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16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
17 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
18

19 ADAM RICHARDS, BRETT STEWART,
20 SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION,
INC., THE CALGUNS FOUNDATION, INC.,

21 Plaintiffs,

22 v.

23 ED PRIETO, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SHERIFF, COUNTY OF
24 YOLO,

25 Defendants.
26
27
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**CASE NO: 2:09-cv-01235-MCE-DAD
(TEMP)**

**APPLICATION OF BRADY CENTER
TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE TO
FILE BRIEF AS *AMICUS CURIAE***

**DATE: March 10, 2011
TIME: 2:00 p.m.
CRTRM: 7, 14th Floor
JUDGE: Morrison C. England, Jr.**

1 Through undersigned counsel, Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence applies to the Court
2 for leave to file a brief as *amicus curiae* in this case for the facts and reasons stated below. The
3 proposed brief is attached hereto as Exhibit A for the convenience of the Court and counsel.

4 The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence is the nation's largest non-partisan, non-profit
5 organization dedicated to reducing gun violence through education, research, and legal advocacy.
6 Through its Legal Action Project, the Brady Center has filed numerous briefs *amicus curiae* in
7 cases involving both state and federal gun laws.

9 District courts have inherent power to grant third parties leave to file briefs as *amici*
10 *curiae*, particularly regarding "legal issues that have potential ramifications beyond the parties
11 directly involved or if the [*amicus* has] unique information or perspective that can help the court
12 beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide." *NGV Gaming, Ltd. v.*
13 *Upstream Point Molate, LLC*, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (internal quotations
14 omitted). Here, *amicus* brings a broad and deep perspective to the issues raised by this case and
15 has a compelling interest in the federal courts' interpretation of Second Amendment issues.
16 *Amicus* thus respectfully submits the attached brief to assist the Court with the constitutional
17 issues in this case, including important matters of first impression under the Second Amendment.

19 The proposed brief provides an overview of recent and longstanding Supreme Court
20 Second Amendment jurisprudence, the policy implications of recognizing a right to carry firearms
21 in public, and addresses an open question that has resulted from this jurisprudence—namely, what
22 the appropriate standard of review for Second Amendment claims should be, and shows how
23 lower courts have answered that question thus far. The brief also discusses the emerging trend in
24 lower courts towards using a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment claims that asks (1)
25 whether the law or regulation at issue implicates protected Second Amendment activity, and if so,
26 (2) whether it passes the appropriate standard of review. The brief then applies this two-pronged
27
28

1 approach to Second Amendment issues in the case at hand, employing case law, sociological data,
2 and legal commentary to place the permitting process of California Penal Code § 12050 in the
3 larger context of Second Amendment issues. The brief concludes that (1) California's concealed
4 weapons permitting process does not implicate protected Second Amendment because the
5 Supreme Court has only recognized a Second Amendment right to possess and carry guns in the
6 home, and (2) that even if the permitting process did implicate protected Second Amendment
7 activity, it would survive the appropriate level of review – the reasonable regulation test that over
8 forty states have adopted – because it is a valid exercise of the state's police powers to enact
9 legislation designed to protect public safety. *Amicus*, therefore, respectfully submits the attached
10 brief to assist the Court in deciding the complex and significant issues raised in this matter.
11

12 CONCLUSION

13
14 For the foregoing reasons, *amicus curiae* Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence
15 respectfully requests that the Court grant leave to file the attached *amicus* brief.

16 Dated: February 10, 2011

17 Respectfully submitted,

18 /s/ Megan Dixon

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EXHIBIT A

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**BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT
GUN VIOLENCE**

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INTRODUCTION

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The right to keep and bear arms recognized in *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), is unique among constitutional rights in the risks that it presents. Guns are designed to kill, and gun possession and use subject others to a serious risk of harm that is all too often deadly. While the Supreme Court has held that the Second Amendment protects a limited right to possess a gun *in the home* for self-defense, the Court has never recognized a far broader right to carry guns in public places, which would subject the public-at-large to those grave risks. On the contrary, *Heller* found that prohibitions on concealed carrying are in line with permissible gun laws, *Heller*, 128 S. Ct. at 2816, and did not disturb the Court’s ruling from over a century ago that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.” *Robertson v. Baldwin*, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897).

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Nor has the Court stated that concealed carrying can only be banned (or restricted) if open carrying is allowed. In *Heller, supra*, and *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), the Court had ample opportunity to announce a right to carry in public, or to question the continuing validity of *Robertson*. After all, the Court did not limit itself to the constitutionality of the laws at issue, but expounded at length on the limited nature of the Second Amendment right. Yet it repeatedly stated its holding as bound to the home. Numerous courts, from the 19th century to post-*Heller* and *McDonald*, have recognized that the Second Amendment does not prevent states from restricting or barring the carrying of handguns – especially concealed handguns – in public. It would be unprecedented and unwise to hold that the Constitution bars states and communities from choosing to keep guns out of public places, or – as California has done – from allowing those tasked with protecting public safety to determine whether individuals have “good cause” to bring hidden handguns into public spaces. There is no Constitutional requirement that the general public, when walking to school, driving to work, or otherwise going about their daily activities, be subjected to the risks of gun carrying. And there never has been.

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An extension of the Second Amendment to deny law enforcement the authority to determine who has “good cause” to carry guns in public would run counter to *Heller* and

1 *McDonald's* “assurances” that “reasonable firearms regulations” will remain permissible, as well
2 as the Court’s longstanding recognition that the exercise of protected activity must be balanced
3 against legitimate public interests, chief among which is public safety. *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at
4 3047; *Heller*, 128 S. Ct at 2816-17, 2871 & n. 26. California’s law governing the carrying of
5 concealed weapons – California Penal Code Section 12050 – is precisely such a reasonable
6 regulation.

7 The permitting process of Section 12050 does not implicate protected Second Amendment
8 activity and even if it did, requiring a showing of “good cause” as a condition to issuing a
9 concealed weapons is a reasonable, justified, and permissible exercise of the state’s police
10 powers. While Plaintiffs may disagree with Section 12050, their recourse is through the
11 legislative process, not the judiciary. This Court is obligated to uphold legislation where there is
12 a reasonable basis to do so; it should not usurp the functions of the Legislature and local law
13 enforcement by declaring a new Second Amendment right that the Supreme Court has not
14 acknowledged and by striking down a law that so plainly satisfies the state’s interest in protecting
15 public safety.

