the intermediate bodies: what of them?' These are given form or determined by the extreme bodies, and thus mediately determined by the 'place'. Instead of saying 'are given form' or 'are determined' Aristotle says 'are like'; being entitled to do so by the meaning just given to 'like'. The like to which earth moves is that from which it receives its form, and the like to which water and air move is the extreme body—earth in the one case, fire in the other—from which each receives its form. Thus 'like' means 'receptive of form from'. In this sense water is like air which is like fire, and air is like water which is like earth; but the extremes themselves, earth and fire, are like nothing but their places. The relation of likeness is reciprocal (i.e. determination is mutual) only between the intermediates; and the chain of resemblance breaks off in each direction short of the extreme. Starting from the centre, we find in the three terms, water, air, fire, a gradual approximation (\(\alpha \varepsilon i \tau o \alpha \nu \omega \tau e r \rho o n \ldots\) ) to the form realized in fire; starting from the extremity, we find in the terms air, water, earth, a gradual approximation to the form realized in earth. (Of these two complementary statements Aristotle gives only the first; but the second is necessary to complete the argument.) Therefore the intermediate bodies, as well as the extremes, may be said in moving to their places to attain their form.—The above account agrees in principle with that of Simplicius, who, however, is not very clear. Alexander, he tells us, took another view, based on a different interpretation of \(\alpha \varepsilon i \tau o \alpha \nu \omega \tau e r \rho o n \) \(\kappa \tau \lambda\). As reported the view is not easy to fit into the context.—For the relation of upper to lower bodies, cf. 312a 15 and De Gen. et Corr. 335b 18.

4 Alexander’s \(\delta \eta\) for \(\delta \epsilon\) here, like his \(\tau o n \) \(\alpha \lambda \lambda o n\) for \(\tau o \tau \tau o n\) in l. 22,
moves upward and earth downward is the same as to ask why the healable, when moved and changed quid healable, attains health and not whiteness; and similar questions might be asked concerning any other subject of alteration. Of course the subject of increase, when changed quid in- ceasable, attains not health but a superior size. The same applies in the other cases. One thing changes in quality, another in quantity: and so in place, a light thing goes upward, a heavy thing downward. The only difference is that in the last case, viz. that of the heavy and the light, the bodies are thought to have a spring of change within themselves, while the subjects of healing and increase are thought to be moved purely from without. Sometimes, however, even they change of themselves, i.e. in response to a slight external movement reach health or increase, as the case may be. And since the same thing which is heal- able is also receptive of disease, it depends on whether it is moved quid healable or quid liable to disease whether the motion is towards health or towards disease. But the reason why the heavy and the light appear more than these things to contain within themselves the source of their movements is that their matter is nearest to being. This is indicated by the fact that locomotion belongs to bodies only when isolated from other bodies, and is generated last of the several kinds of movement; in order of being then it will be first. Now whenever air comes into being out of water, light out of heavy, it goes to the upper place. It is forthwith light: becoming is at an end, and in that place it has being. Obviously, then, it is a potentiality,
which, in its passage to actuality, comes into that place and quantity and quality which belong to its actuality.\textsuperscript{1} And the same fact explains why what is already actually fire or earth moves, when nothing obstructs it, towards its own place. For motion is equally immediate in the case of nutriment, when nothing hinders, and in the case of the thing healed, when nothing stays the healing. But the movement is also due to the original creative force and to that which removes the hindrance or off which the moving thing rebounded, as was explained in our opening discussions, where we tried to show how none of these things moves itself.\textsuperscript{2} The reason of the various motions of the various bodies, and the meaning of the motion of a body to its own place, have now been explained.

We have now to speak of the distinctive properties of these bodies and of the various phenomena connected with them. In accordance with general conviction we may distinguish the absolutely heavy, as that which sinks to the bottom of all things, from the absolutely light, which is that which rises to the surface of all things. I use the term 'absolutely', in view of the generic character of 'light' and 'heavy',\textsuperscript{3} in order to confine the application to bodies which do not combine lightness and heaviness. It is apparent, I mean, that fire, in whatever quantity, so long as there is no external obstacle, moves upward, and earth downward; and, if the quantity is increased, the movement is the same, though swifter. But the heaviness and lightness of bodies which combine these qualities is different from this, since while they rise to the surface of some bodies they sink to the bottom of others. Such are air and water. Neither of them is absolutely either light or heavy. Both are lighter than earth—for any portion of either rises to the surface of it—but heavier than fire, since a portion of either, whatever its quantity, sinks to the bottom of fire; compared together, however, the one has absolute weight, the other

\textsuperscript{1} Omitting, with F, the words \( \varepsilon\alpha \varepsilon \theta \omega \nu \), which I assume to have been inserted by some one who mistook \( \omega \upsilon \delta = \upsilon \beta i \) for the genitive of the relative.

\textsuperscript{2} Phys. VII. 1, 241\textsuperscript{b} 24; VIII. 4, 254\textsuperscript{b} 7.

\textsuperscript{3} i.e. because there are distinct species of light and heavy.
absolute lightness, since air in any quantity rises to the surface of water, while water in any quantity sinks to the bottom of air. Now other bodies are severally light and heavy, and evidently in them the attributes are due to the difference of their uncompounded parts: that is to say, according as the one or the other happens to preponderate the bodies will be heavy and light respectively. Therefore we need only speak of these parts, since they are primary and all else consequential: and in so doing we shall be following the advice which we gave to those who attribute heaviness to the presence of plenum and lightness to that of void. It is due to the properties of the elementary bodies that a body which is regarded as light in one place is regarded as heavy in another, and vice versa. In air, for instance, a talent's weight of wood is heavier than a mina of lead, but in water the wood is the lighter. The reason is that all the elements except fire have weight and all but earth lightness. Earth, then, and bodies in which earth preponderates, must needs have weight everywhere, while water is heavy anywhere but in earth, and air is heavy when not in water or earth. In its own place each of these bodies has weight except fire, even air. Of this we have evidence in the fact that a bladder when inflated weighs more than when empty. A body, then, in which air preponderates over earth and water, may well be lighter than something in water and yet heavier than it in air, since such a body does not rise in air but rises to the surface in water.

The following account will make it plain that there is an absolutely light and an absolutely heavy body. And by absolutely light I mean one which of its own nature always moves upward, by absolutely heavy one which of its own nature always moves downward, if no obstacle is in the way. There are, I say, these two kinds of body, and it is not the case, as some maintain, that all bodies have weight.

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1 Above, 309b 20: if they would only give an account of the simple bodies, their questions as to the composite would answer themselves.

2 Read ἔστιν τῶν (E and Simpl. omit τῶν).

3 This view is maintained in its most unqualified form by those (atomists, probably) who distinguish the four elements by the size of their particles (cf. c. ii. 310a 9).
Different views are in fact agreed that there is a heavy body, which moves uniformly towards the centre. But there is also similarly a light body.\(^1\) For we see with our eyes, as we said before,\(^2\) that earthy things sink to the bottom of all things and move towards the centre. But the centre is a fixed point. If therefore there is some body which rises to the surface of all things—and we observe fire to move upward even in air itself, while the air remains at rest\(^3\)—clearly this body is moving towards the extremity. It cannot then have any weight. If it had, there would be another body in which it sank: and if that had weight, there would be yet another which moved to the extremity and thus rose to the surface of all moving things.\(^4\) In fact, however, we have no evidence of such a body. Fire, then, has no weight. Neither has earth any lightness, since it sinks to the bottom of all things, and that which sinks moves to the centre. That there is a centre\(^5\) towards which the motion of heavy things, and away from which that of light things is directed, is manifest in many ways. First, because no movement can continue to infinity. For what cannot be can no more come-to-be than be, and movement is a coming-to-be in one place from another. Secondly, like the upward movement of fire, the downward movement of earth and all heavy things makes equal angles on every side with the earth's surface\(^6\): it must therefore be directed towards the centre. Whether it is really the centre of the earth and not rather that of the whole to which it moves, may be left to another inquiry, since these are coincident.\(^7\)

\(^1\) It cannot be right to print ll. 14–19, \textit{λέγω ὅ... κοῦφων}, as a parenthesis, with Prantl. The sentences are not sufficiently self-contained nor closely enough inter-connected to justify such treatment. The argument which begins in l. 19 with \textit{ὅραμεν γὰρ} is a justification of the statement last preceding: as there is, by general admission and by the evidence of observation, a heavy body, so there is a light body.

\(^2\) Above, 311\(^a\) 20.

\(^3\) Since the air is at rest, the explanation that the fire is 'forced up' (\textit{ἐκθάλαμοιν}, 310\(^a\) 10) is inadmissible.

\(^4\) Reading \textit{ὅ} with the MSS. Prantl's conjecture, \textit{οὐ}, is unnecessary.

\(^5\) Read \textit{ἐστὶ} for \textit{ἐστὶν}.

\(^6\) I.e. the line of movement is at right angles to any tangent. Cf. above, 296\(^b\) 20, 297\(^b\) 19.

\(^7\) The question is discussed in II. xiv, 296\(^b\) 9.
BOOK IV. 4

But since that which sinks to the bottom of all things moves to the centre, necessarily that which rises to the surface moves to the extremity of the region in which the movement of these bodies takes place. For the centre is opposed as contrary to the extremity, as that which sinks is opposed to that which rises to the surface. This also gives a reasonable ground for the duality of heavy and light in the spatial duality centre and extremity. Now there is also the intermediate region to which each name is given in opposition to the other extreme. For that which is intermediate between the two is in a sense both extremity and centre.\(^1\)

For this reason there is another heavy and light; namely, water and air. But in our view the continent pertains to form and the contained to matter: and this distinction is present in every genus.\(^2\)

Alike in the sphere of quality and in that of quantity there is that which corresponds rather to form and that which corresponds to matter. In the same way, among spatial distinctions, the above belongs to the determinate, the below to matter. The same holds, consequently, also of the matter itself of that which is heavy and light: as potentially possessing the one character, it is matter for the heavy, and as potentially possessing the other, for the light. It is the same matter, but its being is different, as that which is receptive of disease is the same as that which is receptive of health, though in being different from it, and therefore diseasedness is different from healthiness.\(^3\)

\(^5\) A thing then which has the one kind of matter is light and always moves upward, while a thing which has the

\(^1\) Read ἐστι γὰρ ὡς, omit ἐστὶ after ἐμφορέων, and put a colon after μεταξύ. \(^1\) (I has an erasure in the position of the second ἐστὶ.)

\(^2\) i.e. in every category. For this use of γένος see Bonitz, Ind. \(^2\) \(15^2\) \(16.\)

\(^3\) The doctrine here expressed is the same as that expressed in the last chapter (\(310^b\) \(15,\) note). A single matter is receptive of two opposed forms, weight and lightness or health and disease. But Aristotle here adds the new point that of two such alternative forms one is always more formal and the other more material. Weight and lightness, disease and health, are not true coordinates. A form, we may say, is realized in disease, in weight, in the female; but the form is realized in health, in lightness, and in the male. The principle is stated in the Metaphysics in the form τῶν ἐναρτίων ἡ εὐέρα συστοίχια στέρησις (\(1004^b\) \(27.\).)

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opposite matter is heavy and always moves downward. Bodies composed of kinds of matter different from these but having relatively to each other the character which these have absolutely, possess both the upward and the downward motion. Hence air and water each have both lightness and weight, and water sinks to the bottom of all things except earth, while air rises to the surface of all things except fire. But since there is one body only which rises to the surface of all things and one only which sinks to the bottom of all things, there must needs be two other bodies which sink in some bodies and rise to the surface of others. The kinds of matter, then, must be as numerous as these bodies, i.e. four, but though they are four there must be a common matter of all—particularly if they pass into one another—which in each is in being different. There is no reason why there should not be one or more intermediates between the contraries, as in the case of colour; for 'intermediate' and 'mean' are capable of more than one application.

Now in its own place every body endowed with both weight and lightness has weight—whereas earth has weight everywhere—but they only have lightness among bodies to whose surface they rise. Hence when a support is withdrawn such a body moves downward until it reaches the body next below it, air to the place of water and water to that of earth. But if the fire above air is removed, it will not move upward to the place of fire, except by constraint; and in that way water also may be drawn up, when the upward movement of air which has had a common surface with it is swift enough to overpower the downward impulse of the water. Nor does water move upward to the place of air, except in the manner just described. Earth is not so affected at all, because a common surface is not possible to

1 In l. 24 put the comma after, not before, ἀναλῦσ. (The correction is due to Mr. Ross.) The intermediates, air and water, are only relatively light and heavy. In the absolute sense these characters belong only to fire and water.
3 ὀβδέκα in Bekker and Prantl must surely be a misprint for ὀβδέκι (so J).
3 'Intermediate' stands for a region, not a point, and includes as a rule a variety of things.
it.\textsuperscript{1} Hence water is drawn up into the vessel to which fire is applied, but not earth. As earth fails to move upward, so fire fails to move downward when air is withdrawn from beneath it: for fire has no weight even in its own place, as earth has no lightness. The other two move downward when the body beneath is withdrawn because, while the absolutely heavy is that which sinks to the bottom of all things,\textsuperscript{2} the relatively heavy sinks to its own place or to the surface of the body in which it rises, since it is similar in matter to it.\textsuperscript{3}

It is plain that one must suppose as many distinct species of matter as there are bodies. For if, \textit{first}, there is a single matter of all things, as, for instance, the void or the plenum or extension or the triangles, either all things will move upward or all things will move downward, and the second motion will be abolished. And so, either there will be no absolutely light body, if superiority of weight is due to superior size or number of the constituent bodies or to the fullness of the body: but the contrary is a matter of observation, and it has been shown that the downward and upward movements are equally constant and universal: or, if the matter in question is the void or something similar, which moves uniformly upward, there will be nothing to move uniformly downward.\textsuperscript{4} Further, it will follow that

\textsuperscript{1} The surface of earth is too rough to allow of the necessary \textit{σύμφωσις} (Simpl.), or continuity of surface, with another body.

\textsuperscript{2} Read \textit{ἐστὶν} \textit{ό} (not \textit{ἐστὶν}, \textit{ό} with Bekker). Prantl's ingenious conjecture, \textit{εἰς τὴν ἴπτυ}, is not quite convincing.

\textsuperscript{3} The downward movement of earth (absolute weight) is quite determinate, having its limit at the centre. But the downward movement of air and water (relative weight) is not equally determinate: it is limited only by the surface of the body next beneath, air by that of water, water by that of earth, the upper body being attracted to the lower by similarity of matter. This admission inflicts some damage on the doctrine of 'places'—for where a body has weight it cannot be said to 'rest naturally' or to 'be in its place'—and also on the symmetry of the elements—for if the fire above air were removed the air would not move upward, but if the earth below water were removed the water would move downward.—In l. 18 \textit{εἰς} must be construed with \textit{φέρεται}, and in l. 19 \textit{ἡ} \textit{οἶς}, more fully expressed, would be \textit{ἡ} \textit{εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων οἶς}. The construction is difficult, and the passage may be corrupt.

\textsuperscript{4} The stopping of this sentence requires alteration. \textit{ἐὰν δὲ} in l. 27 is an irregular second limb to the disjunction introduced by \textit{ἡ} \textit{κοῦφον} in l. 23. Put a colon at \textit{πλεῖον} (l. 25) and at \textit{ἄνω} (l. 27), and delete the comma after \textit{πλεῖόνων} (l. 25).
the intermediate bodies move downward in some cases quicker than earth: for air in sufficiently large quantity will contain a larger number of triangles or solids or particles. It is, however, manifest that no portion of air whatever moves downward. And the same reasoning applies to lightness, if that is supposed to depend on superiority of quantity of matter. But if, secondly, the kinds of matter are two, it will be difficult to make the intermediate bodies behave as air and water behave. Suppose, for example, that the two asserted are void and plenum. Fire, then, as moving upward, will be void, earth, as moving downward, plenum; and in air, it will be said, fire preponderates, in water, earth. There will then be a quantity of water containing more fire than a little air, and a large amount of air will contain more earth than a little water: consequently we shall have to say that air in a certain quantity moves downward more quickly than a little water. But such a thing has never been observed anywhere. Necessarily, then, as fire goes up because it has something, e.g. void, which other things do not have, and earth goes downward because it has plenum, so air goes to its own place above water because it has something else, and water goes downward because of some special kind of body. But if the two bodies are one matter, or two matters both present in each, there will be a certain quantity of each at which water will excel a little air in the upward movement and air excel water in the downward movement, as we have already often said.

The shape of bodies will not account for their moving upward or downward in general, though it will account for their moving faster or slower. The reasons for this

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1 sc. in earth.
2 On the somewhat absurd theory that the universal 'matter' is void or absolute lightness.
3 312b 33—313b 3, olon ... γῦς, is a parenthesis and should be so printed, with a colon, instead of a full-stop, at πλῆρες and at κἀτω. This is proved by the infinitive ἐχειν (after φαίη) in l. 3, as well as by the γὰρ which follows.
4 viz. air and water.
5 Prantl's ἐκατέρω is a misprint for ἐκατέρω.
are not difficult to see. For the problem thus raised is why a flat piece of iron or lead floats upon water, while smaller and less heavy things, so long as they are round or long—a needle, for instance—sink down; and sometimes a thing floats because it is small, as with gold dust and the various earthy and dusty materials which throng the air. With regard to these questions, it is wrong to accept the explanation offered by Democritus. He says that the warm bodies moving up out of the water hold up heavy bodies which are broad, while the narrow ones fall through, because the bodies which offer this resistance are not numerous. But this would be even more likely to happen in air—an objection which he himself raises. His reply to the objection is feeble. In the air, he says, the ‘drive’ (meaning by drive the movement of the upward moving bodies) is not uniform in direction. But since some continua are easily divided and others less easily, and things which produce division differ similarly in the ease with which they produce it, the explanation must be found in this fact. It is the easily bounded, in proportion as it is easily bounded, which is easily divided; and air is more so than water, water than earth. Further, the smaller the quantity in each kind, the more easily it is divided and disrupted. Thus the reason why broad things keep their place is because they cover so wide a surface and the greater quantity is less easily disrupted. Bodies of the opposite shape sink down because they occupy so little of the surface, which is therefore easily parted. And these considerations apply with far greater force to air, since it is so much more easily divided than water. But since there are two factors, the force responsible for the downward motion of the heavy body and the disruption-resisting force of the continuous surface, there must be some ratio between the two. For in proportion as the force applied by the heavy thing

1 ἀναφερόμενα is the better-attested reading (ELMJ Simpl.) and should be preferred to ἀνω φερόμενα. The word is elsewhere used of upward movement by Aristotle.

2 i.e. the fluid or moist. Cp. de Gen. et Corr. 329b 30.
towards disruption and division exceeds that which resides in the continuum, the quicker will it force its way down; only if the force of the heavy thing is the weaker, will it ride upon the surface.

We have now finished our examination of the heavy and the light and of the phenomena connected with them.
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[The sign + following a reference means that many other references could be given.]

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DE GENERATIONE

ET

CORRUPTIONE
PREFACE

'This translation has been made from a revised text, which is now being published for me by the Delegates of the Clarendon Press as part of an edition of Aristotle's περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. I have indicated in a few brief footnotes the chief passages in which the readings I have adopted differ from those of Bekker; a full explanation, and a defence of my interpretation in detail, will be found in my edition.

To Mr. W. D. Ross, Fellow of Oriel College, I am greatly indebted for many most valuable criticisms and suggestions. The references in the footnotes to Burnet are to the third edition of that author's Early Greek Philosophy (London, 1920); and the references to Diels are to the second edition of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1906).

H. H. J.
BOOK II.

cc. 1–8. *The material constituents of all that comes-to-be and passes-away are the so-called 'elements', i.e. the 'simple' bodies. What these are, how they are transformed into one another, and how they 'combine'.*

CH.

1. Earth, Air, Fire, and Water are not really 'elements' of body, but 'simple' bodies. The 'elements' of body are 'primary matter' and certain 'contrarieties'.

2. The 'contrarieties' in question are 'the hot and the cold' and 'the dry and the moist'.

3. These four 'elementary qualities' (hot, cold, dry, moist) are diversely coupled so as to constitute four 'simple' bodies analogous to, but purer than, Earth, Air, Fire, and Water.

4. The four 'simple' bodies undergo reciprocal transformation in various manners.

5. Restatement and confirmation of the preceding doctrine.

6. Empedokles maintains that his four 'elements' cannot be transformed into one another. How then can they be 'equal' (i.e. comparable) as he asserts? His whole theory, indeed, is thoroughly unsatisfactory. In particular, he entirely fails to explain how compounds (e.g. bone or flesh) come-to-be out of his 'elements'.

7. How the 'simple' bodies combine to form compounds.

8. Every compound body requires all four 'simple' bodies as its constituents.

cc. 9–10. *The causes of coming-to-be and passing-away.*

9. Material, formal, and final causes of coming-to-be and passing-away. The failure of earlier theories—e.g. of the 'materialist' theory and of the theory advanced by Sokrates in the *Phaedo*—must be ascribed to inadequate recognition of the efficient cause.

10. The sun's annual movement in the ecliptic or zodiac circle is the efficient cause of coming-to-be and passing-away. It explains the occurrence of these changes and their ceaseless alternation.

Appendix.