16 **INTEREST OF AMICUS**

17 *Amicus* the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence is the nation’s largest non-partisan,
18 non-profit organization dedicated to reducing gun violence through education, research, and legal
19 advocacy. Through its Legal Action Project, the Brady Center has filed numerous briefs *amicus*
20 *curiae* in cases involving both state and federal gun laws, including on the right to carry firearms
21 and the scope of the Second Amendment right post-*Heller*. *Amicus* brings a broad and deep
22 perspective to the issues raised by this case and has a compelling interest in ensuring that the
23 Second Amendment does not impede reasonable governmental action to prevent gun violence.

24 **LEGAL BACKGROUND**

25 Recent Supreme Court Second Amendment Jurisprudence: In *Heller*, the Supreme Court
26 recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms in the home for the purpose of self-defense.
27 128 S. Ct. at 2818. While the Court could have simply decided whether the District’s handgun
28 ban was unconstitutional, it went out of its way to assure courts that its holding did not “cast

1 doubt” on other gun laws – even approving of the constitutionality of a number of laws and then
2 making clear that “[w]e identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as
3 examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.” *Id.* at 2816-17, 2871 & n. 26. Moreover, in
4 approvingly discussing long-understood limitations on the right to keep and bear arms, the Court
5 specifically noted that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that
6 prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state
7 analogues.” *Id.* at 2816. The Court thus reaffirmed – and certainly did not disturb – its ruling in
8 *Robertson v. Baldwin* that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not
9 infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.” 17 S. Ct. at 326.

10 Nor did the Court in *Heller* state that concealed carry bans could only be permissible if
11 open carrying of guns in public were allowed. Rather, the Court repeatedly referenced the home
12 in its holding. And the Court made clear that “carry” did not imply “outside the home,” as the
13 Court ultimately held that “[a]ssuming that *Heller* is not disqualified from the exercise of Second
14 Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a
15 license *to carry it in the home.*” 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (emphasis added).¹

16 In *McDonald*, the Court incorporated the Second Amendment to the states, but also
17 “repeat[ed]” the “assurances” it made in *Heller* regarding its limited effect on other gun laws, and
18 agreed that “state and local experimentation with reasonable firearms regulation will continue
19 under the Second Amendment.” 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (internal citation omitted). Once again, the
20 Court did not extend the Second Amendment right outside the home.

21 The Open Question: Standard of Review: Neither *Heller* nor *McDonald* articulated a
22 standard of review for Second Amendment challenges, though the Court in *Heller* explicitly
23 rejected the “rational basis” test and implicitly rejected the “strict scrutiny test.” *See Heller v.*
24 *District of Columbia* (“*Heller II*”), 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 187 (D.D.C. 2010) (the “strict scrutiny
25 standard of review would not square with the [*Heller*] majority’s references to ‘presumptively
26

27 ¹ The narrow scope of the Court’s ruling in *Heller* was also apparent in the Court’s 2009 opinion
28 in *United States v. Hayes*, 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009), in which the Court upheld a broad reading of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) – which prohibits possession of firearms by persons convicted of
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence – without even mentioning the Second Amendment.

1 lawful regulatory measures’”). The Court’s reasoning also foreclosed any form of
2 heightened scrutiny that would require the government to ensure that firearms legislation has a
3 tight fit between means and ends, as *Heller* recognized that the Constitution provides legislatures
4 with “a variety of tools for combating” the “problem of handgun violence,” *Heller*, 130 S. Ct. at
5 2822, and listed as examples a host of “presumptively lawful” existing firearms regulations
6 without subjecting those laws to any such analysis. *Id.* at 2816-17 & n. 26.

7 *Heller* and *McDonald* thus left lower courts with the task of determining an appropriate
8 standard of review for Second Amendment claims: one that is less rigorous than strict scrutiny,
9 “presumes” the lawfulness of a wide gamut of gun laws currently in force, allows for “reasonable
10 firearms regulations,” and permits law-abiding, responsible citizens to keep guns in their homes
11 for self-defense. As discussed below, the “reasonable regulation” test, overwhelmingly applied
12 by courts throughout the country construing right to keep and bear arms provisions in the states, is
13 the most appropriate standard of review for the California statute at issue here.

14 The Two-Pronged Approach: In the wake of *Heller* and its progeny, a number of courts
15 have begun to utilize a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment claims. *See, e.g., United*
16 *States v. Skoien*, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); *Heller II*, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 188; *United States v.*
17 *Marzarella*, 614 F.3d 85, 89(3rd Cir. 2010). Under this approach, courts ask: (1) does the law
18 or regulation at issue implicate protected Second Amendment activity, and (2) if so, does it
19 withstand the appropriate level of scrutiny? *See, e.g., Heller II*, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 188;
20 *Marzarella*, 614 F.3d at 89. If the challenged law or regulation does not implicate protected
21 Second Amendment activity, then the analysis ends and the law is deemed constitutional. Even if
22 the law implicates protected activity, however, it still will be deemed constitutional if it passes
23 muster under the appropriate level of scrutiny. *Marzarella*, 614 F.3d at 89.

24 This two-pronged approach represents an appropriate manner in which to approach the
25 issues presented by Second Amendment claims. *Amicus* advocates its use by this Court in
26 analyzing the constitutionality of California Penal Code Section 12050.

27 ARGUMENT

28 For at least two principal reasons, the firearms regulations in Section 12050 are

1 constitutional. First, the permitting process in Section 12050 does not implicate protected Second
2 Amendment Activity. Second, even if it did, Section 12050 is a reasonable regulation that
3 furthers important governmental interests established by the California Legislature and the law
4 enforcement community.

5 **I. THE PERMITTING PROCESS IN SECTION 12050 DOES NOT IMPLICATE**
6 **PROTECTED SECOND AMENDMENT ACTIVITY.**

7 *Amicus* respectfully suggests that this Court should use the two-prong approach to Second
8 Amendment claims and hold, first, that the permitting process in Section 12050 does not
9 implicate protected Second Amendment activity because Plaintiffs have no general Second
10 Amendment “right to ‘possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation’” in public places.