11. In what sense, and under what conditions, the things which come-to-be are 'necessary'. Absolute necessity characterizes every sequence of transformations which is cyclical.
ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY

BOOK I

1 OUR next task is to study coming-to-be and passing-away. We are to distinguish the causes, and to state the definitions, of these processes considered in general—as changes predicable uniformly of all the things that come-to-be and pass-away by nature. Further, we are to study growth and 'alteration'. We must inquire what each of them is; and whether 'alteration' is to be identified with coming-to-be, or whether to these different names there correspond two separate processes with distinct natures.

On this question, indeed, the early philosophers are divided. Some of them assert that the so-called 'unqualified coming-to-be' is 'alteration', while others maintain that 'alteration' and coming-to-be are distinct. For those who say that the universe is one something (i.e. those who generate all things out of one thing) are bound to assert that coming-to-be is 'alteration', and that whatever 'comes-to-be' in the proper sense of the term is 'being altered': but those who make the matter of things more than one must distinguish coming-to-be from 'alteration'. To this latter class belong Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Leukippos. And yet Anaxagoras himself failed to understand his own utterance. He says, at all events, that coming-to-be and passing-away are the same as 'being altered': yet, in common with other thinkers, he affirms that the elements are many. Thus Empedokles holds that the corporeal elements are four, while all the elements—including those which initiate movement—are six in number; whereas

1 Cf. fr. 17 (Diels, pp. 320-1).
Anaxagoras agrees with Leukippos and Demokritos that the elements are infinite.

(Anaxagoras posits as elements the 'homoeomeries', viz. bone, flesh, marrow, and everything else which is such that part and whole are the same in name and nature; while Demokritos and Leukippos say that there are indivisible bodies, infinite both in number and in the varieties of their shapes, of which everything else is composed—the compounds differing one from another according to the shapes, 'positions', and 'groupings' of their constituents.)

For the views of the school of Anaxagoras seem diametrically opposed to those of the followers of Empedokles. Empedokles says that Fire, Water, Air, and Earth are four elements, and are thus 'simple' rather than flesh, bone, and bodies which, like these, are 'homoeomeries'. But the followers of Anaxagoras regard the 'homoeomeries' as 'simple' and elements, whilst they affirm that Earth, Fire, Water, and Air are composite; for each of these is (according to them) a 'common seminary' of all the 'homoeomeries'.

Those, then, who construct all things out of a single element, must maintain that coming-to-be and passing-away are 'alteration'. For they must affirm that the underlying something always remains identical and one; and change of such a substratum is what we call 'altering'. Those, on the other hand, who make the ultimate kinds of things more than one, must maintain that 'alteration' is distinct from coming-to-be: for coming-to-be and passing-away result from the consilience and the dissolution of the many kinds. That is why Empedokles too uses language to this effect, when he says 'There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled'.

Thus it is clear (i) that to describe coming-

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1 Aristotle's point (from 314a11 to 314b11) is that Anaxagoras, Empedokles, Leukippos, and Demokritos are all pluralists, and therefore logically bound (whatever they may say) to distinguish coming-to-be and 'alteration'. They are all pluralists, though their theories differ, and though the theory of Anaxagoras is actually 'contrary' to that of Empedokles.

2 i.e. as well as Anaxagoras: cf. above, 314a13–15.

3 Cf. fr. 8 (Diels, p. 175), and the paraphrase in MXG 975a36–b16.
to-be and passing-away in these terms is in accordance with their fundamental assumption, and (ii) that they do in fact so describe them: nevertheless, they too must recognize 'alteration' as a fact distinct from coming-to-be, though it is impossible for them to do so consistently with what they say.

That we are right in this criticism is easy to perceive. For 'alteration' is a fact of observation. While the substance of the thing remains unchanged, we see it 'altering' just as we see in it the changes of magnitude called 'growth' and 'diminution'. Nevertheless, the statements of those who posit more 'original reals' than one make 'alteration' impossible. For 'alteration', as we assert, takes place in respect to certain qualities: and these qualities (I mean, e.g., hot-cold, white-black, dry-moist, soft-hard, and so forth) are, all of them, differences characterizing the 'elements'. The actual words of Empedokles may be quoted in illustration—

The sun everywhere bright to see, and hot;
The rain everywhere dark and cold; and he distinctively characterizes his remaining elements in a similar manner. Since, therefore, it is not possible for Fire to become Water, or Water to become Earth, neither will it be possible for anything white to become black, or anything soft to become hard; and the same argument applies to all the other qualities. Yet this is what 'alteration' essentially is.

It follows, as an obvious corollary, that a single matter must always be assumed as underlying the contrary 'poles' of any change—whether change of place, or growth and diminution, or 'alteration'; further, that the being of this matter and the being of 'alteration' stand and fall together. For if the change is 'alteration', then the substratum is a single element; i.e. all things which admit of change into one another have a single matter. And, conversely, if the substratum of the changing things is one, there is 'alteration'.

1 i.e. as well as ordinary people: cf. 13 ff.
2 Cf. fr. 21, ll. 3 and 5 (Diels, p. 180).
3 i.e. according to Empedokles.

B 2
Empedokles, indeed, seems to contradict his own state-ments as well as the observed facts. For he denies that any one of his elements comes-to-be out of any other, insisting on the contrary that they are the things out of which every-thing else comes-to-be; and yet (having brought the entirety of existing things, except Strife, together into one) he maintains, simultaneously with this denial, that each thing once more comes-to-be out of the One. Hence it was clearly out of a One that *this* came-to-be Water, and *that* Fire, various portions of it being separated off by certain characteristic differences or qualities—as indeed he calls the sun ‘white and hot’, and the earth ‘heavy and hard’. If, therefore, these characteristic differences be taken away (for they can be taken away, since they came-to-be), it will clearly be inevitable for Earth to come-to-be out of Water and Water out of Earth, and for each of the other elements to undergo a similar transformation—not only *then*, ¹ but also *now*—if, and because, they change their qualities. And, to judge by what he says, the qualities are such that they *can* be ‘attached’ to things and *can* again be ‘separated’ from them, especially since Strife and Love are still fighting with one another for the mastery. It was owing to this same conflict that the elements were generated from a One at the former period. I say ‘generated’, for presumably Fire, Earth, and Water had no distinctive existence at all while merged in one.

There is another obscurity in the theory of Empedokles. ² Are we to regard the One as his ‘original real’? Or is it the Many—i.e. Fire and Earth, and the bodies co-ordinate with these? For the One is an ‘element’ in so far as it underlies the process as matter—as that out of which Earth and Fire come-to-be through a change of qualities due to ‘the motion’.² On the other hand, in so far as the One results from composition (by a consilience of the Many), whereas they result from disintegration, the Many are more ‘elementary’ than the One, and prior to it in their nature.

¹ i.e. at the period when Empedokles himself appears to recognize that his ‘elements’ come-to-be.
² i.e. the motion of dissociation initiated by Strife.
We have therefore to discuss the whole subject of 'unqualified' coming-to-be and passing-away; we have to inquire whether these changes do or do not occur and, if they occur, to explain the precise conditions of their occurrence. We must also discuss the remaining forms of change, viz. growth and 'alteration'. For though, no doubt, Plato investigated the conditions under which things come-to-be and pass-away, he confined his inquiry to these changes; and he discussed not 'all coming-to-be, but only that of the elements. He asked no questions as to how flesh or bones, or any of the other similar compound things, come-to-be; nor again did he examine the conditions under which 'alteration' or growth are attributable to things.

A similar criticism applies to all our predecessors with the single exception of Demokritos. Not one of them penetrated below the surface or made a thorough examination of a single one of the problems. Demokritos, however, does seem not only to have thought carefully about all the problems, but also to be distinguished from the outset by his method. For, as we are saying, none of the other philosophers made any definite statement about growth, except such as any amateur might have made. They said that things grow 'by the accession of like to like', but they did not proceed to explain the manner of this accession. Nor did they give any account of 'combination': and they neglected almost every single one of the remaining problems, offering no explanation, e.g., of 'action' or 'passion'—how in physical actions one thing acts and the other undergoes action. Demokritos and Leukippos, however, postulate the 'figures', and make 'alteration' and coming-to-be result from them. They explain coming-to-be and passing-away by their 'dissociation' and 'association', but 'alteration' by their 'grouping' and 'position'. And since they thought that the truth lay in the appearance, and the appearances are conflicting and infinitely many, they made the 'figures' infinite in number. Hence—owing to the changes of the compound—the same thing seems different and conflicting to different people: it is 'transposed' by a small additional

1 And in variety of shape also: cf. above, 314a 22-3.
ingredient, and appears utterly other by the ‘transposition’ of a single constituent. For Tragedy and Comedy are both composed of the same letters.

Since almost all our predecessors think (i) that coming-to-be is distinct from ‘alteration’, and (ii) that, whereas things ‘alter’ by change of their qualities, it is by ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’ that they come-to-be and pass-away, we must concentrate our attention on these theses. For they lead to many perplexing and well-grounded dilemmas. If, on the one hand, coming-to-be is ‘association’, many impossible consequences result: and yet there are other arguments, not easy to unravel, which force the conclusion upon us that coming-to-be cannot possibly be anything else. If, on the other hand, coming-to-be is not ‘association’, either there is no such thing as coming-to-be at all or it is ‘alteration’: or else¹ we must endeavour to unravel this dilemma too—and a stubborn one we shall find it.

The fundamental question, in dealing with all these difficulties, is this: ‘Do things come-to-be and “alter” and grow, and undergo the contrary changes, because the primary “reals” are indivisible magnitudes? Or is no magnitude indivisible?’ For the answer we give to this question makes the greatest difference. And again, if the primary ‘reals’ are indivisible magnitudes, are these bodies, as Demokritos and Leukippos maintain? Or are they planes, as is asserted in the Timaeus?

To resolve bodies into planes and no further—this, as we have also remarked elsewhere,² is in itself a paradox. Hence there is more to be said for the view that there are indivisible bodies. Yet even these involve much of paradox. Still, as we have said, it is possible to construct ‘alteration’ and coming-to-be with them, if one ‘transposes’ the same by ‘turning’ and ‘intercontact’, and by ‘the varieties of the figures’, as Demokritos does. (His denial of the reality of colour is a corollary from this position: for, according to

¹ i.e. if we still wish to maintain that coming-to-be (though it actually occurs and is distinct from ‘alteration’) is not ‘association’.

² Cf. e. g. de Caelo 299ᵃ 6-11.
him, things get coloured by 'turning' of the 'figures'.) But the possibility of such a construction no longer exists for those who divide bodies into planes. For nothing except solids results from putting planes together: they do not even attempt to generate any quality from them.

Lack of experience diminishes our power of taking a comprehensive view of the admitted facts. Hence those who dwell in intimate association with nature and its phenomena grow more and more able to formulate, as the foundations of their theories, principles such as to admit of a wide and coherent development: while those whom devotion to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatize on the basis of a few observations. The rival treatments of the subject now before us will serve to illustrate how great is the difference between a 'scientific' and a 'dialectical' method of inquiry. For, whereas the Platonists argue that there must be atomic magnitudes because otherwise "The Triangle" will be more than one, Demokritos would appear to have been convinced by arguments appropriate to the subject, i.e. drawn from the science of nature. Our meaning will become clear as we proceed.

For to suppose that a body (i.e. a magnitude) is divisible through and through, and that this division is possible, involves a difficulty. What will there be in the body which escapes the division?

If it is divisible through and through, and if this division is possible, then it might be, at one and the same moment, divided through and through, even though the dividings had not been effected simultaneously: and the actual occurrence of this result would involve no impossibility. Hence the same principle will apply whenever a body is by nature divisible through and through, whether by bisection, or generally by any method whatever: nothing impossible will have resulted if it has actually been divided—not even if it has been divided into innumerable parts, themselves divided innumerable times. Nothing impossible

1 i.e. by progressive bisection ad infinitum.
will have resulted, though perhaps nobody in fact could so divide it.

Since, therefore, the body is divisible through and through, let it have been divided. What, then, will remain? A magnitude? No: that is impossible, since then there will be something not divided, whereas \textit{ex hypothesi} the body was divisible \textit{through and through}. But if it be admitted that neither a body nor a magnitude will remain, and yet division\(^1\) is to take place, the constituents of the body will \textit{either} be points (i.e. without magnitude) \textit{or} absolutely nothing. If its constituents are nothings, then it might both come-to-be out of nothings and exist as a composite of nothings: and thus presumably the whole body will be nothing but an appearance. But if it consists of points, a similar absurdity will result: it will not possess any magnitude. For when the points were in contact and coincided to form a single magnitude, they did not make the whole any bigger (since, when the body was divided into two or more parts, the whole\(^2\) was not a bit smaller or bigger than it was before the division): hence, even if all the points\(^3\) be put together, they will not make any magnitude.

But suppose that, as the body is being divided, a minute section—a piece of sawdust, as it were—is extracted, and that in this sense a body ‘comes away’ from the magnitude, evading the division. Even then the same\(^4\) argument applies. For in what sense is that section divisible? But if what ‘came away’ was not a body but a separable form or quality, and if the magnitude is ‘points or contacts thus qualified’: it is paradoxical that a magnitude should consist of elements which are not magnitudes. Moreover, \textit{where} will the points be? And are they motionless or moving? And every contact is always a contact of two somethings, i.e. there is always something besides the contact or the division or the point.

\(^1\) i.e. ‘through and through’ division.
\(^2\) i.e. the sum of the now separated parts.
\(^3\) i.e. all the points into which the body has been dissolved by the ‘through and through’ division.
\(^4\) Cf. above, 316\textsuperscript{a} 24-5.
These, then, are the difficulties resulting from the supposition that any and every body, whatever its size, is divisible through and through. There is, besides, this further consideration. If, having divided a piece of wood or anything else, I put it together, it is again equal to what it was, and is one. Clearly this is so, whatever the point at which I cut the wood. The wood, therefore, has been divided potentially through and through. What, then, is there in the wood besides the division? For even if we suppose there is some quality, yet how is the wood dissolved into such constituents and how does it come-to-be out of them? Or how are such constituents separated so as to exist apart from one another?

Since, therefore, it is impossible for magnitudes to consist of contacts or points, there must be indivisible bodies and magnitudes. Yet, if we do postulate the latter, we are confronted with equally impossible consequences, which we have examined in other works. But we must try to disentangle these perplexities, and must therefore formulate the whole problem over again.

On the one hand, then, it is in no way paradoxical that every perceptible body should be indivisible as well as divisible at any and every point. For the second predicate will attach to it potentially, but the first actually. On the other hand, it would seem to be impossible for a body to be, even potentially, divisible at all points simultaneously. For if it were possible, then it might actually occur, with the result, not that the body would simultaneously be actually both (indivisible and divided), but that it would be simultaneously divided at any and every point. Consequently, nothing will remain and the body will have passed-away into what is incorporeal: and so it might come-to-be again either out of points or absolutely out of nothing. And how is that possible?

But now it is obvious that a body is in fact divided into separable magnitudes which are smaller at each division—into magnitudes which fall apart from one another and are

1 i.e. points-of-division and quality.
actually separated. Hence (it is urged) the process of dividing a body part by part is not a ‘breaking up’ which could continue \textit{ad infinitum}; nor can a body be simultaneously divided at every point, for that is not possible; but there is a limit, beyond which the ‘breaking up’ cannot proceed. The necessary consequence—especially if coming-to-be and passing-away are to take place by ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’ respectively—is that a body\footnote{i.e. every perceptible body: cf. above, 316\textsuperscript{b} 21.} must contain atomic magnitudes which are invisible.

Such is the argument which is believed to establish the necessity of atomic magnitudes: we must now show that it conceals a faulty inference, and exactly where it conceals it.

For, since point is not ‘immediately-next’ to point, magnitudes are ‘divisible through and through’ in one sense, and yet not in another. When, however, it is admitted that a magnitude is ‘divisible through and through’, it is thought there is a point not only anywhere, but also everywhere, in it: hence it is supposed to follow, from the admission, that the magnitude must be divided away into nothing. For—it is supposed—there is a point everywhere within it, so that it consists either of contacts or of points. But it is only \textit{in one sense} that the magnitude is ‘divisible through and through’, viz. in so far as there is one point \textit{anywhere} within it and all its points are \textit{everywhere} within it if you take them singly one by one. But there are not more points than one \textit{anywhere} within it, for the points are not ‘consecutive’: hence it is not simultaneously ‘divisible through and through’. For if it were, then, if it be divisible at its centre, it will be divisible also at a point ‘immediately-next’ to its centre. But it is not so divisible: for position is not ‘immediately-next’ to position, nor point to point—in other words, division is not ‘immediately-next’ to division, nor composition to composition.

Hence there are both ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’, though neither (\textit{a}) into, and out of, atomic magnitudes (for that involves many impossibilities), nor (\textit{b}) so that division takes place through and through—for this would have resulted only if point had been ‘immediately-next’ to
point: but ‘dissociation’ takes place into small (i.e. relatively small) parts, and ‘association’ takes place out of relatively small parts.

It is wrong, however, to suppose, as some assert, that coming-to-be and passing-away in the unqualified and complete sense are distinctively defined by ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’, while the change that takes place in what is continuous is ‘alteration’. On the contrary, this is where the whole error lies. For unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away are not effected by ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’. They take place when a thing changes, from this to that, as a whole. But the philosophers we are criticizing suppose that all such change is ‘alteration’: whereas in fact there is a difference. For in that which underlies the change there is a factor corresponding to the definition and there is a material factor. When, then, the change is in these constitutive factors, there will be coming-to-be or passing-away: but when it is in the thing’s qualities, i.e. a change of the thing per accidens, there will be ‘alteration’.

‘Dissociation’ and ‘association’ affect the thing’s susceptibility to passing-away. For if water has first been ‘dissociated’ into smallish drops, air comes-to-be out of it more quickly: while, if drops of water have first been ‘associated’, air comes-to-be more slowly. Our doctrine will become clearer in the sequel. Meantime, so much may be taken as established—viz. that coming-to-be cannot be ‘association’, at least not the kind of ‘association’ some philosophers assert it to be.

Now that we have established the preceding distinctions, we must first consider whether there is anything which comes-to-be and passes-away in the unqualified sense: or whether nothing comes-to-be in this strict sense, but everything always comes-to-be something and out of something—I mean, e.g., comes-to-be-healthy out of being-ill

1 i.e. all change ‘in what is continuous’.
2 i.e. a ‘formal’ factor.
3 Cf. 328a23ff.
4 The second main topic of investigation is formulated below, 317b34-5.
and ill out of being-healthy, comes-to-be-small out of being-big and big out of being-small, and so on in every other instance. For if there is to be coming-to-be without qualification, 'something' must—without qualification—'come-to-be out of not-being', so that it would be true to say that 'not-being is an attribute of some things'. For qualified coming-to-be is a process out of qualified not-being (e.g. out of not-white or not-beautiful); but unqualified coming-to-be is a process out of unqualified not-being.

Now 'unqualified' means either (i) the primary predication within each Category, or (ii) the universal, i.e. the all-comprehensive, predication. Hence, if 'unqualified not-being' means the negation of 'being' in the sense of the primary term of the Category in question, we shall have, in 'unqualified coming-to-be', a coming-to-be of a substance out of not-substance. But that which is not a substance or a 'this' clearly cannot possess predicates drawn from any of the other Categories either—e.g. we cannot attribute to it any quality, quantity, or position. Otherwise, properties would admit of existence in separation from substances. If, on the other hand, 'unqualified not-being' means 'what is not in any sense at all', it will be a universal negation of all forms of being, so that what comes-to-be will have to come-to-be out of nothing.

Although we have dealt with these problems at greater length in another work, where we have set forth the difficulties and established the distinguishing definitions, the following concise restatement of our results must here be offered:

In one sense things come-to-be out of that which has no 'being' without qualification: yet in another sense they come-to-be always out of 'what is'. For coming-to-be necessarily implies the pre-existence of something which potentially 'is', but actually 'is not'; and this something is spoken of both as 'being' and as 'not-being'.

These distinctions may be taken as established: but even then it is extraordinarily difficult to see how there can be 'unqualified coming-to-be' (whether we suppose it to occur

1 Physics A. 6–9.
out of what potentially 'is', or in some other way), and we must recall this problem for further examination. For the question might be raised whether substance (i.e. the 'this') comes-to-be at all. Is it not rather the 'such', the 'so great', or the 'somewhere', which comes-to-be? And the same question might be raised about 'passing-away' also. For if a substantial thing comes-to-be, it is clear that there will 'be' (not actually, but potentially) a substance, out of which its coming-to-be will proceed and into which the thing that is passing-away will necessarily change. Then will any predicate belonging to the remaining Categories attach actually to this presupposed substance? In other words, will that which is only potentially a 'this' (which only potentially is), while without the qualification 'potentially' it is not a 'this' (i.e. *is not*), possess, e.g., any determinate size or quality or position? For (i) if it possesses none of these determinations actually, but all of them only potentially, the result is *first* that a being, which is not a determinate being, is capable of separate existence; and in addition that coming-to-be proceeds out of nothing pre-existing—a thesis which, more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed the earliest philosophers. On the other hand (ii) if, although it is not a 'this somewhat' or a substance, it is to possess some of the remaining determinations quoted above, then (as we said) properties will be separable from substances.

We must therefore concentrate all our powers on the discussion of these difficulties and on the solution of a further question—viz. What is the cause of the perpetuity of coming-to-be? Why is there always unqualified, as well as *partial*, coming-to-be?

'Cause' in this connexion has two senses. It means (i) the source from which, as we say, the process 'originates', and (ii) the matter. It is the material cause that we have here to state. For, as to the other cause, we have already

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1 Cf. above, 317\textsuperscript{b} 10–11.
2 'Unqualified coming-to-be' = substantial change.
3 'Partial' = 'qualified' coming-to-be, i.e. change of quality, quantity, or place.
explained (in our treatise on Motion) that it involves (a) something immovable through all time and (b) something always being moved. And the accurate treatment of the first of these—of the immovable 'originative source'—belongs to the province of the other, or 'prior', philosophy; while as regards 'that which sets everything else in motion by being itself continuously moved', we shall have to explain later which amongst the so-called 'specific' causes exhibits this character. But at present we are to state the material cause—the cause classed under the head of matter—to which it is due that passing-away and coming-to-be never fail to occur in Nature. For perhaps, if we succeed in clearing up this question, it will simultaneously become clear what account we ought to give of that which perplexed us just now, i.e. of unqualified passing-away and coming-to-be.

Our new question too—viz. 'what is the cause of the unbroken continuity of coming-to-be?'—is sufficiently perplexing, if in fact what passes-away vanishes into 'what is not' and 'what is not' is nothing (since 'what is not' is neither a thing, nor possessed of a quality or quantity, nor in any place). If, then, some one of the things 'which are' is constantly disappearing, why has not the whole of 'what is' been used up long ago and vanished away—assuming of course that the material of all the several comings-to-be was finite? For, presumably, the unfailing continuity of coming-to-be cannot be attributed to the infinity of the material. That is impossible, for nothing is actually infinite.

A thing is infinite only potentially, i.e. the dividing of it can continue indefinitely: so that we should have to suppose there is only one kind of coming-to-be in the world—viz. one which never fails, because it is such that what comes-to-be is on each successive occasion smaller than before. But in fact this is not what we see occurring.

Why, then, is this form of change necessarily ceaseless? Is it because the passing-away of this is a coming-to-be of

1 Physics Θ. 3 ff., especially 258b 10 ff.
2 i.e. πρώτη φιλοσοφία or θεολογική.
3 Cf. below, II. 10.
something else, and the coming-to-be of this a passing-away of something else?

The cause implied in this solution must no doubt be considered adequate to account for coming-to-be and passing-away in their general character as they occur in all existing things alike. Yet, if the same process is a coming-to-be of this but a passing-away of that, and a passing-away of this but a coming-to-be of that, why are some things said to come-to-be and pass-away without qualification, but others only with a qualification?

This distinction must be investigated once more, for it demands some explanation. (It is applied in a twofold manner.) For (i) we say ‘it is now passing-away’ without qualification, and not merely ‘this is passing-away’. And we call this change ‘coming-to-be’, and that ‘passing-away’, without qualification. And (ii) so-and-so ‘comes-to-be-something’, but does not ‘come-to-be’ without qualification; for we say that the student ‘comes-to-be-learned’, not ‘comes-to-be’ without qualification.

(i) Now we often divide terms into those which signify a ‘this somewhat’ and those which do not. And (the first form of) the distinction, which we are investigating, results from a similar division of terms: for it makes a difference into what the changing thing changes. Perhaps, e.g., the passage into Fire is ‘coming-to-be’ unqualified, but ‘passing-away-of-something’ (e.g. of Earth): whilst the coming-to-be of Earth is qualified (not unqualified) ‘coming-to-be’, though unqualified ‘passing-away’ (e.g. of Fire). This would be the case on the theory set forth in Parmenides: for he says that the things into which change takes place are two, and he asserts that these two, viz. what is and what is not, are Fire and Earth. Whether we postulate

1 i.e. the material cause, in the sense of πρότης διή: cf. 319b 18-22.
2 'Once more': for it was from this same peculiarity of linguistic usage that Aristotle started (317a 32 ff.) to establish the being of ἄρπη γένεσις.
3 I have inserted this sentence in view of what follows: cf. 319b 3-11.
4 i.e. not merely ‘this is passing-away and that is coming-to-be’.
5 See note 3.
6 The theory is put forward by Parmenides (fr. 8, ll. 51 ff.; Diels, pp. 121-2) as the prevalent, but erroneous, view. See Burnet, §§ 90, 91.
these, or other things of a similar kind, makes no difference. For we are trying to discover not what undergoes these changes, but what is their characteristic manner. The passage, then, into what 'is' not except with a qualification is unqualified passing-away, while the passage into what 'is' without qualification is unqualified coming-to-be. Hence whatever the contrasted 'poles' of the changes may be—whether Fire and Earth, or some other couple—the one of them will be 'a being' and the other 'a not-being'.

We have thus stated one characteristic manner in which unqualified will be distinguished from qualified coming-to-be and passing-away: but they are also distinguished according to the special nature of the material of the changing thing. For a material, whose constitutive differences signify more a 'this somewhat', is itself more 'substantial' or 'real': while a material, whose constitutive differences signify privation, is 'not real'. (Suppose, e.g., that 'the hot' is a positive predication, i.e. a 'form', whereas 'cold' is a privation, and that Earth and Fire differ from one another by these constitutive differences.)

The opinion, however, which most people are inclined to prefer, is that the distinction depends upon the difference between 'the perceptible' and 'the imperceptible'. Thus, when there is a change into perceptible material, people say there is 'coming-to-be'; but when there is a change into invisible material, they call it 'passing-away'. For they distinguish 'what is' and 'what is not' by their perceiving and not-perceiving, just as what is knowable 'is' and what is unknowable 'is not'—perception on their view having the force of knowledge. Hence, just as they deem themselves to live and to 'be' in virtue of their perceiving or their capacity to perceive, so too they deem the things to 'be' qua perceived or perceptible—and in this they are in a sense on the track of the truth, though what they actually say is not true.

1 sc. as the things into which the unqualified changes take place—as the contrasted 'poles' of unqualified ἐβεβρισ and φθόρια.
2 i.e. one will be 'a positive real' and the other 'a negative something'.
3 sc. between the unqualified and the qualified changes.
Thus unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away turn out to be different according to common opinion from what they are in truth. For Wind and Air are in truth more real—more a 'this somewhat' or a 'form'—than Earth. But they are less real to perception—which explains why things are commonly said to 'pass-away' without qualification when they change into Wind and Air, and to 'come-to-be' when they change into what is tangible, i.e. into Earth.

We have now explained why there is 'unqualified coming-to-be' (though it is a passing-away-of-something) and 'unqualified passing-away' (though it is a coming-to-be-of-something). For this distinction of appellation depends upon a difference in the material out of which, and into which, the changes are effected. It depends either upon whether the material is or is not 'substantial', or upon whether it is more or less 'substantial', or upon whether it is more or less perceptible.

(ii) But why are some things said to 'come-to-be' without qualification, and others only to 'come-to-be-so-and-so', in cases different from the one we have been considering where two things come-to-be reciprocally out of one another? For at present we have explained no more than this:—why, when two things change reciprocally into one another, we do not attribute coming-to-be and passing-away uniformly to them both, although every coming-to-be is a passing-away of something else and every passing-away some other thing's coming-to-be. But the question subsequently formulated involves a different problem—viz. why, although the learning thing is said to 'come-to-be-learned' but not to come-to-be' without qualification, yet the growing thing is said to 'come-to-be'.

The distinction here turns upon the difference of the Categories. For some things signify a this somewhat, others a such, and others a so-much. Those things, then, which do not signify substance, are not said to 'come-to-be' without qualification, but only to 'come-to-be-so-and-so'.

1 'In truth', i.e. according to Aristotle's own view which he has just stated (above, 318b14-18).
2 sc. without qualification.
Nevertheless, in all changing things alike, we speak of 
16 'coming-to-be'\(^1\) when the thing comes-to-be something in 
one\(^2\) of the two Columns—e.g. in Substance, if it comes-to- 
be Fire but not if it comes-to-be Earth; and in Quality, if 
it comes-to-be learned but not when it comes-to-be ignorant. 

We have explained why some things come-to-be without 
qualification, but not others—both in general, and also 
when the changing things are substances and nothing else; 
and we have stated that the \textit{substratum} \footnote{\textit{Substratum} is the material cause 
of the continuous occurrence of coming-to-be, because it is} 
such as to change from contrary to contrary and because, 
in substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always 
a passing-away of another, and the passing-away of one 
thing is always another's coming-to-be. But there is no 
need even to discuss the other question we raised—viz. 
why coming-to-be continues though things are constantly 
being destroyed.\(^3\) For just as people speak of 'a passing- 
away' without qualification when a thing has passed into 
what is imperceptible and what in that sense 'is not', so 
25 also they speak of 'a coming-to-be out of a not-being' when 
a thing emerges from an imperceptible. Whether, there- 
fore, the \textit{substratum} \footnote{\textit{Substratum} is or is not something, what comes-to- 
be emerges out of a 'not-being'.} is or is not something, what comes-to- 
be emerges out of a 'not-being':\(^4\) so that a thing 'comes- 
to-be out of a not-being' just as much as it 'passes-away 
into what is not'. Hence it is reasonable enough that 
coming-to-be should never fail. For coming-to-be is a 
passing-away of 'what is not' and passing-away is a coming- 
to-be of 'what is not'.\(^5\)

But what about that which 'is' not except with a quali- 
30 fication?\(^6\) Is it one of the two contrary poles of the change—e.g. is Earth (i.e. the heavy) a 'not-being', but Fire (i.e.

\footnotesize
\(^1\) i.e. without qualification.
\(^2\) i.e. in the Column containing the positive terms: cf. above,
\footnotesize
\(^3\) Cf. above, 318a 13–23.
\(^4\) A 'not-being' in the popular sense of the term, i.e. an 'imper- 
ceptible'. The imperceptibility of the material is irrelevant to the 
question of its reality.
\(^5\) 'what is not' = what is imperceptible.
\(^6\) The matter of substantial change, according to Aristotle's own 
theory, is \(\mu\nu\) \(\delta\) \(\nu\ \alpha\tau\omega\alpha\sigma\)—i.e. it \textit{is} not, unless you qualify 'is' and say it 
'is-potentially'. Cf. above, 317b 15–18.
BOOK I. 3

the light) a 'being'? Or, on the contrary, does 'what is' include Earth as well as Fire, whereas 'what is not' is matter—the matter of Earth and Fire alike? And again, is the matter of each different? Or is it the same, since otherwise they would not come-to-be reciprocally out of one another, i.e. contraries out of contraries? For these things—Fire, Earth, Water, Air—are characterized by 'the contraries'.

Perhaps the solution is that their matter is in one sense the same, but in another sense different. For that which underlies them, whatever its nature may be *qua* underlying them, is the same: but its actual being is not the same. So much, then, on these topics. Next we must state what the difference is between coming-to-be and 'alteration'—for we maintain that these changes are distinct from one another.

Since, then, we must distinguish (a) the *substratum*, and (b) the property whose nature it is to be predicated of the *substratum*; and since change of each of these occurs; there is 'alteration' when the *substratum* is perceptible and persists, but changes in its own properties, the properties in question being opposed to one another either as contraries or as intermediates. The body, e.g., although persisting as the same body, is now healthy and now ill; and the bronze is now spherical and at another time angular, and yet remains the same bronze. But when nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a *substratum*, and the thing changes as a whole (when e.g. the seed as a whole is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a whole into water), such an occurrence is no longer 'alteration'. It is a coming-to-be of one substance and a passing-away of the other—especially if the change proceeds from an imperceptible something to something perceptible (either to touch or to all the senses), as when water comes-to-be out of, or passes-away into, air: for air is pretty well imperceptible. If, however, in such cases, any property (being one of a pair of contraries) persists, in the thing that has come-to-be, the same as it was in the thing

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1 Cf. below, II. 1-3.  
C 2
which has passed-away—if, e.g., when water comes-to-be out of air, both are transparent or cold—the second thing, into which the first changes, must not be a property of this persistent identical something. Otherwise the change will be ‘alteration’.

Suppose, e.g., that the musical man passed-away and an unmusical man came-to-be, and that the man persists as something identical. Now, if ‘musicalness and unmusicalness’ had not been a property essentially inhering in man, these changes would have been a coming-to-be of unmusicalness and a passing-away of musicalness: but in fact ‘musicalness and unmusicalness’ are a property of the persistent identity, viz. man. (Hence, as regards man, these changes are ‘modifications’; though, as regards musical man and unmusical man, they are a passing-away and a coming-to-be.) Consequently such changes are ‘alteration’.

When the change from contrary to contrary is in quantity, it is ‘growth and diminution’; when it is in place, it is ‘motion’; when it is in property, i.e. in quality, it is ‘alteration’: but when nothing persists, of which the resultant is a property (or an ‘accident’ in any sense of the term), it is ‘coming-to-be’, and the converse change is ‘passing-away’.

‘Matter’, in the most proper sense of the term, is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of coming-to-be and passing-away: but the substratum of the remaining kinds of change is also, in a certain sense, ‘matter’, because all these substrata are receptive of ‘contrarieties’ of some kind. So much, then, as an answer to the ques-

1 Aristotle is not saying that water and air are in fact ‘cold’, but is only quoting a common view in illustration.

2 I follow Philoponos in transposing ὑν... ἰπομένοντος (which the manuscripts read after φθοράν in l. 30) to l. 28 after τοῦ δὲ φθοράν.

3 Aristotle’s doctrine is: (i) If ‘musicalness and unmusicalness’ were not a property of man, the change in which ‘a musical man becomes unmusical’ would be a φθορά of musicalness and a γένεσις of unmusicalness. But (ii) since ‘musicalness and unmusicalness’ are a property of man, the change is in fact an ‘alteration’ of man from a state of musicalness to a state of unmusicalness. At the same time, (iii) the change is a φθορά of musical man and a γένεσις of unmusical man.
tions (i) whether coming-to-be 'is' or 'is not'—i.e. what are the precise conditions of its occurrence—and (ii) what 'alteration' is: but we have still to treat of growth. We must explain (i) wherein growth differs from coming-to-be and from 'alteration', and (ii) what is the process of growing and the process of diminishing in each and all of the things that grow and diminish.

Hence our first question is this: Do these changes differ from one another solely because of a difference in their respective 'spheres'? In other words, do they differ because, while a change from this to that (viz. from potential to actual substance) is coming-to-be, a change in the sphere of magnitude is growth and one in the sphere of quality is 'alteration'—both growth and 'alteration' being changes from what is-potentially to what is-actually magnitude and quality respectively? Or is there also a difference in the manner of the change, since it is evident that, whereas neither what is 'altering' nor what is coming-to-be necessarily changes its place, what is growing or diminishing changes its spatial position of necessity, though in a different manner from that in which the moving thing does so? For that which is being moved changes its place as a whole: but the growing thing changes its place like a metal that is being beaten, retaining its position as a whole while its parts change their places. They change their places, but not in the same way as the parts of a revolving globe. For the parts of the globe change their places while the whole continues to occupy an equal place: but the parts of the growing thing expand over an ever-increasing place and the parts of the diminishing thing contract within an ever-diminishing area.

It is clear, then, that these changes—the changes of that which is coming-to-be, of that which is 'altering', and of that which is growing—differ in manner as well as in sphere. But how are we to conceive the 'sphere' of the change which is growth and diminution? The 'sphere' of growing and diminishing is believed to be magnitude. Are we to

\[1\] Cf. above, 315\textsuperscript{a} 26–28.
suppose that body and magnitude come-to-be out of some-
thing which, though potentially magnitude and body, is
actually incorporeal and devoid of magnitude? And since
this description may be understood in two different ways,
in which of these two ways are we to apply it to the process
of growth? Is the matter,\(^1\) out of which growth takes
place, (i) 'separate' and existing alone by itself, or (ii)
'separate' but contained in another body?\(^2\)

Perhaps it is impossible for growth to take place in either
of these ways. For since the matter\(^3\) is 'separate', either
(a) it will occupy no place (as if it were a point), or (b) it
will be a 'void', i.e. a non-perceptible body. But the first
of these alternatives is impossible. For since what comes-
to-be out of this incorporeal and sizeless something will
always be 'somewhere', it too must be 'somewhere'—
either intrinsically or indirectly.\(^4\) And the second alterna-
tive necessarily implies that the matter is contained in some
other body. But if it is to be 'in' another body and yet
remains 'separate' in such a way that it is in no sense
a part of that body (neither a part of its substantial being
nor an 'accident' of it), many impossibilities will result.
It is as if we were to suppose that when, e.g., air comes-to-
be out of water the process were due not to a change of the
water, but to the matter of the air being 'contained in' the
water as in a vessel. This is impossible. For (i) there is
nothing to prevent an indeterminate number of matters
being thus 'contained in' the water, so that they might
come-to-be actually an indeterminate quantity of air;\(^5\) and
(ii) we do not in fact see air coming-to-be out of water in
this fashion, viz. withdrawing out of it and leaving it
unchanged.

It is therefore better to suppose that in all instances of

\(^1\) i.e. the supposed incorporeal and sizeless matter.

\(^2\) It is clear from what follows that the incorporeal and sizeless
matter is assumed to be 'separate'—to be real independently of body—
under both alternatives.

\(^3\) i.e. the supposed incorporeal and sizeless matter.

\(^4\) i.e. either as itself occupying a place, or as contained within
a body which itself occupies a place.

\(^5\) The original is obscure owing to its extreme compression: I have
expanded it in accordance with Zabarella's interpretation.
coming-to-be the matter is inseparable,\(^1\) being numerically identical and one with the ‘containing’ body, though isolable from it by definition. But the same reasons also forbid us to regard the matter, out of which the body comes-to-be,\(^\)\(^2\) as points or lines. The matter is that of which points and lines are limits, and it is something that can never exist without quality and without form.

Now it is no doubt true, as we have also established elsewhere,\(^2\) that one thing ‘comes-to-be’ (in the unqualified sense) out of another thing: and further it is true that the efficient cause of its coming-to-be is either (i) an actual thing (which is the same as the effect either generically—for the efficient cause of the coming-to-be of a hard thing is not a hard thing\(^3\)—or specifically, as e.g. fire is the efficient cause of the coming-to-be of fire or one man of the birth of another), or (ii) an actuality.\(^4\) Nevertheless, since there is also a matter out of which corporeal substance itself comes-to-be (corporeal substance, however, already characterized as such-and-such a determinate body, for there is no such thing as body in general), this same matter is also the matter of magnitude and quality—being separable from these matters by definition, but not separable in place unless Qualities are, in their turn, separable.\(^5\)

It is evident, from the preceding\(^6\) development and discussion of difficulties, that growth is not a change out of something which, though potentially a magnitude, actually possesses no magnitude. For, if it were, ‘the void’ would exist in separation; but we have explained in a former work\(^7\) that this is impossible. Moreover, a change of that kind is not peculiarly distinctive of growth, but characterizes

\(^1\) ‘inseparable’ from the actual body in which it is contained.
\(^2\) Cf. Physics A. 7; Metaph. 1032\(^b\) 12 ff.
\(^3\) The efficient cause of the coming-to-be of a hard thing (e.g. of ice or terra-cotta) is something cold or hot (a freezing wind or a baking fire); cf. Meteor. 382\(^a\) 22 ff. Such efficient causes are only generically, not specifically, identical with their effects. I have transposed the words σκληρὸν γὰρ ὅπως ὑπὸ σκληροῦ γίνεται so as to read them as a parenthesis after ὀμογενῶς in 320\(^b\) 19.
\(^4\) An ‘actuality’ or ‘form’: cf. Metaph. 1032\(^b\) 25 ff.
\(^5\) i.e. unless Qualities or Adjectival are separable from Substances.
\(^6\) Cf. above, 320\(^a\) 27—\(^b\) 12.
\(^7\) Cf. Physics Δ. 6—9.
coming-to-be as such or in general. For growth is an increase, and diminution is a lessening, of the magnitude which is there already—that, indeed, is why the growing thing must possess some magnitude. Hence growth must not be regarded as a process from a matter without magnitude to an actuality of magnitude: for this would be a body's coming-to-be rather than its growth.

We must therefore come to closer quarters with the subject of our inquiry. We must 'grapple' with it (as it were) from its beginning, and determine the precise character of the growing and diminishing whose causes we are investigating.

It is evident (i) that any and every part of the growing thing has increased, and that similarly in diminution every part has become smaller: also (ii) that a thing grows by the accession, and diminishes by the departure, of something. Hence it must grow by the accession either (a) of something incorporeal or (b) of a body. Now, if (a) it grows by the accession of something incorporeal, there will exist separate a void: but (as we have stated before) it is impossible for a matter of magnitude to exist 'separate'. If, on the other hand, (b) it grows by the accession of a body, there will be two bodies—that which grows and that which increases it—in the same place: and this too is impossible.

But neither is it open to us to say that growth or diminution occurs in the way in which e.g. air is generated from water. For, although the volume has then become greater, the change will not be growth, but a coming-to-be of the one—viz. of that into which the change is taking place—and a passing-away of the contrasted body. It is not a growth of either. Nothing grows in the process; unless indeed there be something common to both things (to that which is coming-to-be and to that which passed-away), e.g. 'body', and this grows. The water has not grown, nor has the air: but the former has passed-away and the latter has come-to-be, and—if anything has grown—there has been a growth of 'body'. Yet this too

1 Cf. above, 320\textsuperscript{a} 27—\textsuperscript{b} 25.
is impossible. For our account of growth must preserve the characteristics of that which is growing and diminishing. And these characteristics are three: (i) any and every part of the growing magnitude is made bigger (e.g. if flesh grows, every particle of the flesh gets bigger), (ii) by the accession of something, and (iii) in such a way that the growing thing is preserved and persists. For whereas a thing does not persist in the processes of unqualified coming-to-be or passing-away, that which grows or 'alters' persists in its identity through the 'altering' and through the growing or diminishing, though the quality (in 'alteration') and the size (in growth) do not remain the same.