11 **A. The Concealed Weapons Permitting Process at Issue Here Does Not Implicate**
12 **Protected Second Amendment Activity Because it Does Not Impact The Right**
13 **to Possess Firearms in The Home Protected in *Heller* and *McDonald*.**

14 The Supreme Court’s decision in *Heller* recognized that the Second Amendment protects
15 “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms *in defense of hearth and home.*” *Heller*,
16 128 S. Ct. at 2821 (emphasis added). In the course of its lengthy majority opinion, the Court had
17 ample opportunity to state that Mr. Heller had a right to carry guns in public. However, it did not
18 do so: the Court never recognized a right to carry guns in public. The Court’s holding only
19 mentions Heller’s right “*to carry [] in the home,*” *id.* at 2822 (emphasis added), and does not
20 mention the carrying of firearms in public at all. *See id.* The Court’s opinion focuses on the
21 historical recognition of the right of individuals “to keep and bear arms to defend their homes,
22 families or themselves,” *id.* at 2810, and the continuing need to keep and use firearms “in defense
23 of hearth and home.” *Id.* at 2821. The Court’s holding is specifically limited to the right to keep
24 firearms in the home: “[i]n sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun possession *in the*
25 *home* violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful
26 firearm *in the home* operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.” *Id.* at 2821-22
27 (emphasis added).

28 Plaintiffs argue, essentially, that the *Heller* Court embraced a Constitutional right to carry
guns in public, but for some reason chose not to say so explicitly. Plaintiffs cannot explain why

1 Justice Scalia would be so explicit about the fact that the Second Amendment was “not
2 unlimited” and that a (non-exhaustive) host of gun laws remained “presumptively lawful,” yet
3 leave his supposed ruling that the Second Amendment protected a right to carry guns in public
4 hidden, implicit, leaving courts to expand on its “confrontation” reference, if they wished. Nor
5 can Plaintiffs explain why the *Heller* Court expressly approved of decisions upholding concealed
6 carry bans, but chose not to state the flip-side that is crucial to Plaintiffs’ argument -- that such
7 bans are (supposedly) only permissible if open carrying is allowed.

8 This Court should not reach for an interpretation of *Heller* as implicitly overruling
9 *Robertson*’s recognition that the Second Amendment does not protect a right to carry concealed
10 weapons – especially given *Heller*’s explicit embrace of concealed carry bans and its repeated
11 statements limiting its holding to the home. Lower courts “should uphold State regulation
12 whenever possible,” *Agricultural Prorate Commission v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles*
13 *County*, 55 P.2d 495, 509 (Cal. 1936), not expand a novel Constitutional right to strike down
14 democratically-enacted legislation.

15 In fact, California courts have refused to read *Heller* and *McDonald* as recognizing a right
16 to carry guns in public. In *People v. Dykes*, for instance, the California Supreme Court noted that:

17 The [*Heller*] court did not recognize a “right to keep and carry any weapon
18 whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose,” observing that
19 historically, most courts have “held that prohibitions on carrying concealed
20 weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.” The high
21 court’s decision in *Heller* does not require us to conclude that possession in a
22 public place of a loaded, cocked, semiautomatic weapon with a chambered round,
23 concealed in a large glove and ready to fire, cannot be defined as a crime under
24 state law.

25 209 P.3d 1, 44 (2009) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). And in *People v. Flores*, 169
26 Cal.App.4th 568, 575 (2008), the California Supreme Court explicitly stated that, “[g]iven this
27 implicit approval of concealed firearm prohibitions, we cannot read *Heller* to have altered the
28 courts’ longstanding understanding that such prohibitions are constitutional.” See also *People v.*
Flores, 2010 WL 2804361, at *34 (Cal. App. July 19, 2010). Recently, a district court rejected a
similar challenge, upholding §12050 as constitutional. *Peruta v. County of San Diego*, --- F.
Supp. 2d ---, 2010 WL 5137137, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010) (finding it unnecessary to decide

1 whether Second Amendment protects right to carry a loaded handgun in public).

2 Other courts have held similarly that the Second Amendment, post-*Heller*, does not
3 protect a right to carry concealed weapons in public. In *People v. Dawson*, the Illinois Court of
4 Appeals rejected arguments strikingly similar to Plaintiffs', and held:

5 The specific limitations in *Heller* and *McDonald* applying only to a ban on
6 handgun possession in a home cannot be overcome by defendant's pointing to the
7 *Heller* majority's discussion of the natural meaning of "bear arms" including
8 wearing or carrying upon the person or in clothing. Nor can the *Heller* majority's
9 holding that the operative clause of the second amendment "guarantee[s] the
10 individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation" require
11 heightened review of the AUUW statute's criminalization of the carrying of an
12 uncased and loaded firearm. As addressed above, *Heller specifically limited its
ruling to interpreting the amendment's protection of the right to possess handguns
in the home*, not the right to possess handguns outside of the home in case of
confrontation—a fact the dissent heartily pointed out by noting that "[n]o party or
amicus urged this interpretation; the Court appears to have fashioned it out of
whole cloth." The *McDonald* Court refused to expand on this right, explaining that
the holding in *Heller* that the second amendment protects "the right to possess a
handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense" was incorporated.

13 934 N.E.2d 598, 605-606 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
14 Recognizing that "when reasonably possible, a court has the duty to uphold the constitutionality
15 of a statute," *id.* at *6, the *Dawson* Court rejected the contention that the Second Amendment
16 protects a broad right to carry that would invalidate Illinois's law.

17 The Kansas Court of Appeals also recognized that "[i]t is clear that the [*Heller*] Court was
18 drawing a narrow line regarding the violations related solely to use of a handgun in the home for
19 self-defense purposes. [The defendant's] argument, that *Heller* conferred on an individual the
20 right to carry a concealed firearm, is unpersuasive." *State v. Knight*, 218 P.3d 1177, 1189 (Kan.
21 Ct. App. 2009).

22 Other courts – both state and federal – have similarly held that the right recognized in
23 *Heller* and *McDonald* is confined to the home. See, e.g., *Gonzalez v. Village of West Milwaukee*,
24 2010 WL 1904977, at *4 (E.D. Wis. May 11, 2010) ("The Supreme Court has never held that the
25 Second Amendment protects the carrying of guns outside the home."); *United States v. Hart*, 726
26 F. Supp. 2d 56, 60 (D. Mass. 2010) ("*Heller* does not hold, nor even suggest, that concealed
27 weapons laws are unconstitutional."); *Williams v. State*, ---A.3d ---, 2011 WL 13746, at *7 (Md.
28 Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2011) ("[*Heller*] reiterated that regulatory schemes . . . prohibiting wearing,

1 carrying, or transporting handguns in various public places outside of the home, were
2 permissible”); *Dorr v. Weber*, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2010 WL 1976743, at *8 (N.D. Iowa May 18,
3 2010) (*Robertson* remains the law, and “a right to carry a concealed weapon under the Second
4 Amendment has not been recognized to date”); *Teng v. Town of Kensington*, 2010 WL 596526
5 (D. N.H. Feb. 17, 2010) (“Given that *Heller* refers to outright prohibition on carrying concealed
6 weapons” as “presumptively lawful”. . . far lesser restrictions of the sort imposed here (i.e.,
7 requiring that Teng complete a one-page application and meet with the police chief to discuss it)
8 clearly do not violate the Second Amendment.”) (internal citation omitted); *People v. Perkins*, 62
9 A.D.3d 1160, 1161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (“New York’s licensing requirement remains an
10 acceptable means of regulating the possession of firearms” because it “does not effect a complete
11 ban on handguns and is, therefore not a “severe restriction” improperly infringing upon
12 defendant’s Second Amendment rights”); *Sims v. U.S.*, 963 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C. 2008) (Second
13 Amendment does not “compel the District to license a resident to carry and possess a handgun
14 outside the confines of his home, however broadly defined.”); *Riddick v. U.S.*, 995 A.2d 212, 222
15 (D.C. 2010) (same); *Brown v. United States*, 979 A.2d 630, 639 (D.C. 2009) (“[I]n *Heller*, the
16 Court neither held nor implied that a law requiring a license to carry a pistol on its face violates
17 the Second Amendment”); *Howerton v. United States*, 964 A.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C. 2009) (“In
18 *Heller*, the issue was the constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s ban on “the possession of
19 usable handguns *in the home*”); *Little v. United States*, 989 A.2d 1096, 1101 (D.C. 2010) (same);
20 *In re Factor*, 2010 WL 1753307, at *3 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Apr. 21, 2010) (“[T]he United States
21 Supreme Court has not held or even implied that the Second Amendment prohibits laws that
22 restrict carrying of concealed weapons.”); *see also United States v. Tooley*, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580,
23 596 (S.D. W.Va. 2010); (“Additionally, possession of a firearm outside of the home or for
24 purposes other than self-defense in the home are not within the “core” of the Second Amendment
25 right as defined by *Heller*. ”). And *In re Bastiani*, 881 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593 (2008), upheld New
26 York’s law that limited carrying to those permitted based on “special need,” noting that
27 “[r]easonable regulation of handgun possession survives the *Heller* decision.” Additionally, in
28 *Digiacinto v. George Mason Univ.*, --- S.E.2d ---, 2011 WL 111584, at *4 (Va. Jan. 13, 2011), the

1 court held that regulations restricting the carrying of firearms in sensitive places are
2 “presumptively legal”.

3 Furthermore, this understanding of the Second Amendment (and its state analogues) as not
4 protecting a general right to carry or a more particular right to carry concealed weapons has been
5 recognized for well over a century. *See, e.g.*, 1876 Wyo. Comp. Laws ch. 52, § 1 (1876
6 Wyoming law prohibiting anyone from “bear[ing] upon his person, concealed or openly, any
7 firearm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town or village”); Ark. Act of Apr.
8 1, 1881; Tex. Act of Apr. 12, 1871; *Andrews v. State*, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871) (upholding statute
9 forbidding any person to carry “publicly or privately, any . . . belt or pocket pistol, revolver, or
10 any kind of pistol, except the army or navy pistol, usually used in warfare, which shall be carried
11 openly in the hand” and relying on the state right-to-bear-arms provision, which it read *in pari*
12 *materia* with the Second Amendment); *Fife v. State*, 31 Ark. 455 (1876) (upholding carrying
13 prohibition as a lawful “exercise of the police power of the State without any infringement of the
14 constitutional right” to bear arms); *English v. State*, 35 Tex. 473, 473, 478 (1871); *Hill v. State*,
15 53 Ga. 472, 474 (1874) (“at a loss to follow the line of thought that extends the guarantee”—in
16 the state Constitution of the “right of the people to keep and bear arms”—“to the right to carry
17 pistols, dirks, Bowieknives, and those other weapons of like character, which, as all admit, are the
18 greatest nuisances of our day.”); *State v. Workman*, 35 W. Va. 367, 373 (1891); *Ex parte Thomas*,
19 97 P. 260, 262 (Okla. 1908); *Aymette v. State*, 21 Tenn. 154, 159-61 (1840) (“The Legislature . . .
20 have a right to prohibit the wearing or keeping weapons dangerous to the peace and safety of the
21 citizens, and which are not usual in civilized warfare, or would not contribute to the common
22 defense.”); *State v. Buzzard*, 4 Ark. 18, 21 (1842); *State v. Jumel*, 13 La. Ann. 399, 400 (1858).²

23 Noted scholars and commentators have also long recognized that a right to keep and bear
24 arms does not prevent states from restricting or forbidding guns in public places. For example,

25 _____
26 ² *Bliss v. Commonwealth*, 12 Ky. 90, 91, 93 (1822), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court
27 declared Kentucky’s concealed-weapons ban in conflict with its Constitution, is recognized as an
28 exception to this consistent precedent. *See* Joel Prentiss Bishop, *Commentaries on the Criminal*
Law § 125, at 75-76 (1868). In fact, the Kentucky legislature later corrected the anomalous
decision by amending the state constitution to allow a concealed weapons ban. *See* Ky. Const. of
1850, art. XIII, § 25.