Now if the generation of air from water is to be regarded as growth, a thing might grow without the accession (and without the persistence) of anything, and diminish without the departure of anything—and that which grows need not persist. But this characteristic must be preserved: for the growth we are discussing has been assumed to be thus characterized.

One might raise a further difficulty. What is 'that which grows'? Is it that to which something is added? If, e.g., a man grows in his shin, is it the shin which is greater—but not that 'whereby' he grows, viz. not the food? Then why have not both 'grown'? For when A is added to B, both A and B are greater, as when you mix wine with water; for each ingredient is alike increased in volume. Perhaps the explanation is that the substance of the one remains unchanged, but the substance of the other (viz. of the food) does not. For indeed, even in the mixture of wine and water, it is the prevailing ingredient which is said to have increased in volume. We say, e.g., that the wine has increased, because the whole mixture acts as wine but not as water. A similar principle applies also to 'alteration'. Flesh is said to have been 'altered' if, while its character and substance remain, some one of its essential properties, which was not there before, now qualifies it: on the other 5

1 viz. the third characteristic—that the growing thing 'persists'.
2 i.e. has 'grown'.
3 i.e. the substance of the shin.
DE GENERATIONE ET CORRUPTIONE

hand, that 'whereby' it has been 'altered' may have undergone no change, though sometimes it too has been affected. The altering agent, however, and the originative source of the process are in the growing thing and in that which is being 'altered': for the efficient cause is in these. No doubt the food, which has come in, may sometimes expand as well as the body that has consumed it (that is so, e.g., if, after having come in, a food is converted into wind), but when it has undergone this change it has passed-away: and the efficient cause is not in the food.

We have now developed the difficulties sufficiently and must therefore try to find a solution of the problem. Our solution must preserve intact the three characteristics of growth—that the growing thing persists, that it grows by the accession (and diminishes by the departure) of something, and further that every perceptible particle of it has become either larger or smaller. We must recognize also (a) that the growing body is not 'void' and that yet there are not two magnitudes in the same place, and (b) that it does not grow by the accession of something incorporeal.

Two preliminary distinctions will prepare us to grasp the cause of growth. We must note (i) that the organic parts grow by the growth of the tissues (for every organ is composed of these as its constituents); and (ii) that flesh, bone, and every such part—like every other thing which has its form immersed in matter—has a twofold nature: for the form as well as the matter is called 'flesh' or 'bone'.

Now, that any and every part of the tissue qua form should grow—and grow by the accession of something—is possible, but not that any and every part of the tissue qua matter should do so. For we must think of the tissue after

1 And therefore it is these which are said to grow or to be 'altered'.
2 Aristotle may be thinking of the conversion of a flatulent food into wind. But more probably he has in mind the maintenance and growth of the ἐνυφον (or σύμφοτον) πνεύμα: cf. de Spiritu 481a 1 ff.
3 The Greek is τὰ ἀνυμομερή, i.e. those parts (of the living thing) whose texture is not uniform throughout.
4 The Greek is τὰ ὁμομομερή, i.e. those parts whose texture is uniform throughout: cf. above, 314a 19-20. In living things such parts correspond roughly to 'the tissues'.
5 i.e. every 'homoeomerous' part (or every 'tissue').
the image of flowing water that is measured by one and the same measure: particle after particle comes-to-be, and each successive particle is different. And it is in this sense that the matter of the flesh grows, some flowing out and some flowing in fresh; not in the sense that fresh matter accedes to every particle of it. There is, however, an accession to every part of its figure or 'form'.

That growth has taken place proportionally, is more manifest in the organic parts—e.g. in the hand. For there the fact that the matter is distinct from the form is more manifest than in flesh, i.e. than in the tissues. That is why there is a greater tendency to suppose that a corpse still possesses flesh and bone than that it still has a hand or an arm.

Hence in one sense it is true that any and every part of the flesh has grown; but in another sense it is false. For there has been an accession to every part of the flesh in respect to its form, but not in respect to its matter. The whole, however, has become larger. And this increase is due (a) on the one hand to the accession of something, which is called 'food' and is said to be 'contrary' to flesh, but (b) on the other hand to the transformation of this food into the same form as that of flesh—as if, e.g., 'moist' were to accede to 'dry' and, having acceded, were to be transformed and to become 'dry'. For in one sense 'Like grows by Like', but in another sense 'Unlike grows by Unlike'.

One might discuss what must be the character of that 'whereby' a thing grows. Clearly it must be potentially that which is growing—potentially flesh, e.g., if it is flesh that is growing. Actually, therefore, it must be 'other' than the growing thing. This 'actual other', then, has passed-away and come-to-be flesh. But it has not been transformed into flesh alone by itself (for that would have

1 I think this clause refers to the matter of the tissue, not to the water. In Aristotle's simile, the 'measure' corresponds to the tissue's form, and the 'water' to its matter. The matter is a flux of different particles always coming-to-be and passing-away, always 'flowing in and out' of the structural plan which is the 'form'.

2 i.e. by an expansion of all parts of the 'form'.
been a coming-to-be, not a growth): on the contrary, it is the growing thing which has come-to-be flesh (and grown) by the food. In what way, then, has the food been modified by the growing thing? Perhaps we should say that it has been 'mixed' with it, as if one were to pour water into wine and the wine were able to convert the new ingredient into wine. And as fire lays hold of the inflammable, so the active principle of growth, dwelling in the growing thing (i.e. in that which is actually flesh), lays hold of an acceding food which is potentially flesh and converts it into actual flesh. The acceding food, therefore, must be together with the growing thing: for if it were apart from it, the change would be a coming-to-be. For it is possible to produce fire by piling logs on to the already burning fire. That is 'growth'. But when the logs themselves are set on fire, that is 'coming-to-be'.

'Quantum-in-general' does not come-to-be any more than 'animal' which is neither man nor any other of the specific forms of animal: what 'animal-in-general' is in coming-to-be, that 'quantum-in-general' is in growth. But what does come-to-be in growth is flesh or bone—or a hand or arm (i.e. the tissues of these organic parts).

Such things come-to-be, then, by the accession not of quantified-flesh but of a quantified-something. In so far as this acceding food is potentially the double result—e.g. is potentially so-much-flesh—it produces growth: for it is bound to become actually both so-much and flesh. But in so far as it is potentially flesh only, it nourishes: for it is thus that 'nutrition' and 'growth' differ by their definition. That is why a body's 'nutrition' continues so

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1 All the manuscripts read ηιδηθη after τουτου in 322a. 9. We must either delete it, or correct it into ηιθηνευ (cf. Philoponos, ed. Vitelli, p. 117, l. 12), or transpose it so as to read it after τουτου in a 8. I have adopted the last alternative in my translation.

2 i.e. 'been modified' so as to be transformed into flesh.

3 i.e. 'lays hold' of it and converts it into fire.

4 i.e. 'must be together with' it when this conversion takes place.

5 i.e. an independent coming-to-be of flesh, not a growth of the already existing tissue.

6 i.e. what comes-to-be in growth is so-much flesh or bone, or a hand or arm of such and such a size: not 'quantum-in-general', but a 'quantified-something'.
long as it is kept alive (even when it is diminishing), though not its 'growth'; and why nutrition, though 'the same' as growth, is yet different from it in its actual being. For in so far as that which accedes is potentially 'so-much-flesh' it tends to increase flesh: whereas, in so far as it is potentially 'flesh' only, it is nourishment.

The form of which we have spoken is a kind of power immersed in matter—a duct, as it were. If, then, a matter accedes—a matter, which is potentially a duct and also potentially possesses determinate quantity—the ducts to which it accedes will become bigger. But if it is no longer able to act—if it has been weakened by the continued influx of matter, just as water, continually mixed in greater and greater quantity with wine, in the end makes the wine watery and converts it into water—then it will cause a diminution of the quantum; though still the form persists.

6 (In discussing the causes of coming-to-be) we must first investigate the matter, i.e. the so-called 'elements'. We must ask whether they really are elements or not, i.e. whether each of them is eternal or whether there is a sense in which they come-to-be: and, if they do come-to-be, whether all of them come-to-be in the same manner, reciprocally out of one another, or whether one amongst them is something

1 i.e. the form which grows in every part of itself: cf. above, 321b 22-34.
2 i.e. this form or power immersed in matter.
3 i.e. a diminution of the size of the tissue whose form it is.
4 For the reading and interpretation of 322a 28-33 see my text and commentary.
5 I have added these words to explain 'first': cf. Zabarella, whose interpretation I have followed.
primary. Hence we must begin by explaining certain preliminary matters, about which the statements now current are vague.

For all (the pluralist philosophers)—those who generate the ‘elements’ as well as those who generate the bodies that are compounded of the elements—make use of ‘dissociation’ and ‘association’, and of ‘action’ and ‘passion’. Now ‘association’ is ‘combination’; but the precise meaning of the process we call ‘combining’ has not been explained. Again, (all the monists make use of ‘alteration’:

but) without an agent and a patient there cannot be ‘altering’ any more than there can be ‘dissociating’ and ‘associating’. For not only those who postulate a plurality of elements employ their reciprocal action and passion to generate the compounds: those who derive things from a single element are equally compelled to introduce ‘acting’. And in this respect Diogenes is right when he argues that

‘unless all things were derived from one, reciprocal action and passion could not have occurred’. The hot thing, e.g., would not be cooled and the cold thing in turn be warmed: for heat and cold do not change reciprocally into one another, but what changes (it is clear) is the substratum. Hence, whenever there is action and passion between two things, that which underlies them must be a single something. No doubt, it is not true to say that all things are of this character; but it is true of all things between which there is reciprocal action and passion.

But if we must investigate ‘action-passion’ and ‘combination’, we must also investigate ‘contact’. For action and passion (in the proper sense of the terms) can only occur between things which are such as to touch one another; nor can things enter into combination at all unless they have come into a certain kind of contact. Hence

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1 I have added the explicit reference to ‘the pluralists’ at b6 and to ‘the monists’ at b9, because Aristotle’s argument in the present passage presupposes this classification and the consequences that were drawn from it in the first chapter.

2 Cf. Diogenes, fr. 2 (Diels, p. 334).

3 i.e. are transformations of a single substratum, or ‘derived from one thing’ as Diogenes maintained.
we must give a definite account of these three things—of 'contact', 'combination', and 'acting'.

Let us start as follows. All things which admit of 'combination' must be capable of reciprocal contact: and the same is true of any two things, of which one 'acts' and the other 'suffers action' in the proper sense of the terms. For this reason we must treat of 'contact' first.

Now every term which possesses a variety of meanings includes those various meanings either owing to a mere coincidence of language, or owing to a real order of derivation in the different things to which it is applied: but, though this may be taken to hold of 'contact' as of all such terms, it is nevertheless true that 'contact' in the proper sense applies only to things which have 'position'. And 'position' belongs only to those things which also have a 'place': for in so far as we attribute 'contact' to the mathematical things, we must also attribute 'place' to them, whether they exist in separation or in some other fashion. Assuming, therefore, that 'to touch' is—as we have defined it in a previous work—'to have the extremes together', only those things will touch one another which, being separate magnitudes and possessing position, have their extremes 'together'. And since position belongs only to those things which also have a 'place', while the primary differentiation of 'place' is 'the above' and 'the below' (and the similar pairs of opposites), all things which touch one another will have 'weight' or 'lightness'—either both these qualities or one or the other of them. But bodies which are heavy or light are such as to 'act' and 'suffer action'. Hence it is clear that those things are by nature such as to touch one another, which (being separate magnitudes) have their extremes 'together' and are able to move, and be moved by, one another.

The manner in which the 'mover' moves the 'moved' is

1 i.e. whether they exist in separation from the perceptible things, or whether they 'are' e.g. as inseparable adjectives of the φυσικά σώματα or as abstracted objects of thought.
3 i.e. if A and B are in reciprocal contact, either A must be heavy and B light, or A light and B heavy: or A and B must both be heavy, or both be light.
not always the same: on the contrary, whereas one kind of 'mover' can only impart motion by being itself moved, another kind can do so though remaining itself unmoved. Clearly therefore we must recognize a corresponding variety in speaking of the 'acting' thing too: for the 'mover' is said to 'act' (in a sense) and the 'acting' thing to 'impart motion'. Nevertheless there is a difference and we must draw a distinction. For not every 'mover' can 'act', if (a) the term 'agent' is to be used in contrast to 'patient' and (b) 'patient' is to be applied only to those things whose motion is a 'qualitative affection'—i.e. a quality, like 'white' or 'hot', in respect to which they are 'moved' only in the sense that they are 'altered': on the contrary, to 'impart motion' is a wider term than to 'act'. Still, so much, at any rate, is clear: the things which are 'such as to impart motion', if that description be interpreted in one sense, will touch the things which are 'such as to be moved by them'—while they will not touch them, if the description be interpreted in a different sense. But the disjunctive definition of 'touching' must include and distinguish (a) 'contact in general' as the relation between two things which, having position, are such that one is able to impart motion and the other to be moved, and (b) 'reciprocal contact' as the relation between two things, one able to impart motion and the other able to be moved in such a way that 'action and passion' are predicable of them.

As a rule, no doubt, if A touches B, B touches A. For indeed practically all the 'movers' within our ordinary experience impart motion by being moved: in their case, what touches inevitably must, and also evidently does, touch something which reciprocally touches it. Yet, if A moves B, it is possible—as we sometimes express it—for A 'merely to touch' B, and that which touches need not touch a something which touches it. Nevertheless it is commonly supposed that 'touching' must be reciprocal. The reason of this belief is that 'movers' which belong to the same kind as the 'moved' impart motion by being moved. Hence if anything imparts motion without itself

1 i.e. if to 'act' be understood in the narrow sense just explained.
being moved, it may touch the 'moved' and yet itself be touched by nothing—for we say sometimes that the man who grieves us 'touches' us, but not that we 'touch' him. The account just given may serve to distinguish and define the 'contact' which occurs in the things of Nature.

Next in order we must discuss 'action' and 'passion'. The traditional theories on the subject are conflicting. For (i) most thinkers are unanimous in maintaining (a) that 'like' is always unaffected by 'like', because (as they argue) neither of two 'likes' is more apt than the other either to act or to suffer action, since all the properties which belong to the one belong identically and in the same degree to the other; and (b) that 'unlikes', i.e. 'differents', are by nature such as to act and suffer action reciprocally. For even when the smaller fire is destroyed by the greater, it suffers this effect (they say) owing to its 'contrariety'—since the great is contrary to the small. But (ii) Demokritos dissented from all the other thinkers and maintained a theory peculiar to himself. He asserts that agent and patient are identical, i.e. 'like'. It is not possible (he says) that 'others', i.e. 'differents', should suffer action from one another: on the contrary, even if two things, being 'others', do act in some way on one another, this happens to them not qua 'others' but qua possessing an identical property.

Such, then, are the traditional theories, and it looks as if the statements of their advocates were in manifest conflict. But the reason of this conflict is that each group is in fact stating a part, whereas they ought to have taken a comprehensive view of the subject as a whole. For (i) if A and B are 'like'—absolutely and in all respects without difference from one another—it is reasonable to infer that neither is in any way affected by the other. Why, indeed, should either of them tend to act any more than the other? Moreover, if 'like' can be affected by 'like', a thing can also be affected by itself: and yet if that were so—if 'like' tended in fact to act qua 'like'—there would be nothing indestructible or immovable, for everything would move itself. And (ii) the same consequence follows if A and B are absolutely 'other', i.e. in no respect identical. Whiteness could not be affected in any way by line nor line by whiteness—
10 We can now understand why fire heats and the cold thing cools, and in general why the active thing assimilates to itself the patient. For agent and patient are contrary to one another, and coming-to-be is a process into the contrary: hence the patient must change into the agent, since it is only thus that coming-to-be will be a process into the contrary. And, again, it is intelligible that the advocates of both views, although their theories are not the same, are yet in contact with the nature of the facts. For sometimes we speak of the *substratum* as suffering action (e.g. of ‘the man’ as being healed, being warmed and chilled, and similarly in all the other cases), but at other times we say ‘what is cold is being warmed’, ‘what is sick is being healed’: and in both these ways of speaking we express the truth, since in one sense it is the ‘matter’, while in another sense it is the ‘contrary’, which suffers action. (We make the same distinction in speaking of the agent: for sometimes we say that ‘the man’, but at other times that ‘what is hot’, pro-
duces heat.) Now the one group of thinkers supposed that agent and patient must possess something identical, because they fastened their attention on the *substratum* : while the other group maintained the opposite because their attention was concentrated on the 'contraries'.

We must conceive the same account to hold of action and passion as that which is true of 'being moved' and 'imparting motion'. For the 'mover', like the 'agent', has two meanings. Both (a) that which contains the originative source of the motion is thought to 'impart motion' (for the originative source is first amongst the causes), and also (b) that which is last, i.e. immediately next to the moved thing and to the coming-to-be. A similar distinction holds also of the agent: for we speak not only (a) of the doctor, but also (b) of the wine, as healing. Now, in motion, there is nothing to prevent the first mover being unmoved (indeed, as regards some 'first movers' this is actually necessary) although the last mover always imparts motion by being itself moved: and, in action, there is nothing to prevent the first agent being unaffected, while the last agent only acts by suffering action itself. For (a) if agent and patient have not the same matter, agent acts without being affected: thus the art of healing produces health without itself being acted upon in any way by that which is being healed. But (b) the food, in acting, is itself in some way acted upon: for, in acting, it is simultaneously heated or cooled or otherwise affected. Now the art of healing corresponds to an 'originative source', while the food corresponds to 'the last' (i.e. 'contiguous') mover.

Those active powers, then, whose forms are not embodied in matter, are unaffected: but those whose forms are in matter are such as to be affected in acting. For we maintain that one and the same 'matter' is equally, so to say, the basis of either of the two opposed things—being as it were a 'kind'; and that that which can be hot must be made hot, provided the heating agent is there, i.e. comes near. Hence (as we have said) some of the active powers.

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1 By 'the coming-to-be' (τὴν γένοσιν) we must apparently understand 'that which is coming-to-be' (τὸ γενόμενον).
2 Cf. above, 324b 26–9.
3 i.e. a kind, of which the two opposed things are contrasted species.
are unaffected while others are such as to be affected; and what holds of motion is true also of the active powers. For as in motion 'the first mover' is unmoved, so among the active powers 'the first agent' is unaffected.

The active power is a 'cause' in the sense of that from which the process originates: but the end, for the sake of which it takes place, is not 'active'. (That is why health is not 'active', except metaphorically.) For when the agent is there, the patient becomes something: but when 'states' are there, the patient no longer becomes but already is—and 'forms' (i.e. 'ends') are a kind of 'state'. As to the 'matter', it (qua matter) is passive. Now fire contains 'the hot' embodied in matter: but a 'hot' separate from matter (if such a thing existed) could not suffer any action. Perhaps, indeed, it is impossible that 'the hot' should exist in separation from matter: but if there are any entities thus separable, what we are saying would be true of them.

We have thus explained what action and passion are, what things exhibit them, why they do so, and in what manner. We must go on to discuss how it is possible for action and passion to take place.

Some philosophers think that the 'last' agent—the 'agent' in the strictest sense—enters in through certain pores, and so the patient suffers action. It is in this way, they assert, that we see and hear and exercise all our other senses. Moreover, according to them, things are seen through air and water and other transparent bodies, because such bodies possess pores, invisible indeed owing to their minuteness, but close-set and arranged in rows: and the more transparent the body, the more frequent and serial they suppose its pores to be.

Such was the theory which some philosophers (including Empedokles) advanced in regard to the structure of certain bodies. They do not restrict it to the bodies which act and suffer action: but 'combination' too, they say, takes place 'only between bodies whose pores are in reciprocal symmetry'. The most systematic and consistent theory, however, and one that applied to all bodies, was advanced

1 i.e. like 'health'.
2 For this sense of πάλιν see Bonitz, Index 559b 13 ff. Perhaps, however, Aristotle means 'We must go back and discuss'.
by Leukippos and Demokritos: and, in maintaining it, they took as their starting-point what naturally comes first.\(^1\)

For some of the older philosophers\(^2\) thought that ‘what is’ must of necessity be ‘one’ and immovable. The void, they argue, ‘is not’: but unless there is a void with a separate being of its own, ‘what is’ cannot be moved—nor again can it be ‘many’, since there is nothing to keep things apart. And in this respect,\(^3\) they insist, the view that the universe is not ‘continuous’ but ‘discretes-in-contact’\(^4\) is no better than the view that there are ‘many’ (and not ‘one’) and a void.\(^5\) For (suppose that the universe is discretes-in-contact. Then)\(^6\) if it is divisible through and through, there is no ‘one’, and therefore no ‘many’ either, but the Whole is void; while to maintain that it is divisible at some points, but not at others, looks like an arbitrary fiction. For up to what limit is it divisible? And for what reason is part of the Whole indivisible, i.e. a plenum, and part divided? Further, they maintain, it is equally\(^7\) necessary to deny the existence of motion.