1 John Norton Pomeroy's Treatise, which *Heller* cited as representative of "post-Civil War 19th
 2 century sources" commenting on the right to bear arms, 128 S. Ct. at 2812, stated that the right to
 3 keep and bear arms "is certainly not violated by laws forbidding persons to carry dangerous or
 4 concealed weapons" John Norton Pomeroy, *An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the*
 5 *United States* 152-53 (1868). Similarly, Judge John Dillon explained that even where there is a
 6 right to bear arms, "the peace of society and the safety of peaceable citizens plead loudly for
 7 protection against the evils which result from permitting other citizens to go armed with
 8 dangerous weapons." Hon. John Dillon, *The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Public and Private*
 9 *Defense (Part 3)*, 1 Cont. L.J. 259, 287 (1874). An authoritative study published in 1904
 10 concluded that the Second Amendment and similar state constitutional provisions had "not
 11 prevented the very general enactment of statutes forbidding the carrying of concealed weapons,"
 12 which demonstrated that "constitutional rights must if possible be so interpreted as not to conflict
 13 with the requirements of peace, order and security." Ernst Freund, *The Police Power, Public*
 14 *Policy and Constitutional Rights* (1904). Post-*Heller*, scholars continue to recognize the logic
 15 behind limiting the right to the home. See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, *Guns as Smut: Defending the*
 16 *Home-Bound Second Amendment*, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (Oct. 2009); Michael C. Dorf, *Does*
 17 *Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?*, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225 (2008).

18 The concealed weapons permitting process at issue in this case does not meaningfully
 19 impede on the ability of individuals to keep handguns in defense of their homes. Instead, it only
 20 governs the carrying of concealed weapons *in public*, a different issue entirely, and one that
 21 neither the Supreme Court nor any other court has recognized as protected under the Second
 22 Amendment. As a result, the Court should not find that Plaintiffs are challenging protected
 23 Second Amendment activity.

24 **B. The Second Amendment Right Should Not Be Extended to Prevent**
 25 **Communities from Restricting or Prohibiting Carrying Guns in Public.**

26 There are profound public safety rationales for restricting guns in public, as California
 27 courts continue to recognize post-*Heller*:

28 Unlike possession of a gun for protection within a residence, carrying a concealed
 firearm presents a recognized threat to public order, and is prohibited as a means

1 of preventing physical harm to persons other than the offender. A person who
2 carries a concealed firearm on his person or in a vehicle, which permits him
immediate access to the firearm but impedes others from detecting its presence,
3 poses an imminent threat to public safety. . . .

4 *People v. Yarbrough*, 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 314 (2008) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); *see also United States v. Walker*, 380 A.2d 1388, 1390 (D.C. 1977) (there is an
5 “inherent risk of harm to the public of such dangerous instrumentality being carried about the
6 community and away from the residence or business of the possessor”). The carrying of firearms
7 in public – and the carrying of *concealed* weapons especially – pose a number of issues and
8 challenges not presented by the possession of firearms in the home. Three issues, in particular,
9 are worthy of note.

10 First, when firearms are carried out of the home and into public, the safety of a broader
11 range of individuals is threatened. While firearms kept in the home are primarily a threat to their
12 owners, family members, friends, and houseguests, firearms carried in public are a threat to
13 strangers, law enforcement officers, random passersby, and other private citizens. One study has
14 shown that “[b]etween May 2007 and April 2009, concealed handgun permit holders shot and
15 killed 7 law enforcement officers and 42 private citizens.” Violence Policy Center, *Law*
16 *Enforcement and Private Citizens Killed by Concealed Handgun Permit Holders*, July 2009.
17 States, therefore, have a stronger need to protect their citizens from individuals carrying guns in
18 public than they do from individuals keeping guns in their homes.

19 Second, the carrying of firearms in public is not a useful or effective form of self-defense
20 and, in fact, has been shown in a number of studies to *increase* the chances that one will fall
21 victim to violent crime. One study, for instance, found that “gun possession by urban adults was
22 associated with a significantly increased risk of being shot in an assault,” and that “guns did not
23 protect those who possessed them from being shot in an assault.” Charles C. Branas, *et al.*,
24 *Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession and Gun Assault*, AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH, vol. 99,
25 No. 11 at 1, 4 (Nov. 2009). Likewise, another study found that:

26 Two-thirds of prisoners incarcerated for gun offenses reported that the chance of
27 running into an armed victim was very or somewhat important in their own choice
28 to use a gun. Currently, criminals use guns in only about 25 percent of
noncommercial robberies and 5 percent of assaults. If increased gun carrying

1 among potential victims causes criminals to carry guns more often themselves, or
2 become quicker to use guns to avert armed self-defense, the end result could be
that street crime becomes more lethal.

3 Philip Cook, *et al.*, *Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare*
4 *Perspective*, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1081 (2009).

5 Third, the carrying of firearms in public has other negative implications for a number of
6 social issues and societal ills that are not impacted by the private possession of handguns in the
7 home. When the carrying of guns in public is restricted, “possession of a concealed firearm by an
8 individual in public is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that the individual may be
9 dangerous, such that an officer can approach the individual and briefly detain him in order to
10 investigate whether the person is properly licensed.” *Commonwealth v. Robinson*, 600 A.2d 957,
11 959 (1991); *see also Commonwealth v. Romero*, 673 A.2d 374, 377 (1996) (“officer’s observance
12 of an individual’s possession of a firearm in a public place in Philadelphia is sufficient to create
13 reasonable suspicion to detain that individual for further investigation”). The California
14 legislature has similarly enacted Section 12031, which generally prohibits the carrying of loaded
15 firearms in public or in vehicles, and states that peace officers may arrest persons who they have
16 probable cause to believe are illegally carrying loaded guns. CAL. PEN. CODE §12031(a)(5). The
17 law was enacted out of “a growing concern over an increase in the carrying of loaded
18 firearms” and the dangers resulting “from either the use of such weapons or from violent
19 incidents arising from the mere presence of such armed individuals in public places.” *People v.*
20 *Zonver*, 132 Cal.App.3d Supp.1, 5 (1982) (quoting Stats. 1967, ch. 960, § 6). Law enforcement’s
21 ability to protect the public could be greatly restricted if officers were required to effectively
22 presume that a person carrying a firearm in public was doing so lawfully. Under such a legal
23 regime, it is possible that an officer would not be deemed to have cause to arrest, search, or even
24 engage in a *Terry* stop if she spotted a person carrying a loaded gun, even though far less risky
25 behavior could justify police intervention. Law enforcement should not have to wait for a gun to
26 be fired before protecting the public. Further, if drivers are allowed to carry loaded guns, road
27 rage can become a more serious and even potentially deadly phenomenon. David Hemenway,
28 *Road Rage in Arizona: Armed and Dangerous*, 34 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 807-14