Reasoning in this way, therefore, they were led to transcend sense-perception, and to disregard it on the ground that ‘one ought to follow the argument’: and so they assert that the universe is ‘one’ and immovable. Some of them add that it is ‘infinite’, since the limit (if it had one) would be a limit against the void.\(^8\)

There were, then, certain thinkers who, for the reasons we have stated, enunciated views of this kind as their theory of ‘The Truth’.\(^9\) ... Moreover,\(^10\) although these

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\(^1\) Perhaps we should read κατὰ φύσιν, ἵππερ ἔστιν and understand the words as a reference to Parmenides (cf. e.g. fr. 8, 1. 1; Diels, p. 118).

\(^2\) The reference is to Parmenides, Melissos, and (probably) Zeno.

\(^3\) i.e. for rendering intelligible the being of a ‘many’.

\(^4\) This appears to be the view of Empedokles, as Aristotle here expresses it: cf. below, 325\(^b\) 5-10.

\(^5\) This appears to be the view of the Pythagoreans: cf. Physics 213\(^b\) 22-7.

\(^6\) I have added these words to bring out the connexion of thought, which is clear enough in the original without any addition.

\(^7\) i.e. the existence of motion is just as impossible on the hypothesis of Empedokles as on that of the Pythagoreans.

\(^8\) Cf. Melissos, e.g. fr. 3, 5, 7 (Diels, pp. 144, 145).

\(^9\) These words (περὶ ἔτι ἀληθεύειν) seem to be intended to suggest ‘The Way of Truth’ in the poem of Parmenides.

\(^10\) One or more arguments against the Eleatic theory appear to have dropped out before ἕτε in a 17.
opinions appear to follow logically in a dialectical discussion, yet to believe them seems next door to madness when one considers the facts. For indeed no lunatic seems to be so far out of his senses as to suppose that fire and ice are ‘one’: it is only between what is right, and what seems right from habit, that some people are mad enough to see no difference.

Leukippos, however, thought he had a theory which harmonized with sense-perception and would not abolish either coming-to-be and passing-away or motion and the multiplicity of things. He made these concessions to the facts of perception: on the other hand, he conceded to the Monists that there could be no motion without a void. The result is a theory which he states as follows: ‘The void is a “not-being”, and no part of “what is” is a “not-being”’; for ‘what “is” in the strict sense of the term is an absolute ‘plenum’. This plenum, however, is not “one”: on the contrary, it is a “many” infinite in number and invisible owing to the minuteness of their bulk. The “many” move in the void (for there is a void)\(^1\): and by coming together they produce “coming-to-be”, while by separating they produce “passing-away”.\(^2\) Moreover, they act and suffer action wherever they chance to be in contact (for there they are not “one”), and they generate by being put together and becoming intertwined. From the genuinely-

one, on the other hand, there never could have come-to-be a multiplicity, nor from the genuinely-many a “one”:

\[\text{325b} \quad \text{that is impossible. But} \quad \text{(just as Empedokles and some of the other philosophers say that things suffer action through their pores,\(^3\) so) all “alteration” and all “passion” take place in the way that has been explained: breaking-up (i.e. “passing-away”) is effected by means of the void, and so too is growth—solids creeping in to fill the void places.}

Empedokles too is practically bound to adopt the same

\[\text{1 i.e. there is a void, though it is a “not-being” or “unreal”.}
\[\text{2 I am greatly indebted to the translation given by Burnet (§ 173) of 324\textsuperscript{b} 35—325\textsuperscript{a} 32, though I have not been able to accept his version in all its details.}
\[\text{3 The comparison with “Empedokles and some of the other philosophers” is of course not part of the argument which Aristotle is here reproducing from Leukippos.}
theory as Leukippos. For he must say that there are certain solids which, however, are indivisible—unless there are continuous pores all through the body. But this last alternative is impossible: for then there will be nothing solid in the body (nothing beside the pores) but all of it will be void. It is necessary, therefore, for his 'contiguous discretes' to be indivisible, while the intervals between them—which he calls 'pores'—must be void. But this is precisely Leukippos's theory of action and passion.

Such, approximately, are the current explanations of the manner in which some things 'act' while others 'suffer action'. And as regards the Atomists, it is not only clear what their explanation is: it is also obvious that it follows with tolerable consistency from the assumptions they employ. 15 But there is less obvious consistency in the explanation offered by the other thinkers. It is not clear, for instance, how, on the theory of Empedokles, there is to be 'passing-away' as well as 'alteration'. For the primary bodies of the Atomists—the primary constituents of which bodies are composed, and the ultimate elements into which they are dissolved—are indivisible, differing from one another only in figure. In the philosophy of Empedokles, on the other hand, it is evident that all the other bodies down to the 'elements' have their coming-to-be and their passing-away: but it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away. Nor is it possible for Empedokles to explain how they do so, since he does not assert that Fire too 1 (and similarly every one of his other 'elements') possesses 'elementary constituents' of itself.

Such an assertion would commit him to doctrines like those which Plato has set forth in the Timaeus. 2 For although both Plato and Leukippos postulate elementary constituents that are indivisible and distinctively characterized by figures, there is this great difference between the two theories: the 'indivisibles' of Leukippos (i) are solids, while those of Plato are planes, and (ii) are characterized by an infinite variety of figures, while the characterizing

1 i.e. as well as the composite bodies.
2 Cf. Timaeus 53 c ff.
figures employed by Plato are limited in number. Thus the 'comings-to-be' and the 'dissociations' result from the 'indivisibles' (a) according to Leukippos through the void and through contact (for it is at the point of contact that each of the composite bodies is divisible\(^1\)), but (b) according to Plato in virtue of contact alone, since he denies there is a void.

Now we have discussed 'indivisible planes' in the preceding treatise.\(^2\) But with regard to the assumption of 'indivisible solids', although we must not now enter upon a detailed study of its consequences, the following criticisms fall within the compass of a short digression:—

(I) The Atomists are committed to the view that every 'indivisible' is incapable alike of receiving a sensible property (for nothing can 'suffer action' except through the void) and of producing one—no 'indivisible' can be, e.g., either hard or cold.\(^3\) Yet it is surely a paradox that an exception is made of 'the hot'—'the hot' being assigned as peculiar to the spherical figure: for, that being so, its 'contrary' also ('the cold') is bound to belong to another of the figures. If, however, these properties (heat and cold) do belong to the 'indivisibles', it is a further paradox that they should not possess heaviness and lightness, and hardness and softness. And yet Demokritos says 'the more any indivisible exceeds, the heavier it is'—to which we must clearly add 'and the hotter it is'. But if that is their character, it is impossible they should not be affected by one another: the 'slightly-hot indivisible', e.g., will inevitably suffer action from one which far exceeds it in heat.\(^4\) Again, if any 'indivisible' is 'hard', there must also be one which is 'soft': but 'the soft' derives its very name from the fact that it suffers a certain action—for 'soft' is that which yields to pressure. (II) But further,

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\(^1\) Cf. above, 325\(^b\) 32–4.

\(^2\) Cf. de Caelo I. 1, especially 298\(^b\) 33 ff., II. 7 and Δ. 2.

\(^3\) Or perhaps this clause is a quotation: 'since "no indivisible can be either hard or cold".'

\(^4\) If, as Demokritos asserts, the 'indivisibles' differ in weight, being heavy in direct proportion to their mass, his 'spherical indivisibles' (Aristotle argues) must differ in the degree of their heat on the same principle. But if A is hotter than B, B is susceptible to the action of A. Hence Demokritos has violated a fundamental thesis of his own theory (cf. 326\(^a\) 1–2), viz. that every 'indivisible' must be àπαθής.
not only is it paradoxical (i) that no property except figure should belong to the 'indivisibles': it is also paradoxical (ii) that, if other properties do belong to them, one only of these additional properties should attach to each—e.g. that this 'indivisible' should be cold and that 'indivisible' hot. For, on that supposition, their substance would not even be uniform. And it is equally impossible (iii) that more than one of these additional properties should belong to the single 'indivisible'. For, being indivisible, it will possess these properties in the same point—so that, if it 'suffers action' by being chilled, it will also, qua chilled, 'act' or suffer action' in some other way. And the same line of argument applies to all the other properties too: for the difficulty we have just raised confronts, as a necessary consequence, all who advocate 'indivisibles' (whether solids or planes), since their 'indivisibles' cannot become either 'rarer' or 'denser' inasmuch as there is no void in them. (III) It is a further paradox that there should be small 'indivisibles', but not large ones. For it is natural enough, from the ordinary point of view, that the larger bodies should be more liable to fracture than the small ones, since they (viz. the large bodies) are easily broken up because they collide with many other bodies. But why should indivisibility as such be the property of small, rather than of large, bodies? (IV) Again, is the substance of all those solids uniform, or do they fall into sets which differ from one another—as if, e.g., some of them, in their aggregated bulk, were 'fiery', others 'earthy'? For (i) if all of them are uniform in substance, what is it that separated one from another? Or why, when they come into contact, do they not coalesce into one, as drops of water run together when drop touches drop (for the two cases are precisely parallel)? On the other hand (ii) if they fall into differing sets, how are these characterized? It is clear, too, that these, rather than the 'figures', ought to be postulated as 'original reals',

1 The uniformity of the substance or 'stuff' of the atoms was a fundamental doctrine in the theory. Cf. Physics 203.34—204.2, de Cælo 275b 31—2; Burnet, p. 336a.

2 i.e. in its single, indivisible, undifferentiated identity.

3 Cf. above, 325b 22.

4 i.e. these qualitatively-distinct sets of atoms.
i.e. causes from which the phenomena result. Moreover, if they differed in substance, they would both act and suffer action on coming into reciprocal contact. (V) Again, what is it which sets them moving? For if their 'mover' is other than themselves, they are such as to 'suffer action'. If, on the other hand, each of them sets itself in motion, either (a) it will be divisible ('imparting motion' *qua* this, 'being moved' *qua* that), or (b) contrary properties will attach to it in the same respect—i.e. 'matter' will be identical-in-potentiality as well as numerically-identical.¹

As to the thinkers who explain modification of property through the movement facilitated by the pores, if this is supposed to occur notwithstanding the fact that the pores are filled, their postulate of pores is superfluous. For if the whole body suffers action under these conditions, it would suffer action in the same way even if it had no pores but were just its own continuous self. Moreover, how can their account of 'vision through a medium' be correct? It is impossible for (the visual ray)² to penetrate the transparent bodies at their 'contacts'; and impossible for it to pass through their pores if every pore be full. For how will that ³ differ from having no pores at all? The body will be uniformly 'full' throughout. But, further, even if these passages, though they must contain bodies, are 'void', the same consequence will follow once more.⁴ And if they are 'too minute to admit any body', it is absurd to suppose there is a 'minute' void and yet to deny the existence of a 'big' one (no matter how small the 'big' may be ⁵), or to imagine 'the void' means anything else than a body's place—whence it clearly follows that to every body there will correspond a void of equal cubic capacity.

¹ For the doctrine implied in this argument, cf. *Physics* 190b 24, 192b 1 ff.
² I have added these words because Aristotle is referring to Empedokles's theory of vision. Cf. Empedokles, fr. 84 (Diels, pp. 196-7); Plato, *Timaeus* 45 b ff.
³ s. having pores, all of which are 'full'.
⁴ i.e. the body will still be impenetrable, even if the pores as such (as channels) are distinguished in thought from what fills them. For in fact the pores are always 'full' and the body is a *plenum* throughout—though perhaps not a 'uniform' *plenum*.
⁵ 'Big' is a relative term and may include a void in any degree bigger than the infinitesimal.
As a general criticism we must urge that to postulate pores is superfluous. For if the agent produces no effect by touching the patient, neither will it produce any by passing through its pores. On the other hand, if it acts by contact, then—even without pores—some things will 'suffer action' and others will 'act', provided they are by nature adapted for reciprocal action and passion. Our arguments have shown that it is either false or futile to advocate pores in the sense in which some thinkers conceive them. But since bodies are divisible through and through, the postulate of pores is ridiculous: for, qua divisible, a body can fall into separate parts.\footnote{1}{Cf. above, 316b 28-9. Division \textit{eo ipso} opens a channel in the body.}

Let us explain the way in which things in fact possess the power of generating, and of acting and suffering action: and let us start from the principle we have often enunciated. For, assuming the distinction between (a) that which is \textit{potentially} and (b) that which is \textit{actually} such-and-such, it is the nature of the first, precisely in so far as it is what it is, to suffer action \textit{through and through}, not merely to be susceptible in some parts while insusceptible in others. But its susceptibility varies in degree, according as it is more or less such-and-such, and one would be more justified in speaking of 'pores' in this connexion: for instance, in the metals there are veins of 'the susceptible' stretching continuously through the substance.\footnote{2}{viz. to express such lines of greater susceptibility.}

So long, indeed, as any body is naturally coherent and one, it is insusceptible. So, too, bodies are insusceptible so long as they are not in contact either with one another or with other bodies which are by nature such as to act and suffer action. (To illustrate my meaning: Fire heats not only when in contact, but also from a distance. For the fire heats the air, and the air—being by nature such as both to act and suffer action—heats the body.) But the supposition that a body is 'susceptible in some parts, but insusceptible in others' (is only possible for those who hold an erroneous view concerning the divisibility of magnitudes.
For us the following account results from the distinctions we established at the beginning. For (i) if magnitudes are not divisible through and through—if, on the contrary, there are indivisible solids or planes—then indeed no body would be susceptible through and through: but neither would any be continuous. Since, however, (ii) this is false, i.e. since every body is divisible, there is no difference between 'having been divided into parts which remain in contact' and 'being divisible'. For if a body 'can be separated at the contacts' (as some thinkers express it), then, even though it has not yet been divided, it will be in a state of dividedness—since, as it can be divided, nothing inconceivable results. And (iii) the supposition is open to this general objection—it is a paradox that 'passion' should occur in this manner only, viz. by the bodies being split. For this theory abolishes 'alteration': but we see the same body liquid at one time and solid at another, without losing its continuity. It has suffered this change not by 'division' and 'composition', nor yet by 'turning' and 'intercontact' as Demokritos asserts; for it has passed from the liquid to the solid state without any change of 'grouping' or 'position' in the constituents of its substance. Nor are there contained within it those 'hard' (i.e. congealed) particles 'indivisible in their bulk': on the contrary, it is liquid—and again, solid and congealed—uniformly all through. This theory, it must be added, makes growth and diminution impossible also. For if there is to be apposition (instead of the growing thing having changed as a whole, either by the admixture of something or by its own transformation), increase of size will not have resulted in any and every part.

So much, then, to establish that things generate and are generated, act and suffer action, reciprocally; and to distinguish the way in which these processes can occur from the (impossible) way in which some thinkers say they occur.

1 A clause to this effect appears to have dropped out before διοπισσατος in a6.  
2 Cf. above, 316a 14—317a 17.  
3 i.e. if this potentiality be realized: cf. 316a 19. The argument turns on Aristotle's conception of τὸ διαμαρὰ: cf. Metaph. 1047a 24—6.  
4 Cf. above, 315b 33—316b 1.  
5 Cf. above, 321b 2—26.
But we have still to explain ‘combination’, for that was the third of the subjects we originally proposed to discuss. Our explanation will proceed on the same method as before. We must inquire: What is ‘combination’, and what is that which can ‘combine’? Of what things, and under what conditions, is ‘combination’ a property? And, further, does ‘combination’ exist in fact, or is it false to assert its existence?

For, according to some thinkers, it is impossible for one thing to be combined with another. They argue that (i) if both the ‘combined’ constituents persist unaltered, they are no more ‘combined’ now than they were before, but are in the same condition: while (ii) if one has been destroyed, the constituents have not been ‘combined’—on the contrary, one constituent is and the other is not, whereas ‘combination’ demands uniformity of condition in them both: and on the same principle (iii) even if both the combining constituents have been destroyed as the result of their coalescence, they cannot ‘have been combined’ since they have no being at all.

What we have in this argument is, it would seem, a demand for the precise distinction of ‘combination’ from coming-to-be and passing-away (for it is obvious that ‘combination’, if it exists, must differ from these processes) and for the precise distinction of the ‘combinable’ from that which is such as to come-to-be and pass-away. As soon, therefore, as these distinctions are clear, the difficulties raised by the argument would be solved.

Now (i) we do not speak of the wood as ‘combined’ with the fire, nor of its burning as a ‘combining’ either of its particles with one another or of itself with the fire: what we say is that ‘the fire is coming-to-be, but the wood is passing-away’. Similarly, we speak neither (ii) of the food as ‘combining’ with the body, nor (iii) of the shape as ‘combining’ with the wax and thus fashioning the lump. Nor can body ‘combine’ with white, nor (to generalize) ‘properties’ and ‘states’ with ‘things’: for we see them persisting unaltered. But again (iv) white and knowledge cannot

1 Cf. above, 322b 5 ff.
2 sc. in the resulting complex (e.g. ‘white-body’ or ‘learned-man’).
be 'combined' either, nor any other of the 'adjectivals'.

Ann, this is a blemish in the theory of those who assert that 'once upon a time all things were together and combined'. For not everything can 'combine' with everything. On the contrary, both of the constituents that are combined in the compound must originally have existed in separation: but no property can have separate existence.)

Since, however, some things are-potentially while others are-actually, the constituents combined in a compound can 'be' in a sense and yet 'not-be'. The compound may be-actually other than the constituents from which it has resulted; nevertheless each of them may still be-potentially what it was before they were combined, and both of them may survive undestroyed. (For this was the difficulty that emerged in the previous argument: and it is evident that the combining constituents not only coalesce, having formerly existed in separation, but also can again be separated out from the compound.) The constituents, therefore, neither (a) persist actually, as 'body' and 'white' persist: nor (b) are they destroyed (either one of them or both), for their 'power of action' is preserved. Hence these difficulties may be dismissed: but the problem immediately connected with them—'whether combination is something relative to perception'—must be set out and discussed.

When the combining constituents have been divided into parts so small, and have been juxtaposed in such a manner, that perception fails to discriminate them one from another, have they then 'been combined'? Or ought we to say 'No, not until any and every part of one constituent is juxtaposed to a part of the other'? The term, no doubt, is applied in the former sense: we speak, e.g., of wheat having been 'combined' with barley when each grain of the one is juxtaposed to a grain of the other. But every body is divisible and therefore, since body 'combined'...

1 Aristotle is perhaps thinking of the 'Sphere' of Empedokles, as well as of the πύρα of Anaxagoras.

2 Cf. below, 328a28-31 and 334b8-30.

3 The difference between these two views—both of which Aristotle rejects—is one of degree. According to the first view, the constituents are divided into parts too small for the normal vision to discriminate, and then shuffled. According to the second, the constituents are divided into 'least' parts, i.e. into atoms: and these are shuffled.

4 For μικτόν = μικτέω cf. e.g. below, 334b31.
with body is uniform in texture throughout, any and every part of each constituent ought to be juxtaposed to a part of the other.

No body, however, can be divided into its 'least' parts: and 'composition' is not identical with 'combination', but other than it. From these premises it clearly follows (i) that so long as the constituents are preserved in small particles, we must not speak of them as 'combined'. (For this will be a 'composition' instead of a 'blending' or 'combination': nor will every portion of the resultant exhibit the same ratio between its constituents as the whole. But we maintain that, if 'combination' has taken place, the compound must be uniform in texture throughout—any part of such a compound being the same as the whole, just as any part of water is water: whereas, if 'combination' is 'composition of the small particles', nothing of the kind will happen. On the contrary, the constituents will only be 'combined' relatively to perception: and the same thing will be 'combined' to one percipient, if his sight is not sharp, (but not to another;) while to the eye of Lynkeus nothing will be 'combined'.) It clearly follows (ii) that we must not speak of the constituents as 'combined' in virtue of a division such that any and every part of each is juxtaposed to a part of the other: for it is impossible for them to be thus divided. Either, then, there is no 'combination', or we have still to explain the manner in which it can take place.

Now, as we maintain, some things are such as to act and others such as to suffer action from them. Moreover, some things—viz. those which have the same matter—‘reciprocate’, i.e. are such as to act upon one another and to suffer action from one another; while other things, viz. agents which have not the same matter as their patients, act without themselves suffering action. Such agents cannot 'combine'—that is why neither the art of healing nor health produces health by ‘combining’ with the bodies of the patients. Amongst those things, however, which are reci-

1 The words I have added represent the antithesis implied by the beginning of the sentence: but Aristotle prefers to clinch his argument by the reference to Lynkeus, at the cost of a slight anacoluthon.

2 Cf. above, I. 7.
procally active and passive, some are easily-divisible. Now
(i) if a great quantity (or a large bulk) of one of these easily-
divisible 'reciprocating' materials be brought together with
a little (or with a small piece) of another, the effect produced
is not 'combination', but increase of the dominant: for the
other material is transformed into the dominant. (That is
why a drop of wine does not 'combine' with ten thousand
gallons of water: for its form is dissolved, and it\(^1\) is changed
so as to merge in the total volume of water.) On the other
hand (ii) when there is a certain equilibrium between their
'powers of action', then each of them changes out of its own
nature towards the dominant: yet neither becomes the other,
but both become an intermediate with properties common
to both.\(^2\)

Thus it is clear that only those agents are 'combinable'
which involve a contrariety—for these are such as to suffer
action reciprocally. And, further, they combine more
freely if small pieces of each of them are juxtaposed.
For in that condition they change one another more easily
and more quickly; whereas this effect takes a long time
when agent and patient are present in bulk.

Hence, amongst the divisible susceptible materials, those
whose shape is readily adaptable have a tendency to com-
bine: for they are easily divided into small particles, since
that is precisely what 'being readily adaptable in shape'
implies. For instance, liquids are the most 'combinable'
of all bodies—because, of all divisible materials, the liquid
is most readily adaptable in shape, unless it be viscous.

Viscous liquids, it is true, produce no effect except to
increase the volume and bulk. But when one of the con-
stituents is alone susceptible—or superlatively susceptible,
the other being susceptible in a very slight degree—the
compound resulting from their combination is either no
greater in volume or only a little greater. This is what
happens when tin is combined with bronze. For some
things display a hesitating and ambiguous attitude towards

\(^1\) sc. the drop of wine.

\(^2\) Each of the constituents, qua acting on the other, is relatively
'dominant'. Neither of them is absolutely 'dominant', for each
'suffers action' from the other. Hence each meets the other half-
way, and the resultant is a compromise between them.
one another—showing a slight tendency to combine and also an inclination to behave as 'receptive matter' and 'form' respectively. The behaviour of these metals is a case in point. For the tin almost vanishes, behaving as if it were an immaterial property of the bronze: having been combined, it disappears, leaving no trace except the colour it has imparted to the bronze. The same phenomenon occurs in other instances too.

It is clear, then, from the foregoing account, that 'combination' occurs, what it is, to what it is due, and what kind of thing is 'combinable'. The phenomenon depends upon the fact that some things are such as to be (a) reciprocally susceptible and (b) readily adaptable in shape, i.e. easily divisible. For such things can be 'combined' without its being necessary either that they should have been destroyed or that they should survive absolutely unaltered: and their 'combination' need not be a 'composition', nor merely 'relative to perception'. On the contrary: any thing is 'combinable' which, being readily adaptable in shape, is such as to suffer action and to act; and it is 'combinable with' another thing similarly characterized (for the 'combinable' is relative to the 'combinable'); and 'combination' is unification of the 'combinables', resulting from their 'alteration'.

BOOK II

I We have explained under what conditions 'combination', 'contact', and 'action-passion' are attributable to the things which undergo natural change. Further, we have discussed 'unqualified' coming-to-be and passing-away, and explained under what conditions they are predicable, of what subject, and owing to what cause. Similarly, we have also discussed 'alteration', and explained what 'altering' is and how it
differs from coming-to-be and passing-away. But we have still to investigate the so-called ‘elements’ of bodies.

For the complex substances whose formation and maintenance are due to natural processes all presuppose the perceptible bodies as the condition of their coming-to-be and passing-away: but philosophers disagree in regard to the matter which underlies these perceptible bodies. Some maintain it is single, supposing it to be, e.g., Air or Fire, or an ‘intermediate’ between these two (but still a body with a separate existence). Others, on the contrary, postulate two or more materials—ascribing to their ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’, or to their ‘alteration’, the coming-to-be and passing-away of things. (Some, for instance, postulate Fire and Earth: some add Air, making three: and some, like Empedokles, reckon Water as well, thus postulating four.)

Now we may agree that the primary materials, whose change (whether it be ‘association and dissociation’ or a process of another kind) results in coming-to-be and passing-away, are rightly described as ‘originative sources, i.e. elements’. But (i) those thinkers are in error who postulate, beside the bodies we have mentioned, a single matter—and that a corporeal and separable matter. For this ‘body’ of theirs cannot possibly exist without a ‘perceptible contrariety’: this ‘Boundless’, which some thinkers identify with the ‘original real’, must be either light or heavy, either cold or hot. And (ii) what Plato has written in the Timaeus is not based on any precisely-articulated conception. For he has not stated clearly whether his ‘Omnirecipient’ exists in separation from the ‘elements’; nor does he make any use of it. He says, indeed, that it is a substratum prior to the so-called ‘elements’—underlying them, as gold underlies the things that are fashioned of gold. (And yet this comparison, if thus expressed, is itself open to criticism. Things which come-to-be and pass-away cannot be called by the name of the material out of which they have come-to-be: it is only the results of ‘alteration’ which retain the name of the substratum whose ‘alterations’ they

1 Cf. below, 332a 20–6.  
2 Cf. Timaeus 51a.
are. However, he actually says\(^1\) that 'far the truest account is to affirm that each of them\(^2\) is "gold"'.\(^3\) Nevertheless he carries his analysis of the 'elements'—solids though they are—back to 'planes',\(^3\) and it is impossible for 'the Nurse'\(^4\) (i.e. the primary matter) to be identical with 'the planes'.

Our own doctrine is that although there is a matter of the perceptible bodies (a matter out of which the so-called\(^5\) 'elements' come-to-be), it has no separate existence, but is always bound up with a contrariety. A more precise account of these presuppositions has been given in another work\(^6\): we must, however, give a detailed explanation of the primary bodies as well, since they too are similarly derived from the matter.\(^6\). We must reckon as an 'originative source' and as 'primary' the matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from, the contrary qualities: for 'the hot' is not matter for 'the cold' nor 'the cold' for 'the hot', but the \textit{substratum} is matter for them both. We therefore have to recognize three 'originative sources': \textit{firstly} that which is potentially perceptible body, \textit{secondly} the contrarieties (I mean, e.g., heat and cold), and \textit{thirdly} Fire, Water, and the like. \textit{Only 'thirdly', however:} for these bodies change into one another (they are not immutable as Empedokles and other thinkers assert, since 'alteration' would then have been impossible), whereas the contrarieties do not change.

Nevertheless, even so\(^7\) the question remains: What sorts of contrarieties, and how many of them, are to be accounted 'originative sources' of body? For all the other thinkers assume and use them without explaining why they are; \textit{these} or why they are just \textit{so many}.

\section*{2} Since, then, we are looking for 'originative sources' of

\(^1\) Cf. \textit{Timaeus} 49 d–50 c.
\(^2\) I.e. each of the things that are 'fashioned of gold'.
\(^3\) Cf. \textit{Timaeus} 53 c ff.
\(^4\) Cf. \textit{Timaeus}, e.g. 49 a, 52 d.
\(^5\) Cf. \textit{Physics} A. 6–9, where \(\pi\rho\omega\tau\eta\ \iota\lambda\eta\) and 'the contrariety' (\(\epsilon\iota\delta\omega\varsigma\) and \(\sigma\tau\iota\rho\iota\nu\iota\varsigma\)) are accurately defined and distinguished as presuppositions of \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\iota\). The account in the \textit{Physics} applied generally to the \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\iota\) of any and every perceptible body. Aristotle now proposes to apply it to the \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\iota\) of the \textit{primary} perceptible bodies in particular.
\(^6\) Cf. Physics A. 6–9, where \(\pi\rho\omega\tau\eta\ \iota\lambda\eta\) and 'the contrariety' (\(\epsilon\iota\delta\omega\varsigma\) and \(\sigma\tau\iota\rho\iota\nu\iota\varsigma\)) are accurately defined and distinguished as presuppositions of \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\iota\). The account in the \textit{Physics} applied generally to the \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\iota\) of any and every perceptible body. Aristotle now proposes to apply it to the \(\gamma\epsilon\nu\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\iota\) of the \textit{primary} perceptible bodies in particular.
\(^7\) I.e. notwithstanding the sketch Aristotle has just given.
perceptible body; and since 'perceptible' is equivalent to 'tangible', and 'tangible' is that of which the perception is touch; it is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute 'forms' and 'originative sources' of body, but only those which correspond to touch. For it is in accordance with a contrariety—a contrariety, moreover, of tangible qualities—that the primary bodies are differentiated. That is why neither whiteness (and blackness), nor sweetness (and bitterness), nor (similarly) any quality belonging to the other perceptible contrarieties either, constitutes an 'element'. And yet vision is prior to touch, so that its object also is prior to the object of touch. The object of vision, however, is a quality of tangible body not qua tangible, but qua something else—qua something which may well be naturally prior to the object of touch.

Accordingly, we must segregate the tangible differences and contrarieties, and distinguish which amongst them are primary. Contrarieties correlative to touch are the following: hot-cold, dry-moist, heavy-light, hard-soft, viscous-brittle, rough-smooth, coarse-fine. Of these (i) heavy and light are neither active nor susceptible. Things are not called 'heavy' and 'light' because they act upon, or suffer action from, other things. But the 'elements' must be reciprocally active and susceptible, since they 'combine' and are transformed into one another. On the other hand (ii) hot and cold, and dry and moist, are terms, of which the first pair implies power to act and the second pair susceptibility. 'Hot' is that which 'associates' things of the same kind (for 'dissociating', which people attribute to Fire as its function, is 'associating' things of the same class, since its effect is to eliminate what is foreign), while 'cold' is that which brings together, i.e. 'associates', homogeneous and heterogeneous things alike. And 'moist' is that which, being readily adaptable in shape, is not determinable by any limit of its own: while 'dry' is that which is readily determinable by its own limit, but not readily adaptable in shape.

1 sc. in this connexion: the tangible qualities are the only qualities which characterize all perceptible bodies.

2 sc. the other non-tangible perceptible contrarieties.
From moist and dry are derived (iii) the fine and coarse, viscous and brittle, hard and soft, and the remaining tangible differences. For \((a)\) since the moist has no determinate shape, but is readily adaptable and follows the outline of that which is in contact with it, it is characteristic of it to be 'such as to fill up'. Now 'the fine' is 'such as to fill up'. For 'the fine' consists of subtle particles; but that which consists of small particles is 'such as to fill up', inasmuch as it is in contact whole with whole—and 'the fine' exhibits this character in a superlative degree. Hence it is evident that the fine derives from the moist, while the coarse derives from the dry. Again \((b)\) 'the viscous' derives from the moist: for 'the viscous' \((\text{e.g. oil})\) is a 'moist' modified in a certain way. 'The brittle', on the other hand, derives from the dry: for 'brittle' is that which is completely dry—so completely, that its solidification has actually been due to failure of moisture. Further \((c)\) 'the soft' derives from the moist. For 'soft' is that which yields to pressure by retiring into itself, though it does not yield by total displacement as the moist does—which explains why the moist is not 'soft', although 'the soft' derives from the moist. 'The hard', on the other hand, derives from the dry: for 'hard' is that which is solidified, and the solidified is dry.

The terms 'dry' and 'moist' have more senses than one. For 'the damp', as well as the moist, is opposed to the dry: and again 'the solidified', as well as the dry, is opposed to the moist. But all these qualities derive from the dry and moist we mentioned first.\(^3\) For \((i)\) the dry is opposed to the damp: i.e. 'damp' is that which has foreign moisture on its surface ('sodden' being that which is penetrated to its core), while 'dry' is that which has lost foreign moisture. Hence it is evident that the damp will derive from the moist, and 'the dry' which is opposed to it will derive from the primary dry. Again \((ii)\) the 'moist' and the solidified derive in the same way from the primary pair.

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1 'in contact' with the vessel which contains it.
2 The fine, owing to the subtlety (= the smallness) of its particles, leaves no corner of its containing receptacle unfilled.
3 Cf. above, 329\(^b\) 30–2.
4 sc. by foreign moisture: cf. below, \(^a\) 22.
5 i.e. the 'dry' which is contrasted with the damp: the 'dried'.
DE GENERATIONE ET CORRUPTIONE

For 'moist'¹ is that which contains moisture of its own deep within it ('sodden' being that which is deeply penetrated by foreign moisture), whereas 'solidified' is that which has lost this inner moisture. Hence these too derive from the primary pair, the 'solidified' from the dry and the 'liquefiable' from the moist.

25 It is clear, then, that all the other differences reduce to the first four, but that these admit of no further reduction. For the hot is not essentially moist or dry, nor the moist essentially hot or cold: nor are the cold and the dry derivative forms, either of one another or of the hot and the moist. Hence these must be four.

30 The elementary qualities are four, and any four terms can be combined in six couples. Contraries, however, refuse to be coupled: for it is impossible for the same thing to be hot and cold, or moist and dry. Hence it is evident that the 'couplings' of the elementary qualities will be four: hot with dry and moist with hot, and again cold with dry and cold with moist. And these four couples have attached themselves to the apparently 'simple' bodies (Fire, Air, Water, and Earth) in a manner consonant with theory. For Fire is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist (Air being a sort of aqueous vapour); and Water is cold and moist, while Earth is cold and dry. Thus the differences are reasonably distributed among the primary bodies, and the number of the latter is consonant with theory. For all who make the simple bodies 'elements' postulate either one, or two, or three, or four. Now (i) those who assert there is one only, and then generate everything else by condensation and rarefaction, are in effect making their 'originative sources' two, viz. the rare and the dense, or rather the hot and the cold: for it is these which are the moulding forces, while the 'one'² underlies them as a 'matter'. But (ii) those who postulate two from the start—as Parmenides postulated Fire and Earth—make the intermediates (e.g. Air and Water) blends of these.

¹ i.e. the 'moist' which is contrasted with the solidified: the 'liquefiable'.
² i.e. the single 'element' which these monistic theories postulate.
The same course is followed (iii) by those who advocate three. (We may compare what Plato does in 'The Divisions': for he makes 'the middle' a blend.) Indeed, there is practically no difference between those who postulate two and those who postulate three, except that the former split the middle 'element' into two, while the latter treat it as only one. But (iv) some advocate four from the start, e.g. Empedokles: yet he too draws them together so as to reduce them to the two, for he opposes all the others to Fire.

In fact, however, fire and air, and each of the bodies we have mentioned, are not simple, but blended. The 'simple' bodies are indeed similar in nature to them, but not identical with them. Thus the 'simple' body corresponding to fire is 'such-as-fire', not fire: that which corresponds to air is 'such-as-air': and so on with the rest of them. But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of cold. For freezing and boiling are excesses of heat and cold respectively. Assuming, therefore, that ice is a freezing of moist and cold, fire analogously will be a boiling of dry and hot: a fact, by the way, which explains why nothing comes-to-be either out of ice or out of fire.

The 'simple' bodies, since they are four, fall into two pairs which belong to the two regions, each to each: for Fire and Air are forms of the body moving towards the 'limit', while Earth and Water are forms of the body which moves towards the 'centre'. Fire and Earth, moreover, are extremes and purest: Water and Air, on the contrary, are intermediates and more like blends. And, further, the members of either pair are contrary to those of the other, Water being contrary to Fire and Earth to Air; for the qualities constituting Water and Earth are contrary to those that constitute Fire and Air. Nevertheless, since they are four, each of them is characterized par excellence

1 Cf. above, 329a2. Philoponos attributes this trialistic theory to Ion of Chios.
2 I take 'The Divisions' to mean that section of the Timaeus (35a ff.) in which Plato describes the making of the Soul. Aristotle's point is merely that Plato makes 'the middle' of his three kinds of 'substance' a 'blend' of the other two.
3 Cf. de Caelo, e.g. 269b 20–9, 308a 14–33, 311a 15 ff.
by a single quality: Earth by dry rather than by cold, 5 Water by cold rather than by moist, Air by moist rather than by hot, and Fire by hot rather than by dry.

It has been established before 1 that the coming-to-be of 4 the 'simple' bodies is reciprocal. At the same time, it is manifest, even on the evidence of perception, that they do come-to-be: for otherwise there would not have been 'alteration', since 'alteration' is change in respect to the qualities of the objects of touch. Consequently, we must explain (i) what is the manner of their reciprocal transformation, and (ii) whether every one of them can come-to-be out of every one—or whether some can do so, but not others.

Now it is evident that all of them are by nature such as to change into one another: for coming-to-be is a change into contraries and out of contraries, and the 'elements' all involve a contrariety in their mutual relations because their distinctive qualities are contrary. For in some of them both qualities are contrary—e.g. in Fire and Water, the first of these being dry and hot, and the second moist and cold: while in others one of the qualities (though only one) is contrary—e.g. in Air and Water, the first being moist and hot, and the second moist and cold. It is evident, therefore, if we consider them in general, that every one is by nature such as to come-to-be out of every one: and when we come to consider them severally, it is not difficult to see the manner in which their transformation is effected. For, though all will result from all, both the speed and the facility of their conversion will differ in degree.

Thus (i) the process of conversion will be quick between those which have interchangeable 'complementary factors', but slow between those which have none. The reason is that it is easier for a single thing to change than for many. Air, e.g., will result from Fire if a single quality changes: for Fire, as we saw, is hot and dry while Air is hot and moist, so that there will be Air if the dry be overcome by the moist. Again, Water will result from Air if the hot be overcome by the cold: for Air, as we saw, is hot and moist

1 The reference is probably neither to 314b 15-26 nor to 329b 35, but to de Caelo 304b 23 ff.
while Water is cold and moist, so that, if the hot changes, there will be Water. So too, in the same manner, Earth will result from Water and Fire from Earth, since the two 'elements' in both these couples have interchangeable 'complementary factors'. For Water is moist and cold while Earth is cold and dry—so that, if the moist be over-35 come, there will be Earth: and again, since Fire is dry and hot while Earth is cold and dry, Fire will result from Earth331b if the cold pass-away.

It is evident, therefore, that the coming-to-be of the 'simple' bodies will be cyclical; and that this cyclical method of transformation is the easiest, because the consecutive 'elements' contain interchangeable 'complementary factors'.1 On the other hand (ii) the transformation of Fire into Water and of Air into Earth, and again of Water and Earth into Fire and Air respectively, though possible, is more difficult because it involves the change of more qualities. For if Fire is to result from Water, both the cold and the moist must pass-away: and again, both the cold and the dry must pass-away if Air is to result from Earth. So, too, if Water and Earth are to result from Fire and Air respectively—both qualities must change.

This second method of coming-to-be, then, takes a longer time. But (iii) if one quality in each of two 'elements' pass-away, the transformation, though easier, is not reciprocal. Still, from Fire plus Water there will result Earth and2 Air, and from Air plus Earth Fire and3 Water. For there will be Air, when the cold of the Water and the dry of the Fire have passed-away (since the hot of the latter and the moist of the former are left): whereas, when the hot of the Fire and the moist of the Water have passed-away, there will be Earth, owing to the survival of the dry of the Fire and the cold of the Water. So, too, in the same way, Fire and Water will result from Air plus Earth. For there will be Water, when the hot of the Air and the dry20

1 Aristotle has shown that, by the conversion of a single quality in each case, Fire is transformed into Air, Air into Water, Water into Earth, and Earth into Fire. This is a cycle of transformations. Moreover, the 'elements' have been taken in their natural consecutive series, according to their order in the Cosmos.

2 sc. alternatively.

3 sc. alternatively.
DE GENERATIONE ET CORRUPTIONE

of the Earth have passed-away (since the moist of the former and the cold of the latter are left): whereas, when the moist of the Air and the cold of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, owing to the survival of the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth—qualities essentially constitutive of Fire. Moreover, this mode of Fire's coming-to-be is confirmed by perception. For flame is paranexcellence Fire: but flame is burning smoke, and smoke consists of Air and Earth.

No transformation, however, into any of the 'simple' bodies can result from the passing-away of one elementary quality in each of two 'elements' when they are taken in their consecutive order, because either identical or contrary qualities are left in the pair: but no 'simple' body can be formed either out of identical, or out of contrary, qualities. Thus no 'simple' body would result, if the dry of Fire and the moist of Air were to pass-away: for the hot is left in both. On the other hand, if the hot pass-away out of both, the contraries—dry and moist—are left. A similar result will occur in all the others too: for all the consecutive 'elements' contain one identical, and one contrary, quality. Hence, too, it clearly follows that, when one of the consecutive 'elements' is transformed into one, the coming-to-be is effected by the passing-away of a single quality: whereas, when two of them are transformed into a third, more than one quality must have passed-away.

We have stated that all the 'elements' come-to-be out of any one of them; and we have explained the manner in which their mutual conversion takes place. Let us nevertheless supplement our theory by the following speculations concerning them.

1 Cf. above, note on 331b.4.
2 If the 'elements' are taken in their natural order, Water (e.g.) is 'consecutive' to Earth, and Air to Water. Water is moist and cold. It shares its 'cold' with Earth and its 'moist' with Air: its 'moist' is contrary to Earth's 'dry', and its 'cold' is contrary to Air's 'hot'.
3 If, e.g., Fire plus Air are to be transformed into Water or into Earth, it is not enough that a single quality should be eliminated from each of the generating pair: for this would leave either two 'hojs' or a 'dry' and a 'moist' (cf. 331b.26-33). Either Fire's 'dry' or Air's 'moist' must be eliminated: and, in addition, the 'hot' of one must be eliminated and the 'hot' of the other be converted into 'cold'.
BOOK II. 5

If Water, Air, and the like are a 'matter' of which the 5 natural bodies consist, as some thinkers in fact believe, these 'elements' must be either one, or two, or more. Now they cannot all of them be one—they cannot, e.g., all be Air or Water or Fire or Earth—because 'Change is into contraries'. For if they all were Air, then (assuming Air to persist) there will be 'alteration' instead of coming-to-be. Besides, nobody supposes a single 'element' to persist, as the basis of all, in such a way that it is Water as well as Air (or any other 'element') at the same time. So there will be a certain contrariety, i.e. a differentiating quality: and the other member of this contrariety, e.g. heat, will belong to some other 'element', e.g. to Fire. But Fire will certainly not be 'hot Air'. For a change of that kind is 'alteration', and (b) is not what is observed. Moreover (c) if Air is again to result out of the Fire, it will do so by the conversion of the hot into its contrary: this contrary, therefore, will belong to Air, and Air will be a cold something: hence it is impossible for Fire to be 'hot Air', since in that case the same thing will be simultaneously hot and cold. Both Fire and Air, therefore, will be something else which is the same; i.e. there will be some 'matter', other than either, common to both.