1 (2002). And an increase in gun prevalence in public may cause an intensification of criminal
2 violence. Philip Cook & Jens Ludwig, *The Social Costs of Gun Ownership*, J. PUB. ECON. 379,
3 387 (2006).

4 The concealed weapons permitting process at issue here prevents many of these risks to
5 the public, without implicating the Second Amendment activity protected in *Heller*. Individuals
6 in California who are not otherwise disqualified by operation of law and who can demonstrate
7 that they can possess and use firearms responsibly are allowed to maintain handguns to protect
8 themselves in the home. *See* CAL. PENAL CODE § 12026(b). The law simply provides no basis
9 for expanding that right to the carrying of concealed weapons in public.

10 **II. EVEN IF THE CONCEALED WEAPONS PERMITTING PROCESS IN SECTION**
11 **12050 DID IMPLICATE PROTECTED SECOND AMENDMENT ACTIVITY, IT**
12 **WOULD WITHSTAND THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY.**

13 In choosing a level of scrutiny appropriate for Second Amendment challenges, courts need
14 not – and should not – limit themselves to the choices utilized in First Amendment jurisprudence:
15 strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. While these levels of scrutiny may
16 seem to be the easiest and most obvious options in picking a standard of review, key differences
17 between the First and Second Amendments suggest that using one of these three levels of scrutiny
18 is *not*, in fact, an appropriate choice. The exercise of Second Amendment rights creates unique
19 risks that threaten the safety of the community and can be far more lethal than even the most
20 dangerous speech. While “words can never hurt me,” guns are designed to inflict grievous injury
21 and death – and often do. To protect the public from the risks of gun violence – unlike the
22 significantly more modest risks posed by free speech – states must be allowed wide latitude in
23 exercising their police power authority. Otherwise, the exercise of Second Amendment rights
24 could infringe on the most fundamental rights of others – the preservation of life.

25 The Supreme Court, moreover, has not limited itself to these three levels of scrutiny in the
26 past, but has instead fashioned a wide variety of standards of review that are tailored to specific
27
28

1 constitutional inquiries.³ For all these reasons, a standard of review specific to the Second
 2 Amendment context is warranted here, particularly given the Supreme Court’s recognition that an
 3 individual’s right to bear arms must be evaluated in light of a state’s competing interest in public
 4 safety. To that end, *amicus* respectfully suggests that this Court apply the test that state courts
 5 throughout the country have crafted and utilized for over a century in construing the right to keep
 6 and bear arms under state constitutions: the “reasonable regulation” test.

7 **A. The Reasonable Regulation Test is the Appropriate Standard of Review.**

8 While courts are just beginning to grapple with a private right to arms under the federal
 9 Constitution, courts have construed analogous state provisions for over a century. Over forty
 10 states have constitutional right-to-keep-and-bear-arms provisions, and despite significant
 11 differences in the political backdrop, timing, and texts of these provisions, the courts in these
 12 states have, with remarkable unanimity, coalesced around a single standard for reviewing
 13 limitations on the right to bear arms: the “reasonable regulation” test. *See* Adam Winkler,
 14 *Scrutinizing the Second Amendment*, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 686-87, n. 12 (2007) (describing
 15 “hundreds of opinions” by state supreme courts with “surprisingly little variation” that have
 16 adopted the “reasonableness” standard of review for right-to-bear-arms cases). Under the
 17 reasonable regulation test, a state “may regulate the exercise of [the] right [to bear arms] under its
 18 inherent police power so long as the exercise of that power is reasonable.” *Robertson v. City &*
 19 *County of Denver*, 874 P.2d 325, 328, 333 n. 10 (Colo. 1994).⁴ More demanding than rational
 20 basis review, but more deferential than intermediate scrutiny, this “reasonable regulation” test
 21 protects Second Amendment activity without unduly restricting states from protecting the public

22 ³ *See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana*, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008) (affirming that the Eighth
 23 Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment should be measured by an “evolving
 24 standards of decency” test); *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (applying
 25 an “undue burden” test to determine whether a statute jeopardized a woman’s right to choose);
 26 *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that determinations of procedural due
 process require a balancing of three competing interests); *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)
 (upholding a “stop and frisk” under the Fourth Amendment where an officer had “reasonable
 grounds” to believe a suspect was armed and dangerous).

27 ⁴ *See also Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t*, 927 A.2d 1216, 1223 (N.H. 2007) (the relevant
 28 inquiry is “whether the statute at issue is a ‘reasonable’ limitation upon the right to bear arms”);
Jackson v. State, 68 So.2d 850, 852 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953) (“It is uniformly recognized that the
 constitutional guarantee of the right of a citizen to bear arms, in defense of himself and the State .
 . . is subject to reasonable regulation by the State under its police power.”).

1 from gun violence. The test recognizes “the state’s right, indeed its duty under its inherent police
2 power, to make reasonable regulations for the purpose of protecting the health, safety, and
3 welfare of the people.” *State v. Comeau*, 448 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Neb. 1989). The reasonable
4 regulation test, which was specifically designed for cases construing the right to keep and bear
5 arms and has been adopted by the vast majority of states, remains the standard of review best-
6 suited for Second Amendment cases after *Heller* and for the case at hand.

7 The reasonable regulation test is a more heightened form of scrutiny than the rational
8 basis test that the majority opinion in *Heller* rejected (and is more demanding than the “interest
9 balancing” test suggested by Justice Breyer in dissent) because it does not permit states to
10 prohibit all firearm ownership. See Eugene Volokh, *Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear*
11 *Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda*, 56 UCLA LAW
12 REVIEW 1443, 1458 (2009). Instead, it “focuses on the balance of the interests at stake, rather
13 than merely on whether any conceivable rationale exists under which the legislature may have
14 concluded the law could promote the public welfare.” *State v. Cole*, 665 N.W. 2d 328, 338 (Wis.
15 2003). Laws and regulations governing the use and possession of firearms thus must meet a
16 higher threshold under the reasonable regulation test than they would under rational basis review.

17 Although the reasonable regulation test may be more deferential than intermediate or strict
18 scrutiny, it is not toothless. Under the test, laws that “eviscerate,” *State v. Hamdan*, 665 N.W.2d
19 785, 799 (Wis. 2002), render “nugatory,” *Trinen v. City of Denver*, 53 P.3d 754, 757 (Colo. Ct.
20 App. 2002), or result in the effective “destruction” of a Second Amendment right, *State v.*
21 *Dawson*, 159 S.E.2d 1, 11 (N.C. 1968), must be struck down. Laws that are reasonably designed
22 to further public safety, by contrast, are upheld. See, e.g., *Robertson v. City & County of Denver*,
23 874 P.2d at 328, 330 n. 10 (“The state may regulate the exercise of [the] right [to bear arms]
24 under its inherent police power so long as the exercise of that power is reasonable.”); *Jackson*, 68
25 So.2d at 852 (same); *Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t*, 927 A.2d at 1223 (same).

26 Nor would adopting the reasonable regulation test here be at odds with district courts that
27 have elected to use intermediate scrutiny following *Heller*. In virtually every post-*Heller* case
28 where a district court has adopted intermediate scrutiny, the court was evaluating a particular

1 provision of 18 U.S.C. § 922, the federal firearms statute that imposes restrictions on broad
2 classes of individuals and types of arms. *See, e.g., Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 87 (evaluating §
3 922(k) barring possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number); *United States v.*
4 *Yanez-Vasquez*, 2010 WL 411112 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010) (evaluating § 922(g)(5) barring illegal
5 aliens from possessing firearms); *United States v. Miller*, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1164 (W.D.
6 Tenn. 2009) (evaluating § 922(g) barring felons from possessing firearms); *United States v.*
7 *Bledsoe*, 2008 WL 3538717, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (evaluating § 922(x) barring juveniles from
8 possessing firearms). By contrast, Section 12050 involves a permitting process that relies on
9 *individual* determinations and law enforcement discretion, rather than broad categories.⁵ Courts
10 have always looked with a more wary eye on laws that impose restrictions on broad classes of
11 people than laws that require individual determinations. Heightened scrutiny – like intermediate
12 scrutiny – is less appropriate here.

13 The reasonable regulation test also has two particular strengths that intermediate scrutiny
14 does not: (1) it affords law enforcement officials the discretion they need to adequately enforce
15 handgun laws, and (2) it gives an appropriate amount of deference to legislative directives.

16 **1. Law enforcement officials should be afforded an appropriate amount**
17 **of discretion in enforcing firearm regulations.**

18 Local law enforcement officials are better situated to make determinations about who in
19 their communities can carry concealed weapons safely and responsibly than either courts or
20 juries. Not only are they extensively trained in the proper and safe use of firearms, they are also
21 more likely to be familiar with the backgrounds and personalities of the members of their
22 communities than courts or juries situated miles (and perhaps even counties) away. They are
23 uniquely situated to know, for instance, whether a man requesting a concealed weapons permit
24 previously has threatened his wife with violence (even if she, say, declined to testify against him

25 ⁵ The only exception appears to be a recent case in the United States District Court for the District
26 of Columbia, *Heller v. District of Columbia* (“*Heller II*”), in which the plaintiffs challenged (1)
27 the District of Columbia’s firearm registration procedures, (2) the District’s prohibition on assault
28 weapons, and (3) the District’s prohibition on large capacity ammunition feeding devices. 698 F.
Supp. 2d 179, 181 (D.D.C. 2010). But even in that case, two of the three provisions that the
district court was evaluating were broad restrictions on entire classes of firearms. *Id.*

1 so he was not formally charged), or whether for other reasons an individual requesting a permit
 2 would pose dangers if carrying weapons in public. These are precisely the types of decisions that
 3 need to be made in order to protect communities from firearm violence.⁶

4 Law enforcement officials also have a particular stake in who has and can carry firearms
 5 in their communities. Not only are law enforcement officials often tasked with enforcing state
 6 and local firearms regulations, they are also charged with responding to situations involving
 7 firearms and thus often suffer from the impacts of the irresponsible and criminal uses of firearms
 8 in greater numbers than the general population. Law enforcement officials are thus both uniquely
 9 qualified to assess who in their communities possess the proper qualifications and need to carry
 10 handguns and uniquely positioned to feel the effects of those decisions. Courts, accordingly,
 11 should afford them an appropriate degree of discretion in enforcing firearm regulations. *See, e.g.,*
 12 *Harman v. Pollock*, 586 F.3d 1254, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[Courts] must defer to trained law
 13 enforcement personnel, allowing officers to draw on their own experience and specialized
 14 training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to
 15 them.”).

16 **2. Given the governmental interest in protecting the public from the**
 17 **harms associated with firearms, deference to legislative directives is**
 18 **appropriate.**

18 There is a profound governmental interest in regulating the possession and use of
 19 firearms. States have “cardinal civil responsibilities” to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
 20 their citizens. *Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis*, 553 U.S. 328, 342 (2008); *see also Queenside*
 21 *Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl*, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946) (“[T]he legislature may choose not to take the
 22 chance that human life will be lost”). States are thus generally afforded “great latitude” in
 23 exercising “police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and
 24 quiet of all persons” *Gonzales v. Oregon*, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (internal quotations
 25 omitted). Regulations on the carrying of firearms are an essential exercise of those powers, for
 26

27 ⁶ States that do *not* afford any discretion to law enforcement officials have issued handgun carry
 28 permits to numerous individuals who have gone on to kill innocent civilians and law enforcement
 members. *See* Violence Policy Center, *Private Citizens Killed by Concealed Handgun Permit*
Holders: May 2007 to the Present, available at [http:// www.vpc.org/cckillers.htm](http://www.vpc.org/cckillers.htm).