The same argument applies to all the 'elements', proving that there is no single one of them out of which they all originate. But neither is there, beside these four, some other body from which they originate—a something intermediate, e.g., between Air and Water (coarser than Air, but finer than Water), or between Air and Fire (coarser than Fire, but finer than Air). For the supposed 'intermediate' will be Air and Fire when a pair of contrasted qualities is added to it: but, since one of every two contrary qualities is a 'privation', the 'intermediate' never can exist—as some thinkers assert the 'Boundless' or the 'Environing' exists—in isolation. It is, therefore, equally

1 For this 'law of nature', cf. Physics 224a 21—226b 17.
2 If Air is to 'alter' into (e.g.) Fire, we must assume a pair of contrasted differentiating qualities, and assign one to Fire and the other to Air.
3 i.e. Air becoming Fire by being heated.
4 i.e. bare of all qualities. The 'Boundless' was criticized above,
and indifferently any one of the 'elements', or else it is nothing.

Since, then, there is nothing—at least, nothing perceptible—prior to these,\(^1\) they must be all.\(^2\) That being so, either they must always persist and not be transformable into one another: or they must undergo transformation—either all of them, or some only (as Plato wrote in the *Timaeus*).\(^3\) Now it has been proved before\(^4\) that they must undergo reciprocal transformation. It has also been proved\(^5\) that the speed with which they come-to-be, one out of another, is not uniform—since the process of reciprocal transformation is relatively quick between the 'elements' with a 'complementary factor', but relatively slow between those which possess no such factor. Assuming, then, that the contrariety, in respect to which they are transformed, is one, the 'elements' will inevitably be two: for it is 'matter' that is the 'mean' between the two contraries, and matter\(^6\) is imperceptible and inseparable from them. Since, however, the 'elements' are seen to be more than two, the contrarieties must at the least be two. But the contrarieties being two, the 'elements' must be four (as they evidently are) and cannot be three: for the 'couplings' are four, since, though six are possible,\(^7\) the two in which the qualities are contrary to one another cannot occur.

These subjects have been discussed before\(^8\): but the following arguments will make it clear that, since the 'elements' are transformed into one another, it is impossible for any one of them—whether it be at the end or in the middle\(^9\)—to be an 'originative source' of the rest. There

\(^{332a}\)

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2. i.e. all the 'simple' bodies there are.
3. Cf. *Timaeus* 54 b-d.
4. Cf. above, 331\(^a\) 12-20.
5. Cf. above, 331\(^b\) 22 ff.
6. One contrariety produces two 'elements' only: for πρώτη θάνατος has no separate subsistence and does not constitute a third 'element' alongside of its two contrary informations. Perhaps, however, we ought to translate: 'for the supposed "intermediate" is nothing but "matter", and that is imperceptible and incapable of separate existence.'
7. i.e. *mathematically* 'possible'.
8. Cf. above, II. 2 and 3.
9. i.e. at either end, or in the middle, of the 'natural series' of the 'elements'.
can be no such 'originative element' at the ends: for all of them would then be Fire or Earth, and this theory amounts to the assertion that all things\(^1\) are made of Fire or Earth. Nor can a 'middle-element' be such an 'originative source'\(^{10}\)—as some thinkers suppose that Air is transformed both into Fire and into Water, and Water both into Air and into Earth, while the 'end-elements' are not further transformed into one another. For the process must come to a stop, and cannot continue *ad infinitum* in a straight line in either direction, since otherwise an infinite number of contrarieties would attach to the single 'element'. Let E stand for Earth, W for Water, A for Air, and F for Fire. Then (i) since A is transformed into F and W, there will be a contrariety belonging to A F. Let these contrarieties be whiteness and blackness. Again (ii) since A is transformed into W, there will be another contrariety\(^2\): for W is not the same as F. Let this second contrariety be dryness and moistness, D being dryness and M moistness. Now if, when A is transformed into W, the 'white' persists, Water will be moist and white: but if it does not persist, Water will be black since change is into contraries. Water, therefore, must be either white or black. Let it then be the first. On similar grounds, therefore, D (dryness) will also belong to F. Consequently F (Fire) as well as Air will be able to be transformed into Water: for it has qualities\(^2\) contrary to those of Water, since Fire was *first* taken to be black and then to be dry, while Water was moist and then showed itself white. Thus it is evident that all the 'elements' will be able to be transformed out of one another; and that, in the instances we have taken, E (Earth) also will contain the remaining two 'complementary factors', viz. the black\(^3\) and the moist (for these have not yet been coupled).

We have dealt with this last topic before the thesis we set out to prove.\(^3\) That thesis—viz. that the process cannot continue *ad infinitum*—will be clear from the following considerations. If Fire (which is represented by F) is not

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1. Or perhaps 'that all the "elements" result from Fire or Earth by "alteration"'—a view which Aristotle has already refuted (cf. 332\(^a\) 6–20).
2. *sc.* belonging to A W.
to revert, but is to be transformed in turn into some other
'element' (e.g. into \(Q\)), a new contrariety, other than those
mentioned, will belong to Fire and \(Q\): for it has been
assumed that \(Q\) is not the same as any of the four, \(E\), \(W\),
\(A\) and \(F\). Let \(K\), then, belong to \(F\) and \(Y\) to \(Q\). Then \(K\)
will belong to all four, \(E\), \(W\), \(A\) and \(F\): for they are trans-
formed into one another. This last point, however, we may
admit, has not yet been proved: but at any rate it is clear
that if \(Q\) is to be transformed in turn into yet another
'element', yet another contrariety will belong not only to
\(Q\) but also to \(F\) (Fire). And, similarly, every addition of
a new 'element' will carry with it the attachment of a new
contrariety to the preceding 'elements'. Consequently, if
the 'elements' are infinitely many, there will also belong to
the single 'element' an infinite number of contrarieties. But
if that be so, it will be impossible to define any 'element':
impossible also for any to come-to-be. For if one is to
result from another, it will have to pass through such a vast
number of contrarieties—and indeed even more than any
determinate number. Consequently (i) into some 'ele-
ments' transformation will never be effected—viz. if the
intermediates are infinite in number, as they must be if the
'elements' are infinitely many: further (ii) there will not even
be a transformation of Air into Fire, if the contrarieties are
infinitely many: moreover (iii) all the 'elements' become one.
For all the contrarieties of the 'elements' above \(F\) must belong
to those below \(F\), and vice versa: hence they will all be one.

As for those who agree with Empedokles that the
'elements' of body are more than one, so that they are not
transformed into one another—one may well wonder in
what sense it is open to them to maintain that the 'ele-
ments' are comparable. Yet Empedokles says 'For these
are all not only equal . . .' \(^1\)

If (i) it is meant that they are comparable in their amount,
all the 'comparables' must possess an identical something
whereby they are measured. If, e.g., one pint of Water
\(^1\) i.e. so that the 'elements' are genuinely or irreducibly 'many'.
The theory of Empedokles is directly opposed to the theory Aristotle
has been maintaining.

\(^2\) Empedokles, fr. 17, l. 27 (Diels, p. 179).
yields ten of Air, both are measured by the same unit; and therefore both were from the first an identical something. On the other hand, suppose (ii) they are not ‘comparable in their amount’ in the sense that so-much of the one yields so-much of the other, but comparable in ‘power of action’ (a pint of Water, e.g., having a power of cooling equal to that of ten pints of Air); even so, they are ‘comparable in their amount’, though not \textit{qua} ‘amount’ but \textit{qua} ‘so-much power’.\footnote{\textit{Cf.} above, 327\textsuperscript{b} 31, 328\textsuperscript{a} 28–31; below, 334\textsuperscript{b} 8–30.} There is also (iii) a third possibility. Instead of comparing their powers by the measure of their amount, they might be compared as terms in a ‘correspondence’: e.g., ‘as \(x\) is hot, so correspondingly \(y\) is white’. But ‘correspondence’, though it means equality in the \textit{quantum}, means similarity\footnote{i.e. \textit{only} ‘similarity’}. Empedokles might have said the ‘elements’ were all \textit{analogous} or \textit{similar} without inconsistency: but he asserts that they are \textit{equal}, i.e. quantitatively comparable (and therefore, ultimately, transformable).

A further objection to the theory of Empedokles is that it makes even \textit{growth} impossible, unless it be increase by addition. For his Fire increases by Fire: ‘And Earth increases its own frame and Ether increases Ether.’\footnote{\textit{Cf.} Empedokles, fr. 37 (Diels, p. 186). By \textit{aithip} Empedokles means Air (not Fire) as Aristotle recognizes elsewhere: perhaps, therefore, the words ‘Fire increases by Fire’ are a paraphrase of a verse now lost.} These, however, are cases of addition: but it is not by addition that growing things are believed to increase. And it is far more difficult for him to account for the \textit{coming-to-be} which occurs in nature. For the things which come-to-be by natural process all exhibit, in their coming-to-be, a uniformity either absolute or highly regular: while any
exceptions—any results which are in accordance neither with the invariable nor with the general rule—are products of chance and luck. Then what is the cause determining that man comes-to-be from man, that wheat (instead of an olive) comes-to-be from wheat, either invariably or generally? Are we to say 'Bone comes-to-be if the "elements" be put together in such-and-such a manner'? For, according to his own statements, nothing comes-to-be from their 'fortuitous consilience', but only from their 'consilience' in a certain proportion. What, then, is the cause of this proportional consilience? Presumably not Fire or Earth. But neither is it Love and Strife: for the former is a cause of 'association' only, and the latter only of 'dissociation'. No: the cause in question is the essential nature of each thing—not merely (to quote his words) 'a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled'.\(^1\) And chance, not proportion, 'is the name given to these occurrences'.\(^2\) for things can be 'mingled' fortuitously.

The cause, therefore, of the coming-to-be of the things which owe their existence to nature is that they are in such-and-such a determinate condition:\(^3\) and it is this which constitutes the 'nature' of each thing—a 'nature' about which he says nothing. What he says, therefore, is no explanation of 'nature'.\(^4\) Moreover, it is this which is both 'the excellence' of each thing and its 'good': whereas he assigns the whole credit to the 'mingling'.\(^5\) (And yet the 'elements' at all events are 'dissociated' not by Strife, but by Love: since the 'elements' are by nature prior to the Deity, and they too are Deities.)\(^6\)

Again, his account of motion is vague. For it is not an adequate explanation to say that 'Love and Strife set things

1 Cf. Empedokles, fr. 8 (Diels, p. 175). The same fragment is quoted above, 314\(^b\) 7–8.
2 Aristotle appears to be parodying the last line of Empedokles, fr. 8.
3 i.e. that they are compounds produced by the consilience of their constituents in a certain proportion.
4 i.e. Empedokles' poem, in spite of its title (\(\Pi\epsilon\iota\ \phi\omega\sigma\epsilon\omega\), tells us nothing about nature.
5 Cf. \textit{Metaph.} 984\(^b\) 32—985\(^a\) 10.
6 This sentence is a belated criticism of the functions Empedokles attributed to Love and Strife: perhaps we ought to read it after \(\alpha\iota\nu\epsilon\) (above, \(\textit{b} \ 13\)). The 'Deity' is the 'Sphere': cf. Empedokles, fr. 27, 28, 29 (Diels, pp. 183–184).
moving’, unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind. He ought, then, either to have defined or to have postulated these characteristic movements, or to have demonstrated them—whether strictly or laxly or in some other fashion. Moreover, since (a) the ‘simple’ bodies appear to move ‘naturally’ as well as by compulsion, i.e. in a manner contrary to nature (fire, e.g., appears to move upwards without compulsion, though it appears to move by compulsion downwards); and since (b) what is ‘natural’ is contrary to that which is due to compulsion, and movement by compulsion actually occurs; it follows that ‘natural movement’ can also occur in fact. Is this, then, the movement that Love sets going? No: for, on the contrary, the ‘natural movement’ moves Earth downwards and resembles ‘dissociation’, and Strife rather than Love is its cause—so that in general, too, Love rather than Strife would seem to be contrary to nature. And unless Love or Strife is actually setting them in motion, the ‘simple’ bodies themselves have absolutely no movement or rest. But this is paradoxical: and what is more, they do in fact obviously move. For though Strife ‘dissociated’, it was not by Strife that the ‘Ether’ was borne upwards. On the contrary, sometimes he attributes its movement to something like chance (‘For thus, as it ran, it happened to meet them then, though often otherwise’), while at other times he says it is the nature of Fire to be borne upwards, but ‘the Ether’ (to quote his words) ‘sank down upon the Earth with long roots’. With such statements, too, he combines the assertion that the Order of the World is the same now, in the reign of Strife, as it was formerly in the reign of Love. What, then, is the ‘first mover’ of the ‘elements’? What causes their motion? Presumably not Love and Strife: on the contrary, these are causes of a particular motion, if at least we assume that ‘first mover’ to be an ‘originative source’.

1 i.e. according to Empedokles himself.
2 i.e. according to Empedokles’ own statements.
3 i.e. though Strife initiated the disintegration of the Sphere.
5 Cf. fr. 54, ibid.
6 sc. a first cause of motion in general.
An additional paradox is that the soul should consist of the 'elements', or that it should be one of them. How are the soul's 'alterations' to take place? How, e.g., is the change from being musical to being unmusical, or how is memory or forgetting, to occur? For clearly, if the soul be Fire, only such modifications will happen to it as characterize Fire \textit{qua} Fire: while if it be compounded out of the 'elements', only the corporeal modifications will occur in it. But the changes we have mentioned are none of them corporeal.

The discussion of these difficulties, however, is a task appropriate to a different investigation: let us return to the 'elements' of which bodies are composed. The theories that 'there is something common to all the "elements",' and that 'they are reciprocally transformed', are so related that those who accept either are bound to accept the other as well. Those, on the other hand, who do not make their coming-to-be reciprocal—who refuse to suppose that any one of the 'elements' comes-to-be out of any other \textit{taken singly}, except in the sense in which bricks come-to-be out of a wall—are faced with a paradox. How, on their theory, are flesh and bones or any of the other compounds to result from the 'elements' \textit{taken together}?

Indeed, the point we have raised constitutes a problem even for those who generate the 'elements' out of one another. In what manner does anything other than, and beside, the 'elements' come-to-be out of them? Let me illustrate my meaning. Water can come-to-be out of Fire and Fire out of Water; for their \textit{substratum} is something common to them both. But flesh too, presumably, and marrow come-to-be out of them. How, then, do such things come-to-be? For (a) how is the manner of their coming-to-be to be conceived by those who maintain a theory like that of Empedokles? They must conceive it as \textit{composition}—just as a wall comes-to-be out of bricks and stones: and the 'Mixture', of which they speak, will be composed of the 'elements', these being preserved in it

\(^1\) Cf. \textit{de Anima}, A. 4 and 5, especially 408\textsuperscript{a} 18-23 and 409\textsuperscript{b} 23 ff., where Aristotle exposes the failure of Empedokles to account for the soul.
unaltered but with their small particles juxtaposed each to each. That will be the manner, presumably, in which flesh and every other compound results from the 'elements'. Consequently, it follows that Fire and Water do not come-to-be 'out of any and every part of flesh'. For instance, although a sphere might come-to-be out of this part of a lump of wax and a pyramid out of some other part, it was nevertheless possible for either figure to have come-to-be out of either part indifferently: that is the manner of coming-to-be when 'both Fire and Water come-to-be out of any and every part of flesh'. Those, however, who maintain the theory in question, are not at liberty to conceive that 'both come-to-be out of flesh' in that manner, but only as a stone and a brick 'both come-to-be out of a wall'—viz. each out of a different place or part. Similarly (b) even for those who postulate a single matter of their 'elements' there is a certain difficulty in explaining how anything is to result from two of them taken together—e.g. from 'cold' and 'hot', or from Fire and Earth. For if flesh consists of both and is neither of them, nor again is a 'composition' of them in which they are preserved unaltered, what alternative is left except to identify the resultant of the two 'elements' with their matter? For the passing-away of either 'element' produces either the other or the matter.

Perhaps we may suggest the following solution. (i) There are differences of degree in hot and cold. Although, therefore, when either is fully real without qualification, the other will exist potentially; yet, when neither exists in the full completeness of its being, but both by combining destroy one another's excesses so that there exist instead a hot which (for a 'hot') is cold and a cold which (for a 'cold') is hot; then what results from these two contraries will be neither their matter, nor either of them existing in its full reality without qualification. There will result instead an 'intermediate': and this 'intermediate', according as it is potentially more hot than cold or vice versa, will possess a power-of-heating that is double or triple its power-of-cooling, or otherwise related thereto in some similar ratio.
Thus all the other bodies will result from the contraries, or rather from the 'elements', in so far as these have been 'combined': while the 'elements' will result from the contraries, in so far as these 'exist potentially' in a special sense—not as matter 'exists potentially', but in the sense explained above. And when a thing comes-to-be in this manner, the process is 'combination'; whereas what comes-to-be in the other manner \(^1\) is matter. Moreover (ii) contraries also 'suffer action', in accordance with the disjunctively-articulated definition established in the early part of this work.\(^2\) For the actually-hot is potentially-cold and the actually-cold potentially-hot; so that hot and cold, unless they are equally balanced, are transformed into one another (and all the other contraries behave in a similar way). It is thus, then, that in the first place the 'elements' are transformed; and that (in the second place) \(^3\) out of the 'elements' there come-to-be flesh and bones and the like—the hot becoming cold and the cold becoming hot when they \(^4\) have been brought to the 'mean'. For at the 'mean' is neither hot nor cold. The 'mean', however, is of considerable extent and not indivisible.\(^5\) Similarly, it is qua reduced to a 'mean' condition that the dry and the moist, as well as the contraries we have used as examples, produce flesh and bone and the remaining compounds.

All the compound bodies—all of which exist in the \(^8\) region belonging to the central body \(^6\)—are composed of all the 'simple' bodies. For they all contain Earth because every 'simple' body is to be found specially and most abundantly in its own place. And they all contain Water because (a) the compound must possess a definite outline

\(^1\) sc. in the only manner which was taken into account in the formulation of the problem at \(334^b\) 6–7.

\(^2\) Cf. above, I. 7, where Aristotle explains the precise sense in which action-passion is between contraries, and under what conditions contraries in 'acting' are themselves 'acted upon' by their patients.

\(^3\) There is no expressed elva (answering to πρότον in \(b\) 24) but it is implied.

\(^4\) sc. these extremes, the completely-hot and the completely-cold.

\(^5\) i.e. the 'mean' is a stretch, not a point.

\(^6\) Or perhaps 'in the region about the centre'.
and Water, alone of the 'simple' bodies, is readily adaptable in shape: moreover (b) Earth has no power of cohesion without the moist. On the contrary, the moist is what holds it together; for it would fall to pieces if the moist were eliminated from it completely.

They contain Earth and Water, then, for the reasons we have given: and they contain Air and Fire, because these are contrary to Earth and Water (Earth being contrary to Air and Water to Fire, in so far as one Substance can be 'contrary' to another). Now all compounds presuppose in their coming-to-be constituents which are contrary to one another: and in all compounds there is contained one set of the contrasted extremes. Hence the other set must be contained in them also, so that every compound will include all the 'simple' bodies.

Additional evidence seems to be furnished by the food each compound takes. For all of them are fed by substances which are the same as their constituents, and all of them are fed by more substances than one. Indeed, even the plants, though it might be thought they are fed by one substance only, viz. by Water, are fed by more than one: for Earth has been mixed with the Water. That is why farmers too endeavour to mix before watering.

Although food is akin to the matter, that which is fed is the 'figure'—i.e. the 'form'—taken along with the matter. This fact enables us to understand why, whereas all the 'simple' bodies come-to-be out of one another, Fire is the only one of them which (as our predecessors also assert) 'is fed'. For Fire alone—or more than all the rest—is akin to the 'form' because it tends by nature to be borne towards the limit. Now each of them naturally tends to be borne towards its own place: but the 'figure'—i.e. the 'form'—of them all is at the limits.

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1 i.e. cold-dry (Earth) and cold-moist (Water).
2 i.e. hot-moist (Air) and hot-dry (Fire).
3 Plants are nourished naturally by water impregnated with earth and artificially by water mixed with manure, which is a kind of earth.
4 Cf. above, 321b 16—322a 33.
Thus we have explained that all the compound bodies are composed of all the ‘simple’ bodies.

Since some things are such as to come-to-be and pass-away, and since coming-to-be in fact occurs in the region about the centre, we must explain the number and the nature of the ‘originative sources’ of all coming-to-be-alike: for a grasp of the true theory of any universal facilitates the understanding of its specific forms.

The ‘originative sources’, then, of the things which come-to-be are equal in number to, and identical in kind with, those in the sphere of the eternal and primary things. For there is one in the sense of ‘matter’, and a second in the sense of ‘form’: and, in addition, the third ‘originative source’ must be present as well. For the two first are not sufficient to bring things into being, any more than they are adequate to account for the primary things.