1 the “promotion of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State’s
2 police power.” *Kelley v. Johnson*, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976).

3 While individuals and organizations may differ on the net risks posed by guns in our
4 society, such disagreement underlines that firearm regulation is best suited for the legislative
5 arena, not the courts. *See Miller*, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 n. 13 (“[D]ue to the intensity of public
6 opinion on guns, legislation is inevitably the result of hard-fought compromise in the political
7 branches.”). Indeed, legislatures are designed to make empirical judgments about the need for
8 and efficacy of regulation, even when that regulation affects the exercise of constitutional rights.
9 *See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC*, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (state legislatures are “far
10 better equipped than the judiciary to ‘amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data’ bearing upon
11 legislative questions.”); *Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 544 (1989) (“Local officials,
12 by virtue of their proximity to, and their expertise with, local affairs, are exceptionally well
13 qualified to make determinations of public good within their respective spheres of authority.”)
14 (internal quotations and citations omitted). State governments “must [thus] be allowed a
15 reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.” *Young v.*
16 *American Mini Theatres, Inc.*, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).

17 In fulfilling their responsibility to protect the public, states have enacted laws and
18 permitting regimes – like the one at issue here – to ensure that guns are used responsibly and
19 possessed by responsible, law-abiding persons. These laws have helped reduce the use of guns in
20 crime and saved lives. *See, e.g., D.W. Webster, et al., Effects of State-Level Firearm Seller*
21 *Accountability Policies on Firearm Trafficking*, 86 J. URBAN HEALTH: BULLETIN OF THE N.Y.
22 ACAD. OF MED. 525 (2009); *D.W. Webster, et al., Relationship Between Licensing, Registration,*
23 *and Other State Gun Sales Laws and the Source State of Crime Guns*, 7 INJURY PREVENTION 184
24 (2001); *Douglas Weil & Rebecca Knox, Effects of Limiting Handgun Purchases on Interstate*
25 *Transfer of Firearms*, 275 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1759 (1996). The risks posed by invalidating or
26 unduly restricting these legislative judgments on firearms regulations is severe, and courts should
27 review such legislative judgments with an appropriate amount of deference. Here, too, therefore,
28 the reasonable regulation test is better situated than either intermediate or strict scrutiny to defer

1 to legislative judgments. It allows for different permitting and concealed carry regimes
2 depending on the needs of the particular state or locale, and recognizes the strong interest of the
3 state in protecting its citizens rather than being overly focused on a narrow means-end nexus of
4 the challenged regulation.

5 **B. The Concealed Weapons Permitting Process at Issue Is Constitutionally**
6 **Permissible.**

7 Courts have repeatedly found that there is a “compelling state interest in protecting the
8 public from the hazards involved with certain types of weapons, such as guns,” *Cole*, 665 N.W.
9 2d at 344, particularly given “the danger [posed by the] widespread presence of weapons in
10 public places and [the need for] police protection against attack in these places.” *Id.* (internal
11 quotations omitted).

12 Indeed, as discussed above, there is strong sociological and statistical evidence which
13 suggests that permitting and registration procedures that make it more difficult for someone to
14 carry a gun in public reduce both the number of gun deaths and criminal access to firearms. *See*,
15 *e.g.*, Webster, *et al.*, *Relationship Between Licensing*, at 184. Webster, *et al.*, *Effects of State-*
16 *Level*, at 525; Weil & Knox, *Effects of Limiting Handgun Purchases*, at 1759. The Second
17 Amendment does not forbid state or local governments from using such protocols to achieve
18 these ends and both state and federal courts have upheld them for decades.

19 Moreover, California’s concealed weapons permitting process is not an outright ban on
20 the possession or carrying of firearms and thus does not even approach the blanket prohibition on
21 handgun ownership that the Supreme Court struck down in *Heller*. *See Heller*, 128 S. Ct. at
22 2788. Instead, it merely requires individuals who wish to carry concealed firearms outside the
23 home to meet certain basic requirements and to have their request approved by local law
24 enforcement officials. *See* CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050. Those officials, in turn, review
25 applications to ensure that all the statutory requirements have been met. *See id.* This is a
26 perfectly reasonable process designed to ensure that individuals who carry concealed weapons
27 can do so responsibly. The California Legislature and the law enforcement community already
28 have decided that this is a reasonable way to protect public safety. The Court should not second-

1 guess those judgments, particularly for firearms activity that has never been recognized as a
2 Second Amendment right by any other court.

3 In sum, the California concealed weapons permitting process is both reasonable and not
4 unduly restrictive of an individuals' Second Amendment right to keep guns in their home. It is
5 thus a valid exercise of state's "police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limb,
6 health, comfort, and quiet of all persons" and passes the reasonable regulation test.⁷ *Gonzales v.*
7 *Oregon*, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (internal quotations omitted).

8 CONCLUSION

9 For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that Section 12050 is constitutional.

10 Dated: February 10, 2011

Respectfully submitted,

11 /s/ Megan Dixon

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⁷ Section 12050 also would survive intermediate (or even strict) scrutiny were the Court to apply that standard of review because it is substantially related to an important government interest. Numerous courts have upheld firearms laws, finding that the protection of the public from firearm violence is an important government interest. *See, e.g., Heller II*, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 186; *Miller*, 604 F.Supp.2d at 1171; *Bledsoe*, 2008 WL 3538717, at *4; *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 96-97; *State v. Sieyes*, 225 P.3d 995, 995 (Wash. 2010); *United States v. Engstrum*, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233 (D. Utah); *Yanez-Vasquez*, 2010 WL 411112, at *3; *Miller*, 604 F.Supp.2d at 1171-72; *United States v. McCane*, 573 F.3d 1037, 1050 (10th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Masciandaro*, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 789-91 (E.D. Va. 2009); *United States v. Radenich*, 2009 WL 127648 (N.D. Ind. 2009); *United States v. Schultz*, 2009 WL 35225 (N.D. Ind. 2009); *Flores*, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 574-75.

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