Now cause, in the sense of material origin, for the things which are such as to come-to-be is ‘that which can be-and-not-be’: and this is identical with ‘that which can come-to-be-and-pass-away’, since the latter, while it is at one time, at another time is not. (For whereas some things are of necessity, viz. the eternal things, others of necessity are not. And of these two sets of things, since they cannot diverge from the necessity of their nature, it is impossible for the first not to be and impossible for the second to be. Other things, however, can both be and not be.) Hence coming-to-be and passing-away must occur within the field of ‘that which can be-and-not-be’. This, therefore, is cause in the sense of material origin for the things which are such as to come-to-be; while cause, in the sense of their ‘end’, is their ‘figure’ or ‘form’—and that is the formula expressing the essential nature of each of them.

But the third ‘originative source’ must be present as well—the cause vaguely dreamed of by all our predecessors,

1 Cf. above, 314a 2 and 318a 25-27.
definitely stated by none of them. On the contrary (a) some amongst them thought the nature of ‘the Forms’ was adequate to account for coming-to-be. Thus Sokrates in the Phaedo first blames everybody else for having given no explanation;¹ and then lays it down that ‘some things are Forms, others Participants in the Forms’, and that ‘while a thing is said to “be” in virtue of the Form, it is said to “come-to-be” qua “sharing in”, to “pass-away” qua “losing”, the Form’. Hence he thinks that ‘assuming the truth of these theses, the Forms must be causes both of coming-to-be and of passing-away’.² On the other hand (b) there were others who thought ‘the matter’ was adequate by itself to account for coming-to-be, since ‘the movement originates from the matter’.

Neither of these theories, however, is sound. For (a) if the Forms are causes, why is their generating activity intermittent instead of perpetual and continuous—since there always are Participants as well as Forms? Besides, in some instances we see that the cause is other than the Form. For it is the doctor who implants health and the man of science who implants science, although ‘Health itself’ and ‘Science itself’ are as well as the Participants: and the same principle applies to everything else that is produced in accordance with an art. On the other hand (b) to say that ‘matter generates owing to its movement’ would be, no doubt, more scientific than to make such statements as are made by the thinkers we have been criticizing. For what ‘alters’ and transfigures plays a greater part³ in bringing things into being; and we are everywhere accustomed, in the products of nature and of art alike, to look upon that which can initiate movement as the producing cause. Nevertheless this second theory is not right either.

For, to begin with, it is characteristic of matter to suffer action, i.e. to be moved: but to move, i.e. to act, belongs to a different ‘power’.⁴ This is obvious both in the things

¹ Cf. Plato, Phaedo 96 a-99 c. ² Cf. Plato, Phaedo 100 b-101 e.
³ sc. than the Forms.
⁴ Matter is a δύναμις in the passive sense: that which initiates movement is a δύναμις in the sense of an active force. Cf. e.g. Metaph. 1046a 9-29, 1048a 25-b 9.
that come-to-be by art and in those that come-to-be by nature. Water does not of itself produce out of itself an animal: and it is the art, not the wood, that makes a bed. Nor is this their only error. They make a second mistake in omitting the more controlling cause: for they eliminate the essential nature, i.e. the 'form'. And what is more, since they remove the formal cause, they invest the forces they assign to the 'simple' bodies—the forces which enable these bodies to bring things into being—with too instrumental a character. For 'since' (as they say) 'it is the nature of the hot to dissociate, of the cold to bring together, and of each remaining contrary either to act or to suffer action', it is out of such materials and by their agency (so they maintain) that everything else comes-to-be and passes-away. Yet (a) it is evident that even Fire is itself moved, i.e. suffers action. Moreover (b) their procedure is virtually the same as if one were to treat the saw (and the various instruments of carpentry) as 'the cause' of the things that come-to-be: for the wood must be divided if a man saws, must become smooth if he planes, and so on with the remaining tools. Hence, however true it may be that Fire is active, i.e. sets things moving, there is a further point they fail to observe—viz. that Fire is inferior to the tools or instruments in the manner in which it sets things moving.

As to our own theory—we have given a general account of the causes in an earlier work, and we have now explained and distinguished the 'matter' and the 'form'. Further, since the change which is motion has been proved to be eternal, the continuity of the occurrence of coming-to-be follows necessarily from what we have established: for the eternal motion, by causing 'the generator' to approach and retire, will produce coming-to-be uninterruptedly. At the same time it is clear that we were also right when, in an earlier work, we called motion (not coming-to-be) 'the primary form of change'. For it is far more reason-

1 Cf. Physics B. 3-9. 2 Cf. above, 335a 32-b 7.
3 Cf. Physics Θ. 7-9.
4 i.e. the sun, as will appear presently.
able that \textit{what is} should cause the coming-to-be of \textit{what is not}, than that \textit{what is not} should cause the being of \textit{what is}. Now that which is being moved \textit{is}, but that which is coming-to-be \textit{is not}: hence, also, motion is prior to coming-to-be.

We have assumed, and have proved,\(^1\) that coming-to-be and passing-away happen to things continuously; and we\(^2\) assert that motion causes coming-to-be. That being so, it is evident that, if the motion be single, \textit{both} processes cannot occur since they are contrary to one another: for it is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remain in the same condition, always produces the same effect, so that, from a single motion, either coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. The movements must, on the contrary, be more than one, and they must be contrasted with one another either by the sense of their motion\(^3\) or by its irregularity:\(^4\) for contrary effects demand contraries as their causes.

This explains why it is not the primary motion\(^4\) that causes coming-to-be and passing-away, but the motion along the inclined circle:\(^5\) for this motion not only possesses the necessary continuity, but includes a duality of movements as well. For if coming-to-be and passing-away are always to be continuous, there must be some body always being moved (in order that these changes may not fail) and moved with a duality of movements (in order that both changes, not one only, may result). Now the continuity of this movement is caused by the motion of the whole:\(^6\) but the approaching and retreating of the moving body are caused by the inclination.\(^7\) For the consequence of the inclination is that the body becomes alternately remote and near; and since its distance is thus unequal, its movement will be irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching and by its proximity, it—this very same body—

\(^{1}\) Cf. above, 317\(^b\) 33\(^ff.\).
\(^{2}\) Cf. \textit{de Caelo} 270\(^b\) 32—271\(^a\) 33.
\(^{3}\) Cf. \textit{de Caelo} 288\(^a\) 13—27; \textit{Physics} 228\(^b\) 15—229\(^a\) 6.
\(^{4}\) i.e. the revolution of the \textit{πρώτος ὕδραυλος}.
\(^{5}\) i.e. the annual movement of the sun in the ecliptic or zodiac circle.
\(^{6}\) i.e. the revolution of the \textit{πρώτος ὕδραυλος} (the outermost sphere) which carries along with it all the concentric spheres.
\(^{7}\) i.e. the inclination of the ecliptic to the equator of the outermost sphere, which (on Aristotle's theory) is the equator of the universe and is in the same plane as the terrestrial equator.
DE GENERATIONE ET CORRUPTIONE

destroys by retreating and becoming remote: and if it generates by many successive approaches, it also destroys by many successive retirements. For contrary effects demand contraries as their causes; and the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy equal periods of time. Hence, too, the times—i.e. the lives—of the several kinds of living things have a number by which they are distinguished: for there is an Order controlling all things, and every time (i.e. every life) is measured by a period. Not all of them, however, are measured by the same period, but some by a smaller and others by a greater one: for to some of them the period, which is their measure, is a year, while to some it is longer and to others shorter.

And there are facts of observation in manifest agreement with our theories. Thus we see that coming-to-be occurs as the sun approaches and decay as it retreats; and we see that the two processes occupy equal times. For the durations of the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be are equal. Nevertheless it often happens that things pass-away in too short a time. This is due to the 'intermingling' by which the things that come-to-be and pass-away are implicated with one another. For their matter is 'irregular', i.e. is not everywhere the same: hence the processes by which they come-to-be must be 'irregular' too, i.e. some too quick and others too slow. Consequently the phenomenon in question occurs, because the 'irregular' coming-to-be of these things is the passing-away of other things.

Coming-to-be and passing-away will, as we have said, always be continuous, and will never fail owing to the cause we stated. And this continuity has a sufficient reason on our theory. For in all things, as we affirm, Nature always strives after 'the better'. Now 'being' (we have explained elsewhere the exact variety of meanings we recognize in this term) is better than 'not-being': but not all things can possess 'being', since they are too far removed from the 'originative source'. God therefore adopted the remaining

1 For the reading and interpretation of 336b 20–24 see my text and commentary.
2 Cf. above, 318a 9 ff.
3 Cf. e.g. Metaph. 1017a 7 ff.
alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, because that ‘coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually’ is the closest approximation to eternal being.

The cause of this perpetuity of coming-to-be, as we have often said, is circular motion: for that is the only motion which is continuous. That, too, is why all the other things—the things, I mean, which are reciprocally transformed in virtue of their ‘passions’ and their ‘powers of action’, e.g. the ‘simple’ bodies—imitate circular motion. For when Water is transformed into Air, Air into Fire, and the Fire back into Water, we say the coming-to-be ‘has completed the circle’, because it reverts again to the beginning. Hence it is by imitating circular motion that rectilinear motion too is continuous.

These considerations serve at the same time to explain what is to some people a baffling problem—viz. why the ‘simple’ bodies, since each of them is travelling towards its own place, have not become dissevered from one another in the infinite lapse of time. The reason is their reciprocal transformation. For, had each of them persisted in its own place instead of being transformed by its neighbour, they would have got dissevered long ago. They are transformed, however, owing to the motion with its dual character: and because they are transformed, none of them is able to persist in any place allotted to it by the Order.  

It is clear from what has been said (i) that coming-to-be and passing-away actually occur, (ii) what causes them, and (iii) what subject undergoes them. But (a) if there is to be movement (as we have explained elsewhere, in an earlier work) there must be something which initiates it; if there is to be movement always, there must always be something which initiates it; if the movement is to be continuous, what initiates it must be single, unmoved, ungenerated, and...

1 The sun’s annual movement, by which it alternately approaches and retreats, causes the alternate ascent and descent of Water, Air, and Fire. They are thus brought into contact, with the result that their constitutive contrary qualities act and suffer action reciprocally, and the ‘simple’ bodies themselves are transformed.

2 Cf. above, 336b 12.

incapable of 'alteration'; and if the circular movements are more than one, their initiating causes must all of them, in spite of their plurality, be in some way subordinated to a single 'originative source'. Further (b) since time is continuous, movement must be continuous, inasmuch as there can be no time without movement. Time, therefore, is a 'number' of some continuous movement—a 'number', therefore, of the circular movement, as was established in the discussions at the beginning. But (c) is movement continuous because of the continuity of that which is moved, or because that in which the movement occurs (I mean, e.g., the place or the quality) is continuous? The answer must clearly be 'because that which is moved is continuous'. (For how can the quality be continuous except in virtue of the continuity of the thing to which it belongs? But if the continuity of 'that in which' contributes to make the movement continuous, this is true only of 'the place in which'; for that has 'magnitude' in a sense.) But (d) amongst continuous bodies which are moved, only that which is moved in a circle is 'continuous' in such a way that it preserves its continuity with itself throughout the movement. The conclusion therefore is that this is what produces continuous movement, viz. the body which is being moved in a circle; and its movement makes time continuous.

Wherever there is continuity in any process (coming-to-be or 'alteration' or any kind of change whatever) we observe 'consecutiveness', i.e. this coming-to-be after that without any interval. Hence we must investigate whether, amongst the consecutive members, there is any whose future being is necessary; or whether, on the contrary, every one

1 i.e. the supposed continuous movements which, gua continuous, must be circular.
2 I follow Philoponos and Paeius in referring ταῖται (a 21) to the ἀρχαί which the circular movements imply.
3 i.e. time is that which is numerable (ἀριθμῶς = τὸ ἀριθμοῦμενον or τὸ ἀριθμητῶν, not ἄριθμοῦμεν) in continuous movement: cf. Physics 219b 1-8.
4 sc. at the beginning of Aristotle's 'Philosophy of Nature': cf. Physics 217b 29—224a 17.
5 Aristotle uses κίνησις in its general sense, in which it includes ἀλλοωσίς and αὔξησις as well as φορά, but he is thinking primarily of φορά.
of them may fail to come-to-be. For that some of them may fail to occur, is clear. \(a\) We need only appeal to the distinction between the statements ‘\(x\) will be’ and ‘\(x\) is about to...’, which depends upon this fact. For if it be true to say of \(x\) that it ‘will be’, it must at some time be true to say of it that ‘it is’: whereas, though it be true to say of \(x\) now that ‘it is about to occur’, it is quite possible for it not to come-to-be—thus a man might not walk, though he is now ‘about to’ walk. And \(b\) since (to appeal to a general principle) amongst the things which ‘are’ some are capable also of ‘not-being’, it is clear that the same ambiguous character will attach to them no less when they are coming-to-be: in other words, their coming-to-be will not be necessary.

Then are all the things that come-to-be of this contingent character? Or, on the contrary, is it absolutely necessary for some of them to come-to-be? Is there, in fact, a distinction in the field of ‘coming-to-be’ corresponding to the distinction, within the field of ‘being’, between things that cannot possibly ‘not-be’ and things that can ‘not-be’? For instance, is it necessary that solstices shall come-to-be, i.e. impossible that they should fail to be able to occur?

Assuming that the antecedent must have come-to-be if the consequent is to be (e.g. that foundations must have come-to-be if there is to be a house: clay, if there are to be foundations), is the converse also true? If foundations have come-to-be, must a house come-to-be? The answer seems to be that the necessary nexus no longer holds, unless it is ‘necessary’ for the consequent (as well as for the antecedent)\(^1\) to come-to-be—‘necessary’ absolutely. If that be the case, however, ‘a house must come-to-be if foundations have come-to-be’, as well as vice versa. For the antecedent was assumed to be so related to the consequent that, if the latter is to be, the antecedent must have come-to-be before it. If, therefore, it is necessary that the consequent should come-to-be, the antecedent also must have come-to-be: and if the antecedent has come-to-be, then the conse-

\(^1\) Cf. above, \(^b\)14-15: the coming-to-be of the antecedent was conditionally necessary, i.e. necessarily presupposed in the being of the consequent.
quent also must come-to-be—not, however, because of the antecedent, but because the future being of the consequent was assumed as necessary. Hence, in any sequence, when the being of the consequent is necessary, the *nexus* is reciprocal—in other words, when the antecedent has come-to-be the consequent must always come-to-be too.

Now (i) if the sequence of occurrences is to proceed *ad infinitum* 'downwards',¹ the coming-to-be of any determinate 'this' amongst the later members of the sequence will not be *absolutely*, but only *conditionally*, necessary. For it will always be necessary that some other² member shall have come-to-be before 'this' as the presupposed condition of the necessity that 'this' should come-to-be: consequently, since what is 'infinite' has no 'originative source', neither will there be in the infinite sequence any 'primary' member which will make it 'necessary' for the remaining members to come-to-be.³

Nor again (ii) will it be possible to say with truth, even in regard to the members of a limited sequence, that it is 'absolutely necessary' for any one of them to come-to-be. We cannot truly say, e.g., that 'it is absolutely necessary for a house to come-to-be when foundations have been laid': for (unless it is *always* necessary for a house to be coming-to-be) we should be faced with the consequence that, when foundations have been laid, a thing, which need not always be, must always be. No: if its coming-to-be is to be 'necessary', it must be 'always' in its coming-to-be. For what is 'of necessity' coincides with what is 'always', since that which 'must be' cannot possibly 'not-be'. Hence a thing is eternal if its 'being' is necessary: and if it is eternal, its 'being' is necessary. And if, therefore, the 'coming-to-be' of a thing is necessary, its 'coming-to-be' is eternal; and if eternal, necessary.

It follows that the coming-to-be of anything, if it is absolutely necessary, must be cyclical—i.e. must return

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¹ i.e. so that effect *will* succeed effect endlessly.
² i.e. some other *still later* member of the sequence.
³ i.e. the infinite sequence will not contain any absolutely necessary member which will serve as the ground of the conditional necessity of the other members. The 'primary' member or *ἀρχή*, in the sequence proceeding *ad infinitum* 'downwards', would have to be a *τέλος*—i.e. an absolutely necessary 'end-event'.

upon itself. For coming-to-be must either be limited or not limited: and if not limited, it must be either rectilinear or cyclical. But the first of these last two alternatives is impossible if coming-to-be is to be eternal, because there could not be any 'originative source' whatever in an infinite rectilinear sequence, whether its members be taken 'downwards' (as future events) or 'upwards' (as past events). Yet coming-to-be must have an 'originative source' (if it is to be necessary and therefore eternal),¹ nor can it be eternal if it is limited.² Consequently it must be cyclical. Hence the nexus must be reciprocal. By this I mean that the necessary occurrence of 'this' involves the necessary occurrence of its antecedent: and conversely that, given the antecedent, it is also necessary for the consequent to come-to-be. And this reciprocal nexus will hold continuously throughout the sequence: for it makes no difference whether the reciprocal nexus, of which we are speaking, is mediated by two, or by many, members.

It is in circular movement, therefore, and in cyclical coming-to-be that the 'absolutely necessary' is to be found. In other words, if the coming-to-be of any things is cyclical, it is 'necessary' that each of them is coming-to-be and has come-to-be: and if the coming-to-be of any things is 'necessary', their coming-to-be is cyclical.

The result we have reached is logically concordant with the eternity of circular motion, i.e. the eternity of the revolution of the heavens (a fact which approved itself on other and independent evidence),³ since precisely those movements which belong to, and depend upon, this eternal revolution 'come-to-be' of necessity, and of necessity 'will be'. For since the revolving body is always setting something else in motion, the movement of the things it moves must also be circular. Thus, from the being of the 'upper revolution' it follows that the sun revolves in this determinate manner; and since the sun revolves thus, the seasons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle, i.e. return upon themselves; and since they come-to-be cyclically, so in

¹ A clause to this effect seems to have dropped out after ἄρχην
² On the reading and interpretation see my text and commentary.
³ Cf. Physics Θ. 7-9.
their turn do the things whose coming-to-be the seasons initiate.

Then why do some things manifestly come-to-be in this cyclical fashion (as, e.g., showers and air, so that it must rain if there is to be a cloud and, conversely, there must be a cloud if it is to rain), while men and animals do not ‘return upon themselves’ so that the same individual comes-to-be a second time (for though your coming-to-be presupposes your father’s, his coming-to-be does not presuppose yours)? Why, on the contrary, does this coming-to-be seem to constitute a rectilinear sequence?

In discussing this new problem, we must begin by inquiring whether all things ‘return upon themselves’ in a uniform manner; or whether, on the contrary, though in some sequences what recurs is numerically the same, in other sequences it is the same only in species. In consequence of this distinction, it is evident that those things, whose ‘substance’—that which is undergoing the process—is imperishable, will be numerically, as well as specifically, the same in their recurrence: for the character of the process is determined by the character of that which undergoes it. Those things, on the other hand, whose ‘substance’ is perishable (not imperishable) must ‘return upon themselves’ in the sense that what recurs, though specifically the same, is not the same numerically. That is why, when Water comes-to-be from Air and Air from Water, the Air is the same ‘specifically’, not ‘numerically’: and if these too recur numerically the same, at any rate this does not happen with things whose ‘substance’ comes-to-be—whose ‘substance’ is such that it is essentially capable of not-being.

1 i.e. in some cycles the same individual eternally recurs: in others the same species or specific form is eternally represented in the succession of its perishing individual embodiments.

2 As, e.g., a follower of Empedokles would maintain.
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In the main he regards his task as that of ascertaining what he really takes to be the best or truest solution of the problem which he is to solve, whether that can be fully worked out or not. But he insists with sufficient clearness the point which Aristotle can hardly be thought to have raised himself. With regard to this, the note on p. xxiii. is specially instructive. Aristotle, it may be thought, comes perilously close to the theory which he imputes to Plato in his dilemma: for the ἄρμουν ἔλος ("man-as-a-singular circle," &c.) shows unmistakable affinity to the Platonic idea as Aristotle interprets it.

That is where the trouble lies. Aristotle (and I can blame him for it?) believed in the individual, and even goes so far as to deny that anything else can be real in the full sense of the word. On the other hand, he holds that the world, itself, is really firmness (and surely he is right) if science has to do only with the universal, and not with the individual. It was for him to follow that science does not deal with reality, but Aristotle declines to draw this conclusion. "We should have expected him," says Professor Joachim (p. xxv., n. 2), "either (i.) to deny the self-subistence of the imperceptible singularity, i.e., to show that the singulars are only imperfectly 'real'—as, indeed, sometimes does; or (ii.) to insist that the tangible world of φώτικη, like the intelligent world of the mathematical sciences, is a world of abstracta isolated by definition from the sensible world of things. As a matter of fact, he does neither of these things, though it would be quite easy to deduce a series of "texts" in either direction as the sole alternative; and it is possible, indeed, that his greatness is to be found just at this rate, it can hardly be said, that he has given the complete solution of the problem. But he never restates it. Aristotle, as quick and as subtle as he was, therefore he refused it, and therefore he refused it.

As a matter of fact, he does not really believe that any solution of the problem has been given yet; and it is possible, indeed, that his greatness is to be found just at this rate, it can hardly be said, that he has given the complete solution of the problem. But he never restates it. Aristotle, as quick and as subtle as he was, therefore he refused it.
Aristotle. 

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